MR. PRESIDENT: The purpose of the amendment, which is offered on behalf of myself and Senators Gore, Mansfield, Symington, Humphrey, Monroney, and Lehman, is to maintain the strength of our Army at its present level of nineteen divisions. The pending Defense Appropriation Bill - which cuts the Army appropriation $5.3 billion or 41% below last year's level, and would cut at least $4 billion or 30% in estimated total expenditures - requires a reduction in Army forces to seventeen divisions by the end of fiscal 1955. This cut, which would be accompanied by a cut in military personnel of 230,000 men or 16%, would be a further cut imposed upon the cut of one division which has already been made since the beginning of this year, when we had twenty divisions. It is my understanding that this two-division cut, which our amendment is intended to prevent, will leave the United States with only six combat divisions in the Far East and only five in Europe.
Mr. President, if we could safely assume that such a cut would in no way reduce our armed strength, or if we could safely assume that there will be a reduced need for military manpower, or if we could safely assume that the threat and military power of the Soviet Union were being similarly reduced, then we would be more than justified in supporting a cut of the magnitude contained in this bill. Certainly none of us are desirous of maintaining an excessive military establishment.
But the fact remains that, whatever assumptions might have been possible in August 1953 when this budget was developed, or whatever assumptions might have been possible in the spring of 1954 when it was presented to the Senate Appropriations Committee, we cannot safely make such assumptions on June 17, 1954.
1. The Proposed Reduction in the Army Budget Will Give Us Less Security. It is all very well to hope that our "new look" atomic deterrent power will prevent an outbreak of war; to hope that other nations will take up the slack caused by the reduction in our manpower; and to hope that the United States will not be forced to intervene in Indo-China or anywhere else on the globe. But these hopes, expressed by the able Senator from Michigan (Mr. Ferguson) yesterday, neither give us more security, nor conceal the fact that this slash in Army strength will give us less security. General Ridgeway testified before the Senate Committee (p. 59) as follows:
"…We are steadily reducing Army forces - a reduction through which our capabilities will be lowered while our responsibilities for meeting the continuing enemy threat have yet to be increasingly lessened….This reduction in strength has made it necessary for the Army to re-evaluate its military program, its present force structure, and its worldwide deployments…."
Earlier, he had told the House Appropriations Committee (p. 54) that: "A reduction in the order of magnitude that we are making will certainly, when completed, leave us with less combat effectiveness than we had when we started." And he agreed that our much heralded new weapons "will not be of particular benefit in replacing ground forces during the coming fiscal year." Similar statements by Secretary Stevens and General Honnen, Chief of the Army Budget Division, make it clear that "the overall combat effectiveness of the Army by the end of 1955, even with gains we could make with improved weapons, will be somewhat less than it is today."
2. The Proposed Reduction in the Army Budget is Inconsistent with the Increasing Threat of Communist Military Power. It is the height of folly to reduce our strength when the Soviets are increasing theirs. General Ridgway testified that: "The military power ratio between western defense capability and the Soviet bloc's capability is not changing to our advantage…The strength of the major components of Soviet bloc military power continues to increase…unaccompanied by an offsetting increase in Allied strength."
The President, on January 21, stated that the reduction of two divisions was "made possible by the cessation of hostilities", among other reasons; but what are the possibilities of new hostilities on June 17? Secretary Wilson justified this budget in March upon his assumption that "the threat to our security will not reach a peak at any particular point in time." But in June, the recent events in Indo-China, Geneva, Paris, and elsewhere, indicate to me that the peak threat to our security is being reached very rapidly. On March 15, long before the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the negotiations for SEATO - which, if to be realistic, will surely require U.S. strength comparable to our five NATO divisions, Secretary Stevens stated that: "A 17-division force is predicated upon certain basic assumptions", including not only the assumption that hostilities in Korea will not be resumed, but also "that no additional requirement is made upon the Army."
General Ridgway, in discussing "the growth in Soviet nuclear weapons", the progress of the military forces in North Korea and Communist China "from the status of mere masses of riflemen toward the status of a more modern Army" and the menace which exists at every significant point of contact between the Soviet bloc and the West - including Germany, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the entire Far Eastern area - emphasized what he called the "increasing threat to the United States" and the unabatement "of the ultimate intentions of the Soviet bloc to bring about out downfall."
3. The Proposed Reduction in the Army Budget Unduly Emphasizes Budget Savings Over National Security. General Ridgway accepted this budget, he testified, only because:
"It has been my unvarying position that when a career military officer receives from proper superior authority a decision, that regardless of his views previously expressed, he accepts that decision as a second one, and he does his utmost within his available means to carry it out."
Although the General asked for opportunity to express his views in executive session, he testified in his prepared statements that:
"This budget seeks to achieve the maximum combat capability for the Army within the means provided by national policy…The Army has been guided in the preparation of this budget by basic economic and strategic decisions which have been made at a higher level…The Army believes that the programmed distribution of strength and forces for fiscal year 1955 is the best attainable within the authorized end strength of 1,172,700 personnel."
Moreover, the emphasis given by Secretary Wilson and others to the necessity of maintaining the cost of national security at what he called a "bearable" level "over the long pull" indicates that budget reductions are a primary feature of the "new look" military policy, and a primary consideration in the elimination of these two Army divisions. Indeed, the boast was made in the other House that these Defense Department reductions "are largely responsible for the $7.4 billion tax reduction which the House has already voted this year."
But a budget reduction - an objective we all share - should be an objective secondary to our national security and our responsible leadership in world affairs. Today what we shall "afford" should not be determined on the basis of whether the budget is balanced, but on the basis of expenditures which give us a clear margin of superiority over our enemies. If the weaknesses resulting from these cuts in Army strength invite an attack in Indo-China or Korea, our "savings" would be paid for many times over.
Moreover, our amendment to restore these two divisions will cost a total of only $350 million, less than the pending bill has already cut from the total Army budget submitted by the President, and far less than its billion dollar cut from the total Defense budget as submitted. Our amendment, therefore, will in no way contribute to an imbalance of the President's budgetary policies, or weaken this nation economically in future years.
If we are to make and keep America strong in an age of peril, we will not permit this reduction in the effectiveness and strength of our Armed Forces. Permit me to say, as Henry Clay at the age of 33 told the Senate in 1810, in urging strong military measures just prior to the War of 1812:
"I call upon the Members of this House to maintain its character for vigor. I beseech them not to forfeit the esteem of the country."
For, Mr. President, if the Senator from Michigan is proven right by future events, then we shall have saved $350 million, an important savings. But if future events prove right the contentions of those of us who fear the consequences of weakening our armed strength - and I pray that we shall be proven wrong - then any action we take today which reduces our strength may well cost us heavily in terms of our security and freedom. Trouble and danger are our constant companions: our enemies are powerful and implacable. If in our judgment of future events we are to err - let us err on the side of strength.
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