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Biographical Note

Anderson, an organizer for the 1960 Kennedy for President campaign in Oregon, discusses labor issues, the 1960 Democratic primary candidates, and the 1960 presidential campaign in Oregon, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

Of

E. Dean Anderson

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E. Dean Anderson

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Oral History Interview

with

E. DEAN ANDERSON

February 12, 1966
Portland, Oregon

Charles T. Morrissey

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MORRISSEY: I think the best way to start is for me to ask you how you viewed the approaching 1960 Democratic campaign for the presidential nomination from the vantage point of the late 1950s. Was there any one candidate that appealed to you?

ANDERSON: This is a rather interesting question because, of course, there were a number of candidates who were going to offer themselves. This was pretty apparent. I tried to be somewhat realistic about it, and weigh merits and demerits of a number of those who had been rather prominently mentioned. One day our representative from this congressional district [Edith S. Green], with whom I had worked closely for many years, called me and asked if I had done much thinking about this. I said yes, I had. And so had she. So she asked me, "Have you got any preference?" And I named about, as I recall, three people and said I thought that the best candidate would come from this group. This didn't completely answer her, but I then said, "Do you have a preference?" And she said, "Yes, I have. I have made up my mind that Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] is the best candidate." She said "I've watched his work here in Congress, and got to meet him," and so on. She knew the others, too. But, "I think he's the best candidate." And I said, "Well, that's my inclination." I hadn't gone quite so far as to say absolutely, but, "That's my inclination. I think he looks the best."

Then she asked me some questions about what did I think of the fact that he was an easterner, a New Englander, or what difference would this make? and so on. Well, the most significant question she asked me was, "What do you think about the religious question?" And I said, "Well, I don't think it really ought to be a relevant issue and the only way, therefore, to handle it is to in a sense ignore it. That is sure, he is a Catholic, and people are going to hear about this. I think they ought not to take this into account in choosing a candidate, and I think good citizenship demands that we don't." And she said she had come to pretty much the same conclusion. So anyway, by the end of the conversation, she said, "Well, I wanted to know how you felt, and I'm talking to some other people because I'd like to bring him out to Oregon to meet some of the people in the district. "So she did; that is, she extended the invitation for a luncheon here in Portland--I'd say, about twenty people--to meet with Senator Kennedy, and he couldn't come, at the last minute.

MORRISSEY: When was this approximately?

ANDERSON: I think late summer, '59, or early fall. I would say along in there. Maybe you could trip me up here, because I'm not sure when Congress was in or out of session. But as I recall, I think that's about when it was, and it was a matter of a late vote or something that he had to stay for, some crucial issue. So he had to cancel the visit.

She rescheduled it. I could look back on my calendar and find out when that is. I will guess that it was about October or November. And so he came, and I remember very well the occasion. Among other things, first time, of course, I'd met him, and so before the luncheon we were standing around chatting. I came in and shook hands with him, and I said something like, "We appreciate your taking the time to come out here." And he looked me right in the eye, you know, and said with that very fine smile, "It's very good of you to give me a second chance." So I went home and said to my wife, "Well, that's the right choice." You know? I mean, the way he said it, though it was perfectly apparent.... On issues, on his progressive outlook and so on, I already was pretty sure. But on the personal side if he could show this kind of feeling, let's say, and make people really feel that he was interested personally, which was the appearance certainly we got out of this, I thought he was a darn good candidate

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aside from all the other qualities and views. Anyhow, then we went on from that point to try to set up some organization. Now, the biggest problem that we had here, of course, was that the senior senator [Wayne L. Morse] was a candidate himself.

MORRISSEY: At that time had he announced?

ANDERSON: Well, no, he had not announced at that time. That's what I'm going to speak about briefly, because I think it's interesting and has some bearing on our work here. Mrs. Green had asked him if he were going to be a candidate before she announced for Kennedy, and he said no, whereupon she announced

for Kennedy. Sometime later he changed his mind. Then, I would say, he found it very hard to forgive her being committed to somebody else, and, in fact, he has never forgiven her.

During the course of the campaign, after he had announced, he was at the college one day for a luncheon and he sat about two places away from me, and at a certain point leaned over and looked right at me and said, "And I don't understand what's happened to Edith Green. In every other state of the union, the local Democratic leaders are supporting the favorite son, but not in Oregon," and so on. It was quite a little tirade. This kind of disgusted me because I felt, I knew that he had been consulted. He had missed his chance. But you know, people's memories are short when their self-interest is involved. I guess he got carried away with his own candidacy.

Well, the other leading candidate that I think had appeal in Oregon was Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey]. And there were a number of people very strongly committed to Humphrey. As a matter of fact, of course, Humphrey came out at one point--I've forgotten when this was--and we had a very large dinner for him which I happened to emcee. And Humphrey had certainly many fine qualities, and Mrs. Green had a great deal of respect for Humphrey, and I think he was disappointed also when she didn't support him. But after all, the kind of person Kennedy was only happens once in a long, long, long time. There may be a lot of good men around, but I think he was the top.

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Well, the Oregon primary seemed to us to be very significant. It has been from time to time in national elections. Our general election is not of too great importance, because we don't have enough votes--six electoral votes, small population. In the Hayes-Tilden [Rutherford B. Hayes-Samuel J. Tilden] election of 1876 the Oregon electoral votes happened to be of some moment, but not very often since then.

But the primary is a different situation because it comes at a rather strategic time, after a few others which may have varying results and contradictory results, as a matter of fact; and then ahead of the California one, of course, and not too far ahead of the actual convention. So because of its time situation I think it has some significance. Also because it is an honest to goodness open primary. And Oregon voters, I believe, tend to be somewhat independent, and we do not have machines in anything like the sense that they have existed in various places of the country from time to time. And I don't think anybody can tell Oregon voters how to vote. They simply have to persuade them. So it makes a rather interesting situation, and especially, of course, if you have a favorite son running, who has strong support in some groups, for instance, labor.

I think Kennedy was a little weak in the labor field at the time, particularly because of certain crucial votes in the Congress. I'm not saying he was wrong; I don't mean that at all. But the support was not there among the labor group, and the senior senator here was rather a hero to the labor forces. Any time you've got any large organized group behind you, you've got some real power.

But anyway, since the primary was so important, we decided to do all we could to build up acquaintance personally with Kennedy during that period, and try to line up delegates for the convention who would be favorable to Kennedy. Now the delegates have to be bound by the Oregon vote for a while at the convention, so that if we lost the primary, our

only hope then would be in case a deadlock developed that they could come around, Kennedy would be a compromise. And of course we didn't intend to lose the primary. So we tried to couple a primary fight with the

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choice of these delegates, and there were a lot of discussions, even down to the ballot slogan. Because they're allowed up to ten words per person after the name, and we wanted to be sure that every one that we could possibly get would include the name Kennedy in his ballot slogan. Small things like that, but after all, if you get in a sense some bandwagon going, it's going to be a big help.

I want to go back to the labor thing for a minute because this seemed to me to be one of the most crucial situations, and one which brought out very well in Oregon Senator Kennedy's character. He had the same approach to it that he had to the, religious question when he talked to the ministers in Texas. He faced the issue head on.

He came out here and he spoke to two groups of labor: one, to the state convention, and one, to the Multnomah County Labor Council, here in Portland. I went down the evening that he spoke there. The audience started out being, you know, a little cool. He gave a very good talk, a very vigorous talk in which he explained why he had voted the way he had voted on certain labor legislation. He said he recognized that this wasn't completely acceptable to some other people, but he gave the reasons for it. A very good explanation. And this was, as I recall, about two weeks after Senator Morse had also spoken to the same group and, as I indicated, been somewhat of a hero. But in any event Kennedy was so well-informed and so consistent, and intelligent in his explanation, that by the time that evening was over, he at least got a very good response out of the group. I don't know how many votes he changed that night, but I know he increased his stature tremendously among these people. So that at least I'm sure many of them were saying good things about him later, even if they.... I don't know how they finally voted, but they certainly were won over in one sense: that is, they had respect for him even, I think, if they somewhat differed from him, and I think that this was primarily because of his courage in facing the issue the way he did.

One of the other things that we decided in the course of this campaign was, obviously you had to get him before as many people as possible since he wasn't very well known in the state actually, and yet we're a long way off, and it's very time consuming here. It's a big state once you get here, and it's time consuming, and how many days could he spare? And, of course, the local committee was always

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asking for more. And we'd work up a schedule depending on so many days, and then a change would come through. And then we would say, "All right, we'll give up two days here, if we can have three days later," and so on.

But I would say that we were given a fairly generous amount of time, and that he was able to get into many parts of the state. And here, I think, he really made a very great effort and was absolutely tireless in meeting people. Here in the Portland area, for instance,

at one stage we had a truck with loudspeakers and he went to shopping centers. He'd simply pull into the shopping center parking area, he'd introduce himself, give a short talk, answer questions, shake as many hands as he possibly could, and go on. And of course, the biggest problem there is to get him to go on, because once he got into that, I think, he really wanted to do a good job and enjoyed meeting these people, and of course, they, him, so that it was pretty hard to keep on schedule, and I was glad I didn't have to try to do that. But somebody did have to keep pushing, pushing, pushing.

But that's the kind of contact that I think pays off. They have to see the candidate. And of course, as was shown in the general election, TV is a pretty darn good substitute for this, but there's no real substitute still, I think, for the actual appearance in the flesh and the handshake, if a fellow can stand up to it. So that kind of visit, spaghetti dinners and so on, where he could tablehop meeting people, and he did. And I know he gave everybody this feeling, that he was out here because he wanted to meet them. If they had something they wanted to say or ask, he wanted to hear it. That's good campaigning.

As a matter of fact later when he was president, it seems to me that it's remarkable for a fellow as young as he was, in the presidency as short a time as he was, what a personal feeling he did develop. Now let's say Eisenhower, [Dwight D. Eisenhower] after all, had an advantage in Europe of being an outstanding general there, the leading military man certainly for many years. But look at the short exposure Kennedy had, and yet the feeling is tremendously deep. I saw yesterday some slides on Berlin, and some of them happened to cover Kennedy's visit there. And one showed

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the wreath at the place where he spoke, after the assassination, and on the wreath is a big ribbon that says, "Unserem Freund, President Kennedy." This is the way they felt, "To our friend." And a year or so ago when my wife and I were in Europe, we found the same thing. Little remote shop in a little village in Holland, a big picture of President Kennedy on the wall. And my wife said to the proprietor, "Oh I see you have President Kennedy's picture here," and the man said, "Oh, yes, he was my friend." He said it very feelingly, and we found this over and over. And I think that that's an indication that this was a real human being. So when I'm talking about campaigning mechanics and so on, sure, you plan them as cold-bloodedly as you can, but he also went into it with a warm human fashion. So I think that's why people would vote for him.

MORRISSEY: Did he emphasize appearances in the Portland area at the risk of not going elsewhere in the state?

ANDERSON: No, he didn't. We planned certain ones here in this area because, after all, half the population is in a very close commuting area here in the state. We did get him out into the hinterland, too, because there are some other good areas, and we wanted all of them to get to know him. That was part of our problem, though. It takes so much more time, and that's why we were always hammering at the national office to let us have him for a few more days. Because, for instance, if you go to eastern Oregon, [there are] huge spaces to cover. But it's important to get him into those

towns; the same with southern Oregon. I think on the whole we did fairly well. We could have used several times as many days, but we did fairly well in the coverage. It's a mistake just to concentrate here. The Democratic majority in this county, of course, is quite heavy, so you start with a little advantage. That's not true in all the rest of the state; it isn't that great, and so more exposure is necessary.

MORRISSEY: Who was the key person responsible for scheduling his appearances?

ANDERSON: One thing I should do is look back in my file and see names. I can think of a lot of people, but I'd hate to give credit where it wasn't

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due and vice versa. I would really rather look that up, I think, and make some notes on it, if you don't mind. I probably could. A lot of people were involved, and they all worked very hard. However, a good deal was done by committee. When you say scheduling, I would say that a small group worked pretty well together on this, saying, "Now what areas?" and so on. I know some people think committees can never do anything, but the committee did a great deal.

One of the other things that, of course, we did was to set up some small offices outside--there was a Portland headquarters, and then some headquarters in other places. And I remember, for instance, one time when Ted Kennedy [Edward Moore Kennedy] was able to come out for a couple of days, we opened three of these headquarters while he was here.

Ted Kennedy was pretty interesting because this poor fellow, as young as he was, was being given a fair amount of responsibility. He did quite well, and he brought along his very beautiful wife [Virginia Joan Bennett Kennedy] which helped a lot. So did Jack once or twice bring his wife [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy], and of course, that was terrific. But Ted had one drawback at that time. I'd say he was very young, and his experience had been in a different part of the country, and I think once or twice he tended to misestimate the Oregon audience, because Boston ward politics are different from Oregon politics. And I'm sure that a couple of his talks would have been received, would have gone over a little bit better there than they did here. But after all, as I said, he was young, he was moving fast, and on the whole he was a help.

MORRISSEY: Were they too partisan?

ANDERSON: Yes, and a little--I hate to use the word, but--too crass. The direct ward concept of, you know, jobs at stake, and so on. Just a little bit too much. I think he's matured tremendously in the years since then, and the way he's carrying on his duties as a senator, I think show promise of statesmanship. Well, at the time I'm talking about, he had just begun to get on the political scene, and it was a different scale.

I might say that one of the problems that we faced, you see, was since Jack Kennedy couldn't come out as much

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as we would like.... The Kennedys, after all, were very.... They were all working for him. I ran across Bob Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] and a cousin from Massachusetts up in Wisconsin, for instance. And the cousin, I met her on a train going to a rather small town, but she was setting up teas.

We were handicapped because we could not use Bob Kennedy in Oregon. And this was not completely understood, I think, in the national office, but we couldn't. You see, the mayor of this city had been before the McClellan [John L. McClellan] Committee [Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Fields] when Senator Robert Kennedy, was active. And I don't want to go into all the details of this, but it was a fiasco as far as the mayor was concerned, and it outraged a good many people here. I think that the mayor was a little ill advised in some respects, and he should have taken some good counsel with him. In a sense he went back and was just a sheep thrown to the wolves. That's a very disrespectful way to speak of a committee, but actually, you know, when they get going they can make a person pretty uncomfortable and, I mean, I think even if he's innocent, the kind of questions and the way they ask them can really shake him and he doesn't show up to the best advantage. The mayor went back clothed in this feeling of innocence, and without any counsel, and didn't know where he was. Anyway this was a fiasco. It had a very bad reaction here, and this carried over to some of our problems during the campaign.

For instance, we could never get him to present the key to the city to Kennedy. He did to Humphrey, and some other visitors, but he never would to Kennedy. The feeling was just too strong. At one point in the campaign the national headquarters sent out a brochure they had produced in very large quantities for distribution in a number of places; they sent copies out and said, "How many of these can you use?" And we took a look at it and said, "None," because on the inside a couple of the pictures showed Robert Kennedy and the committee, and we couldn't distribute those in Oregon. It would just remind people of something that, to them.... Well, it would be no way to win friends and influence voters, favorably. So we had to substitute something for that.

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I've spoken a couple of times of national sending people out and literature out. I thought after the 1964 election what a difference there was in this respect about financing. A lot of people, let's say particularly.... Well, in both parties, would say to us, "What are you having a fund-raising event for? After all look at all the money the Kennedys have. You don't need to raise any money." The Kennedys took the attitude that, of course they were investing some money in this candidacy, but the local areas had something at stake and should raise some money, too. And I think this is a very wise kind of pressure to put on. Nobody has enough money--Kennedys included--to toss in and just spend everything everybody would like to spend. I think it's wise to make committees decide how to use the money to best advantage, and if it's a big Santa Claus, they aren't going to. Well, Kennedy certainly never took this attitude. They always were saying, "How are you coming on the fund raising? How much of this expenditure for that local office are you going to put up?" and so on. I have to admit realistically, of course, it's

nice to have that much money in the background, and certainly some of it came into Oregon. But they didn't just toss it around. They did not toss it around in anything like the sense, then, of buying votes--through just flooding the place.

Well, I think there was a difference in the '60 election here. I think that a great deal more money was poured in, not in the Democratic campaign, but in the Republican. The primary here was a rather intense fight, as you may recall, in '60, with the Republicans and the outside money that came in, and the advertising that it bought was just phenomenal. But was a little harder in '60 for the Democrats and I don't think that was bad for them. They still won the election, and that's what you're after.

I'd like to mention another thing, too. Go back to the religion question for a moment. I found when I would talk to people a very interesting thing, particularly among Catholic Democrats. They would like to vote for Kennedy, let's say, but they were afraid if they were supporting Kennedy, they would be accused of voting for

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him because he was a Catholic, and I think some of them were so conscientious about this, that they were almost inclined not to vote for him, in order to protect this conscience. And of course, I argued at great length with people like this, including one of my close neighbors, and said, "That's ridiculous. This really doesn't have a bearing. It shouldn't have a bearing. It did in '28. If we're ever going to break that hold of prejudice, we've got to break it now and you have an obligation. If you want to reduce prejudice a little bit, if you don't want your children and your grandchildren always to face the same degree of ignorance and prejudice that you're aware of, and people going back to the '28 election are aware of, now's your best chance to break it because if we can elect him that myth will be pretty well scotched." But that's an uphill struggle oddly enough. I've never quite felt how they were thinking, but I guess it was a little protection.

MORRISSEY: How about on the other side of that issue? Did you come in contact with many people who were not going to vote for Kennedy because they were Protestants and he was Catholic?

ANDERSON: I don't think anybody would ever admit this, really, although there was some anti-Catholicism evident. I mean, a few people would, but a lot of people that I'm sure would not vote for him because he was Catholic, would never admit this at all. They would be ashamed, I think, to admit this, yet they felt that way, and they would probably vote their feelings.

And of course, he did lean over backwards once he became president, I think, again, and this was probably wise and I think has paved the way for some moves that have been made later--let's say on aid to education. I think it would have been much longer arriving at a compromise if Kennedy hadn't moved with great skill and deliberation, and made it perfectly clear to everybody that he was committed to separation of church and state in the fundamental sense. [Interruption]

MORRISSEY: I'm confused on at least one point.

ANDERSON: I probably am, too.

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MORRISSEY: Nationally Hubert Humphrey had good support from organized labor, and I assume that was the case here in, Oregon. Yet you emphasize that Wayne Morse had good support from organized labor. Did labor tend to favor one or the other, or did labor tend to split its effort between these two candidates?

ANDERSON: Basically I think labor tended to support Morse. Some individuals in the labor movement were very strongly committed to Humphrey. For instance, among school teachers and some educators Humphrey had a very great following. I don't think the labor support for Humphrey was as strong in some other areas. And, after all, Morse's hold on labor is almost insurmountable here. So when it's a choice of a pro-labor man from the Midwest, and a pro-labor man from your home state, I think labor goes for the home state.

MORRISSEY: Lurking in the background of the entire pre-convention period....

ANDERSON: Excuse me. There were some labor people working for Kennedy, too, and part of this was the result of the fact that Mrs. Green, after all, has generally had pretty good relations with labor, and always on her committees; since the first campaign in '54, there had been some labor people active. Roy Hill, who's the head of the painters union [International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades] here, and George Brown, from the state AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations] are the two, I would say, were most active. This was, of course, long before 14(b) [Section 14(b) of Taft-Hartley Act]. George Brown was very irate with Mrs. Green at the last session for her stand on 14(b). But I think this is somewhat cooling down, and these people had always worked so closely with her that they just naturally moved on to the Kennedy campaign. Others got involved. I mentioned earlier, school people; well, Dale Henderson, for example, who's mentioned in the paper this morning as having led-the fight in the central committee, I think, last night--or I don't know what night they meant-for repeal of their practice of preprimary endorsements. He's a teacher here in town and very active in teachers' union. He was a Humphrey man, but after the primary that was a different thing, of course. They came in very, very well.

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MORRISSEY: I was going to say that lurking in the background of this primary was the enigmatic figure of Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson].

ANDERSON: That's true.

MORRISSEY: Which way did the Stevensonians in Oregon tend to jump?

ANDERSON: Oh, on the whole I think they jumped to Kennedy, but it was not an easy jump for some. Now, I don't think there were ever more devout Stevensonians in '52 and '56 than my wife and I. And of course, Stevenson had been out here, and we'd had some contacts again, and so we had all the respect and real affection in the world for him. But by 1960 we had concluded that it should be somebody else. I know there's this hassle now over whether or not indecisiveness was a real factor. I happen to think it was, and I think that the Stevenson behavior at the convention demonstrated this very much. It was disappointing to us. All we could do is just regret it and feel very, very sorry for him, but I thought it was a demonstration that temperamentally the job would have been very hard for him. But I think on the whole people did tend to move to Kennedy, but I think it was difficult for them, because Kennedy did not have the same kind of liberal image by any means that Stevenson had.

MORRISSEY: How important was the so-called bandwagon effect by the time Kennedy had won in West Virginia?

ANDERSON: I don't think that was too important here. I really don't. I think things were already moving here.

MORRISSEY: Kennedy when he was campaigning here emphasized the idea that the choice at the convention should be made openly and not in smoke-filled rooms, giving the impression that if Morse had carried Oregon's votes to the convention, he would in turn carry them into a smoke-filled room. Did this make much of an impression on the Oregon voters?

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ANDERSON: I don't think so. This never occurred to me, that this was a very great issue. I don't think so. It would be difficult to do that with an Oregon delegation. You see, after all they're committed by law, and people know how they vote. If they try to play fast and loose, it's known. I doubt whether you could successfully do very much.

MORRISSEY: Did you get a lot of volunteer help in that primary?

ANDERSON: A very great deal.

MORRISSEY: What kind of people were volunteering?

ANDERSON: Oh, gosh, everybody. And, of course, the number of young people was very striking. There's no doubt that Kennedy's youth appealed to young people. You know, it gave them.... Kennedy was the right man at the time, in that sense. We were on the verge of the new era of younger people by far. Now when I look around and see the masses of young people--of course we're surrounded with

them at the school--you realize. And what's this figure? By 1970, half the population will be under twenty-seven, or something? Well, that's phenomenal. In that sense, we were getting younger in '60, and I think these young people were beginning to feel their role as a segment of American population. And he certainly challenged them, had great appeal for them.

A couple of times we had him up at the school, and the response was just tremendous, and there was no problem getting kids signed up then for help. Oh, I would say quite a good cross-section of help: retired people working people; business people, yes and no; but in the intellectuals, and the professions, I think we did fairly well. A lot of volunteer.... Of course, we organized the thing with teams, with captains and so on, you know.

MORRISSEY: So, I would assume that you attribute the victory to good sound organization.

ANDERSON: Well, I think this helped, but I think that the thing that

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really was responsible was the fact that Kennedy was a tremendous candidate, and enough people got to know him to become aware of that. I suppose you could get a good organization and sell a dog, but there was no problem of that here. He was just first class.

MORRISSEY: Did you expect Oregon to go for Kennedy in the campaign against Nixon [Richard Milhous Nixon]?

ANDERSON: No, I didn't. I think that's just too much of an uphill fight. I didn't. I hoped, you know, and we worked for it, but after all Nixon was in one sense pretty acceptable, except to the real diehard Democrats. And also, in that election, I have to say frankly, that falls on the local shoulders, because it isn't important enough to get the kind of outside help and attention. We couldn't expect.... I've forgotten now--maybe Kennedy came back for a day, or a day and a half, something like that, for the general election. Well, that's all you could hope to do, you see. When you consider that in the first thing, for the primary, you're campaigning in the party, there's still a lot of the state left that you want to expose him to, but you can't do it, because we can't command that much time. I don't mean to be defensive about this. I think that's just the political reality. Why should he? I think, yes, if we could have had him, I think a lot of the Republicans would have recognized him as quality, and we could have perhaps taken that, but I didn't expect it under the circumstances.

MORRISSEY: Let me ask two questions about the Humphrey organization: First, before the Wisconsin and the West Virginia primaries, how well organized did it appear to be from your vantage point?

ANDERSON: Here?

MORRISSEY: Mm hmm.

ANDERSON: Well, I really can't answer that too well. I am not conscious of any real organization. They had a headquarters, and I know some of the people that worked with them, but it did not seem to me they had as much organization.

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MORRISSEY: The second question is this: After he lost in West Virginia, did the Humphrey organization in Oregon tend to dissipate.

ANDERSON: I think it took some steam out. Yes, I do. I think it had more impact on them than it did on the Kennedy people here. That was a very bitter disappointment. You know, to get people to work in a campaign, a very great deal does depend upon the personality of the candidates, I think. And Humphrey had some very strong supporters, but he simply does not electrify people the way Kennedy did. For one thing, he talked a great deal on his visits out here. I mean, at a social occasion or anything like this where you're meeting him, he really impressed me as almost a compulsive talker. Now what he was saying was intelligent, and so on. Jack Kennedy would talk, but Jack Kennedy also would listen, and would also stop long enough, you know, to make the other person feel that he was getting his feeling. That's rather a small trait, but I think it makes a difference, as I say, particularly if you're going to get people really committed.

MORRISSEY: Is there anything you think we've overlooked?

ANDERSON: Oh, there are probably a lot of things, but I don't think of them now. But I may think of some others by the time that I see the transcript. So that's probably enough time now.

MORRISSEY: Well, thank you very much.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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