The acceleration of recent events in Indo-China has brought within the realm of definite possibility within the next few weeks a request to Congress from the President of the United States for military intervention in that area. It is therefore important for all of us – in and out of Congress – to inquire into the nature of that struggle, and the decisions and actions which have brought us to this brink of war.
We must take particular care to base our impending decisions upon the actual facts of the situation; for I think it is not unfair to say that the policies of the Western powers toward Indo-China have been notably marked by miscalculations and contradictions; that there has been a steadily widening gap between our conception of events in that area and reality; and that our actions frequently have been directed toward conditions which no longer existed. Permit me to mention four examples of what I believe to be glaring errors of conception and judgment.
First, the very foundation of American assistance rested upon a miscalculation of the military program of the French Union forces in Indo-China. The United States, which is now paying more than 80% of the cost of the largely French-directed war, has based such assistance and our diplomatic strategy on the assumption that the so-called Navarre Plan would achieve a military victory against the Viet Minh. This plan, bearing the name of the French general in command of the area, called for development of the native armies and continuation of the struggle by the French Union forces to achieve success by 1955. Joint French-American communiqués in March and September of last year stated that American support was premised on the success of this plan; and as late as April of this year, Secretary Dulles stated in discussing Geneva that there was "no reason to question the inherent soundness of the Navarre Plan" and that "nothing has happened to change the basic estimate of relative military power for 1955." Chairman Radford of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated at the same time that our military and technical assistance was still based upon the "expectation that increased military operation by the French and by the Associated States would defeat the Communist military forces."
Not only were these statements in direct contrast to the steady deterioration of the military situation in Indo-China; they were also in curious contradiction to the policies of the French in that area as outlined one month earlier by Premier Laniel. Recalling previous disagreements over the desirability of negotiation as an alternative to military triumph, M. Laniel told the French Assembly on March 6 that "Today we are unanimous in wishing from now on for a settlement of the conflict by means of negotiation. This is one thing that is settled. There is no need for anyone to argue it further."
The failure of the United States to comprehend the eclipse of the Navarre Plan in French councils as well as on Indochinese battlefields was a most serious miscalculation. It can be traced to further miscalculations on the part of both France and the United States: our underestimation of the military power of the Viet Minh; our failure to consider the effect upon their military capabilities of increased assistance from Red China; and our inability to foresee the drastic turn in the military situation which occurred between the Berlin and Geneva Conferences.
A second basic miscalculation was our inability to recognize the nature and significance of the independence movement in Indo-China. Certainly we must realize now that the success of the Navarre Plan, and any hope of either military victory or a reasonable negotiated peace, rested upon the effectiveness and reliability of the Vietnamese Army and its officer corps; and that in turn depended not only on the quality of French training, but also upon the wholehearted support and devotion which the people of Vietnam would be willing to give to the struggle against the Communists.
Of course, this issue presented the United States with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the importance of Vietnamese spirit and the traditions of our own policy motivated our desires for a French grant of independence. On the other hand, a strong body of opinion within our Department of State argued that the French would withdraw from the struggle, with disastrous results, if the ties binding Indo-China to the French Union were severed. Seeking a rationalization by which to escape from this dilemma while preventing a French withdrawal, the United States, under Democratic as well as Republican administrations, chose to support the myth – and it was no more than a myth – that the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were genuinely independent.
In May of last year, for example, the Department of State in a letter assured me that "France had granted such a full measure of control over their own affairs that… these three countries became sovereign states." This hardly squares with the extensive political control still maintained by the French Republic through its domination of the French Union and the lack of a Popular Assembly in Vietnam; its extensive diplomatic control, through its coordination of Vietnamese foreign policy and diplomatic missions; its extensive military control over the conduct of war, the distribution of American aid, the retention of French facilities, and even the training of native armies; and extensive economic control, through ownership of the country's basic resources, control of transportation and commerce, and special tax and extraterritorial privileges.
The third fundamental American miscalculation was our misapprehension of the fluidity and instability which characterized Asia and allied attitudes toward its problems. To attempt to unify the non-Communist forces of Asia, Western Europe and the United States on a single course of action in Indo-China and Asia in a concentrated period of time was an impossible task, and failed to distinguish the diplomatic difficulties faced in Asia and those on which we had achieved comparative unity in Europe. In Europe, we have always dealt with established governments reasonably able to maintain domestic order, whose officials were familiar with Communist motives and traditional balances of power. In Europe we were able to establish a system of mutual guarantees to deter the Soviet Union from outright military intervention.
The situation in the Far East is entirely different. Young and struggling governments, with a traditional hatred for the white man who had exploited them for several centuries, held no strong hostility for the Communist movement which was and still is to some extent identified in many sections with independence. In Indo-China, the cause of the West was blurred by the visual impact of colonial powers fighting native people. No system of military guarantees had been established; neutrality, far more than mutuality, characterized Asiatic opinion; and there was no real political or military counterforce to offset the massive armies and power of the Chinese. The political and economic interests of ourselves and our European allies in the area were not on the same level, although the West is reaping a bitter harvest of decades of mistakes and exploitation in Asia. It was thus a serious mistake to assume that united action would be quickly forthcoming as the result of our belated prompting, and disunity at home and with our most intimate allies was the unfortunate result.
The fourth and final serious miscalculation by the United States was to base our own military strength upon a mistaken analysis by the National Security Council of the future course of events in the world in general, and in Indo-China in particular. Last year, the administration cut our air force funds by over $5 billion. As a result, instead of possessing 143 wings by 1955 – the minimum requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1951 – we will have no more than 137 wings by 1957. This year, the "new look" provides for a cut of $5 billion from last year's budget. This slash, to result in a reduction from 20 to 17 divisions this year and to 15 next year, is based upon assumptions which have not stood the test of time: that the United States would not have its overseas commitments increased; that we would continue a withdrawal of our ground forces in various parts of the world, including the Far East; and that our "massive retaliatory power", including "a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing," would give us security at bargain prices.
Events in Indo-China and elsewhere today have already knocked the props from under these assumptions; and our reduction of strength for resistance in so-called "brush fire" wars, while threatening atomic retaliation, has in effect invited expansion by the Communists in areas such as Indo-China through those techniques which they deem not sufficiently offensive to induce us to risk the atomic warfare for which we are so ill prepared defensively.
These miscalculations and contradictions upon which our policies have been based for so many years have become more apparent in recent weeks. The resultant confusion, haste, contradictions, reversals and failures are by now well known to you.
We may hope that the Communists, who would be necessarily concerned about a major war in the Far East the end of which they cannot foresee, will come to terms in Indo-China. Present deliberations center about the possibility of a cease fire and partition along the 16th parallel, with Communist recognition of the security of Laos and Cambodia. This might permit the allies to establish a defensive pact solidifying their determination to repel, by whatever means are necessary, any Communist advances beyond that line.
But the Communists' willingness to accept such an agreement will depend upon their assessment of the limits to which they could force us without facing atomic retaliation. Today they are intransigent. Time is passing in Geneva. Our allies, fearful of the tremendous buildup of Russian and Chinese military power, including the Soviet's hydrogen developments and long-range air force, are indecisive; and the French may soon be faced with the basic decision as to settlement, or whether they will surrender or withdraw. Certainly any French decision to maintain the struggle will depend upon assurances of American support. It is thus apparent, as I previously stated, that the administration and Congress may soon be called upon to decide the wisdom of American intervention on behalf of the French Union forces.
The elements of that decision, the ingredients which must balance in order to produce a successful policy, are clear.
First, the United States has insisted that our intervention must be on the basis of united action, and under the auspices of the United Nations. We originally required, as a condition for our participation, the assistance of not only Great Britain and France, but also the peoples of Asia, including India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia in addition to the Associated States of Indo-China.
It is doubtful that this condition can be wholly met. Even if the support of our Western allies, and such island nations as the Philippines and New Zealand is forthcoming, we have no evidence that the heretofore neutral countries of Asia would join us in collective action. We must therefore consider whether this limited support would be sufficient.
Secondly, the United States has insisted upon complete independence for the people of Indo-China as a condition for our intervention, in order to win the support of the Vietnamese and the rest of Asia, and in order to assure the justice of our cause. Here, too, the condition we have imposed presents serious difficulties, including the possibilities of French withdrawal once the ties between the French Union and the Associated States are broken. Moreover, it would be difficult to insist upon free elections in a country where – according to those occasional reports seeping through strict censorship – native units have defected to the Communists even at Dien Bien Phu itself, where most government officials and some of their families are in Europe instead of at home, and where Ho Chi Minh – rather than Bao Dai – is the most popular leader in the land because of this identification with the fight against French colonial rule.
Third, intervention by the United States could not be expected in the absence of a willingness by the French to continue the struggle. The present French Government survives by the razor's edge of a two-vote margin. The French people are weary from eight long years of fighting and the disaster at Dien Bien Phu. We do not know, once the decision faces them, whether they will choose withdrawal or a continuation of the struggle.
Fourth, American intervention is dependent upon the role of the Vietnamese. The lack of popular enthusiasm for the war in that area, the hostility from the natives faced by Western soldiers, and the desertion of the Vietnamese soldiers and civilians to Ho Chi Minh – which might well rapidly increase if a partition contrary to their wishes were adopted – these are the factors upon which the quality of this ingredient would be determined.
Fifth, the United States would, of course, only intervene where such intervention was militarily sound. The terrain in Indo-China is more complex than Korea; and we would not have the support of a friendly population. We would be forced to throw our widely dispersed ground troops into the jungle war where conditions favor the Communists; and it is doubtful that we could possibly achieve decisive results if the Chinese answered our ground troops with so-called "volunteer" units. Certainly this condition is not one that can be discussed in full today without a comprehensive analysis of the military situation; but we know enough to realize the difficulties which surround this condition too.
If these five conditions are not met in full, it will be necessary to weigh each of them in balance against the circumstances of the day in order to determine the desirability of the particular type of intervention which may be requested at that time. We would, moreover, be faced with two other decisions:
First, can we or should we localize such a war in Indo-China as we did in Korea; or would we be prepared to carry the war to the Chinese Mainland and thus risk the invocation of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship and a world-wide nuclear war.
Secondly, we would be required to determine under the circumstances then existent whether all or part of Indo-China is absolutely essential to the security of Asia and the free world. President Eisenhower originally stated that Indo-China was of transcendent importance under the "falling dominoes" theory. Secretary Dulles has since indicated that the loss of all of Southeast Asia might not necessarily follow the loss of Indo-China. But, the internal struggles, the neutrality and the military weaknesses of the other governments of Asia would tend to make them weak reeds on which to lean once Indo-China fell.
These are decisions which weigh heavily upon the minds of the administration and Congress, and indeed all citizens. Permit me to conclude, however, by pointing out what may be one encouraging result: namely, the lessons the United States may have learned in Indo-China for more effective policies in the future in that and other areas.
1. First of all, I hope we have learned the importance of allies. Those who once urged that we "go it alone" in Korea and elsewhere now insist upon the participation of other nations in any military intervention. We have learned, moreover, that we need more than our traditional European allies. For they are overextended in many areas, beset by domestic problems and struggling to unify European defenses; and the battle against communism in Asia - with its long history of Western exploitation - cannot be won without the full support of the nations of that continent.
2. Secondly, I think we now more fully realize the implications of the hydrogen age. The fear of a nuclear war in which no nation would be victor and all nations would be victims has stimulated neutrality and caution throughout the world; and it has radically altered the significance of a military program which relies primarily upon massive retaliatory power. For if the United States can meet aggression only by risking hydrogen warfare, we hand an advantage to the aggressor nation willing to achieve its conquest by methods short of those inducing us to take that risk. In short, we must reverse our air cuts and our "new look" military cuts, and place national security ahead of balancing the budget.
3. Third, I trust the United states has learned that it cannot ignore the moral and ideological principles at the root of today's struggles. Indo-China should teach us that in the long run our cause will be stronger if it is clearly just, if we remain true to our traditional policies of helping all oppressed people, even though it may require unpleasant pressures in our relations with colonial powers and friends. We would have better served France itself, and the cause of the whole free world, had we insisted firmly at the beginning upon the complete Vietnamese independence which was essential to rally native and other Asiatic forces.
4. Finally, the United states now has a clearer realization of the burdens of leadership, and the severe and conflicting criticisms which Great Britain and others bore in the past. Today the British feel we moved too fast in seeking action in Indo-China; the French feel we moved too slow. Many Asiatics feel we have supported continued French domination of the Associated States by our assistance; others feel we have let down the Vietnamese by not intervening more promptly and directly. Some say we are pushing our allies too hard; some say we are not leading them vigorously enough.
Many Americans understandably respond to this criticism with an attitude of disgust and withdrawal. But unless we choose the road that will inevitably lead us to eventual submission or annihilation, we must recognize that these are our burdens borne by others in the past in the difficult task of welding into a powerful force a loose confederacy of heterogeneous nations – some of whom will find our pace too slow, others too fast.
The United States is the leader of the free world today; but this is not so because our citizens are anxious that we take the lead in military battles; nor because our diplomats are the most expert; nor because our policies are faultless or the most popular. The mantle of leadership has been placed upon our shoulders not by any nation nor by our own government or citizens, but by destiny and circumstance, by the sheer fact of our physical and economic strength, and by our role as the only real counter to the forces of communism in the world today. If events in Indo-China have taught us to better fulfill that role, then it is not a wholly dark story after all; and what Washington termed "the sacred fire of liberty" may yet be preserved throughout the world.
Source: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Senate Files, Box 894, "Executive Club, Chicago, 28 May 1954." John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.