

Glenn M. Anderson Oral History Interview – JFK #2, 1/31/1971
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*Lee Dutton Anderson, Glenn Anderson's wife, is also present at the interview

Biographical Note

Anderson, Lieutenant Governor of California from 1959 to 1967 and Representative from California from 1969 to 1993, discusses the 1960 Democratic National Convention, conflicts between Governor Pat Brown of California and Speaker of the California legislature Jesse Unruh, and Anderson's relationship with the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

Of

Glenn M. Anderson

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Glenn M. Anderson – JFK #2

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Second of Two Oral History Interviews

with

GLENN M. ANDERSON

January 31, 1971
Washington, D.C.

By James A. Oesterle

For the John F. Kennedy Library

OESTERLE: Is there anything that comes to mind Congressman Anderson, that you'd like to say as we begin this new interview after reviewing our first interview together?

ANDERSON: You'd better start me off with, in what area?

OESTERLE: All right. Well, you were pretty close to Governor Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson], and you were one of the nominees of Stevenson at the Democratic National Convention in 1960.

ANDERSON: Yes. Stevenson had been our nominee twice. During the period that Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] was president, there were some other candidacies apparently being developed. I know that then Senator Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]

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had been to California many times, as had other Washington leaders. But in California there still remained the rather strong feeling that the outstanding man in the country at that time was Adlai Stevenson. True, he had run twice; he had been defeated. But most people felt that anyone who had run against Eisenhower at the time that Stevenson did would have

probably been defeated the same way. And we felt that those positions that Stevenson took, most of them years ahead in projection were the right ones, and we felt that this was the man of the hour that our country needed. It was not a negative feeling toward anyone else, but it was more of a pro-Adlai Stevenson feeling.

Now, during this time Adlai Stevenson had not indicated that he wanted to run for a third term, this was just a feeling that was somewhat spontaneous throughout the country. There had been primary campaigns in different parts of the country where different candidates, including

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then Senator Kennedy, were picking up votes for the coming national convention in Los Angeles. I was one of those who thought that Stevenson would make our best, make the best president. There was a question in my mind whether he would be the best one to be elected or not. But I thought even then the country was willing to accept most anyone, I felt, a Democrat, and if we could get Adlai Stevenson nominated, we could win.

We have in California what they call a favorite son delegation. We didn't have a pledge to any one candidate. It was set up to a great extent by Governor Brown [Edmund G. Brown]. I'm sure the other leaders of the party had something to do with getting different people appointed. I know that the Governor had consulted with me a little bit. And so a group of people were picked, supposedly representing all the groups in the party, to be the delegates to the national convention, and I was one of those. I believe that had Governor Brown.... Well, I know that had Governor

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Brown come out definitely for a candidate, for Kennedy anyway, that we would have probably gone along with Governor Brown. But Governor Brown did not come out for any one candidate. He indicated an interest in Stevenson; he indicated an interest in Kennedy and others. But he didn't take a leadership position.

And so in almost the closing hours of the time before the convention itself started, I moved into the vacuum and came out publicly for Stevenson for a third term. We started rallying support amongst the various members of the delegation, various party leaders throughout California. We started contacting different national Democratic leaders that we thought would be for Stevenson. And it looked for a moment, for a while that there was a fairly good ground swell at that time; again, not negative as far as President Kennedy was concerned or anyone else, but feeling that, "Well, lets try it once more with Stevenson." And so we went into that convention in Los Angeles, and I was one of those who

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placed his name in nomination; Mrs. Roosevelt [Eleanor R. Roosevelt], Senator McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy], Senator Lehman [Herbert Henry Lehman], Mr. Wyatt [Wilson W. Wyatt], I believe, from Kentucky, and myself, the five of us placed Stevenson's name in nomination. And there was a tremendous sentiment, growing sentiment in the Los Angeles

area in California. And if you were to listen to the people around the convention hall--and I say "around" because they were not only jammed or inside, but for large areas (or I was going to say blocks around) for large areas around the convention, there were people that were very, very pro-Stevenson. You would have had the impression that it was almost, his convention.

However, we were not able to put the votes together. I forget the number of votes that California was entitled to--36, 38--and I believe we delivered 33 of the votes that California was entitled to for Governor Stevenson. We were the only state to really deliver for him. The other states that had good spokesmen like Senator Lehman

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from New York and Senator McCarthy from his state and so on, were not able to deliver their delegations. And so the Stevenson move died in the first ballot and Senator Kennedy became our nominee.

Now, this didn't mean that we were against Senator Kennedy. It meant, as I said earlier, that we felt that Stevenson was the man of the hour and Kennedy still had years in the future where he could probably be our nominee and be elected at that time. But since Senator Kennedy became our nominee, then we all threw our support behind him and the ticket that was selected of Kennedy and Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson], I offered my support for. I was appointed the state get-out-the-vote chairman of California for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, and I proceeded then to work diligently up and down the state. My main strength in California was with grassroots organizations, Democratic clubs, labor groups, people like this. And I made many appearances at various areas trying to get the people to get out and work. For example,

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I broke the state up into some regions. I had a little gimmick that we had worked out of having a special watch given to the person who got out the highest number of votes in his precinct in his region. I gave sixteen of these watches out with the people's name on the back. We publicized this. We had competition in different communities so that people who would get out and get the highest number of votes out for the Democrats in their precinct would be up there to be contenders for the winners. We did everything we could to get out the vote and we were successful and I received many letters of appreciation from people like President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson and Governor Brown and many others for the work that we did in supporting the entire ticket. I think maybe we ought to stop here while we're doing this.

OESTERLE: Okay.

[Interruption].

OESTERLE: Did President Kennedy acknowledge the role that you played as chairman of the get-out-the-vote campaign?

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ANDERSON: Well, yes. I received a very nice letter from President Kennedy thanking me for my efforts in the campaign. I think that President Kennedy was aware that I liked him, that as a friend of his that I had worked for him after he'd been nominated. After he became president, I found it somewhat difficult to really get in back here in Washington. I had been told many times that I was kept out because I had been active in the Stevenson effort rather than in the Kennedy effort, but I believe that that was the result of actions of others than the President himself; I at least chose to place the blame upon those who were around him that kept the doors closed. Other times when I'd met Kennedy when he was president, or when I'd met Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] or when I met Ted [Edward Moore Kennedy]--or, for example, only recently when Ted was in California at a fundraising function with his mother [Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy] and we were talking, he told his mother, he said, "You remember the Andersons, don't you Mother?"

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They've always been good Kennedy supporters." And I think that the Kennedys themselves felt that we were good supporters of theirs. But because of the one time that I had made an overt action for Stevenson, at least doors were closed to me during the time that he was president here on the higher level. I found that I could not get in like I thought I should have, at least. I was always able to get into certain things, but I was not accepted as an intimate in the White House during that time.

As a lieutenant governor, I was lieutenant governor at that time and I had a responsible role to play--I had to come back to Washington from time to time to meet with the California delegation and appear on behalf of certain state projects, and so I did have to come back here and meet with government leaders. I felt I could have done a better job had I been able to really get in and have the reception that I'd hoped that I would maybe receive after I worked as hard as I did in the get-out-the-

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vote effort. I know that at different times we made many gestures. We had a party back here in Washington where we tried to get the president or someone of the highest stature to come to our party, to show again that we were in. The congressmen, many senators showed up, we had two or three Cabinet members. But we were never able really to do what we had hoped in showing the appreciation that we felt we were somewhat entitled to.

OESTERLE: Do you have any insight into Governor Stevenson's disappointment at not being appointed secretary of state in the Kennedy administration?

ANDERSON: Well, we were very close to Governor Stevenson. And I don't believe there was any question on anybody's part but that he was disappointed that he was not selected as secretary of state. I know when I talked with him about it, it was just talk with the feeling that he was the man that should have had the job. He had all the ability and he had all the knowledge, and should have been there. And when he was given the job as the ambassador

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to the United Nations, I'm sure he recognized what it was—a kind of a sop, a kind of a gesture. He was able to do a job there, a good job, but he could have done such a much better job in the role of secretary of state. In talking with him, there was no, he never would say, "I'm disappointed that I wasn't made secretary of state," this type of a thing, but in his general conversation there wasn't any question but that he was aware of this same feeling that he was doing a job at the United Nations--a fine place to work, but he could do a much better job in the other spot.

And, of course, in my talks with him before, the time that we... I talked to him earlier when I encouraged him to allow us to make the presentation of his name, his candidacy, he never really, you know, came out and said, "I'm a candidate for a third term," but he at least went so far to let us say, well he didn't mind our putting his name in contention there. At that time I talked to him. I said, "Our feeling is in many of us is that

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you're the man of the hour that can do the job that is so important today in world leadership." Of course, next to the president in world leadership, the secretary of state's job is probably right there. And my feeling was he could have done such a good job for President Kennedy as his secretary of state.

OESTERIE: Do you know anything about the preparation of the report that Governor Stevenson prepared for President Kennedy with recommendations in regard to the State Department?

ANDERSON: No, I don't. No.

OESTERIE: You were also quite close with Mrs. Roosevelt. I imagine that she might have in some way indicated her disappointment that Governor Stevenson had not been appointed Secretary of State.

Do you recall any...?

ANDERSON: Well, yes, we were quite close to Mrs. Roosevelt. Again, dating myself a bit, I became a Democrat originally because of the early

philosophy of FDR [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] in his original debates or his program contrary to President Hoover's [Herbert Clark Hoover] campaign policies. At that time Roosevelt

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convinced me to be a Democrat because of my business feelings on pump priming. So I somewhat drifted, I think, over the years from an FDR supporter to maybe shifting a great deal of my respect and allegiance to his wife, Mrs. Roosevelt. So through the years whenever there was a function where she would be in California, I would make it a point to be there. We became fairly good friends.

Of course, I think the thing that maybe tied us together even closer was the effort on behalf of Stevenson when the five of us--she and I were two of the five that placed his name in nomination and did our best to secure votes for him. And then following that time we had numerous social meetings with Mrs. Roosevelt. We were her guest at her home, where Mrs. Anderson [Lee Dutton Anderson] and I went and discussed with her, and of course, she was always very frank in saying she was delighted with this or disappointed in this. She felt that Governor Stevenson should have been secretary of state, and that

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if he couldn't be president, he should have at least been that. On the other hand, I think she was enough of a politician to be aware that when he didn't make the secretary of state, she then was a very strong supporter of Stevenson when he rose as ambassador. And they were good friends and I know kept a fairly close relationship.

OESTERIE: Did John Kennedy take a particular interest in the Chile aid program that you worked so closely on?

ANDERSON: Well, it was our understanding that it was his program, that he had wanted this. No, he never called us up and said, "Mr. Anderson, we want you to get involved in it." But this was President Kennedy's idea. We had understood it was his idea that it would be good if you could develop a relationship between a state in the country and some other foreign nation and have them take the responsibility of the administration of that program. We'd understood that was his idea. Now, it may not have been. The fact that when it was brought

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to me.... Actually, I believe Governor Brown of California was the one who called me in and discussed it first with me and asked me if I was interested in becoming involved in the program, asked if I was there with the state. That's when I was able to get my executive secretary made the number two man to the California program. And, of course, Governor Brown invited me in several times at meetings when we had the Ambassador from Chile to the United States as our guest in Sacramento. And so we developed a fairly good friendship

that enabled me, through Alan Sieroty, through Governor Brown, and through other people to keep a fairly close watch on what was going on in Chile.

And, of course, it was these ideas and this knowledge and this work over two, three, four years, I guess it would have been after I was out of office, I was then recommended by Governor Brown, why didn't I go after the job as Ambassador to Chile? Because we were told at that time that there was going to be a vacancy in the ambassadorial spot. And I believe he had been called up and asked if he

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wanted it. And he said no but he thought that, he recommended that I be considered. And he wrote letters, I know, to the President, and the California delegation all gave me their unanimous endorsement, if I remember right, for it. As I think I mentioned earlier, I came back and met with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk] and many others in this, not campaign, but in an effort to see if there was really any serious thought on it. And it so happened the vacancy never developed. When I look at things now with what's happened down there since, I'm, perhaps glad that I didn't get the assignment. But this was, getting back to your initial question, there was never a doubt, a question in my mind or anyone's mind but that this was a wish of President Kennedy's that we work out this kind of a program.

OESTERLE: Now, President Johnson later visited at least once, if not more than that, to see the poverty program or education programs in works in California.

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ANDERSON: President Johnson was out there many times. Actually when he was vice president under President Kennedy, he made a very good tour in California. He was a guest at our home in Sacramento, Mrs. Anderson and I had a party that Vice President Johnson was the honored guest. There were many times that we had a fairly close relationship with the Vice President. And then later when he became president, we found that the doors back here were open that hadn't been opened under President Kennedy.

OESTERLE: You actually enjoyed a better relationship with President Johnson....

ANDERSON: I think our first visit when we came back to Washington, we asked if we could see the President, Mrs. Anderson and I. Not only did we see the President, but he gave us a personal tour through the White House, took us in different rooms, took us into the swimming pool and showed us this, very many things in the place, and was very friendly. He took us and our.... That was when Mike [Glenn M. Anderson, Jr.] was with us, wasn't it, Lee?

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MRS. ANDERSON: He was so enchanted with our youngster.

ANDERSON: We took our son in, who was then in the eighth grade and had been studying governments, Cabinet--he'd been studying the various positions. So as the three of walked into this room with President Johnson, and he showed, "Well, here's where the Secretary of State sits, and Secretary so and so." And so he went right around the table, I think there was twenty--you know, a whole bunch of them, and he was able to name every Cabinet member, which something that I couldn't have done. I'd have almost as tough a job doing it here today when I'm living with them here, but this was from California. And he was quite impressed to have an eighth grade kid come back and...

OESTERLE: I'd guess so...

ANDERSON: ...name every one just off the bat. But these were relationships we had with the president.
And, of

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course, he came to California many times in different roles. His poverty program he was very much interested in, his educational programs. We found that if there was a dedication of a school or something, that President Johnson would make almost every effort to do whatever he could. For example, the dedication of the University of Irvine [University of California at Irvine], we had him out there at the groundbreaking, and we had him at numerous dedicatory events in California with our university and the state college program. So we became quite friendly with him in this role. I know that Mrs. Anderson and I, as lieutenant governor and as a regent, again working with Governor Brown, were on numerous reception committees where we brought President Johnson into activities in California.

OESTERLE: Do you recall any meetings with Robert Kennedy when he came out to California?

ANDERSON: Well, I recall them, but not specific ones. Just as I tried to point out a while ago, every one of the Kennedys were out there at

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different times at different functions. And we were there, too, because we were in California. And there would be a Democratic rally or meeting in Los Angeles or San Francisco or Fresno or Sacramento, one of the Kennedys would usually be there. It wouldn't be specifically a Kennedy affair. And we would usually be, either Governor Brown and I would be there, we'd be there to welcome them. And we would shake hands and

talk with them for a minute or two, but nothing of a specific nature. But I would assume that this happened with different Kennedys a dozen or more times during that period. But it's hard to identify one or the other unless it comes up as I mentioned earlier, when Tunney [John V. Tunney], now Senator Tunney, mentioned the specific case when I was the big name that came out to help him get elected to Congress even though he had Ted Kennedy there with him at the same luncheon. And so at that time I would not consider it a specific thing that we had Ted Kennedy there. Today, as events have turned

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out in the history of things, the names, the events, are much more important and make much greater significance.

OESTERLE: I wondered if you'd tell me anything about the relationship that Jess Unruh [Jesse M. Unruh] had with the Kennedys?

ANDERSON: Well, one of the problems we had in California has been Jess Unruh. I think maybe before the question you ask about his relationship with the Kennedys, I think perhaps we ought to create it so the question would be maybe better put later on. He was in the state assembly when Governor Brown was elected governor. The state assembly picked a speaker named Ralph Brown [Ralph M. Brown], who was the first speaker of the assembly under Pat, under Governor Brown. Governor Brown actually created Jess Unruh by actually appointing him as his representative on the floor, picking him as the head of the Ways and Means Committee, which is the committee

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that handles the governor's budget. The governor usually has the prerogative of selecting the person of his party to handle his budget. He was the one, Governor Brown picked Jess Unruh to be the head of the Ways and Means Committee, to handle his budget on the floor. This was the job that Governor Brown gave Jess that created Jess. Jess then had as the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, the muscle, the way he used it, to be able to build himself up personally. Ralph Brown eventually died; Jess became the Speaker. Well actually, Ralph Brown became a judge before he died. Ralph Brown was appointed to the bench by Governor Brown and Jess then, in his position as Ways and Means chairman, was the logical person to step up and become the Speaker.

But it was his control of the budget and his control of the Ways and Means Committee that enabled him to deal with the lobbyists, the third house in Sacramento, that made him the big power. He used that position in building himself up and also in helping elect

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other people to the assembly. He often said that he could take money from a contributor in a campaign, but this didn't mean that he had to vote that way. He said, if you can't take

money from a lobbyist and say no to him the next time he asks you for a vote, you shouldn't be in politics. And, well, there's another statement, I think, that money is the mother's milk of politics. He was a money man who was able to get the lobbyists to contribute to coffers--not to him personally; nothing illegal or dishonest about this. But he was able to use the position, first as Ways and Means chairman and then as Speaker, to get money contributed by the lobbyists into coffers, into funds, that again were directed to help people who would be elected to the assembly, who would keep him in as Speaker.

First he was part of Governor Brown's team, but as he got bigger and more powerful he became an independent person. He eventually became Governor Brown's most severe critic. He caused Governor Brown more problems, and I

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don't want to identify when it started; I know at least through the second term he was the Governor's probably worst critic in California, and it might have even started a little bit before that. That was at a time when he had built himself so big that the Governor couldn't hardly shake him loose. Now, the governor knew, I think, that when Jess was building himself up that he was also building up a problem, and at that time he should have cut him off somehow. There were ways he could have cut him off. He was the governor; he didn't have to do things that built up the power of the Speaker. But he allowed the Speaker to become stronger and stronger and stronger. The Speaker, instead of appreciating the fact that the Governor did this, was very critical of him and called him jellyfish and all these kind of--what was the one thing, "tower of jelly"? No, that was somebody else. Well, anyway, these kind of statements went out, "tower of jelly" and things. So, we had the development in California of a governor that was powerful,

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but a speaker in his own party who was almost equally powerful.

Now, getting up to the Democratic Convention, I mentioned earlier that the delegation, the favorite son delegation that had been picked, had been to a great extent selected by the Governor, and I assume to some extent with the advice of Speaker Unruh, myself, Alan Cranston [Alan M. Cranston], many others. It was an across-the-board delegation. And I told you how at that time had Governor Brown come out earlier--or come out early, I should say--and said, "I'm for Kennedy for President," or someone else, I'm sure he could have influenced the delegation to go his way. I know if he had come to me and said, "Glenn, I'm going to support Kennedy, I want your support," I would have maybe been a little disappointed because I was for Stevenson, but I probably would have adhered to his wishes. But he did not make a decision. He was for Stevenson, for Kennedy, friendly to Symington [(William) Stuart Symington], not unfriendly to Johnson--he was pretty well all over. And so it was into this vacuum that I had moved, and came out for

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Stevenson.

We lost our effort, but in that campaign Jess, who in the meantime was quite close to Bobby Kennedy and was working very hard for Kennedy, then became the Kennedy spokesman in California, or at least portrayed himself to be that. And I believe he was. I think that they did feel that, well, Governor Brown is the governor, and Anderson's lieutenant governor, and somebody else is something else, but Jess Unruh was our friend. And I know that during those next few years when Kennedy was in the White House, Jess at least gave the impression that if you wanted to see the President you saw Jess first. And we found it was somewhat that way. We didn't get to see the President during that period except, you know, at public affairs. And then when President Johnson came in, Jess did not have that relationship with President Johnson and so as a result--matter of fact, he went back, and, I understand, tried to get the relationship put together and was not successful. But anyway, we found when we were able to go back to Washington under Johnson the reception

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was much easier, much better.

Now, there wasn't any love between Speaker Unruh and myself. I've mentioned earlier that he was Governor Brown's most severe critic during at least the last four years of Governor Brown's tenure, and maybe even a little more. He was our most severe critic during all eight years. He perpetually criticized my activities, not mine so much personally, but what we stood for. I had been long identified with the club movement. I believe in a decentralization of political power, and I believe in people being encouraged to be active in local clubs, whether they be Democrat or what they are, on an idealist basis, on a volunteer basis. I have long felt that the best workers were those who went out and worked on a voluntary basis, for free, and did it because they felt that what they were doing was the right thing to do. As I mentioned, again, earlier, that we in California had over a period of years developed a very strong and a very vital club movement that well, we had somewhere between fifty, sixty thousand active club people throughout California

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at the peak of the club movement, and these people were not paid. They were held together by the belief that what they were doing was right and that they agreed for the most part in a philosophy that was somewhat tied together. And we tried to do this by having regular monthly meetings of our executive boards with representation from all over California, and we tried to be receptive of what the people really wanted throughout the state. So we were for volunteer, grass roots politics.

Unruh felt that this was the wrong approach. He felt that precinct workers were only good if they were paid, and that you had to have money to pay precinct workers, and so you had to have money from some type of a source. And he felt then you raised money through fundraisers and you paid people to do precinct work and you did it on a professional basis and this was the way to do it. So here was two schools of thought: I represented one and I assume he would represent the other. And he set about over a period of years to undermine the club movement

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and successfully pretty well did that. The Democratic councils in the club movement and the CDC [California Democratic Council] as most of us envisioned it was pulled apart. It still is a skeleton organization today, but it's not the CDC of the 1956, '58, '60 period. And so while Jess would criticize the club movement, he could do it to some extent by criticizing what the lieutenant governor was doing and vice versa. So there has never been any great love between Unruh and myself, and I know there isn't much love today between Governor Brown and Unruh. And during the period that President Kennedy was in the White House, Unruh had, that was probably the peak of his prominence, and he was then recognized as the Kennedy man in California.

OESTERLE: Do you have any knowledge of campaign workers organizing for John F. Kennedy from outside of the state that came in during the campaign?

ANDERSON: No, I don't. I know that during the convention when they flew in, the Kennedy campaign came in, there were a lot of young people that

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apparently had been following Kennedy in his campaigns in other states were there. I don't know how many they were, I don't know whether they were volunteer, whether they were paid, I don't know. There were a large number of young people. But I don't think they needed to bring them from out of the state because he was attractive in the state. I mean, there was no question but that Kennedy appealed to the young people in California. And this was particularly true after the convention, the party people, those who were for Stevenson, for everybody, got behind him and there was a great campaign in California. And youth, the youth was in it. We saw a lot of young people that were addressed, you know, as Kennedy campaigners all over California.

OESTERLE: The California State Council of Democratic Parties that was organized in '53 took a very active role in this.

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, after the nomination everybody closed ranks. And

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I assume this was one of my jobs as being a former head of that organization, to help pull in the club movement in that direction. But I mean there were some people who didn't, but for the most part the party people up and down the state were working very hard for the Kennedy Johnson ticket. Because I think at the same time you have to remember who they

were working against, and this was Nixon [Richard Milhous Nixon]. And in California if anything would unite party workers, this would be it.

OESTERLE: Maybe we should stop here and have the coffee.

[Interruption]

OESTERLE: Can you tell me something about Pat Brown's problems with the legislature?

ANDERSON: Well, I think that Pat Brown's initial problem with the legislature was that he'd never been really familiar with it. He'd been the district attorney in San Francisco and he'd been the attorney general of California. Of course, both of these positions kept him in some contact with, the legislature, but he had never been a legislator himself and as a result felt, he was always worried about his dealings with

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it directly. And so when he became governor, he delegated this responsibility to someone else. And, of course, in his office he, Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] was one of his key people who worked with the legislature. And, of course, as I've mentioned earlier he somewhat had picked Jess Unruh to be, handle his finances, handle the Ways and Means Committee, which gave Jess great power in the legislature, in the assembly. And he did the same thing in the senate, although I think his relationships in the senate were more spread around and not put in the hands of two or three people like he did in the assembly.

But Pat had very poor personal relationships with the state assemblymen and the state senators, and this was one of his problems all during his tenure. He delegated his program to other people. And it so happened, he was successful in getting much of the program through which is a kind of a, contradicts itself. Because his record will show that in the eight years that he was governor he was very successful in getting some very important legislation on the

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books in almost every field, whether you're talking about education, or whether you're talking about finances, or political, the election laws, the abolishment of cross-filing, the Fair Employment Practices [Act], all of these were great things as far as the legislation was concerned, and these were Governor Brown's program. By the same token he never was himself close to the legislature. And he, in delegating people to represent him they would become political powers in their own right. And I mention two of those who did become very powerful in Sacramento because the Governor delegated them this way: one was Fred Dutton; the other was Jess Unruh. And of course both of them in later years moved very far out into the area of Senator, and later President Kennedy.

MRS. ANDERSON: I think that you've made what would be considered on the tape an error of history, here, in that you, it seemed to me you gave the impression that Fred Dutton was a member of the legislature, and in he wasn't. He was Pat's

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executive secretary as Governor. I just wanted to point that out.

OESTERLE: Paul Ziffren had been Fred Dutton's sponsor. Do you know the background of that?

ANDERSON: Well, Fred Dutton, as has been pointed out here, was not in the legislature, he was one of the governor's secretaries. But his rise to politics was fairly phenomenal in that he came into California sometime in the mid '50's, as far as politics were concerned. I believe he had worked for some gas or utility company in Northern California as an attorney. I know that in about '55,'56 Paul Ziffren, who was then the national committeeman of California, called me--I was then, had a key position in the club movement in Southern California--and he told me that he had a young fellow who had just moved to Southern California that was a smart young attorney and showed an interest in becoming active in politics, and was I able to give him some assignment, give him perhaps some title. And his name was Fred Dutton and so I got up and talked to Fred Dutton, and I've even forgotten what title we gave him, but we gave him respon-

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-sibility for organization and work in the club movement. I think he was living then in the East Los Angeles area around Covina; must have been somewhere in there, or maybe that's the area he became active in. But he was brought in, he was sponsored by Paul Ziffren and became active in the club movement, or in the Democratic Party, in about '56. When Governor Brown was running for governor, he became identified in Governor Brown's campaign. And, of course, when Governor Brown became elected he became Governor Brown's, practically his top advisor, his secretary in his office and handled much of the legislation for the Governor. So it was in this role that he was a power in California politics with his influence with legislation. And, of course, later Fred Dutton left the Governor's office to come back to Washington and eventually wound up with President Kennedy.

OESTERLE: Can you tell me anything about Ben Swig [Benjamin H. Swig] and his support for Governor Brown?

ANDERSON: Well, Ben Swig has always been a close friend of

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Governor Brown's. He was a friend of Brown's when the Governor was the attorney general and, I believe, before that when he was district attorney. Ben has had his business in San Francisco as long as I can remember, and he was always a loyal Brown supporter. When he supported other people and was identified maybe with somebody else, I think you always still remembered that he was really Governor Brown's friend and Governor Brown's advisor. I don't, I really can't think of anybody off the top that had closer entrée to the Governor's office than Ben Swig did. If Ben wanted to talk to the Governor he would call him up...

[END SIDE I, TAPE I]

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

ANDERSON: The procedure, I think, as far as Governor Brown was concerned, with Ben Swig was the same, that he often called Ben Swig up and asked him advice and told him of his problem. And I think he was one of the closest friends in politics that Governor Brown had.

OESTERLE: So, his support of John F. Kennedy's candidacy would have been at least in part because of

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Governor Brown.

ANDERSON: I'm sure that, of course, after Kennedy became the candidate of the party, I'm sure that there wasn't any question but that Governor Brown urged all of his friends to support the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. I'm not sure whether Ben Swig supported Kennedy before he received the nomination, but I would have a feeling that if he if did, if he was one of those who helped provide money during those primary days, that he would have even let Governor Brown know that he was doing it and Governor Brown would probably have said, yes, it's a good idea. Because there would be nothing wrong with having a friend support somebody else who might be, who might be a president at that time. But I wouldn't think that Ben Swig would have done really anything of this nature that he wouldn't have perhaps discussed with Governor Brown before he did it.

OESTERLE: Would you agree with the description, and if so, to what would you attribute the blossoming, if you will, the blossoming of Democratic Party

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politics between 1953 and 1958?

ANDERSON: Well, I assume there were things that caused this blossoming: first, the Republicans set the stage for it, because under President Eisenhower I think the record will show they did a pretty poor job on most fields, particularly economics, that set the stage for people's dissatisfaction. And so there was a desire on the part of people for a new kind of leadership, I think on a national scale and, of course, this was true in California. We'd had some pretty bad handling of many problems in the state by Republican governors. And so by 1953 when we were coming out of our lowest ebb in politics--I assume our lowest ebb in Democratic politics in California was during that period from Eisenhower's first election up through his, maybe his second election, from '52 to '55, '56, somewhere in there. And we started the club movement in 1953 and developed a strong, broad-based, grass roots club movement that was interested in campaigning on issues, and there was a lot of

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enthusiasm, a lot of people felt that what they were doing was the right thing. And so I think that this had, this together with the conditions that were being created by the administrations both in Washington and California, helped this develop.

By 1954 in California, we in the club movement put our first statewide ticket on the ballot, and I think it was the first time in at least memory that the Democrats had a person-nominated for every statewide position. Prior to that, due to cross-filing, we often lost most of our statewide candidates in the primaries. This was the first time the Democrats were so united that we nominated a ticket from governor right straight on through, and nominated every one of them. The fact that we didn't elect them in the general election was not good, but at least it showed we had made some progress. That was in 1954. Four years later we had a chance to really develop this club movement, really get the issues across to the people and the needs of the state, and so we put up our slate in 1958 and

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we were elected. And that time we swept almost every office; there was only, I think, one office of secretary of state that we didn't sweep in that election. So from almost zero in 1952 to at least some progress in 1954, to practically a clean sweep in 1958 was the record of that eight years. I attribute much of it to the club movement the--California Democratic Council at that time--and the working together of party people in a unity basis; all of us were, everyone was working together.

And, of course, when we won, and people who were in office, much of that unity disappeared. There then became rival factions and problems arose, and I assume some people didn't--had expected different laws to be passed. But I thought we did very good. Most of the things that we pledged we were going to do, we did. We abolished cross-filing, I think that was the first law we put in. Well, the next one was to establish the Fair Employment Practices Commission, establishment of a master plan for higher education--all of the various things that we did in California--the

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Water Program itself was one of the greatest engineering and legislative achievements, I guess, in any state in the country. That's bigger than any project ever undertaken by any other state in our country's history, and yet it was just one of the things that we did during that period. It was a great period and I'm sure that historians in the future will look upon those eight years and recognize them for what they are.

OESTERLE: Does Fred Dutton perhaps play a role, along with Jess Unruh, in undermining the relationship between the White House of John F. Kennedy and Governor Brown?

[INTERRUPTION]

ANDERSON: I think the word "undermining" bothers me a little bit there, and so I'd like to not answer it in that, using the word of undermining. Both Jess Unruh and Fred Dutton, in the positions they held, one as speaker of the Assembly and the other as the secretary for legislation, moved up into periods of great power, and this was in 1959 and 1960. Now, this was before President Kennedy was elected. But about this

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same time we'd had the election in California, I believe, of a new national committeeman, and this was Stanley Mosk. And we had a change of political planning where people now were not thinking of who's going to be governor of California, because we had a governor, but there were people thinking who were going to be, who's going to be the next president. And I believe that about this time Jess and Fred Dutton, and I think Stanley Mosk was involved in their initial discussions he was the new national committeeman; I'm not sure whether Stanley was involved--but I think they began to feel, well, Governor Brown is just a governor. They had become somewhat critical of him in some areas, even this early. I know that Fred Dutton was the one who made the statement, the reference to Governor Brown when he called him a "tower of jelly," and I believe that was made back here in Washington about that same time. I'm not exactly sure of the time and the place, except that I know that it made Governor Brown very unhappy when it got back to him that his

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executive secretary had referred to him in this manner.

But I think that there were at that time being plans made for the support of Kennedy for President, and I believe that Dutton and Jess were involved in that fairly early in the stages there. And they, to some extent, took initiative away from Governor Brown, who was out in California, still trying to keep California a neutral state. There were several other candidates, Symington, Johnson, others that were, whose names were mentioned, that Governor Brown tried to, I think, give the impression that California was going to be open

for all of them and that's why he had a favorite son delegation, that's why people were on it who were supposedly for all candidates. And so in his own organization, and I assumed really without his knowing it, some of his top leadership was already in a sense undermining his position and working in a Kennedy for president campaign movement. And, of course, after the convention, when Governor Brown had failed to take the leadership, and when he lost

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the leadership and the delegation actually was delivered for Adlai Stevenson, this naturally made people like Fred Dutton and Jess Unruh seem that much more important. And, of course, Jess I'm.... This apparently, I think, is Jess's attitude, the attitude that won for him the name of "Big Daddy": he made it very clear that he was the man to see in California if you wanted to see President Kennedy.

Now, I'm not sure whether he was as big really as Fred Dutton was. Fred came back to Washington, became a part of the Kennedy Administration, and probably was the one who maybe had more influence in who was going to see President Kennedy maybe than Jess Unruh did. But the people in California didn't know this; as a matter of fact, most people in California had never heard of Fred Dutton, most of them never, haven't, even today. But everybody in California is familiar with Jess Unruh. And Jess let it be known that he was Jack Kennedy's friend. And, of course, he kept the same policy with Bobby and so on. But there's no doubt Fred Dutton left Governor

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Brown's office, became part of the Kennedy Administration back here, and was, I think, probably one of the most influential Californians in the Kennedy policy administration, policy-making part.

[INTERRUPTION]

OESTERLE: Both Tom Braden [Thomas W. Braden] and Lloyd Hand [Lloyd Nelson Hand] ran against you for the office, didn't they?

ANDERSON: Well, that event came many years later, that was when I was running for reelection as lieutenant governor for a third term. I was elected to two terms lieutenant governor. Running the third term, found myself opposed in the primary by two very able and very colorful and very popular Democrats: one, Tom Braden, a publisher in Oceanside, California; and the other Lloyd Hand, a man who had been identified as the protocol ambassador here with President Johnson. Both Lloyd Hand and Tom Braden, their support for the most part appeared to be coming from back in Washington. Tom Braden was identified as the candidate of the Kennedy people--I suppose you would use that term loosely--that Kennedys all over were

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supposedly supporting Tom. I know that he had had a very close relationship with the Kennedys. His wife [Joan Braden] was a very close friend of Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy]. The Kennedys, several of them, at different times came out and made appearances that Tom Braden was able to make use of. And there was no question but that Kennedy support, and apparently Kennedy contributors, contributed and supported Tom Braden's campaign.

The same was true of Lloyd Hand. Lloyd Hand--only his support was Johnson. He was part of the Johnson Administration. And there wasn't any question but that Johnson contributors were those who were called upon to contribute to Hand's campaign, and there was no question but that the Johnson people were supporting Lloyd Hand, although President Johnson said he never in anyway encouraged him. Although I, one night at a party where Lynda [Lynda Bird Johnson Robb] was, when somebody asked her about Lloyd Hand, Lynda said, "Oh, we're supporting him, or my daddy's supporting him," or something like that. And I was in the group, and so I think the next, thing that happened

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was that I was presented to her as the lieutenant governor of California that Lloyd Hand was opposing. There was a little embarrassment for a few moments there, but there wasn't any question in California. Most of the newspapermen in their cartoons identified the incumbent lieutenant governor that had opposition from two men who had the backing of Johnson on one side and Kennedy people on the other.

I went ahead and beat, won the nomination, got, I received, I believe, more votes than both of them put together which was a victory but it was a shallow victory, because any time the party people tear up an incumbent of their own party in a campaign it sets the stage for the Republican opposition a few months later. And, of course, a few months later I was defeated. I'm sure the attacks upon me by these two men in the primary contributed to that, although as it turned out, everyone was swept out of office. It was part of a nationwide sweep that swept people out of office from the East Coast, Illinois, up all through the West. Every one

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of us were defeated. This was the Reagan [Ronald W. Reagan] landslide in California, and we were defeated by about a million votes, all of us. And that was the election when Bob Finch [Robert H. Finch], who later became the Secretary of HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] back here under Nixon, defeated me for lieutenant governor.

So that was kind of an unhappy picture, to find two people so closely identified with two national parts of the Democratic Party, both of which I had supported to a degree at different times, and to a great degree at others, to sort of be given a little slap by that type of support. But those are the things that have happened in California many times. And I assume one of our problems is, and it will continue to be that way, is that we are so far from the national scene that people in Washington think they can do things by calling up one or two people and they'll have the idea of what's going on in California without realizing that

it's a state of, it's almost many states in one. If you lay California on the East Coast it reaches from Maine to South

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Carolina. If you thought of running in a state on the East Coast from Maine to South Carolina by calling up one or two people and getting the pulse, you'd see how ridiculous it would be. But that's what they try to do in California. They think that they can make one quick trip to Los Angeles or San Francisco or a couple of telephone calls and they'll have what's going on in the state, and it just can't be done.

OESTERLE: Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman.

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[END OF INTERVIEW]

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