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MOSS: All right, Commissioner Carver, in our last interview we were talking about the Bureau of Land Management [BLM], and I’d like to continue on that subject for a while. You indicated that the early policy statements originated by Mr. Landstrom [Karl S. Landstrom] were somewhat ill-advised or at least ill-conceived. Would you enlarge somewhat upon this? Just what was it about these statements that was wrong or missed the mark? On the surface they looked like good, public interest efforts.

CARVER: Well, I think that they were well intentioned, and

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I think they missed the mark, at least as land management decisions, because they were premised on the general philosophy that the avoidance of windfalls was the primary objective of the land managing agency. Land management is such a complex matter that if you’re framing your policy on a strictly reactive basis, trying to figure out who’s going to be able to outthink you, you’re just jumping from one point to the other, and you don’t have a really broad positive program.

Historically, the land policies of the United States have been done with a broad brush, and historically certain people have done quite well under them. Other people, of course,
have put their sweat and their blood and their money into it, sometimes to the benefit of the United States, and have taken nothing out. The aggregate probably is that the policies have been good for the country even though some people have profiteered, and other people have been taken advantage of.

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Now when we came in in 1961, Mr. Landstrom had his eye on a bunch of admitted bad practices which were going on under the land laws...

MOSS: Such as?

CARVER: Oh, down in Arizona there was political pressure to complete the disposal of certain lands which had been in the military control for a while. In Nevada there was quite a drive to take up some land under existing land laws, where there was a question about the availability of water. In many cases...

MOSS: Who was behind this?

CARVER: Mostly, as in any kind of a developmental area those people who had some capital and the vision of what could be done with the land saw the opportunity, saw that the public land laws seemed to be available to them and thought that if they could get the land at these cheap prices, that they could apply their talent and their capital to it and make some money out of it.

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MOSS: Yeah, I understand that. I think what I’m more after is, was it individual speculators, or was this tied into any large group or interest bloc; specifically...

CARVER: Those particular early ones I’m quite confident were individual entrepreneurs.

MOSS: How about the real estate people?

CARVER: Well, real estate people.... Broker types, the ones who want to buy cheap and sell dear, if you consider that as a group, I suppose that group would be interested. But obviously they have to see—there have to be buyers; in other words there have to be people at some point in time who are going to do something with the land.

MOSS: But it was largely speculative rather than with a specific end in view, specific use.
CARVER: Many of the situations at that time were speculative. And perhaps—I don’t say that those policies which were instituted at that time were bad, I just think they kind of put off for a while the getting at the broader, more reasoned policy for all of the management of the public lands.

MOSS: Which in your terms would be what?

CARVER: Well, the United States has a considerable proprietary responsibility, several hundred million acres of land, which is capable of being used and managed and put to constructive purposes. And in many cases it’s skewed out of what might be its proper or best use because of the existing restrictions of the public land laws and so on. For example, you get an isolated piece of land which is really not any good to anybody—not good to the United States in its ownership—but might be a contributing part of the tax base if it could be sold. The laws permitting the sale at that time were quite restrictive. In other cases, of course, the land could have been and should have been made available to states and political subdivisions for, their purposes.

The United States is just another landowner, in a kind of a checkerboarded pattern of the land ownership in a given area. If the United States of America doesn’t have

the money to keep the weeds off or to build the roads or all of the other things that landowners might do with the situation, why, then that particular land sometimes doesn’t realize its potential. Other land gets kind of the opposite treatment; it gets overused and abused because you don’t have the money, you don’t have the investments, to build the trails and the facilities and so on so that it can be properly controlled.

MOSS: What were the procedures for reviewing such policy statements? If this originated with Landstrom, I presume it had to go through you and through Udall [Stewart L. Udall] and perhaps his staff, and if so, how did it come about that this was put through?

CARVER: Hell, one of the.... Now that I think about it, I guess the biggest issue that occurred during the first months was the translation into a kind of a policy statement of an idea which Landstrom had held as a staff member on the House Interior Committee, which was to change the terminology of the public domain lands into something called the national land reserve. This was just like building a big old hotfoot under a good segment of the Western interests in Congress, because the Taylor [Edward T. Taylor] Grazing Act provides that the land is held and managed until it
should be disposed of. And the use of the terminology of “national land reserve”—I think it either came into a secretarial speech even, or perhaps into a presidential speech real early. That particular way of formulating policy is I guess the answer to your question. Some of these ideas had been formulated and devised during the “out” period, so it wasn’t a matter of starting from scratch, particularly in the case of Secretary Udall who’d come from the House Interior Committee, nor for Mr. Landstrom who’d been a staff member out there, but rather taking some of the ideas which had been in a period of gestation and finding a place to sort of get them into the policy mainstream.

The example of the other

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way of doing it, what I consider a much better way of doing it, was the whole example of the grazing fees, where I undertook in conjunction with the Bureau of Land Management real early, to take the kind of basic steps which are necessary to make a change, a constructive change, in existing policy. It was quite clear that the grazing fees ought to be increased. The ranchers had been paying twenty cents an animal unit a month for the use of the forage on the public lands, and the commercial rate might be upwards of two dollars and a half. The Forest Service was charging sixty cents, and the BLM was charging a dollar and a quarter. So you had a very inequitable situation on its face, so far as the government realizing its return.

MOSS: I notice recently there was a trial balloon to see if they couldn’t get another raise of the fees.

CARVER: Oh, the situation repeats itself and will

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continue repeating itself for another ten or fifteen years. Well, the way we were able to get a 50 per cent increase, raise it from twenty to thirty cents—it really wasn’t much of a raise in absolute terms, but as a percentage it was substantial—was a kind of case study of a better way of doing it.

What we did was go to the.... First we went through the consultative process with those people who were going to be affected by it. But more importantly, we set forth as a kind of premise for our action a sort of a basic understanding of the economic realities for the particular people affected. And those economic realities are very simple. The cheap fees had been capitalized into the value of the base property, with which grazing rights had to be associated. So you have to start out with a recognition that even though there may be an appearance of a subsidy price here, that if a farmer had paid one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a piece of private land,

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which without these grazing rights might be worth fifteen thousand dollars, the cost of carrying that one hundred and forty thousand dollars difference was for him the economic
cost of the grazing. So that even though the government might not be doing well out of it, that particular rancher, if he should suddenly have to pay a dollar or two dollars for that grazing would be bankrupted, because he had already, in effect, paid for this cheap rate.

An honest recognition of this economic reality as the starting point for the dialogue—the thing I kicked off in a speech to the cattlemen in Tampa, Florida—laid the foundation so that later, when we did raise them, I went up to the Hill and was confronted by just an absolute demand that we postpone the grazing fee raise. And I told Senator Bible [Alan Bible] and the committee that if they wanted to legislate, take their responsibility legislatively, fine, but we had our responsibility as the Executive branch, and we had decided that this was what we were going to do. And we’d gone through all the motions, all the procedures, and we did it, and there wasn’t any problem; it turned out to be a great success.

But it is this careful building of policy that is so important when you’re dealing with the kind of pluralist kind of activities which go on in the public lands of the West. These lands, you know, they may just look like they belong to all of the people, but they’re also a part of the local economy, and the local economy’s got local voters and local congressmen. It’s a structure that has to be mastered before you can make any changes in it. You try to change it without doing your homework, and it’s counterproductive; you don’t get anything changed.

MOSS: All right. Let me ask you this. As an Assistant Secretary, how do you deal with the eager beaver bureau chief who doesn’t do all this preparation and yet has some good ideas that you don’t want to squelch?

CARVER: Well, of course that’s the name of the game. That’s precisely what you’re supposed to do as a political leader in the Department. That’s what President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] intended to have as a kind of marriage between policy leadership and an absolutely fine reliance on the bureaucracy and the career service. And your techniques vary. In some areas, the assistant secretary, in effect, may have to step in and become a kind of a de facto bureau chief.

MOSS: Did this in fact occur in the public lands area?

CARVER: At some levels it did; certainly in the Congressional relations it did. In other areas, you worked with them. In other areas, you prod them or scare them or a lot of things like that. There’s no formula, it’s just a recognition that the real responsibility for policy leadership has to kind of focus up to the President.
the other interview when we mentioned our dealings with the National Parks Service on its intransigence,

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it represents another kind of example of it.

MOSS: How much of a constituency does a bureau chief have, really, in which to defend his own position and to bargain with you as an Assistant Secretary?

CARVER: Oh, tremendous, tremendous constituency. Landstrom understood this aspect of his job very well. He had a deputy, a fellow named Hochmuth [Harold R. Hochmuth], who also understood it. And Hochmuth was just a professional about it. His heart really wasn’t in it, but he undertook to help his chief, Landstrom, build a constituency, so that by the time Landstrom had to be replaced, which he did have to be, he had already established a position as kind of a patron saint of the more militant conservationists, as being the best BLM chief that they’d ever had. And this was summarized by Hochmuth one day to me: “Well,” he said, “there’s more red hats than there are black hats,” meaning that there’s more hunters and fishermen than there are cowboys and ranchers.

But, you know, that’s a precise example of the kind of mixed constituency that a BLM chief has. He can go the route of the conservation symbolism, or he can go the route of the development, of the user business; in either case, there’s a very powerful force to be mobilized behind him, and they will mobilize in a general way, based upon where they think their interest lies as a practical matter.

I guess by the time I left the job I was in better repute with the users than with the others, and I guess I plead guilty to that, because it seemed to me that there needed to be some easing of these tensions if you’re ever to make any forward motion. So I would frequently go out—and you can tell from reading my speeches—emphasizing that the cattlemen, too, were conservationists; that the preservation group didn’t have a monopoly on the good words. You get a good response. They weren’t exploiters, necessarily; some of them had been in the past. But really, if this country was to go forward, the conservation movement had to be broad enough

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to include the users. And of course some of them took up that challenge and really ran with it. And where that happened, I think the public good was served. Where they tried to out-conservate the conservationists, you really got better management.

MOSS: In reading over your speeches I noted this. Once or twice, toward the end of your term, I noticed a sense of disillusion here and there in this
cooperation between the preservationists and the users. Early hopes had somehow diminished, or what?

CARVER: The thing went pretty well right through the election of 1964. But the disillusion—and I haven’t read the speeches for a long time—but the disillusion, I think, came as I sort of lost a little of the support I had from within the Department, perhaps as the Secretary began, himself, to go with the red hats rather than seeking this balance. He became, you know, kind of.... He could see this environment thing as really the

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wave of the future. So on a lot of these issues I was kind of left arguing for a more reasoned approach long after the train had gone by. Oh, some of these issues like Merrywood here and some of the others, those were just public relations gimmicks, but they worked.

MOSS: Did you find any instances in which your bureau chiefs had a tendency to maintain independent contacts with Congress, or say the Budget Bureau, that undercut your position? You speak of Udall sort of getting away from your position and leaving you behind, did your bureau chiefs do this?

CARVER: Well, during my tenure as Assistant Secretary this was a problem, but one in which I never was apt long to blame the bureau chief, since that’s what he was there for. If I couldn’t protect myself and exert the leadership sort of on my own merits, why, I deserved what happened to me.

Basically speaking, this didn’t really

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bother me much. Stoddard [Charles H. Stoddard], for example, when he came in as the BLM chief, had a kind of a Midwest constituency which was really out of the mainstream of the public land states. Although he could make quite a lot of waves in a kind of a limited area, the solid support that I had from Walter Baring [Walter S. Baring, Jr.] and from Wayne Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall] and people like that, and Alan Bible, I just didn’t much worry about the fact that Stoddard was making a lot of headway with Gaylord Nelson and Bill Proxmire [William Proxmire], and people like that. It was important and, perhaps, more important nationally, but in terms of actual program, getting our appropriations through and getting our authorizations and so on, why, my channels remained the very best in the Department. These other guys weren’t on the committees, at least the committees that counted with us.

Now that to some extent changed as we picked up the responsibility for water pollution because

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then we got into the Public Works Committee and got a whole new group of congressional people to deal with, who weren’t as Western-oriented as the Interior Committee.

MOSS: Yes, I want to go into this in more detail later when we come to the congressional relations portion. Let me ask you specifically about some of your contemporaries in the Department—how you remember them, how you viewed their effectiveness, and this kind of thing. Just off the top of the list, Frank Barry [Frank J. Barry, Jr.], who was the Solicitor.

CARVER: Frank and I, I guess, had more difficulties than any two members of Udall’s team. I don’t know whether it’s attributed to Udall or to Frank or to me that the team sort of stayed together as long as it did, because it really got tough. But Frank is a guy who had a very close relationship with Udall when Udall was practicing law out in Tucson. And when the Secretary came to the Cabinet—I think it was Oscar Chapman [Oscar L. Chapman], at least Oscar Chapman told me that he, Chapman, told Udall, “Get your own lawyer. Don’t let anybody give you a politician.” And Udall accepted that advice and told the President and got Frank Barry, this rather mystical father figure from his young days in Tucson.

And Frank had that kind of a relationship which would give him a kind of a dominance even though I’ve heard Udall, you know, raise more hell about his bad advice from Barry. Still, it never interfered with the relationship. And after a while, Frank became—now this is my view, and it certainly is an ungenerous one, and it may be a wrong one—but I always felt that the real power down there was his deputy, Weinberg [Edward Weinberg], who knew where he wanted to go, and what he wanted to do and knew the uses of power and therefore was able to gain an influence with Frank, which in turn communicated itself to the Secretary, so that on many of these issues, particularly where water development

became the principal focal point, my influence was virtually nil. There are lots of places, you know, where the infighting within the Department leaves the land people and the water people sort of at cross purposes.

But aside from those things, Frank was a decent man and a very sensitive man. I don’t think he was a good administrator; I think he was a lousy administrator, but it was hard not to love him because he was that kind of a guy. He sometimes played dirty; he did with me when he told a reporter, falsely, that I’d given away the government’s resources at Camp Breckinridge [John C. Breckinridge]. But I don’t think he ever played dirty maliciously, he just saw that was the way the public interest was as he saw it, and it was a kind of—as I say, mystical is the word I’d use for it.

MOSS: Why do you chose the word “mystical?”
CARVER: Because he didn’t ever really act much like a lawyer, a government lawyer or any other kind of a lawyer. He just kind of had a feeling for

what was “in the highest good” as he saw it. Well, lawyers kind of react hardheadedly to vested rights and people that rely upon what the government has said. It never bothered him; if he felt that some policy was wrong, why, the fact that people had relied on it and changed their position on it and might be bankrupt by his decision didn’t bother him, it was a kind of a “higher good” sort of a thing.

MOSS: All right, let’s move onto another: Frank P. Briggs, who was the Fish and Wildlife man.

CARVER: Well, Frank wasn’t there really very long, and he was not a man with whom I had any significant business or professional dealings within the Department. But he’d been a United States Senator, he had a lot of whiskers in terms of both politics and age over the whole group, and we all loved him. I just couldn’t say one bad thing about him, and I don’t believe I ever heard a bad thing about him. I guess the worst thing that anybody could possibly think to say about a man who was that lovable, that he wasn’t very effective as an Assistant Secretary, but I don’t even think that was the case. I think he did a good job.

MOSS: Do you think that that particular area was say as—I won’t say challenging—as difficult, perhaps, as some of the others?

CARVER: Aw, it was a non-job in those days. In the first place, there were two presidential appointees, both confirmed by the Senate, with exactly the same responsibilities, really, the Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife and the Assistant Secretary. There was always a movement—which later took place—to move the Parks Service over there. I always resisted that; as long as I was there, it didn’t happen. But it wasn’t really much of a job.

MOSS: How about John Kelly [John M. Kelly] in Mineral Resources. There was some opposition to him originally, wasn’t there, from William Proxmire…

CARVER: Well, John Kelly came from the mineral industry, and Proxmire didn’t believe that anybody from the mineral industry could possibly be serving
the public interest. That was a very unfair thing so far as John was concerned because he performed very, very creditably. Unlike the situation with Frank Briggs, there were many places where Kelly’s bureau interests and my bureau interests were at cross purposes, and we were like a couple of banty roosters, each one of us very, very jealous of our own prerogatives. But you know, there was no back-biting; we’d have it out head-to-head, and there was a good feeling of mutual respect.

I certainly respected him. He knew the mineral industry; he knew the mineral constituency. Interestingly enough, he had a kind of a penchant for the international business; he really loved that part of it, something which I took no interest in whatever. So he was always off representing the Department in Paris or Geneva or Tokyo or somewhere, and I was glad to have him have it; I didn’t envy that.

But he was a first class Assistant Secretary. He tended to go off—I guess maybe it’s an aspect of his liking this international business—he kind of liked to be the man in his area, even in terms of the White House and the total Administration picture. So once in a while this would get him kind of crossed up with the boss. But he’d keep things close to his vest, and he’d go over to the White House to brief them and so on. But I think he was a good citizen and a good Assistant Secretary.

MOSS: And Kenneth Holum in Water and Power?

CARVER: Ken came into the job as a kind of a different type from the rest of us. We all sympathized with him because the Under Secretary at that time, Jim Carr [James K. Carr], had come out of the reclamation-water management area and was an engineer and took a great interest in all of Ken’s doings, so that Ken didn’t ever seem to get much status in his job as Assistant Secretary in the early years. After Jim left, Ken was able to kind of get his own stature in this business, and I think he wore very well. Nobody paid an awful lot of attention to him early. He had such strong bureau chiefs as Chuck Luce [Charles F. Luce] up in Bonneville and the other power administrators, and he had Floyd Dominy [Floyd E. Dominy], who was just totally unmanageable. So that exerting a policy influence between the nutcracker of Jim Carr on the one side and Floyd Dominy on the other was just a very frustrating job for this South Dakota farmer. But that basic strength, you know, was there all the time, and he was the one that lasted. He went through all of both terms and is about the only one who did.

MOSS: How about Mr. Beasley [D. Otis Beasley], the Administrative Assistant Secretary?

CARVER: Well, that would take a whole book to tell all about the problems of Otis
Beasley because he

had, by virtue of the way the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] people had run the place, been able to kind of bring into his bailiwick a very powerful position, particularly in the control of the budget. He had close relationships with Mike Kirwan [Michael J. Kirwan] and with certain other powerful people on the Hill, both Senate and House. And of course the sparks flew real early between Beasley and Udall, and Udall said very early that he was going to get another Assistant Secretary for Administration. He was very jealous of Orville Freeman [Orville Lothrop Freeman] who had gotten himself a new Assistant Secretary for Administration right at the outset; he hadn’t paid a bit of attention to this business of having a career man.

And I had a lot of squabbles with Beasley in the early days, but as it turned out in later time, he and I became quite peaceful coexisters. We understood each other and worked together very well, particularly in the later years when I was Under Secretary and had responsibility for budget and a few things like that. But his relationships with Udall never were good enough to go with that kind of a job. And when he was finally booted out, it was one of the tawdrier examples of Udall’s personnel practices because it just wasn’t handled very well. Too bad, too, because, you know, the guy had given his life to the public service. But, you know, that’s a political-type job even though it’s not supposed to be.

When you get to Beasley personally, he didn’t really run a good show up there; he did a good job personally, but he was very poor at delegating to his own budget director, his own personnel director, and people like that, so that there was a lot of waste motion in the way that aspect of the Department’s work was done. But he was a good soldier. If Udall wanted him to do things, he’d find a way to get them done. And particularly this was true if we had, you know, investigations of somebody getting involved in some hanky-panky or something.

He’d take care of that in good shape,

MOSS: How do you mean?

CARVER: Well, the business of, let’s say, a charge that a contract was let wrong or something like that. I can’t remember any specific examples, but he’d put his investigations unit on it and get all the facts and lay them out and would always be sure that the Department was protected; that if, you know, there was something to be referred to the Justice Department, it would be referred to the Justice Department; and that if there was something which ought to be done over, it would be done
over; that if a contract appeared to have been improvident, which I think one or two of them did....

I can’t remember, there was one that was outside my area, but I think the helium contracts got a great, big going-over. And I think some of those, the government was a little bit more generous than it should have been, in terms of what it said it would do. I don’t remember the details, but I do remember that I think

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Beasley’s handling of those things was very good.

MOSS: Well, one of the reasons that I have pressed you on that, is that there is a good deal of the popular analytic literature that cites the Interior Department and the regulatory agencies as ripe targets for hanky-panky and manipulation and so on, and I was wondering if you could either counter this or substantiate it in any way, so that people in the future will get a balanced view or a better view of it.

CARVER: Well, we came into the Department and I used to keep on my desk, you know, a history of the Teapot Dome scandal. And any department, of course, that’s been through the Ballinger [Richard A. Ballinger] experience and so on has or ought to have, a pretty lively sensitivity to this sort of thing. I don’t know of any example—somebody asked me that the other day, you know, what could I remember of real venality. There might have been some, there undoubtedly was, but I can’t remember any case. I think that the public morality—you know, with all of the marketing of

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timber you do and the granting of permits for this and that and the other thing, I think we had a very high order of it, and I think Udall promoted this thing. Certainly the Kennedy Administration’s challenge for excellence kind of permeated. I do not recall any public scandals during our Administration. I understand that the present Administration is now going back and looking at a couple of things which Udall is supposed to have done, particularly down in the Virgin Islands. But I think the very absence for eight years of anything like that is a true representation of what I think was a very high order of public morality. But there is no question that if you get kind of a loose morality about it, it could be awful contagious. That’s why I mentioned it in terms of Beasley, that you’ve got to have an independent investigative unit, which is...

MOSS: Which at least finds out the facts so that the public...

CARVER: ...which is going to get into these things and give you the straight answers on it.

MOSS: How about Mr. Carr, who was the Under Secretary
until you became Under Secretary?

CARVER: I didn’t ever really appreciate Jim Carr until I got to be Under Secretary myself. It’s another non-job, really. And it can amount to a great deal or amount to nothing at all, depending on the relationships between the Under Secretary and the Secretary. And Udall had Jim, and he had me, and he had Charlie Luce, and he had Dave Black [David S. Black], and that’s a pretty wide range of types of individuals, and I don’t think any of us enjoyed being Under Secretary.

Jim enjoyed the panoply of it more than anybody else, and he found a lot of satisfaction in just being the number two man in the Department. But he had to get his outlet for really doing something on a kind of a project by project basis, generally affecting the state of California. He was kind of the Under Secretary for California, so that he’d get the Whiskey Town Recreation Area and push that through, or he’d get involved with some of the water projects down there. In a more generalized way, he took a great interest in all of the water development matters. But he never was a true advisor to the Secretary on a broad departmental basis, and I guess I wasn’t either. I think maybe Charlie Luce came closer than anybody, later. But the Secretary had his own kind of built-in staff structure; it was a small one, and it was an efficient one. One of the ablest men in government, Orren Beaty, really did many of the things which an under secretary might theoretically be doing in policy advice and also in a kind of a directory basis.

MOSS: Let’s move on to the staff, then, and take Orren Beaty as the first.

CARVER: Well, Orren was with the Secretary in his office, and as I said a minute ago, I don’t know an abler man that I ever really ran into or worked with. He was very, very, very much better in the earlier years than he was in the later years. By that I mean in the earlier years he undertook to see that the Secretary had at hand every point of view that this very complex Department had to offer. And later, because he was such an able man, he knew every point of view; and knowing every point of view, he didn’t need to go through it, and then the communication began to break down. He really did a monumentally good job of being sure that everybody who had something to do with the matter had a whack at it, in the earlier years. But that situation fell down. Later he got some assistants of his own, Bill Pozen [Walter I. Pozen] and others who didn’t really give a damn about coordination. Orren always cared, but eventually it just didn’t work.
But that particular way of operating—Udall ran his office as Secretary exactly like he ran his office as a congressman. And of course the span of control in a Congress office is maybe eight or nine people, and it’s just got to be enormously bigger in a department, and he never really was very organized. Orren made it work just by sheer energy. He’d have huge piles of material on his desk, but he generally kept the stuff moving. People would always complain about stuff piling up on Orren’s desk, but it moved.

I have a very, very high regard for him, although I had some monumental battles with him, and I think at the very end, I think he probably had quite a little bit to do with my leaving. But it was an honest fight, and I bear no rancor about it. I think, he’s looking after the Secretary’s interest.

MOSS: Specifically over what issue, or...

CARVER: I don’t recall it was over any particular issue. I’m a fairly active type and had a lot of experience, and I wanted to do things, and I wanted to do them, you know, as a man would as Under Secretary, in his own right. And this was a challenge to the general way it had been done. And I guess more than anything else... We didn’t have very many confrontations, I just got kind of exasperated after a while and would kind of go my own way; pick out what little things I could get done—the budget review, the planning, programming and budgeting system, and that sort of thing—and just left them alone upstairs, figuring if they wanted me they knew where I was. And this wasn’t a very healthy relationship, and I really can’t blame Orren for saying, you know, this is no way to run a department, because it wasn’t.

MOSS: Another man is Graham Hollister.

CARVER: Well, I considered Hollister to be more or less a kind of a fraud. I never could understand exactly what his—I don’t mean that in any mean sense, but he was a kind of a Nevada-type politician who had an idea and got some assignments and so on which were way out of his depth. And he was kind of shipped off eventually to run some land deal involving reclamation land, principally, out in the lower Colorado. Although I always got along with him, he was a kind of a mystery man as far as I was concerned. He just wasn’t really in the mainstream.

MOSS: How about Pozen?

CARVER: Well, Bill is a very, very bright East Jersey, Eastern-establishment-oriented type of lawyer who sold himself to the Secretary and to Orren. And his principal problem was he was talking out of both sides of his mouth most of the time, so that you never, never really trusted him. He used the Secretary’s
name and the prestige of that office sometimes to the Secretary’s disadvantage—kind of an endemic matter around this town. Something

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Orren never did, so far as I know. You know, “The Secretary wants...,” and that sort of thing. But he had a way around the town, I think he has done very well since. I never understood what the connection was, but he seemed to be friendly with the President and the First Lady [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis], and his daughter went to the same nursery school or something with Caroline [Caroline Bouvier Kennedy], and indeed, I guess he got a mention in Bill Manchester’s [William Manchester] book on that basis. But what the basis of that relationship was was no concern of mine, and I don’t know.

MOSS: How far did the feeling of Eastern snobbery versus Westerners go in this whole lash-up? I’ve seen references to it here and there.

CARVER: Well, I think Udall kind of went to kind of a geographical migration, and along toward the end, I think the migration was completed. He started out, you know, being the Westerner’s Secretary, an Arizona boy and everybody was delighted; you know, he understood their problems, and so on. And he played that role for a while, and then he kind of gradually shifted until along toward the end of his term, his connections

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with the West were either nonexistent or very bad. And he was the darling of the national, John Oakes [John B. Oakes], Brooks Atkinson [Justin Brooks Atkinson] type of business, and he really loved it, loves it now, teaching up at Yale and so on. But that’s a very interesting kind of development that occurred, is this migration of the Westerner to the halls of ivy. And it’s a funny Department, you know. He made it a national Department, and after a while, I think it became sort of an Eastern Department. Not quite, but he did change the balance from being a strictly Western tilt.

MOSS: Did it crop up in other ways, such as your dealings with the White House staff and this sort of thing? Did you ever get any sense of impatience?

CARVER: I think the White House staff kind of liked us better when we were looking after the interests of the West. I think they felt they could take care of the East all right.

MOSS: All right. One or two other people. Robert McConnell [Robert C. McConnell] who is down in the Manual [Government Organization Manual] as Congressional Liaison. Is this the function that he filled?

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CARVER: Well, Bob McConnell came from the Hill. He came from that sort of New Mexico Mafia, whatever it is. He'd worked for Denny Chavez [Dennis Chavez], and he knew all those people out there. And he came up in a pretty low-level job, first with the BLM—Congressional liaison type, I think. No he didn't—I take that back—for a while he was deputy Assistant Secretary to John Kelly. Then the Secretary moved him over to Congressional Relations, and he was really outstanding in that job. He didn't know a damn thing about anything, substantively, but he really understood how to butter up those Congressmen and how to do the little favors and how to get their nephews in the park jobs. He'd go up and play paddleball with some of the leaders up there, and he was an outstanding Congressional liaison guy so long as you didn't concern yourself with the substance of what he was trying to get done, He just wasn't in that line of command.

The Secretary was immensely fond of him and one time thought about, indeed offered him the job as governor of American Samoa, which would have been absolutely the worst thing that he could have been appointed to. And the very fact that the Secretary would think of it is a kind of a reflection on the Secretary, and the fact that McConnell had sense enough to say that it was out of his league, which he told me one time, is a good reflection on McConnell. He had a pretty good feeling for his own inadequacies in the substantive area. Eventually, the Secretary did promote him to be Assistant Secretary for Administration, but I think as a practical matter he just kept on using him for what he was best at. And I don't think he was a very good Assistant Secretary for Administration, but this was after I left.

MOSS: I have three more names here very quickly. Max Edwards [Max N. Edwards], as Legislative Counsel.

CARVER: Max is a Western boy who's got the Eastern polish from Dartmouth. He'd been an advance man. His ties, I think, were more with the Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] group than anybody else's. But he was a very good Legislative Counsel. He got along with Frank Barry just about like I did which was extremely poorly. But he was able to protect the integrity of his own place in the hierarchy very well. He did have things to do with substantive matters, he did have ideas. He was kind of basically a little conservative about what you could and couldn't get done. He was used during the campaigns as advance man again, which he was very, very good at. And eventually, the Secretary promoted him to a secretarial job. Rather to everybody’s surprise, I think he did fairly well at it, although that was after I’d left, and I just don’t have any real strong feeling for it. But I guess I would have expressed the view that perhaps he wouldn’t have been the right man for it if I’d been asked, which I wasn't.
MOSS: James Faber [James N. Faber], in Information.

CARVER: Well, Jim came in very early and left very early, and he didn’t really do as well as the Secretary thought he should have. But I don’t know if it was Jim’s fault or not; I think he was more a public relations type than a good information man.

MOSS: And Dr. Revelle [Roger R. Revelle], who was the Science Advisor?

CARVER: Well, Roger Revelle, of course, couldn’t be assimilated by the Department, and he didn’t

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last very long. I think he may have communicated some good projects to the Secretary, but he wasn’t there long, didn’t have much of an impact. His successor, Tom Bates [Thomas F. Bates], did very, very much better in that job, although as a scientist his reputation wasn’t anywhere near Revelle’s.

MOSS: Okay, fine. I think that uses up most of our hour and tape, and we’ll get on to the Congress next time.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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