

**Stephen Ailes Oral History Interview - JFK #2, 9/26/1968**  
Administrative Information

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Ailes, under secretary of the Army under President John F. Kennedy, discusses issues surrounding the United States' presence on Okinawa, and also procedural and bureaucratic matters within the Department of Defense.

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STEPHEN AILES  
JFK #2

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Second Oral History Interview

with

STEPHEN AILES

September 26, 1968  
Washington, D.C.

by Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: You can just take off and describe how you first got involved in this problem.

AILES: Well, the army has some responsibility with respect to Okinawa in the sense that the high commissioner out there is typically a lieutenant general in the army and receives policy direction not from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any military command but from the secretary of the army. That responsibility is usually handled by the under secretary, and he actually has a deputy under secretary for international affairs whose job it is to work on Panama and Okinawa. And, incidentally, that guy was Harry McPherson for a long time--earlier, Howard Haugerud, who's over with the AID (Agency for International Development) agency now as deputy inspector general.

There was some sort of a crisis in Okinawa matters, really quite early in the business, that arose--it always arises--in connection with elections in Japan. The opposition party in Japan always takes the position that the United States is still occupying Okinawa and should allow--what is it--reversion to take place, and the party in power argues that that shouldn't happen. But there is a terrible sense of sort of war guilt in Japan with respect to Okinawa which really got terribly beat up during the war, and there were a great number of casualties, civilian casualties, about a third of the population was killed or something like that. Another thing, Okinawa was the poorest prefecture of Japan and was not kindly used--there is a basis for arguing that Japan had worried about

Okinawa too much prior to the tsar. And so the Japanese are sensitive to the Okinawa problems. Here they were with a great deal of prosperity; here was Okinawa still under the U.S. control although Okinawa had not started the war and had been an unwilling or unfortunate participant, and now they were not independent and so on.

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So, very early in the game.... Well, that kind of a problem creates a built-in conflict between the State Department, which is worried about maintaining relationships in Japan, and the military, who were worried about a two- or three-billion dollar base in Okinawa which has in it or on it a lot of things that you can't put in Japan. In those days you couldn't ever bring a nuclear submarine into a Japanese harbor. And as Reischauer [Edwin O. Reischauer] used to say to me, "You're worried about less than a million Okinawans, but I'm worried about ninety million Japanese, and there can't be much question about which comes first in this calculation." I'd say, "I'm worried about the ability of the free world to defend itself in the Pacific which is dependent upon Okinawa and not on Japan, at this point, which has no military force whatsoever."

I started working at the earliest possible time on trying to bring these two points of view into some kind of harmony. And let me say this: that problem is made more difficult by attitudes on the Hill where you get hawks, so to speak, which was a word not then in common parlance, but people who are interested in the military business who didn't want you to in any way relax the hold we had on Okinawa. On the other hand, there were those up there who were terribly offended by the notion that we would have a military presence somewhere in the world and a military occupation this long after the war.

A task force to review the Okinawa situation was created at a very early stage in my army career. And I, for the life of me, couldn't tell you what the genesis of that was. I remember very well that it was created; I remember that Carl Kaysen from the White House staff was made the head of it; I remember that we assigned John Sitterson, who was a colonel working for Haugerud, to work directly with the task force or be a member of it, and we assigned a senior colonel named Benjamin Franklin Evans, who made brigadier while he was out there, to work on it.

HACKMAN: He was working on it out in a field?

AILES: Yes. They went to Okinawa, this task force.

HACKMAN: The whole task force went out there for a while. I see.

AILES: And there were some State Department people on it and some others. I remember having a long talk with Kaysen beforehand, who had started out with the preconceived notion that you were going to solve all the problems by getting rid of the military high commissioner and making a civilian one.

HACKMAN: This was Caraway [Paul W. Caraway] at the time?

AILES: Yes. I felt very strongly that that was a mistake because the only justification for our presence on Okinawa was military necessity, and that it made sense to always emphasize that by having the military in control, as a way of emphasizing that we were not interested in taking over territory.

Well, the task force did come back with a series of recommendations which tended to liberalize the nature of the control that we exercised over Okinawa. It was a good effort all around. I think Carl Kaysen is an immensely bright guy, and he was struck with the fact that there were two sides to this question and two types of interests to be protected, and that the military operations there and the quasi-military operations had to go on. You have problems like the business of bringing people through there. If it's somebody else's country and under some other sovereignty, you know, you really have a problem not only about your own troops but by people that might be coming the other way and all this sort of stuff.

We had something called the "Voice of the United Nations Command" that beamed soap operas into China, which were very effective, according to refugees in Hong Kong. This operation had been in Japan, and they asked that it be removed from there because it seemed a little militant for the posture that they wanted to take.

The fundamental issue between the military view, certainly Caraway's view, and the task force was really over whether or not you brought the government of the Ryukyus along by letting them make mistakes or whether you exercised this power of veto and the power to issue ordinances in order to correct errors when they were made. For instance, as I recall, the legislature used to vote to abolish the income tax fairly regularly so that Caraway would veto it, and they would get the political benefits of having been for low taxation but wouldn't have destroyed the government. But this was an impossible situation in terms of getting any maturity and responsibility in the legislature. On the other hand, if they had really wiped out the income tax, we couldn't have gotten the appropriations back here that we were trying to get to support the Ryukyuan economy.

Well, I do remember that the report involved the replacement of the civil administrator, who was a brigadier general, with a civilian. And it involved a series of other steps but resulted in a workable situation as far as I was concerned, as far as the military was concerned. We were able to persuade General Decker [George H. Decker] who was chief of staff of the army to go along with the report although there, of course, was some disagreement with it in some places in the Pentagon. All in all, I think the report was constructive and helped.

I felt very strongly myself that you could not maintain our presence and position in Okinawa with bayonets that you had to do it by getting across to the public there that things were being handled properly and that there was a genuine need for our presence there in terms of the

broader problems of peace in the Pacific, and that we were there for that purpose; we're going to be there only as long as was necessary for that purpose, but we're taking all the steps in the interim to see to it that at the end of our period the Ryukyus would go back to

Japan in the finest possible condition to be accepted and become a stronger part of the Japanese community than they'd been before. Toward this end, we went up and battered and begged, battered on the House committee--the foreign aid committee; it's really that subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee that handles foreign aid, Otto Passman, went up there--and struggled to get money each year for our program for aid to Okinawa. And they were small numbers, but they were hard to get. They were only like seven million, eight million dollars.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any problems in getting Caraway, or the other people who came in to testify, to testify in the terms that you desired, or were there any problems in working this out?

AILES: No. There was never any problem about position after we really sort of got organized and under way on it. I'll say this, in working out the business with the State Department, as far as I was concerned, we were greatly assisted by the fact that a fellow named H. L. T. Koren....

HACKMAN: That's Barney?

AILES: Yes, Barney got assigned to this. It was funny: I walked over there once with a delegation from the army, and the State Department delegation came in the other door. And everybody was horrified to hear a war whoop come out of me and one come out of Barney. Barney was one of my best friends in college. [Laughter] He'd been in the Philippines, and I didn't even know he was back. But Barney also knew the military and understood them. He'd served in Berlin as a colonel in the army on loan from the State Department. And we were able to sit down and agree on objectives and agree on procedures very, very fast. He did a great deal to facilitate the development of an understanding between the military and the State Department people. Also John Steeves was very good in that whole area. And there were a couple of people who were just impossible on the State Department side and who were so carried away with the specific aspect of the problem that had been theirs that they would gladly have closed the whole business--all through facilities in Okinawa.

HACKMAN: Can you remember who the State Department people were who were particularly tough on this? [Interruption]

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AILES: Whenever you want to take the afternoon off, all hell breaks loose.

HACKMAN: You were talking about Koren putting down the fellow over at State Department.

AILES: Well, I'd say that makes it sound a little rough. I remember later Roger Hilsman was an assistant secretary in State for Far Eastern Affairs or

whatever it was, and he really called me up one day and said that he thought it would be a good idea if we recalled Caraway because that would help him with some Japanese negotiations having to do with a textile treaty. (Laughter) So I'd say that's a perfect example of somebody getting preoccupied with his problem and being somewhat uninterested in yours. The beautiful thing about Koren was that he had enough of an understanding of the military and of the State Department business to be the basis for working out a good relationship there.

Ambassador Reischauer and General Caraway never got along too well because we used to say that General Caraway would fire these feisty telegrams back here and Ambassador Reischauer would respond in funereal tones. (Laughter). But they'd all be to their respective seniors back here, and they never communicated directly. And I made a great effort, greatly aided by General Jake Smart [Jacob E. Smart], who was the Air Force general in command there in Japan, to try to work out some way so that General Caraway and Ambassador Reischauer could meet, get together and communicate directly, and understand each other's problems. But that never was particularly successful. When General Al Watson [Albert W. Watson] went over to succeed General Caraway, that end of it all was immediately straightened out. I did feel that General Caraway, while he had a talent for antagonizing some of the Japanese, nonetheless, made a lot of policy decisions that were very damn good.... [Interruption]

HACKMAN: You'd mentioned that you talked to the president about this at one point. How did this conversation come about?

AILES: It came about because Carl Kaysen wanted the president to say something to Caraway. So he invited General Caraway to come over, and he was nice enough to ask me to come with him. So General Caraway and I went in to see President Kennedy with Carl and reported to him on just the way the Okinawa thing looked to us and what we were trying to do. And he expressed his tremendous interests in the area and the problems of Japan and the almost pre-eminence of Japan as a problem for the United States at this particular time and urged us to do everything possible to meet the military need with a minimum of ruffled feelings as far as the Japanese were concerned. And it was one of those wonderful sessions that you came away from with the feeling that the--or that people

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came away from feeling that the president really understood what you were trying to do and was very much in your corner. And he astounded me by, at the conclusion of the interview, turning to me and saying, "Steve, I want you to come over here and talk to me about Panama one of these days." Whether Kaysen had tipped him off that I was working on Panama or not, I don't know.

Let me just say one thing about President Kennedy in that connection: Elvis Stahr or Cy Vance [Cyrus R. Vance] started the practice of bringing all the military commanders over to see the president while President Kennedy was there. The Military Commanders' Conference is a conference when all of your senior generals all over the world return here. The fact that this occurs around the time of the army-navy game is a

coincidence, of course. But, nevertheless, they all come back. And there are two or three days of very serious briefings and everything, and the culmination of this in the last few years has been a trip to the White House, and these generals sit around a table with the president.

These situations with President Kennedy were an unbelievable lift to the army as a whole and constituted just a tremendous personal triumph on his part. And I never attended any because just the secretary went; I went later when I was the secretary. But I talked to so many of the men who were there, and I've seen the results that these meetings had on them. But the president went around the table, and he would talk to each man, "Where are you now?" and "What is your command there?" and "What are your problems?" or he would ask him about something that was happening in that area that was highly important. At the conclusion of the meeting he would say something to the effect that he was immensely proud of the military organization around the world and the job that it was doing and was very anxious to let them know that he was following what they were doing with a great deal of interest, that he wanted to be kept informed about what was going on and that he was behind them just 100 percent. And, literally, these men would walk out of that meeting ten feet in the air and go back to their respective commands with a tremendous charge of enthusiasm that came directly from dealing with the president.

HACKMAN: Do you know if there were attempts to get people over like that to see the president when they couldn't get in, when O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] or someone shut them off, in effect?

AILES: Oh, I don't believe so. Ted Clifton [Chester V. Clifton] was very alert to what a meeting like this could mean to the military. If Ted told the president that this really played a useful role, it is my impression that the president would go to great lengths to do something about it because I can remember other things that were done above and beyond the call of duty by the president just because they did have such a good impact on the man in uniform, in whom he took a tremendous interest, as

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you know. And they all felt that he took a big interest in them.

One other time I was with him. I went down to a show at the Eglin Air Force Base that they put on for him. He manifested a tremendous interest in all that military business, and they really felt he was their commander-in-chief. There's no two ways about it.

HACKMAN: You know something you'd said earlier--you'd said that on the Okinawa thing that you'd convinced General Decker to go along, but there was some resistance at other points within the Department of Defense.

AILES: What I really meant was that a draft report was worked out in the staff which was going to be the army's reply or comments on the task force report, and I found it a doctrinaire statement of an old position.

HACKMAN: This is within Decker's staff or Joint Chiefs' staff?

AILES: No. It'd be within the army staff.

HACKMAN: Yes. Okay.

AILES: And I could be wrong on that. That could have been proposed. Well, I know what happened. I don't know whether the report came out of the Joint Chiefs or it came out of the army, but my recollection is it was supposed to go back to the Joint Chiefs. So either it was the army's submission to the Joint Chiefs as the proposed comment on the task force report or it was an army review of a proposed Joint Chief's comment.

But I remember this, that when I saw it, I thought it terribly unfortunate to take these positions, and I remember telling General Decker that I thought the army ought to say certain things or take a certain position which he said he basically agreed with although this was different than the position we have taken before, but under the circumstances he thought they did make sense. For instance, it hardly made sense for the military to insist that the civilian administrator be a civilian--I mean a military man. Why not try a civilian and see how it works?

So he said, "Why don't you prepare a revision of this?" So I sat down with Colonel Sitterson, and we discussed basically what I had talked with General Decker about, and overnight Sitterson re-wrote the report. And it was the best job of turning out a document I saw the whole time I was in the Pentagon. It was a superb effort, and strangely enough Colonel Sitterson had sort of been on the other side before the task force began, and his views had been modified pretty substantially. But we sent back this, and General Decker just said, "I'll approve that right like it stands."

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Whether that went in as the Army comment or the Joint Chiefs' comment, I don't know, but I suspect the latter. I suspect that that's what we were working for.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything after that? There was an amendment then that came out to the executive order on the Ryukyus in March, I believe, of '62. Can you remember anything beyond what you've just said in getting this amendment written up?

AILES: The amendment probably had to do with some of these relationships....

HACKMAN: Yes, there were four or five strong points there.

AILES: That's right. How was the chief executive to be selected? No. That problem kicked along. I went out there twice to.... Once I went at the

request of Averell Harriman, who came over and asked me if I would go out because he thought that perhaps the way things were being done were not as I thought they were when he and I had talked about it.

HACKMAN: You mean in the sense of the way the military was carrying out the mission in the field?

AILES: Yes. The problem always with General Caraway, who was a very bright, very strong man, but he was a sort of a loner, and he was an autocrat. Our civil administrator that we sent out there had a dreadful time trying to work for him--his name was Shannon McCune--for the simple reason that General Caraway really wanted to do most everything himself anyway. But we had that series of problems, and, as I say, when Al Watson went out there, he was able to just smooth the water really to quite a substantial extent. And I understand that the man who is presently there, whose name, I think, is General Unger [Ferdinand T. Unger], is just very good.

HACKMAN: Did anything flow directly from the meeting you had with the president when you and General Caraway went over?

AILES: No. Again, the president was simply, his purpose was to impress on General Caraway his personal interest in Okinawa and the importance of what we were doing there, but also the tremendous importance of doing it in such a way as to still permit the State Department of the president to maintain the proper relationships with Japan.

HACKMAN: Do you remember seeing any evidence of Robert Kennedy's interest on this side of things?

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AILES: Not at all. I just don't remember any interests of his on it at all.

HACKMAN: Well, maybe we can just spend a couple of minutes on something. You talked about General Clifton as a president's aide. What other types of things would he communicate back to you and to Secretary Stahr? Would he always go through General Decker, or how did this work exactly?

AILES: Well, there was a real rumpus early in the business, early during my tour over there, when some material was in the hands of the President that had obviously gone from army staff to General Clifton to the president and was partisan in character with respect to the army. Bob McNamara was furious and properly so. And thereafter, we, all of us, were very anxious that nothing like that would happen.

HACKMAN: Had this gone through Secretary Stahr's office?

AILES: No, I don't think so. I think this was just some memorandum about whether an increase in the marines would be as productive in terms of the national defense as an increase in the army, some partisan comment of this character. The way McNamara wanted to run the Pentagon, that was just treason. That was a terrible thing. And I agree. So that sort of thing came to a crushing halt, and it was an aberration anyway, that particular instance.

Ted (Clifton) was very thoughtful with respect to Elvis and with respect to me always on purely personal things. If you were asked to come over to the White House for some sort of function or luncheon or something like that, Ted always saw that you were met or taken care of. He would relay some questions back or call up about something the president might be interested in, you know, purely for information purposes. But we went to great pains to see to it that the chain of command was the president, the secretary of defense, the secretary of the army, and that there wasn't any short circuit in that process on anything that was what you might call of an official nature. But Clifton was always interested in the army, and he always kept in touch with us and, as I say, always sort of looked out for us. And I think Clifton was an extremely able guy, too.

HACKMAN: Did you ever get anything back from the White House on.... There was some sort of dispute between Clifton and the other military aides over who was going to be the senior military aide. Can you remember getting involved in that?

AILES: No. I just always assumed that he was, that he sort of outranked those other guys. But that was something that was strictly within the White House.

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HACKMAN: It's 11, if you've got an appointment at 11. Or we can start on something else.

AILES: Well, I think these guys may.... Let's just see. They're going to call here.

HACKMAN: Okay. Okay. Fine. Well, while we're on relationships within the Defense Department, why don't we just talk about the army and Arthur Sylvester's office on press relations and on speeches? There were a lot of problems here. Were there any attempts on his part or on Secretary Stahr's part to formulate any kind of new rules on relationships with the press?

AILES: Well, McNamara put out a rule that said that you shouldn't deal with the press unless you had somebody from your own public relations office with you. To me this was extremely helpful, and primarily for one reason, and that was that it was never real clear to me where the security line was. And in talking to a member of the press, if your press guy was there, you could say, "How much of this can I say?" rather than stand way back from whatever subject the man from the press wanted to

talk about. If you had the press guy there, you could say, "Can I tell him about so-and-so?"

HACKMAN: Yes. You mean the army's press information office, not Sylvester's office?

AILES: True, true. But McNamara's requirement was, as I recall, that there be someone from either Sylvester's office or your chief of information's office present at all interviews. And I do remember that. Let me say, as far as Art is concerned, I am immensely fond of Sylvester personally. I'd known him before; (he'd gone to Princeton, some years ahead of me) but he and I used to sit on the Princeton Club Board here together and all that.

But Art sort of had the desire to want to pull more and more of the information, quote-unquote, activities under his own operation, and I thought that was a serious mistake, and we battled back and forth on that from time to time. It never got to be a real big issue. I don't think Art's rather grandiose plans ever got very far. You see, there had been some centralization in the intelligence business for very proper reasons, and there had been some centralizations in procurement with the Defense Supply Agency. And Art always thought that it would make sense to centralize the information business along the same lines, but that was getting kind of close to home.

And I am personally a strong believer in preserving the separate services but eliminating duplication. The information business is just like recruiting; it's kind of close to the service, you know; it's hard to preserve

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separate services but have one central agency worrying about input of people or one central agency worrying about output of information, you know. So we used to have some trouble with Art on that, after a fashion.

All that stuff about clearance of speeches is a frightful nuisance but something that they were always terribly polite about, I must say, I got some speeches cleared long after they were given. You know, if you had to make a speech on X day, you send them the speech that you'd given last time because you really hadn't gotten around to preparing one for this one. So they'd clear that, and that would make you feel better about the last time. (Laughter) But they were awfully kind to me, always looking at material long after the deadlines they'd set. They weren't too stuffy about things although sometimes....

I remember making a speech once where I said something about what a big change had occurred in thirty years. I said, "After all, in '36, boys up at Harvard were eating goldfish." It was erased. In the speech, of course, I said, "This originally read, 'Boys up at Harvard were eating goldfish.' This has been through the censor, and has been revised, and I'm supposed to read it as follows, 'In 1936 college boys were eating goldfish.'" And of course I got a tremendous howl from the crowd out of all that. (Laughter)

But the business about muzzling the military was poppycock, just utter poppycock, I always thought.

HACKMAN: In the sense that it was overblown in the press, the whole problem?

AILES: Yes, that's right. It didn't really exist. There's a limit on what you can say and be a member of somebody's agency. You don't really get into a very serious debate over whether or not a specific thing should or should not be said. Most people would agree it either should be said or it shouldn't be said. But you get into a terrible debate when you start talking about what general principles are going to be applied.

HACKMAN: The type of thing that.... I believe part of the background of this is that Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] memo to Secretary McNamara protesting the role that some army retired people, I believe, were playing in public education.

AILES: Oh, yes. Oh, sure. Yes. Those seminars?

HACKMAN: Yes.

AILES: They weren't army retired people as much as there was a navy admiral, Chester Ward, as I recall, who'd been very active, and

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I think maybe General Wedemeyer [Albert C. Wedemeyer] had, come to think of it. Yes, I didn't remember that Fulbright had written a memo, but I remember that problem, so-called "National Strategy Seminars".... There had been some Army support of those programs, and then some nefarious statements off the podium. I remember that problem very well.

HACKMAN: Did you ever get any criticism or hear anything at all from the White House on things that army people gave, either yourself or Secretary Stahr or Decker and his people? Salinger's [Pierre E. G. Salinger] office--any problems there at all?

AILES: Do you mean like things that army people said? Of course, we had one explosion, Major Roberts [Edward V. Roberts], that perhaps you recall, when General Ted Walker [Edwin A. Walker] got in trouble over there with his "pro-blue" program, Major Roberts came back here and submitted a speech for clearance that he was going to give before the DAR (Daughters of the American Revolution), and the army wouldn't clear it. So he gave it anyway and said that Soapie Williams [G. Mennen Williams]--(who was another classmate of mine in college)--was a Communist, and so was Mayor Yorty [Samuel W. Yorty].

I called up General Decker and said, "That guy has to be suspended." He was a reserve officer on active duty, and I said, "He has to be suspended." And George says, "There isn't any such procedure." So I said, "Fine. Just tell him he's suspended." And he said, "He's entitled to a hearing," And I said, "I've just been looking at the tube; he just had his hearing." (Laughter) And we suspended him and later fired him. And then the

Court of Appeals held that some step was left out, not in what I did about suspending him, but in the actual dismissal procedure. But that's an aberration. I don't immediately recall anybody in the White House ever getting after us about anything that any senior army officer said.

HACKMAN: What about the Walker thing. Did you get personally involved?

AILES: Oh sure. So did Sylvester. That was one problem we had with Art. Old Art was going to interview him on the long distance telephone or something like that. He got wrapped up in that, and we had a little trouble saying to Art, "Just leave this alone. Let us handle this hear." Yes, I got very much involved in the Ted Walker matter. It was just an unfortunate situation of a fellow who had a marvelous reputation in the army, and a great record as a combat leader, who'd just gotten a fixation or two on a couple of subjects--well, on some subjects, and his subsequent conduct at Oxford, Mississippi bears out the diagnosis.

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HACKMAN: Was there any disagreement on how to handle it, what you could do?

AILES: No, We assigned him to another job out in Hawaii, as I recall, and there sure were those who thought that was a terrible thing, that should have been just let out altogether or something like that. And I suppose they were right. I don't know that he even took that job.

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[END OF INTERVIEW]

Steven Ailes Oral History Transcript  
Name List

President Kennedy	Kennedy, John F.
Powell	Pierpoint, Powell
Johnson	Johnson, Louis
Elvis	Stahr, Elvis
Frank	Pace, Frank
Paul	Warnke, Paul
Harold	Leventhal, Harold
Bill	Schaub, William F.
Dick	Morse, Richard S.
Paul	Ignatius, Paul
Tom	Morris, Thomas D.
Finn	Larsen, Finn
John	Bailey, John
Dick	Donahue, Richard K.
Dorothy	Davies, Dorothy
Cy	Vance, Cyrus R.
Stan	Resor, Stanley R.
Adam	Yarmolinsky, Adam
Bob	McNamara, Robert S.
Roy	Davenport, Roy K.
Al	Fitt, Alfred B.
President Johnson	Johnson, Lyndon B.
Ros	Gilpatric, Roswell L.
Gene	Zuckert, Eugene M.
Ed	Pratt, Edmund T. Jr.
Charlie	Hitch, Charles J.
Bob	Anthony, Robert
Jack	Fitch, John H.
Tyler	Port, Tyler
John	Macy, John
James	Cook, James
Robert	Willey, Robert
General Johnson	Johnson, Harold K.
Joe	Farland, Joseph S.
Barney	Koren, Henry L. T.
Eisenhower	Eisenhower, Dwight D.
Bob	Fleming, Robert J. Jr.
Phil	Leber, Walter P.
Elihu	Root, Elihu
Chiari	Chiari, Roberto F.
Mac	Bundy, McGeorge
Rusk	Rusk, Dean
Dicky	Arias, Ricardo M.
Ed	Martin, Edwin M
Gardner	Ackley, Gardner
Potter	Potter, W. E.
Zincke	Zincke, Bernard J.
Dan	Flood, Daniel J.
Don	McGowen, Donald W.
Jim	Cantwell, James F.

Joe	Peck, Merton J.
General Decker	Decker, George H.
Sterling	Wright, W. H. S.
Tom	Kenan, Thomas A.
Freddie	Weyland, Fred C.
Congressman O'Konski	O'Konski, Alvin E.
Ros	Gilpatric, Roswell L.
General Hamlett	Hamlett, Barksdale
Congressman Hebert	Hebert, F. Edward
Mendel	Rivers, L. Mendel
Bill	Bray, William G.
General Van Fleet	Van Fleet, James A.
Bill	Sutton, William F.
Max	Rich, Maxwell E.
Bo	Hearn, George A.
General Wheeler	Wheeler, Earle G.
Ignatius	Ignatius, Paul R.
Jerry	Ford, Gerald R.
Johnnie	Heintjes, John A.
Max	Taylor, Max
General Boyle	Boyle, Leo M.
Dave	Traub, David W.
Jack	Norton, John W.
Larry	Hoelcher, Leonard W.
Sol	Horwitz, Solis
Larry	O'Brien, Lawrence F.
Pittman	Pittman, Steuart
Ken	Hansen, Kenneth R.
Corbie	Truman, Corbie
Lou	Truman, Louis W.
Ed	McDermott, Edward A.
V.P. Johnson	Johnson, Lyndon B.
Tom	Powers, Tom
Gen. Westmoreland	Westmoreland, William C.
Gene	Salet, Eugene A.
Gene	Zuckert, Eugene M.
Tom	Morris, Thomas D.
Ribiciff	Ribbicoff, Abraham A.
McCloy	McCloy, John J.
Fisher	Fisher, Adrian S.
Ed	Gullion, Edmund A.
Harold	Brown, Harold
Lyle	Garlock, Lyle
Glenn	Seaborg, Glenn
Paul	Paul, Norman S.
Willis	Hawkins, Willis