

Eugenie (Helen) M. Anderson Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 03/11/1973
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

(1909 - 1997) Ambassador to Bulgaria (1962-1965), discusses campaigning for Hubert H. Humphrey and John F. Kennedy, appointment as ambassador, and work as a diplomat in Bulgaria, among other issues.

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Signed Eugenie W. Anderson
Eugenie Anderson

Date 1-10-89

Eugenie (Helen) M. Anderson – JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

With

Eugenie Anderson

March 11, 1973
Red Wing, Minnesota

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Uh, why don't we just start by my asking you if you had any contact with John Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] before 1960. You weren't a delegate to 1956, and I don't know....


ANDERSON: I was there...

HACKMAN: But you were there. I didn't know that.

ANDERSON: ...in 1956. Uh, you see, the delegates were elected, uh, in a presidential primary in Minnesota...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...in 1956, and Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] won the state, so all the Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] slate, which I had been on, the



Humphrey slate, were defeated. And so many of us did go to the convention, however, and I went and, as I remember, I, uh, had access to the floor. I was there, as I was some kind of, uh, I suppose, part of Humphrey's staff or something.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: And I was there and fairly involved in the Humphrey campaign for the vice presidency, you might say, as far as it went. And, I only remember.... I don't think I met, uh, Kennedy in 1956. At least if I did, it was just a very casual meeting. And I remember his part in it only as a fact that, toward the end of the convention, there began to be rumors that, uh, he might be, uh, Stevenson's [Adlai E. Stevenson] choice instead of, uh, Humphrey or Kefauver. And then, of course, Stevenson decided to, uh, throw it open to the convention, and it was a foregone conclusion then that it would be Kefauver.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, I do remember of Kennedy's, uh, I believe, narrating a film...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...at the end of the convention, and that he made, uh, an impression on the convention as a very attractive young man, and everyone thought that we would be hearing from him in the future.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But that's about all I remember.

HACKMAN: Nothing in terms of your work with, particularly, state delegations trying to fight Kennedy?

ANDERSON: No. No.

HACKMAN: Well, uh, then, before 1960, are there any contacts with Kennedy or with those close to Kennedy? Let's say, before the spring of '60.

ANDERSON: No, I don't recall any before, uh, the spring of '60. Of course, I was working with, uh, Humphrey and the Humphrey forces. You know, Humphrey's...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...campaign began really, I suppose, in '59. And I was fairly close to his sort of inner circle of, of advisers in Minnesota. I don't recall that I did much campaigning for him around the country. He'd talked about it, but in actual fact, I think I only went to Wisconsin. I do remember several strategy sessions that we had in Minnesota...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...when Jim Rowe [James J. Rowe] came out and, uh, we talked about

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what Humphrey should do or should not do. I was one of those who, from the beginning, was not in favor of the primary approach...

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: ...and advised, uh, him against it. But, of course, I was in the minority and...

HACKMAN: Do you recall who was with you in that position?

ANDERSON: Right. The only one that I can really remember, I think, was Art Naftalin [Arthur Naftalin].

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I think Art and I both felt strongly that it would not be wise, that Humphrey couldn't hope to, uh, win, uh, in a primary fight. We thought it was doubtful that he could even win in Wisconsin...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...because, in the first place, we knew that, uh, Humphrey didn't have the organization that Kennedy obviously had at that time, and he didn't have the money. And, uh, while we thought that he could eventually, perhaps, win the nomination, we just didn't think he could get it by the primaries.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Had you and Naftalin and, and other people that you knew been urging Humphrey much earlier to build an organization similar to the ones that the Kennedys had, or, uh, can you, can you recall that? Is it anything you had given much thought to?

ANDERSON: I think we urged him, yes, earlier than '59 to start working on organization, but, uh, it didn't get very far.

HACKMAN: Yes.

ANDERSON: This was obviously one of his big weaknesses.

HACKMAN: Right. What can you recall about your conversations with Adlai Stevenson, let's say, throughout the '56 to '60 period in terms of what he might do about a '60 campaign?

ANDERSON: I was quite active in the '56 campaign for Adlai. In fact, I was with him on the campaign plane from early in September through the election. And I think that

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one of the reasons that he asked me to, uh, accompany his staff—and I was sort of, uh, officially listed as one of his foreign policy advisers—was because he realized that Minnesota was very disappointed...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...about Humphrey not being chosen as his vice-presidential candidate, and he wanted to do everything possible to keep Minnesota's support and, uh, also to, uh, have Humphrey's support. And I think Humphrey felt and recommended strongly to Adlai that it would be useful for him to have me, uh, on his campaign staff. So I did campaign, but as I remember, I felt that, uh, it was not very productive. Jane Dick and I were about the only women on the campaign plane who were there in non-secretarial or non-lowerstaff capacity.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And the conversations that I was able to have with Adlai about foreign policy were always very, uh, frustrating and disappointing because he didn't really want to make... He wanted to make, he said that he wanted to make foreign policy an issue in the campaign, but his professional staff kept urging him not to in '56. And I felt that this was a mistake, that people were interested in the, uh, issues of peace and foreign policy, that in the end, that would be really basically why they would choose Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] because they thought he would keep the peace.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, but Adlai wasn't able to make up his mind about it and his, his, uh, professional staff prevailed. Chet Bowles [Chester B. Bowles] was along part of the time and he also felt very frustrated on this, and one or two other, uh, people. But by and large, his staff including Arthur Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] really, I think, felt that the domestic issues were the, the bread and butter issues were what counted.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: We didn't make very much headway.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Now, my question is then, from '56 to '60 were there conversations with him about possibly trying again in 1960?

ANDERSON: Well, he, uh, he always... I think there were some conversations, yes, but he always discouraged them, and he didn't really make up his mind until, I think, quite late, maybe well into June...

HACKMAN: Right.

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ANDERSON: ...that he would be a candidate. And I think that—I didn't discuss this with him very much I might have one or two occasions—but Humphrey had urged him that if he was going to do it, he must make up his mind and get started.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Mrs. Roosevelt [Eleanor R. Roosevelt], I think, was very, uh, much of the opinion that he should do it.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I do remember Mrs. Roosevelt's, uh, urging him in 1956 not to choose Kennedy as his vice-presidential candidate, and that she urged him—I happened to be present at the conversation, so I had met him then. Yes, I was present at the conversation. Yes, I was present at a conversation. No, no I hadn't met Kennedy myself—but a conversation that she had with Adlai urging him not to choose Kennedy, but to choose Humphrey in '56. However, as you know, she, she urged Adlai to run again in '60. And I think Humphrey, Humphrey did in a way, although I don't think that he was very sanguine about it.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But, uh, I didn't really have very much to do with it one way or another.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: I think I, I just felt that Adlai wasn't going to do it and I had become a little disenchanted with Adlai's, uh, lack of—or I'd say, maybe disenchanted isn't quite the right word—but I had felt during the '56 campaign that he was indecisive, and I doubted if he would decide the things that had to be decided in time, and so....

HACKMAN: Do you remember at all in that '56 campaign Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] being on that plane and traveling?

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, I do. I remember him quite well. I remember that he was always sort of a loner and he, he quite often was sort of included in a little group that would meet with Adlai in his suite, and, but he was always sort of sitting in a corner and acting rather uncomfortable. And, uh, I felt that, uh, he felt that he was just sort of tagging along, you might say, and that he'd been included because of his brother.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But he seemed more like an observer than a participant. And whether he had

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any real.... Maybe on one or two occasions, Adlai asked him to talk to some people. I don't think he really did play much of a role.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: He seemed very young to me at the time...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...but my impression was that he was sort of out of it. But he was there.

HACKMAN: Right. Skipping ahead then to '60 when you do go in and campaign for Humphrey in Wisconsin, what, what do you recall about the Kennedy campaign there? And what I'm trying to get at is...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...in the interview with Lila Johnson, at one point you say one of things that sort of turned you off on Kennedy was that the campaigns in Wisconsin and West Virginia seemed very ruthless and machinelike.

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: What comes out of Wisconsin, that sort of thing?

ANDERSON: Well, there were.... I think that, as I recall, Robert Kennedy was, sort of, we felt he was sort of the hatchet man. At least in Wisconsin he was. And there were—I don't remember now exactly what the rumors were—but there were rumors that were circulated about Humphrey which we knew were not true. They maybe had something to do with his, uh, record, not having been in the war or something like that....

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: ...and other things that, uh, we felt it was an attempt to smear Humphrey. And, uh, of course, we felt very strongly that it was not, that this wasn't the right kind of a tactic. And we also—maybe it was partly envy—but we also were impressed with the tremendous, uh, organization that they had, far more, uh, paid people and far more bodies...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...at work than we did. We just couldn't, uh, we couldn't begin to cope with them in terms of numbers. And also, uh, we felt we didn't like the way in which the Kennedy family was brought in to sort of glamorize the campaign.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: We didn't agree in Minnesota, Minnesota's a very issue-oriented state...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...and, we didn't agree with the, sort of all these teas and things that we felt were.... We could see they were having an effect and we didn't like that. But I think that one of the things that made the strongest impression on me was a conversation which, uh, Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] had had with Barney Allen [Byron G. Allen], not with me, but Barney Allen was our national committeeman at the time. This was after both Wisconsin and West Virginia. And, uh, the Kennedy people had come to Minnesota to try to persuade us to support Kennedy now that

Humphrey was out of it. And, uh, Barney had, uh, had expressed to Ted that this was not going to be easy for us to do in view of the tactics that we felt that they had used in Wisconsin and West Virginia. And he said, "You must understand that, uh, Humphrey is really a hero to most of us in Minnesota because he's built this party..."

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: "...and he has been our leader for a good many years." And, uh, Ted was not, uh, at all understanding of this point of view, that he, uh, said, "Well, you must understand that we are playing for the greatest stakes in the world..."

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: "...the presidency of the United States, and anything goes."

HACKMAN: Not the kind of answer to give at all.

ANDERSON: It wasn't the kind that impressed us.

HACKMAN: Right. Yes, of course.

ANDERSON: And, uh, so I think that, I don't think that he helped Kennedy when he came. I think Kennedy himself, uh, helped himself. He came, as I remember—as I remember, this was my first remembered meeting with him—I think he came to attend a meeting of the state central committee or of the delegation....

HACKMAN: It was of the delegation in early June.

ANDERSON: Yeah, in early June. And I remember of meeting him at that time, and, uh, he made, I think, a good impression, and a number of people who had been undecided about him at that time, I think, decided to support him.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, I think Sargent Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.] had been out earlier. And he also made a good impression, and, uh, I think, uh, I remember Art Naftalin was very impressed with Sargent Shriver. I think Art was a delegate to that convention.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: Uh, but I think the main reasons that we felt resentful were that we felt that Humphrey was misrepresented. And, uh, this, of course.... Well, we just didn't believe in that kind of politics.

HACKMAN: Yes. How much at that time can you recall religion being a factor in your own mind, not a political factor...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...but in terms of a legitimate feeling that a Catholic...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...would have problems in the presidency?

ANDERSON: Well, I think it was discussed, and I think it was a problem in my mind for a while. Uh, I thought that, I was doubtful if he could be, if a Catholic could be elected. This was my feeling first, in the beginning, and I doubted if he could be. But, of course, I, uh, decided after West Virginia that I was mistaken about that and I think one or two things in Texas happened...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...which I forget, but some conversations that he had in Texas, uh, press interviews or something, that seemed to go a long way toward answering questions that, uh, had existed. But I think that, uh, it was an issue. I think that one of the things that I rather resented, uh, about the Catholic issue was that when I had sought the Democratic nomination for the Senate, uh—or not the nomination, but I'd tried to get the, uh, DFL [Democratic-Farmer-Labor party] endorsement.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: This was in '58 and McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] was also seeking it and McCarthy, uh, had tried to make it an issue. I didn't think that it was an issue at that time, didn't think that, uh, it should be. A lot of my supporters were Catholics, and they didn't consider that there was, the choice was between McCarthy as

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a Catholic and me as a non-Catholic. I'm not an active Protestant, but I mean I'm a nominal Protestant. And, uh, here again, there was sort of a whispering campaign by the McCarthy people that I was anti-McCarthy because I was anti-Catholic.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I resented this very much, and, uh, I felt that some of those same tendencies, uh, existed in the '60 campaign, that if you weren't supporting Kennedy that there was a tendency on the part of some people to consider that...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...you weren't because he was a Catholic.

HACKMAN: When the Kennedys first started to build lines into Minnesota, let's say, in '59 or into '60, were the people that they seemed to be allying themselves with, or, or receiving support from, uh, generally Catholic, generally the same people who had worked with Eugene McCarthy in '58, for example, mostly in St. Paul labor...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...and this kind of thing, you know? Is that a generalization that might be made?

ANDERSON: No, I don't think so. I think that, uh, later on there were, of course, there was quite a bit of support from the, uh, Catholic prominent lay people and also Catholic colleges, but I don't recall that that was the case in '59 and '60. I don't think they made much headway in Minnesota in those years because Minnesota was really pretty solidly Humphrey. There were a very few people that maybe let themselves be known as Kennedy supporters, but I can't remember who they were even.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Perhaps you have, you know.

HACKMAN: Well, I'm thinking of a couple of people that I've seen correspondence from, uh, Bystrom [John Warren Bystrom].

ANDERSON: John Bystrom.

HACKMAN: John Bystrom from St. Paul, and, uh, Hess [Robert Hess], the labor fellow.

ANDERSON: Bob Hess.

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HACKMAN: Bob Hess.

ANDERSON: Yes, I believe, uh, they weren't for Kennedy until after Humphrey was out of it though.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: As I remember...

HACKMAN: Right. That's true.

ANDERSON: ...they were, they both supported Humphrey, and they had both been long-time Humphrey supporters and friends.

HACKMAN: Until after West Virginia, I believe.

ANDERSON: Yeah. And, uh, neither one of them were Catholics at all. Well, maybe Bob Hess is, I don't, I don't remember. We never had really, uh, after the DFL, after the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties had fused, we really hadn't been much conscious of the Catholic, uh, issue in this state. There had been a Catholic issue before the fusion took place...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...because the old-time Democrats, uh, were mostly Irish and mostly Catholic and the Farmer-Laborites were not.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And so there did, uh, there was, I was told—I wasn't active in the party at that time—but I was told that there did tend to be a certain amount of, of opposition in the Farmer-Labor party to the Democrats on that basis. But, uh, after the fusion took place, I don't remember that it was an issue. And one of the reasons, I think, that it wasn't, was because of Humphrey.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Humphrey's leadership was, uh,.... He had uh, for one thing, he had great support among the Catholics and he was always very strongly in support, uh, of non-discrimination on religious...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...or racial grounds, and most of the rest of us felt the same way. We all, civil liberties and, uh, civil rights had been one of our main interests. So I don't

think that this was really an issue.

HACKMAN: Right. Now, after the Minnesota delegation had been selected in '60 and when your Kennedy and Shriver are making trips out, uh, are there other people that they sort of used as their agents with people like yourself who were generally not supportive at that point...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...to try to persuade you, particularly people from what would be called, I guess, the Stevenson, Stevenson wing of the party of something like that? Does Chester Bowles and Arthur Schlesinger make any great efforts with you, for example, at that point?

ANDERSON: Arthur Schlesinger came out, and he didn't see me, but he did see some of the Humphrey people I would think. I remember Geri Joseph [Geraldine R. Joseph] seeing him.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Or the only person that I can remember that came to see me, came along with Art Naftalin, uh, James MacGregor Burns.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And they came down here to talk to me and, uh, to try to persuade me to, uh, support Kennedy. I don't remember others, but there probably were others, but I don't remember.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Now, you mention the personal factors in your decision not to go to the primary in 1960 and generally the fact that you didn't think...

ANDERSON: You mean to the convention.

HACKMAN: I mean to the convention, right. And that Minnesota would be split and all this. How much of, how much of this, for a person like yourself, is just a problem of being caught between Humphrey and Freeman [Orville Lothrop Freeman] who seemed to be going in very different directions...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...at about that time?

ANDERSON: Well, I knew that would be a very unhappy situation, but I think that it was, it was more personal, actually related to my son's, uh, wedding.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But I remember that it would have been a very unhappy thing. I was, uh, I, I was probably equally close at that point to both Humphrey and Freeman, and, uh, they knew what my feelings were. I, I think that I, I accepted the fact that Kennedy was going to be the candidate. I didn't think there was the slightest possibility that that, uh, Stevenson would make it. I certainly didn't think that Humphrey would....

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And I didn't think that Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] would. One of my friends, India Edwards, who had been a very, uh, old friend from the time that I first went into politics and whom I admired very much, she came out to Minnesota in the summer of '60, I think also in June, to try to get support for Johnson. But even though we were good friends and all, I, I didn't feel at all interested in Johnson's candidacy. And I don't think there were many in Minnesota who did.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Everybody liked India, but, uh, hardly anybody was for Johnson at that point.

HACKMAN: All right. Were there, during the convention itself while, while you were here, were there many phone calls back and forth as the delegation seemed to really be, uh, tossing and turning, so to speak, to try to decide what to do?

ANDERSON: I don't remember any of that. I think I, I just sort of felt out of it after I decided not to go. I heard all about it when I, uh, from my friends...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...especially the delegate who took my place, or the alternate...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...who is now the mayor of Red Wing, uh, Demetrius Jelatis.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I don't believe he was mayor then, although maybe he had just been elected. But in any case, they were very unhappy. It was a miserable situation, and they, they all told me about how miserable it was that the Minnesota delegation split up so.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But this was not a new thing for Minnesota. [Laughter]

HACKMAN: Right. Did that, uh, convention and the events before and just after have, have any real impact on Humphrey and Freeman's long-run relationship that, that you could tell?

ANDERSON: I think there was a period of, of estrangement, but, uh, it didn't last too long. Their friendship was really a deep friendship and had, they'd been through a number of...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...struggles together. And this, while I think this was the first time when they were really on opposite sides—of course, Humphrey supported Kennedy as soon as Kennedy got the nomination—and, uh, I don't, I only do recall that after, uh, Freeman went to Washington, that they very soon sat down together. I remember both of them telling me about it, and deciding that they should let bygones be bygones...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and that they had a lot of work to do together. And I think that the estrangement, you might—I would hardly call it an estrangement, but there was a distance between them for that time—I think that it disappeared in a relatively short period.

HACKMAN: After the convention, then, as the campaign gets going in Minnesota in 1960, what kind of efforts can you remember being made, if any at all, to get, uh, yourself or people who you felt...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...close to more involved in the campaign, assuming there's still some, uh, coolness at that point toward Kennedy...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...as the nominee?

ANDERSON: I don't remember that very great efforts were made. I was, I was willing to campaign. I was, uh, had volunteered and said that I would be willing to campaign, but, uh, I don't remember that I was asked to do very much.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I think this is always a problem with uh, every campaign like this where the people had been for one, the one that lost. Uh, the ones that won and that had been there before sort of feel as if it's their ball game. I think this happened last year, too. And, uh, I just felt that I, I wasn't needed very much.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I was asked to do a few speeches, which I did, but I wasn't asked to go outside of Minnesota. And I didn't play really a very active role.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I had thought I would probably be more active than I was, but I wasn't very active.

HACKMAN: I think in your interview with Lila Johnson you covered pretty well then that period, the transition period, when you were basically out of the country, and then coming back...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...and starting to talk...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...about your appointment to Bulgaria. But there were a couple of things. One I mentioned earlier, and that's this meeting on August 2nd of 1961 where you and Senator Humphrey go in and meet...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...with President Kennedy, and you said you could remember something of that.

ANDERSON: I think that I mentioned probably, too, uh, in the other interview, that I had heard from Sargent Shriver while I was in India.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: This was in the Spring of '61. I can't remember, and I can't find the letter, whether he wrote to me directly—you know, he was sort of the one that was making the talent hunt...

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HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...you might say—and asked me if I was interested in an appointment, or whether he wrote to Humphrey and wanted to know how to get in touch with me and said that they were interested in me, and whether Humphrey wrote me. I'm inclined to think it was that way.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But in any case, I was, uh, not going to be back from India until June, and I... I did quite a bit of lecturing while I was in India, and a good bit of it about Kennedy's foreign policy because there was a good bit of interest in it, even though I wasn't very sure...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...about what it was at that time, but I, I did the best that I could. And I do remember of—maybe I mentioned this in the other interview that there was a great concern in, uh, Saigon when I stopped there because there were just—this was at the end of '60. It was before Kennedy's inauguration--and there was just the beginning of the, uh, Viet Cong insurgency...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and the guerrilla activity and two or three Americans had been killed...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...on a golf course or something...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and there was great anxiety among the Americans there because they felt that, uh, nobody in this country was paying any attention. And they wanted me to carry the message back to Kennedy and to Harriman [William Averell Harriman] in particular. They felt that he would have...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I believe perhaps he was going to be the assistant secretary...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...for Far Eastern of southeastern Asia or something.

[-15-]

HACKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: In any case, uh, I felt that this overture—I would wait until I got back to the states to see whether or not—I wasn't sure whether I wanted to have another diplomatic appointment. And I think when I did return, soon after I got in touch with Humphrey, who thought that I should, uh, come back into the government and wanted me to meet President Kennedy with him, and he wanted to talk to Kennedy to find out more specifically if Kennedy was really interested or not.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I think that I was invited to come down to Washington to, for a meeting of some citizens' committee that President Kennedy had established and appointed me to, a Citizens Committee for International Development programs. I think he thought this would help him to get the legislation.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I believe that I was in Washington for that meeting...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and that Humphrey arranged this, uh, interview, took me over to the White House. And I remember, I believe we went in sort of a side door or something.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: It was more or less a, well, not a secret, but I mean it was not publicized in any way.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, as I remember, it was just sort of, uh, a social call. I don't remember what Humphrey and Kennedy talked about. They may have talked about some legislation. Uh, Humphrey mainly wanted Kennedy to meet me and wanted Kennedy to, uh, hear a little bit about the kind of thing that I had done in Denmark, and why Humphrey thought that I should be back in government.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I don't remember, other than that, much about the conversation.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh. There's one other thing in '61. I note this letter to you if you can.... [Interruption]

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ANDERSON: Let's see, yes.

HACKMAN: It's a letter from.... Or I can read it to you if you like. [Interruption] It's a letter from a fellow named Shea or O'Shea [John J. O'Shea], I don't know who he is, but apparently you have given someone some information about the Minnesota house delegation. I wondered if you could remember how that came about?

ANDERSON: Isn't that funny? I can't remember it, no. What was he the executive director of?

HACKMAN: I don't know. I've never heard of him. [Pause] I don't know.

ANDERSON: He must have been, uh.... It might have been in connection with the international development program. It's possible. I think, it seemed to me that President Kennedy had already sent a foreign aid bill to the, about that time.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: I think that that was what our meeting coincided with and it was probably that. I'm pretty sure that was it...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...but I can't absolutely identify it.

HACKMAN: Okay, well, why don't we move on then to Bulgaria. And, uh, let's see what else there is. You said then you went, when you went out in the spring of '62, you talked with Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan]. Can you remember what he had on his mind at that point?

ANDERSON: I think that was, must have been in early, uh, probably that was maybe in the very early spring or maybe even in the winter...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...of '62. But in any case, there again I think that, uh, Humphrey had been checking with Ralph to see. At the time when, uh, Humphrey first discussed this possibility of my being appointed to some diplomatic post, Ralph said that there just weren't any openings at the present time, but they wa-, they did want to appoint me to some suitable post and that, uh, when there were some openings that he would get in touch with Humphrey. And then apparently Ralph did get in touch with Humphrey and said that there were now a couple of openings, one in Romania and one in Bulgaria, and that, uh, they thought it'd be interesting to talk with me about them. So Humphrey and I had breakfast at the White House with Ralph Dungan, and we talked, uh, about the possibility of one or

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the other of those, whether I would be interested in either one, and if so which one I would prefer. And then we had quite a conversation about the State Department, the Foreign Service in general. And as you know, I'm sure, and there was a lot of critical feeling in the White House about the State Department the Foreign service, which, of course, is traditional, but I think that Dungan seemed to be interested in some of the ideas which I expressed, which were also quite critical. And, he asked me in the course of that conversation whether I would consider being on a commission, a small high-level presidential commission, to make a real survey or study of the State Department with recommendations for...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...how it ought to be reorganized...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and what ought to be done to make it, uh, more effective. And he said we would think, for instance, in terms of having some other people on it, people like, uh, Robert Kennedy and, uh, I forget who the others were that he named, uh, but one or two people that he thought the president had considerable confidence in and would have weight with the president. But I said, uh, that while I thought I approved of the idea, I would not be interested in serving on such a commission because in

the first place, I didn't think that the president knew me well enough to really have that much confidence...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...in me and I doubted whether, uh, I was close enough to the bureaucracy to really undertake a job like that and do it well. And I wouldn't want to do it, I said, unless I would know that I would really have the backing of the White House...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...because I could imagine you'd break your neck or your back...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...on such a job...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...and then, uh, it wouldn't get anywhere.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: So he dropped the, uh, idea. I was surprised that he even suggested it.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But, uh, in any case, I said I would think it over about the, uh, Bulgarian or Romanian possibilities and discuss it with my husband. During the course of that conversation, Humphrey expressed considerable approval of my going to one of those places.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Ralph, as I remember, said he thought one of the reasons that they should consider me was because President Kennedy wanted to open things up over in Eastern Europe...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and thought that, uh, with the kind of approach that I had had in Denmark trying to get to the people...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...that this might very well be possible, uh, in Eastern Europe in the coming years. And, uh, he thought it would be a good, uh, a good experiment, you might say, to send someone like me there. So I did think it over, and as I remember, I decided that it would be an interesting assignment, either one. I thought from my.... I didn't know too much about either country, but I thought Romania might have more possibilities than Bulgaria, which I think it probably would have.

HACKMAN: Did, right.

ANDERSON: Did. But, uh, this, uh, I didn't actually.... While Ralph gave me the impression that I would have the choice, the, of course, inner circle in the State Department, uh, decided that, uh, one of their...

HACKMAN: William Crawford [William A. Crawford], right.

ANDERSON: ...yes, one of their sort of, uh, old-timers would, uh, prefer Romania.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And, uh, so he went to Romania and I went to Bulgaria.

HACKMAN: Now, you, uh, you described a bit in the other interview about your briefings in Washington before you went out...

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ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...and that the *New York Times* fellow in Vienna may have been more helpful than all the, all the briefings you had ahead of time.

ANDERSON: I did have one, uh, one or two conversations in, when I was in the, uh, department for the briefings that were very helpful.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: One of them was with, uh, Harlan Cleveland's [J. Harlan Cleveland] brother.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I'm not sure what his first name was, maybe Bob [Robert G. Cleveland?]. I'm not sure. He was his younger brother. And he had served in Sofia. And, uh, my conversation with him was mostly about Mikhail Shipkov...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...who was in prison still.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And that was a very important conversation and gave me really a lot of, a lot more motivation, you might say, about some of the things that I was going to be working on.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I also talked with one or two other, uh, State Department Foreign Service people who had been in Bulgaria, but I don't remember who they were.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: I, I remember that those conversations...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...were more helpful than the strictly formal...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...briefings.

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HACKMAN: You said that, uh, you were a little dismayed in the briefings because possibly you hadn't realized how Stalinist Bulgaria had really been, how extreme.

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: Once you got there, did you find out that that had been overstated a great deal by the, in the state briefings or what other...

ANDERSON: No, I don't think so. Uh, you asked about the reading, by the way...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...that I did before I went. The State Department gave me quite a reading list of books that I thought were helpful. I don't know whether you want me to detail them...

HACKMAN: Yes.

ANDERSON: ...but one of them that I thought was especially good was the book by L.A.D. Dellin, whom I later got to know, on Bulgaria. And, uh, then there was one on the Bulgarian communist party, a history of it since the war. Uh, I can't remember the, well, I've got all the books right out here—I should go and look at them if you really want to know the names of them—uh, one of them was by Cyril Black [Cyril E. Black]...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...on the Bulgarian constitution of 1789.

HACKMAN: Right. He's the fellow who later figures in the Georgiev [Ivan-Asen Khristov Georgiev] case, or whatever.

ANDERSON: Yes, yes.

HACKMAN: I've read some of his stuff.

ANDERSON: And, uh, then there was a marvelous book by, uh—he was really a sociologist called Irwin Sanders who had been in the Foreign Service and served in Bulgaria before the war and who came back after the war briefly—but he wrote a book called *Balkan Village* which was about a little village called Dragalevtsy which was right outside of, uh, Sofia. And this gave me a very, a good picture of what life had been like before the war and, uh, after, the contrast when he came back after the war. I think those were the books which, uh, made the most, uh, impression on me and actually, uh, interested me more, uh, in the assignment. But I don't think that the department had

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overemphasized the degree to which the country was still, uh, quite Stalinist. There began to be a change. Uh, Khrushchev [Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev] had visited Bulgaria shortly before I arrived there. I think he came in May.

HACKMAN: Right, in May, right.

ANDERSON: Uh-huh, and I can think that, uh, the change began to be apparent shortly after his visit, but it was very slow. And, uh, I think that the, the real leaders, the real bosses, you might say, of the country, when I first arrived there, were still pretty much hard-line Stalinists, I think.

HACKMAN: Right, right. Were there other stops you made around town in terms—did you go, for example, to Defense [Department of Defense], to CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]...

ANDERSON: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I, I had briefings, uh, with CIA people. I didn't go to their offices, but they came to the State Department. Excuse me. I went to the, uh, Defense Department as I recall, and I also had briefings with the State Department security people, which made quite an impression on me of the problems that we would have about communication...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and the dangers of, of, uh, infiltration involving our, you know, mission. And, uh, I think that in general the briefings were helpful, but I had the same feeling about them that I had had with the briefings in Denmark. I think probably most, uh, diplomats have the same feeling. You just really have to learn a great deal of it after you're there on the spot because so many of the things that you're told somehow don't mean anything until you're there. Then when you're there, uh, you suddenly find what's important and a lot of the things...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...assume a different kind of reality...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...in a different proportion. And I think the briefings were, were, helpful, but I, I really learned much more after I got there.

HACKMAN: Right. Assuming that, uh, most people knowledgeable in the area of Eastern European affairs at that point within the government would have looked at your appointment as one that was a sort of an opening up because of your background...

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ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...could you feel much resentment or, uh, disapproval at the point before you left in Washington and then maybe you can carry that forward with, uh...

ANDERSON: I don't remember that I was made to feel that in the State Department. I think that, uh, there may have been some reservations among the Eastern European top people. I, I would think as I came to know them later they probably did have some reservations...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...but they didn't make me aware of them. I do think that, uh, actually I had a lot of friends in the State Department still there from the record that I had made in Denmark. And on the whole, I think that I was well received. I don't think that I was made conscious of, if there were reservations, I don't recall.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: There may have been some, but I just don't remember.

HACKMAN: Is there any work that, uh, you did on the Hill [Capitol Hill] before you left in terms of, uh, just acquainting people to the fact that you were going out, laying some groundwork for any-, anything later in terms of, uh, Eastern European relations?

ANDERSON: I don't remember that. I do remember that my, uh, hearings in connection with my, uh, approval by the Senate—I remember going over to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee along with several other diplomats who were up for confirmation—they were very perfunctory, and they didn't ask me much of any questions as I remember. And, uh, they were very courteous, and, but they didn't really....

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I was sort of prepared for...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...questions, you know, but there weren't any very difficult ones.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: There may have been some questions that I didn't know the answer to—I can't remember now what it was—but, uh, I just said I didn't know...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...but I could find out.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: Uh, I don't remember that I had any, uh, meetings other than I did call on our own senators. Uh, I don't remember of any.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Of what value then were...

ANDERSON: I, excuse me...

HACKMAN: Go ahead.

ANDERSON: I might just say that, uh, maybe you were going to ask me about meetings with Kennedy before I went...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...to Bulgaria. And I, I believe there was this one formal...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...call...

HACKMAN: Right. May 28, I believe.

ANDERSON: ...uh, which I don't remember very well. The only thing I do remember about it was that, uh, Kennedy expressed appreciation that I was willing to go there. And he recognized that it'd be a difficult assignment...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and that he, he was hopeful that we could open things up there. And th-, he thought there were more possibilities now in Eastern Europe. It was a very general talk, and I don't remember that we went into any detail. It was a short meeting as I remember. I do remember that I was invited to the White House for dinner about that same time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh. You mentioned that in the other one briefly.

ANDERSON: Yes, yes. And I remember Kennedy greeting me at the door, uh, and saying, in a very jovial and friendly way, "It's a sin to send you to

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Bulgaria." And I wasn't quite sure what he meant by that, but, uh, in any case, that's about all that I remember about my meeting with him. I do remember that at the dinner, uh, at the White House that I sat—there were a number of round tables where there were perhaps eight or ten people at a table. Then there was the one long table where the president sat. I can't remember who were the guests of honor. I think there were some, there were some, but I don't remember who—but in any case, uh, Robert Kennedy sat next to me on my left. I can't remember who sat on my right, but, uh, I was sort of amused because I remembered him, uh, much better than he remembered me. He didn't seem to have a very clear idea of who I was. I think he thought I was going to be a minister to Luxembourg or something like that. [Laughter] And, uh, I tried to straighten him out, but he had his mind on other things. What they were now, I don't remember, but I do remember we had a little discussion about something...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...that he was thinking about.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. You mention stopping off in Vienna and talking with, I, I believe Mike Handler [M.S. "Mike" Handler] of the *New York Times*. Now how was he helpful? What kind of information could someone like that provide that you didn't have? Do you remember?

ANDERSON: Well, yes, I would like to say first whether there were any other meetings, you asked about, that I had in the states with non-officials...

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: ...that I thought were helpful.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: One of the most helpful meetings was with Dr. Floyd Black [Floyd H. Black], Cyril Black's father. Dr. Floyd Black had been the president of the American College, and he and his wife had lived there for a good many years.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: His wife had been Bulgarian.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And this meeting was arranged through, uh, some Bulgarian friends of the Jelatises. I mentioned that Mayor Jelatis, uh, had been my alternate to the

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convention. The, the name of these people who were also helpful to me, their name was Elogin, Albert and Hennie Elogin. They lived in Wellesley, Massachusetts, and Dr. Floyd Black and his wife lived near there also.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I went there and spent a couple of days with the Elogins and they, uh, had the Blacks come. And they were the first people that I had met who were not diplomats who had known Bulgaria before the, uh, war...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and before the Communist take-over. And I felt that they gave me a great deal of insight into, uh, what the people were like and what the country had been like, and, uh, also, uh, they helped me to understand the legacy that the American educators had really left in Bulgaria, which I later realized, uh, had been quite deep.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, Dr. Floyd Black—I'm not sure if he's still living—but, uh, he was fairly elderly at that time but vigorous.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Did you learn at all at that time that, uh, Cyril Black was a contact at the UN [United Nations] with, uh, Georgiev until...

ANDERSON: No, I didn't know that at that time. No. I knew that he was the author of this book that I had read on the constitution and I knew that he was a very distinguished, uh, professor at Princeton [Princeton University] and Floyd Black, his father, was very proud of him.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But I didn't know anything...

HACKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: ...about that contact.

HACKMAN: How much did the, does the CIA tell you at that point about, uh, either CIA people within the country...?

ANDERSON: They didn't tell me very much before I went there. Uh, I don't recall much about our briefings, but, uh, I do recall that I—maybe I'm getting a little ahead of the story, but—I did feel...

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HACKMAN: No, that's all right.

ANDERSON: ...that the CIA reports while I was in Bulgaria were very good. I oftentimes learned, uh, very helpful information from them that we didn't seem to have, uh, access too. It was always awfully difficult to find out what was going on really in the country and especially within the communist party, to any...

HACKMAN: If they're the kinds of things that I've looked at in the National Security Council file...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...they're usually someone in the party or with contacts in the party...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...reporting to the

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...CIA and then the CIA sends the report out to

ANDERSON: Yes.

HACKMAN: ... and they, you know, obviously I don't have the judgment you have, but they seemed awfully accurate...

ANDERSON: I felt they were very good and there were very few times when they turned out not to be accurate or not to be, uh, the way things did go or the way we later had confirmed.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

[PORTION CLOSED]

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: I didn't feel.... I felt that from what I could see, the operation of the CIA there in Bulgaria was much better and more useful than it had been, say, when I was in Denmark. Uh, there, there was a different kind of man who was the CIA representative in the embassy, and I didn't feel that their reports were nearly as useful. Of course, this is an open society...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and we had our own contacts and all...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...but it's quite a different thing in a Communist country.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh. You mentioned in your interview with Lila Johnson that your deputy chief of mission and you did not, were not on the same wavelength.

ANDERSON: No.

HACKMAN: How did, how did you work around.... You talk about then the role that your cultural affairs officer, Bloomfield? Perry...

ANDERSON: Alex Bloomfield.

HACKMAN: Alex Bloomfield, and how important he became to you...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...and how helpful. Uh, how did you handle the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] problem then, more or less working around that person or just assigning him very formal things to do, but not...?

ANDERSON: Well, uh, I didn't, uh... In the first place, he was due for a reassignment during the, 1963 and, uh, I'm not sure whether I asked for this to be speeded up or not or whether I just waited until it came through. I knew that it was just a matter of time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Uh, we had correct relationships uh, and there were times when he was, uh, I felt, helpful. But I think that he, he felt probably a little isolated and he

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probably felt a little left out because it was so apparent that with the negotiations on the financial, uh, claims, which were one of my main assignments that first year, uh, he couldn't be very helpful. And Alex Bloomfield...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...was enormously helpful not only as an interpreter, but also as a strategist. And he understood the psychology of the Slavic people...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...because he was himself a Slav.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, uh, Charles Stefan [Charles G. Stefan] had had a different kind of a background, and I think, uh, I just don't think that he was, uh, really the right person for that, uh, assignment. And then there's always the, there's always a problem, he had been more or less in charge of the mission before I came because Mr. Page [Edward Page, Jr.], Minister Page...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...had not been in good health and hadn't been very active. And I think I, uh, gradually learned that Mr. Stefan had really more or less run things...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and I suppose it was hard for him feeling displaced. I'm sure it was and, uh, I suppose he thought he would continue that way and, uh, when he learned that he wouldn't and that I was really in charge and going to be, I expect that he felt some resentment.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But, he, he, uh, I don't think that he was disloyal to me. There was one time when he had made a decision without consulting me that I didn't feel was proper. That was shortly after I arrived there and I found out that he had already decided about the protocol rank of my husband.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And, uh, this I felt was very improper. And, uh, I didn't accept it and the State Department backed me up, and I think he was unhappy about that, but...

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...he wasn't, it didn't last very long or didn't, you know, it was not a festering...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...conflict. We didn't have any big confrontations or anything like that. We were just on a sort of formal basis, you know.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. You mentioned again in that first interview, uh, the situation—is it Plovidav?

ANDERSON: Plovdiv.

HACKMAN: Plovdiv Fair [Twentieth International Trade Fair, Plovdiv, Bulgaria] with the pamphlets and this whole crazy...

ANDERSON: Oh, yes.

HACKMAN: ...crazy cops kind of thing. But what, I came across a telegram from you to the department, uh, where you raised the problem of not being informed that NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] maneuvers were going on in Northern Greece along the border...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...on the very day that was American day at the fair.

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: Can you remember the back and forth with the department there and what was settled if anything?

ANDERSON: Well, I, I remember that, uh, because I hadn't been informed, it was too late to do anything about it. I do remember that. And I do remember that I felt that, uh, I should have been informed and I was rather irate about it. Uh, it wasn't, it didn't get to be a big problem as I had feared it might. I was afraid the Bulgarians might make a big issue of it...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...but I don't think it amounted to very much.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: There wasn't anything that could be done about it by that time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh. I assume that's basically the same case with this question I had on the Bulgarian ship wanting to dock in Tampa.

ANDERSON: Yeah.

HACKMAN: There was very little you could do about that after the fact.

ANDERSON: Yeah, yeah. It was just too late for me to... I don't know if I could have had any effect in any case—in those cases—because I think those were probably decisions that had been cleared, you might say, with the Defense or taken by the Defense Department and I doubt if the State Department, really, people really sort of thought about it, you know, which they should have, but I don't think they did.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. I had a question then about, uh, interpreting the, uh, the, uh, convention, uh, of the, uh, Bulgarian Communist party in November.

ANDERSON: The Congress [Bulgarian Communist Party Congress].

HACKMAN: Right, the congress of the party and, uh, what that all meant...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...and then what the purges or

ANDERSON: ...Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...whatever the self-incrimination meant. Was there a problem in interpreting exactly what that meant, the dissension?

ANDERSON: Nobody knew what was going on before the Congress. Everybody was trying to find out. And all the diplomats were asking each other if they knew what was going on and as I remember, uh, everyone was wrong. Almost all the diplomats at least were wrong, and the sources that we had, the only source there that I do remember, I do think that the CIA reports did report to us that there might well be a shake up.

HACKMAN: Right. This is what I thought was so striking. They seemed to be pretty well informed of that.

ANDERSON: Yeah, and they knew, uh, but, uh, none of the diplomats did. The only diplomat the I think did have some idea of it was the Yugoslav ambassador,

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Ajtic [Predrag Ajtic]. He was usually in closer touch with the party people, Bulgarians, and he usually seemed to have better sources than we did. I used to talk with him every chance that I got...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...because I felt he was well informed.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I think he had some ideas, but I don't believe, uh, anyone had quite realized that Yugov [Anton Yugov] would be out completely. And nobody, uh was quite sure what it would all mean until, as time went by, we began to see that, uh, there were, that some of the things that had been sort of rumored about—that there would be freedom of discussion within the party and that there would be the release of political prisoners and quite a few other prisoners and that there would be more, uh, cultural freedom and that there would be the possibility of, uh, exit visas being given to people to go...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...to leave the country, to go abroad for visits.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And this, these things did, uh, turn out to be true in the coming months, but at first we weren't quite sure whether to really believe these things or whether it was just, uh, talk.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But it gradually emerged that there really had been a fairly important shake-up. I'm not sure how deep the purges were. There were differing reports about how deep they were. It was fairly widespread...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...as I remember.

HACKMAN: You spoke of talking with other members of the diplomatic community and in, uh, one of the episodes you recount in your first interview was, uh, when you walked out of the, uh, at the time that insulting remarks were made...

ANDERSON: That was in November. That was after the Cuban...

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HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...missile crisis.

HACKMAN: And that several other NATO people, I believe, left.

ANDERSON: Yes.

HACKMAN: How much, uh, how much cooperation was there either with, among NATO ambassadors or ministers...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...and, uh, beyond that, if there were any other groupings that...

ANDERSON: We had a, a fairly informal or maybe you'd even call it formalized, uh, group, the NATO diplomats and chiefs of mission. We met fairly regularly and we, we could meet--they were the only non-Americans that were permitted to use our security room...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...in the mission--we had meetings in that room fairly regularly and also on an ad hoc basis whenever there was something that came up that we thought we ought to consult together about. And I think that in general, there was a tendency for the m-, NATO mission chiefs to sort of look to the American as the leader...[Interruption]

BEGIN TAPE II SIDE I

ANDERSON: ...uh, sort of establish my credentials with them, I think, because I suppose some of them, most of them—they were all career people, of course—and most of them were older than I or at least, uh, much more experienced than I and most of them had been in Bulgaria for some time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I think at first, uh, there was a little skepticism about, uh, not only about the fact that I was a woman and a non-careerist, but some of them were openly skeptical about my, uh—what soon became apparent—my efforts to establish communication with the people. And they were worried about this, and they were afraid that it, it might, uh, have, you know, counter, could be counterproductive. At least that's what they s-, told me. And, uh, some of them as individuals, I remember in particular the Greek, uh, charge d'affaires, was very worried as to how it would affect, uh, relations with Greece, and...

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HACKMAN: Is this Papadopoulos at the time...

ANDERSON: No.

HACKMAN: ...or is Papadopoulos, was pulled out maybe the year before.

ANDERSON: No, this was, uh, this was George Yobas [Jean Georgiou Yobas] is his name. Jean Georgiou. And, uh, he was, he was very bitter about any efforts to improve relations between Bulgaria and the United States. He thought this could only be at the expense of Greece.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, while he was very courteous and, and we had fairly, I would say, friendly relationships—and I always kept him quite well informed, better than I did the other NATO ambassadors about anything that concerned Greece—but, uh, he was always getting these messages from the Greek politicians about how they felt threatened and there were these ridiculous rumors in

connection with the Greek elections that we were going to try and press, uh, pressure Greece into giving Bulgaria free port rights and all, all kinds of crazy things.

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: And this caused some nervousness with, uh, Georgiou and I was always having to tell him that these things weren't true. Once or twice I was really irritated, frankly, because he accused me of going, actually working, uh, against Greece and wo-, working for Bulgaria, which, uh, was the last thing in the world that I wanted to do. And, well then, he apologized, and, but he was under pressures of this kind and you may recall in, in the other interview that the American ambassador in Greece had the same....

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I think I went into that...

HACKMAN: I think you, I think you mentioned it.

ANDERSON: ...in some detail. Labouisse [Henry R. Labouisse] was there at the time.

HACKMAN: Henry Labouisse.

ANDERSON: He was quite, uh, disturbed because he, he, he fell for the rumors that I was coming to Greece to try to...

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...have some influence...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...or something, which I was just coming for a vacation.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I wanted to get away from Bulgaria...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...for a little while. But in any case, I had, uh, good relationships as the time went by with, uh, all our colleagues in the NATO group, and I became really, I would say, quite, uh, close friends with the Turkish

minister who I thought was one of the best informed. And, uh, the French and the British, I didn't feel that they were as well informed as even we were.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I felt that the, uh, as I mentioned, the Yugoslav, outside of the NATO group, I felt that he was one of the most useful.

HACKMAN: Any one, uh, neutralist countries or even bloc countries who were at all helpful or even friendly to you?

ANDERSON: Well, of course, uh, Yugoslavia was not in the bloc, but it was not, it considered itself nonaligned. And I felt he was very friendly. We, we had a very good relationship. He was recalled, uh, I think, late in '63, probably early '64, because he fell out of favor with, uh, Tito [Josip Broz Tito] for a while. And then, uh, I never got to know his successor as well. He was a different kind of a man. But Ajtic was, uh, a very open and, I think, very pro-American and very friendly person, and we got along. In fact, I think we got along extremely well. I also was very friendly with the Israeli ambassador, our minister he was, and we had a close relationship and they had sources, uh, from the Jewish community—what there was left of it—in Bulgaria that oftentimes were helpful.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, eventually my, my relationships with, I think, the Polish, uh, ambassador who became the dean of the diplomatic corps for a little while,

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they, they became quite warm, and the Hungarian also. Uh, the Czechoslovakian, I never got very close to and the Romanian became more and more friendly toward me...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...as the Romanian line changed.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: So that I thought all those contacts were of interest and Soviet, the relationships with the Soviet ambassador went up and down with the U.S.-Soviet relations...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and also the personalities of the Soviet ambassador. When I first arrived there, the man who was there had been there for a quite a few years. In fact, I believe he was at that time the dean of the corps. Denisov [Georgy A. Denisov] was his name. He didn't stay very long. Uh, he was quite an outgoing, friendly fellow. Then his successor Organov [Nikolai N. Organov], who was a member of the Politburo, I believe, he was more formidable and, uh, he could be quite aggressive and sometimes was very aggressive...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and crude, uh, but when he had instructions to be the opposite, the, uh, he put on quite an act.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, it was a rather interesting association, but I always just knew that it was strictly according to orders.

HACKMAN: Right. How much did you, how much contact did you have with people like, uh, Crawford in Romania, Outerbridge Horsey was...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...in Czechoslovakia, and, of course, Kennan [George Frost Kennan] in Yugoslavia.

ANDERSON: Well, I felt the most rapport with Kennan, uh, partly I had known of him before, of course, and, and admired him for a long time from afar, but I, I

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hadn't met him. They invited us to come over and see them, which we did and then they came back and spent a few days with us. And we just got along so well together that I felt, uh, you know, as if we were old friends. And, uh, we had, we felt we had similar problems and similar feelings about the State Department, the Eastern European, uh, people, because we'd both had a lot of frustrations with them. And Kennan confirmed my feelings that, uh—which I didn't know as much about the State Department bureaucracy as he did—but he, he said that he thought that they were the most conservative of all the, uh, different groups...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...in the State Department, that the Eastern European officials were, are the ones in charge of Eastern Europe, and uh, he thought there was need for a thorough housecleaning. Uh, he was pretty upset about them, and,

uh, we had a lot of interesting talks comparing notes. With Outerbridge Horsey, I think he came to visit us a few days, and, uh, we enjoyed his visit, but we weren't able to return the visit. He asked us to, but we couldn't get away. Uh, he was more of an old-line careerist and I don't remember that we had as much contact as I did feel with Kennan. And, uh, with Bill Crawford, they came to see us once and we went to see them once or twice, maybe only once. But I don't remember that we, uh, had as much rapport, you might say, as I felt with Kennan. I think, uh, then I visited Poland and I also visited, uh, the Soviet Union in '64 and, uh, the Cabots [John Moors Cabot] were extremely friendly and I thought very helpful. And, uh, the, uh, our ambassador in the Soviet Union was.... Isn't it dreadful, I can't...

HACKMAN: Beam [Jacob D. Beam] hadn't been appointed then yet, had he?

ANDERSON: No, no, no.

HACKMAN: Was Thompson [Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr.]....

ANDERSON: No.

HACKMAN: After Thompson?

ANDERSON: No, that was before Thompson. Well, his name is just gone at the moment, but, uh, he's a professor now in Florida, in the University of Florida, you surely would...

HACKMAN: I'm, uh, you know, it's like it is for you. I, I know I've seen the name a hundred times.

ANDERSON: Well, in any case, it'll come back to me, but right now, his name escapes me. But, uh, the immediate ones right around us, the Greek our, our, uh,

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ambassador in Greece.... I finally did stop there on the way through to, uh, make a visit on vacation to the Middle East and, uh, we went there for lunch and all but we didn't have, we had a rather distant relationship after that little incident...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...earlier in 1963 when he...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...had thought that I was coming and then told me not to come.

HACKMAN: Who were the people in the, uh, East European area that particularly give you problems? Is it Vedeler [Harold C. Vedeler]? Is that his name? Is that the way you say it?

ANDERSON: Well, Mr. Vedeler was in charge of the, uh, Eastern European division...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...and as I recall, Richard Davis [Richard H. Davis]...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...was the assistant secretary...

HACKMAN: Deputy...

ANDERSON: ...or deputy secretary, and Bill Tyler [William R. Tyler, Jr.] was the assistant secretary for European affairs. Of course, I had the most, uh, contact with, uh, Vedeler although once or twice when I was back for consultations, I did, uh, I did talk with Tyler and also with Davis. I felt that Tyler was helpful on one or two occasions and, uh, I, I didn't feel that, I didn't feel that you'd say that Mr. Vedeler gave me trouble, but I would say that, uh, his, his, ah, caution at times was, uh, I thought, I thought he was so cautious that at times...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...it was very difficult to persuade him...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...of things. But I did persuade him and the others—I think we talked also with Davis and Tyler when I went back for my first consultations at the end of

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'62—I persuaded them to let me try to negotiate the financial claims settlement in Sofia. They had been working on it in the department for several years and weren't making any headway. And I felt that with the changing atmosphere in Sofia and the expressed desire of the Bulgarians to improve relations...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and that we kept saying that we wanted to improve relations, that there might be some more possibilities.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I think at first they were a little reluctant to let me do it, but then they decided that there wouldn't be any harm in trying.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, so we did, uh, we did get instructions down on that. I also finally got their cooperation.... I hadn't gotten anybody interested in the problems of the legation residence. I kept sending telegrams about it, but no one seemed to pay much attention and it was really shocking.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: The residence was just in dreadful shape. The Pages had been gone a great deal and I think they'd had also most of their own furniture there...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and they had left the mission in just very poor condition, the residence I mean.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And I had to go back with photographs and really pound on some desks...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Right.

ANDERSON: ...in order to get people interested. But I finally did. And I can't remember, there were one or two other things that I thought would make a great difference for the morale of the, uh, staff in the legation that I finally succeeded when I was back there...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: ...in interesting them. One was about our pouches. We only got mail I think once a week, uh, in the classified pouch and we had discovered that it was utterly impossible to get our personal mail in the open pouch because, uh, the letters were always opened and delayed. And I did get it worked out so that we would have, uh, the personal mail twice a week in the classified pouch and I also succeeded in, uh, getting approval for us to look for and try to establish a recreation house in

the mountains near Sofia at Borovets for the staff because, you have no idea of the difficulties and strain and tensions that the legation staff worked under and lived under.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, I felt it was absolutely essential for them to have more recreation possibilities and to get outside of the mission and I finally got approval for that by going back that time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I also got the approval from the Defense Department—and I guess State had been the reluctant party. Defense had always been willing—to send planes on a periodic basis whenever we needed them, so to speak, that would bring in supplies...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and would also provide transportation for our, our staff to go out on recreation, rest and recreation. And, uh, so these were some of the things that really made an enormous difference in the morale and attitude of the staff, uh, when we were able to work these things out.

HACKMAN: Right. Were there any, uh, people at the upper levels of the department that were helpful to you on, on getting the East European desk or the European desk, uh, to cooperate on things like, for example, I've heard people say when they came back, well, Harriman was very interested in what I wanted to do...

ANDERSON: Uh-huh.

HACKMAN: ...so I took my problem to him and he reported it.

ANDERSON: Yes. I was going to say I did see Harriman on several occasions and he was interested and he was helpful and so was George Ball [George W. Ball]. And, uh, I remember, I think, I always saw them and I saw Rusk [Dean Rusk] also. Rusk was also interested, but, uh, he was a little more involved with other things.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: And I think that, uh, I think that Harriman, having served in the Soviet Union, he was aware of the problems.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Ball was especially interested in things from the economic...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...side at that time, I think and, uh, they were both helpful. And, uh, I think it...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...helped my position in the State Department for the people at the lower levels to know that, uh, Harriman and Ball...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...were willing to see me. I do remember one thing. I can't remember whether it was the first time that I came back or the second or the third, but it was on one occasion when I came back that, uh, the, uh, lower officials in Eastern European division didn't seem to be very interested in, uh, pressing for an appointment for me to see the president. And, they didn't think there was much reason for me to see him, that there weren't any things that he really had to...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...decide about or do anything about at that stage. And that was true, but I knew that it would make a difference, uh, in my prestige in Bulgaria and in my dealings with the Bulgarian officials if I saw him. But I couldn't seem to get them activated on it, and, uh, so I got, uh, Humphrey to intercede for me and I got the appointment without any difficulty.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And it was a short appointment...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and it was, uh, you know, didn't, wasn't.... I don't remember very much what we talked about excepting the first time that I, so it must have been the first time that I came back when President Kennedy, uh, spoke with, I felt, some understanding about what a depressing, uh, place that Bulgaria must be and he seemed to have more sort of feeling...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...about this than I would have expected from the human point of view because he was quite right, it really was enormously depressing in especially the first months. Well, you never really got used to lack of freedom or to the constant, uh, oppressive atmosphere of living in this country where everybody was under the control of the police and the party and where we were under constant wraps...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...even in our house, our own bedroom.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: We never could talk freely.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And all this was, uh, not only tension-producing, but it was depressing.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And very, you get very, so inhibited, you know, that you, you just feel as if you can't talk to anybody...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and you really don't dare to. And, uh, President Kennedy seemed to have some understanding of this although I think it was on that visit that he was, I didn't think he had been as well briefed as I would have thought he would have been before my visit because he thought I was in Yugoslavia.
[Laughter]

HACKMAN: How embarrassing. I wonder what he thought George Kennan was doing.

ANDERSON: Yeah. And when I, uh, set him straight on it, that I was not in Yugoslavia, I was in Bulgaria, why he, "Oh, yes, oh, that's right." And maybe he just misspoke himself, but I had the feeling that he had the same difficulty that a lot of people have, all those countries over there, you know, they're all...

HACKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: ...sort of a big blur.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah. But you never felt that, uh, that, uh, the policies you were

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pursuing, that, uh, that Rusk or Ball or Harriman were at all disapproving of what you were about there?

ANDERSON: No, not at all.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: Quite the contrary, quite the contrary. I felt that the, uh, officials at the other levels, particularly now to take one example, Mr. Vedeler who was the one with whom I had the most contact, I felt that at first he was probably the most uneasy about me. He happened to be in Bulgaria at the time of, uh, my walkout...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Right.

ANDERSON: ...and he was with me there at the.... He, himself was a little indecisive. He didn't know whether I should walk out or not and, uh, he, you know, he didn't want to say yes, didn't want to say no, but he went along when I said, "Yes, I'm going to."

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And, uh, then later he told me—I think while he was still there—that he felt that, uh, it was a very good thing that I had done this and he said he thought that this together with my strong actions at the Plovdiv fair, which they had commended me for by telegram, had, uh, been a big help in establishing me with the Bulgarian officials and he thought that they would now realize that they couldn't push me around, and that if they had had any such ideas because I was a woman and...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...a non-careerist, that they would, uh, they would understand that this was not the case and he thought it was helpful. Uh, I might say that, uh, I think my position as a political appointee was a help to me in Bulgaria. The State Department people maybe didn't realize it, but, uh, for all, in the communist countries, the main communist ambassadors, they were all political. They were from the party and, uh, they felt that because I was from the party and because I was a personal, uh, friend of the President and other people high up in the Democratic party, this gave me much greater influence. And it did.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, I could always sort of subtly threaten them with, uh, going to Congress...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: ...and the president, you know. That this was going to disturb the Congress, this was going to disturb the president. They were far more concerned about them than they were about the State Department.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: So I felt that this actually—and I, I must say I felt the same thing was true in Denmark, the democratic country—that my position as a political appointee made me stronger in the eyes of the leaders, uh, much stronger. The political leaders in Denmark were very realistic...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and they knew that it gave me a better understanding of their problems. In Bulgaria, of course, the party was entirely different and it took something else for me to understand their party.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But in any case, uh, it certainly was, uh, not a disadvantage to be a political appointee.

HACKMAN: One of the, uh, points from looking at the National Security Council file where it seems as though you're in some disagreement or at least impatient with the department is over the African students thing.

ANDERSON: Oh, yes.

HACKMAN: And I notice that wasn't discussed at all in the interview with Lila Johnson...

ANDERSON: No.

HACKMAN: ...so I wondered if you could, uh...

ANDERSON: Yes, I read my letters about that just a few days ago and, uh, recalled that they were very, uh, impatient because we felt that we had this wonderful opportunity to, uh, open our doors, you might say, to a handful—it wasn't much more than a handful—of African students that suddenly wanted to leave Bulgaria because they, they had been badly treated by the Bulgarian government. I think the Bulgarian authorities probably, uh, came to realize that they had made a big mistake in arresting a lot of the students who were...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: I don't know if you know the background of their first big sort of uprising. The African students wanted to have an all-African student union in Bulgaria, in Sofia. They were representing a number of different countries and the Bulgarian officials in the education ministry who dealt with them insisted they couldn't have an all-African student union. They h- could have a Kenyan student union, but they were afraid of letting them all be...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...in one big group and, uh, so the African students felt this was very unreasonable and, uh, they decided that they couldn't ever get their, their desires for more different arrangements with some of their courses, and living arrangements, and their dissatisfactions about they felt they were discriminated against because they were black.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: There had been some episodes about the students dating Bulgarian girls and things like that. And they started a march to the, uh, education ministry to stage a demonstration, a protest demonstration and they were intercepted on the way by the Bulgarian police who, uh, arrested them and bundled them all into buses and took them to police headquarters, and they were held, I think, overnight or something like that. And, uh, this happened that our legation was the only one that knew anything about this. It never got into the papers, uh, in the Bulgarian papers. Some of our people happened to observe it and also we had good contacts within the African student group. Alex Bloomfield knew quite a few of them because they would come to our library to get books...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...medical books and others that they could understand. This was one of their gripes, that they couldn't understand the Bulgarian textbooks...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and they wanted to have access to English written texts and so on. Most of them did speak English or read English. And, we, we also had some other contacts, but I think Alex had the most contacts and I believe Tom Blackshear had some too. So we knew what was fer-, going on, fermenting, you might say and we had been reporting this to the department, but no one had paid too much attention to it. Well, then when there was this big explosion and the Ghanaian students then wanted to leave the country...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: ...and the Ghanaian ambassador came to us, wanting our assistance to get visas for them to go to the United States—they didn't want to go back to Ghana—most of those who were being, who wanted to leave were Ghanaian although the Bulgarians wanted to send practically all of them back to Africa and, uh, later I think they withdrew from that position. But in any case, we couldn't get the State Department to lift the normal visa, immigration entrance requirements, even for student visas and we felt that they should make, uh, an exception in this case, that it would be a dramatic, uh, way of demonstrating our interest in Africa and in, uh, African students, and the race question at home was also coming more and more to the fore.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And we also felt that we should, uh, try and provide some scholarships for them and get them placed in American colleges. And the State Department didn't seem to want to interest itself much on either one of those things. They said this would all take some time and they would see what could be done and they didn't come right out and say no, but they just kept sort of putting us off.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And finally, uh, we did arouse enough interest among somebody to get, uh, the international students' union to send an American student there to Sofia who had, in his hand, uh, enough money—oh, this was another thing we wanted from the State Department was money from them to...

HACKMAN: Travel.

ANDERSON: ...get transportation--he had enough money for I believe, thirty-six students, and, uh, but he didn't have the places for them to, the colleges that would take them. And so we were trying to get this worked out. We

did get a few out, but, uh, some we got to West Germany and, I believe, some to the Netherlands. But we never did get the State Department really to open up on it and we felt it was a lost opportunity, uh, but I will say that our whole contact with the Ghanaian embassy during that became stronger and I think they were convinced that we were doing the best that we could...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...but we didn't succeed.

HACKMAN: Is this the kind of, uh, instance where you could have gone to a Humphrey or someone on the Hill [Capitol Hill] and gotten them to make statements or talk to the press about this, or is that something you wouldn't have considered on that?

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ANDERSON: Uh, well, I don't recall that I thought of doing it because I, I felt that probably the only way in which we could really get any action, I mean, you would, you would almost have had to be there, I think, if you were going to get much publicity on it.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: There wasn't as much publicity on this in the Western press as I thought there would be. There was some, but, you see, there was no Western newspaper person...

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: ...representative in Sofia and so, so many of these things that by the time the news got out to the West, it was no longer news.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, I don't recall that I considered going to Humphrey on that. I think I might have, uh, been in contact with the Institute of International Education. I once served on their education committee board, uh, but we didn't, it was in the middle of the year, you see, this is another thing. Hardly any college can do anything that fast. It all would...

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: ...have had to be extraordinarily expedited.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: Nobody cared that much or realized what it could mean.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh, something completely different, how did the new Bulgarian ambassador to the United States Popov [H.E. Lyubomir Popov] or whatever it is...

ANDERSON: Popov.

HACKMAN: Popov.

ANDERSON: Yes.

HACKMAN: Does that have any impact, the earlier guy leaving and then Popov taking his place?

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ANDERSON: I don't recall that, uh, there was, I just don't recall that it made much of a, a....

HACKMAN: Oh, Voutog [Peter G. Voutov] or whatever his name was...

ANDERSON: Voutov was...

HACKMAN: ...was the first one.

ANDERSON: Voutov had been there for a number of years and he was just leaving about the time that I was going to Bulgaria and I think that Voutov played a very important role in my negotiations with the financial claims settlement.

HACKMAN: Right. Right. He's the guy you deal with most of the time.

ANDERSON: Yes. He was appointed, I believe—I later came to think that he was appointed just specifically to deal with the...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...on the claims settlement—he had worked on this when he was in the department or in Washington...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...as the Bulgarian minister. And, uh, so he was familiar with the issues and he had been back and forth over them for several years. Uh, he was just as anxious, I think, personally to get a settlement as I was so there was, this was a good thing. Uh, he was, uh, shortly after we, uh, reached the settlement, he was then, uh, demoted, uh, and he was no longer the deputy foreign minister. And he became, uh, uh, deputy minister, I think, or maybe minister for cultural affairs, education and cultural affairs and this was really a demotion for him and not in his field and I learned that, uh, he felt very unhappy about it and that one reason for this was because they felt that, uh, he was too interested in improving relations with the United States and they felt that, obviously, that he and I were getting along too well.

HACKMAN: Just like in the, uh, State Department of the United States, education and cultural affairs is usually a step down.

ANDERSON: Yes, alas, yes. And, uh, so I felt very sorry about this because I, I had felt that we were making headway with Voutov and from that time on, I, I dealt mostly with the foreign minister himself, Bashev [Ivan Hristov Bashev]. But, uh, he was, uh, I think, more insecure than Voutov and also I think he was a under tighter sort of control, you might say, than Voutov had been.

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HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Uh, Voutov got back into grace, I think. After we left, he was appointed as their ambassador to London and the last I heard he was still there. And we did perhaps make some headway after he sort of got into his job as minister for education and cultural affairs because we then began to do more in the cultural field and I think that he was fairly helpful although I think he was a little insecure...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...after his demotion. In fact, I heard that he'd, his children had been too westernized and become too pro-American and this was part of the problem.

HACKMAN: Right. Right. What can you recall then about dealing with the department on raising the legation to an embassy? I believe you suggested it at least formally in August of '63.

ANDERSON: Yes. I felt that we, having settled the claims and having, uh, settled, the outstanding citizenship cases, those were the arguments that were, we had been giving the Bulgarians, for, that we had to do this before we could raise the missions to the status of embassies.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, now we had settled those things, I felt that we ought to raise the mission, uh, as an encouragement and just because we had more or less, they had fulfilled their side of what we had said was part of the condition and, uh, I felt that we should do it. But then somewhat to my dismay, I think the department decided that, uh, until Romania was ready, that, uh, because of the things that were going on in Romania as compared with, uh, what was still, they felt, pretty backward in Bulgaria...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...that they, we shouldn't raise that first. I was never convinced that this was really a legitimate reason. I felt it may have had something to do with personal contacts, perhaps because Bill Crawford was, uh, you know...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...a careerist and they wanted, uh, him to be the first ambassador...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...between the two countries. In any case, they, the State Department—I

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don't remember what excuse other than that—but, uh, they, they didn't do it for some time until I had left there for some time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I didn't feel that it was catastrophic, but I felt that it would have been helpful because there were, you know, quite a lot of positive developments at that time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I think it would have helped us.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. You'd, uh, discussed in some detail in the other interview, Orville Freeman's trip out, but you didn't mention the, uh, visit brief visit, I guess that Earl Warren, Drew Pearson, and that whole group made in August of '63.

ANDERSON: Yes, that was, of course, very brief. It was, uh.... They came on a yacht and the yacht was, uh, anchored in Varna and, uh, we flew over to have dinner with them and we stayed over night in Varna. We flew over at their invitation which came rather suddenly. We didn't know they were coming or anything. We hadn't been informed. I don't know if they had informed the State Department even...

HACKMAN: I don't know. I remember you mentioned it to the department.

ANDERSON: ...until they just, uh, called up, I think, Drew Pearson, and said they were there and wanted us to come over and have dinner with them. And, uh, I think the Freemans had just left or I had just been somewhere. In any case, I had just gotten back from some big trip and if it had been anybody but the chief justice of the United States, I'm sure I would have declined, but because he was present, naturally I felt that I wanted to go. I had, uh, met the chief justice when I was ambassador to Denmark and I had a high regard for him and so we did go. I had also met Drew Pearson sometime before that. And when we, uh, got there, we found that, uh, Mrs. Eugene Meyer [Agnes E. Meyer]—I guess we knew this before—it was really her yacht I believe, or she had rented the yacht. She was the hostess, the official hostess and her daughter, Mrs. Phillip Graham [Katharine Meyer Graham]...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...who was in a state of shock because her husband had, uh, just committed suicide.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: She had left the yacht to go back for his funeral but she had come back...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...to it and, uh, so she was.... I felt, very, very sorry for her that she had to, you know, be, be there at all but that was apparently where she wanted to be...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and it was probably easier for her to be there than in Washington. But in any case, uh, Clayton Fritchey was also on the yacht, and there was a, a New York neurosurgeon, I believe, by the name of Dr. Eklund and Chief Justice and Mrs Warren [Nina Warren]. I don't recall anyone else who was there. There may have been someone else that I don't remember. But in any case, uh, we had a very, uh, pleasant evening. Zhivkov [Todor Zhivkov] had given an interview to Drew

Pearson. Zhivkov was then prime minister and, uh, I'm sure that he was hoping that he would, that Bulgaria would get some good, uh, mention in the American press because of it. I don't think I ever saw the interview, or maybe I did. I think it was a favorable.... I remember of being surprised because Drew Pearson was very impressed with him, thought he had an electric personality, which it never particularly electrified me. [Laughter] And, uh, he was, uh, he thought he was quite a dynamic fellow and, uh, the chief justice was present for the interview, as I remember. They told me that evening that, uh, Zhivkov had expected that I would be present also and, uh, I was sorry that I hadn't been informed about it...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...but I think it was just as well that I wasn't. And, uh, in any case, I don't remember that, uh, very much serious conversation took place throughout the evening. They told me about the interview. I don't think I learned, uh, anything...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...that I hadn't known about before. It was always nice to see them, you know, to see people from home, and I liked the Warrens very much and Mrs. Meyer I had known for some time, I think. It was a very, you know, pleasant evening, but it was just for that one evening.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Then we went on, I think, the next day and we went back to Sofia.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. This is something I should have checked out—but I, and I don't know who Garthoff [Raymond L. Garthoff] is—but in the fall of '63 he comes

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to Sofia, and there are a number of telegrams back and forth about arrangements.

ANDERSON: Well, Garthoff, uh, was the author of at least one and maybe two books about, uh, Soviet policy and Soviet defense strategy and political defense strategy. I can't remember the names of his books now, but he was quite the sort of the "in" author at that time, who was supposed to be in the know about, uh, Soviet...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...uh, policy and, uh, he was making a swing through the Eastern European countries and he came to Sofia and we had one or two meetings with him. Uh, he was, I remember that he was a very sharp young man. I had read one of his books and we, we enjoyed his meeting, uh, meeting him, but I can't remember anything in particular...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...that we talked about...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...excepting we always tried to give everybody that came through of that kind.... He was, I think, in an official position of some kind...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...because I remember we were able to go into the security room to talk with him.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: We had our own conference room there.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Those are really all the questions I have on Bulgaria, uh, unless you can think of things that you didn't cover with Lil-, Lila or myself. Those are the things that seem to come up from the, uh, file.

ANDERSON: Yes. Well, I uh, I guess I did talk about the, uh, Dorset case with Lila.

HACKMAN: Right. That's, that was discussed at more length.

ANDERSON: At some length and I think I talked with her also about the, uh, reaction of the Bulgarians to, uh, President Kennedy's assassination.

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HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: I thought you might be interested in seeing the letter that I wrote at that time because I, I found in looking at the letter that there was so much, there were so many moving things...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...that I wrote down at the time that I didn't probably remember when I was talking with Lila, uh, that might be of interest to you. Also you might be interested in seeing this, uh, chronological record of the Dorset story which gave an indication. I might say that it was this, this case more than any other where I felt myself really in conflict with the State Department.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I was reminded of this as I mentioned, I think, to Lila, when this Soviet, uh, sailor who tried to...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...seek asylum on board the American...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Right.

ANDERSON: ...ship and the State Department people really weren't interested. And, uh, the State Department people—I don't, I never know who drafted these telegrams, of course, when they were just signed Rusk, you know.

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: But, if I had followed their advice, Dorset, I'm sure, would have been arrested...

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: ...as soon as he left the legation, probably would have been dead...

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

ANDERSON: ...before very long. And, uh, they, uh, were very disapproving of my method of dealing with it, uh, but, uh, they reluctantly went along until near the end of it.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

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ANDERSON: They never, they never commended me for succeeding which irked me a little bit because...

HACKMAN: They don't like being out-stalled.

ANDERSON: ...there wasn't anything that I had put more into, I guess, than this...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...and, uh, had, had succeeded. And also I felt without this we might not have, uh, well, perhaps we would have settled the claims as soon, but actually the two things became sort of connected.

HACKMAN: What would be the best way to arrange to copy these? I mean I'd be perfectly hap-, uh, happy to take the things back, copy them, and return the originals, though you may feel a little insecure about that, uh, letting them go.

ANDERSON: I'd like to, uh, yes, I'd like to be sure that I have other, know where my other copies of these things are before I let them go.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I've got....

HACKMAN: Or if you wanted to have them copied here sometime, uh, that's possible.

ANDERSON: Well, that would be hard for me to do, you know.

HACKMAN: That's difficult. Yeah. We'd be glad to, uh, pay for the copying or whatever.

ANDERSON: This was the, uh, first letter that I wrote... (Interruption) The one in Eastern Europe, uh, where people came to the official residence most of the missions had the books in the, uh, at the embassy or the legation and people came there, but I don't think it had as much, uh, significance as the fact that people really dared to come to the residence and, uh, talk with me.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, it was, I must say it was just an enormously moving demonstration of the way, uh, in which they regarded President Kennedy.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Much more, uh, strong, they had much more strong feelings about him than I

had realized. I, you know, I...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...have so little contact that...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...I just couldn't have known how deeply affected they would be.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. You had just mentioned briefly in your interview with Lila about, uh, President Johnson, uh, sort of carrying on the same policies. Ever any problems at all, uh, in your contacts with him on Bulgaria or any real shifts that you can attribute to his personality?

ANDERSON: No. Actually, I saw him when I went back in December of '63.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I saw him just very briefly. Of course, he was so busy at the time.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I couldn't have, uh, a private, uh, interview with him which I tried to get, but I understood why. You know, he was just overwhelmed with everything, assuming the office, and, uh, but, yeah, they did make it possible for me to, uh, be present when he was signing an agreement with Mexico and so, uh, he gave me one of the pens—well, that didn't matter—but the main thing was that my picture was taken with him to, for us to use in our window in Bulgaria because we were anxious for the people to know that President Johnson was carrying on the same policies and that I was staying on.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, I spoke with him briefly when the picture was being taken. Oh, that reminds me. You asked me about if I remembered what I talked about when I saw President Kennedy. I do think that when I saw him when I first went home for my first consultation in December of '62—I think I saw him in December...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...or was it January of '63?

HACKMAN: I believe it was, uh, January 9, 1963.

ANDERSON: Yeah, I saw him just before I returned to Bulgaria and I, I don't remember

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what he told me so much. I do remember of his asking with concern about the, it being, whether it was awfully depressing and all that. But I do remember that I thought he would be interested in knowing what the reaction had been to the Cuban missile crisis. I remember telling him about that...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and how I felt that it had very much, uh, uh, enhanced, uh, his prestige...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and the United States' prestige...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...not only with the friendly countries, the NATO countries, but also with the Communist countries...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...and the Bulgarians themselves...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...that we were, uh, in a much stronger position. Uh, but, uh.... So far as Johnson's policies were concerned, I think that he, it was.... I don't remember while I w-, yes, I think it was while still in Sofia, that Johnson made a speech in which he talked about building bridges, uh, to Eastern Europe...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...which, uh, made quite an impact at the time and the Bulgarians were anxious to know what was meant by that. And there was, there was more, uh, talk by the Johnson administration than there had been by the Kennedy administration about the possibility of the, more trade and the most favored nation, uh, possib-, status possibilities. Now, I don't think anything more was done. I felt actually quite critical of both administrations for giving lip service to this, but neither one really went to bat for it with Congress. I think, uh, I could understand why. They always had things that they considered of higher priority and they just didn't want to, uh, raise, uh, hackles and opposition. And it would have taken, uh, much more, uh, single-mindedness on this issue in order to change uh, the mind of Congress.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, but neither.... I couldn't get any interest in either administration to really

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move on this.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And I felt that, uh, in the first place, I felt that we ought to change the name of the legislation and call it a nondiscriminatory tariff...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...status instead of most favored nation...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...because I felt that was a blockage...

HACKMAN: Misleading. Right. Right.

ANDERSON: Yes, misleading and a blockage to most congressmen who couldn't go home and explain to their people...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...why they had voted to give Communist countries...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...most favored nation status. But I couldn't get really anybody, uh, in either administration very interested in this.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I, uh, I felt that without this, we wouldn't make much headway.

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: And, uh, I felt that Johnson, uh, had a few more, uh, good speeches, uh, made by somebody. I, I might say incidentally—I found this in one of my letters which I thought was quite interesting—when I came home in the summer of 1963, I had been invited to make the commencement address at Carleton College where I was to get an honorary degree, and I had written my speech for the most part in Bulgaria before I left there. And, a good bit of it was about our relationships with Eastern Europe and I had to get clearance from the State Department to include this and how its wording, just that they approved of everything that I said.

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

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ANDERSON: And I thought it was watered down quite a bit and I didn't think that it was all that significant at the time when I made it. But when I was on my way back to Bulgaria, I think early in July, I stopped off in, uh, Frankfurt and some of the Radio Free Europe officials came up from Munich to interview me— incidentally, they were very well informed, and, uh, about developments because they had a lot of contacts with people leaving the Eastern European countries—and they were, uh, said that my speech at Carleton which they had gotten out all over at VOA [Voice of America] and RFE [Radio Free Europe], that my speech was the first statement of Eastern Europe that they had had by any high-ranking official in the department for five years.

HACKMAN: [Laughter] That's amazing.

ANDERSON: Well, I was absolutely shocked and then I realized, well, it's true that nobody ever talks about Eastern Europe and, of course, a lot of this was because of the sensitivity that Llewellyn Thompson and others who were more concerned with the, uh, negotiations with the Soviet Union...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...than anything else. They didn't want to rock the boat...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...with the Soviet Union. And, uh, they felt that to talk about opening things up with Eastern Europe would rock that boat.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, while I understood this, uh, I felt that they were overly cautious about it because actually—and I think that in a sense Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] proved this when he went to Romania and also, uh, talked

somewhat about, uh, what we would do as regards, uh, you know, let it be known that we wouldn't stand idly by if Yugoslavia...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: ...were invaded the way that Czechoslovakia was—that actually we would have strengthened our, our hand with the Soviet Union if we had let them know that we were going to be more active in Eastern Europe.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But, uh, at that time, I think that Llewellyn Thompson was—I admire him. I don't mean to blame it all onto him. I think this had been our policy before he

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was, uh, in charge of Soviet affairs—but, uh, the basic policy which was carried out by all the Eastern European officials was not to do anything that might upset the Soviet Union...

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And, uh, for this reason, the best way they thought was never to say anything. And, uh, so it was not only a lack of, uh, real attention to policy but, even a, a lack of saying much of anything.

HACKMAN: Was there ever any evidence that Robert Kennedy was at all interested in this as a policy area?

ANDERSON: No, I never...

HACKMAN: Does anything strike you?

ANDERSON: ...uh, I never knew of any. If he were, if he had any interest, uh, it was never conveyed to me in any way.

HACKMAN: Did you have contact, subsequent contacts with him either during the administration or later in the sixties?

ANDERSON: No. I did not. I notice you, uh, had a number of questions, but, I don't uh, I didn't have any contacts with him. And, uh, I didn't, I didn't uh, become active in Humphrey's campaign until really after the Democratic convention in 1968.

HACKMAN: Yeah, I get a little more of a feeling for that since I put these questions together.

ANDERSON: Then I, uh, resigned. I was trying to resign. I had tried to resign earlier...

HACKMAN: Right.

ANDERSON: ...thinking that I would, uh, then be able to be active, but, uh, then President Johnson--at that time, I thought President Johnson was going to be the candidate—and, uh, but I didn't actually succeed in getting my resignation accepted until I think the fourth of October.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And as long as I was actually in the State Department, I, I just didn't do really any real active campaigning. After, uh, after the convention, Orville Freeman asked me to be a member of his, uh, policy committee in Washington, which met every morning in his office. Uh, we had breakfast together in the Department of

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Agriculture. It was a, it was a high-level policy committee that worked on, uh, Humphrey policy. And I think, uh, that was about the most important input that I made into the Humphrey campaign in '68.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I traveled with Humphrey a few times later on in October when, I, he went out to California and a number of other places...

HACKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: ...but I didn't feel that, uh,.... I felt my more important contribution was on the policy level.

HACKMAN: Uh-huh. That's all I have.

ANDERSON: Very good.

HACKMAN: Okay. Thank you.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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