

Orren Beaty, Jr., Oral History Interview – JFK#6, 11/21/1969
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Beaty, administrative assistant to Congressman Stewart L. Udall during the late 1950s and assistant to Secretary of Interior Udall from 1961 to 1967, discusses appointments to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and territorial administrations including Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands, among other issues.

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
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Orren Beaty
July 4, 1979
Month Day Year


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Orren Beaty, Jr. – JFK#6

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Sixth of Fourteen Oral History Interviews

with

Orren Beaty, Jr.

November 21, 1969
Washington, D. C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: I said last time that we'd pick up with John Carver's [John A. Carver, Jr.] people, and I find that I left my list of people at the office. You know, I've got my regular questions, but I think I have the--from memory, I think I have the people. We've already talked about Landstrom [Karl S. Landstrom] really, Bureau of Land Management.

BEATY: I think so, yeah.

MOSS: And let's take, I think, the Territories [Office of Territories] people first and get that out of the way. Richard Taitano, [Richard F. Taitano] is it, who was the head of the...

BEATY: I think they pronounced that Taitano. (Taí ta-no)

MOSS: Taitano?

BEATY: Uh-huh. Taitano? Yeah.

MOSS: He was head of the Office of Territories.

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BEATY: Right.

MOSS: Okay, how did he come to hold that post?

BEATY: Well, I think he's a.... I'm not sure whether he's Guamanian or--I think he is. Sure he is, now that I think about it. I started to say I didn't know whether he was Guamanian or from the Territories in Micronesia.

MOSS: That was my understanding, that he was from Guam.

BEATY: Yeah, I think that's right. He was a career man with the department. We wanted somebody from out that way, too, and not just give them somebody from a political background in the states. And I don't know whether John Carver came up with him personally or whether he was recommended by somebody else, but I know there was a search going on. We kept the director of the Office of Territories from the previous administration in office for some time, several weeks. And then he stayed on, I think, as kind of a consultant to be helpful in the transition, eventually going to work for a Republican congressman. I don't know why I can't think of his name, but it doesn't make any difference. There's never any intention of keeping him; he didn't intend to stay.

Taitano, we thought, would have a feeling for these people and their problems, and it was an area that had been neglected. The country as a whole was subject to a lot of criticism for the way we'd handled it since the end of the war: taking over a lot from the Japanese and let the military pretty well dictate what was being done; very little effort made to rebuild facilities that were destroyed during the war or that had worn out because of lack of proper maintenance and repairs; pretty sad situation. I suppose it still is, to a certain extent, although we made some improvements. But this is getting off the subject a little bit. I just don't know where Taitano came from. The first I heard of him was John Carver is mentioning him to Udall [Stewart L. Udall] in one of the meetings where we were discussing personnel, that he thought Taitano was probably a good choice.

MOSS: And Udall bought it just on a basis of that?

BEATY: I think that that's right. I don't know. Udall maybe will tell you that he had other recommendations. I don't think he did. I think we made that choice at Interior without any outside push.

MOSS: All right. You got Taitano, a Guamanian, back here as head of

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the Office of Territories, but out to Guam went Bill Daniel [William Patlov Daniel]. Now that was pure political.

BEATY: Absolutely; couldn't have been any more blatantly political.

MOSS: All right. Who engineered that one?

BEATY: Well, I'm sure it was Lyndon Baines Johnson. Price Daniel [Marion Price Daniel] is the brother of this amiable slob. He just caused all kinds of trouble. You know, he was inept. In an era when people've learned a whole lot more about ecology and about what you shouldn't do about loosing exotic plants and animals into a different environment, he was making headlines by taking new types of animals onto Guam and introducing them there. I don't think he caused any harm. I think they kept pretty close watch on it; but you know, he just did all sorts of things.

MOSS: He wasn't satisfied with the gooney bird.

BEATY: I guess not. He was a very poor choice, and apparently one we didn't have any choice about, and as soon as we could, we got rid of him.

MOSS: How did you manage to get rid of him?

BEATY: He kept doing things that weakened his position. I'm not sure exactly how it finally worked out. If I remember, we brought him back to make him a consultant on something for a while. He resigned according to the newspaper headlines and things, but....

MOSS: Bringing him back as a consultant sort of served notice that he ought to be looking for another job?

BEATY: I think so. I'm very hazy on this. I just remember the relief with which his departure from Guam was greeted.

MOSS: Who was it that replaced him?

BEATY: A man named Manuel Guerrero [Manuel F.L. Guerrero], who is a.... His name sounds Spanish, and of course, the Spaniards settled Guam and their names prevail over there, but he doesn't speak Spanish, doesn't regard himself as Latin, of Latin extraction. He's a Guamanian. I don't know what his background--whether he was one of the people there who are descendents of mostly of the Micronesians who lived there beforehand or whether the Spanish blood predominated. The reason I mentioned it because, you know, the question comes up periodically, "How many people of minority races do you have in your high-level

positions?" And I think he was listed as one of Spanish extraction. Certainly he was of a minority no matter what you call it, but I know I was surprised by the fact that he spoke no Spanish. And he served.

I think his brother was a leader in the legislature in Guam, and Taitano had a brother who was active in Guamanian politics as well. Taitano may have been in the state government in Guam rather than the Interior employee. But one way or another, they--I'm sure they shift back and forth from those different jobs and he had administrative experience. He had sociological experience; he worked with them from the sociological standpoint. And Guerrero, I think, was more the businessman and perhaps a politician, but we thought he did a good job. For example, when they had this devastating typhoon out there, he handled it very well, the emergency.

MOSS: This occurred after Daniel?

BEATY: I think so. I think it was. If not, all the rehabilitation was left to Guerrero anyway. I think it all happened after Daniel left.

MOSS: Okay. And Rex Lee [Hyrum Rex Lee] went from what, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Samoa?

BEATY: Yeah, Rex was a career man in the Indian Bureau. Each bureau had congressional liaison people. He was assistant director or deputy director or deputy commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs; probably number three commissioner or somebody immediately under the commissioner and then several people in the next echelon, and I think that's where Rex was when we came in. But he had been on the Hill so much, he was better known, probably, than almost anybody else in the Bureau on the Hill, in the Interior Committees, and was rather highly regarded up there by the chairman of the committees, the people he dealt with, subcommittees on territories and Indian territorial matters, whatever they were. He had pressed John Carver quite a bit. Stewart had known him, I think, probably more than John had. Was Frank Church on the Interior Committee? I can't remember.

MOSS: Yeah, sure he was.

BEATY: Sure he was, because he was subcommittee chairman on Indians at one time. So John must have come in contact with Rex Lee, too, in Carver's service as administrative assistant to Frank Church. At any rate, there was no disagreement about putting him out there.

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There were a lot of things that happened before he was chosen. I can't think of the names. But there are colonies of Samoans on the West Coast, San Francisco area particularly, and there are some of them even back on the East Coast, and we were visited by several delegations pushing people, people who were living in the United States either--I don't think

any Samoans were really pushed for the job, although they had some ideas of a Samoan getting the second position out there. I can't think of any of the names now.

It seems to me one was a sociologist, a PhD, a woman, Marie Berger [Marie Cole Berger], or something on that order, and we pretty well decided to appoint her at one time. She had very good credentials from a standpoint of understanding primitive, emerging people, and she had the support, apparently, of some of the Samoans. I think she was shot down, really, by--not by the Samoans or by politicians as much as by advocates of somebody else. This is a man whose name I ought to mention if I could think of it* because there was more pressure--I mean more letter writing and more this and that on behalf of this particular man than anybody else. He made a very poor impression on me and I think on the Secretary. I don't think there was ever any consideration given to appointing him, but I think his people were the ones that.... When the word got out that Marie Berger was about to be appointed, the story came out of Samoa that the traditional chiefs down there'd be outraged if a woman were put over them, and the whole thing blew up. Of course, the other guy didn't get it either.

But there were representations from the Hawaiians--there are a lot of them live in Hawaii, too. I'm sorry, I overlooked that. Those that go to school beyond what kind of schooling was available in Samoa at that point, they usually went to Hawaii or perhaps a school in the San Francisco area. It's kind of a coincidence, one of their--maybe it was their governor in the last administration--if not the governor, one of the top people in our government activity there was a man I had met in the army. We went through infantry OCS [Officer Candidate School] together. And I don't think he ever expected to stay on. He was a Republican appointed by the last administration, previous administration, but I got reacquainted with him during all this. He was one of the really Hawaiian-type Samoans. Maybe he wasn't even Samoan; maybe he was Hawaiian. But he had been sent to the Islands by the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] administration.

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MOSS: You didn't even catch a glint in his eye when he saw an old friend in the Secretary's office?

BEATY: Oh, sure. We talked; we visited; we had some.... It was interesting. You know, several years have now passed and I again can't think of his name.

MOSS: The name I have.... I don't have the name for the fellow who was the high commissioner for the trust territories. Do you recall?

BEATY: Will Goding [M. Wilfred Goding].

MOSS: Yes, I believe that's right.

BEATY: He was given to us by Senator Bartlett [Edward L. Bartlett], I believe. Bartlett was a.... I think maybe Bartlett and Green [Edith S. Green] both backed him.

* See Ninth Interview, page 183: Steele Holman.

They probably did because he had an Alaskan background. But Bartlett, it seems to me, was his principal sponsor, and I think he probably got commitments out of President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] on this job. I know that Goding had support from others than from just the senators. He made a good impression on everybody, seemed businesslike; he knew the Hill; he knew this and that. It turned out not to be a very fortunate choice. I don't know exactly what all the problems were, but within a year and a half or so, we were ready to replace him if we could, but we couldn't because the senators kept their pressure on the White House. Senator Bartlett was a really good friend of ours on many things, and nobody wanted to outrage him, particularly.

MOSS: Okay. Let me ask something developing that a little bit: you said that you sort of wanted to get rid of him, and the senators kept the pressure on to keep him. Now, how does the word drift around on this sort of thing?

BEATY: Well, I'm sure that he knew by the things that came up during meetings when he came back to Washington from a trust territory that things weren't going so well or, at least that his work wasn't meeting with favor, and he very likely kept up a rather close liaison with the Alaskan senators. I really think that's what happened. I also think, probably, John Carver occasionally talked to Senator Bartlett about different things and certainly about problems in Alaska and things that he'd be interested in, and undoubtedly this came up; that, you know, you try to lay the groundwork for some future change. I don't think it's any secret, although probably nobody came right out and said it for the first couple of years after he was--after both Carver and Udall felt that he had to be replaced.

Well, he had the trust--you know, this is the United Nations' trusteeship, and one of the first things that we did after we came in

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was hurriedly get briefed on the whole situation because the United Nations survey team was going out there. And we met with them on a couple of occasions. They expressed their views, I think, based on previous studies, previous surveys, and everybody was aware that a lot of things had to be done. But we were hoping that our attitude and determination to do something about it would keep the United Nations Trusteeship Council or whatever it's called from blasting our administration because of poor attitude or lack of programs, But it was difficult to get enough appropriations. This was one of the toughest things.

Well, subsequent reports by this group seemed to indicate that Goding was not willing to listen to other people's views. He was a pretty single-minded guy, had his own thoughts on it. And I hesitate to say anything about him, because I'm just not really familiar with it. The things I seem to remember are that he didn't have a great deal of sympathy for the views of the Micronesians. It wasn't a matter of working with the people to bring them along but telling them what to do, and this didn't create any real good will or progress in relations with them. I hope John Carver can give you a lot better fill-in on it than that because I'm not really very familiar with it. Eventually, of course, we did get rid of him after a lot of pain and a lot of grief and picked up Bill Norwood [William R. Norwood] from Governor

John Burns' [John A. Burns] staff in Hawaii. Norwood had had a lot of experience out there and impressed both Udall and Carver, I think, a lot more than Goding did at the beginning, and they were better pleased, I think, the way he handled things.

MOSS: The Virgins Islands fellow, I'm not sure I can pronounce his name.

BEATY: Paiewonsky [Ralph M. Paiewonsky]?

MOSS: Paiewonsky?

BEATY: Right.

MOSS: Ralph. Wasn't it Ralph Paiewonsky?

BEATY: Ralph Paiewonsky. Talk about politicians. They apparently played politics in the Virgin Island like they do in some Latin American countries or like they did in this country a hundred and fifty years ago. They really go at it hammer and tong. Each group has its own newspaper, and you'd be sued for libel or slander every day up here if our papers took out after opposing politicians in the news columns like they do down there. So Udall hadn't been designated secretary three days, I don't think, until a big

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delegation came in from the Virgin Islands, and I saw them--I mean different groups--over and over again. You couldn't tell them that there were other things to do, to be done, that there were a lot of things to be settled before we could make up our minds about many things, particularly the governorship of the Virgin Islands. Also, there was a

MOSS: Did this catch you by surprise or....

BEATY: Oh, sure. Yeah, yeah. You know, I was not unaware of the fact that the Virgin Islands existed and that they were a territory of the United States and that the Interior committees had some jurisdiction over it, and therefore, if they did, the Interior Department would. But the intensity of the political feeling in all these things, I was not prepared for that. I don't know if Udall was or not. He probably was better than I was because he sat through all these committee meetings, hearings on Virgin Islands matters, but it wasn't something that concerned us in Arizona, so there wasn't much communication between us on things like that when he was a congressman.

MOSS: How did you try to discover who was who and what party was doing what to whom?

BEATY: Well, you know, you're in doubt, you're coming in under the auspices of a political administration, as you go to the people that know who the

politicians are that had some favor. I'm sure we had several different conversations with Larry O'Brien's [Lawrence F. O'Brien] operation, even though it wasn't Larry personally. I just don't know. I don't remember at this point.

There was quite a campaign started on behalf of a radio man whose stations you may hear around here, Connie B. Gay. He apparently owns property down there and lives in the Virgin Islands part of the time. He had a lot of contacts in Washington, and we got lots of mail on his behalf. I think we were had by an old friend who turned out not to be particularly--not to have the integrity I thought he had. He ran the Committee for an Effective Congress, Maurice Rosenblatt, and we'd known him over the years, not intimately, but we'd see him from time to time and occasionally go to a fund-raising luncheon or cocktail party or something for some liberal Democrat or Republican, because they do endorse a few Republicans--John Sherman Cooper, for example. But Maurice, one way or another, talked to Udall about going down to the Virgin Islands and doing a little survey for him. Well, I'm convinced that....

MOSS: At what point was that?

BEATY: Well, I can't remember. I think it must have been after we took over because his expenses were paid by--he was put on as a consultant or something like this, so it must have been

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very early in the administration, but in late January or early February. And he came back with a big report. He was a Connie B. Gay partisan from the beginning, and, one way or another, we should've known it, I think. It was very embarrassing--he leaked it to Drew Pearson or somebody. You know, they know all the techniques, these guys who work around here. It was designed to shoot down Paiewonsky because he was the favorite candidate. Well, he'd been active in the campaign; he'd gone to the convention; he'd worked for John Kennedy; and I think it'd saved us a lot of trouble if somebody, if Larry O'Brien or John Kennedy or somebody, had told Stewart at the beginning., "Look, this is the guy that's going to get it," or something. We didn't know that--at least, I didn't. I don't think Stewart knew it. But both familiarity...

MOSS: Would you say that it simply got lost in the rush?

BEATY: I think that's probably right.

MOSS: Because I'm trying to get...

BEATY: Oh, I don't think there was any planning in this; it's just one of those things that happened.

MOSS: This is one of the things I'm after because in the whole business of staffing the new administration you get the whole business of talent scouts and so on and

the impression of a very careful filing system and that sort of thing, and I'm curious if one of these seemed to get lost in the shuffle.

BEATY: Yeah. The filing system either didn't exist or fell down in this. In my view, it did because as careful as Stewart was about paying attention to recommendations from the Kennedy administration people, the key people in the campaign and so forth, the ones we'd gotten to know, I'm sure he wouldn't have ever involved himself in any investigation of the candidates for this job if he'd known that there was somebody that was likely to get it.

And I think it was a combination, perhaps, of this report that leaked out--and that's what the Senate committee got hold of, knocking Paiewonsky and his business connections with the liquor industry and real estate and so forth. I think it was that as well as probably familiarity with Paiewonsky by veteran members of the committee who undoubtedly had gone to the Virgin Islands for some hearing or meeting, vacation, and had gotten familiar with some of these people and personalities. But Senator Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson], at that time chairman of the committee, was very negative on Paiewonsky, and it took all kinds of persuasion by Stewart and I'm sure by people around the President to keep him from shooting that nomination down. Well, I think Paiewonsky was a very effective governor, did an

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excellent job. I don't know what he did in his business interests. I just don't know. Periodically, there were columns or blasts from Congress trying to make him look bad.

MOSS: Well, the whole setup down there with the Virgin Islands Corporation and so on is a tricky one.

BEATY: It is. Of course, they got rid of the corporation, I guess, and it was.... But at that time, the corporation was in existence and it was for quite some time. It isn't one of the areas that I worked in very closely, and I'd probably give you more bad information, inaccurate information, than anything else if I tried to talk about it. John Kirwan [John J. Kirwan] was on John Carver's staff--no he wasn't. He was in the Island Territories.

MOSS: Yeah, that is Mike Kirwan's [Michael J. Kirwan] son.

BEATY: That's right, yeah. And John was, I think, an excellent guy, very well informed. He understood the personalities. I don't think that he.... I personally don't think he ever did anything or made any recommendations based on any business or contributions-type relationship between businesses and Mike Kirwan and the Democratic campaign committee or anything else. I may be wrong on that, but it seemed to me when talking to John--I talked to him more than anybody else--he had a feeling that nobody could get through to John Carver and that the only way that Udall would ever learn anything would be if he talked to me. And this didn't happen very often, but when he'd get

desperate, he'd give me a call or I'd bump into him at a party for Paiewonsky or something like that. I mean, I just recall that particular incident when the counsel for VICORP [Virgin Islands Corporation] or something like this.... I can't think of his name. Leventhal [Harold Leventhal]. He's now a judge in the Circuit Court here. Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman] took over that part of the law practice for him. But there was a party for Paiewonsky one night, ten months or maybe a year after he became governor, and I remember this incident. John Kirwan was brooding and cornered me as I was leaving, really. And I stayed around ten or fifteen minutes listening to his story. For the size of it and for the importance of it, it caused an awful lot of trouble.

MOSS: Kind of a tangent here: Mike Kirwan also had a son-in-law in the department, didn't he?

BEATY: Yes, yes.

MOSS: Wound up, what, in the Outdoor Recreation Bureau, was it? Or what?

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BEATY: Oh, he was in the Indian Bureau for a while. I don't know whether he worked with the task force. His name is Bob Vaughn. He's married to Mike's daughter. He had been in the department during the Truman [Harry S. Truman] administration in the Stoddard [Charles H. Stoddard] staff, what later became the Stoddard staff, technical review staff. He probably was in the Indian Bureau, too, for all I know. I thought he had a good understanding of Indian matters, more than you just pick up in a few months in a job. I remember John Carver was very unhappy with the idea of hiring him because of--John, on the Senate side, had ideas about how Mike Kirwan raised money for the Democratic campaign when he was campaigning, and sure we'd get some trouble in hiring Bob, but I think there was.... Kirwan was chairman of our principal appropriation subcommittee, and it was just inevitable that if he wanted Bob on the job, he'd be on the job. I don't recall any direct communication, but I'm sure there was some on Bob's behalf.

He had been working on one of the committees on the Hill, on a committee staff, and the chairman of that committee, whatever it was, put in a good word. That's the first time I heard about Bob Vaughn, rather than through Kirwan himself. And I don't recall that Mike ever said anything, but he could have, and I'm sure he did. I mean, I'm convinced he did without ever knowing that it was done. Bob was a very good man. I think he did a good job, and after John Carver became under--he got up on John's staff, eventually--and after John moved up to the under secretary's job, he took over as a deputy under whoever succeeded John in the assistant secretary's job and stayed on there right up to the end of the administration.

MOSS: As I understand it, both of these fellows were very capable kind of guys. It wasn't a case of a party hack, anything of this sort.

BEATY: That's right. That's right. They did their job well, I think.

MOSS: Up on the Alaska Railroad, John Manley [John E. Manley], wasn't it, who went up. A fellow named Smith [Donald J. Smith] had been in the job and was due to be rotated out.

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: And Manley...

BEATY: They had made a practice, I think, of borrowing somebody from the U.S. railroad industry to head that thing. Manley was more of a career man, and I think he was recommended by Smith as a likely replacement, and probably for the first time we broke the tradition of sending up somebody new and took on a career man. I think

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everybody was satisfied with the way he performed.

MOSS: Any static from the railroad people on this?

BEATY: No, I don't think so.

MOSS: Okay. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Philleo Nash.

BEATY: Did we talk about this at all before? I might have had....

MOSS: I don't believe we touched on it. It may have been mentioned in passing, but I don't think we went into it in any depth.

BEATY: Well, Philleo had been the lieutenant governor of Wisconsin. He was, I guess, a PhD: an anthropologist. His family, also, is probably the biggest cranberry producers in the country. You don't have to be a very big cranberry producer; you got a hundred acres, you're a big cranberry producer. But he had been defeated for reelection for lieutenant governor partly because conservative groups had circulated handbills accusing him of left-wing, pinkish, communistic tendencies; and he'd been for Hubert Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] in the primary, presidential primary, in Wisconsin. He and Pat Lucey [Patrick Joseph Lucey] were at odds, and Pat Lucey was the big political wheel in Wisconsin as far as the Democrats were concerned at that time.

We got mixed reviews on Philleo. His name was on every list we got from the national committee or from the Kennedy organization as somebody who wanted to work in Washington and who was a good Democrat and who ought to be put on the job, on a job. He was recommended for assistant secretary, and he was recommended for a lot of things. I don't remember any specific assistant secretaryship. He came in to see us up on the Hill. I visited with him, got to know him very well, liked him. John Kennedy, apparently, was

willing to forget primary fights and things like this that he had won and make best use of the people available. A lot of his staff people were very negative on Nash. Whenever we'd mention that he was somebody under consideration, we'd be met with raised eyebrows or dirty words, you know, like we shouldn't even be considering him.

MOSS: Who or...

BEATY: I can't remember at this point. I would say Dick Donahue [Richard K. Donahue] is one example. I'm not sure about this, but there were people who just didn't--they remembered his opposition in Wisconsin, and that's all they remembered. Well,

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we weren't ready to make a choice for that job, anyway. Udall wanted an Indian, at least give the impression of an emphasis on Indians by getting an Indian commissioner. And I think if he could've found one that really measured up, there would've been an Indian who was the Indian commissioner. As it was, we took John Crow [John O. Crow] who was the deputy or pretty close to the top in the bureau at that time, and made him acting commissioner and set up this Indian task force with Crow on the job as the representative of the Bureau and with W. W. Keeler [William W. Keeler], an Indian or part Indian from Oklahoma, as chairman, I believe. Philleo Nash was on this task force and Jim Officer [James E. Officer], who is a sociologist from the University of Arizona and a friend of Udall's, was on it, and I think maybe Bob Vaughn worked on it, I'm not sure. John Carver took an active part in it, although not being actually on the task force.

I think Nash was serving as a--some of them were on it as consultants and working only when they were making these trips to different areas or when they were meeting in Washington. I think Nash was put on a full-time position as Carver's assistant. I think that's the relative position he filled for payroll purposes before John got Bob Mangan [Robert M. Mangan] over as his principal assistant. I think both Udall and Carver decided, oh, midway through the deliberations of this task force, that Nash was going to be the commissioner. I don't remember now how many months went by before this happened, but we got mail from time to time from Wisconsin denouncing Nash and you know, "What do you mean putting this communist on the federal payroll?" I think this--knowing him and what kind of a person he was, this kind of mail just made Udall and Carver more determined to put him on the job. I don't think it was the deciding factor, but it stiffened the resolve rather than caused any trouble.

The Senate committee handling this was--it was very difficult, and they went into it in some detail. I remember meeting Jerry Verkler, who is the staff director, at some filling station about halfway between his office and my home one Saturday or Sunday afternoon to get the transcript of the hearings because there were some unsettled questions that Senator Anderson had and that some other people had, and we had to get it over the weekend in order to get it back to the committee before they resumed deliberations.

MOSS: Along what lines were the doubts?

BEATY: Well, I think it was the loyalty, the questions that had been raised by some of his previous associations. I think he has a daughter who was active in some organization that had been branded by the attorney general's list of subversive organizations as subversive. I'm not sure. Nobody took it seriously in our operation, but there were enough questions raised on the

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committee that we had to go through the whole routine. It wasn't an automatic approval. That's about as much as I can remember about it.

MOSS: And of course, in the Park Service you had Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth] as a career holdover, in effect.

BEATY: Yeah, he's one of these guys who built his own constituency and his own support. He was one of the first people we interviewed when we set up offices--I think I've mentioned this before--on the seventh floor at the end of the Interior Department building that's closest to the Secretary's office. And at times Udall was there to interview these people and....

[Interruption]

MOSS: All right. Okay, I'll cut this off in about five minutes or so. Let's see, we were talking about Connie Wirth and you said that you interviewed him...

BEATY: Well, no. First Stewart interviewed him. I was there, but I didn't.... It wasn't one of the cases where I would talk to somebody. Usually, if it was a bureau chief on the job, Udall met with them; he didn't delegate it to me. It was the outsiders who were looking for jobs that I usually got first crack at. Stewart went through that meeting and left things hanging. He didn't tell Wirth that he was going to keep him on; he didn't say he was going to get rid of him either. I'm sure Wirth had all the confidence in the world he was going to stay, which he did. I can't remember how soon afterwards the appointment was announced. He was also one of the first bureau chiefs to go, later on.

MOSS: One more thing--it wasn't directly in the Interior Department. Did you all get involved at all in the Swidler [Joseph C. Swidler] appointment to the FPC [Federal Power Commission]?

BEATY: No, we didn't. No, no.

MOSS: Okay.

BEATY: I couldn't offer anything that'd add anything to this. I remember dimly some hassle about it, but it didn't involve us.

MOSS: Okay. All right. Well, this is a natural breaking point for me and my outline, so we might as well cut this off.

BEATY: Okay.

[END OF INTERVIEW #6]

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