

Bernard L. Boutin Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 04/27/1972
Administrative Information

Creator: Bernard L. Boutin
Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman
Date of Interview: April 27, 1972
Place of Interview: Winooski, Vermont
Length: 72 pages

Biographical Note

Boutin was the mayor of Laconia, New Hampshire from 1955 through 1959; a staff member of John F. Kennedy's [JFK] 1960 presidential campaign; the Administrator of the General Service Administration from 1961 until 1964; and Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from 1965 through 1968. In this interview Boutin discusses New Hampshire politics; presidential elections and Democratic National Conventions from 1956 through 1968; various staff members of JFK's presidential campaign from 1956 to 1960; JFK's presidential campaign in several different states; the 1960 presidential primary in New Hampshire; working as the Administrator of the General Services Administration [GSA], including public works projects, federal buildings and sites, reorganization of GSA structure and personnel, and working with Congress and other federal agencies on GSA matters; the National Archives and Records Administration and presidential libraries; the Democratic National Committee during JFK's Administration; Boutin's memories of immediately following JFK's assassination in 1963; tensions between Robert F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson; and "Johnson people" versus "Kennedy people," among other issues.

Access
Open.

Usage Restrictions

According to the deed of gift signed October 12, 1973, copyright of these materials has passed to the United States Government upon the death of the interviewee. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

Copyright

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection

to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation

Bernard L. Boutin, recorded interview by Larry J. Hackman, April 27, 1972, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Bernard L. Boutin

to the

JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

I, Bernard L. Boutin, do hereby give to the John F. Kennedy Library, for use and administration therein, all my rights, title and interest, except as hereinafter provided, to the tape recording and transcript of the interview conducted in Winooski, Vermont on April 27, 1973 for the John F. Kennedy Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Researchers may, at any time, apply to me for written permission for access to the interview, and those receiving my written permission are to be granted access to the interview by the Director of the John F. Kennedy Library.

2. The interview is to be closed to general research for a period of 10 years, or until my death, whichever is the later.

3. The tape of this interview is to be destroyed.


4. I retain literary property rights to the interview for a period of 10 years, or until my death, whichever is the later, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to the United States Government.

5. Copying of the interview transcript or portions thereof, except as needed to maintain an adequate number of research copies available in the Kennedy Library, is expressly prohibited, and copies may not be disseminated outside the Library.


BLS
10-1-73

6. The limitation on copying and dissemination shall be in effect until September 3, 1983 or until my death, whichever is the later.

7. This agreement may be revised or amended by mutual consent of the parties undersigned.



Bernard L. Boutin



Archivist of the United States

October 1, 1973
Date

October 12, 1973
Date

Bernard L. Boutin – JFK #2
Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1	New Hampshire [NH] politics in the 1950s
2	1956 presidential election and Democratic National Convention
4	Plans for John F. Kennedy [JFK]’s 1960 presidential campaign in New Hampshire
5	Paul M. Butler, William L. Dunfey, the Arrangements Committee
9	1960 Democratic National Convention
10	JFK campaigns for the presidency, 1956–1960
12	1960 NH presidential primary
16	Kennedy family members working on JFK’s 1960 campaign
17	JFK’s presidential campaign in Maryland
20	JFK’s presidential campaign in other eastern states
23	Robert F. Kennedy [RFK] on JFK’s presidential campaign
24	JFK’s 1960 campaign in California
26	JFK visits NH during 1960 campaign
28	Presidential appointments of NH figures
33	Reorganization of the General Services Administration [GSA] under Boutin
35	Working with Congress on GSA matters
37	Working with the Bureau of the Budget and funding GSA projects
39	Public works projects and public buildings
43	Working with other federal agencies, departments, and groups on and press coverage of GSA matters
45	National Archives and Records Administration and presidential libraries
48	Problems for the GSA with some federal buildings and sites
50	Thomas J. McIntyre’s 1962 senatorial campaign, NH
52	The Democratic National Committee during JFK’s Administration
55	Immediately after JFK’s assassination, 1963
57	Plans for the JFK Presidential Library
58	1964—write-in vote for RFK in NH vice-presidential primary
60	Discussing what RFK and other members of JFK’s Administration would do next after Lyndon B. Johnson [LBJ] becomes President
62	1964 Democratic National Convention
63	The relationship between RFK and LBJ
64	Gearing up for the 1968 presidential election
68	RFK’s relationship with R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.
69	“Johnson people” versus “Kennedy people”
70	Boutin works with Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis on various projects under the heading of the GSA during JFK’s Administration
71	The 1964 NH presidential primary and establishing loyalty to President LBJ

Second Oral History Interview

With

BERNARD L. BOUTIN

April 27, 1972
Winooski, Vermont

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Just following along that outline, in the first interview with Dan [Dan H. Fenn, Jr.], there really isn't a description of what was happening in terms of New Hampshire politics in the late fifties. I thought maybe you could just sort of generalize about it in terms of when you and your people came in, what that meant in terms of New Hampshire politics, what new ethnic groups, if any, you can generalize on that—or geographical areas—and in any other way you can describe it.

BOUTIN: Go right on?

HACKMAN: Yeah.

BOUTIN: The Democratic Party in New Hampshire in the middle fifties, early fifties, and even in the late forties was in very sad condition. There was bad feeling between the French Democrats and the Irish Democrats. This was a very clear line of cleavage. There literally was almost a total absence of Democratic organization except in some of the larger urban centers like Manchester and Nashua. What there was there were more personal organizations for mayoralty candidates and aldermanic candidates than anything like a state structure. Sure, we had a party, we had conventions, but it just wasn't too respectable to be a Democrat. Even back then we had a lot of people from Massachusetts who had moved to New Hampshire, many of whom were Democrats, but they

took a look at the situation and found that the real competition took place not in the election, but in the primary. So, they'd vote in the primary and would get a Republican label, and that was it. Unfortunately, too, many of the Democrats who had at least been Democrats in their younger years, who had achieved

[-1-]

some measure of success, found that it was with more prestige to be a Republican. They joined the country club, they became Republicans, and that kind of thing. So, it was a pretty sorry situation.

Then, too, the Republicans had very cleverly manipulated the Democratic Party, even to having a voice at times in the selection of some of the Democratic candidates, if not overtly, certainly covertly. Styles Bridges [H. Styles Bridges] was a master at that. He even had some of the so-called prominent Democrats at that time on his payroll, or at least that is what is alleged. And then, this whole question of patronage. Most of your state commissions and committees and so forth had requirements for minority representation; and so the Democrats were more active in trying to get recognized by being appointed through a Republican organization than through their own. Then, Mr. Loeb, William Loeb of the *Manchester Union Leader*, had a tremendous stranglehold on the Democratic Party, and this was a very great problem. At that time, his fair-haired boy was a fellow from Rochester by the name of John Shaw. John Shaw was an ultraconservative. This is surely what Mr. Loeb was looking for. He ran in both 1954 and 1956 as the Democratic candidate for governor against Lane Dwinell [Seymour Lane Dwinell], the Republican; and he was thus the titular head of the Party. He was running the show.

And that really gets back then to the first meeting with Senator Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]. In 1956—I had just been elected Mayor of Laconia the year before—we had a presidential primary in New Hampshire. Tom McIntyre [Thomas J. McIntyre], now U.S. Senator McIntyre, asked me if I would be state chairman for Estes Kefauver in the primary, which I agreed to do. We swept the delegates, and Estes did extremely well in the primary. The Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] people didn't do well at all, nor did Stevenson himself in New Hampshire. I was elected as the Democratic National Committeeman from '56 to '60. At the Chicago Convention [Democratic National Convention], feeling that the New Hampshire voters had expressed their will by voting for Kefauver, I held most of our delegates in line for the vice presidential nomination for Kefauver against Senator Kennedy, who I didn't know at the time.

The following October, I was down at a meeting of the National Committee [Democratic National Committee]—this would have been October of 1957—and I received a telephone call from Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] asking me if I would be willing to go up to the Hill and have a talk with the Senator the next day. So I agreed to do that and went up, and I spent about thirty minutes with Senator Kennedy, just the two of us. He told me that he was thinking seriously of running for the presidency. We spoke of the importance of the New Hampshire primary as the first primary

[-2-]

in the nation, the very bad experience that others had had in New Hampshire, it being more a spoiler in presidential primaries than a builder—you will remember the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower]-Taft [Robert A. Taft] situation there, the Kefauver-Truman [Harry S. Truman] situation in '52, and many other examples—and the need for strengthening the Democratic Party in New Hampshire and putting responsible people in key positions. I don't really remember some of the other things that we talked about. I do remember that he talked about the need for the country to get moving again, some of the things he talked about later in the campaign, his desire to run for the presidency. He just asked for my help, and from then on I was a captive audience. Anything he wanted I was glad to do.

HACKMAN: Do you remember anything at all at the '56 Convention about Kennedy efforts to get any of the delegates in New Hampshire to swing on that second ballot to Kennedy?

BOUTIN: Sure, I remember very well.

HACKMAN: How did it come about?

BOUTIN: There was Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.]—he was particularly active at that time—coming around and talking to the delegates personally. Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] was there and was doing that. Senator Kennedy himself was also in evidence. [Interruption]

HACKMAN: You were talking about the Kennedy efforts in '56 at the Convention. You mentioned Reardon. I don't know whether there was anything in particular that...

BOUTIN: They were very aggressive in looking for delegate votes. In fact, I thought early in the game that he very likely was going to get that nomination. Then, of course, there were some switches of key votes. When Tennessee changed, that changed the whole ball game. And, of course, Estes did get the vice presidential nomination. We all know the rest.

HACKMAN: Did you ever talk with either John Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or other Kennedy associates as to what they thought happened on those switches in 1956?

BOUTIN: No, I never did. I never talked with any of them about it, and I really don't know more than I've read in various reports that have come out. So I don't know. But we were able to pretty much hold our New Hampshire delegation. We, I think, had one or two votes that went and stayed with Averell Harriman [William Averell Harriman]. The rest of them were almost all Kefauver. I think we had one or two that went Kennedy.

HACKMAN: You said you came out of that October '57 meeting with Senator Kennedy personally committed to Senator Kennedy. But what kind of understanding, if any, was there as to what you would go back and do with it?

BOUTIN: Right at that point, there was really no understanding. He just asked me for assistance. We talked about the New Hampshire political situation, the condition of the Party and, from that first meeting, nothing really very much happened except that a relationship was established. From then on, I was in very frequent communication with him, either personally or by mail or by telephone. One of the things, of course, we realized very early in the game and I'm sure was behind this initial telephone call, that the only way that the New Hampshire Democratic Party could be reformed would be for someone besides a Loeb candidate to get the gubernatorial nomination. In talking about it, my colleagues, people like Bill Dunfey [William L. Dunfey] and Murray Devine [J. Murray Devine] and others in the state, felt that I should run and, of course, I did and won that primary against John Shaw. We did, immediately after the 1958 primary, completely reorganize the Democratic Party structure.

HACKMAN: Before you ran in '58, were you spending much time talking with people about possible support for John Kennedy in '60, or does that really wait until after you ran and lost in '58?

BOUTIN: No, we really were talking about the Kennedy campaign immediately after that first meeting in '57. I was talking with many people. They, in turn, were broadening the circle of those who would be influential in the campaign, responsible for it. We were talking of the Kennedy '60 campaign as if it were a foregone conclusion.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any of the people you found it particularly difficult to convince and why?

BOUTIN: There was difficulty in getting some Democrats to line up with Kennedy, and I think there were two major factors. One was very clearly the religious factor. People either were hostile to the idea—not in great numbers, but some of them—to a Catholic running for the presidency. But, even more so, there was great skepticism that the country was ready to elect a Catholic as President. So it wasn't hostility to Kennedy or hostility to a Catholic, but just doubt that it could in fact happen. The second was the Senator's age.

HACKMAN: So mostly French and Irish Catholics who would have had the doubt.

[-4-]

BOUTIN: Yes, that is correct.

HACKMAN: Can you remember the evolution of your own dealings with Kennedy staff people? Was it primarily O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] and O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] or did Reardon stay in the picture or Frank Morrissey [Francis X. Morrissey] out of Boston?

BOUTIN: We knew Ted Reardon best of all of the Kennedy people at that point. Subsequently, his role in the primaries and his role outside of Washington was to diminish. But Ted knew a great many people in New Hampshire; we knew him. Frank Morrissey, to the best of my knowledge, had zero participation in the New Hampshire primary. He didn't do anything at all. Our main relationship—and this was kind of a tandem situation—was with O'Brien and O'Donnell. They'd come up at alternate times, and we kind of looked upon them as the two main leaders of the political effort. Even Robert Kennedy, at that point, most of us had not met and did not know.

But I think it's interesting to point out, Larry, that Kennedy himself, Senator Kennedy, was giving the personal leadership himself. He wasn't depending upon others. He would have his secretary call up and invite us to his home, or say, "Could you meet me in Boston?" He was doing it himself, he wasn't depending on lots of other people in the early stages.

HACKMAN: Can you remember in that period discussing with him at all the concept of what a state party should be or Party reform, the organizational role of the Party? You know, some people have said that you got along very well with Paul Butler [Paul M. Butler]...

BOUTIN: Yes, I did.

HACKMAN: ... and that Paul Butler was very interested in building the Party and issues and this kind of thing, and people have talked about the Kennedys' lack of interest in that. Did you have conversations like this with him in that period?

BOUTIN: A great deal. I've never understood the point you've just made that people allege that his attitude toward political organization was different than Paul Butler's. I'd say that they were synonymous. The New Hampshire primary campaign is a good example. West Virginia, Wisconsin are other examples. His own efforts in Massachusetts are probably the best example of all, where he had Kennedy secretaries in every single precinct and little tiny communities with only a few hundred voters. He believed in a personal relationship with

[-5 -]

his own Party leaders. But to get leadership in every community—and that was really the weakness of the Party in New Hampshire—this is what we immediately set out to accomplish in 1956. I can remember going to little communities where they said they hadn't seen a

Democrat actively asking for support or interested in registration or any other political matter for ten, fifteen, twenty years. Both Kennedy and Butler were interested in developing new leaders and in bringing new people into the Party. They both recognized the value of organization and in getting politics out of the smoke-filled rooms.

HACKMAN: You don't have the feeling then that he would have looked at.... Well, let's say, the kinds of things that those regional Democratic National Committee representatives like Bill Dunfey, the operation that Drexel Sprecher [Drexel A. Sprecher] was running in that period at the DNC, you don't have the feeling that the Kennedy people felt that those were largely a waste of time in the focus on leadership conferences and all these kinds of things.

BOUTIN: I never got the feeling that that was so. I attended some of those conferences. We had one up in Bethel, Maine, with people from the entire eastern seaboard there. Now, there weren't very many who, early in this effort, were overtly Kennedy partisans. But some of the people favorable to Kennedy did attend, and they were terribly useful and very helpful later on. I never heard anybody in the Kennedy camp comment adversely on the Drexel Sprecher operation. I can draw a parallel that is exactly what we did after the nominating convention was over in '60. We put that exact same type of structure into effect: having field coordinators with areas of responsibility.

HACKMAN: What do you remember about Bill Dunfey's role in that period when he was acting as a DNC regional representative in terms of a tie-in with efforts on behalf of John Kennedy?

BOUTIN: Bill Dunfey was a Kennedy man from the very beginning. While all of these people from Paul Butler on down were supposed to be completely neutral—after all, they were all human beings with their own emotions and their own desires—I know in Bill Dunfey's case that while Paul Butler was his boss and while he was working for the Democratic Party, and a lot of his work was with organized labor, he nevertheless, as I was, was completely dedicated to the Kennedy effort. Paul Butler, during that period, made no secret to me of his hope that John Kennedy would get the presidential nomination. He, obviously, couldn't do anything overtly to influence that, but yet the things he said, the work he did, the interest he

[-6-]

had.... Paul and I were very, very close friends, so we did talk about these things.... I had absolutely no reason to doubt that he was for Kennedy. You've got to remember too, Larry, that during that period, Paul Butler was very much opposed to the relationships that our leading congressional Democrats had with the Republican administration. Both Sam Rayburn [Samuel T. Rayburn] and Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] were barely on speaking terms with Paul. Of course, that didn't bother him a bit. He was a liberal Democrat after the Harry Truman tradition, and he enjoyed nothing better than a good fight.

HACKMAN: Can you remember when you got involved, then, on the Arrangements Committee? First of all, how did you get on the Arrangements Committee actually—at John Kennedy's request to Butler or exactly how did that work out?

BOUTIN: While I was appointed by Paul Butler, there was no secret that Kennedy had requested this of Paul and Paul was glad to go along.

HACKMAN: I just had that list you might want to refer to. You referred to, on the first interview with Dan, you said that when you wanted to get things done in terms of Kennedy interests on arrangements for the Convention, that there were some good friends on the Arrangements Committee that were helpful. Who were they, and can you remember any of the specifics on what was done and how?

BOUTIN: Well, Paul Ziffren from California is a good example. He was very much in Senator Kennedy's corner and was very helpful. Another one was Mildred Otenasek, Dr. Mildred Otenasek from Maryland. We worked together very closely. Camille Gravel [Camille F. Gravel, Jr.] of Louisiana surely was in that situation. Carmine DeSapio [Carmine G. DeSapio], while originally not, very soon became very strongly in support of the Kennedy candidacy which, I think, was interesting because DeSapio usually made pretty sure of the way the wind was blowing before he made a choice. I think he saw very early in the game what was going to happen. Donald Mitchell is another one who was very helpful. Lyndon Johnson had some strong supporters as did Adlai Stevenson on this committee. Elizabeth Smith [Elizabeth Rudel Gatov], as an example, was strictly Adlai Stevenson. Georgia Neese Gray was 100 percent Lyndon Johnson. Some of the others fell in between. Another one I should have mentioned as being for Kennedy was Mary Cunningham of Nebraska.

HACKMAN: Did you talk with Butler about any of the appointments to this committee, or do you know that John Kennedy talked to Butler about appointing

[-7-]

particular people, or did some of these, in fact, switch to Kennedy after they were already on the committee, or what?

BOUTIN: Well, nobody told anybody anything, as a matter of fact, but it became obvious to me very early in our meetings—and we had a great many meetings of this committee and we traveled around the country a good bit—just who the people were. We developed friendships. You knew who you could depend on and who you couldn't. An interesting part of that, Larry, is you'll remember that there was a strong push to have Hale Boggs [Thomas Hale Boggs, Sr.] as the temporary chairman and the keynote speaker.

HACKMAN: Right.

BOUTIN: I remember Senator Kennedy saying, “Well, good Lord, he’ll turn everybody off with that drawl of his. We want Frank Church, but let’s don’t antagonize Hale Boggs in the process.” So we did a little arm twisting and Frank Church was selected.

HACKMAN: Can you remember, on any of these others, ones—on the second page there’s a list of the officers of the Convention? Are there any others that there was a direct Kennedy role in? I don’t know if you can remember...

BOUTIN: Oh, yes, LeRoy Collins [Thomas LeRoy Collins]...

HACKMAN: Yeah, sure.

BOUTIN: ... was very much a Kennedy preference. So was Chester Bowles [Chester B. Bowles]. Chester Bowles, very early in the game, was an adviser to Kennedy on foreign policy. Perleman [Phillip B. Perleman] is another. I don’t think Kennedy felt quite so strongly on that one, but he was leaning in that direction. And then, Camille Gravel, of course, was a very close friend of the Kennedy effort.

HACKMAN: Do you remember anything on the Loveless [Herschel Celler Loveless] thing in terms of, at this point, Loveless was sort of hoping for the vice presidency. I wondered if there’s any way that you can remember working that on terms of rules and order of business or anything.

BOUTIN: I just don’t remember anything on that one. It’s just vague in my mind, which probably means I really wasn’t as deeply involved as I was in some of the others.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any problems from the Kennedy camp’s

[-8 -]

point of view as the Convention came closer, in terms of either Chester Bowle’s performance on the platform or any of the other people that had been chosen?

BOUTIN: Well, there were always problems. But, honestly, they were minimized by having people in key positions, plus the tremendous help that we were getting from Paul Butler. The platform is always difficult, and we had an awful lot of give-and-take on that one. But, by and large, it was quite good. You’ll remember some of the other potential candidates at the time were very much along the same beliefs that Kennedy was anyway. I’m referring now to Williams [G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams] of Michigan, as an example. I think the real difference was between the Southern leadership and Kennedy, and the Southern leadership including Lyndon Johnson at that point.

HACKMAN: What can you remember on the selection of Los Angeles as a site? I can remember reading a newspaper clipping in a New Hampshire paperback in '59 or '60, saying, "It's surprising that Boutin and the New Hampshire Democrats went for Los Angeles because we thought Kennedy wouldn't want Los Angeles," or something like that.

BOUTIN: Well, of course, he did. We knew that very early, that he wanted Los Angeles. We had gone out there. Paul Butler was very, very favorable to Los Angeles. They offered a magnificent facility in the sports arena there, for one thing. They had the hotel space. Then they made a very handsome financial offer to the National Committee. As usual, the Committee was broke, and it didn't leave much room for doubt as far as a choice. None of us wanted Chicago. I think we had had our fill of the cow arena or whatever they called it there out in the stockyards, the long distance from the hotels, and it just was not an appealing situation. Another one I should have mentioned here who was very, very helpful in the Kennedy campaign is Mrs. Vel Phillips [Vel R. Phillips], a great person, and she did just a huge amount of work, just an awfully good person.

HACKMAN: What can you remember about John Kennedy's feeling in that period about Paul Butler, or Robert Kennedy's feeling, or any of the other people who were very close?

BOUTIN: I was very surprised on this. My opinion at that time was that I was talking to people who had a great deal of respect and admiration for each other, that there was a very cordial relationship between Paul Butler and the Kennedys. I was so close to both camps perhaps I was deceived because, as you know, the Kennedy Administration, after the nominating convention of '60, did not treat Paul Butler

[-9-]

well at all. I've always felt very badly about that because I think Paul did everything he could within the limitations of fairness to be helpful to the Kennedys. Who turned the Kennedys off on Paul Butler? I don't know. But, I think, they were both the losers for it.

HACKMAN: I wanted to ask you also about Mrs. John Kennedy's [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis] attitudes—you said she was involved in a lot of the conversations from '56 to '60—just about John Kennedy's plans and politics and her own feeling about participating in various kinds of political events, or whatever else you can remember that characterized her in that period.

BOUTIN: She always was a very gracious hostess. When we would visit at the Kennedy home, she would always be so very nice, so thoughtful, and so cordial. I don't remember once during that period of her getting into any kind of a spirited political discussion. She was just being the Senator's wife. I didn't detect, at that point, any hostility to campaigning or anything like that, that I've heard so much about

since from reading books written about that period. In the presidential primary campaign in New Hampshire she was a very great help. She did come to New Hampshire with the Senator both before the primary and after. Whenever she was in New Hampshire she was just magnificent to everyone.

HACKMAN: Can you remember at Democratic National Committee meetings, while you were the Committeeman '56 to '60, taking particular actions that were favorable to Kennedy? For instance, Resolution G—do you remember that?—which would have changed the number of delegates and the way delegates were allotted to slates. This, I think, is in September of '59 [September 16, 1959]. You introduced on the floor at a meeting.... Is that anything particularly aimed at the Kennedy camp or is that a...

BOUTIN: It was strongly supported by the Kennedy camp. That is why I was so deeply involved in it. Here again, I think, is an example of the Kennedy-Butler relationship as I thought existed during that period. I wasn't told this by any of the Kennedys, I was told by Paul Butler that they would like to have this handled, and so I did.

HACKMAN: Well, I don't know all the details on this, but I know when you introduced it, there was some.... Denmark Groover [Denmark Groover, Jr.]—is that the correct pronunciation...

BOUTIN: Yeah.

HACKMAN: ... and other people were upset, and they said

[-10-]

that this resolution had been changed from the time it was originally sent around to people, I believe, to the time you introduced it. It was a little different mix or something. Do you remember anything particular on that? Was there any pre-checking with the Kennedy Senate office or anything?

BOUTIN: If there was, it wasn't by me. It was by Butler.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Okay. Fine. What kind of reaction did you get in your efforts to build Kennedy support in New Hampshire from some of this old Party leadership—toward Kennedy? I assume you consciously worked mostly with new people whom you had some connection with in your campaign or whatever. But what was the attitude from some of the old people, or did you check with them for anything?

BOUTIN: Well, I think we'd have to go back to the gubernatorial primary of 1958. I've already spoken of that and how we had the strong support and

encouragement of the Kennedys to take this step. Initially, the main thrust of the whole idea was not to win the gubernatorial election necessarily which looked to be impossible because of the heavy Republican registration in New Hampshire, but to form a new image of a dynamic Democratic Party with a lot of new people. Now, in the course of that primary campaign, a great many new people were actually motivated and brought into the mainstream of the Democratic Party and the campaign that we were running. At the same time, some of the older Democrats were supporting John Shaw. The problem after the 1958 primary was to do some fence repair.

A good example was Freddie Catalfo [Alfred J. Catalfo, Jr.] from Dover, who, during that primary, was vehemently against me. We ultimately became very good friends, and he ran as a Kennedy delegate and was elected as a Kennedy delegate. So, once the primary was over, we had to salvage as many of the people from the former Party structure as we could. Some we just couldn't. That's why you saw in that '60 primary people like Nick Hart and Helene Donnelly [Helene R. Donnelly] and Helen Desjardins [Helen A. Desjardins] and Albert Beland [Albert L. Beland] and Kenneth Jenkins [Kenneth A. Jenkins] running for delegate favorable to Symington [Stuart Symington, II]. It isn't that they were particularly for Symington as that they were against Boutin and Kennedy. So we did have some of that, and some of it never was fully repaired. But this was, you know, offset a hundredfold by the new people that were brought in from every section of the state. We also brought in a lot of people who had thought of the Democratic Party in New Hampshire before as kind of a Catholic party. We brought in many, as an example, of Jewish persuasion, Protestants of literally every denomination, and we became, for the first time

[-11-]

in a great many years, a Party of prestige, of ideas, and of imagination—all the time with the man sitting at the top being Jack Kennedy. That was the goal, that's what all of us were working for.

As you know, once we won the primary, and we did so well in it that we said, "Maybe we can win the election." We ran very hard, and if I remember correctly, I was only beaten by a handful of votes, something like sixty-five hundred votes, which was the closest in a great, great many years. Kennedy was very helpful there. He did, at his own expense, some filmstrips with me. We had all kinds of pictures taken that we put on literature. I remember he gave me twenty-five hundred dollars which was the biggest donation I received from anywhere. So he was right in back of it all the time.

HACKMAN: But that's basically the sum of the financial support you got directly from Kennedy, or does he raise funds in Massachusetts that come in through any other route, or others?

BOUTIN: For that election of 1958 that was the sum total. We ran that whole gubernatorial election on something like twelve to fifteen thousand dollars and about thirty-five hundred of that was my money. Those were lean, lean days.

HACKMAN: Speaking of that Symington support in '60, any indication that William Loeb is, to any extent, behind Symington? People like Hart, for instance, who later becomes a Republican, I guess, and some...

BOUTIN: Sure, this was again the Bill Loeb influence. Of course, Symington, at that time, had in recent years been Secretary of the Air Force. He was then regarded as a hardliner—quite different than what his image grew to be in fact. He [Loeb] was just completely hostile to the Kennedys. I remember in 1960 hearing John Kennedy out before the *Manchester Union Leader* in the park out there, saying that if there was a more irresponsible editor or publisher in the country, he didn't know who it was, and if there was a worse newspaper, he didn't know which it was. Loeb was just on him every single day, just continuous.

HACKMAN: You don't remember early on any thought that possibly Loeb would be for Kennedy, do you?

BOUTIN: We never thought there was a chance of that. We'd have been very much upset, I think, if Loeb had come out for Kennedy. We just didn't see that as any

[-12-]

possibility at all. A great many of the New Hampshire Democrats, Bill Dunfey and I perhaps most particularly, felt that anything that Loeb was for had to be wrong. We surely weren't looking for him to support Kennedy, nor was J. Murray Devine, the State Chairman.

HACKMAN: You don't remember a Joseph P. Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] role at all in the relationship with Loeb?

BOUTIN: Not at all. In fact, with all the years that I've known all of the Kennedys—the children and the mother [Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy]—I never met the father. I never had a conversation with the father. I never had a conversation with the father. So, no. I do remember the story, though, that Joseph Kennedy was supposed to have called Loeb and to try to get him to support John Kennedy or at least get off his back. But I've always doubted the validity of that. It may very well be true, but I don't think so.

HACKMAN: Yeah, okay. Can you remember on the '60 New Hampshire primary, then, any problem in getting—I think you put together a budget plan for twenty-seven thousand dollars which you sent down, I can't remember whether it was to O'Donnell, I think it was to O'Brien—them to accept what you had set up there in terms of plans?

BOUTIN: It took a little explaining. You know, back then twenty-seven thousand dollars for a primary campaign was a heck of a lot of money. Gene

McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] I understand in '68 spent over three hundred thousand in New Hampshire. But they wanted an itemized budget, a line-item budget which is exactly what we gave them—how we intended to spend the money... [Interruption]

HACKMAN: You talked about the budget, getting on with the budget.

BOUTIN: Yeah, they wanted a line-item budget, and I was very much impressed, Larry, all through this period with the careful planning and stringent fiscal controls. I remember once we were on the *Caroline* going up to Berlin, New Hampshire. Senator Kennedy took out the budget and he said, "Now, you know you're awful close on this item. It looks like we've got a little too much money in this item," etc. Evidently, he was controlling his own finances. He had a man in Boston, an accountant whose name I've forgotten, who we used to have to send our bills to. We also raised a good deal of the budget in New Hampshire. I remember the item that particularly aggravated him as part of this twenty-seven thousand: it was to pay the rental in the Carpenter Hotel, then owned by the Dunfeys, for a large room called the Laconia Room for a headquarters.

[-13-]

It was down in the basement of the hotel, which he was unhappy about. If I remember right, the rent for three months was something like fifty-five hundred dollars. He was very unhappy about that and felt, I guess, that the Dunfeys should have given it to him for less or for nothing. But that was really one of the largest items in the whole budget. We did live within that budget. If I remember correctly, we actually spent just under twenty-five thousand, which was really a miracle. I don't know today how we did it.

HACKMAN: Yeah, I think there was a few dollars you finally turned back or something, right?

BOUTIN: Right, we did. You know, the interesting thing.... We have heard so much and read so much during those times and since about all of the Kennedy money.... We always regarded the Kennedys as having kind of deep pockets and short arms when it came to paying people in the campaign. All of us were working as volunteers, and this is, of course, the better way. The only paid people that I knew of at the time were the people on his own staff: Larry O'Brien, Kenny O'Donnell, Myer Feldman, Ted Sorensen. But all the rest of us were working for nothing. We had one paid executive in the New Hampshire primary, a fellow by the name of Fred Forbes [Fred A. Forbes].

HACKMAN: Right.

BOUTIN: We were paying him the huge sum of a hundred dollars a week to handle all the public relations. We weren't spending much money at all.

HACKMAN: Can you remember—I know I've seen a memo in your papers, I think, from Fred Catalfo to John Kennedy, urging that they spend the traditional kind of money, walking money or whatever, on the day of the primary to get out the vote in Manchester, particularly, I believe, or other cities. Can you remember discussions of that and the decision on that?

BOUTIN: We had a great many discussions on this subject of using the regular Party organization and the individual organizations of the mayors and so forth. They loved that. Joe Benoit [Josaphat T. Benoit] was mayor of Manchester and, of course, he liked nothing better than to oil the wheels of his own machines. All of this was to be expected, but we didn't do it.

HACKMAN: Sure.

BOUTIN: Our philosophy was entirely different. It was getting

[-14-]

out new people, people who would work for nothing, who were dedicated to Kennedy. We felt that a volunteer was worth at least three paid workers. This proved to be very true. Then, of course, we had a lot of help from organized labor. Interesting too is originally, you know, organized labor wasn't too hot for Kennedy. They remembered the Beck [David D. Beck] situation in the Teamsters [International Brotherhood of Teamsters]. But, more and more, particularly Al Barkan's [Alexander E. Barkan] operation, COPE [Committee on Political Education of AFL-CIO], felt that Kennedy was the man they wanted. We developed some very good labor relationships. They provided a huge number of volunteer workers to get out the vote, and they paid themselves for cars, etc., to make sure of a large turnout at the polls.

HACKMAN: This is in New Hampshire?

BOUTIN: This is in New Hampshire.

HACKMAN: I think I remember that at that point Barkan was deputy to McDevitt [James L. McDevitt].

BOUTIN: That's correct.

HACKMAN: Is there any difference in attitude between those two that you can remember, or did they both come around for Kennedy?

BOUTIN: I don't remember. I do remember Barkan's attitude was very favorable to Kennedy. He and a fellow by the name of Bill Duchessie and the New England-New York coordinator for COPE, Henry Murray [Henry F. Murray], were all very much in Kennedy's corner. In fact, Barkan called me, not once, but a

dozen times, saying, “We’ve got to have at least one prominent labor leader on that slate of delegates.” Tommy Pitarys [Thomas J. Pitarys] was one of those selected.

HACKMAN: Yeah. There’s a list of... [Interruption]
Did people like Henry Murray have to do much work to get New Hampshire labor people to get active in that campaign? And did the role that New Hampshire labor played in that campaign differ a great deal from what New Hampshire labor had done in previous Democratic primaries?

BOUTIN: Well, New Hampshire labor has been split for several generations. Joe Moriarty [Joseph Moriarty], as an example, is a very strong Republican; Basil French, at that time, who was the head of the Teamsters, was also considered in the Republican column. Then others like Tom Breslin [Thomas H. Breslin] of the Steelworkers [United Steelworkers of America] and John Giderian of the Shoe Workers [United Shoe Workers of America],

[-15-]

these people were strong Democrats. This didn’t mean, though, that they always worked in that direction. So it was a question of marshalling this support. By getting Tommy Pitarys, who comes from the Textile Workers [United Textile Workers of America] and who was state president of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations], to be on the slate was a clear signal. But we still had to have a lot of help from the Henry Murrays. We had guys like Minot Powers [Minot L. Powers, Jr.], as an example, of the Meat Cutters Union [Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America]. These people were great. The paper sulfite workers in the north country, up in Lincoln and Berlin and Groveton; these people just did a magnificent job. Also Louis Mantel of the construction trades.

HACKMAN: I want to skip ahead and ask you about what happens, then, with Pitarys during the Administration when he resigns and becomes a Republican, I believe, at some point.

BOUTIN: During the Kennedy Administration?

HACKMAN: Yeah, right. What do you remember of that?

BOUTIN: I don’t really remember that. Tom became a Republican. I know that Tommy called me several times to get a job for his son, as I remember. So I was in contact with him during this period. My relationship with Tom all through this time right up to the present, has been very cordial.

HACKMAN: You talked about in the very early period, it was mostly with John Kennedy and O’Brien and O’Donnell. You didn’t see much of Robert

Kennedy. When does he start to come into the picture, and what can you remember about him?

BOUTIN: Well, Robert Kennedy really doesn't come into the picture until we actually get into the New Hampshire primary campaign itself. He made a trip or two to the state for his brother. I remember one in particular to Portsmouth where he made a series of speeches a week or two before the primary election. He was very active and visible at that point. I did talk to him frequently during that period on the telephone. We looked upon Robert Kennedy as really, at that point, the general, the guy who was calling the shots, and really the fellow who was over both O'Donnell and O'Brien.

Mrs. Rose Kennedy, during that period, made a couple of very, very excellent visits to New Hampshire. She spoke at Plymouth State College, she spoke at Keene State College, she

[-16-]

attended a bar mitzvah in Concord, she made just an incredible impression on our Democrats and particularly young people, talking about bringing her son John up and what kind of a youngster he was and what kind of a young man. Eunice [Eunice Kennedy Shriver] came into the state a couple of times. Jean Smith [Jean Kennedy Smith] did. Pat Lawford [Patricia Kennedy Lawford] did also. Teddy [Edward M. Kennedy] made quite a few trips. I remember one in particular in Suncook, where in very halting French, Ted made a speech that just brought the house down. No one knew that a Ted Kennedy could talk French, and here he was talking to people who preferred French to English, in that little mill town. He brought an awful lot of support.

BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I

HACKMAN: ... Kennedy, so I guess I have to ask you again about your efforts in other states. Is there anything else we skipped in there when it stopped?

BOUTIN: I don't think.

HACKMAN: Okay. Well, let's pick up with California again, what you were doing in California.

BOUTIN: I was out in California with the Arrangements Committee and also doing some work with some of the Democratic leaders out there, particularly Paul Ziffren, because at that time you will remember Pat Brown [Edmund G. "Pat" Brown] was vacillating all over the place. It looked like Kennedy might have to go into that California primary. I got a call from Robert Kennedy one night. He asked me what I was doing in California. I told him I was out there, of course, looking after the Kennedy interests as I was asked to do, and I also was working with the Arrangements Committee there preparing for the Convention. He told me that things were very iffy in West Virginia at the time and that if they did badly in West Virginia, they had to follow it up immediately

with a victory or they would be hurt badly. The next primary coming up was Maryland. He told me that Torby MacDonald [Torbert H. MacDonald] was in charge of it, but he didn't think that Torby was doing anything and that the thing looked like pretty much of a mess and would I please pack my bags and head for Maryland, which I did. When I got there, I found that Robert Kennedy's judgment was, in fact, very good indeed. Things in Maryland were an absolute mess. Joe Curnane [Joseph A. Curnane] had gone down from Massachusetts. Joe, I think, was an undertaker by profession. He was spending his time in the headquarters office in Baltimore.

HACKMAN: In Everett, Massachusetts.

[-17-]

BOUTIN: Joe was down there. He was great in greeting the people as they came in the office, but really nothing was happening at all. The Democratic congressional delegation still had their finger up to the wind, and we didn't know which way things were going to go. All they were interested in was getting a piece of that Kennedy money if they could. Tawes [J. Millard Tawes], the governor, was playing it very cozy.

But we were able to start moving immediately. I had meetings with Mayor Grady [Joseph Harold Grady], who was mayor of Baltimore at the time, and with Bill MacMillan, who was state chairman of the Kennedy effort—he also was attorney for the *Baltimore Sun*; Mike Birmingham [Michael J. Birmingham], the Democratic National Committeeman; Mildred Otenasek, the Democratic National Committeewoman and a very close friend of mine; Joe Tydings [Joseph D. Tydings], who was the state coordinator. But Joe was very busy with law practice, and it just seemed to me he wasn't doing much in the campaign. We also found that Hubert Humphrey's [Hubert H. Humphrey] people had pretty much cornered the market with organized labor, particularly the Steelworkers and the shipyard workers. So we were in a very tough position.

One of the things I had to do was to make all the arrangements for a Kennedy visit to Maryland. I asked several of these leaders I have mentioned if they would go with me around the state to organize a visit. To make a long story short, Larry, I couldn't get one of them to leave their offices and go with me. So I got a Hertz-you-drive-it—and, incidentally, I drew four hundred dollars in expense money from Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] at the time, and of all the years that I worked for the Kennedys, which I was awfully glad to do, that's the only time that I ever drew any expense money—and I toured the whole state from the panhandle all the way down to Salisbury. We arranged a terrific visit for Kennedy. I went out and made arrangements for high school bands to meet him at various airports and I talked with Democratic leaders and found that at the grass roots, in fact, there was an awful lot of support for Kennedy.

But one fellow that particularly deserves mentioning here is a man who subsequently became mayor of Baltimore, Phil Goodman [Philip H. Goodman]. Phil was a member of the board of aldermen and had excellent connections with organized labor. So I asked Phil as a personal favor—he was for Kennedy anyway—if he wouldn't please do everything he could with labor. Well, Phil turned that whole thing around in its tracks, and we developed

immense labor support. The people who I contacted in their home communities all over the state were of great help. Not one of them ever let us down at all. They did just a fine job.

[-18-]

HACKMAN: Was this break on labor before Humphrey was defeated in West Virginia?

BOUTIN: Yes, it was before. It was about, in fact, three weeks before. This was largely thanks to Goodman. There's a fellow in Baltimore, a political long timer by the name of Pollack [James H. Pollack], who controls a couple of heavily Democratic precincts there. I remember several meetings with him and with Joe Curnane where Pollack started with twelve thousand dollars as his price for turning out the vote. I didn't think much of that so I called Robert Kennedy and said, "What shall I do?" He said, "Tell him to go to hell." So I relayed that message, and the price kept coming down. The last one I remember was three thousand dollars about a week before the primary. I submitted it as usual, and Bob told me the same thing, he said, "Tell him to go to hell." And we never paid him a dime and carried every one of those precincts in good shape.

HACKMAN: How about George P. Mahoney and D'Alesandro [Thomas D'Alesandro, Jr.], the Baltimore politician?

BOUTIN: Well, Tommy D'Alesandro, Jr., was a big help to us. He was a very young man at the time and full of energy and he responded very well to everything that I asked him to do. Blair Lee [Blair Lee, III], of a very old Democratic family, was very helpful in the southern part of Maryland, adjacent to the District of Columbia. So the help was there all along. It's just that it had not been marshaled. And I guess Curnane had spent all of his time dealing with the pros in Baltimore. You know, that wasn't where the action was. The action was with the people out in the various parts of the state. And it really wasn't much of a trick to get this done. As I say, with four hundred dollars in expense money, I covered every inch of that state with a road map and a Hertz.

HACKMAN: Once you came in, how did Curnane then operate, or where was he taking orders from if from anywhere?

BOUTIN: I can't answer where he was taking orders from. I never once saw Torby MacDonald in Maryland all the time I was there. Joe, I think, just kept on with what he was doing, talking with the members of the congressional delegation who were out to protect their own necks. Joe, I think, kind of looked upon me as some outsider. I did my job, and I didn't pay any attention to what he was doing. And he really didn't pay much attention to what I was doing. But this was work that had to be done. If Maryland had been left alone, if Robert Kennedy hadn't have been discerning enough to see that there could be trouble there we could have

[-19-]

lost that state even with the West Virginia victory.

HACKMAN: Whatever happened on Tydings? Were you ever able to crank him up there and make him useful, or....

BOUTIN: Well, interestingly—I didn't know this until we got to Los Angeles in the preconvention meetings that we had out there—Joe, evidently following the terrific Kennedy victories in New Hampshire and Wisconsin, West Virginia and Maryland, then became an advance man himself and worked in some southern states and evidently did a good job. I didn't see that he did very much in the Maryland campaign, though.

HACKMAN: Okay. What about some of the other states? You said you spent some time in New York. Now, that's a very complicated state in that period. What could you do in New York?

BOUTIN: There, it was essentially working with the Democratic leadership: Bob Wagner [Robert F. Wagner], Carmine DeSapio, Averell Harriman, a number of other people in the city administration. It was really to maintain—to create and maintain, rather—a good liaison, to keep the channels of communication open, to make sure that there were no slights or no mistakes that were being made. These people were most cooperative.

My main effort outside of New Hampshire and California, Maryland, some work in West Virginia, was in the New England states. Vermont is an example. We did a huge amount of work there. I also worked with people like Pat Lynch [John M. "Pat" Lynch] and Dick Maguire [Richard Maguire] in Massachusetts, with Abe Ribicoff [Abraham A. Ribicoff] and John Bailey [John Moran Bailey] in Connecticut, with the Pastore [John O. Pastore] people and others in Rhode Island.

HACKMAN: What kinds of things in these states? Now, if you're coming in as an outsider, how do you make yourself useful to them and who do you report back to in the Kennedy organization?

BOUTIN: I always used to report back to Robert Kennedy in the Kennedy organization. These visits would be largely connected with attending meetings. If there was going to be a Democratic meeting, let's say, in Pawtucket, we would want the Kennedy people represented not only by those who were for Kennedy in the state, but some out-of-state people, too, to analyze problems and come up with solutions. The organization at that point was very thin. There was Sarge Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.] and Steve Smith and Bobby and Dick Donahue [Richard K. Donahue]

[-20-]

and Larry O'Brien, Kenny O'Donnell in headquarters in the ESSO building. The rest of us were in the field. Being so thin, we all kind of doubled in brass and worked other states as

well as our own. I also did some work in New Jersey. I remember at the time Bob Meyner [Robert B. Meyner] was a real problem; I worked mostly with Dave Wilentz [David T. Wilentz].

HACKMAN: Right. Any problems with him at all that you can remember?

BOUTIN: It was great with Dave; it was impossible with the governor.

HACKMAN: How about other people: Kenny [John V. Kenny] or—I can't remember the other couple of big fellows there in the cities in New Jersey, but any problem in bringing any of those people around?

BOUTIN: No, no, the big problem was Meyner and that was a big problem indeed.

HACKMAN: Did you get involved in that one personally, or did you say...

BOUTIN: Yes, I did. Meyner was an impossibility because he had stars in his eyes at the time; he thought he should be President.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah. It's amazing.

BOUTIN: He was the only one who thought so, though.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Anybody in the state who could talk to him? Thorn Lord or any of these other people who could...

BOUTIN: No, he'd just turn a deaf ear. He had it all figured out, and he was going to be it. He was very hostile to Senator Kennedy.

HACKMAN: Yeah, yeah, that's amazing. What were the concerns in Connecticut? Let's see, were there concerns about the way Bailey and Ribicoff were running things in Connecticut? I guess that's the important thing.

BOUTIN: No, that was a very, very close and good relationship. Both Bailey and Ribicoff were not only working Connecticut and handling it beautifully, but they were working lots of other states as well. They were of huge help to us in New Hampshire. Dempsey [John Noel Dempsey], who subsequently

[-21-]

became lieutenant governor and then governor, was another who was very, very helpful. This was a very good team. Connecticut was one of the last states, of course, with a real honest-to-god, hardnosed Democratic Party organization.

HACKMAN: We were talking a little bit this morning about Clauson [Clinton A.

Clauson] in Maine. Any problems with Senator Muskie [Edmund S. Muskie] in that period?

BOUTIN: No problems at all. Muskie was for Kennedy; he was just great. Oliver [James C. Oliver] who was a congressman also helped us. Then a brilliant man who later worked in the State Department is now circuit court judge...

HACKMAN: Oh, Frank Coffin [Frank M. Coffin].

BOUTIN: Frank Coffin was just of huge help, just did a very, very great job. So, no, we were united in New England as we've never been before or since. The only one who was off the reservation was Dodd [Thomas J. Dodd], but Dodd was never much of a Democrat, in my opinion, anyway. I remember he came up and spoke at the dinner when Styles Bridges announced his candidacy for reelection in 1959 or 1960. Democrats in New Hampshire didn't look at Dodd with a very favorable eye. He was just a maverick.

HACKMAN: Yeah. How about in Massachusetts? How would you get involved down there with Maguire, these people who'd been dealing in the state for a long time?

BOUTIN: Well, we were just, again, supplementing the efforts of each other. Just as Maguire might come in New Hampshire, some of us would go to Massachusetts. It was just a great big team that worked together. The relationships of that period are something today that we can marvel at. There was no dissension, nobody was mad, everyone was working together. I remember Bill Green [William J. Green] coming up to Massachusetts. Well, the same kind of question could be asked, "Well, why Bill Green in Massachusetts?"

HACKMAN: This is young Bill Green.

BOUTIN: This is old Bill Green.

HACKMAN: Old Bill Green.

BOUTIN: Old Bill was, you know, so completely for Kennedy that it was infectious. He could come up to Massachusetts and turn fifty people on that maybe were for Kennedy, but weren't doing much about it. He would say,

[-22-]

"Get off your duffs and get out and work."

HACKMAN: No problem at all then from what you could see when Robert Kennedy sort of comes in after other people have been working and he sort of

comes in on top; no problem with O'Brien or O'Donnell or anyone down the line.

BOUTIN: There was never in all of my experience during this time any unpleasantness in that regard of somebody fearing, "Well, somebody's horning in on my territory or someone is looking over my shoulder." We just all felt that we were a darn good ball team. I don't know if you've ever heard this story, Larry, but it's a true one. A great many of us, you know, were told to be out at the Convention several days ahead of time to do some advance work out there. The second day we were there, Robert Kennedy called a meeting at eight o'clock in the morning. He, as you remember, was kind of short in stature, so he took a footstool and stood on it. Here had a room full of volunteers—I don't think there was a person there who was getting paid expenses or anything else. He said, "It's come to my attention that some of you find it more important to go to Disneyland than to nominate the next President of the United States." And he said, "Those who feel that way, I want their resignations right now." Of course, there was nothing to resign from. We were all volunteers. But, you know, nobody went to Disneyland after that.

HACKMAN: Yeah, you said that in the first interview with Dan, but that's a good story.

BOUTIN: It was so funny.

HACKMAN: You know, people have talked about Robert Kennedy being either difficult to deal with or just a tough personality or making the tough decisions in dealing with people on the tough things. Can you remember examples of that in '60 where he specifically either was very difficult for people to deal with or played the tough guy intentionally and did the dirty work and all that?

BOUTIN: When John Kennedy was running and when he was President, Bob was the lightning rod. He knew somebody had to make the hard decision or take responsibility for the hard decision no matter who made it. For giving the people a boot in the behind when they weren't doing their job or were goofing off, the guy who had to make the demands, even if the demands were pretty hard for some people to stomach, like doing more, being away from their families, putting the campaign first. He was like that because, I think, he saw that as his role. But there was another side to Robert Kennedy that didn't become evident, I think, to the general public until after John Kennedy's

[-23-]

death, of a guy with a huge amount of compassion, who could be ultra-kind to people, very thoughtful, loved kids. The parties he used to have for little kids at the Justice Department—some of my kids went to those—were just absolutely great. And when he became a candidate himself in the senatorial race in New York and then for the presidential nomination, he was completely different than the Robert Kennedy who had to be the tough guy running interference for his brother.

HACKMAN: On the Convention, you mentioned but you didn't go into any detail on the states that you were responsible for at the Convention. Which states were those and what kinds of problems did you have on those?

BOUTIN: I had the New England states and New Jersey. Bailey and Ribicoff, as an example, would have had different states than their own. No, I had a very easy time of it with the exception of New Jersey. And you will remember that delegation was split right down the middle, and when it came time for them to vote there was almost a fist fight that broke out. The feelings had just run so very high. But those were the states that I was responsible for. But, generally, I was on the phone all the time, and kept getting instructions to do this and do that outside of my own area. But I couldn't reconstruct that at this point, it's just been too long.

HACKMAN: Okay. I want to just get back to something. You said you were in California and you were dealing with Paul Ziffren.

BOUTIN: Right.

HACKMAN: Any problems in keeping Paul Ziffren for Kennedy in that period, particularly as the Stevenson thing developed in California?

BOUTIN: Paul Ziffren, from all of my dealings with him and observations, was Kennedy first and last, and I never saw any wavering at all during any of that period. His counterpart, Mrs. Smith [Elizabeth Rudel Gatov], however, was very much Stevenson. I thought we had her convinced at one point for Kennedy, and then she got off the reservation and, of course, subsequently, she got back on again. But it was a very difficult type of thing. It was particularly difficult with Pat Brown because Pat wouldn't stand still. He was for everybody and for nobody. I've often wondered if he didn't have a few stars in his eyes like Meyner, himself.

HACKMAN: How about Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] in that period? Do you remember talking with him when you were out there?

[-24-]

BOUTIN: Yes, I talked with Fred quite a few times. In fact, I had a very good relationship with Fred. Fred's loyalties, of course, had to be first and foremost with Pat Brown. I don't think there was ever a question but what Fred thought that Kennedy was the best candidate and the guy who he really wanted to support. But he was Pat Brown's man, and that's the way it had to be. After the National Convention, Fred did some tremendous work for John Kennedy.

HACKMAN: The other guy I'm interested in is Unruh [Jesse M. Unruh] and the development of the Kennedy camp's feeling about Unruh and his abilities,

particularly. Do you remember that?

BOUTIN: Well, it was split all over the place. Some of us saw Unruh as being a *Last Hurrah* type, kind of a buffoon; the guy who may know a lot about California politics, but not about national politics. Of course, we were badly deceived in that kind of a judgment because he is such a bright guy. But we really didn't take Unruh very seriously at that point. Of course, Unruh was not taken seriously by very many outside of California until a few years after that.

HACKMAN: At the Convention, do you remember getting involved in any discussions of the decision to drop Butler as Chairman of the DNC [Democratic National Committee] and the selection of Scoop Jackson [Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson] for the campaign?

BOUTIN: I think, because of my relationships with Butler and having worked on the Convention committee and so forth with him, that I should have been privy to those conversations, but I wasn't. I was absolutely shocked at the meeting of the National Committee on the last day of the Convention to find that Butler had been dropped. The scuttlebutt at the time was that Butler wanted to be out and was going to play a very prominent role in the Kennedy presidential campaign away from the Committee. That, of course, never happened. Paul was never given a chance. Scoop Jackson was a fine chairman, but, of course, he was a nominal chairman. O'Brien and O'Donnell pretty much split that role right straight through till the time that John Bailey was named after the election and Scoop's resignation. That was not a happy period for the National Committee. Butler was loved and respected by his coworkers at the Committee.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any discussions at the Convention then of campaign plans or campaign organization? Were there decisions that you got involved in or discussions that you got involved in of the way things would be done?

[-25-]

BOUTIN: The thing that I remember the best is that after the experience of the primaries where all of us learned a great deal (different techniques were tried organizationally as well as in materials and media). Larry O'Brien distributed a very excellent campaign manual that, in fact, we followed meticulously during the campaign. It was a masterpiece.

HACKMAN: On the campaign itself, can you remember any anecdotes or anything you regard as important about John Kennedy's two trips into New Hampshire, the one very early and the one at the windup on the campaign; particularly any differences on how you scheduled him or how often he comes to the state or things like that?

BOUTIN: The first time he came into the state was the day following his announcement for the presidency. I went to Boston, picked him up in my own car, he and Mrs. Kennedy and Pierre Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger], and drove up to Nashua, New Hampshire, and at the state line had a ceremony with a great many people there. We toured the city of Nashua and then went into Manchester. Of course, Senator Kennedy made quite a few trips to New Hampshire; it wasn't just a first and last one. But the thing we learned on that first trip was that here we...

HACKMAN: Yeah, I was talking about the campaign; you're talking about the primary, but if you can remember...

BOUTIN: I'm talking about the primary.

HACKMAN: ... things about the primary, that would be...

BOUTIN: That here's a man who wanted to be meeting people and wanted to be tightly scheduled. Anything that aggravated him was to finish one part of the schedule and then have maybe a fifteen-minute periods. I remember once, during one of his trips, we were up at Dartmouth College. This was prior to the time that he had spoken in Houston to the ministers' conference. The great interest at his Dartmouth appearance was on the question of a Catholic as President. I remember there was even some conversations on birth control. But Kennedy inside of fifteen minutes had that Dartmouth audience eating out of his hand. It was also during that time that he was using so well that speech on Thomas Jefferson and all of the capabilities that Jefferson had—he could dance a minuet, design a building, all kinds of different things. It was great to see his ability to turn people on, young people, older people, whatever.

[-26-]

But, as far as his trips to New Hampshire following the nomination, I particularly remember the trip he made the night before the election itself. You'll remember he was going from New Hampshire to Boston where he was to speak before a nationwide hookup. He spoke that night in Manchester in the bitter cold to, as I remember it, over ten thousand people who had gathered out on the common. His strength had grown so that people were willing to wait long periods and not be bothered by cold or things like that. You could literally see that man grow during that entire election period. Did you have anything specific that you had in mind?

HACKMAN: Well, the birth control thing prompts a question on his Catholicism. You were obviously a very active and sincere Catholic in that period. Did you ever talk to him about his own feeling about the Church, the Church's role, or his own concept of religion, or did he...

BOUTIN: No, no, I didn't. I never talked to him personally about that. He and I attended mass together a number of times, but when we were together,

there was too much to talk about concerning the logistics of the campaign and planning for the future. All of these things just had to be done, and there never was time enough to do them.

HACKMAN: Did you ever talk to him after the campaign about what had happened in New Hampshire and the outcome of the vote, your own race for the governorship and his, and the vote for the presidency?

BOUTIN: No, we never talked about that. He always was looking forward and never backward. I do know that right after the election, I got a telephone call from him. He said, "Bernie, what are you doing?" I said, "Well, I'm finally getting settled back in my own business." He said, "Well, sell it. I want you to come to Washington." He was enough of a pied piper so that I never even questioned that judgment. I went home, told Alice [Alice M. Boutin], "Let's get ready to move."

HACKMAN: Do you recall anything specific about the trip you took down when the Alvan Fuller [Alvan Tufts Fuller] contribution came through in '60, and, I think, you went down to Hyannis Port personally and...

BOUTIN: It's interesting how that developed. I had gotten word from Bill Dunfey that Alvan Fuller, who, of course, comes from a prominent Republican family in Massachusetts, was very much interested in supporting Kennedy and could I arrange a meeting for the two of them,

[-27-]

Fuller and Kennedy, to get together. We, in fact, did that—this was still now in the primary period. When Kennedy was in the state, they met at the Carpenter Hotel and talked for a considerable period. I'm sure that Alvan Fuller was generous to the campaign at that time, although I never knew how much. But, following the nominating convention, Alvan called me up and said, "I would like to make a contribution to the campaign," and, in fact, gave five thousand to five different Kennedy committees for a total of twenty-five thousand, which was the most generous contribution received from anyone up to that point. So I called Senator Kennedy and asked, "What do you want me to do with it?" He asked me to take it down to Hyannis Port. So I did go down and I remember getting there just as he was receiving a foreign policy briefing from Chester Bowles. I stayed and talked with the both of them. Then Dave McDonald [David J. McDonald] of the Steelworkers came in with a whole group of labor people. I stayed and talked with them. The whole group was very busy in discussions. Kennedy was getting rested from the primaries at that time, but his mind surely wasn't getting rested. He was asking a million questions of everyone. It was great. I remember, too, at that point taking Pierre Salinger's wife and kids back to New Hampshire for a vacation because Pierre knew that he was going to be awfully busy, and it was time to get them a little vacation if he could.

HACKMAN: What then on your own appointment? Do you know if there were other

positions other than Deputy of GSA [General Services Administration] considered? Do you know of people making other efforts on your behalf with other positions?

BOUTIN: All that I know is that I got this call from him, and I had absolute trust and confidence that wherever he wanted me, that's where I'd be. Up until the time he announced the appointment as Deputy of GSA, I didn't know that anything else had ever been under consideration. Now, I found out subsequently, that at least one other was. That was Commissioner of Internal Revenue [Internal Revenue Service] that Mort Caplin [Mortimer M. Caplin] subsequently was appointed to. But the announcement came; actually, the people heard it on the radio and on TV before I actually was told by him or any member of the staff of the appointment. But I also found out subsequent to the appointment that they felt that GSA had such a huge amount of fiscal responsibility for handling such a big piece of action in purchasing and construction that he was looking for someone who had some experience in that line and who would make sure the operation was completely honestly run. I think my being mayor of Laconia for four years may have influenced that judgment plus he knew he could trust me.

[-28-]

HACKMAN: How did you and Bill Dunfey or whoever else was involved set up, if you did, during that interim period between the election and the inauguration to get positions for deserving New Hampshire people who played a role in the primary or who were just qualified for positions?

BOUTIN: We really didn't even try. Bill and I were in daily conversations, but that was nothing new because we had been for years. We were sounded out by the Kennedy people about different people who we might want to locate, but we weren't putting the arm on anybody. We weren't aggressively pushing.

HACKMAN: Who was basically coming to you? Was it the talent search-Shriver kind of operation or was it basically O'Donnell and O'Brien who were coming to you or...

BOUTIN: I didn't even know about the Shriver talent search at that time; I only found out about it later. Our liaison was with O'Donnell and O'Brien.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Okay. I'll just run through this list of some of the names that I have from New Hampshire, and you can comment if anything comes to mind about difficulties on getting the appointment or anything. Bill Craig [William H. Craig], I guess, is the first one.

BOUTIN: Well, let me put it in focus, Larry. During this period and even after the election of Senator McIntyre, not a single appointment was made of a

person from New Hampshire without first the Kennedy headquarters and later the White House clearing through me. We had that kind of a relationship. If I didn't want to do something, that was the end of it. And if I did want to do something, they tried to get it done. Bill Craig, we were all in agreement on. There were really three of us during that period that would compare notes on these people: J. Murray Devine, the state chairman, who we loved dearly; Bill Dunfey; and myself. So the Craig appointment was a very easy one to decide on. The Royal Dion appointment as U.S. Marshal was another one, and you may have others you want to ask about there.

HACKMAN: Bagley [J. Leo Bagley].

BOUTIN: Leo Bagley. Leo was a close friend and had been very active—this goes back now to the '56 Kefauver campaign, the Kennedy campaign of '60, the two gubernatorial campaigns that I was involved in. We thought Leo was highly deserving of consideration. He was appointed

[-29-]

Regional Administrator of the Immigration and Naturalization [Immigration and Naturalization Service].

HACKMAN: Wasn't there some resistance on that appointment though?

BOUTIN: No, there was not any resistance on that appointment.

HACKMAN: Louis Janelle [Louis M. Janelle], is that the pronunciation?

BOUTIN: Louis Janelle, right. He succeeded Bill Craig as U.S. Attorney. Again, a fellow that had been very helpful to us and a very fine lawyer. Then Paul April's [Paul G. April] appointment succeeding Royal Dion. Again, a noncontroversial type of appointment. Fred Forbes, who had been with us from the beginning of the '60 campaign, who got the congressional liaison job in Housing and Home Finance Agency.

HACKMAN: Emmett Kelley [Emmett J. Kelley].

BOUTIN: Emmett really is a story in himself in New Hampshire. Emmett's days go all the way back to the Jim Curley [James M. Curley] and Al Smith [Alfred E. Smith]—a fantastic Democrat. Emmett wasn't looking for anything. He was an elector in 1960 but he didn't want any appointment. Emmett was just so pleased to have Kennedy in as President. Romeo Champaigne [Romeo J. Champaigne] was looking for an appointment. We were not in harmony with that, and subsequently he was chosen as a U.S. representative at an inauguration of some president of a country in Africa, as I remember. He made the trip with Vice President Johnson.

HACKMAN: How about a possible Dunfey appointment, or any of the Dunfeys?

BOUTIN: We, at the time of the assassination, were very close to Bill's joining the White House staff in some role, probably in Dick Maguire's operation or in Larry O'Brien's operation at the White House. Of course, the assassination wiped that out. Bill did get an offer previously for Assistant Postmaster General, which he turned down.

HACKMAN: We can shift then to GSA. In the first interview there's no real explanation of what Moore's [John L. Moore], John Moore's problems were in that first year and why he goes out.

BOUTIN: Well, we get into a very sticky situation here, Larry. John is still living and is a very fine guy. John Moore, who had been in government service before, had worked

[-30-]

for Mike DiSalle [Michael V. DiSalle] in the Office of Price Administration, had worked for Harold Stassen [Harold E. Stassen] during the Eisenhower Administration, and came to GSA fresh from a job as Vice President for Administration of the University of Pennsylvania—at the time of the appointment was right on the verge of a nervous breakdown. It quickly became evident, in fact, within the first three days at GSA, that John's health was very bad and that emotionally and mentally he was right at the breaking point. This affected, of course, his ability to perform as administrator. He was in and out of the hospitals continuously during this period, which made it very difficult at GSA, and literally the full responsibility of being administrator fell on my shoulders. I used to talk frequently with Kenny O'Donnell about this, worrying about John and worrying what was going to happen. I've seen John so emotionally upset in a tight situation that he couldn't sign his name. The man was sick; this was the situation. Subsequently, I'm happy to report, he recovered his health and went to the University of Rochester as Vice President there for Administration. But his days at GSA were hard days, and he did resign in November of 1961. But, during that period of six or seven months, there were not more than two or three months at the most that he was able to effectively be administrator of the agency.

HACKMAN: There was no advance knowledge of that on the people who were supporting him from Pennsylvania though, that you know of?

BOUTIN: No. Of course, he was supported by Billy Green. He was a Billy Green appointment on the basis of prior government service and prior service to the University and so forth. This is a guy who should have been able to do that job very well and I'm sure would have if his health had been better. But he was right at the breaking point at the time that he was appointed.

HACKMAN: I brought along a list—you may not even need these—to refer to, but

that's for each year from the *Government Organization Manual* [*United States Government Organization Manual*] of leadership in GSA, and here's a list of the early regional office setups. Maybe you could discuss how some of these were made, particularly what your own role was, or whether Moore played a role in the first round of selections for the regional offices and other positions.

BOUTIN: Really John didn't play any role in the selection of personnel at all. He knew of my close relationship with the Kennedy organization, and he left this pretty much up to me. He did bring an old friend of his from the Department of Defense [DOD] in to work with him, but this was

[-31-]

about the limit of his decisions in this regard.

We did, of course, during the four years that I was at GSA, completely shake up the organization. GSA had come out of the Hoover [Herbert Hoover] Commission studies, and the first administrator had been Jess Larson. It brought together a whole flock of agencies under one central administration. Jess Larson was remembered by everyone with a great deal of love and affection and respect. In the meantime, GSA had fallen on hard days. The man who followed Larson during the Eisenhower Administration [Edmund F. Mansure] had been under a shadow for suspected wrongdoing. They had then brought in a man by the name of Franklin Floete [Franklin G. Floete], who was a retired businessman well along in years, who was a tough, hardnosed administrator, but not a man who had anything like a close relationship with the people who worked for him.

I remember, before my appointment as deputy administrator, reading a Drew Pearson column in which Pearson said that GSA was the worst mess in Washington. When we took over, we sure found that that was true. There was the famous Hanna [M. A. Hanna Company] nickel mining situation in Cuba where Castro [Fidel Castro] had taken over the entire nickel operation there and money had disappeared because people there had not foreseen this happening and even had payroll being distributed the day that Castro nationalized it. It was an awful mess. The biggest mess of all, I think, was in the strategic and critical materials where all kinds of favoritism allegedly occurred with people like Wilson [Charles E. Wilson] and Humphrey [George Magoffin Humphrey] and their respective companies. The agency was in a very bad state.

So we did a broad reorganization of the agency which accomplished two things: it gave us a new functional organization, number one, which is what we wanted; and it enabled us to use reorganization as a tool for getting people out of jobs that they weren't competent to fill. We made some massive changes in the agency. I would guess that in the four years that I was there, including people at all levels, we probably made eight thousand personnel changes and developed a very strong team, very strong at the top and very strong at the bottom. We did a lot of recruiting to accomplish this.

HACKMAN: You mentioned in that first interview using reorganization to solve some of the personnel problems. Can you describe that in a little more detail as

to exactly how you worked that and how you aimed your reorganization at handling some of the personnel problems?

BOUTIN: Well, by using reorganization, we would abolish a

[-32-]

whole series of jobs.

BEGIN SIDE I, TAPE II

HACKMAN: You were just at the point of talking about or finishing your explanation of reorganization, setting up new positions that required new people. Then, let's see, I had to ask you...

BOUTIN: Is that where we want to pick up?

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah, I think so.

BOUTIN: I selected Lawson [B. Knott Lawson, Jr.] as my deputy administrator because of his broad experience in government service, the excellent reputation he enjoyed at GSA and at Department of Defense, and also because of the huge knowledge he had particularly of the Public Buildings Service of GSA itself.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Can you look at some of those other appointments and remember how they were made and any problems in deciding who to select or...

BOUTIN: Well, all the time that I was at GSA, four years and, as I say, making probably eight thousand appointments at all the various levels within the agency, I only remember twice where the Kennedy organization or the White House insisted on any appointment. One was Robert T. Griffin, a Massachusetts Democrat, a close friend of Congressman Tip O'Neill's [Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.] and Eddie Boland's [Edward P. Boland] where we did get some instructions, shall we say, that Bob should be Assistant Administrator for Congressional and Public Affairs. The second one was much later on in the days at GSA when a fellow by the name of Lazzaro [Paul Lazzaro] was appointed as Regional Administrator in Boston. I was very much opposed to this second appointment, but Senator Ted Kennedy thought that he was the fellow for it, so that was done. Besides that, I received no interference at all. I was told to use my own judgment. I did, and I think that system worked very well.

HACKMAN: How much of a problem did you have in shifting from the positions as a mayor and then as a candidate into knowing how very early on to start to

reorganize some of these things? Is there expertise in the agency that you were really able to call upon, or do you look to outsiders for advice, or is this basically coming out of your own experience?

[-33-]

BOUTIN: Those were tough days, Larry. I thank goodness for the experience I had as mayor where we did a lot of reorganization, had a lot of experience in fiscal planning, things of that type, and my business experience in my own agency back home. But, even more important than the two of them, the relationship that I had with the Kennedys where there was real mutual trust, and they didn't expect me to get all of this done in two days. Literally, I was working eighteen hours a day when I got to GSA, just learning what it was all about, finding out who I could trust and who I couldn't trust, starting to build a team—and much of what happened from then on was a team effort—getting people with the expertise to do the right kind of in-depth study of the agency. I found people there like Joe Moody [Joe E. Moody], as an example, who was tremendously helpful; Bill Turpin [William P. Turpin]; Howard Greenberg; Herb Angel [Herbert E. Angel]; then new people I brought in like Maurice Connell [Maurice J. Connell], who was the head of Defense Materials [Defense Materials Service]; Bob Conrad [Robert B. Conrad]; people of this type. We were able to mesh, in other words, people who had experience already in federal government service—with new people from the outside and to build a strong, viable team.

HACKMAN: Now, how do you come up with, let's say, a guy like Conrad, who ran and lost in Nebraska? Does this come at all from the White House? Or is this you going out and looking for a guy?

BOUTIN: Dorothy Davies was running a personnel office in the Executive Office of the President at the time. I called Dorothy and told her I needed such and such a type of person. "Have you got anybody there before I go looking elsewhere?" She came up with, as I remember it, four or five suggestions for top jobs, one of whom was Conrad. I interviewed Bob, was very much impressed with him, and he came to GSA and stayed all the time I was there. He's still with the agency.

HACKMAN: Any other people who come from Dorothy Davies' operation?

BOUTIN: Maury Connell [Maurice J. Connell] came from Dorothy Davies' operation. There were also a lot of people at the lower grades, grades GS-5 and 6 and 9 and 12 but I couldn't place names of those now. But that was a good office. They weren't there to stuff anything down your throat; they did a good headhunt for you.

HACKMAN: What can you remember about early contacts that you made on the Hill with members of your substantive

[-34-]

committees and your appropriations committees?

BOUTIN: Very early in the game, in fact, the first week we were there, we had to testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee. I can tell you I was one scared guy. The only people that I knew on the Hill, besides those who had worked in the Kennedy campaign, were the two senators from New Hampshire, Styles Bridges and Norris Cotton. Styles was on the Appropriations Committee, and I remember he treated me very well that day. But it didn't take me long to decide that one of the things we had to do was to develop a first-rate liaison with Capitol Hill. As a consequence, from that time on, I spent an awful lot of time on the Hill and developed some wonderful relationships that stand with me to this day, on both sides of the political aisle.

HACKMAN: Did the John Moore problem create a lot of problems on the Hill in that first year, or were you basically able to make up for that on your own?

BOUTIN: We were able to keep the John Moore problems invisible both as far as the press was concerned and as far as Capitol Hill was concerned. So, no, it was not a problem. We always worried about it being a problem because John's health was so bad all through that period. But, you know, we made great friends of people like Carl Vinson, head of the House Armed Services Committee, and Albert Thomas, the chairman of our Appropriations Subcommittee [House Appropriations Subcommittee], and Eddie Boland was a great help to us; Eddie was also on the Appropriations Subcommittee. The Senate side with people like Warren Magnuson [Warren G. Magnuson], who was chairman of our Appropriations Committee [Senate Appropriations Committee], and Senator Ellender [Allen J. Ellender], who was on that committee. John McCormack [John William McCormack] was of huge help both during the time he was Majority Leader and the Speaker [Speaker of the House]. He opened just lots and lots of doors for us. We had a great relationship on Capitol Hill.

HACKMAN: How did you tie in with O'Brien's operation? From what I understand and can find out, O'Brien's operation wouldn't have cranked up into full gear on GSA legislation probably because there wasn't that much major legislation. But how did you feed information to O'Brien's operation and what did you call upon them for help on?

BOUTIN: Well, you're right in the statement you've made. We never looked to Larry to help us with our legislative problems because we had them darn well in hand. But Larry's problems were much bigger and different than ours. He

[-35-]

was there to get the Administration's program through the Congress. Here we sat at GSA, one of the largest procurement agencies in the government, and we also had the federal

buildings program and so forth. We also had all kinds of programs going on in strategic and critical materials and transportation of all types. So we kept Larry fully informed as to what we were doing at GSA. Let's say, as an example, that we decided to build a federal building in Casper, Wyoming. Larry would be the first on to know that, so that if he wanted to go to the senators or the congressman from Wyoming and build himself some points, he could do it. Announcements from our agency were channeled through Larry's office so that these people on the Hill could take credit. Well, that built a three-cornered friendship that was worth an awful lot.

HACKMAN: Can you describe how this worked in terms of timing? Let's say a project had been approved within GSA and the announcement's ready. Can O'Brien decide when the announcement should be made? Can you remember specific instances where things are delayed or hurried up depending on another issue that the Administration is interested in?

BOUTIN: Well, it didn't work quite that way because, first of all, we would have to go before—on Public Buildings, now—we would have to go before the Public Works Committees [Public Works Subcommittees] of the House and Senate to get authorization. Then, once we got authorization, we'd have to go to our Appropriations Subcommittees in two stages, once for the design fees and land acquisition and secondly for the construction funds. Where we could really make some points was at the time the President's budget was put together. If, as an example, we got through the Bureau of the Budget and approval by the President that we could request congressional authorization for, let's say, twenty-five new buildings and the locations where we wanted to build them, before or after the President's budget was announced, Larry could use that information to very good advantage to build goodwill on the Hill. The same thing would apply to major contracts. Let's say, as an example, that we were going out for ten thousand mailsters for the Post Office Department. We'd get our bids in, evaluate them, determine the successful bidder, but before we made the announcement publicly, we would often go to Larry O'Brien and say Firm is the low bidder, all the pre-contract investigators are complete, and we're ready to award. Well, if that happened to be in Ohio, as an example, he could call the congressmen and the senators before the notice to the public and let them know that an award was about to be made. So while there was not any White House influence on the selection, there was White House benefit on actual announcement.

HACKMAN: Is there ever a White House veto on anything that

[-36-]

you've approved, that you can recall?

BOUTIN: Never, not once.

HACKMAN: Okay. Speaking of the process in getting things through BOB [Bureau of the Budget], what can you remember about your relationship with, first,

Dave Bell [David E. Bell] and then Kermit Gordon, or other people down the line who handled your requests?

BOUTIN: My person-to-person relationships with Dave Bell and with Kermit Gordon, both, were very friendly relationships. The heck of it is that you spent your time dealing with people below, you know, lower down the line. Every agency had its own BOB people who were assigned to us. Elmer Staats [Elmer B. Staats] as deputy head of the BOB was also an official I had to deal with a great deal. The lower levels were the biggest problem. Frankly, it at times got to be very difficult. You'd know something should be done, but that old caution of BOB would prevent you from really moving. So I never used to hesitate—if I wasn't getting what I wanted out of BOB, I'd call up Kenny O'Donnell. Between Kenny and the President, the problems often had a way of evaporating.

HACKMAN: You don't remember losing any big ones to the BOB?

BOUTIN: I never lost a big one to the BOB.

HACKMAN: One other one I wanted to ask you about was the Area Redevelopment Administration [ARA] where there's some tie-in between GSA and ARA, I believe. I wondered if you can remember any particular problems with Bill Batt [William L. Batt, Jr.] or....

BOUTIN: No, I remember Bill very well. We had a good relationship there. The big thing, as far as GSA was concerned, was for preferential treatment for contractors in depressed areas on the award of contracts. You'll remember there was an opportunity for set-asides of contracts for businesses in areas of severe unemployment. We had a very good working relationship and I don't recall any significant problems.

HACKMAN: How about following that with that accelerated public works program where, I think, you did have some problems in getting what you thought GSA should have in terms of allocation under that program.

BOUTIN: That was a question of accelerating the implementation

[-37-]

of the Public Buildings Act [Public Buildings Act of 1959]. The Congress and the Executive Branch had identified twenty billion dollars worth of needed projects, and we were trying to get these in place as quickly as we could, and we saw a huge opportunity here for major impact by going faster than our timetable at that time indicated. As an example, for social security offices and other small federal facilities we developed a system of prototypes where we would not have to go out for separate

architectural design for each building. We had a choice of five or six models that could be chosen. We could award construction contracts very, very quickly.

But we were unsuccessful in getting the allocations of funds that we needed. Yes, we did lose on that one to the Bureau of the Budget. I'd like to point out one of the things that I learned as far as congressional relations—that by building good relationships of trust and respect, you could really work with these people and it paid big dividends. I remember having a real problem with the Department of Defense on procurement: the question of what items they would procure vis-à-vis what items GSA would procure. We had a close relationship with Paul Douglas [Paul H. Douglas], who was Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee. So I went up and told Paul about it, and he very graciously and immediately scheduled some hearings. He gave DOD and the Bureau of the Budget merry hell because they weren't moving on something that made good sense. The same thing was true of Jack Brooks [Jack Bascom Brooks] in the Government Operations Committee of the House. We had a great relationship with Jack, who, by the way, you will remember was one of the early Kennedy supporters and the only one, initially, from Texas. Anytime we ran into a problem with another agency or the Bureau of the Budget and were able to make a good, sound case, all I had to do was let Jack know, and he'd call a hearing, and somebody'd really get a haircut. He was a great believer in effective and efficient government.

HACKMAN: Can you remember other agencies where you did have serious problems?

BOUTIN: I remember in VA [Veterans Administration], as an example, we had some problems where they were buying some of the same things that we were. It just didn't make any sense at all. Either they should do it or GSA should. We couldn't get it resolved and so we resolved it on Capitol Hill. On the Republican side of the aisle, I remember in the Appropriations Committee [Senate], enjoying a very wonderful relationship with Norris Cotton. I'd go up and explain the budget in advance of the hearing to Norris and then he would take care for me of the Republican side of the Committee. We had relatively clear sailing. So these efforts

[-38-]

just paid huge dividends and they built some lasting friendships.

HACKMAN: Okay. Let's say with a guy like Cotton, for example, to build that good relationship are there things that you can be particularly helpful to him on as the relationship is built, let's say, in New Hampshire, or are there other ways you build a relationship like that? Same way with Brooks or whoever it might be.

BOUTIN: It never was a question of a quid pro quo, of having to give something to get something. It's just a question of keeping these people fully informed, making sure they have all the necessary information, being always very honest with them and, when you could, being helpful. The only man on the Hill that I used to feel was trying to buy me with a hot dog was Senator Byrd [Robert C. Byrd] of West Virginia. He'd invite you up for lunch and maybe buy you a fifty-cent sandwich, and he

wanted a hundred thousand dollars or a million dollars worth of contracts to be awarded in West Virginia. Well, hell, you'd rather not have had the lunch in the first place. But I didn't find that generally true other than with Byrd. These were personal relationships that were developed.

HACKMAN: Speaking of Byrd, do you remember details on that Morgantown arsenal with Barron [William W. Barron] and Byrd and Randolph [Jennings Randolph]? Any particular problems there in working that out?

BOUTIN: That was a difficult problem. It was a plant that was built during World War II, that had employed thousands and thousands of people. It had fallen into not only disuse but disrepair. It literally was crumbling. You couldn't find a use for it because it's intended use was to manufacture ammonia, and there was just no demand for this obsolete facility. Byrd was always after me to do the impossible. He expected that I could bring in General Motors, and they'd put an assembly plant in there or something. Jennings Randolph was just the opposite. Jennings was the chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee [Senate Public Works Subcommittee], following the death of Senator Chavez [Dennis Chavez]. We had a good relationship. He always was understanding. Eventually, we were able to work out with a buyer the sale of the property at Morgantown, and it was developed into an industrial park. But the facilities that were there just were no good. They were special purpose for a need that was no longer in existence.

HACKMAN: I wondered if you'd talk more about Yasko's [Karel H. Yasko] role. You didn't mention him by name in that first transcript. How much of a problem was there bringing

[-39-]

a guy like that into the GSA bureaucracy and keeping him satisfied in terms of feeding in some quality into the building process and in dealing with your other people there who may have been dissatisfied with what he was trying to...

BOUTIN: We had a man by the name of Len Hunter [Leonard Hunter], who was the head of design and construction for public buildings. Len was there when the Administration changed—a very, very fine architect in his own right. But I always felt that he just was not terribly imaginative. You know, anybody can build cracker boxes. We wanted buildings with some style and some life. Len, we didn't feel, measured up. In fact, we were of the opinion that perhaps he was stifling imaginative design by the architects we were hiring. Well, I never knew trouble in that office until Len quit and went to work for Warnecke [John C. Warnecke].

Then we got to looking around for an architect of imagination. John Gronouski [John A. Gronouski], who was then Postmaster General, said, "I've got just the man for you"—in fact, he put some heat on us to appoint him—"Karel Yasko from Wisconsin." Well, Karel Yasko came in with an awful lot of support by Gronouski and a lot of expectations on our part, but he proved to be just an impossible problem because he never could make a decision.

He was imaginative enough, but a procrastinator of the first order. So Bob Daly [Robert T. Daly], who at that point was the Commissioner of Public Buildings [Public Buildings Service], used to have to make the decisions for him. If we had waited for Karel Yasko, we'd have built one building every ten years. Now, I know von Eckardt [Wolf von Eckardt] in the *Washington Post* has said what a great guy Karel Yasko is and what a great architect. The fact of the matter is, he was a stumbling block at GSA because we just couldn't move with him; we couldn't move fast enough. He not only was a problem to me, but he was a problem to successive administrators after me.

We had some great people, though, around Yasko in that department, fine architects and engineers. Despite some of the problems, we were able to design and build some great buildings, using people like Mies van der Rohe [Ludwig Mies van der Rohe], who did the Chicago buildings, and Marcel Breuer [Marcel Lajos Breuer], who designed the HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] building, and Edward Durell Stone, who designed quite a few buildings for us, Charlie Luckman [Charles Luckman], who designed several buildings, including the U.S. Pavilion at the New York World's Fair. People like Nat Owings [Nathaniel A. Owings] and Clazer [Samuel Glaser] and Yamasaki [Minoru Yamasaki].

We put in a policy at GSA that for projects in Washington, we would work with any architect in the country; it was open territory. But outside of Washington, the choice would be

[-40-]

limited to a firm in the state where the construction was to be. So that, as an example, a federal building in San Antonio would have a Spanish-American flavor, whereas if we brought in an architect from Chicago, we'd likely get a Chicago building or a Des Moines building by an architect from there. Now, sometimes in the smaller states, there wasn't the competence for large projects, so we'd establish joint ventures—an architect in the state coupled with an architect from out of state. This worked beautifully. We got some of our best projects because of the local flavor, of people knowing what the local people wanted. I think a good example of that is right in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where on the site or close to the site of Studley's Tavern, which dates back to pre-Revolutionary days, we built a building that harmonized with the architecture of that historic city. The fact that GSA was doing a good job during the period I was there in architecture is confirmed in an article by von Eckardt just before I left, praising GSA for its innovative design concepts and what we'd been able to do with the fine arts; also the fact that the President, President Kennedy, was recognized for this work of GSA.

HACKMAN: Can you remember specifically on the HUD building how that decision evolved to name—is it Breuer, Brauer...

BOUTIN: Marcel Breuer.

HACKMAN: ... Marcel Breuer to take charge of that, because hadn't there been someone else, hadn't work already been proceeding on the design for that,

and then there was a switch, in fact, to Breuer? How do you remember that?

BOUTIN: I don't remember the details of that, but I can tell you how traditionally it went. We would ask for submissions of interest by leading firms. We would tell them of the size and type of building we were planning. We might ask for submissions from as many as ten or fifteen firms. There would be person-to-person meetings between these firms and the people at GSA. We would look at such things as their initial concepts of design, the availability of personnel for the conduct of the project—if they were loaded with work, as an example, and were going to put a couple of junior people on it, we wouldn't be interested at all. We'd finally boil it down until we got one, two, or three firms. Then it would go to my office for final decision. We were very much—I remember at the time Breuer was appointed—impressed with a mockup design that he brought down with him, and he had some concepts already worked out. The administrator

[-41-]

of Housing and Home Finance [Housing and Home Finance Agency] at the time, Doctor Weaver [Robert C. Weaver] who became Secretary of HUD, also played a key role in this. He had some definite ideas of what he wanted, and there was this kind of a partnership that worked it out.

HACKMAN: You don't remember being personally, yourself, opposed to using Breuer, or other people feeling strongly against using Breuer at GSA?

BOUTIN: Well, as far as I'm concerned, I was the one who was pushing Breuer. I don't remember any opposition to Breuer, but there may very well have been. But not as far as I was concerned. He was my choice right from the beginning.

HACKMAN: On the World's Fair building that.... I came across in your papers a memo from the President to you, saying that some people were dissatisfied with the Luckman design on that building and wondering whether and asking, I think, the question, how can we assure that other architects are given—I don't remember the phrase—given a chance at it or given some feed-in on the quality of that design. Can you remember how that came about?

BOUTIN: I remember that very, very well. The whole concept of what was going to be displayed in the World's Fair building was developed over at the Department of Commerce. Franklin Roosevelt, Jr. [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.] and Herb Klotz [Herbert W. Klotz] were riding herd on that. Real controversy developed between GSA and Commerce because Commerce kept changing the concept of the U.S. exhibit. Every time they changed we had to change the building design. We felt very strongly that the Department of Commerce was not being completely candid with the President on this. They were pointing the finger at us while they were at fault for continuously changing

their minds. We had a number of real hot meetings over this before it was finally resolved. In no way was Luckman at fault. In the end, we did open on schedule. You will remember there was a strike on in New York at the time and so we went all the way to Arizona to get Del Webb [Delbert Eugene "Del" Webb] to come into New York to build that building. There was some opposition by the commissioner of the World's Fair to our getting a California architect to design a building for New York and using an out of state contractor. So the President was getting pressure from various sources. But following that memorandum, I remember taking the sketches and schematics over to the President and showing exactly what the facts were. He was happy with it and, subsequently, he was very pleased with the building. I don't know how he liked the exhibit.

[-42-]

HACKMAN: Another building, the national aquarium building, and again I'd found a memorandum, January 7, '63, from the President to you, in which he urges that you consider having competitive bidding on the design for that. Maybe that wasn't being considered before that. Again, how did that situation develop?

BOUTIN: This was before any architects were chosen at all. What the President was suggesting was a competition. I remember going over and explaining to him what a competition entailed. First of all, it's extremely time-consuming. It's also very costly because no one is going to spend the time designing a building of that scale and that magnitude without getting paid for it. Then you have to go through the AID [American Institute of Architects] to get their blessing on doing it in this way for major projects. It just looked like the building would never get built if we were going to do that. You know, it was like the Franklin Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] memorial that hasn't been built to this day because they can't agree on the winning design.

BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE II

BOUTIN: So I told the President that I thought we would be much better served by using extreme care in picking the very best firm that we could to design a building that was going to be an asset to Washington. He went along with that.

HACKMAN: Do you remember any problems with the Interior Department in working that one out? I think in your memo back to him, you said you would discuss the possibilities with the Interior Department.

BOUTIN: This is true because the building when complete would house a function under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department. I do remember discussing the matter with the Undersecretary Carr [James K. Carr]. I'm sure that the memo was provoked by a letter or a call from the Secretary of the Interior [Stewart L. Udall], and it didn't come unexpected.

HACKMAN: Can you remember other examples where the President or someone else at the White House comes to you and says, “We think there should be competitive bidding on this,” in a situation where there wouldn’t normally have been competitive bidding?

BOUTIN: No. Competitive bidding, as was understood by

[-43-]

practically everyone, was such a very, very difficult way to do it, and with horrendous delays. My belief—and I think this has been proven to be valid—was that we should use very careful judgment in making sure we’re getting the right firm for the type project being planned rather than going out for design competition. One of the things we found, even on the relatively small prototype buildings I referred to before, is that often the most imaginative concept would come in from some firm too small to do the work in a timely manner if awarded the contract. They’d come in with great ideas—often right out of school—but then not have the personnel to put it all together.

HACKMAN: How much of a problem was the commission on fine arts for you, or was Heckscher [August Heckscher], particularly, or Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] or other sort of intellectuals floating around in the Administration, who would—was there constant harassment of GSA or a constant problem for you from people like this?

BOUTIN: Not really. As an example, on projects in Washington, Charlie Horsky [Charles A. Horsky] was just wonderful to work with. Charlie wasn’t one to write a lot of memos. He’d come over to the office; we’d talk out the problem and then come to a decision. The fellow in the fine arts, who was most helpful to me, was Bill Walton [William Walton]. Bill used to spend a lot of time at GSA just on a visit basis at my request. I’d tell him what we had in mind, and we’d discuss it.

The real problem was the Congress, not on the Senate side, but on the House side. Albert Thomas just didn’t believe that we ought to build buildings with any fancy doodads or expensive art work, that we ought to build buildings as inexpensively as possible but that would last at least a hundred years—just straight functional buildings. Well, it used to be a tradeoff. Albert wouldn’t give us enough money. We’d go to Magnuson on the Senate side and get some more added, and then it would be cut down to half the increase granted by the Senate. So we were able to do some very good things with works of art, but nothing like what was done during the PWA [Public Works Administration] days. If we could only have had some additional money, we could have done some really great things.

HACKMAN: I’ve found, again in your papers, a memo—this is pretty late; this is May 22, ’63, after you obviously have made a lot of efforts to improve architectural design and everything—in which the President writes to you just a very short note, “Do you have any thoughts on how we can improve the architectural design for this Administration

for our public buildings?” Why that late in the Administration, after all of your efforts, does something like that come to you from the President? I found it curious.

BOUTIN: Chances are because somebody was over there with a complaint and said, “Mr. President, have you seen the building in such and such a place? It really is awful.” Well, at that point, the President forgets all about the fact that he has gotten an award from the AIA for the excellence of architectural design in his Administration and deals with the matter at hand—a complaint.

HACKMAN: What kind of efforts did you make to improve press coverage or press interest in what GSA was doing, and were they at all successful?

BOUTIN: We hired a fellow by the name of Jeb Byrne [John E. “Jeb” Byrne], who had been Governor Clauson’s AA [administrative assistant] in the state of Maine, to come down and handle our press relations. The problem was that so much of our press was straightforward, factual kinds of reporting. We seldom got headlines. The real significant stories were handled by Larry O’Brien’s office and through the Congress. We never were very successful in generating a lot of interest in what was going on at GSA by the press. There were exceptions. The Lafayette Park redevelopment—the buildings on both sides of the park and the recreation of the facades as they existed in the Civil War period—developed huge interest. Local press would be interested in announcements concerning their own area but releases of local interest were seldom of national interest. We didn’t have the type of announcements that the State Department or DOD had. We just didn’t have that. We did get a good deal of interest in a piece of legislation that the President sponsored. That was the creation of the Historical Publications Commission in the National Archives. It provided for the commissioning of research studies concerned with early American history such as papers of our early Presidents.

HACKMAN: Maybe you could talk just a little bit about the role of the archives and GSA and your relationships with the Archives leadership.

BOUTIN: The National Archives and Records Service is one of the principal components of GSA; it has responsibility for the Archives proper in Washington and ten regional centers of national records plus the military records center in St. Louis. It also is responsible for the presidential libraries. At that time, we had the Roosevelt Library, the Truman Library, the Hoover Library,

the Eisenhower Library, and we were making plans for the Kennedy Library. This was a very exciting and interesting part of GSA. It was headed at that time by Dr. Wayne Grover [Wayne C. Grover], who was a delightful man to work with. We also did an awful lot of

work with all of the agencies and departments of government to help them to do a better job of records keeping. We had a freeze, I remember, on file cabinets to force these agencies to use modern concepts, and this freeze lasted for a year. We took dump trucks of worthless records and destroyed them, and then took the real meaningful records and brought them into our record centers.

HACKMAN: Can you remember some of the details you mentioned earlier in the car today about problems on various presidential libraries? I think historians of those periods would find those sort of interesting—Eisenhower and...
[Interruption] I was asking you about particular problems with various presidential libraries.

BOUTIN: The Hoover Library was a problem because the records were split up, and some of them were controlled by different members of the family. During this time we never did get this fully resolved and get all of the records to the Hoover Library depository. It was not until after President Hoover's death that this was finally accomplished. The Roosevelt Library was a joy to work with particularly during the time that Eleanor Roosevelt was alive. She could remember every single thing that went on during the Roosevelt years. You could ask her questions about when something happened or why something didn't happen, and she could immediately recall it. I just hope that all of that was gotten down on tape because she was a reservoir of information. She also, of course, knew so much about Governor Stevenson and people like Senator Lehman [Herbert H. Lehman]. You could talk with her by the hour, and she would have so much information that she could give you. During the period I was there, we did plan and start construction on the increase in size of the library, and that work still goes on to this day.

The Eisenhower Library was started, of course, at the time of the change of Administration. I remember very well the day that that library was dedicated, of Charlie Halleck [Charles A. Halleck] being there and the President [Eisenhower] inviting a group of his friends to his private railroad car for breakfast the morning of the dedication and not allowing Charlie Halleck in. I also remember that during that period we had had some problem with an aide to President Eisenhower, a colonel by the name of Schulz [Robert L. Schulz] who was carrying on a private war with Eisenhower's secretary and using GSA as

[-46-]

the fall guy in this by saying we weren't properly serving the Eisenhower needs. At the time of the dedication, I talked to President Eisenhower about this. He was terribly angry that any such things were being said and that Schulz was playing that kind of a game. Right in my presence and the presence of Wayne Grover, Eisenhower really gave Schulz a tremendous haircut and told him that kind of stuff was going to stop right then. We worked with Eisenhower as a former President, both at Abilene and in Pennsylvania and out at his winter home in California.

President Truman, of course, was still very, very active during this period. I remember him calling me and saying he wanted me to come out to the library the next day. I asked at what time and he said six forty-five in the morning. So I flew out to Kansas City that night and was at the library in Independence at the appointed time the next morning, and

there he was already at his desk. Really, he had nothing serious that he wanted us for, but he wanted to talk. Wayne Grover and I spent the whole morning with him as he reminisced about his days in World War I, his days in the Senate, his days in Kansas City, and then the years of his presidency, including his firing of MacArthur [Douglas MacArthur]. I was thinking if I only had a tape recorder, but unfortunately, I didn't.

HACKMAN: Did he have any comments about the way his own library was operating? Do you remember?

BOUTIN: He was terribly enthusiastic about it. During that period, he was at the library every day. Guests would come in, and he would invite them into the little auditorium that was there and talk to them personally about the presidency and national affairs. He took a huge interest and he spent a great deal of time there.

HACKMAN: In your efforts to improve the quality of personnel in GSA or the performance of people in GSA, how did you measure the Archives' performance since it's not really typical of some of the other services? Maybe you can't look at it in quite the same way.

BOUTIN: We made very, very few changes in Archives. It's a highly professionalized field of work, they were staffed with some excellent people, and there just wasn't the need to shift people around or to bring new people in. We did, however, establish some new goals, policies, and guidelines and some new expectations of performance, particularly in this whole field of paper management. We also became much more aggressive as an agency in looking, as an example, for

[-47-]

papers and records that should be protected for future generations. A big achievement was the successful negotiation with Henry Ford, II, for some very, very valuable acetate films that Henry Ford, I, had taken or taken himself, going way back to the earliest days of the motion picture industry. They were one-of-a-kind films, and an invaluable record of Americana.

HACKMAN: Did you find in any way that the Archives was more difficult to evaluate, particularly other than the records management side of things, because it isn't as easily measurable in terms of its production or...

BOUTIN: No, we were able to put in standards of expectations in Archives as we were in other components of the agency. We put in systems management, and it applied just as well to Archives as it did anyplace else. Now, if you're referring to activities, as an example, like the presidential libraries or the Historical Publications Commission, this was an entirely different kind of work. But when you talk

about paper management; when you talk about the type of programs we ran, educational type programs and so forth, no, we could measure productivity.

HACKMAN: Some of the academic community has said for a long time that the National Archives doesn't fit well in GSA; it should be independent as it was at the beginning. Did you ever feel any pressure on that side of things, or do you agree at all with that viewpoint?

BOUTIN: No, I completely disagree with the viewpoint. I think right now, as an example, that we have at least 50 percent too many agencies, and probably 75 percent. The grouping of agencies under common direction makes an awful lot of sense and can save a huge amount of money. I felt that Archives was well placed. A major role of GSA is to promote good management practices. Records and paper management is surely a part of this. If you have an administrator at the top of the agency who has no interest in National Archives, who will not fight for appropriations and will not fight for their programs, that's something different. But that never was my viewpoint. I used to be a very strong partisan of theirs.

HACKMAN: You know, we were talking earlier about particular federal buildings. Can you remember any of the larger federal buildings where there were really tough political problems on them—Kansas City or Chicago or wherever?

BOUTIN: I would think the toughest one of all was the federal

[-48-]

building in San Francisco. There we had a very poor contractor who was constantly in labor troubles. If he wasn't in trouble with the trades, he was in trouble with suppliers. The workmanship was shoddy; we had to run inspections on the project all the time and have them rip out work. The project was very late in being accomplished. The Foley Square project in New York City was extremely difficult because we had to acquire and demolish a large area of old buildings and kick the tenants out, which is always unpleasant. Then we found that the underpinnings of the building would require special treatment. We had to do an awful lot of blasting; as a result, some buildings in the proximity to the site started to sag. We had some pretty exciting times.

HACKMAN: Any of the other ones that stand out like that?

BOUTIN: No, most of the projects went ahead in an orderly manner. The Denver federal office building did cause a special problem because of a major fire during construction. The one in Boston, as an example, created no special problem but I never personally liked the design of the building. The building is beautifully built and will be there a long time to come, but I do not consider it one of our best designed buildings by a long shot.

HACKMAN: Any problems at all on the FBI plans in Washington?

BOUTIN: The FBI building has a curious history to it. The Bureau of the Budget and the President were very much opposed to building the FBI building on Pennsylvania Avenue. It didn't seem to be compatible with the agencies and departments already housed there. Pennsylvania Avenue was always envisioned as being a street of activity, of commerce as well as government, and here J. Edgar Hoover wanted to take a great big hunk out of this and build an FBI building that very likely would be considered a monument to himself, I guess. So we never did get authorization from the President or from the Bureau of the Budget to proceed with this. But Mr. Hoover was a man of great power and prestige, and he was able to go up to the Senate and to convince the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Carl Hayden [Carl T. Hayden]...

HACKMAN: Carl Hayden, sure.

BOUTIN: ... that this building should be built. I was called up to the Hill by the chairman, and he said, "Either you're going to put the money in or I'm going to put it in. Now which way is it going to be?" So the money was put in, and we went ahead and acquired the site and

[-49-]

started the development of the schematics: it will occupy a very, very expensive site, and, with its size is more prestigious than the Department of Justice building.

HACKMAN: That's right. Any consideration to having the President get involved at the point where Hayden was insisting on going ahead with the funding or...

BOUTIN: The President, to my knowledge, never did get involved in that. Carl Hayden was influential enough so he was able to get the House to go along with putting the money in. I remember being called to a hearing of the Appropriations Committee and being told in no uncertain terms that "Look, let's stop fooling around, this is what we're going to have."

HACKMAN: How about the disposal of Ellis Island? Do you remember any...

BOUTIN: That was very thorny. There was, first of all, a great dispute between New York and New Jersey. What we at GSA wanted to do was to turn the island into a recreation area, demolish the buildings and to put in grass and trees and shrubs. But the jurisdictional problem between New York and New Jersey was not resolved all the time that I was there. Neither one would give an inch. They were more interested in jurisdiction than anything else. Some said that it should be preserved as a historical monument, but I talked to a great many people and they remembered Ellis Island not as a place of pleasure and of opportunity, but where immigrants were literally stacked up

waiting to be processed. They regarded it as an island of tears not an island to be remembered with pleasure.

HACKMAN: I had a few questions on New Hampshire politics during the Administration. I wonder particularly if you can remember efforts to get McIntyre to run in '62, and what role the White House played, if any, in that?

BOUTIN: The White House played no role at all in getting Tom to run. Those of us who were active in state Democratic politics felt that the Republican Party, following the death of Styles Bridges and the appointment by Governor Powell [Wesley Powell] of his administrative assistant Murphy [Maurice J. Murphy, Jr.] as interim senator was probably going to split seven ways to Sunday. At that time, as a result of the work done in '58 and '60, we had a strong Democratic organization in the state with lots of vitality and some real promise of success.

[-50-]

So a few of us got together with Tom McIntyre, who had been narrowly defeated by less than five hundred votes for Congress in 1954, to convince him to run. We even went so far as to say, "Tom, this will cost you not one penny out of your own pocket. We'll guarantee to raise the money." We brought him down to Washington for a meeting, and finally we were able to convince him to run. He was very content practicing law in Laconia, and he had spent a lot of his own money in '54 and was not anxious to go through it again. John King [John W. King], who was Minority Leader of the New Hampshire House of Representatives, also decided to run for governor. In the primary, both King and McIntyre did fine. The Republicans, as we expected, were divided.

Just before the election—we're talking now of October—they needed financial help very badly. I had raised quite a lot of money for them as had others but they were in bad straits financially. They needed a lot of money and they needed it quickly if they were to have any chance of winning. For the Democratic National Committee, a fellow by the name of Bucci [John Bucci] from Pennsylvania had done a poll in New Hampshire and it showed McIntyre and King were going to get badly beaten. The E. John Bucci Firm showed that Pillsbury [John Pillsbury] was ahead of King at that point 52.2 percent to 47.8 percent, and Bass [Perkins Bass] 57.3 percent for the Senate against McIntyre 42.7. Well, the Democratic National Committee and the Kennedy organization felt it was useless in view of that kind of a poll to put any money in, but the pressure persisted from the state. The President asked me personally to go to New Hampshire and to get the lay of the land and come back with a recommendation. I did go but I didn't meet with the political leaders for a couple of days. I just took a car and covered the state from Colebrook all the way down to the Massachusetts line and stopped at filling stations, at restaurants, at fire stations, at supermarkets, at professional offices, at union headquarters, and just ran a little poll of my own, which indicated that both King and McIntyre could win. At worst, it was a tossup and probably was a lot better than that. So I reported that to the President. As a result, we were able to put together between the Kennedy people and the Democratic National Committee about fifty

thousand dollars of help. This money was essential for media advertising and other campaign expenses. Both were elected.

HACKMAN: Now, after you came back from that trip, did you see the President and discuss it with him, or how did you impress upon people that the situation was more favorable than they believed?

BOUTIN: I talked personally with the President; I also talked

[-51-]

with Ken O'Donnell and with Dick Maguire.

HACKMAN: On August 28, as indicated on this outline, Salinger arranged just a very brief meeting, which you wrote him a little thank-you note for, with the President. Is that the meeting, or what's that about?

BOUTIN: No, that is not the meeting. That was completely for a different purpose. The town of Gilford, which is next door to the city that I come from, Laconia, was having their centennial anniversary, and they wanted me to present to the President on their behalf a medallion.

HACKMAN: Right. Yeah. Okay. I had seen, I believe, earlier in '62 or maybe it's even late '61, some correspondence in your papers about polling which the DNC was involved in in New Hampshire, and they were wanting Joe Napolitan [Joseph Napolitan]. One note you have says, or I think indicates, that either you or Bill Dunfey would prefer that Oliver Quayle, who was at that point working for Kraft [John F. Kraft, Inc.], go in and do something. Do you remember any of the details of that?

BOUTIN: The reason that we preferred Quayle at the time is because he'd been doing an awful lot of work for us in New Hampshire, and we just felt that he was closer to the situation than Joe was.

HACKMAN: How was polling like that handled? Was it paid for by the DNC? Was that the way it worked out, or do...

BOUTIN: Paid for by the state committee.

HACKMAN: Paid for by the state committee. How was the DNC involved? Why were they initiating it as a policy?

BOUTIN: At times it would be on the basis of a shared expense. Sometimes it would be totally at the expense of COPE, where they would agree to underwrite all or part of a poll. Usually the DNC and the state Democratic committee would get together.

HACKMAN: Some other things that are mentioned in connection with New Hampshire in your files are the navy yard, the air base, and Northeast Airlines [Northeast Airlines, Inc.]. Now, I haven't gone into a lot of detail; I don't know details on those, but what can you remember about those three things?

BOUTIN: On the navy yard, even back then, there was serious question of cutbacks, and the navy yard was then and is now of critical importance to the city of Portsmouth.

[-52-]

So it was constantly a matter of trying to get work assigned to the Portsmouth Navy Yard vis-à-vis other government-owned or other yards that were run privately. As far as the air base is concerned, the main problem at that time was some off-base housing that had been built during World War II and had deteriorated very badly. We were very anxious in disposing of that by Housing and Home Finance Agency that it wasn't allowed to deteriorate further into a real ghetto. As far as Northeast Airlines is concerned, of course, they always had been an airline of broken promises. They make all kinds of promises when they're before hearings and when they're looking for special treatment and then ignore all those promises afterwards. We were fighting for decent service for New Hampshire. [Interruption]

HACKMAN: Okay. You were talking about Northeast Airlines and broken promises.

BOUTIN: I think we finished that.

HACKMAN: Okay.

BEGIN SIDE I, TAPE III

HACKMAN: On plans for the '64 campaign, can you remember getting involved in planning for the Convention site for '64? How much was that discussed?

BOUTIN: Not at all. I wasn't in on any of those discussions, if you mean the selection of Atlantic City? I was not involved in that one at all.

HACKMAN: What was your impression of the role of the Democratic National Committee and the way it was run under the Kennedy Administration?

BOUTIN: We actually were doing some very exciting things. I never felt that John Bailey, either by choice or necessity, was as forceful a leader as Paul Butler, as an example. But it was under different circumstances. We had an incumbent President. We had very frequent meetings over at the DNC. We used to meet early Tuesday mornings for breakfast, about two dozen of us representing Kennedy people from all of the various departments and agencies. We'd have breakfast and talk about

problems, particularly as we were looking toward the election of 1964 with Kennedy. Out of that came a concept that I was coordinator of. Working with organized

[-53-]

labor and with the Farmers Union, we had key representatives in every single state of the Union. These people would send me weekly reports of problems, good things that were happening, new people that were being brought into the Party structure, reports on who was mad, who was glad, a real good intelligence system that I would correlate and provide the President with a summary of. We were really getting off the ground in terms of organization, in terms of a good information system, and developing key men in every section of the country. And then, of course, the assassination came and the first thing I did was to destroy all of those records. Of course, I'm sorry for it today. I wish that I had them. But I had volumes and volumes and volumes of reports and they were most encouraging.

HACKMAN: Did you select the people around the country yourself?

BOUTIN: Al Barkan and Dick Maguire did most of that.

HACKMAN: Speaking of the DNC, how did Maguire and Bailey get along? Was Bailey making a lot of decisions or was Maguire, in fact, making the more important decisions?

BOUTIN: My observation was that Maguire was making most of the decisions. John and Dick though, had a very cordial relationship. I don't think that this caused any strain between them. I think there was a good understanding that John was kind of the "Mr. Outside" man; he made the speeches. Dick Maguire raised the money and did the planning and did most of the hiring and firing over at the DNC.

HACKMAN: How much of a role.... How close did Robert Kennedy stay to the kinds of things that were being discussed at the large meetings with the...

BOUTIN: Very, very little. He had a man working with him by the name of Gwartzman [Milton S. Gwartzman], who used to come over periodically just to look over the records we were developing and occasionally, as I remember it, he used to attend the meetings, but not regularly. Robert Kennedy never did to the best of my knowledge.

HACKMAN: How about Corbin [Paul Corbin], who seems to create some problems for some people?

BOUTIN: Corbin created problems for everybody, as far as I know. No, he did not normally attend these meetings. He was always kind of in the background someplace

and constantly zinging somebody. He was not the favorite person of very many people down there, and yet Robert Kennedy strongly defended him.

HACKMAN: Did you ever have conversations with Robert Kennedy about Corbin and why he remained?

BOUTIN: No, I didn't. I had often wondered about it. Subsequently when Robert Kennedy ran for the Senate and when he ran for the presidency, this fellow was not visible. So somewhere along the line, Bob must have got sick of it, too. I know that President Kennedy's appraisal of Corbin was not favorable.

HACKMAN: Any problems in planning for the '64 campaign in terms of what various people in the Kennedy leadership wanted to do? Let's see, there's Steve Smith, who was beginning to at least plan a role in '64 or play a role on '64 planning? Is there any friction here in the way things are going?

BOUTIN: I didn't detect any friction at all. We were planning the campaign on the basis that it would run much like it did with much the same key people as in 1960. We just presupposed that Steve Smith and Robert Kennedy would probably be the two who would call the shots, that Kenny and Larry would be deeply involved and many of the rest of us would. An amazing thing is during these Kennedy years, there was not the usual competition for position. People were just glad to be part of the action and part of the team. This is so different during the Johnson years where people were looking for visibility. They didn't feel they needed it with John Kennedy.

HACKMAN: You said after the assassination you destroyed these records. So I assume they wouldn't really have been helpful in a Johnson campaign in '64, or had you thought that far along at the time?

BOUTIN: I hadn't thought any further than that day. We were all so stunned by the assassination. I just felt that these records at that point were none of anybody's business so I destroyed them.

HACKMAN: What do you remember then in the days immediately following the assassination about your first contacts, particularly with Robert Kennedy, but on Kennedy family problems, the funeral, or Mrs. John Kennedy?

BOUTIN: Well, the first responsibility that I had as Administrator of General Services

was having all of the President's belongings taken out of the Oval Office, which I can remember doing with tears streaming down my face. I was terribly upset by all of it. We did that the very next morning following the assassination so that Mr. Johnson would have immediate availability of the presidential office. Then, while I was not part of the decision of Mrs. John Kennedy going within a few days to Averell Harriman's home in Georgetown, we did help with the logistics of that move and subsequently the selection of an office with Pam Turnure [Pamela Turnure] in New York and the staffing of that office. I had special approval of Congress to provide some secretarial help and expense money.

HACKMAN: This mainly dealing with Albert Thomas, or are there other people involved?

BOUTIN: Albert Thomas and Warren Magnuson both. So that she could answer the tons and tons of letters that were coming in.

When the President took this trip to Dallas, we were going to surprise him on his return. We'd worked this out with Kenny O'Donnell to really spruce up the Oval Office. There was an old beat-up rug in there that was badly worn. We were going to have the office painted and so forth. We had just completed this at the time of the assassination. I remember right away getting a call from Walter Jenkins [Walter W. Jenkins], saying that the President [Johnson] wants to know where that rug is that was in the Oval Office. So I said, "Well, I've got it and that rug is going to go in the Kennedy Library." He said, "Well, the President wants that back right now." I replied, "The President isn't going to have that back right now." Subsequently, the President did support me on that.

Another problem we had was with the undertakers in Dallas, who provided the casket that President Kennedy was flown back to Washington in. They really had used everyone very badly. The casket was defective. You'll remember a handle broke off as they were unloading the casket from Air Force One. They came in with just really a horrendous bill—it was over \$4,000 as I remember it—demanding that it be paid. We negotiated a settlement of that bill but we were not happy about it. I think to this day that they used the Kennedy family very badly. That defective casket was taken to the National Archives and concealed from anybody's view and the new casket was provided in Washington for the President's burial. We came to a point of trying to decide what to do with it. So as far as I know, there were only a couple people privy to this, namely Robert Kennedy, who made the final decision, Secretary McNamara [Robert S. McNamara], Lawson Knott at GSA, and myself. We had the casket crated,

[-56-]

put aboard an air force plane and disposed of it at sea so it wouldn't be a curiosity for people in the future to paw over and so forth.

We had also worked with Mrs. Kennedy and with the President prior to the assassination on their new home at Rattlesnake Mountain. We had provided the security that was needed there by the Secret Service and special facilities that security needed such as special communications. Of course, with the assassination, Mrs. Kennedy never wanted to go back there so we did work with her very quietly to help dispose of that property.

HACKMAN: Any discussions, any very early discussions with Robert Kennedy about the assassination? Did you ever talk with him about that, particularly the Warren [Earl Warren] Commission hearings?

BOUTIN: No, I never did. GSA provided all of the logistics for the Warren Commission. We provided the office space at the General Services Administration, National Archives Building; all kinds of logistical support. I never did talk with Robert Kennedy about that at all. We also provided office space for William Manchester at Archives.

HACKMAN: Any early discussions with him after the assassination about what to do with the Kennedy Library plans or how to carry forth on that?

BOUTIN: We had some meetings, including one in Boston, on the Kennedy Library. The initial decisions while the President was living, as you know, had been to put it on the site adjacent to the Harvard Business School, a barely adequate site because of size. The Harvard board expressed little enthusiasm for the choice and even seemed only slightly lukewarm about the Library being at Harvard at all. We had also looked at the site across the river where the marshaling yards were for the trolley cars but that appeared to be unobtainable. A number of other sites including one in Belmont were considered and rejected. After the assassination, the site decision was changed but I was not privy to the discussions leading to the change. The marshaling yards became available, not without much controversy and delay to the project, and the Harvard Business School site was given up. I did have conversations about the Library with Mrs. Kennedy mostly and I met with her a number of times in New York and Boston. I also spoke with her when she was at the Averell Harriman home—this more recently after the assassination—as we were trying to do everything that any of us possibly could do for her. In the three months following the assassination, I talked with Robert Kennedy perhaps six to ten times mostly on the phone.

[-57-]

I remember one meeting with him at Senator Ted Kennedy's home and once in Boston. Most of our talk had to do with the President's papers and Library, and governmental matters. In February of 1964 I had conversations with him concerning the forthcoming New Hampshire presidential and vice-presidential primary. He indicated that he would like to find out the extent of public sentiment and he asked me if I would quietly see what I could do to get out a write-in vote for him in the vice-presidential primary. I told him that should he allow his name in the presidential primary in New Hampshire he would in all probability get more votes than President Johnson. He declined doing this saying that relationships between he and President Johnson were none too cordial and he neither wanted to further strain these relationships nor create a division in the Democratic Party. I called some friends and associates in New Hampshire and we quietly organized a write-in vote for Robert Kennedy for Vice President. Without expending a penny, Robert Kennedy received 25,094 votes for Vice President in that New Hampshire March 1964 primary versus the 29,317 votes

President Johnson received for President. This was a clear indication that in a head-on contest, Robert Kennedy might well defeat President Johnson for the Democratic presidential nomination and at the very least would add substantial strength to the Democratic national ticket. Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy encouraged me in this New Hampshire effort for Robert. Bill Dunfey also did a lot of work with me on it.

HACKMAN: Who made the first phone call? Did he call you or did you call him, do you remember?

BOUTIN: I think probably I called him to ask, "What do you want us to do?"

HACKMAN: I've seen in your papers as early as December 9 in a long memo you wrote to Cliff Carter [Clifton C. Carter] describing the situation in New Hampshire that you're suggesting the possibility of what you call a possible "trial balloon" on the vice-presidential candidate in the primary. Do you remember what kind of response, if any, you ever got back from Carter or from the White House at that point?

BOUTIN: No, I do not remember any reply. I never at any time, for obvious reasons, told anyone in the White House about the write-in campaign for Robert Kennedy in New Hampshire. It was strictly a matter between Robert Kennedy and me and those in New Hampshire who were helping us.

If we can turn now to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City in 1964, I was one of the Convention coordinators. Bill Dunfey of New Hampshire was a coordinator with me and

[-58-]

there were, I think, seven others. When Robert Kennedy appeared before that Convention crowd and received that tremendous ovation and finally was able to speak, afterwards he just plain disappeared, and Bill Dunfey and I looked frantically everywhere for him. We found him on an outside fire escape just literally crying his eyes out. It was a very emotional experience. It must have been very, very hard for him.

During the New York campaign when Robert Kennedy was running for the Senate and Lyndon Johnson was running for President, I acted frequently as go-between for the two. I was in New York State, working for the presidential campaign, but at the same time working for Robert Kennedy's election to the Senate, and finally was able to convince the Johnson people to put some real money into that New York effort and to have a presidential trip with Robert Kennedy and the President together. You remember that was very, very effective. But right up through the last I despaired that it would happen at all.

HACKMAN: Where was the resistance? Was it from the White House or was it from people in New York who felt they were Johnson's agents or whatever?

BOUTIN: Weisl [Edwin Weisl, Sr.], of course, was very much opposed to it, and

some of the people, I think, in the White House were opposed to it. I had no trouble once I got to the President. I never did with Mr. Johnson; I never had any problems. Getting through some of the people though at times was very difficult. Weisl I found impossible to work with.

HACKMAN: In your efforts in the early spring to get something going here in New Hampshire in terms of the write in, did you have much of a problem in terms of how to handle it without making it too obvious that you and others were involved or that you were involved?

BOUTIN: No, because I was dealing with friends. Even at that point there was a strong reservoir of goodwill left over from '58, '60, '62, and '64. I'd helped a lot of people during the Kennedy Administration, too, with jobs and with other things. To the best of my knowledge, we never had a leak where somebody went to the press, for example.

HACKMAN: I was thinking particularly at one point Hugh Bownes [Hugh Henry Bownes]—is it Bownes?

BOUTIN: Bownes, right.

[-59-]

HACKMAN: ... who succeeded—who was it?—Bill Dunfey. I mean not Bill Dunfey.

BOUTIN: I think he did succeed Bill Dunfey.

HACKMAN: Well, Bownes at that point made a statement sometime in early '64 saying he wasn't going to write in anybody in the vice-presidential slot. How did that come about, disagreement with you or anyone else?

BOUTIN: No, I think it was just a failure of communications. I also think Hugh Bownes felt a loyalty to Mr. Johnson because he was then the President. There was always an overriding factor with those of us who were so very, very close to the Kennedys. We could have a loyalty to someone else to a point, but always in the background there was that strong Kennedy association that had to come first. Bownes was not that close to the Kennedys.

HACKMAN: In a December 24 of '63 memo that you wrote to O'Donnell, I think this is chiefly talking about your talking to Albert Thomas about arrangements for Mrs. Kennedy and the secretaries and everything, but you close by saying, "I also hope you folks are having a chance to talk things out so that we get some firm direction for the future." What were you talking about at that point?

BOUTIN: Who was that to, please?

HACKMAN: To O'Donnell.

BOUTIN: I was talking about precisely this matter of what Robert Kennedy was going to do, what Kennedy people in the administration were going to do; were Kenny and Larry going to stay with Mr. Johnson: were they going to get out? During this period, we were at wit's end not knowing what to do. We had all been told by Dean Rusk to submit our resignations, which we did. I wanted to go home the next day. A couple of weeks after the assassination, I remember going over to the White House after calling and calling Bill Moyers [William D. Moyers], who was very helpful to me, to see the President to resign. I remember he walked out of his office and he put that big finger in my face and he said, "Bernie Boutin, you get back to work. I need you at GSA. You're not going anywhere and I don't want to hear anymore about it." We didn't know what to do. We'd been so accustomed to the Kennedy leadership, and way of doing things and we'd come to take it for granted, and all at once it was gone.

[-60-]

HACKMAN: Did you ever feel it in the early days there, or let's say up to the Convention of '64, that you got any kind of feedback from Robert Kennedy on what he wanted people to do?

BOUTIN: None. Absolutely none. The only thing was during the New Hampshire primary where he and I used to talk on the phone frequently.

HACKMAN: What was he concerned with in those phone conversations? Or how much direction was he giving to the effort?

BOUTIN: He'd just say, "How's it coming? Are we going to make a respectable showing up there? Are we going to do well? Are we going to do poorly? Have they already forgot the Kennedys?" This type of thing.

HACKMAN: At this point is he thinking at all about whether he wants to be Vice President or not, or is he strictly interested in the showing of support?

BOUTIN: I think he was interested in a showing of support. I think the smartest thing Lyndon Johnson could have done would have been to offer the vice-presidential nomination to Robert Kennedy. That could have healed the wounds. You've got to remember now that back to 1960, nearly all the Kennedy people were opposed to Lyndon Johnson being on that ticket—I was one of these influenced in part by Paul Butler's attitude toward Mr. Johnson and by the hateful things that Johnson said at the Convention about John Kennedy's health and so forth. We headed for the Coliseum [Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum] the day of the vice presidential nomination fully convinced that Stuart Symington was going to be the nominee. We were thunderstruck with the selection of Mr. Johnson. Some of this carried over all the way through the Kennedy Administration

period. Nothing was done by either party to offset it. You know, Johnson was looked at kind of as a necessary evil. It's most unfortunate for all parties that that was allowed to persist. Some of us were eventually able to bridge the gap and continue working with Mr. Johnson, but we were still Kennedy people.

HACKMAN: Let me just make this absolutely clear. On December 9 you wrote a memo to Bill Dunfey up here, saying that no write-in campaign for the vice presidency should be tried unless you received some positive direction. Now by that you would have meant some positive direction or an okay from Robert Kennedy, right?

BOUTIN: An okay. That's all I'd have meant. Just an okay.

[-61-]

HACKMAN: What about Corbin in a campaign up in New Hampshire in '64? Some people would say he was making some efforts, and it's always been discussed as to whether that was at Robert Kennedy's instigation or whether he was off on his own.

BOUTIN: I do not believe Robert Kennedy encouraged Paul Corbin to go to New Hampshire.

HACKMAN: Yeah, with a guy named Bob Shaine [Robert Shaine].

BOUTIN: Right. A fellow who is regarded by most Democrats as being bad news—a wheeler-dealer like Corbin.

HACKMAN: After the write in thing in New Hampshire then, did you discuss with Robert Kennedy his desire to be or not be Vice President, and particularly after Johnson eliminated the Cabinet in that announcement in either late June or July, I've forgotten which. Were there further attempts?

BOUTIN: No, there were no further attempts at all. With that announcement, we just figured that that was going to be the end of it.

HACKMAN: Okay. I don't mean to trip you up on this, but what I found that prompted that question was on August 5, which is after Johnson makes his announcement, you wrote to Walter Dunfey [Walter James Dunfey] saying, "There will be much to do at the Convention on behalf of Muskie or the Attorney General." I had wondered whether you meant in connection with the vice presidency or something else, or whether you meant something else completely.

BOUTIN: No, at that point we were actually looking toward the New York senatorial race. The direction had already shifted. We also knew that if Robert

Kennedy in Atlantic City would give any overt expression of interest in the presidential nomination that he could have it. I'm convinced of that to this day. Not the vice presidential only, but the presidential as well.

HACKMAN: Can you remember people, important people that you were talking with in that period that gave you that strong feeling, or was this a general feeling that you had?

BOUTIN: This was a general feeling and some of it came from talking to delegates. I was one of the coordinators who were working that Convention. We were on the

[-62-]

phones to the delegations and others. We were in very close touch with things. The emotion of that Convention brought everyone right back to that day in Dallas. If Robert Kennedy had said, "I think that a Kennedy should continue as President," I think that would have been it.

HACKMAN: Did you have conversations with him about that at the Convention?

BOUTIN: No, I did not.

HACKMAN: Maybe you could give your own impression of the evolution then of Lyndon Johnson's relationship with Robert Kennedy, and what you can see from over the whole period.

BOUTIN: I think that it goes back to the campaign and right up to the day in Los Angeles at the Convention when there was a debate between Lyndon Johnson and Jack Kennedy. Some things were said by Johnson that should not have been said. I remember one of the Johnson people the night of the states dinner at the Convention when John Kennedy came in, refusing to stand and hearing her say, "Look at that son-of-a-bitch." You know, these things are printed on your mind. Unfortunately, you tend to blame the candidate for what his supporters do and say whether the candidate for what his supporters do and say whether the candidate himself agrees or not. Before the 1960 Convention, Lyndon Johnson was for Lyndon Johnson, not John Kennedy. Robert Kennedy did not take lightly anyone saying things against his brother so there was a very hostile feeling. When John Kennedy made his decision to go with Lyndon Johnson, I still do not believe that Robert Kennedy ever agreed with that even though he went along with it. I don't think Robert Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson ever had a cordial relationship during the Kennedy period.

HACKMAN: Was that obvious to you at the time in '60, that he would disagree with it?

BOUTIN: Oh, sure, everyone sensed that this was true. Yet, it was so darned unfortunate. Mr. Johnson and Bob kind of got themselves painted in a

corner in this kind of an antagonistic posture which is so terribly unfortunate because if they could have talked more person-to-person, I think the relationship could have been better. But the respective friends and staffs made sure that the attitude continued. This should not have continued, but it nevertheless did and one thing led to another to a point where retrieving any posture of friendliness was impossible.

HACKMAN: I've either never heard or I've forgotten the story

[-63-]

about John Kennedy not standing at that states dinner. What are the details on that?

BOUTIN: No, no, it wasn't John Kennedy who didn't stand; it was one of the Johnson supporters who was at my table at that dinner. And, as you know, as the head table people come in, you stand and applaud. Well, she refused to stand when Kennedy came in and then referred to him as an s.o.b. You could imagine what my reaction was. You know, next to God, this was my guy.

HACKMAN: Did you make any personal attempts during the period when Robert Kennedy was in the Senate to discuss with him the relationship with Johnson or was there any sense in doing it?

BOUTIN: No, I did not. I didn't think it was my place. I wasn't a high enough ranking person to do it. I tried to maintain good relationships with both parties, but my relationship with Robert Kennedy was a particularly cordial one.

I'd like to jump ahead now to 1967. I had been in marginal health for a while and was in Florida for a week, trying to catch my breath, when I got a call from Larry O'Brien who said that they were gearing up for the '68 election, and that they would like my thoughts and so forth on New Hampshire. I did a good deal of thinking about it and made some recommendations. I talked at length with Bill Dunfey. Bill felt that we should use a stand-in for Mr. Johnson and not expose him to the possibility of being hurt in New Hampshire, and he recommended former Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan. I thought that this would be a fatal mistake. It seemed to me the only men who could possibly successfully stand in for Mr. Johnson would be either Governor King or Senator McIntyre, and that the risk here was too great. If either one of them got beaten, not only would the President be hurt, but we could lose the only two men the New Hampshire Democrats had in high elective positions.

HACKMAN: Was this before or after Dunfey resigned as state chairman? Do you remember? That was in about April of '67.

BOUTIN: This probably was just before that. But these conversations continued throughout the spring and early summer. In the meantime, in March of

'67, my family and I had been most anxious to get back to New Hampshire. I really was sick of it. I was tired and I wasn't feeling well so I told Mr. Johnson that I had a very good offer in private industry and I wanted to get out of government service. So

[-64-]

we talked it over in a number of conversations. Subsequently at the end of July 1967, I did leave and went to New Hampshire and I went to work for Sanders Associates [Sanders Associates, Inc.].

During the course of these discussions with O'Brien, Marvin Watson and others, it was made clear that the President was not going to be an announced candidate in the New Hampshire primary. This meant that his name would not be on the ballot. He was adamant in this position. It also meant we couldn't have a pledged slate of delegates and alternates which left the thing wide open. I should have seen real danger signals here, but I thought that through organization we could put together an effective write-in effort just as we did in 1964. I was asked if I would serve as campaign coordinator for the campaign with Governor King, and Senator Tom McIntyre as a co-chairman. I thought about it and agreed to do it. But before agreeing to do it I went up to the Hill to talk with Robert Kennedy about it.

All through this period when I was at SBA [Small Business Administration] and OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity], my relationship with Robert Kennedy continued to be very, very cordial but I did not see him or hear from him nearly as frequently as during the Kennedy Administration. I told the Senator in this conversation of the role I was requested to play by the Johnson people and asked his advice. We discussed the rumors then making the rounds that he, Senator Robert Kennedy, might be a candidate in the New Hampshire was still Kennedy country and that if he ran he would win. He asked me what I thought he should do. I told him that I thought it would split the Democratic Party right down the middle if he ran against President Johnson and likely assure the election of Richard Nixon [Richard M. Nixon], but if he decided to run that he could count on my support. I also told him that I thought his running in 1968 would be premature and that, expecting President Johnson would be reelected in 1968, that 1972 would be an ideal time for him to run. He indicated that he agreed with that analysis at least in general. He told me that despite much pressure he had decided not to run in 1968 for at least in part the reasons I gave why he should not run. We also discussed the ugly mood the country was in and how tragic all of this was. He told me that he would like to see me accept the request made that I coordinate the Johnson 1968 New Hampshire primary effort and that it was important, because of the poor relationship he had with the President, to keep lines of communication between the Johnson people and the Kennedy people as open as possible. He saw Larry O'Brien and I as the two people likely to be able to keep this gap bridged. It was a very pleasant and long conversation and took place in his Senate office. I subsequently

[-65-]

told the President, fine, I would do it.

Well, you know the outcome and I don't have to go into that. In all my years of association with the Kennedy family and the Kennedy people, never was our relationship anything but open and friendly. There was an exception to this during the 1968 presidential primary. Bill Dunfey and I, close friends for many years and the two people from New Hampshire closest to the Kennedys, had discussed the primary and I asked Bill for his help. He told me that because of the pressure of family business he could not participate in any way. I later discovered that he was indeed very active as an adviser to the Gene McCarthy effort in New Hampshire. I concluded, rightly or wrongly, that he would not be doing this without encouragement from Robert Kennedy. Considering my conversation with Bob already referred to, I felt left out on a limb. This feeling was further expanded when Ted Sorensen came to New Hampshire during that primary and despite our friendship of over 12 years did not even give me a call. That was the trip Ted made to New Hampshire to say that Robert Kennedy was not a New Hampshire primary candidate. In other words, communications were nil. In the meantime we were developing a good statewide organization to get out a large write-in vote for President Johnson. Despite large sums of money we knew the McCarthy people were spending, their campaign did not appear to be generating much support. There were four turning points in that campaign. The first was the President's refusal to be an announced candidate which meant a write-in campaign and even more seriously prevented us from limiting the number of candidates for delegate and alternate favorable to President Johnson. This resulted in the vote being badly split up. Secondly was the Tet Offensive with the tremendous loss of life that brought the horror of the war home to every American. The third was the pledge card we were using which the McCarthy people exploited by saying it was something improper which it surely wasn't. The fourth was a disagreement late in the campaign with Governor King taking a hard line and Senator McIntyre a much softened line on the war issue. I just couldn't visualize New Hampshire supporting Senator McCarthy. I did not have a high regard for him as a result of my Washington days and considered him as lazy and ineffective. I was also aware of his antagonism toward the Kennedys going back to the 1960 Democratic Convention. I couldn't see Kennedy Democrats supporting Gene McCarthy. Looking back on it, I don't think New Hampshire Democrats were really voting for McCarthy as much as they were voting against President Johnson. In any event, I read the public sentiment incorrectly. Referring back to the four turning points in the campaign, a factor that should not be overlooked were the tens of thousands of young people from college campuses all over the country who furnished the

[-66-]

manpower for the McCarthy effort. They were tremendously effective as events proved. One thing that I've regretted ever since, that right after the New Hampshire primary was over and Robert Kennedy made his announcement that he would seek the Democratic presidential nomination, Sorensen called me up one night and asked me to go to Indiana to help in the Robert Kennedy effort there. At that point I was tired, frankly sick of politics, not feeling well physically and angry because I felt neither Robert Kennedy nor Ted Sorensen had been completely fair and open with me during the New Hampshire primary. I told Ted in no uncertain terms that I would not go to Indiana for him or anyone else and told him why. Now, with 20/20 hindsight I sure wish I had gone.

HACKMAN: First, can you give me even an approximate date on the conversation that you had with Robert Kennedy when you went up in '67? Spring or even in summer?

BOUTIN: It was late summer.

HACKMAN: Late summer.

BOUTIN: Yeah.

HACKMAN: He didn't give you any feedback at that point on whether he was—well obviously, he...

BOUTIN: As explained, he said he was not going to run in 1968.

HACKMAN: What had happened in New Hampshire in the meantime? Was it really the war, or was it.... Was Bill Dunfey's resignation important, or what was it that changed the Party organization?

BOUTIN: Well, a lot of things had happened. I didn't realize their significance. Frances Adams, the National Committeewoman at the time I was National Committeeman, died. J. Murray Devine at forty-nine had a heart attack and died. The Democratic organization that had my personal stamp on it and the Kennedy stamp had, in fact, changed. There was a miscalculation on my part of the effect of the war; people were strongly against it. A large influx of people from out of state had changed the profile of the Party as well. Many of us, including me, misread the depth of antagonism against the President that had built up because of the war.

In my own mind I would want to say, Larry, I was convinced as early as January of '68 that President Johnson was not going

[-67-]

to run.

HACKMAN: In the year or so that you were at OEO, do you remember contacts with Robert Kennedy on OEO matters?

BOUTIN: Yes.

HACKMAN: What kind of things?

BOUTIN: Very pleasant contacts. Questions he had on what was going on in New York. We had huge programs going on in Bedford-Stuyvesant, in Harlem,

in Upper New York State. In every one of these he had a huge interest and wanted to know who the people were and what they were doing, and who was the person responsible. At a hearing one day before a Senate committee—this is an indication of the kind of guy he was—he came in and took a seat with the other senators and sent me down a pleasant little note of how glad he was to see me there. It was just a very friendly, very cordial relationship.

HACKMAN: There were no particular problems then.

BOUTIN: Oh, never.

HACKMAN: No impossible complaints or anything like that.

BOUTIN: Never.

HACKMAN: You'd mentioned earlier today, to skip back to something else, the problem of the Harvard overseers. Was that only after the assassination?

BOUTIN: No, it was before as well. It was so difficult to get these people, at least in my opinion, to really understand how important the Kennedy Library was going to be. You see, at that point, we were thinking of this still young man, having been through two terms as President, full of get up and go, loving Harvard as he did, with lots of activity, with people from foreign lands coming to visit and so forth. Gee, the Harvard people kind of looked at us as ho-hum, you know, so what's new. I'll tell you at St. Michael's [St. Michael's College] we'd love to have it.

HACKMAN: Recall anything at all that you could see about Robert Kennedy's relationship with Sarge... [Interruption]

BOUTIN: I never detected anything but a pretty

[-68-]

good relationship with Robert Kennedy, but Sarge was a Shriver not a Kennedy and therefore not as close as the three Kennedy brothers. Sarge had no inferiority complex about it, he felt pretty secure in his own right. So I think the relationship just was different than between the Kennedys themselves. Sarge, of course, at Peace Corps was a tremendous success. He wasn't quite so successful at OEO, but golly, at Peace Corps he did a fantastic job.

HACKMAN: Do you remember conversations with President Johnson as to what his opinion was of how Robert Kennedy felt about him and why? Or how even to handle the problem of the friction?

BOUTIN: President Johnson just felt that Robert Kennedy disliked him and that

there was no room for reconciliation. He regarded it as a contest between LBJ and RFK. I repeat that I think that was the fault to a large extent of the staff. It was very difficult for some of us who did stay on with the Johnson Administration to bridge that gap. We almost had to lead two lives in order to do it. We were constantly reminded of it by some of the people around Johnson.

HACKMAN: Well, would you say it was primarily the responsibility though of the Johnson staff as opposed to the Kennedy staff?

BOUTIN: Both.

HACKMAN: Both.

BOUTIN: Both. There was a strained, hostile relationship that was just very unfortunate and terribly deep-seated. The Johnson people particularly were very suspicious of the Kennedy people or anyone having Kennedy friendships.

HACKMAN: Did the way that you operated at GSA or the way the White House operated vis-à-vis GSA change with President Johnson as opposed to the way it had been with President Kennedy?

BOUTIN: Yes, it did because I think President Johnson because of his long, long experience in government recognized GSA as a sensitive agency, and he knew the agency much better than he knew me. So he wanted to know to a much greater extent what was going on at GSA than President Kennedy did. President Kennedy's instructions to me were to clean out the deadwood, get good people in there, make sure they're honest, and keep the agency out of trouble. He wanted it a

[-69-]

place of vitality as well. There was not even remotely any interference. Nor was there under the Johnson Administration, but he wanted to know a lot more of what was going on.

HACKMAN: Okay, in terms of problems on corruption or however you would call it, did you ever find that you had much of a problem in that regard once you got your people in, or are there any regional offices that create problems for you that you've got to get rid of people in?

BOUTIN: We had a few such problems where we had to get rid of people—people who didn't use their heads, as an example, and accepted gratuitous airplane trips or entertainment. But not much of this at all. I had a couple of men in Transportation [Transportation and Public Utilities Division] who spent a weekend out in Chesapeake Bay on a contractor's yacht. But we took disciplinary action very, very quickly. We just didn't fool around with things like that at all.

HACKMAN: Any particular political problems on the regional office level with people who just weren't doing their job that you had a problem getting rid of because of local political support to senators?

BOUTIN: This could be a problem, but I followed a policy of going up to the Hill and talking with the appropriate senator or congressman and telling him what the facts were, and I never had one case where I wasn't told, "Well, you use your judgment and go ahead and do it."

HACKMAN: I can't really think of other things that I want to go into other than that final question I had just on if you can think of things in comparing John and Robert Kennedy's personalities that we haven't brought out that are clear to you.

BOUTIN: Well, there's one thing that I was hoping that we'd get into just a bit because I think it's very helpful in viewing Mrs. Kennedy during this time. You remember that the Blair-Lee House had been the temporary residence of President Truman when they redid the White House and had been used for many, many years as the domicile of visiting dignitaries, visiting presidents or royalty and so forth. That had fallen into incredible disrepair. Mrs. Kennedy thought that this was a national shame that we were entertaining people of that caliber in buildings where the wallpaper was torn off the walls in places, where light fixtures didn't work, where the plumbing went back to the dark ages.

HACKMAN: The reason I didn't ask about that is because you

[-70-]

did discuss that to some extent in the first interview.

BOUTIN: Oh, I did. Okay. But you know her interest was huge. The same thing with Lafayette Square. I remember going to the White House a number of times. We'd go downstairs and just lay out all the plans on the floor and look at them on our hands and knees. "Well, I like this. Well, I don't like that." She had just a great interest.

HACKMAN: Was there much of a problem when John Warnecke [John Carl Warnecke] became involved and the old plans were sort of put aside and new plans...

BOUTIN: Well, John Warnecke really was a White House selection and the only one all the time that I was at GSA. But this was in the front yard of the White House and obviously the White House had a great interest. I never, very frankly, was terribly impressed with Warnecke, but the fellow I was impressed with was a young man who worked for him by the name of Harold Adams [Harold L. Adams], an

extremely creative architect. We put an office for Harold Adams right in one of the old buildings at Lafayette Square. The concepts that John Warnecke has taken credit for and been given credit for actually belonged to Harold Adams.

HACKMAN: I hadn't heard that. That's good to know. Well, I've probably about tired you out. That's about as...

BOUTIN: I can't think of anything.

HACKMAN: That's just all I have. Well, if you come down to the Library at some point... [Interruption] Why don't we add some additional comments about the New Hampshire primary?

BOUTIN: In the '64 New Hampshire presidential primary while we hoped to do very well for the Robert Kennedy write-in, actually the results were way beyond our expectations. The margin between Johnson's vote for President of twenty-nine and Robert Kennedy's vote for Vice President on a write-in of twenty-five—was actually very close. It really spoke very eloquently about the mood of the people. While he never told me so directly, I heard indirectly from people on the Johnson staff that the President was just furious that this had occurred and felt that he was being boxed in and was being forced to accept Robert Kennedy as his running mate in the presidential election.

HACKMAN: One thing you mentioned was that it was always

[-71-]

difficult to establish your loyalty to the—for people in general, Kennedy people to establish their loyalty to President Johnson and his Administration or however you want to phrase it. Can you remember from your own experience or what you know of other people's experience sort of tests that were given to people to meet? How do you finally get to the point where he at least has enough confidence in you so you can operate comfortably with him?

BOUTIN: If you were in any way identified with the Kennedys, you were told, "We only want people around us that are absolutely loyal to the Johnsons. We're depending upon people who are going to be with us through thick and thin. This kind of thing. I'm sure the President didn't know this. He never said anything like this to me. Mr. Johnson himself was never less than very gracious and kind to me.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

[-72-]

Bernard L. Boutin Oral History Transcript – JFK #2
Name List

A

Adams, Frances, 67
Adams, Harold L., 71
Angel, Herbert E., 34
April, Paul G., 30

Cotton, Norris, 35, 38, 39
Craig, William H., 29, 30
Cunningham, Mary, 7
Curley, James M., 30
Curnane, Joseph A., 17-19

B

Bagley, J. Leo, 29, 30
Bailey, John Moran, 20, 21, 24, 25, 53, 54
Barkan, Alexander E., 15, 54
Barron, William W., 39
Bass, Perkins, 51
Batt, William L., Jr., 37
Beck, David D., 15
Beland, Albert L., 11
Bell, David E., 37
Benoit, Josaphat T., 14
Birmingham, Michael J., 18
Boggs, Thomas Hale, Sr., 8
Boland, Edward P., 33, 35
Boutin, Alice M., 27
Bowles, Chester B., 8, 9, 28
Bownes, Hugh Henry, 59, 60
Breslin, Thomas H., 15
Breuer, Marcel Lajos, 40-42
Bridges, H. Styles, 2, 22, 35, 50
Brooks, Jack Bascom, 38, 39
Brown, Edmund G. "Pat", 17, 24, 25
Bucci, John, 51
Butler, Paul M., 5-7, 9-11, 25, 53, 61
Byrd, Robert C., 39
Byrne, John E. "Jeb", 45

D

D'Alesandro, Thomas, Jr., 19
Daly, Robert T., 40
Davies, Dorothy, 34
Dempsey, John Noel, 21, 22
DeSapio, Carmine G., 7, 20
Desjardins, Helen A., 11
Devine, J. Murray, 4, 13, 29, 67
Dion, Royal, 29, 30
DiSalle, Michael V., 31
Dodd, Thomas J., 22
Donahue, Richard K., 20
Donnelly, Helene R., 11
Douglas, Paul H., 38
Duchessie, Bill, 15
Dunfey, Walter James, 62
Dunfey, William L. 4, 6, 13, 14, 27, 29, 30, 52, 58-61, 64, 66, 67
Dutton, Frederick G., 24, 25
Dwinell, Seymour Lane, 2

E

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 3, 31, 32, 46, 47
Ellender, Allen J., 35

C

Caplin, Mortimer H., 28
Carr, James K., 43
Carter, Clifton C., 58
Castro, Fidel, 32
Catalfo, Alfred J., Jr., 11, 14
Champaigne, Romeo J., 30
Chavez, Dennis, 39
Church, Frank, 8
Clauson, Clinton A., 22, 45
Coffin, Frank M., 22
Collins, Thomas LeRoy, 8
Connell, Maurice J., 34
Conrad, Robert B., 34
Corbin, Paul, 54, 55, 62

F

Fenn, Dan H., Jr., 1, 7, 23
Floete, Franklin G., 32
Forbes, Fred A., 14, 30
Ford, Henry, 48
Ford, Henry, II, 48
French, Basil, 15
Fuller, Alvan Tufts, 27, 28

G

Gatov, Elizabeth Rudel, 7, 24
Giderian, John, 15
Glaser, Samuel, 40
Goodman, Philip H., 18, 19

Gordon, Kermit, 37
Grady, Joseph Harold, 18
Gravel, Camille F., Jr., 7, 8
Gray, Georgia Neese, 7
Green, William J., 22, 31
Greenberg, Howard, 34
Griffin, Robert T., 33
Gronouski, John A., 40
Groover, Denmark, Jr., 10
Grover, Wayne C., 46, 47
Gwirtzman, Milton S., 54

H

Halleck, Charles A., 46
Harriman, William Averell, 3, 20, 56, 57
Hart, Nick, 11
Hayden, Carl T., 49, 50
Heckscher, August, 44
Hoover, J. Edgar, 49
Hoover, Herbert, 32, 45, 46
Horsky, Charles A., 44
Humphrey, George Magoffin, 32
Humphrey, Hubert H., 18, 19
Hunter, Leonard, 40

J

Jackson, Henry M. "Scoop", 25
Janelle, Louis M., 30
Jefferson, Thomas, 26
Jenkins, Kenneth A., 11
Jenkins, Walter W., 56
Johnson, Lyndon B., 7, 9, 30, 55, 56, 58-67, 69-72

K

Kefauver, Estes, 2, 3, 29
Kelley, Emmett J., 30
Kennedy, Edward M., 17, 33, 58, 69
Kennedy, John F., 2-31, 33, 35-38, 41-46, 49-61, 63-70, 72
Kennedy, Joseph P., Sr., 13
Kennedy, Robert F., 3, 5, 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 54-59, 61-71
Kennedy, Rose Fitzgerald, 13, 16, 17
Kenny, John V., 21
King, John W., 51, 64-66
Klotz, Herbert W., 42
Kraft, John F., 52

L

Larson, Jess, 32
Lawford, Patricia Kennedy, 17
Lawson, B. Knott, Jr., 33, 56
Lazzaro, Paul, 33
Lee, Blair, III, 19
Lehman, Herbert H., 46
Loeb, William, 2, 4, 12, 13
Loveless, Herschel Celler, 8
Luckman, Charles, 40, 42
Lynch, John M. "Pat", 20

M

MacArthur, Douglas, 47
MacDonald, Torbert H., 17, 19
MacMillan, Bill, 18
Magnuson, Warren G., 35, 44, 56
Maguire, Richard, 20, 22, 30, 52, 54
Mahoney, George P., 19
Manchester, William, 57
Mansure, Edmund F., 32
Mantel, Louis, 16
McCarthy, Eugene J., 13, 66, 67
McCormack, John William, 35
McDevitt, James L., 15
McDonald, David J., 28
McIntyre, Thomas J., 2, 29, 50, 51, 64-66
McNamara, Robert S., 56
Meyner, Robert B., 21, 24
Mies van der Rohe, Ludwig, 40
Mitchell, Donald, 7
Moody, Joe E., 34
Moore, John L., 30, 31, 35
Moriarty, Joseph, 15
Morrisey, Francis X., 5
Moyers, William D., 60
Murphy, Maurice J., Jr., 50
Murray, Henry F., 15, 16
Muskie, Edmund S., 22, 62

N

Napolitan, Joseph, 52
Nixon, Richard M., 65

O

O'Brien, Lawrence F., 5, 13, 14, 16, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 35, 36, 45, 55, 64, 65
O'Donnell, Kenneth P., 5, 13, 14, 16, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 37, 52, 55, 56, 60
Oliver, James C., 22

Onassis, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, 10, 26, 55-58, 60, 70, 71
O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr., 33
Otenasek, Mildred, 7, 18
Owings, Nathaniel A., 40

P

Pastore, John O., 20
Pearson, Drew, 32
Perleman, Phillip B., 8
Phillips, Vel R., 9
Pillsbury, John, 51
Pitarys, Thomas J., 15, 16
Pollack, James H., 19
Powell, Wesley, 50
Powers, Minot L., Jr., 16

Q

Quayle, Oliver, 52

R

Randolph, Jennings, 39
Rayburn, Samuel T., 7
Reardon, Timothy J., Jr., 3, 5
Ribicoff, Abraham A., 20, 21, 24
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 46
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 43, 45, 46
Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 42
Rusk, Dean, 60

S

Salinger, Pierre E.G., 26, 28, 52
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 44
Schulz, Robert L., 46, 47
Shaine, Robert, 62
Shaw, John, 2, 4, 11
Shriver, Eunice Kennedy, 17
Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., 20, 29, 68, 69
Smith, Alfred E., 30
Smith, Jean Kennedy, 17
Smith, Stephen E., 18, 20, 55
Sorensen, Theodore C., 2, 14, 66, 67
Sprecher, Drexel A., 6
Staats, Elmer B., 37
Stassen, Harold E., 31
Stevenson, Adlai E., 2, 7, 24, 46
Stone, Edward Durell, 40
Sullivan, John L., 64
Symington, Stuart, II, 11, 12, 61

T

Taft, Robert A., 3
Tawes, J. Millard, 18
Thomas, Albert, 35, 44, 56, 60
Truman, Harry S., 3, 7, 45, 47, 70
Turnure, Pamela, 56
Turpin, William P., 34
Tydings, Joseph D., 18, 20

U

Udall, Stewart L., 43
Unruh, Jesse M., 25

V

Vinson, Carl, 35
von Eckardt, Wolf, 40, 41

W

Wagner, Robert F., 20
Walton, William, 44
Warnecke, John Carl, 40, 71
Warren, Earl, 57
Watson, Marvin, 65
Weaver, Robert C., 42
Webb, Delbert Eugene "Del", 42
Weisl, Edwin, Sr., 59
Wilentz, David T., 21
Williams, G. Mennen "Soapy", 9
Wilson, Charles E., 32

Y

Yamasaki, Minoru, 40
Yasko, Karel H., 39, 40

Z

Ziffren, Paul, 7, 17, 24