Details
The following are excerpts of a White House presidential recording of an August 28, 1963 meeting between President Kennedy and his highest level Vietnam advisors, including former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Frederick Nolting.
This meeting took place after Cable 243, described by one historian as the “single most controversial cable of the Vietnam War”, was sent. The telegram was drafted on Saturday August 24, 1963 when President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and CIA Director John McCone were all out of town. The telegram set a course for the eventual coup in Vietnam on November 1, 1963 leading to the fall of President Diem and his death on November 2, 1963.
After the cable was sent and during the course of four days of meetings, President Kennedy met with his advisors to discuss the evolving situation in Vietnam and what steps should be taken. There was considerable disagreement between the State Department advisors, who had drafted Cable 243, and the President’s military and intelligence advisors on whether the coup was advisable and what support it would have in Vietnam with the Vietnamese military.
Ambassador Nolting, who had been recently relieved of his duties in Saigon and replaced by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, was asked by the President to be present at these meetings. Nolting’s advice and opinions were pointed, candid and very often at odds with State Department officials in the room, especially Roger Hilsman and Averell Harriman. At the August 28th meeting, Ambassador Nolting and the President began a discussion on a post-coup Vietnam. Excerpts of that discussion follow:
Transcript
Clip 1: 8/28/63
108 Reel 1 at 1:30
8/28/63 CD at 30:29
Frederick Nolting: One of the things that worries me about this, as I indicated yesterday, is that further encouragement, and in fact the encouragement we’ve given so far, does to my mind run counter to the agreement to, that we - under which we increased US assistance. You remember, you and I, President Diem, you remember, the negotiations that followed General Taylor’s mission
This question, this thing that’s come up now, this box that we are in, is the same that was foreseen by Diem, I’m sure, when all these negotiations were going on. That is to say what will the United States do in a situation in which we have a disagreement about the running of the internal affairs of Vietnam. As one who has dealt with that and who feels somewhat committed myself, a question of good faith in this affair.
And without apologies for what the Nhus have been doing, I have very grave reservations in my own mind based on personal commitments, if you will, which in turn were based on government instructions. By putting ourselves in the position of engineering a coup d’etat to, for the purpose of establishing a government with which we can deal more effectively and which we hope would give us a better basis for winning the war against the Viet Cong. Somehow in my mind this is a bad principle and a bad precedent.
Clip 2: 8/28/63
108 Reel 1 at 25:15
8/28/63 CD at 54:11
Frederick Nolting: Mr. President, the other point that was analyzed yesterday beyond the question of balance of forces while this could be a clean cut operation or relatively so, was what will be the condition of the government of the country after a successful coup? Have we got any further information on that I’d like to ask; the question of leadership, whether it is going to be a revolving thing - go on from one to another or whether it’s likely to stabilize? This from the point of view of balancing our risks here.
Roger Hilsman: The [Vietnamese] Generals plans are to, (unclear) ah , the last information on the CIA report on this is that they were planning to have the Vice President assume power. Their idea was despite the instability of military juntas in the Korean example which they don’t approve of, they do have plans for the composition of the government. They’ve been in touch with Mr. Buu, the labor leader (if you recall), and a number of civilians are what the graphic plans are. The Vice President, the Vice President taking to the Presidency, a Cabinet of about evenly divided between military and civilian.
President Kennedy: What about Diem - Diem and Nhu would be ( unclear )? Exile them, is that it? That’s what we would favor of course, but.
Roger Hilsman: We know, we know no information.
President Kennedy: But I think it would be important that nothing happen to them if we, if we have any voice in it. Is that your view Ambassador?
Frederick Nolting: With all the humility again, Mr. President, my view is that there is no one that I know of who can - who has a reasonably good prospect of holding this fragmented, divided country together except Diem.
President Kennedy: Even with the Nhus - you’d take him?
Frederick Nolting: Well, I think it’s possible that and quite likely in fact, that Madame Nhu can be sent away. I said yesterday I thought there was no possibility of getting President Diem to send his brother Ngo Diem Nhu away. I’m not sure of that - this would be my guess and have them all the way ( unclear). I think it’s (unclear ) consideration whether or not the - that attempt shouldn’t be made again, absolutely down to earth talk with, with Diem. This was discussed earlier and was discarded I believe on the grounds if we did that the coup plot would be blown.
McGeorge Bundy: This was the Ambassador’s theory.
President Kennedy: Lodge’s?
…
Averell Harriman: Needless to say I don’t agree with this -
President Kennedy: What?
Averell Harriman: Needless to say I don’t agree with Ambassador Nolting and I think it’s been obvious for some time.