

**John A. Carver, Jr. Oral History Interview – JFK#3, 09/11/1969**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** John A. Carver, Jr.  
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**Biographical Note**

Carver was Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Public Lands Management from 1961 to 1964, Under Secretary of the Interior from 1965 to 1966, and Commissioner of the Federal Power Commission from 1966 to 1972. In this interview he discusses federal regulation of the Alaska Railroad, including rates and personnel; the debate over congressional oversight versus executive prerogatives in acquiring areas for the National Park Service; the interaction between the Department of the Interior and then First Lady Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis to preserve the White House as a monument; and the management style of Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall, among other issues.

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John A. Carver, Jr. – JFK #3

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Third Oral History Interview

With

JOHN A. CARVER, JR.

September 11, 1969  
Washington, D.C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right, Mr. Carver, I would like to go through a bureau by bureau review of legislation and events that happened during the Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] Administration. And I think I'd like to start with the Alaska Railroad. There are a couple of things. First of all, there were two bills that I ran across in the research. One was Senate 2593, the Alaska Railroad Personnel Bill. And, as I recall, this was a question of how far civil service provisions, personnel regulations, apply to people who are employed on the Alaska Railroad. Now, the first question that

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I have on this is where did the pressure for extending civil service provisions to the Alaska Railroad people come from? Do you recall?

CARVER: They were under the civil service, as I recall. The pressures were rather contrary.

MOSS: Well, specifically, I'm thinking in terms of the application of flat seniority as opposed to seniority with experience, the question of collective

bargaining, the business of veterans' preference. Evidently, this Senate bill was designed to preserve these features for the Alaska Railroad people, and there was some question that they were in jeopardy, either by civil service regulations or something else.

CARVER: Well, that's the way it was. As a practical matter, I guess the railroad had operated sort of on its own railroad scheme which had been accommodated as best they could to the civil service rules, but I don't think the accommodations satisfied the civil service people, and particularly, they had some problems when they tried to apply the provisions of the veterans' preference act. As a result, from time to time, they were seeking legislation which would, in effect, allow them to keep

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on running it as a railroad rather than to running it under the strict civil service rules.

MOSS: Okay. Who sought the legislation?

CARVER: The railroad did.

MOSS: The railroad did.

CARVER: The railroad did because the railroad was under quite severe pressure both from within the Department itself and also by way of some law suits and compensation claims and other kinds of things from the outside through the courts.

MOSS: Okay. And the civil service situation put these claims in jeopardy, did it?

CARVER: Well, the civil service situation, the strict laws to federal employees treated the employees somewhat differently than the railroad had been treating them. And this naturally created some very severe operating problems to the railroad. They felt they couldn't operate the railroad efficiently under the rules as they were to be applied or as they would be normally applied in a normal civil service situation. I'm not as familiar in retrospect as, I guess, I was at the time about it. And, as to who exactly put forth the bill, as I recall, there was kind of close

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cooperation between Senator Bartlett [Edward Lewis Bartlett] and the railroad people up there.

MOSS: So it came that way rather than through the Department?

CARVER: Oh yes, yes. The Department—I think when we got there, we got a little bit more sympathetic with the railroad than I think the previous

administration had been and tried to work it out, but the bill didn't ever have any chance.

MOSS: It didn't. Why was that?

CARVER: Well, you don't take on the whole Veterans' Preference Act by way of getting an exception to one little outfit like the Alaska Railroad without getting an awful lot of other people upset about it, the veterans' organizations and so forth.

MOSS: There was that much of an exception in the bill, was there? Because it was my understanding that the bill preserved the features, at least, of veterans' preference.

CARVER: Well, what you'll find in some of the other bureaus is "foot in the door" syndrome. This is psychological more than anything else, the reaction to it.

MOSS: And this was, in effect, what killed the bill?

CARVER: Sure.

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MOSS: Okay. Now, another bill that came up was the economic regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. And evidently there were users or competitive carriers who felt that the Secretary and the general manager of the railroad shouldn't be the last arbiter of rates on the railroad.

CARVER: Well, I was strongly of that opinion myself. The Alaska Railroad is the main line transportation agency in Alaska, and being a government railroad with the power to fix (and largely un-reviewed power) had within its grasp the economic life and death of a lot of other aspects of the Alaskan economy. Oh, to give you an example, a cheap rate on fabricated culverts would, you know, look like a good idea, but it would stifle a fabrication business ever getting a foothold in Alaska. You bring in a fabricated culvert on the cheap through rate from Seattle, then you can't get an outfit that can buy, you know, the flat steel and make the culverts in Alaska. That's just a kind of a homely example of what kind of power the rate-fixing authority can have, can exert, in a new state like that. I felt, strongly felt, that

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it was absolutely requisite to remove the final arbitration or the final judgment on economic matters away from the agency which had such a stake in it. I thought it was good

government. The opposition to that bill was a purely doctrinaire kind of opposition from within the Budget Bureau. The school of thought over there was that this was in the executive function, that the proposed recipient of the authority, the ICC [Interstate Commerce Commission], was quasi-legislative and that no executive powers should be given to a non-executive agency.

MOSS: Yes, I was going to ask you about this because in your testimony you said that if the Congress were to meddle with executive privilege in this case, it would be a breach of the division of powers amongst the branches, but that the reassignment or the re-delegation of power didn't jeopardize that power itself.

CARVER: Well, that was what we worked out right at that hearing. It was one of the few times when legislation was effected right square in the middle of a hearing

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on it because I went up and, in the course of a colloquy with Senator Bartlett with the Budget Bureau sitting there, I said, "Well, Mr. Seidman [Harold Seidman] may be right, you know, as a straight governmental proposition, but I can't see why the President, who's got authority over this thing, couldn't delegate his functions to another agency—he's done a lot of others—to the ICC." And so Senator Bartlett said—it's so many years ago, I may not be remembering it accurately, it's all in the record—he said, "What about that, Mr. Seidman?" And Mr. Seidman said, "Well, yes, that would work." So eventually that's what we did.

MOSS: So it was almost a semantic conceptual thing.

CARVER: Well, to those people who care about this sort of thing, protecting the executive prerogatives, many things are just semantic. President Kennedy had that problem in more places than this.

MOSS: Do you remember any other examples of it that would be interesting?

CARVER: Well, I suppose the principal one would be in the District of Columbia government proposition which I

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was only kind of peripherally aware of, but that was at the heart of the whole thing there, the question of the presidential appointive power and so on.

MOSS: Over the Commissioners, the District Commissioners.

CARVER: Over District Commissioners.

MOSS: Now, do you recall who brought up the legislation on the regulation of the rates?

CARVER: Oh, I think the Department did...

MOSS: The Department did.

CARVER: ...for the railroad.

MOSS: For the railroad. Where in the Department did it originate? (The idea)

CARVER: With the railroad.

MOSS: With the railroad. And then it came up to the general manager in Alaska...

CARVER: Well, the general manager in Alaska and the railroad are, you know...

MOSS: Synonymous.

CARVER: ...synonymous in these terms.

MOSS: Right. And then it came to your office at the Department?

CARVER: Yes.

MOSS: And the legislation was drafted there, was it?

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CARVER: Oh, I don't recall that. I assume that it was reworked. I'm sure the original draft must have been done in Alaska. I have no way of knowing that.

MOSS: And then reworked at your office and again in the Congress.

CARVER: Sure. Well, actually nothing was ever passed in the Congress. It was all eventually handled by a delegation from the President.

MOSS: How so? I didn't get to that in the research.

CARVER: Well, I think that thing was handled by Executive Order.

MOSS: Ah ha.

CARVER: In other words, legislation became unnecessary in terms of a delegation

from the president of the economic regulation which we had been exercising. That was delegated to the ICC.

MOSS: I see. So Congress didn't get into it at all.

CARVER: So Congress didn't have to get into it. We got the same results without legislation.

MOSS: Right. As a result of your confabulation with the Congress.

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CARVER: As a result of that colloquy there in the Senate.

MOSS: Do you recall any pressure to shift from public to private control of the railroad?

CARVER: No, there never was any pressure of that kind. I looked into that immediately upon becoming assistant secretary, and there would be no way for any private outfit to repay the government for its investment. In terms of the pressure upon the United States treasury, the railroad was paying its operating expenses—it wasn't paying its depreciation, but at least it wasn't costing the taxpayers any money currently. They weren't getting the amortization of the investment of forty years before back, but there'd be absolutely no basis, no sense really, to sell the railroad. It was being efficiently run and under circumstances which, at least during my tenure in office, were pretty much immune from any of those old criticisms that say, you know, let's get back to private enterprise. That old battle was long since gone.

MOSS: Was there any question of preferred treatment for certain users or any attempt by users to get preferred

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treatment in the way of rates and things?

CARVER: Well, all users try to get preferred treatment, and the statutes provided certain preferred users, namely the United States of America.

MOSS: Yes, the Defense Department and so forth.

CARVER: But I'm very proud of the way that railroad was operated on a strictly competitive basis, at the same time being fair to other modes such as the highways and so on. It was during our administration, for example, that we got these containerization and these through sea trains and that sort of thing. And it really revolutionized the whole business just during those three or four years.

MOSS: You didn't have any people trying to make end runs around the regulations, did you?

CARVER: Oh, sure we did, all the time, of course.

MOSS: Nothing that you couldn't handle?

CARVER: I suppose if we thought about it, we'd have thought we couldn't handle it, but we handled it all.

MOSS: Okay, fine, I won't probe that anymore. I'd like you to chat a minute or two about the two general managers who were out there during your administration, Donald J. Smith and John E. Manley, how you remember

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them and what they did and that sort of thing.

CARVER: Don Smith was the general manager when we came in. He was a direct action, forceful, kind of up-through-the-ranks sort of railroader who'd been sent up there under an arrangement whereby we were supposed to get our presidents on a kind of a borrowing basis from the carriers, and then they'd go back to their companies. One of the first decisions we had to reach within the first two or three weeks of the administration was whether to continue that practice, which was basically non-political, or whether we should yield to the understandable political pressures of the Democratic senators to get their political friends into that office. And, an early recommendation that I made to Udall [Stewart L. Udall] is that that was a very sensible kind of arrangement and we should keep it. And we did. Senator Gruening [Ernest Gruening] raised hell about it.

MOSS: In what ways?

CARVER: Well, he never stopped, whatever ways were available to him. I'm sure he must have talked to high officials at the White House about it—may have talked to the

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President about it—because he was absolutely outraged that any Republican was still in office after three or four weeks of 1961, you know....

MOSS: Well, how did this get back down to you at the Department if it had gone to the White House?

CARVER: Oh, we'd hear from that immediately. We'd hear from Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan] or the people over at the White House. They'd call up and say, "Gruening says so and so." Those guys over there were excellent, you know. You'd tell them, you know, this is the way to run the thing; this is what we've decided; and once in awhile they'd disagree, but, basically, they wanted the thing to run right. So we were backed up by the White House on this kind of thing, basically by just not ever letting it get up to the point of a direct confrontation. Anyway, we kept Smith on there until his time came for him to go back. And he was a good operator; he'd brought the railroad up to—oh, he'd improved it and done a lot of things of an operational nature. But the problems were principally political with a small "p." It was a matter of the relationships with all of the other government agencies

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and with the users and with the state legislature and the governor and that sort of thing.

So when we had to replace him, then, we were kind of caught up in our own principles. The question came: should we, you know, ask the Association of American Railroads to get us another general manager? But by this time it was pretty clear that John Manley, who'd been the number two man up there, was just a natural for it, and nobody was really against him. I don't think Gruening was for him, but Bartlett was for him, as I recall. But at any rate, we just kind of quietly promoted him. And, of course, he's still running it. He's one of the very, very best government servants I ever ran into; he is really a topflight citizen. His performance after that Alaska earthquake, for example, should have earned him the highest civilian award that the government could give. Of course, it didn't because there were a lot of other people who were involved in that disaster.

But his skills were more attuned to what the then needs of the railroad were. They weren't operational any more except when the disaster came, and they had to do with kind of protecting the railroad's position

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with reference to the Defense Department who wanted to, you know, put in their own pipeline when he could demonstrate that that didn't make economic sense—or at least he could get his point across that there was an interest in keeping that railroad operating from the Defense standpoint as well as the interior standpoint. The loss of the coal load to heat Elmendorf Field, for example, is a battle which eventually was lost, but we made it clear that if you switched to natural gas the Defense Department had to consider the loss of revenue to the railroad because it was still part of the government. Even though you might have a cheaper fuel bill, if you had the social cost or the economic cost of a bunch of miners being out of work, or the railroad having to charge all the rest of the users a lot of increased rates to keep up with their costs, why, this was a cost to be measured against it. So, John Manley, as I say, is still there, but I can't say too much about him. He's a very, very outstanding manager, perfectly capable of running the biggest railroad in the country.

MOSS: Fine. Is there anything else about the Alaska

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Railroad that we haven't covered at this point that you'd like to put in the record?

CARVER: Well, a person ought to have a footnote somewhere about its problems with the Machinists Union and some of the internal politics within the Department about collective bargaining, but I'm not familiar enough with it to go into that. But in the whole question of government relationships with organized labor, with collective bargaining within government units by somebody, that's worth following up because there's quite a little story there.

MOSS: Who would be a good person to talk to on this or to...

CARVER: Well, you'll get different sides of the story from different people. Ted Fitch [Edwin M. Fitch], who's now retired from the railroad, knows a great deal about it; John Manley does; the man from the Machinists Union—I can't remember his name, I'll try to supply it to you; Otis Beasley [D. Otis Beasley], who was Administrative Assistant Secretary. They'll be able to tell you quite a bit about this. There is a book, by the

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way, on the Alaska Railroad by the Praeger Company that Ted Fitch authored which has got a lot of background on this.

MOSS: Good. Okay, if we've got nothing more on the Alaska Railroad, I'd like to move along to the National Park Service and park development and open up that whole can of worms.

CARVER: Well, I'm afraid that's going to take more than the balance of our hour today.

MOSS: Well, I'm sure that it will, and if so, I'd like to arrange other sessions.

CARVER: Sure.

MOSS: I'd like to start off with the seashore bills and, first of all, the Cape Cod Seashore Bill which had begun before the Kennedy Administration, I noticed some rather uncharitable references to it as a playground for President Kennedy. Did this give you much static?

CARVER: No, we didn't have anything except sort of conversational static on it. I guess the fairest thing to say about that particular issue is that it's one of

the first things President Kennedy really wanted, you know, to get done.  
And Stewart Udall was a very

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bright man, and he saw immediately just exactly, what this could mean to him and his Department to get through all this kind of delay and local problems and that sort of thing that existed up in Massachusetts and get it through. And so he took the leadership, as he properly should have, and got that Cape Cod bill through very early; I guess—I think it was in April or something like that. I had much less, to do with that particular one than with many of the others because the Secretary, very properly, was using this to establish, you know, that he could get things done and he could be responsive and also get this kind of conservation foothold as a political issue. So he made it a thing of his own office.

MOSS:                So he made it a thing of his own office rather than relying on your office to provide the power for it.

CARVER:            Yes, yes. This is—of course, we were all new, but in the very early years of the Administration, Mr. Udall focused pretty heavily on Park matters. Later he got into the other matters. You know, a Secretary kind of, as with a big department like that, from time to time can be his own Commissioner of Indian Affairs or time to time he can be his own Commissioner

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of Reclamation or time to time he can be his own Park Service Director. And as he takes command, why then, of course, there's plenty of things for the rest of us to do, we'll kind of pull back away from that. I always felt that I shouldn't, you know, try to duplicate any of the Secretary's work. If he wanted to be active in one of my bureaus, I had plenty of others to work with so that, particularly when I was assistant secretary, that was a good working relationship.

MOSS:                How did he let you know that there was something he was interested in?

CARVER:            Oh, Stewart at the very early time would have these evening meetings which you've no doubt run into. We'd have these big sessions and they would give you the general line of his interest. You could tell what he was interested in. He never was very orderly really in delegating or lining things out. You just had to kind of feel and adjust to what he was working at, help him out.

MOSS:                You'd suddenly see a couple members of his staff working on something and...

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CARVER: Well, it was.... In those early days, much more than later, he ran things on kind of a town meeting basis. He had everybody that had any remote connection with something in these big sessions. So it wasn't like, you know, sending the Secretary's office supers down into affairs. He wasn't that way. It got to be that way somewhat—it always gets to be that way later. But there was a very good morale about this whole thing in those early years.

MOSS: Do you have any trouble later with the whole business of condemnation and acquisition on the Cape?

CARVER: Well, yes, we had a great deal of problems about that. You know, this is a very sensitive area, and those people are pretty independent minded and pretty articulate and pretty ornery sometimes. We selected a very good man—I think, as I recall, it was Jim Meyers, but it might have been somebody else—to kind of go up there as the first superintendent. And he did a real good job in kind of keeping this thing within manageable proportions. Once there was a kind of a little flurry of problems arising out of who was selected to do the appraising, and there were some political

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charges that there was a little bit of favoritism. As far as I know, there may have been some bad judgment made by some of the lower officials, you know, trying to get the law firm that's known to be associated with the Kennedys or so on. But I think, by and large, we were pretty careful about that sort of thing although there was some flak about that that you'll probably run into.

MOSS: How about some of the subsequent seashore bills? Was there any particular difficulty getting Padre Island and Point Reyes through?

CARVER: Well, I guess in the chronology Point Reyes was....

MOSS: First, I believe.

CARVER: ...was first and...

MOSS: Padre Island was next, the following year.

CARVER: Clem Miller [Clement W. Miller], who was you know, a real mystical kind of a guy, congressman from that area, probably did more for that park by dying than, you know, he'd succeeded in doing as an active congressman. The idea of seashores caught hold. The public kind of grasped the idea that this was a resource which was vanishing. And there was a lot of interest in it

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even though it was pretty clear that these weren't the mass recreational—particularly that Point Reyes wasn't ever going to be a mass recreation area and, furthermore, that it represented some almost insuperable problems of, you know, putting together a kind of a thing which we always thought of as being a national park, you know, having the place for the facilities and that sort of thing. It's really quite an inhospitable area, if you want to get the truth of it, you know, to go visit, it's beautiful, but you should never see it three, four days out of a month.

MOSS: Well, speaking of mass recreation, you had quite a to-do over the Fire Island question. Everybody seemed to be pulling six different ways on that at first.

CARVER: Well, that came much later and that's a pretty good example of what I'm talking about of getting a force at work wanting something where the forces at work opposing it were pretty heavy too, and you had some very strong philosophical problems as to whether the Interior Department ought to be in, you know, basically mass recreation. The Park Service didn't want much to

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do with that. You know, they would take it, but it was regarded more as a kind of a pioneering concept—which the secretary was vastly interested in. But he never did figure out or hadn't thought out at the very start of it exactly how this kind of a thing could be integrated into the Park program.

MOSS: Well, now, if the Park Service didn't want it, who was pushing for it?

CARVER: The Secretary and a lot of people in the area and some congressmen and so on, but the Park Service wasn't enthusiastic about it, you know. It didn't qualify really in terms of what they were interested in doing. But Point Reyes also represented some quite serious problems internally of an administrative nature within the Department because Secretary Udall conceived the idea of trading some of the public lands under Interior administration in other parts of California, and in Oregon, for some of the timber lands which had to be acquired for Point Reyes. And that got to be a huge donnybrook, the details of which it'd take me a while to bring back to mind. But when you get into this whole question of exchanges one public resource under one

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bureau which has its program to serve the interest of another bureau and its program, then you get the classic kind of intra-department rivalries of which—you know, the Interior Department is just rife with them.

The estimates on the cost of acquiring Point Reyes which were made to the Congress in connection with getting the bill passed were just so short of being realistic as to cause continuing problems—and they still exist. You know, the authorized mount of appropriations

were exceeded within a very, very short time, and then they got more money and that was exceeded, and then, as of now, they're going to have to cut back from their original plans. They just never will get the kind of park which the Congress authorized because of a failure to anticipate the kind of escalation in values which goes kind of cumulatively. The creation of the park itself in the area raises values, and then the developer's desire for this kind of location for their projects is a separate force. And the two get together and it just goes out of sight. Those were the principal problems on Point Reyes.

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MOSS: How about Padre Island?

CARVER: Well, to be really candid with you, I never paid a whole hell of a lot of attention to Padre Island. The thing was another one of those which was the Secretary's own kind of private project. And I guess the really honest answer is to say that I just stayed out of that. You'd better talk to other people about that one.

MOSS: You don't know if the Vice-President [Lyndon B. Johnson] had any interest in it, do you?

CARVER: Well, I was about to say that there was a lot of Texas politics involved in that, Yarborough [Ralph W. Yarborough] and the vice-president too, but exactly how it worked I'm just....

MOSS: Okay, let me get on to a couple of failures in the way of seashores. One is the Oregon Dunes. Who was really opposing the thing?

CARVER: Well, the Oregon Dunes represented a—it was a failure. And I suppose if you had to pin the responsibility anywhere, it would have to be on Wayne Morse [Wayne L. Morse], although his heart was in the right place. He insisted upon provisions with reference to the existing owners within the area which were, as it finally, turned

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out, quite unacceptable—you know, kind of an immunity against condemnation and that sort of thing. It would have to be recognized also that the timber companies mounted a pretty good campaign there, and the Forest Service was not enthusiastic about losing any of its area into a national park. They felt, and to some extent properly, that they had a pretty good program for a good deal of the land which was under their jurisdiction. But there's a truism involved in this thing: You're never going to get any national park, any national area, if any major politician, political figure in the area, bucks it. There's only one exception to that that I know about, and it really isn't an exception when you think about it either, and that was Indiana Dunes.

MOSS: I was going to come to that.

CARVER: The only guy who really wanted Indiana Dunes wasn't from Indiana. And because Hartke [Vance Hartke] and Capehart [Homer E. Capehart] and the others, you know, they were for conservation and for preserving and so on, but they were also for the payroll and the steel mill and so on. And I kind of devised that

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as a kind of a rule that you just forget getting a park unless you have the kind of situation where it was acceptable to the principal political leaders of the state. Now Phil Hart [Philip A. Hart] strongly wanted Sleeping Bear and Pictured Rocks and eventually got it because there was no, you know, real opposition to it. There was some in the beginning. Griffin [Robert P. Griffin], before he was in the Senate, was kind of looking after those land owners out there and so on.

But the political business of getting a new national area is just that: it's a political business. It's a kind of a consensual deal. You can't really run it over the top of people. The closest thing we came to running it over the top of anybody was on redwoods and, of course, that was after President Kennedy had left. But still it represented the case study. You know, the people of the United States wanted to preserve those big trees, and enough people in California did, so that you could kind of run it through. But a North Cascades or these others, they'll only succeed if you get, you know, the

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people generally to agree to it. Now, that doesn't mean that they have to be a majority for it.

MOSS: Somewhat along the same lines, Representative Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall] was put on the spot at the conservation conference about the Indiana Dunes, and his response was that it was such a can of worms, in effect, that Congress wasn't equipped to handle it. Congress wasn't the appropriate place to settle the differences.

CARVER: He was saying about the same thing. Of course, Wayne Aspinall was extremely fond of Jack Kennedy. They'd been next door to each other in the House as members, and Kennedy could get things from Aspinall that nobody else could because Aspinall was, he was the "Congressman." He was a kind of a Rayburn [Sam Rayburn] tradition of the prerogatives of the Congress, particularly in the public lands areas, areas involving the jurisdiction of the Congress under the Constitution. In the last days of the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] Administration they had signed an executive order for the C. & O. National...

MOSS: Canal.

CARVER: ... Canal out here. And that piece of the executive

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effrontery, as Aspinall saw it, was a very great burden that Kennedy had to bear for a long time. And, you know, there wasn't anything personal about it. It was because the Congress had been affronted by creating an area by Executive Order when he felt it could only be done by congressional action. Consequently, he used his considerable influence to be sure that his friends on the Appropriations Committee never would give any money for the new area, and it got nowhere for many years.

MOSS: The same kind of thing that's being pulled now with the D.C. subway.

CARVER: Exactly, it's precisely the—except I think there's a.... Well, there's an equivalent Constitutional provision. Just as there's a provision in Article IV about the Congress having the public lands, so there's a provision about the government of the federal district.

MOSS: Back to the Indiana Dunes. What was Ray Madden's [Ray John Madden] role in the thing?

CARVER: Well....

MOSS: He was for the Dunes, wasn't he?

CARVER: He was for the Dunes. As a matter of fact, there

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were several political figures for the Dunes, but I'd be hard pressed to say that I ever had any conversations or direct contact with that particular political aspect of it. I didn't ever take that Indiana Dunes problem very seriously myself. That doesn't mean that I wasn't for it or worked as hard as I could, but it looked to me like it was a losing operation and you could spend your time better on some others. So I can't answer your question as to what his role was. I recall, of course, that he was interested in it, He was comfortably remote from it.

MOSS: Let's move to something quite different. I'll ask you what you recall of Mrs. Kennedy's [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis] efforts to preserve the White House, the artifacts, and making it a national monument, and that sort of thing. How did she get things done?

CARVER: Well, there were certain things in our Department which were always handled directly by the Secretary or through his offices and dealing with Jackie Kennedy was a Udall prerogative. Although I've talked to her two or three times, it was only sort of accidentally

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he wasn't there or something. And she kind of exhibited an interest in making the White House an historic monument. Stewart had the good sense to get interested in it personally and also to put some good people at her disposal. And the thing just kind of kept widening out a little bit, and I consider that it was a fine little operation. But if you want to know how she worked or how people worked with her, I don't know.

MOSS: Or who gave her trouble?

CARVER: No, not even who gave her trouble. I mean, she was always so gracious in any dealings you had with her—the Department would turn handsprings for her, even when she was asking quite irrational things sometimes.

MOSS: Such as?

CARVER: Well, I'd be, I guess, hard pressed to say that she ever really got irrational. About the only thing I can really think of that got us all kind of upset was when she wanted to get the monuments lighted up—the Jefferson Memorial and.... Those Park people had a very funny feeling about not

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having these sound and light kind of flamboyant French type lighting of this thing. So I think she was really a little frustrated in what she wanted to do in that area. But that's the only one I can recall. But I don't think it ever caused any problems with her except it was just a kind of a matter of foot dragging and so on. But she did make some requests sometimes which had to be dealt with with care.

MOSS: Moving back out West again, the Canyonlands, Utah, business and the to-do about the film at Utah State was it or Utah University when they banned the film about the Canyonlands as a piece of Interior propaganda.

CARVER: I can't remember that, but I can remember in a general way that there was an awful lot of lessons in government bureaucracy in Canyonlands. The area is magnificent, and it was, virtually all of it, under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department. And the Bureau of Land Management was trying to get its foot into the recreational door. So quite early in the Administration there was a plan developed which took, oh, a god-awful number of acres in the triangle between

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the Green River and the Colorado but there to be set apart for its recreational potential by just an order of the Secretary because, of course, it was all under Interior Department dominion. I

guess that was one of those situations where you go for the great big thing, and then you finally compromise on something a good deal smaller, and that which you compromise on is more than you would have gotten if you'd started just for that.

Eventually Ted Moss [Frank Edward Moss]... The business of doing this by the stroke of the pen sort of thing then got the Congress affronted, kind of the Aspinall syndrome was involved there. And it became clear that, if we were going to do anything about this, it had to be done legislatively, and so then came the problem of devising a bill. And it was at this stage, of course, that the film was made, and the problem came up about the propaganda and so on. But almost to the surprise of the political people of Utah, it turns out that there was a good deal more sentiment for a park in Utah than any of the politicians had at first guessed. They had been accustomed to think

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of this area as kind of cattlemen-range dominated, and they'd been in somewhat fear and trembling about the political force of these ranchers and so on, mining interests and things like that. And, as it became evident that the people of Utah thought this was a fine idea, the whole thing kind of shifted around, and all of a sudden, you know, the proponents of the park had the advantage. So a bill was passed at virtually no capital cost to the United States of America—that was the only reason you got it. It was all federal land anyway. It was just a matter of shifting its jurisdiction and making some disposition of the few ranchers' grazing permits that were in there. It was virtually free. And it is a magnificent area. But here again, I have to give Udall credit because he spotted these things around and had his timing of these things to get the maximum benefit of whatever political or other forces were at work.

MOSS: Let me climax this interview, since we're getting towards the end of the hour, with the retirements of Messrs. Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth] and Tolson [Hillory A. Tolson]. And let me ask, first of all, they came about the

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same time as the speech you trade at Yosemite in which you came down pretty hard on the Park Service's...

CARVER: Independence.

MOSS: ... independence. Were the retirements settled before you made your speech, or did they come after?

CARVER: The retirements came after. Connie Wirth was an outstanding park director. But I guess that was his problem with Udall because Udall wanted an outstanding park director except when he wanted to be the park director. Then he wanted an outstanding assistant park director. And this was a role that Mr. Wirth didn't accommodate to very well. In other words, Connie didn't see eye to eye with Udall on the creation of a Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. He dragged his feet pretty heavily

on that, and he lost, and it left some scars. Connie had his own constituency, and he wanted to keep his constituency even when it was defecting to go to Udall, who was at that time the bright shining light, you know, in this whole park movement. And Connie had a hard time adjusting to Udall's method of operation

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although it should have, it did lead to a golden era for the parks.

So Udall had conversations with me and, I think, with the President quite early about getting a new park director. And from time to time he'd talk to Connie about, you know, who were the people coming up and so on. It would be a mistake to think that Connie Wirth left because of the speech. He left after the speech, and I think he wanted to be asked to stay. But he wasn't asked to stay, and, you know, his bluff was called, and that was that. Now, you can make of that whatever you want. That's at least my analysis of exactly how it was. I don't think he wanted to leave. But the friction was not a friction between me and Wirth, although there was quite a bit of that—that wouldn't have made a damn bit of difference; he'd have been there yet, you know, so far as getting along with the assistant secretary, he'd eaten those up for fifteen years, you know, they come and go. Park directors, of course, have got a lot more stature than their nominal bosses in the minds of the general public. I mean, who the hell ever hears of an assistant

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secretary, whereas everybody knows who the park director is, even today. So I wouldn't claim to have done anything except kind of create the crisis after which Udall got what he wanted, which was the opportunity to name his own park director.

MOSS: Right.

CARVER: Now, I think maybe I did a little bit of a service to the country on that basis because, you know, if Udall had undertaken to ask Wirth to go on his own steam, so to speak, it would have broken up the team a little bit. As it was, I was a son of a bitch for awhile, but I didn't care. And it had a very healthy effect all around I think. It was time to get new leadership there. I think Udall had made up his mind as to that long before I went out and dropped a big rock on him in that secret speech.

MOSS: And the situation did improve after that, did it?

CARVER: Well, yes, the situation improved. When you get a new man, he's fresh and he's ready to go, you know. And George Hartzog [George B. Hartzog, Jr.] was—he'd already been brought back in. Well, he'd been kind of tapped for it. I don't remember what the timing was, but he was just full

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of vigor and he'd been on the outside for a while. He'd been with the St. Louis Development Association or something like that. So he'd had a kind of a sabbatical from the Park Service business and could be, therefore, his own man, pick his own people. He had a good relationship with Udall—apparently not as good with Hickel [Walter J. Hickel].

MOSS: All right. I've got a little bit of tape left. Would you want to make some general comments on the whole business of multi-use versus preservation that seems to come up in a philosophical way all over the place?

CARVER: Well, I've written a number of speeches about that which you may or may not have run into. I have always felt that this multiple use slogan is just that. It's a good idea, but it doesn't help you make any decisions when you've got to choose between uses which are not compatible one with the other. You can talk all you want about having multiple uses, but there comes a time when, if you're going to have a campground, you can't have any grazing or if you're going to have a dam there and cover it with water you can't do something else with it. And the real problem to the administrator

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is not whether you're going to have the concept of multiple use, but, you know, how you're going to make the decisions, what process you're going to make, and what values you're going to apply in making the individual decisions, and, of course, that has to be a kind of an ad hoc, case by case basis. You've got a semantic justification for what you've done when you're through with it, but it's just that. It's semantic. I've never been greatly entranced with those meaningless terms—although we use them, I use them, and they serve useful public purposes. They don't help you make decisions.

MOSS: All right. Thank you very much indeed.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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