

**Elizabeth M. Boggs, Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 7/17/1968**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Elizabeth Boggs  
**Interviewer:** John F. Stewart  
**Date of Interview:** July 17, 1968  
**Location:** Washington, D.C.  
**Length:** 25 pages

**Biographical Note**

Boggs, President of the National Association for Retarded Children (NARC) from 1958 to 1960 and member of the President's Panel on Mental Retardation from 1961 to 1962, discusses NARC's legislative and public policy goals during the 1950s and 1960s, her frustration at John F. Kennedy's lack of action on mental retardation issues during his time in Congress, and the inner workings of the President's Panel on Mental Retardation, among other issues.

**Access**

Open.

**Usage Restrictions**

According to the deed of gift signed on October 21, 1994, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

**Copyright**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

**Transcript of Oral History Interview**

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. Footnotes and bracketed words that appear in this document were retained from the original transcript. If

researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

**Suggested Citation**

Elizabeth M. Boggs, recorded interview by John F. Stewart, July 17, 1968, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of  
ELIZABETH BOGGS

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Elizabeth Boggs, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted on July 17, 1968 and February 17, 1969 at Washington, DC and prepared for deposit in the John F. Kennedy Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be made available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the John F. Kennedy Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.


(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the John F. Kennedy Library.

ELIZABETH M. BOGGS  
11 HENDERSON ROAD  
HAMPTON, NJ 08827-9508

  
Donor

November 18, 1993  
Date

  
Archivist of the United States

October 21, 1994  
Date

Elizabeth M. Boggs—JFK#1

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1	1957 Mental Retardation Bill
2	Pro-forma contract with John F. Kennedy's (JFK) campaign in 1960
4	Publicity or lack thereof of Rosemary F. Kennedy's retardation
5	National Association for Retarded Children (NARC)
7	NARC's legislative and public policy goals
11	Beginning of the President's Panel on Mental Retardation
15	Panel task forces
17	Meetings with people at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
18	Boggs' role as a NARC representative on the Panel
20	Panel members
22	Text of the Panel report
23	Deciding on the Panel's recommendations

First of Two Oral History Interviews

with

Elizabeth M. Boggs

July 17, 1968  
Washington, DC

By John F. Stewart

For the John F. Kennedy Library

STEWART: Why don't we start by my asking you precisely when was your first association or encounter with the Kennedy family or the Kennedy Foundation?

BOGGS: Well, to the best of my recollection my first view, as it were, of Senator John F. Kennedy was a fleeting one, and it took place in the corridors of the Capitol on I think it was April 4, 1957. And I have reason to remember this occasion because Senator Kennedy was a member of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare which was holding hearings on the first mental retardation bill, which eventually became Public Law 85-924—926, I guess it is—and we had had a real struggle to get this legislation attended to. The subcommittee under Senator Hill [Lister Hill] had held an executive session that morning, and Senator Kennedy had attended. This was between 9 and 10 in the morning. When the executive session broke up, he left, and I saw him leave. I was waiting outside to testify.

I have to say that this was an incident that was associated in my mind with some resentment because I felt that even if they [the Kennedys] did not wish to admit publicly that this was a problem in their family, the least that the Senator could have done would have been to attend to the [committee] business as any other sympathetic senator might have done. Now it's easy to say, and it may very well have been, is probably true, that he had other business to attend to, and there was a reason for his leaving the meeting at that time, but I

couldn't help feeling that he was leaving to others a task which he could have very well lent his support to at that time. So that was the first incident of contact.

STEWART: Did you have any other contact with his office on that particular legislation?

BOGGS: No, I don't recall that we did. I have to say that we were much more inexperienced then and much more naïve. I, as a matter of fact, was not legislative chairman at that time; I was vice president in charge of programs and services, which meant that I was concerned with this particular

[ -1 - ]

legislation because it was education legislation. So that I didn't have as a volunteer in the organization the particular responsibility for continuing contacts with legislators. And we had probably not learned the art of working with staff members as perhaps we have since. Of course, one has to remember also that not very many people [politicians] were sensitive to and opening the doors when one said, "I come here representing the mentally retarded." The exceptions to that were, of course, Congressman Fogarty [John Edward Fogarty] and Senator Hill, who were quite interested and receptive.

The legislation I speak of, you see, was first introduced in 1956 by Senator Hill and Congressman Fogarty in the two Houses. And Senator Hill secured passage in the Senate without any difficulty, but Congressman Fogarty was not on the Education and Labor Committee, and his bill didn't have such success. And so it was reintroduced again in the next session, and it was that second introduction that was the occasion of the hearing that I mentioned in the Senate.

There are some interesting sidelights, incidentally, on that. The difficulties in the House arose in part because the chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee then was Graham Barden [Graham A. Barden] of North Carolina and he was essentially stonewalling—he told us, in effect, that as far as he was concerned the Supreme Court decision on desegregation [Brown v. Board of Education] had fixed in his mind the determination not to pass any federal education legislation. We tried to plead with him that this was a group of children who really weren't involved in that and so on, but he was quite adamant. And he only yielded finally, late in 1958, when Congressman Carl Elliott [Carl A. Elliott] of Alabama, who was in the Hill tradition in many respects, asked to carry the ball with his special committee, and he did.

Well, anyway, you asked did I have contacts with the staff? My first recollection of a contact with the staff was in the winter of 1960<sup>1</sup>—it must have been February, I think—when I had a letter from Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman]. And one has to recollect that in this period, January or February or so, one was not in a position to predict what the course of events would be, and the Kennedy candidacy was, you know, one among many. It was a letter which looked to be almost like a form letter which said, in effect, "We are formulating our objectives, and we would like to know what the program of your organization is." And

---

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth Boggs was President of NARC from October 1958 to October 1960.

here again I have to say that my sense of resentment entered into my response because I felt that this was a pro forma or routing request undoubtedly directed to fifty or a hundred national organizations and did not represent the sensitivity to our issue that I felt we had, I won't say a right to expect, but a right to hope for.

But I wrote back and said I wasn't quite sure what they had in mind by our "program;" we had very broad objectives in

[-2-]

promoting the welfare of the mentally retarded; but I did enclose the material we were just then preparing for the Appropriations Committee, which covered most of the activities of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare which were relevant, or could become relevant, to mental retardation.

I didn't mention that we had formulated a fairly comprehensive set of legislative objectives in 1956, and we were kind of working on those for a period of about five years because in those days we were alone and progress was slow. And the only substantive legislation really that we had primary responsibility for pressing was this bill on teacher training, although we had also been giving attention to the so-called adult-child disability benefits under Social Security which were passed in '56 and became effective in '57. Then we were also concerned with interpretations of legal wording and things of that kind that were substantive.

But there is another interesting little incident that occurred in that connection because, having sent that program to Feldman, I said that I would stop by and bring some material the next time I was in Washington. I was scheduled to come down early in March to appear before Mr. Fogarty's Committee on Appropriations. I was supposed to appear in the morning, and there was a heavy snow storm. The result was I could not fly, I had to take a train from Newark, New Jersey, and I got there about 3:30 in the afternoon. And I was put on as the last witness.

Even in those days, I knew enough not to read every word that I'd written. So I presented the testimony for the record and made a few highlighting remarks and expected that the whole thing would wind up very rapidly. But on the contrary, Mr. Fogarty kept me there for an hour or more of dialogue in which he was trying to elicit from me, in some instances, support beyond the point I was prepared to give it for some of the programs. But, at any rate, we had quite an interesting dialogue, and this, of course, all became part of the record of the Committee.

By the time that was over it was very late in the afternoon. So that in order for me to get back home that night, I couldn't take time to skip all the way over to the Senate; so I asked Mr. Fogarty if he would be so kind as to send these things through on the Capitol mail, or whatever. I just made up a package of these things and dispatched them. And I didn't hear anything more from Kennedy's people.

However, that incident was apparently not entirely forgotten because—and I'm skipping over a little bit here now—just before the Panel [President's Panel on Mental Retardation] was convened, all the Panel members—I suppose all of them did, I did—received a call from Mike Feldman. Mike said—this was kind of a gracious way of doing it, but indicated that the events were connected—he said, "A couple of years ago, or some time

ago, around 1960 you gave us some help. Now we want you to give us some more help,” or something of that sort. And this was his introduction inviting me to sit on the Panel. So I guess that what was done

[ -3- ]

was not done in vain. But I had the feeling that it [the 1960 episode] was a kind of an arm’s length interchange, and it didn’t have the warmth of dialogue that I would have liked to have had.

STEWART: You mentioned the attempts of the Association [National Association for Retarded Children, NARC] to involve the President or the President’s family in mental retardation activities in Massachusetts. Could you go over that a little bit?

BOGGS: Well, that’s something that I can’t speak to personally. I just know that the president of NARC, John Fettinger [John G. Fettinger], who came in second following me was very active in our association for a long time and had been president of the Massachusetts Association, and he did tell me at one time—he came in on the national board about 1955, and we worked together on various projects, and he did say to me—“We have tried to reach the Kennedy family through our channels in Boston, and we haven’t gotten any response.” But I was not personally involved because I was not a Massachusetts person. And one has to recognize that at that point Massachusetts was the focal location, and the Senator was, after all, the Senator from Massachusetts. So that would have been the natural approach.<sup>2</sup>

STEWART: And you also mentioned this incident during the campaign of...

BOGGS: Yes, that picture, I could produce that issue of *Children Limited* for you. It might be of some interest to have.

STEWART: Could you just recount that story again?

BOGGS: Well, yes. Well, you will recall we mentioned that during the early part of 1960 there had appeared a picture in one of the national news magazines, I think it was *Time*, that showed the whole family and identified Rosemary Kennedy [Rosemary F. Kennedy]. And to someone who was sensitive to what was being said, it did affirm, in some respect, her existence as mentally retarded. But in general no publicity was seen on this subject, but the fact was known in the circles of people interested in the mentally retarded.

So during the more active part of the campaign, and I’m not sure whether it was the primary or the regular campaign, Senator Kennedy passed through part of Pennsylvania. He was prevailed upon to accept as a gift a product of a sheltered workshop which I believe is in

---

<sup>2</sup> I recollect being told that an approach had been attempted through then-Archbishop Cushing [Richard James Cushing].



Montgomery County outside Philadelphia, and a picture of this presentation, which involved the president of the

[-4-]

local chapter, Harold Nathan, who later became the president of the Pennsylvania Association—the picture of the president of the association and of Senator Kennedy and, I think, a retarded person who had made this thing, appeared on the front page of *Children Limited*, which is the national newspaper of the NARC. And the caption included reference to the fact the President had a retarded sister. I am not just sure who prompted the follow-up on that in the NARC office, but almost immediately thereafter a bulletin went forward to our local associations saying that although this fact had been mentioned in *Children Limited*, no capital should be made of this, and that the family preferred not to have this, in fact, mentioned, and we would respect their wishes in this matter as we would any other family's wishes. So that was a little incident that occurred in that connection.

Then, as you know, when the Panel itself was appointed, the *New York Times* had an article which alluded, but rather incorrectly and obliquely, to this subject. So that really there was very little publicity given to Rosemary until the time that Eunice Shriver [Eunice Kennedy Shriver] wrote the article for the *Saturday Evening Post* which I think appeared in late '62. And this really, apparently, according to Sorensen's [Theodore C. Sorensen] account, was a distinct decision on the part of the family that this reticence was really no longer appropriate.

STEWART: Is there anything about that article that...

BOGGS: Eunice's article?

STEWART: Yes. Did you review it or anything?

BOGGS: I was trying to recall. No, I didn't personally have much to do with it, but my recollection is that Dr. Dybwad [Gunnar Dybwad], who was then our executive director in NARC, used to give quite a bit.... He was at that period making himself useful to Eunice personally and to the Kennedy Foundation people and so on, and my recollection is that he did assist with some of the background work for that article. But, of course, the main thrust of that article was her personal recollections of growing up with her sister and her parents' [Joseph P. Kennedy; Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy] feelings about the subject. No, I didn't.... I was trying to recall whether I saw the article before it was published. I don't believe so. I think I just heard about it. I knew it was in the works. No.

As a matter of fact, my first encounters with Eunice were at the time the Panel was formed, and I think that, if you're interested in this aspect of it, I should then bring in another thread of association here which is indirect. Dr. Richard Masland [Richard Lambert Masland] had been engaged by NARC in about 1954—well the arrangements were made in '54, and he began to work on a study, I think, in earnest in '55. Between '55 and '57 he did an extensive

survey on the research literature which was eventually published, and he and I had quite a bit of personal contact during this period, and

[ -5 - ]

I prepared some material on the epidemiology for him. He is a very fine person, unpretentious and very delightful to work with. There's another little incident in that connection because we had felt that the National Institute for Neurological Diseases and Blindness (NINDB), which had gotten some of this Fogarty money in Fiscal '56, should do more. And I felt personally that if they were to have someone on their staff who was really interested in mental retardation, it would be helpful in focusing up the interest there. And I was pressing, trying to press for this and Masland kept objecting or advising against it—this was towards the end of the project—and, of course, I didn't cotton up. But apparently, as I see it afterwards, he had already been asked to head up the NINDB, you see, and this [any pressure from NARC] would have looked like something that he was cooking up. But in fact, of course, it was completely spontaneous on my part. We were delighted when he was named.

Well, Dr. Masland was one of the people along with Cooke [Robert Edmond Cooke] and Tarjan [George Tarjan] and others, whom in the late 50's the Kennedy family found and began to rely on as advisors. And I attribute my appointment to the Panel to Dr. Masland's intervention. I don't know that for sure, but he called me in June or so and asked if I would be willing to serve if appointed, and he told me a little about what was cooking and what kind of appointments would be made to the Panel. He said that the Panel would be divided among people who were experts in the retardation, and people who had a more general background in the hope they had something to contribute and could be drawn in.

STEWART:        Could we go back just a little and talk about...

BOGGS:            Just let me tell you the final bit about this.

STEWART:        Go ahead. I'm sorry.

BOGGS:            So my first meeting with Eunice and Sarge [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.] was in connection with the first meeting of the Panel. And it's my recollection that on the second day of the first meeting—I think it was then, or else it was in the December meeting—we were taken and given a buffet lunch in the Attorney General's [Robert F. Kennedy] suite. The Attorney General wasn't there, but we were also given a little talk about the mentally retarded in the federal penal system and one thing and another. Well, in order to get us from the White House, I guess, to the Department of Justice, a bus had been chartered. And Eunice and I were standing near the front of the bus—I think we were both standing up, as a matter of fact—and she turned to me and she said, "Are you married?" And I told this story to Leonard Mayo [Leonard W. Mayo] later because it revealed to me how little she knew about the genesis of our organization [NARC] which by its origins was a parent organization. So that I could see that she had really no knowledge of my background or my motivations for being in this work.

[ -6 - ]

And later, of course—particularly in connection with the Kennedy Foundation awards, I think the Kennedy Foundation was inundated with nominations on behalf of parents who had been active at the local and state level in getting things going—later she became very much aware of and convinced of the value of the National Association and its constituent parts, partly through traveling around and meeting people and having people appear at the hearings of the Panel and partly through this awards process. But at that moment [1961-62] I think she had very little understanding of the dynamics of this parent organization. As I say, I think they had shut themselves off from it in a certain sense. And later this attitude was completely reversed, both with respect to their public admission of the problem and with respect to their attitude toward the voluntary association.

STEWART: Yours was certainly the only lobbying group in the field then...

BOGGS: I won't say that we were completely alone because the Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), which was the branch of the National Education Association composed of people in special education, education of the handicapped, was also interested in the particular legislation [P.L.85-926] providing subsidies for teacher education, and they [CEC] supported the legislation also. And they had, I think even at that time, an office here in Washington.

You have to recognize that then, and also now, we are largely amateurs in this field. I've been spending some time down here the last two or three days, but I do this on my own, and I have very few resources. And we have no one resident in Washington.<sup>3</sup> Of course, there were people who'd been interested in rehabilitation, and people like Martha Eliot [Martha May Eliot], who was the chief of the Children's Bureau, were very interested in the handicapped. When she retired, she recruited me to appear on a panel she headed to appear before the Ways and Means Committee in support of Children's Bureau legislation, and things of that sort because they could relate it to the handicapped. So it would be unfair to say that nobody was doing anything, but it was mostly done in conjunction with something else, rehabilitation or crippled children's programs or whatever.

STEWART: Were you people specifically... Let me ask it this way: is it possible to generalize about the type of change you were looking for in the overall attitude of the federal government toward mental retardation before 1961? Or was it just a matter of looking at individual programs and...

BOGGS: Well, I would say this: we could not, of course, have

[ -7 - ]

foreseen that we would have a president who would make a big

---

<sup>3</sup> NARC established a Washington office in April of 1969.

difference. Dr. Masland once said about prevention of mental retardation, “Progress in this field is going to be made by many small advances across a broad front.” This was also true in the development of programs in service areas. And we recognized, as we still do, that the nature of mental retardation is such—the variety is such—that you need to get people interested in health and welfare and education and rehabilitation and employment and recreation and religion and the whole business. So we were pressing wherever we could get an entrée.

Dr. Salvatore DiMichael [Salvatore George DiMichael] was our first executive director; he had been a federal employee and understood the processes in HEW. Don’t forget HEW was brand new at the time, and don’t forget also that this was a period—it was during the Eisenhower Administration [Dwight D. Eisenhower]—it was during a period when the concept of what the federal government should and could do in the health, education, and welfare field was quite different than it is now. So we were looking for what we could get included under the prevailing philosophy, how we could maximize our gains within the concept that the federal role was primarily one of assisting or documenting or consulting or whatever. And also, however, we were capitalizing on the fact that there was a recognized direct role for the federal government in research. So this is one reason we were interested in the NINDB. This was a place where we could really get a push.

And it’s really of great interest that even in those very early days of NARC when there was so little to offer to parents and families that the parent leadership of the association was determined to support research, to promote research. They had a very strong feeling that “what happened to us need not happen to the next generation.” So we pressed that point. And Dr. DiMichael’s thought was that inherent even in the existing authorizing legislation there were possibilities for doing more for the retarded if people would focus on it.

One of the first things we did was point out that the Children’s Bureau appropriations were not up to authorized strength and that an additional earmarked amount within that—which, you see, was something that Fogarty could do; he didn’t have to go to a substantive committee for it—would be very helpful. So we got one million and then two million earmarked of Children’s Bureau money that the states had to spend in this area or not receive. This was as valuable as if it had been a special bill. Similarly, even today, you know, about a quarter of the federal government expenditure for the mentally retarded is in Social Security benefits for adult disabled children. And it has also been true in certain respects that the things that were accomplished in the 1965 legislative session of direct benefit for the retarded were more massive than the ’63 legislation, but they weren’t labeled as “mental retardation.” So what is real and what carries the banner is something one has to distinguish and one has to take account of in strategies and ride on whatever

[ -8 - ]

tide is running.

STEWART: What expectations did you have as far as either a Kennedy administration or a Democrat administration?

BOGGS: I would have to say that we had no expectations beyond what we already

had, for the reason that I mentioned, that we had not had any response from Kennedy. And when I recall the incident I mentioned, where Senator Kennedy could have quite naturally espoused a bill that was the only piece of legislation that had the term mental retardation in it, without compromising himself personally at all, and he did not even do it, you can see that we had no expectations because in the face of that apparent silence on the part of the family, we could only expect that there would be an evasion of the subject or, at any rate, a failure to treat it any differently than it had been treated in the past, because that's the way that they had treated it up until that point. I infer, I don't know for sure, but I have every reason to believe that Eunice was responsible for saying, "Let's use this opportunity of the presidency to develop something." They did this for two years [1960-1962], just as a project without identifying their family interest.

I think Masland was probably the most helpful person who was directly in public office, aside from Wilbur Cohen [Wilbur J. Cohen], who also was adroit enough to know how to use this opportunity. Of course, the behind the scenes manipulator of most of this was Bob Cooke. You know about that task force, and I don't think there's anything I have to add to that.

STEWART: Well, certainly this would have been an indicator, wouldn't it, this transition task force that Drs. Cooke and Lederberg [Joshua Lederberg]....

BOGGS: Well, yes, but you have to remember that that transition task force, in the first place, wasn't primarily a task force on mental retardation...

STEWART: No, no.

BOGGS: ...it was a task force on health and welfare.

STEWART: Right.

BOGGS: And all that was happening was that Bob Cooke was utilizing this to focus on a few other things. And you also have to recognize that although Cooke was in there pressing for the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and although in the testimony that was eventually adduced in support of NICHD he did make considerable reference to mental retardation, that this also was not a unique wave, as it were. The sentiment for this [NICHD] had been building among

[-9-]

pediatricians and obstetricians for quite a while regardless of mental retardation. They had been increasingly disaffected with the disease centered approach because this didn't suit their disciplinary approaches. So that the groundswell of backing for NICHD came out of a sense of need to study child development, and mental retardation was kind of blended into this by Bob Cooke. And Wilbur Cohen was adroit enough to take cues and use them. As a matter of fact, Gunnar Dybwad, who was then the executive director of NARC, and I had some differences of opinion at that point. You see, I stepped down as president of NARC in 1960,

so I was around as an elder statesman at that stage, and he didn't have to consult me. Not that he did when I was president either. But he was an old proponent of the Children's Bureau, old partisan of the Children's Bureau, and he saw NICHD as a threat to the Children's Bureau.

STEWART: Oh, really?

BOGGS: And he wrote a letter to Dr. Grover Powers saying, "Your protégé and student Bob Cooke is upsetting the Children's Bureau applectart. You'd better tell him to stop." [Laughter] So there were a number of snafus in connection with NICHD which had to do with the fact that Cooke is a somewhat gung-ho character and didn't always, you know, touch base with everybody. Anyway, you know, they had to back and fill, and get a truce between the Children's Bureau and the NICHD.<sup>4</sup> And there's a provision that the Children's Bureau is represented on the NICHD Advisory Council. Incidentally, I am now on the Advisory Council. [1967-71]

STEWART: Oh, really?

BOGGS: Yes, so I succeeded Eunice Shriver. There's at least one public position on most of those boards, you know. Eunice had the first one.

STEWART: Would you go so far as to say that there was an air of pessimism among people in the mental retardation field on what could be expected from the Kennedy Administration?

BOGGS: I would say that there was an air of non-expectation, let's put it that way: "Okay, so another president comes in, and so we will continue to make our efforts at the congressional level."

[-10-]

And, you know, this was the era in which it was traditional for both the House and the Senate to raise the appropriations. The administration would come in with conservative requests, and Fogarty and Hill would advance these. Hill was promoting the Hill-Burton Act through appropriations, and all this sort of thing. And of course, the instrument of the appropriations bill was important from our point of view because in one fell swoop it dealt with all the programs. And there was at that time still so much that could be done under the existing authorization.

Voc. Rehab. [Vocational Rehabilitation Administration], Mary Switzer [Mary E. Switzer] got the message, and she began stepping up special grants to workshops from 1954 on. Clifford MacDonald who had been quite active in rehabilitation for the blind in Florida, was president of NARC from '55 to '57 and had been very active in promoting a really very

---

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Dr. Martha Eliot to Senator Lister Hill dated Sept. 13, 1962, and printed at page 77-78 of Senate L&P.W. Committee hearings on S.2269 & H.R.11099. "Institutes of Health." Sept. 13, 1962; also Senate Report #2174, 87<sup>th</sup> Cong. P.4 (Sept. 27, 1962).

good sheltered workshop and rehabilitation program in Florida; he knew Mary Switzer fairly well. And Mary Switzer's very sensitive in the sense that she's, in the best sense of the word, an opportunist, and she saw that this was kind of a wave of the future, and along about '56 she spoke to her colleagues and said, "Let's get on the ball. This is our new challenge, mental retardation."

You see, this is one of the things that many people don't realize, that by 1960 there was a lot cooking in MR. I'm not minimizing for a moment the effect, the dramatic effect of the Kennedy interest and action, but I believe that it was much more effective because this groundwork had been being developed over a period of about a decade, and there were colleagues in Congress even though they were few and far between. I talked to Congressman Flood [Daniel J. Flood] two or three months ago, and he said, "You know, I never heard of mental retardation before 1960." And I didn't say, "You know, you may not, but some of your colleagues did."<sup>5</sup> [Laughter] Fortunately.

STEWART: You said that the first you heard of the President's Panel was when Dr. Masland suggested that you would be a member, or...

BOGGS: My recollection.... Well, I will say this, I don't recall. You know how it is, there are many rumors about what was going on, and I don't recall exactly. My feeling is that when he [Masland] called me, I already knew that this was being talked about. Yes, I think I knew that this was being talked about, and that there was.... But I knew this only second hand. And after all I was only one—I was a past president at that time—I was only one of several leaders who might have been selected to represent NARC or parents

[-11-]

generally. But I did have a call, and my recollection is that it was along about in June 1961 from Dr. Masland, in which he said it's being talked about and we're working on it, and he wanted to know if I would accept if asked.

And then I didn't hear anything directly until just before the appointment, although Gunnar Dybwad, who had been kind of back and forth, and listening at the keyholes, and one thing and another, and talking to people in the Children's Bureau, knew that it was cooking and being developed and so on. And he told me shortly, he said, "You're in." And I said, "Well, I'll believe that when I get it in writing." I never did get it in writing.

STEWART: Oh, really?

BOGGS: It was all done by telephone.

STEWART: From what was originally told to you as to the scope of the Panel's activities, what did you really expect that the Panel could do or would do?

---

<sup>5</sup> Flood was a member of the full Committee on Appropriations but not of the Subcommittee on Labor HEW, during the critical period of the mid and late '50's. He succeeded Fogarty as chairman of the subcommittee on Fogarty's death in 1967.

BOGGS: Well, my recollection is that my understanding of the scope of the mission was about correct from the start. In other words, Masland didn't use many words, but he said to study the whole federal—no, he didn't say the whole federal—he said to study the problem of mental retardation, and I think he intimated that it would cover research, training and service. And he also indicated that the Panel would be, as I indicated, a mixed one in terms of its interests and competencies. And at that time we didn't have quite as many presidential commissions, committees, and so forth. You know, now every time a problem comes up you appoint a committee, and that was not quite so common in those days. So in that sense I had the feeling that there was the chance to have an impact. He said that there would be staff, as I recall. I had the feeling that if it was a good group and if we were allowed to work and not, you know, forced to accept the staff report or forced to conform to the notions of the people already in the civil service, we could write a very good report. Again, I could have no way of predicting one way or another whether it would have impact or not. And I have to say that you couldn't have told that on the first day of the Panel either because the effectiveness—insofar as it was effective, and I think it was effective—resulted from a combination of factors. It was not only the fact that the President decided he was going to be interested, and that Eunice is a very driving person, but it was also the fact that Leonard Mayo handled the whole thing very adroitly. And it was also the fact that to a surprising degree, I felt, the people on the Panel really wanted to express themselves. They had something on their minds that they could contribute.

And this was true even of the generalists. By that I mean

[-12-]

people like Lederberg and Wendell Stanley [Wendell Meredith Stanley], who, incidentally, epitomized one of the very early disagreements in this area because Lederberg was really quite opposed to the idea of centers for research, and Stanley said, "Yes, but we've had cancer research centers and they've worked. They've advanced the cause." But Lederberg felt that it was very important not to have mission-oriented research. This, of course, is a struggle that goes on in the profession anyway, but it was reflected in microcosm here. Kety [Seymour S. Kety], who was chairman of the research panel, was more of the Lederberg school than of the Stanley school.

As we got going, of course, there was another factor. As I recall, there was a committee report, known as The Fountain Report, after Congressman L.H. Fountain, one of those recurring things, that came out in the middle of the panel's deliberations and which was critical of the NIH [National Institutes of Health] operation. These have been coming out now every so often for a decade. And Kety was strongly identified with NIH—at the time he was appointed to the Panel he was not at NIMH [National Institute of Mental Health], he was appointed to NIMH shortly after that—which presented him with a kind of conflict of interest after the fact. But at any rate he was very sensitive to this, and part of the language of the report really reflects a rebuttal of the Fountain committee.

STEWART: Oh, really. You had no reservations about the Panel itself, that, for example...



BOGGS: Yes, I had some in the sense that I felt it was not too well balanced. It was about half medical. And this is a problem that has constantly recurred. If you had to abandon all disciplines but one when it comes to helping the mentally retarded [as distinct from research], you really would have to hold on to education. And yet education was relatively poorly represented. Now I don't mean in terms of quality, but in quantity it was poorly represented. And there was a panoply of basic scientists. So I had some reservations from that point of view.

Of course, one of the other chronic struggles in our field has been between pediatrics and psychiatry within medicine, and that, you know, I had some partisanship in, too, but at least the lines were fairly equally drawn on the Panel there. There were hardy spokesmen on both sides. I am trying to recall what other concerns I had then. I think that I was also concerned at the outset that these people were fairly high-powered theoreticians. The majority of them were university people and not necessarily involved in programming, you know, at the operational level, although George Tarjan was at that time a superintendent. And that problem was to some extent compensated for as the task forces were organized, and they began to co-opt additional people as consultants and so on. I had my anxieties.

I was one of the few real lay people, and I think I may say

[-13-]

the only knowledgeable lay person, on the group. You see, there were people like Wally Tudor [W. Wallace Tudor], who was well intentioned and very able, but completely uninformed about the subject. And I was, you know, quite acutely aware of the action problems, the problems of getting something accomplished, and of the need to keep these internecine, inter-disciplinary fights under some sort of control so that they didn't paralyze people. But there again, you see, Leonard was quite adroit, and he had had long experience in dealing with all these different groups. And he had a kind of relaxed way about him, and he was very good at doing behind the scenes manipulations and so on. I was tremendously excited, and I saw it as a great opportunity.

I remember after the first meeting sitting down and writing a little piece for *Children Limited*.<sup>6</sup> This was on the feeling side, what it was like to be inside the White House with this mission, you know, after having floated around on the peripheries for so long. So I regarded it as a tremendously exciting thing. And, you see, the timing of the announcement was rather, I think, purposefully set up to coincide with our [NARC] national convention of that year. So the first meeting was held immediately after the convention. As I recall, I flew back from the convention in San Francisco right to here [Washington].

STEWART: October 17, I believe.

BOGGS: Something like that, yes. And I've forgotten the details, but I remember making a quick trip back. So once the Panel was appointed and I saw the

---

<sup>6</sup> Newspaper of NARC, later renamed *Mental Retardation News*.

caliber of people and we got the sense that the President really wanted to see this go, I had great hopes.

And you speak about the timing, incidentally, you know the message, the formal message that was delivered to us said, "I am asking the Panel to report by December 1962..."

STEWART: I was going to ask you about that.

BOGGS: Well, that's what he said, and all of us looked at one another, and some of us who had been old cronies in the field, like Lloyd Dunn [Lloyd M. Dunn] and others, we said, "Well, we can never do this in fifteen months, and they'll find that out, and they'll have to give us an extension." Well, we came back in December. I think we met about the eighth of December, and Leonard announced, "We're going to have to get this done by September if we want to influence the legislation in 1963." And we all said [laughter]. And there followed, from December through the following spring, the most frantic effort on everybody's part. The task forces met furiously all over the country. People turned to with a terrific will.

I was asked by Leonard and George [Tarjan] to sit in with

[-14-]

one or two other people who kind of got together after the topics of the task forces were determined to assist with the assignment of members to the task forces. It had been kind of assumed up until that point that I was interested in being on the research group, and I had been on the research half of that first discussion in the Panel in October as you pointed out, and had spoken up in it. But my role as chairman of the NARC research committee, which is the way I was always identified in PPMR listings, was essentially that of a lay-liaison person. I was not technically on the research side. My training is in mathematical chemistry. We [NARC] have a very well qualified research advisory board set up by Dr. Powers, and I had volunteered for the role of go-between between the Association's frankly lay leadership and the research advisory board. So I had considerable thoughts about research, but I did not feel that really I had much to contribute to that task force. Not only that, but the loading of the Panel was already very strong on that side.

So I more or less suggested that I do what I could in the areas that were the weakest. And the weakest from the point of view of numbers of people available was the task force on the law. Judge Bazelon [David L. Bazelon], of course, was outstanding, but he was alone.

And there's a little interesting story about that from a personal point of view. You asked somewhere in your questions about staffing. He had available to him some funds to employ assistants for himself, and he put on this project Mrs. Patricia Weinberg, who was quite gifted as well as charming. So that task force had a little piece of staff of its own, and in addition to that, Judge Bazelon, as chairman, recruited several people who were not on the Panel who were either attorneys or psychiatrists or whatever. I was vice chairman. We had from the first of January through, I guess, June. It seems to me we had a meeting every month, and at each of these meetings we were each assigned a topic to write a sort of term paper on, and then we came back the next month and it was all torn apart by our colleagues. I

haven't worked so hard since I was a graduate student [laughter]. And it was very exciting and stimulating.

And I have a little satisfaction out of that because I had to earn my way up from scratch with Judge Bazelon. He didn't see how anybody who wasn't trained in the law had anything to contribute to his task force. But I have to mention that I had some background: I had served on a state legislative commission which had over a period of three years drafted a complete revision of the New Jersey Code on mental health and mental retardation. And in preparation for that I had taken a graduate seminar on the law and the legal basis for protective services. So I had some concepts developed in this area. Well, I decided I was going to do my part, and I did my best, and I wrote my bit, and I listened to what they said and responded, and so forth and so forth.

I remember the night before we met with the President in

[-15-]

October 1962 to present the report, there was a meeting of Mayo and Tarjan and the task force chairmen, including Judge Bazelon. I think it was he who asked that I attend, maybe I was asked because I had had a part in the writing, but anyhow I was an extraneous person. We were having a little cocktail hour before the meeting and Bazelon came up to me, and he said, "I owe you an apology." He said, "You really made a contribution. But when you started, I didn't believe anybody who wasn't trained in the law would have anything to contribute to this report on the law." So I was real pleased. It was really a very satisfying moment about the whole operation.

Then, of course, there was a task force on coordination which was a little slower in getting going, and there were some struggles back and forth on that which I can tell you about, if you're interested.

STEWART: Yes.

BOGGS: Well, the task force on coordination was composed of people, not necessarily chairmen, but of people from the other task forces. Everybody who was on coordination was on something else. And it was deliberately planned that we move slowly. I was extremely interested—I had been for some time—in the whole theory and practice of coordination and of the need, that I have indicated earlier, of going it the hard way in terms of the organization and administration of services for the retarded. The easy way is to say, "Let's set up an agency for the mentally retarded and assign to that agency everything that the mentally retarded need." Well, in my view that's both philosophically and practically self defeating in the long run. But in many ways it's harder to keep the education and welfare, or education and rehabilitation people all balancing and doing their job in concert.

But this was a view that I held, and it was also shared by Bill Hurder [William P. Hurder], who was the chairman of the task force on coordination. Hurder is a very able fellow and a very constructive thinker. One of the problems, however, that arose was that he was slow in moving on this, and consequently on the time-table of writing the reports, we didn't really have much to present in March, and so we kept saying, "Okay, Hurder will

come in later.” So when we [staff, Mayo and I] were working on the report in August, we really didn’t have a draft which was as well worked over as what had come up from the other task forces. And we found ourselves confronted, Leonard and I found ourselves confronted, with a rather elegant paper on the philosophy of coordination which said not one thing about what do we do about it, and I finally had to write something more. There’s a part of the report which deals specifically with coordination as it affects the role of federal government. This was largely written by me and, in certain respects, not quite as well integrated in terms of, you know, the whole process of having been reviewed by everybody and all that sort of thing. But this came about

[-16-]

because we had to do it at the end because we waited for Hurder, and it didn’t come.

Then a year later I worked with Hurder on what eventually became the task force report, which was issued under some pressure. He and I were asked to work it up so that it would be available as a document for that White House Conference on Mental Retardation [Airlie House-September 1963].

One of the things that he and I did, in which he [Hurder] and I played more of a role than the other members of the task force, was in June of 1962 we spent a couple of days in HEW. Luther Stringham [Luther Winters Stringham] set up interviews for us with the various heads of agencies, people from NIMH, NINDB, from the Office of Education, and so on. And we asked them about some of their problems.

This was quite revealing because, for example, it came out very strongly that the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] and the NIH didn’t trust each other at all and were not exchanging information that really they should have exchanged. And out of that, the thoughts stimulated by that, I drew some of the concrete thoughts for what ought to be done.

There’s the whole question of the Secretary’s Committee on Mental Retardation and the reactivation of that idea. You see, the idea of some sort of a coordinating mechanism within HEW had been just about the only objective of our [NARC] 1956 program, that was not realized by 1960. And I say it was not realized because although Joe Douglass [Joseph Douglass] was chairman of the committee, it didn’t function. As you mentioned, it was a reactivation.

STEWART: It was disbanded and...

BOGGS: Yes, essentially, it went into disuse. And then Luther Stringham saw, of course, when the Panel began to move in and we had offices in HEW, he saw that it was going to be essential, from the point of view of the office of the Secretary, that there be a point of confrontation, a point at which the response of the HEW could be coordinated, and a point through which the Panel’s work could be facilitated in the most constructive way. And this whole issue of the interaction with the HEW people and how our objectives were modified by theirs and vice versa is in itself an interesting study.

I saw this particularly in relation to Jack Haldeman in the Division of Hospital and Medical Facilities because Haldeman was an able and aggressive administrator, and he had

been aware of the pressures that we in NARC had put on prior to 1960 with respect to the administration of the Hill-Burton act. The Hill-Burton Act had been drawn to specify that there should be no support for facilities for purely “domiciliary care.” And the Hill-Burton people in HEW had the gall, if I may say so, to come out with policy guidelines and regulations which defined institutions for the mentally retarded as institutions for domiciliary care. It said that by definition domiciliary or

[-17-]

custodial is what they are. And we were furious about that.

Eventually, after negotiations with Senator Hill and whatnot, we did get—I think in ‘58 or ‘59—a few grants made, but these were restricted to medical facilities within residential facilities. Residential facilities for the retarded were never recognized as medical facilities. So Haldeman was aware that even if he gave a liberal interpretation, he couldn’t do all the types of instruction that were needed for the retarded under existing statute. He was also aware that he had to gather the statistics to back up this finding. So Leonard organized a kind of ad hoc committee that met several times during the summer of 1962. And I was able out of the NARC background and files to pull together some figures that looked good, in the sense that they were sweeping, about the waiting lists and the obsolescence and all this sort of thing, and so I trotted this into the committee. And this information was more concrete than he [Haldeman] got from almost anybody else on the committee.

The result was that Haldeman involved me later in the implementation of the Act after it was enacted and funded. I was one of the people on his advisory group and so was Bob Cooke. He had a Surgeon General’s Advisory Council to prepare guidelines and a booklet to implement this [P.L. 88-164 Part C]. It was very interesting to watch that, though, because, in polite terms, Haldeman’s empire building aspirations were also apparent. I don’t say this in a negative way. Everybody’s job is to do his job better and to aspire to more. But he did want to involve us in one controversial bit that I refused to be entangled in because he wanted the Panel to recommend that the construction of sheltered workshop facilities be in their [DHMF] bailiwick and not in the vocational rehabilitation bailiwick. Well, we, I think, managed to stay out of that particular scrap.

I happened to favor the idea that construction be the servant of program, and that the construction authority should be where the program authority is. When the bill came out, you know, it had sheltered workshops as one of the things that could be constructed under Part C of Title I. And E.B. White, on behalf of the National Rehabilitation Association, quietly went in there in 1963 and got Senator Hill to put in the bill [P.L. 88-164] that under Part C, the agency could construct workshops only when they were part of comprehensive facilities—that is part of another program package. And then later VRA came in and got construction authority of their own. But these incidents illustrate some of the pulling and hauling that was going on. The struggle for jurisdiction over construction of workshops was going on in July and August of ‘62. Of course, Haldeman was already drafting his proposed bill at that time.

STEWART:       Excuse me. To what extent throughout this whole thing did you look on yourself, or did others look on you, as the representative of the National Association?

BOGGS: Well, I would say this. I think it was perfectly clear that I was the only person who was appointed because of strong identification with the National Association and with parents as a constituency. I think I was appointed because they wanted somebody.... I think Masland wanted me personally, but he also wanted me as the tie with the Association. And there had to be that. And whatever may have been Eunice's lack of knowledge about us, there were people who knew about us who felt that we had to be in it. And at the same time I made it clear to NARC that the nature of the whole operation was such that I couldn't be going back and getting a policy statement from the board every time I turned around, and that the nature of my representation derived from my strong identification with the goals of the Association and the fact that I had been one of the molders of its policy.

You see, I have been active, I am probably the only person, even now, who has been active continuously in the national association since its founding. I was a founder, a member of the first board, and I was on the board for the first thirteen years [1950-1963], which is more than anybody. Well, I had six years on the board, and then I was vice-president, and president, and so on. So that I do have a certain ability to bespeak the thought of the group because I've been part of making the thought. I think that people in the Panel and people in NARC both thought of me in that light, yes. However, NARC was not asked to name anyone.

STEWART: I asked you because I don't think there was any other real organizational representation on the Panel as such. Most of the people...

BOGGS: It was much less so. I was trying to think. Yes, on the Panel itself there was probably less. There were two or three people who got involved in other ways. Now George Tarjan, for example, has been very closely associated with the American Association on Mental Deficiency. He was president either just before or just after that, and he could have been regarded in that light. I think that we all functioned on the Panel as individuals. Gunnar Dybwad [NARC executive] was a person who had himself quite strong views which he sometimes bespoke on behalf of the association without necessarily checking them out; there were some differences of opinion between him and myself on some issues which were evident.

I did try to steer a tightrope course in the sense that I tried, on the one hand, to keep the NARC informed in a legitimate way and at the same time not to break the faith of the confidentiality that was essential to the processes of the Panel. This is not always easy to do, but I think if you try to keep your eye on the objectives, you can do it. This was part of my task at the time.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

STEWART: You mentioned that you had some role or some involvement in the initial

selection of people.

BOGGS: Not to the Panel but the distribution of Panel members among the task forces.

STEWART: Oh, I see, I'm sorry.

BOGGS: No, no, I had nothing to do with the selection of the Panel. The knowledge of who specifically was on it came as almost a complete surprise to me at the announcement. But at the December meeting, I think—it was either the end of the first October meeting, which was a two day meeting, or at the December meeting, and I can't remember which,<sup>7</sup> but the records surely show that—after the decision was made as to what task forces there should be, after the rebellion relative to manpower, Leonard and George and at least one other person, I'm sure, and I went off to a side corner to discuss who would be assigned to which task force. And I think I was probably involved in that because I probably knew a greater number of people on the Panel than even Leonard because Leonard had not been a specialist in MR until that point. So I think that was how I happened to get involved in that. I did have that role. We were just moving pegs around the boxes at that point, you know.

STEWART: As far as the staff of the Panel, the people who were working with Leonard Mayo, were you at all involved, one, in their selection, and two, in determining how they would function?

BOGGS: Not really, but let me tell you my involvement. Bert Brown [Bertram S. Brown], of course, was corralled to write the President's address and do a lot of the staff work in the preliminary setup and to gather some of the initial material together. And I don't know who was responsible for the nomination of Rick Heber [Rick F. Heber], although it might very well have been Nick Hobbs [Nicholas Hobbs], who was quite in the confidence of the Kennedy family and the Foundation—he was one of the advisors to the Foundation and did quite a bit with the Peace Corps, too. And Rick was one of his first students in the [Hobbs] mental deficiency doctoral program.

The first I heard about it was that shortly before the Panel was appointed—I suppose this must have been in September—I had a call from Rick, who said did I know what was up; (I guess he

[-20-]

even mentioned that he understood I would be appointed, I don't recall) and what did I know; and was he going to have latitude to work; and this and that. And he apparently knew at that time about Leonard. I mean, he knew that Leonard was chairman, and he didn't know

---

<sup>7</sup> It was the December meeting. See page 10 of Minutes of Meeting of December 8-9, 1961. This record shows that Cooke, Davens [Edward Davens], and Hurder were also involved and that we decided on the "functional divisions" as well as the distribution of members among them.

Leonard, and he wanted to know what kind of a fellow he was, and so on. My recollection is that Rick was brought in, and I may be wrong about this, but my recollection is that he was brought in a little before the Panel actually was appointed.

So almost one of the first things that I encountered in relation to staff—and I've forgotten whether it was just before of just after the Panel was appointed and convened—was that Rick ran head on into Bert Brown very early on. And that was one of the early tussles, you know, was Rick going to be the staff, or was Bert Brown going to manage it from out there [NIMH]? And that was resolved, essentially, in favor of Rick. I think Rick was probably also considerably responsible for recruiting Gardner [William I. Gardner] although there again Nick Hobbs probably had something to do with that.

But Rick was determined that if he was going to do this, he was going to do it his way. He recognized that at this particular time in his professional career he was taking himself away from an appointment he had just obtained at the University of Wisconsin, and that if he was going to take this time out at that particular point in his career, he had to make it count for him professionally. There's nothing wrong with that, you know. There are times in one's career which are more critical than others, and this was one for him. And he recognized that if he did well, he would make his mark, and if he didn't, that he'd have lost an important, crucial period.

This was also part of the struggle between psychiatry and the rest of the world, too. The personal problem between Rick and Bert was a reflection in part of that larger issue.

I believe that it was understood before the Panel met that while Rick was recruited, he was not to be the director, and there be available a position which would be a more senior position. I think that George and Leonard, who did not know each other before, had hopefully started out to recruit such a person, and then they realized that they could spend half a year recruiting and the job had better get done. And Leonard was in a position to take a leave, and so, if I recall correctly, it was at the December meeting that it was recommended that Leonard direct the staff. I think we all kind of heaved a sigh of relief because, really, getting too many people on board in an operation that's supposed to take only nine months is a problem. So it was agreed that Leonard would act as director of the staff. And I think that worked all right. But the whole question of the role of the NIMH, of course, was involved then and later, and has been an ongoing issue.<sup>8</sup>

[-21-]

Rick was very much disturbed and reported to me after he left Washington in late 1962. Between the time that we presented the report to the President and the time that it was published, it was understood that some editing would go on. It was our understanding this was editing strictly in the sense of improving grammar and prose style and so forth. And Rick went back to Wisconsin in October, and he reported back to me that no sooner had he left Washington than Bert Brown was in maneuvering with text, you see.

STEWART: Oh, really? Well, who was officially supposed to be doing it, or what was the arrangement?

---

<sup>8</sup> See page 2 of minutes of Dec. 8-9.



BOGGS: Well, my recollection was, and you have to remember that I no longer had any direct responsibility. You know, there were different stages of editing. There was editing which was a question of moving sections or paragraphs around and assimilating the information and deciding what data went in and what didn't go in.<sup>9</sup> And then there was this editing for style, which was all that was supposed to go on after the report had been filed by us in October 1962.

But it was also true that we in the Panel had not wanted to do a lot of phony documentation, like saying how many people there are and all that sort of stuff, because we recognized that we had not had the time to do the research, the independent research, that was necessary to do this, and we knew these estimates are not very reliable. I knew better than anyone because I'm responsible for this 3 percent figure; I knew better than anybody that these things are just guesses and hypotheses and so forth, and that the recommendations really did not depend on them. In other words, the recommendations were valid whether those figures were off by 50 percent or not. And so we [Panel members and staff] had shortchanged that portion.

Well, apparently the BOB [Bureau of the Budget] people came over the horizon, and they said, "That's not justification enough for us. We've got to have some data that say this is a big problem and sling the millions around." And so there had been some suggestion that a portion of the introduction to the report be written in which this was done. Well, that was, in fact, done between October and the time that the report was published. I don't know who all got into that, but Rick came back, I guess to assist with this, and he was disturbed because he felt the subject matter was being shifted in some instances, and in some instances he felt it was deliberately being shifted in order to throw the ball to NIMH when Rick didn't feel that that had necessarily been our intention with respect to that certain part. So there was edginess about that at that time.

[-22-]

There was another interesting aspect about this, and I don't know just exactly who all and to what extent these things were determined in the office of the President. Mike Feldman, of course, played a very inconspicuous but very important role during the entire Panel year. And he had several jobs, one of which was to tell Eunice, you know, when she had to stop.

STEWART: Can you think of any examples?

BOGGS: [Laughter] No, excepting that Leonard told me on one or two occasions that when Eunice had been pressing a point, you know, beyond what seemed to be reasonable and that he, Leonard, really got up against it, he would get Mike Feldman to say that this was as far as she could go.

Anyway, there was an interesting incident in this connection at that same evening meeting that I had mentioned earlier at which Bazelon made his remark to me; Mike

---

<sup>9</sup> Mike Feldman and Mike March (Bureau of the Budget) wanted more "facts and figures" put into the report, and accordingly some data was added late in 1962. See subsequent transcript.

Feldman was present. And there had appeared, even at that point, some form in the language of the report as we had it in front of us which did represent some change from the way it had been written. The new language again suggested that the NIMH was going to be the focal point. We questioned it and Mike Feldman said, "Well, somebody's got to do this, and the NIMH is the obvious one." I turned to him and said, "I don't think we think that that is necessarily the way it ought to be done." And I added, "If the President determines that this is the way it is to be done, that is his determination, but I think you should let us recommend what we think should be done." And he looked a little startled, but I think that he respected that view.

I might mention in that connection that there was one recommendation of the Panel that did not appear in the record which was the recommendation relative to the establishment of a position in the White House, the position that Warren [Stafford L. Warren] was eventually recruited for. And I mention this because...

STEWART: Well, that was in the Panel's report?

BOGGS: No, it was not in the report. That's what I say: it was one recommendation of the Panel which was not in the record.

STEWART: But it was a recommendation?

BOGGS: It was a recommendation of the Panel, and we agreed to it, and it was understood that it would be conveyed to the President. This was quite clear the morning that we met with the President finally. I mean, it was clear among us at our pre-meeting—in the period where we met together before we met with the President. And I mention this because afterwards, you know, when this came forward and there was some controversy about Warren's functioning in this position, people said, "But the Panel never recommended that." And I said, "Well, in fact, we

[-23-]

did." But we didn't put it in writing because we felt that this was very much a decision that the President ought to make, and we did not want to be in the position of making it publicly if he was not going to accept it. So it was made, and we participated in it, but it was not formally written down.

STEWART: To what extent did this attitude about including or not including things that possibly would embarrass the President, to what extent was this a factor in your work?

BOGGS: I believe that this one recommendation was the only place in which that came forward very strongly. I was just trying to think whether we.... Well, I think, for example, that we may not have said quite what some people would have liked to have said about family planning, for example, recognizing that that might embarrass the President, both personally and administratively. And there may have

been a few things like that where.... Perhaps I should phrase this differently: there were not too many areas where, because of political sensitivity—and in a sense I think that was politically sensitive—we soft-pedaled things. Rather I think that we had before us the example of the Joint Commission on Mental Health report which we felt had defeated itself in some respects because it had been so extravagant in its recommendations, and so we tried, I think, to be bold without being brash, I might say, or without being impossible. And perhaps it might be said that we aspired to dream the possible dream in the hope that thereby we would foster its realization, rather than foster more dreams merely. So in that sense we may have spoken in terms of aspirations which were five year aspirations rather than twenty-five year aspirations.

STEWART: You mentioned that you spent...

BOGGS: And I have to say parenthetically on that that, of course, you have to recognize that much that was put in the report was derived directly from task forces, and I have no knowledge of, you know, what was going on in other people's minds when they modified their remarks or proposals for administrative purposes. And I do think that it's important to recognize that there were several recommendations in the Panel report which, while they were genuinely related to mental retardation, were also part of people's larger agendas. The domestic Peace Corps was recommended, and the whole business about maternal and child health—that developed into the maternity and infant care projects. These were genuinely and appropriately related to mental retardation, but they could have equally well have come out of a panel or a task force on umpty-ump other topics.

STEWART: Was there much discussion that possibly these shouldn't

[-24-]

be in the report, that these would, in effect...

BOGGS: I don't believe that there was really that. I recall fairly early in the game Nick Hobbs making a remark which was not specific to the maternity and infant care but was specific to the general question of what is the scope of the report and what is the scope of mental retardation as we see it here. And he said, "Are we really going to address ourselves to the problems of deprivation and to mental retardation which is generated by the socio-economic conditions in the country?" Of course, these terms were not in such common use then; they weren't the language of every day. And I remember everybody nodding their head and saying, "Yes, we should address ourselves to the whole problem. We should tell it like it is." And I remember concurring in that view. And I think that this was related also to this business of maternity and infant care.

But the maternity and infant care proposal, which, as it turned out, was one of the most far-reaching, was basically an Ed Davens proposal. He was in a position to know, from his work in Baltimore and his work with his colleagues, that there was an acute and changing aggravation of this problem of infant mortality. There was every reason to believe that infant

mortality was an index of morbidity. So that originated there, and he got strong support from Bob Cooke.

STEWART: Look, what time will you have to...

BOGGS: Well, I think I should depart almost any minute now. We're in the middle of a tape, aren't we?

STEWART: Well, that's all right.

[-25-]

[END OF INTERVIEW #1]

Elizabeth M. Boggs Oral History Transcript – JFK #1  
Name Index

**B**

Barden, Graham A., 2  
Bazelon, David L., 15, 16, 23  
Brown, Bertram S., 20, 21, 22

**C**

Cohen, Wilbur J., 9, 10  
Cooke, Robert Edmond, 6, 9, 10, 18, 20, 25  
Cushing, Richard James, 4

**D**

Davens, Edward, 20, 25  
DiMichael, Salvatore George, 8  
Douglass, Joseph, 17  
Dunn, Lloyd M., 14  
Dybwad, Gunnar, 5, 10, 12, 19

**E**

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 8  
Eliot, Martha May, 7, 10  
Elliott, Carl A., 2

**F**

Feldman, Myer, 2, 3, 23  
Fettinger, John G., 4  
Flood, Daniel J., 11  
Fogarty, John Edward, 2, 3, 6, 8, 11  
Fountain, L.H., 13

**G**

Gardner, William I., 21

**H**

Haldeman, Jack, 17, 18  
Heber, Rick F., 20, 21, 22  
Hill, Lister, 1, 2, 10, 11, 18  
Hobbs, Nicholas, 20, 21, 25  
Hurder, William P., 16, 17, 20

**K**

Kennedy, John F., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14,

15, 20, 22, 23, 24

Kennedy, Joseph P., 5  
Kennedy, Robert F., 6  
Kennedy, Rose Fitzgerald, 5  
Kennedy, Rosemary F., 4, 5  
Kety, Seymour S., 13

**L**

Lederberg, Joshua, 9, 13

**M**

MacDonald, Clifford, 11  
Masland, Richard Lambert, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 19  
Mayo, Leonard W., 6, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 21, 23

**N**

Nathan, Harold, 5

**P**

Power, Grover, 10, 15

**S**

Shriver, Eunice Kennedy, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 19, 23  
Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., 6  
Sorensen, Theodore C., 5  
Stanley, Wendell Meredith, 13  
Stringham, Luther Winters, 17  
Switzer, Mary E., 11

**T**

Tarjan, George, 6, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21  
Tudor, W. Wallace, 14

**W**

Warren, Stafford L., 23  
Weinberg, Patricia, 15  
White, E.B., 18