My only regret about my participation in this program is my inability to have heard the preceding discussion. You have had the privilege of listening to some of the most outstanding observers available and their views on issues of vital concern not only to the business community but to our national security. I want to congratulate all of you on your interest in these issues -- and I want to congratulate the Johns Hopkins Advanced School of International Studies for these invaluable conferences for corporation executives. I also want to pay my respect to the chairman of this session, Paul Nitze, whose contribution to our nation's security is perhaps greater than most people realize.....
A New Attitude on Latin America
.... In the final analysis, this question of attitudes will prove to be more important in improving or worsening relations between the United States and Latin America than dollars, tariffs and treaties of friendship. Unless we in the United States reexamine our attitude toward Latin America, there is little value in reexamining our policies and programs.
If we take our Western Hemisphere friends for granted -- if we regard them as worthy of little attention, except in an emergency -- if, in patronizingly referring to them as our own "back yard", we persist in a "papa knows best" attitude, throwing a wet blanket on all of their proposals for economic cooperation and dispatching Marines at the first hint of trouble -- then the day may not be far off when our security will be far more endangered in this area than it is in the more distant corners of the earth to which we have given our attention. If we persist in believing that all Latin American agitation is Communist inspired -- that every anti-American voice is the voice of Moscow -- and that most citizens of Latin America share our dedication to an anti-communist crusade to save what we call free enterprise for the free world -- then the time may come when we will learn to our dismay that our enemies are not necessarily their enemies, and that our concepts of progress are not yet meaningful in their own terms.
a policy of non-intervention does not tie our hands completely with respect to dictatorships in Latin America or anywhere else in the world. We should not attempt to influence voters in their choice of governments -- but we should always indicate our hope that they will always have an opportunity to make such a choice -- that we are not indifferent to human rights -- and that we look with favor upon the emergence and continuance of free governments. It is no answer to say, as Mr. Dulles has said, that there are various degrees of democracy in every government. For there are also degrees of regard and respect which should govern our attitude toward these governments, differences of degree which should be borne in mind when we give a dictator praise, or medals, or military assistance which will only be used to tighten his hold. For there is little question that should any Latin country be driven by repression into the arms of the Communists, our attitude on on-intervention would change overnight.
The recent performance by our Government -- and the British -- in Cuba illustrates our lack of vision in this matter. Both our sense of judgment and our official prophecies were very wide of the mark. But, more important, the record shows unmistakably that both our assistance and our moral authority helped to sustain General Batista in power. Our policy of non-intervention was not only a fiction, but it was also weighted in favor of an oppressive regime whose persecutions and brutalities far exceed the retributions of the Castro regime. We have reason to be disturbed by the chain of trials and killings of the Castro regime, but ............our responsibility is to adopt a position which will mitigate, not irritate, those revolutionary passions.
........In recent years, Latin America has been the step-child in the Department of State, the responsibility of lesser officials and too often the haven for ambassadors of less than top-flight quality. Many top embassy posts have been left vacant for undue periods of time -- in others, the top officials have been moved in and out too swiftly, with changeovers occurring all at once in the same post. Too often, the job has been selected for the man -- rather than the man for the job. We have attempted to measure our interest by the quantity of American personnel in a given nation, rather than the quality. And too many of our emissaries in this area have associated only with the elite and the Americanized, with all too little contact with the leaders of the future, labor, students, small businessmen and the growing middle class. For we have not always recognized that the ideal contact is between peoples, rather than governments -- governments come and go, while lasting personal friendships and impressions remain.
Equally serious, we have permitted the OAS -- the Organization of American States -- to wither in a back-seat role, concerned much of the time with unimportant policies and briefings rather than real consultations .....
.....Latin Americans do want to use American capital within their own political and economic framework. They resent our insisting upon a larger role for their private enterprise, which cannot cope with many of their problems, or a larger role for our private investors, who have limited their interests almost entirely to extractive industries and to only five countries (Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and Chile).
Nevertheless, we know -- or surely ought to know -- that Latin America is certainly as essential to our security as southeast Asia -- that Latin America is also plagued by poverty, instability, and Communist political and economic warfare -- and that neutralism and anti-Americanism are as strong there as in other parts of the world. Yet our twenty Latin American neighbors have consistently received less than 3 to 5% of our foreign aid budget.
And far too much of this has been in military assistance -- desirable perhaps if it assists in our continental defense, with radar and missile bases and troop patrols to guard our sea lanes in case of war -- but undesirable when it tightens the grip of dictatorial governments, makes friends with those in power today at the expense of those who may be in power tomorrow, and emphasizes the role of the military in states that want to be peace-loving.........
.......The deterioration of relations in this hemisphere cannot be blamed entirely upon the United States or cured entirely by the United States. Latin American nations have complained about our tariff barriers when embarked upon protectionist policies of their own. They have blamed our government for not making more loans available -- and resented us as creditors when they came. They have complained about the selfish nationalism of our agricultural and mineral policies -- but have exhibited the same tendencies in their own official programs. They dislike too much foreign capital -- yet they ask for more foreign capital. They oppose American intervention in their internal affairs -- but think we should have intervened more to help their economies or to oppose certain dictators. They want to be regarded as members of the American family -- but they also want to be dealt with as a separate force that cannot be taken for granted.
.....The basic issue is whether we are going to approach the future together or separately......
It is not a matter of cost to the United States. A small sum spent now may save us billions later.
Source: David F. Powers Personal Papers, Box 31, "Latin America, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 28 January 1959." John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.