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Signed John F. Dalton
Date January 22, 1969

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Oral History Interview

with

John M. Dalton

June 28, 1967
Jefferson City, Missouri

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Governor Dalton, do you remember when you first met John Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] or had any contact with something he was involved in?

DALTON: I met him as early as 1956, rather unofficially. At that time, I was Attorney General of Missouri.

HACKMAN: Do you recall if you had any initial impressions of him at that time, or in what capacity was the meeting?

DALTON: Well, I was impressed with his intelligence and his public relations quality because in political life public relations is very important and we always watch, and sometimes we imitate. Of course, that's the highest form of flattery.

HACKMAN: Did you have any other meetings or connections with him in the period then, let’s say from ‘56, from that first meeting, to before 1960?

DALTON: No, not until the campaign year of 1960. Then I was the candidate for Governor in Missouri on the Democratic ticket.
HACKMAN: Right. You did not attend the Democratic National Convention in ‘60, correct?

DALTON: No. The incoming candidate for Governor does not go. Then four years later, though, he is always in the middle of the Convention.

HACKMAN: Do you recall the state party convention in May of 1960 when the delegates were chosen and were to go to Los Angeles and vote for Symington [Stuart Symington II] under the unit rule, Senator Symington?

DALTON: Yes, I attended the state convention.

HACKMAN: Do you recall at that time if there was any problem in some people being reluctant to be bound by the unit rule for Senator Symington at that time?

DALTON: Yes, but they were mostly professional politicians in the cities. Rural Missouri was united fairly well for Symington, but a number of the political people, professional political people, were for Kennedy because they thought he was the man that could win.

HACKMAN: And that’s what they were primarily interested in?

DALTON: Yes.

HACKMAN: Would that have been people like Jack Dwyer [John J. Dwyer] and...

DALTON: Jack Dwyer would be typical of the type of person for him.

HACKMAN: After Kennedy got the nomination, what problems did the Kennedy-Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] ticket present to candidates at the Missouri level—yourself and the other state candidates?

DALTON: Well, there was some opposition to Kennedy, some of it on account of the fact that Symington had been defeated, and they thought that perhaps money had

influenced the campaign in a very material way. We found some people in Missouri who did not like his religion, and on the other hand, we found many of his religious persuasion or communion that were for him for that reason. And I think you will find that in Missouri he lost votes on account of his religion, but he gained votes on account of his religion. One
would offset the other. But he was a fine looking individual. He was always meticulously dressed.

And then some people in outstate Missouri, particularly, did not like his wife [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] because they were not acquainted with her. And so there was some opposition there. I have found in my political career that many people voted for my wife [Geraldine Hill Dalton] that wouldn’t even look at me. Or they liked my son or my daughter. And it kind of worried me, but the votes counted for me just the same. The ladies play a very important part in a campaign. I think Kennedy’s weakness was the fact that his wife was not out campaigning with him in this state. I understood she had a very good reason why she was not here.

HACKMAN: Do you recall if any of the other members of his family came in in an attempt to maybe get around the lack of his wife being here?

DALTON: Yes, I understood that one of his sisters was here, and the Kennedy people had business connections in Missouri that helped them. And they were well respected and well liked in business circles.

HACKMAN: Can you think of any specific groups that expressed to you problems on the religious issue? Were there specific religious groups or anything like that?

DALTON: No, I wouldn’t want to say any specific religious communion opposed him because I think he gained as much from his own religious convictions as he lost on the other side. However, in the campaign you remember that Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] was president and the federal people were strong, they were active in support of Dick Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] in this state, and the Republican organization had not been too strong and did not submit a strong state ticket. One reason is that the Republicans had not had too much luck statewide, and I had gotten a few votes in 1956 and had led the ticket as attorney general, and the Republicans did not find a strong candidate to oppose me.

Then, in addition, I did not have any serious primary opposition. While I had five opponents, none of them had any political connection or stature that would attract votes. And this became very important and helpful to the state ticket, but it did not inure to the benefit of the national ticket.

Now, Johnson had some support in southeastern Missouri, and I think he added to the strength of the ticket in Missouri. When the election was over, Kennedy had carried the state by about ninety-eight hundred. I had carried it by a little over three hundred and three thousand. And the rest of the state ticket had carried from a hundred and forty thousand up.

HACKMAN: At the Convention, where this problem of some of the people being uncomfortable with the unit rule became probably more pronounced than it
had at the stage of the state convention.... Did this create any problems in the presidential campaign as far as splits within the Democratic Party? Did this thing carry over or anything?

DALTON: Well, of course, some of the people who had been very strong for Symington were unhappy, and we lost some votes on that account. I think the state ticket was much better known and oriented to Missouri politics than the national ticket to Missouri. Apparently, there had developed a new alignment between certain urban groups and minority groups that gave the Democratic Party much impetus nationwide but did not help us as far as Missouri was concerned.

HACKMAN: Well, we were talking about the religious issue, what other issues in the presidential campaign would have been important? You were talking about the people not being...

DALTON: Civil rights was an important consideration. Some of our people were not too strong for civil rights. Many of them that were rather moderate in their approach, and some of the people thought Mr. Kennedy was rather far advanced on civil rights. However, that was offset by the fact they thought Johnson leaned a bit the other way. And overall, I think it changed the picture in Missouri very little. One would offset the other.

HACKMAN: Do you recall any specific actions by Kennedy or his campaign approach that would have bothered people on civil rights?

DALTON: Not materially. Mr. Kennedy sent some people to Missouri that alienated some of the Democrats. He sent his own representatives that stayed in headquarters, that participated in all of the activities, and seemed to be kind of watching the state organization to see what they were doing. This irritated some of the Democrats. And then the advance people for Mr. Kennedy were very adamant about having all of the radio and T.V. time for the national ticket to the neglect of the state ticket. This caused some trouble. [Interruption]

HACKMAN: You had been talking about the advance people and the T.V. time.

DALTON: Yes. I know they had considerably friction in St. Louis when the advance people for Mr. Kennedy came in and ruled all of the state candidates off of the T.V. time, saying that Mr. Kennedy had to have all of it. The state people had paid for the T.V. time. But most of them acquiesced in this demand and went along rather than have any trouble. And yet, the strength of the state ticket was carrying the Kennedy ticket.

HACKMAN: Right. Right. Do you recall who the advance people were?
DALTON: No. I do not.

HACKMAN: You were talking about the Kennedy people who were watching the state, so to speak. Do you remember a fellow named Phil DesMarais [Philip H. DesMarais]?

DALTON: Yes, from New Orleans.

HACKMAN: Right. From Louisiana.

DALTON: And he was here. And people carried tales to him that he didn’t know whether to rely on them or not. And that did not help in the smoothness of the organization.

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HACKMAN: Could you go into some of the specifics about...

DALTON: I remember one time that there had been an organization organized, Republicans for Dalton. I had nothing to do with it, but they had organized and set up a headquarters in the city of St. Louis. And this gentleman from New Orleans went over there and asked for Kennedy literature, and they said they didn't have any. And the whole headquarters was set up as Dalton, Republicans for Dalton. Well, that made him very angry, and then he reported to national Kennedy headquarters that the Dalton people were not with him, which was a deliberate untruth and an unfair statement. Well, had I been of a quarrelsome nature, I probably would have been antagonistic. But I think you work together, all of you, if you’re going to have any hope of success. I realized these were advance men, but some of my friends were irritated. I personally was not; it didn’t bother me in the least.

HACKMAN: Can you recall any specific conferences that you had with DesMarais as far as planning? What type of things did he want you to do or what types of things did you talk about that you felt he did wrong on?

DALTON: We didn’t think he was there to help us. We thought, actually, he was here to spy on the local organization.

HACKMAN: I see. Was there ever any move on his part, or other people in the state to try to set up organizations outside the regular Democratic organization?

DALTON: Yes. Yes, they did. They set up organizations. Just like I had Republicans for Dalton that had been set up, they set up Republicans for Kennedy. We co operated in all those, thinking it might be necessary in order to carry Kennedy in Missouri.
HACKMAN: What about other Democrats, as far as—was there a feeling on other Democrats in the state that they should go outside the organization to work for Kennedy?

DALTON: No, some of the Democrats didn’t think they should. I recognized that as something that’s politically important. You can get a man to vote for one man on your ticket, and then another organization can get him to vote for a different man on the ticket, and in the overall thing it strengthens the whole ticket. You can get them to vote for one Democrat, but you’ll never get many people to vote for the full ticket or for two. So as many organizations as you can have that sponsor one or more on the ticket will help all the ticket. The complaint that we had is that DesMarais wanted to have the Republicans for Kennedy but didn’t want them to have Republicans for Dalton. And I think he was wrong, and I think his problem was that he was a novice in politics and that he irritated some of the professionals or some of the people that had had experience in politics. I think he was a political science professor...

HACKMAN: Yes. I believe at a little school in...

DALTON: ... and he thought he had all of the answers. But many of our people thought that he was a novice, and that he had theory rather than experience.

HACKMAN: Who, within the state organization, worked particularly on the presidential campaign? Anyone who was...

DALTON: The entire state organization was instructed to be for everyone on the ticket, and if we found anybody that wasn’t for the entire ticket, we took them out of the state organization because you can't have what I call mugwumps, part on one side and part on the other, in positions of power. Our organization worked for the whole ticket; our people spoke for the whole ticket; we emphasized and insisted that our friends go for the whole ticket. Now, we did not always have that with some of these advance men from Mr. Kennedy’s headquarters.

HACKMAN: What about the professional politicians in St. Louis and in Kansas City? Were they strongly in support of the state ticket or....

DALTON: Yes. We had no problem with that. In fact, I led the state ticket in St. Louis and in Kansas City. I think it was—I’ve forgotten the exact amount, but a considerable lead in both cities.

HACKMAN: So there was no problem.
DALTON: And I led outstate, too.

HACKMAN: Jumping back to something else, had you been at all involved in Senator Symington’s campaign on the national level? I know some people in Missouri worked in other states before the Convention.

DALTON: No, I didn’t. I was running for Governor; I was a candidate for Governor in the primary; I had my own fish to fry, so to speak. I had my own obligations, and I was working for John M. Dalton in the primary.

HACKMAN: You had talked earlier about being with President Kennedy, then Senator Kennedy, on some of his trips. Would you want to go into that?

DALTON: We, of course, attended his big meeting in St. Louis. And I appeared on the program, but not on the T.V. time, even though our people paid for the T.V. time. They had insisted that Senator Kennedy should have it, and we acquiesced in this. Then I went with him one morning real early in the [St. Louis] County, and we rode about twenty-five miles through the western part of St. Louis to the airport. This way he had exposure. People could see him, and he was very gracious and very pleasant, and we saw a lot of people that day. Then, at the airport, they had arranged for him to make a brief talk. Well, two or three of us made a very short talk there, and then we got in his plane and flew to Joplin, Missouri, for another meeting, and then he invited us to go with him to Wichita, Kansas, for a third meeting, and then back to Kansas City, where we also rode about twenty five miles through the suburban areas and into a final meeting that night. It’s a very strenuous life that type of campaigning...

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HACKMAN: You wonder how he survived over the whole campaign.

DALTON: That’s correct.

HACKMAN: Did you ever discuss this issue of the T.V. time with him personally, or was this all through the advance men?

DALTON: No, it was settled, and it was settled because I said, “We’re not going to have any trouble; we’re not going to have any dissension. We’re all in this bed together. While some of us thought it would help the ticket more to keep the state ticket strong, if they thought they ought to have the time, let’s give, it to them.”

HACKMAN: When he made his speeches in Missouri, was he listening to people, state leaders in Missouri, on how to approach problems, or was most of it done by his own people?
DALTON: His own people had contacted the state leadership about the problems that were confronting not only the Party but the national ticket in the state. They made a very studied effort to work with the Symington people. And Symington is very, very popular in Missouri and well respected in this state. Symington went all out to help Kennedy.

HACKMAN: Did you have any discussions with him during these times as far as what might happen after the Administration came in, or on any issues at all? Was there time for anything like this?

DALTON: No. Most of our—we talked about a few of the problems when we were riding in the car when he wasn’t visiting or speaking to people. And then we talked some on the plane, and I told him a little about what he might find in Joplin and later what he might find in Kansas City. I didn’t know anything about Kansas because they were pretty rough on the Dalton boys out there one time.

HACKMAN: Pretty rough on Senator Kennedy out there, too, in the election. What about agriculture as an issue in the campaign? Did you think this was of major importance at that point?

DALTON: Well, our people in rural Missouri and in the Midwestern United States were unhappy about the agriculture policies of the Eisenhower Administration. And that was most helpful because some of our problem we had was in the rural areas of Missouri.

HACKMAN: Right. I know Kennedy had earlier in the Senate, I believe in ‘56, voted for Benson’s [Ezra Taft Benson] concept of sliding supports, and I wondered if this had lingered in some people’s minds as far as this whole area.

DALTON: No, Benson was the whipping boy in that campaign, and Kennedy gained by it. They didn’t analyze Kennedy’s record very carefully. And I think very, very, few people actually look at the record. Sometimes they are carried away by emotion.

HACKMAN: Did you talk to the other Party leaders at that time—let’s say Senator Long [Edward Vaughn Long], who was the nominee, and Thomas Eagleton [Thomas F. Eagleton], who was running, and the others on the state ticket—as far as their attitudes towards Kennedy?

DALTON: We talked to Senator Long on many occasions. And Senator Symington, we relied on his judgment on many matters. In that campaign we talked mostly
with the political leadership of the state. I didn’t have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Eagleton much in that campaign. He was quite young and a bit immature, and we thought maybe we would rely upon what we call the old foxes in the Democratic Party.

HACKMAN: Somebody who was successful, too. Did you accompany Senator Johnson when he came out on his visit to Springfield? Do you recall that?

DALTON: Yes, I met him in St. Joseph, Missouri, and I went with him on meetings there, and then flew with him to Bismarck, in southeast Missouri, to attend a cattle sale, and then with him to Springfield where he appeared that night.

HACKMAN: Do you recall discussing with him any of the main issues? Civil rights, for instance, about what he thought Kennedy’s stance would be on this?

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DALTON: No, we didn’t talk about civil rights that I recall. We talked about some of the other problems. Agriculture was one, and we were going to the cattle sale, and that was kind of uppermost on our minds. Johnson was quite tired that day, but a very interesting conversationalist. He did most of the talking.

HACKMAN: Well, let’s move on then from the election, unless you have any overall comments on the outcome of the election.

DALTON: No, we knew we had a close campaign on the presidency here, and we concentrated on that, and we neglected some of the state boys. We felt like the state boys were shoo-in, and they were. And we worked to try to quiet all problems that we could as far as Senator Kennedy and Senator Johnson.

HACKMAN: Was there ever any overall strategy developed on how to handle the religious issue, or how to approach it when people came up with this?

DALTON: No, we just talked to them, that it had no place in it, and we were losing some, but we were gaining some. We felt like all of the Catholics voted for us. We lost some of the people of the other communions. And I think, overall, we didn't lose any votes in Missouri on the religious issue. We gained votes, if anything, because of the many of our people of his religious convictions had felt like they had been discriminated against, and they were going to vote for a man of their religious group. There was some opposition; we may have lost as much as we gained. But that wasn’t an issue in Missouri like it would have been forty or fifty years ago.

HACKMAN: I see. Turning then to the Administration, or the period after the election, did you have any contacts with Kennedy or his people between the election and the Inauguration? Do you recall?
DALTON: No. I do not. We, of course, went to the Inauguration. And that was right interesting despite the snow.

HACKMAN: I think a lot of people had problems getting around at that time.

DALTON: Yes. I did have one funny experience. The people who sponsored the television show decided to have a commercial just as I rode by the presidential stand, and Missouri’s delegation didn’t show on the T.V. program. We had a number of letters wanting to know why he hadn’t attended the Inaugural. Well, we just told them that they better talk to the people that sponsored the program because they had cut Missouri out and immediately after it they had Arkansas. And one fellow had written me and said, “Arkansas went, and they didn’t like the President. Why didn’t Missouri go?” Well, we explained to them that we were there; we had a band with us; we had a good attendance from Missouri; and we just got cut off the television program because it was time. for a commercial.

HACKMAN: Moving on to the Administration then, what types of problems would come up, if any, that you would take to the White House, or people....

DALTON: Well, we had many things about grants, but we operated most of the time with our United States Senators, Senator Symington and Senator Long. They were acquainted up there, particularly Symington, and anything we wanted done we could take to Symington or to Long and ask them to take it up with the White House.

We had excellent cooperation with the White House in every way. I attended a social function or two there and had breakfast one morning, and Mr. Johnson was my partner half of the breakfast and Mr. Kennedy the other. They were talking about a number of things that confronted the states, and they were trying to get a better relationship between the states and the federal government. We had no problem as far as cooperation was concerned.

HACKMAN: There was no problem then as a result of Missouri’s support for Symington that ever had any influence on your ability to work?

DALTON: No. We had no problems with the President or any of his advisors. And there was no apparent attempt to punish us because we had been for Symington.

HACKMAN: What about appointments, federal appointments in this area, were there any problems that any appointments were objected to on the state level?

DALTON: We objected to no appointments. The federal government has a right to
select its own appointees, and I didn’t let them select any of my appointees. We had no problem on that score because I didn’t interfere and they didn’t interfere. And I didn’t let any senator interfere either.

HACKMAN: Well, how effective were the Missouri representatives on the Hill during the period? Did Senator Symington and Senator Long usually go along with most of the things you desired?

DALTON: Yes. And they arranged one time a meeting with the congressional delegation. We had a good delegation in Missouri at that time, still have; they’ve been very cooperative, very helpful; when we’d write and ask them to do things or call them, we’d get excellent cooperation.

HACKMAN: How successful were Kennedy’s programs in relation to Missouri, his domestic programs, as far as agriculture, maybe public works, and things like this?

DALTON: Unfortunately, he didn’t get to stay long enough to get his programs in effect or to learn what the direct results would have been. The fact that he was killed in ‘63 prevented anyone from getting a real good knowledge of what his programs would have done or how effective he would have been had he remained, say, six or eight years.

HACKMAN: What do you think his chances would have been in ‘64 in Missouri?

DALTON: It’d have been all right. He had some problems. But as it turned out, all of the Kennedy people were for Johnson, and there was an emotional thing about keeping Johnson in as a representative of Kennedy. And it made a landslide in Missouri because the Republicans apparently didn’t nominate their best man.

HACKMAN: What about relations with specific executive departments? Were there ever any problems in relation to these?

DALTON: No. We had some problems about the inter-state system in Missouri. And Kentucky and Tennessee and Illinois and Missouri had one road that had not been agreed upon, so we asked Senators... No, we asked the President direct, for a conference, and we went through Mr. Hodges [Luther H. Hodges], who was then Secretary of Commerce. He set up the conference with the President. And we went to the President, the four governors from the states mentioned, and presented our proposition, worked out an agreement, got him to approve the agreement, and sent it over to the Department of Commerce.

However, before it was concluded, the President had died. Then we had to go back again and set up another conference with Mr. Johnson. And we finally got it approved by
President Johnson. President Kennedy had approved it, in effect, but had not officially signed the change.

HACKMAN: What about relations with the Justice Department? Civil rights was no major problem in Missouri, but there were some schools integrated in some places. How...

DALTON: We had no great problem in Missouri on integration. We had a few schools that didn’t integrate immediately, and there are a few now, but our trouble’s been very minor in Missouri. Most of the school districts integrated immediately. I was attorney general at the time when the opinion of the Supreme Court came down. I said then that the laws relative to segregation were invalid. I couldn’t say when it was mandatory that they integrate, but they had the right to integrate immediately. This was the first opinion in the United States and was approved by seven or eight other border states almost immediately.

HACKMAN: Well, during the Kennedy period, if a problem would come up in this area, would the Justice Department talk to you, or people on the state level, or would they go directly to the community? Were there ever any problems in them bypassing the Governor’s office.

DALTON: I talked to Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] on a number of occasions about some of our problems, but we had no great problem in Missouri. Ordinarily, if we heard about it on a state level, we would try to get it corrected before the federal intervened. I know one time I flew down to Anniston, Missouri, where they had had trouble over integration, and personally called the school board together and got it straightened out and got the children, the colored children, enrolled. We didn’t say anything to the dress or anybody else about it; we were trying to quiet the situation down. The press later got a hold of it.

HACKMAN: Well, while we’re talking about that problem. Could you recount how you became involved in the Southern Governors’ Conference, how this came about?

DALTON: Well, Missouri is a border state. The fact is we’re.... The Mason and Dixon line south of Pennsylvania, between that and Maryland, would go out through Columbia, Missouri. Many of our problems, are akin to those of Arkansas and Kentucky, Tennessee. And that was one of the things we were talking to President Kennedy and President Johnson about. They were going to build two interstate ridges within twenty miles of each other in the Cairo-Cape Girardeau area. I thought that ought to be moved down to the extreme “boothel” to connect Pemiscot County with Tennessee. Well, that’s what we worked out.
I had been very much interested in their educational T.V. that the Southern Governors’ Conference had been talking about, and the freight rates that the Southern Governors’ thought they were being discriminated against and which affected Missouri. So I went down to visit the Governors Conference, Southern Governors’ Conference, at Nashville. Well, I found it extremely interesting and found many problems that they had that related to Missouri. And we had no Midwestern conference at that time. I felt like we had more in common with Kentucky or Arkansas, than we had with North or South Dakota. So I was invited to join the Southern Conference. Some one of our papers objected to it, but I found it most profitable, and my successor has remained a member of the Southern Governors’ Conference, and has found it interesting and helpful in a number of places according to what he said.

But after this, I talked to Otto Kerner [Otto Kerner, Jr.], who was Governor of Illinois, and suggested that we call a group of the Midwestern states and try to find one that had other problems in which Missouri had an interest. So Illinois and Missouri had many problems in common, but in order to work the thing out, we added Minnesota, Wisconsin, the two Dakotas, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Ohio, and Michgan, and Indiana. So we formed a Midwestern Governors Conference, which has been really helpful. There are many problems that we have with Illinois or Kansas that we can work together in that Conference. But I still think the Southern Conference has more problems in which we have an interest than we have with Nebraska or the Dakotas or Minnesota.

HACKMAN:  What was the attitude of the Missouri senators and congressional delegation as far as setting up the Midwestern Conference?

DALTON:  They were very helpful, and a number of governors went in and had a conference with our senators and congressional leaders of the whole area, talking about getting industry and developing commerce and foreign trade and things of that kind. We even debated about establishing a headquarters in Washington to get contacts. We determined that we had not been getting our share of government contracts. However, Missouri had done fairly well. Illinois had not.

HACKMAN:  This was more of a regional thing than a Missouri thing.

DALTON:  Yes. So we worked as a region, and we talked to all of our representatives and all of our senators. And that was a helpful contact. We then, after this, Missouri has polished and developed and enlarged the scope of its commerce and industrial development division. And we started then going on impact tours with them to secure industry for Missouri. We felt that while we had regional problems, we had certain problems in Missouri that could only be handled from the Missouri level.

HACKMAN:  Going back to your involvement with the Southerners, with the Southern.
Governors Conference, can you remember any of the... I believe that at a couple of those Conferences there were some people who wanted to censure the Administration on the civil rights stand, particularly Governor Wallace [George C. Wallace] at one time. What do you recall about that?

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DALTON: I recall that I was right helpful in getting that slowed down and getting—there were a number of Southern governors who were moderates; they needed help. And I didn’t participate in any censure; I tried to slow it down; and we did slow it down in a number of instances.

HACKMAN: Who were you working with on trying to slow the thing down?


HACKMAN: What about Governor Faubus’ [Orval E. Faubus] role in this period?

DALTON: Faubus had had trouble over the Little Rock people. But, actually, Faubus is a man of tremendous ability, and he made a very good Governor of Arkansas. His only nationwide exposure was about the Little Rock troops, and actually, he’s a very strong governor.

HACKMAN: I’ve heard that in the case of these Governors Conferences that in some ways he was a moderating influence on some of the more extreme people.

DALTON: Yes. Definitely he was. And then the Governor of Texas was right helpful later, John Connally [John B. Connally, Jr.]. John was trying to keep a moderate approach. Then when Paul Johnson [Paul B. Johnson, Jr.] came in as Governor of Mississippi, he was much more moderate than Governor Barnett [Ross R. Barnett] had been, and that was a stabilizing influence. Governor Sanders [Carl E. Sanders] of Georgia was particularly good, and Governor Farris Bryant [Cecil Farris Bryant] of Florida didn’t want any upset or trouble. Two years of this time Buford Ellington was Governor of Tennessee, and he was by and large a moderate.

HACKMAN: Well, those are about all the questions I have, unless you want to draw some conclusions in general about the Kennedy Administration in relation to Missouri or on an overall level.

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DALTON: I would just say this, that the Kennedy Administration cooperated in every way that we asked them to cooperate. And we had no problem or no cross
current of any magnitude. We worked harmoniously together. What he would have done and could have done will never be known because he had not been there long enough to get any real fair appraisal of his Administration.

HACKMAN: Okay, thank you very much.

[END OF INTERVIEW]
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