

Angier Biddle Duke, Oral History Interview—JFK#4, 7/29/1964
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Duke, Chief of Protocol for the White House and State Department (1961-1965), discusses John F. Kennedy's 1963 state visits to Germany, Ireland, and Italy, among other issues.

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Fourth of Four Oral History Interviews

with

Angier Biddle Duke

July 29, 1964

By Frank Sieverts

For the John F. Kennedy Library

SIEVERTS: This is the 29th of July, 1964, and I'm continuing the interview with Ambassador Duke. Ambassador Duke, let's just pick up a few loose ends and perhaps you would have some things to add on things that happened at the time of the funeral of President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy].

DUKE: As I look back on the notes, one of the things I recall at this time is that when Chancellor Erhard [Ludwig Erhard] came through the line, Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] greeted him and held him in the line and asked him if he realized that that very evening she had looked forward to a state dinner for him, that part of that same evening on November 24, she had planned German music to be played after dinner. She said that under other circumstances we would be dining together tonight, with German music playing in this very house where we are today. There are, I am sure, as I look over the list, other noteworthy remarks she made to other personalities, but I don't think any of them are quite as dramatic as that particular one?

SIEVERTS: Did Chancellor Erhard make any reply?

DUKE: I think he was probably too moved to speak. I am not sure whether we went over the conversations with the President of Colombia [Guillermo León Valencia] at the time of the funeral. Mrs. Kennedy told him that her trip to Bogotá—she felt that in many ways she had gotten more out of that—she and the President

got more out of it—were more touched by the ovation than on any of their trips abroad. She felt this really put the seal on the Alliance for Progress and that she learned a great deal herself. For instance, her stay in the house of the President, the state dinner that they gave at the Presidential Palace, the sense of the past—all of this gave her ideas about the maintenance and restoration of the White House.

As I say, if I looked over the notes on other people who came through the line, I could get other ideas, but I don't have the list here with me today, and perhaps we can do that some other time after I look through these notes here.

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SIEVERTS: Fine, that will be interesting.

DUKE: Particularly in light of what I have said in some of the other places here.

SIEVERTS: Yes. Well, on the subject of trips abroad, perhaps we could turn now to that final, that extraordinarily successful and moving trip to Germany and to Berlin that the President took and say a few words about that.

DUKE: Well, I know that this is covered probably by all the other people that went with us on that trip.

SIEVERTS: Well, I wouldn't assume that—they are not all being interviewed.

DUKE: ...and I am looking at the President's schedule, and I see that we arrived in Bonn on Sunday, June 23rd. I remember all that very well because I was on the advance trips which prepared all this, and I think that, in general, one can say that this was the best planned trip of any that the President made. I refer to the German portion of this trip in contrast to the Italian which was inclined to fall apart. Again, let me look through this—one thing I recall with a certain amount of amusement was the insistence of our hosts to retrace the steps of General de Gaulle [Charles A. de Gaulle]. My colleague, the German Chief of Protocol von Holleben [Ehrenfried von Holleben], persistently insisted that wherever we stopped we would have to have the President make a speech. At the Rathaus (City Hall), I finally protested because it was really a burdensome matter and not an occasion to reach great groups of people. We were hardly able to travel without stopping in every little town hall along the way, and I pushed him quite hard as to why we had to do this. He finally explained that this was what General de Gaulle had done, and they wouldn't want to do anything less for President Kennedy. Well, once I had the reason, then we were able to strike this procedure out. I said we are not retracing the pilgrimage of General de Gaulle—that isn't what we're here for. He gave in with good grace but, as a concession, I arranged with him for the Mayor of Bonn to call on the President at our embassy, thus avoiding the Rathaus visit.

SIEVERTS: Well, the German Protocol Chief wanted to make...

DUKE: Oh, he wanted to be sure we got equal treatment. I think that anyone who went on the trip or even had access to the newspaper accounts of the trip or read the President's remarks on the trip, will recall that the quality of what he had to say never diminished. He didn't make a worse speech in a smaller town, or a shorter one with less meaning. The quality of what he had to say at each stop that Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday was

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really, I think, perfectly remarkable. Even when you might say he could just relax in his talk to the American embassy staff, he didn't. There was no leveling off or let-down among his own people. He maintained an extremely supersonic level in terms of quality all the way through—an extraordinary performance. There was, of course, during the visit—as any of the people inside the Department would know—a certain amount of jockeying between Chancellor Adenauer [Konrad Adenauer] and President Lübke with, of course, future Chancellor Erhard in the wings. The President did have a real interest in talking to Erhard, but he was a guest of the German government and, in particular, of the Chancellor, and therefore he didn't want to do anything to offend Adenauer. At all times he sought out opportunities to talk to Erhard in a way that was not offensive to the Chancellor. Between Adenauer and Lübke [Heinrich Lübke] too, there was a certain amount of jockeying. Adenauer was almost jealous, it seemed, of the time the President would spend with the President of Germany, and I just wanted to let you know that it was part of our job to make sure that everyone had equal time.

SIEVERTS: Wasn't this a problem even in riding in cars—things of that sort as to who should be with whom?

DUKE: The biggest example of that was in Berlin. Let me just leaf over to that. Without going into the juridical status of Berlin, its constitutional basis, or the internationally recognized status of Berlin and its relationship with the German Federal Republic, it was a very delicate point, because no one really wanted to determine whether the Chancellor took precedence over the governing mayor in Berlin or vice versa. No one on the German side wanted to spell this out—it seemed to be in their interest not to. And it was in our interest, of course, not to force the issue either. But when you have the two of them in the back seat of a car with our President, American protocol prescribes that the seat of honor goes to the one on the extreme right and you grade from the right—one, two and three. German protocol goes, if you take the extreme right as the seat of honor, the next best seat is on the other side of the car, and the third seat is in the middle. There was a great deal of beating around the bush and sensitive—back and forth on this subject. Finally, it was solved in a way to make everyone satisfied. Mayor Brandt [Willy Brandt] recognized U.S. procedure as governing the situation and von Holleben took the view that German Federal Republic policy prevailed. That, of course, put Mayor Brandt next to President Kennedy. He was happy. The Chancellor was happy because he could believe he was in the number-two spot, and beside he had one whole side of the avenue to himself.

That was one of the little situations that wasn't so little because we spent quite a lot of time and talk on it.

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SIEVERTS: Well, it depended on which country's protocol you were looking at in terms of as to who had the place of second rank.

DUKE: Yes. They wanted to make certain what the interpretation would be from the German side and the political interpretation put upon it. Then, as I look at the schedule, on Monday, June 24th, there was a discussion with Chancellor Adenauer at the Palace Schonberg, followed by a call on President Lübke alone. This was the kind of thing that made Chancellor Adenauer nervous. You know there was a certain discussion with the German government as to why the President should have a private talk with President Lübke. The Chancellor was the one who would conduct the political talks—Lübke would carry out the ceremonial functions, but as for a private talk with him, the Chancellor's office raised questions as to why the two presidents should get together at all. My reply could only be, "You just work it out as you want it—if you don't want it, just say so." And they would say "No, we can't say we don't want it, we would rather that President Kennedy would say that he didn't need to." Naturally, we weren't going to say that, so he did see him.

SIEVERTS: President Lübke did himself want to see him?

DUKE: Of course he wanted to see him. But there was jockeying within the German government.

SIEVERTS: Did this affect the jockeying between Willy Brandt and Adenauer?

DUKE: Yes, very much. Let me give you an example.

SIEVERTS: There were four different kinds of jockeying going on.

DUKE: Well, Willy Brandt had his own special interests. He insisted on coming up to Bonn the day before President Kennedy was to leave for Berlin, to be with the President alone. I mean this was an official request. In fact, I talked it over with him in Berlin a month in advance. He said that his constituency wouldn't understand it if he didn't. Furthermore, the European Bureau of our State Department thought it over quite thoroughly and, as a result, it was placed on the schedule, and we arranged it as a courtesy call at the American embassy residence. So we did permit it but, behind the scenes, I was told that it made Adenauer very nervous indeed—von Holleben tried to block it with me up to the last moment. He said, "I ask you as a friend what can you do to stop it?" I said, "I can't do anything as a friend, but if you ask me officially, then we, as your guests, would, of course, wish to accede to your wishes." He said, "Oh, I can't put it that way." So the matter was dropped, and Mayor Brandt made his call.

SIEVERTS: But the interesting thing to me, as an outsider, is that President Kennedy seemed to have had a unique political force or magnetism even in a foreign country like Germany, and this is what they all wanted—they wanted a slice of it for themselves.

DUKE: Oh, they wanted to be warmed by the flame—certainly. The aura, the magnetism, the political value that he had, they felt could be shared or imparted, and that's why they were so terribly anxious to be associated with him. They felt that he had so much that something of what he had should brush off on them. They were fighting to get close to him.

SIEVERTS: What we here call the coat-tail theory in politics.

DUKE: The coat-tail theory—quite right! Then we go up to the military part of the program the next day, and there were some difficulties, from my point of view, when we went over into the next German state. We went through to Württemberg—(The Minister President corresponds to a state governor here) the capitol of Wiesbaden—I can't remember whether it was Württemberg or Wittenberg. There was quite a good deal of jockeying because the President went to the American base at Hanover and from there he went by helicopter to Wiesbaden. Then it was a question of who would ride in from the heliport to the hotel, and as the Minister President felt that he should rank even over the Chancellor, we arranged for Adenauer to go alone by car from Bonn to Wiesbaden. The question then arose that if the Minister President wasn't going to be invited to the American military ceremony (and he wasn't), how in the world could he be picked up and how could he get this political magic brushing-off on him as he went through the crowd on the way in to Wiesbaden. He was, therefore, invited to come out to the base to meet the President there, and they would then ride in his car back to Wiesbaden. The Minister President gave a reception that night, which was a compromise as he originally wanted to give a state dinner. President Kennedy didn't stay very long at it.

I have some notes here that indicate that the take-off for Berlin was the morning of Wednesday, June 26, and I don't think that's quite true—I think that was the preliminary arrangement. However, on the actual day, which was a very full day because when you think it over, he left Wiesbaden in the morning, flew into Berlin for a full program, and then went on to a heart warming reception in Dublin in the late afternoon.

Some of the details of that day in Berlin come to my mind—I remember the regularity of people fainting in the crowd during the Rathaus speech and the remarkable efficiency with which the Berlin police reached those who fainted and put them on stretchers and removed them. The quality of the crowd at the Free University and what the President had to say in his appeal to them, the relief with which the American military headquarters

greeted the President—they were so worried that he was going to bypass them because of the pressure of time. And then the trip to Ireland, and you realize that on that same day, in fact that same evening, he arrived in Dublin which was a most entirely different emphasis, an emotional sentimental business in the last sense.

Then we went through a wonderfully staged arrival ceremony in Dublin to a relaxed outpouring of people that had no particular political fervor to it—a friendly welcoming crowd. You could hardly believe all of this happened in one day. It was hard to realize that you had awakened in Wiesbaden in the morning, had been, as I say, through a lifetime of experiences all through Berlin, and had gone through a full-scale tumultuous welcome in the Capitol of Ireland, and thence to bed in the American embassy in Dublin, as he did that night. Books will be written of the events of that day alone!

He rode in to town with President de Valera [Eamon de Valera] from the airport, and I rode behind with the Prime Minister [Sean Lemass]—and he was so proud of the turnout and really so delighted to see his “countrymen.” After the Berlin hordes, of course, it just didn’t compare—as a matter of fact, it would be unfair to compare the hysterical passion of the Berlin multitudes to the jolly, friendly, hand waving crowds on the streets of Dublin. It’s a different population, different size, different motivation, and everything else, but it was almost touching to hear the Prime Minister being so proud—he said that this was the greatest welcome that had ever been given. Well, if you come out of the tumult and hysteria of Berlin, it looked pretty thin, but that didn’t diminish the appreciation we all had for it.

SIEVERTS: In Berlin itself, were there any contacts with the Communists or Soviets—with East Germans?

DUKE: In that regard, you may remember the specially prepared signs at the end of the Stalinalle under the arch there. The Communists put up new signs in German and in English—they were not there when we had looked it over a few weeks before on the advance trip. There were propaganda manifestoes about the German Democratic Republic and the Berlin Wall—the same type of signs were put up at Checkpoint Charlie—the same type of slogans were put up in each place so that when the press

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took a picture of President Kennedy, they could hardly fail to include some of these propaganda messages. When we went by the Soviet war memorial in the British sector, the Soviet troops were on guard there, but we went around behind them and there was no direct confrontation with the Russian personnel, although we were all very conscious of their presence.

SIEVERTS: Did the Russians make any effort to be included in the program or to greet him?

DUKE: No—not at all.

SIEVERTS: How about the French and the British?

DUKE: The French did. The French Commandant of the airport in the French sector—we had gone to see him before—or seen his people—on the advance trip to go over the program—he was insistent on a French role in the arrival and departure ceremonies. There was a good deal of feeling about this. There were questions about reviewing the troops and the national anthems and General Clifton [Chester V. Clifton, Jr.] and I worked very closely on the arrival and departure ceremonies with the Germans, the French, and the British. Of course, we took the position that we were their guests and we would do everything and anything that would be appropriate.

SIEVERTS: You took that position with Berlin, too?

DUKE: Yes, with Berlin—I'm not talking about von Holleben, the German Chief of Protocol, I'm talking about Berlin municipal authorities. They had a man who acted as a senior protocol officer, with whom I worked a lot of these things out. But, as I say, General Clifton was the colleague who helped in sorting out some of the implications on the military side—what national anthem should be played first, how we would line up the various military commandants of the three sectors, and just where would Chancellor Adenauer fit in. I might say that Adenauer did not fly over with us; he came over in advance in his own plane and was on the ground on arrival. Again it became a question as to who would shake hands with the President first, and Willy Brandt, I think, quite deftly solved that one by saying that, of course, he would defer to the Chancellor out of respect for his age and position. It was a good political maneuver because, as a matter of fact, there was no crowd at the military airport—the ceremony took place behind the barricades of a military base and therefore it was an absolutely pleasant gesture but a politically empty one. He was doing it for a few cameras, but the Berlin population wouldn't be in on it. So he gave way and the Chancellor greeted him first and then the French Commandant, and the British Commandant—the American accompanied our President—and then we stood at attention for the national anthems in the same order. My recollection is that there was no review of the troops—

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we just got in the cars. The fact that the American Commandant flew over with us gave him a chance to talk with the President for a little about the situation in Berlin and sort of got us out of the awkward position as to where he should fit in. That left us to deal with only the two other Commandants.

SIEVERTS: Did the President have personal conversations in Berlin? And, if so, did you know what...

DUKE: I didn't sit in on those personal conversations, but yes, he did; he went to Willy Brandt's office at the Rathaus before luncheon and spent, I would imagine, about a half an hour.

SIEVERTS: Were there any small demonstrations in Berlin? We know about the massive crowd, but any little gestures—any individuals doing anything that you recall?

DUKE: Of course, the most dramatic point there was when we looked across the Wall. We all looked to see if we were going to be confronted with anybody but military, and looking very carefully one could see East Berliners come out and dart across the horizon off in the distance. From the Eastern side—yes, there was curiosity but it was manifested very discreetly.

SIEVERTS: Why didn't he stay overnight in Berlin—wasn't it necessary or was there any particular reason?

DUKE: There was no particular reason—naturally, after that, we had the Irish trip to go through and we had the Italian trip to go through—it was a question of time.

SIEVERTS: Was there any particular security problem in Berlin?

DUKE: No, I think anyone who flies over the Soviet-held zone is always concerned about security, but that was a military matter. So, frankly, I wasn't particularly conscious of it. We didn't get pushed around by security nor did it intrude into our work at all, which sometimes does happen.

SIEVERTS: Well, how about the Italian trip—you alluded to it once or twice.

DUKE: Well, I'd like to talk about the Italian trip because the Irish trip, I think, has been so adequately covered in the press. But I would like to go back and say something about the three ladies who joined us—

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Eunice Shriver [Eunice Kennedy Shriver], Jean Smith [Jean Kennedy Smith], and Lee Radziwill [Lee Bouvier Radziwill]—I must say they embellished that visit and gave it such grace and charm and delightfulness—what a relief it was to come out of the heavily charged political atmosphere of West Germany, the intensity and the hysteria of Berlin, and to come to this green Irish countryside with three beautiful ladies on such a wonderful occasion—they added a quality to this which I can recall with sentiment and affection. I remember going to the President's house for dinner and putting all three of them in one car. What a lovely sight! It was quite a bonus, I think, for Ireland to have them along with us.

SIEVERTS: It must seem kind of a waste to put all three of them in one car.

DUKE: I know, I know—it probably was. Anyway, it was a great success to have them with us. But, again, leaping over—you may remember that when I was

introduced in County Wexford, the President introduced members of his party, and he came to me and he said, "I want to introduce my Chief of Protocol who hasn't got one drop of Irish blood"—it got a big laugh from the crowd, and it sent me back to my genealogical tables. I was able to tell him a month or so later that I had found a great grandmother by the name of Artelia Rooney, and I wanted him to know it.

Anyway, to get on with it—I left Ireland ahead of the President and went down to Italy—flew all night—I slept in the President's car on the way down—I went down to see what arrangements I had to make in Milan. The place that had been selected was the Rockefeller Institute Villa on Lake Como, and this is quite a ticklish story because of the fact that the Director of the Rockefeller Institute and his wife, who were in residence at the Institute, in effect told the Secret Service that they did not intend to move out of the house—President or no President. Dean Rusk took me aside when we last saw each other—he didn't come to Ireland—and he told me that he felt somewhat responsible for this because he had suggested the Rockefeller Institute Villa, and he wanted me to make sure that I'd handle advance arrangements there. Well, somewhere along the line during the trip in Ireland, through the Secret Service we got word that the Director of the Institute and his wife just were not going to move out. So Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] reached me and said, "You get them out or make some alternative arrangements"—I think the President sped me on my way on this one and, as I say, I went down a day ahead.

I went directly from Dublin to Milan while the President went over to England and he spent a day—an afternoon—with the Prime Minister [M. Harold Macmillan], so that gave me time. I called on the Director of the Institute and his wife and went over our policy, explaining that for security and other

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reasons, it was the custom for the President to take over the household wherever he stayed. I told them what happened at the American residence in Bonn, for example, and the American embassy in Ireland where both ambassadors and their families had all moved out. We would expect no less here but, of course, I was willing to take over the hotel at the lake, if they had to stay on. Well, they found a cottage on the grounds and moved into it. They did move out of the main house. I don't think I'll labor on this any more—the point is that is why I went down ahead, and he did have a pleasant restful stay there on Lake Como, and we arrived in good shape the following day at the Rome airport.

I think it would be absolutely correct to say this was the worst arranged, the worst done, the most exasperating, the most amusing reception the President received in any foreign country while he was President. It was, from my point of view, a complete disaster. Disorganized—the press swarming all over the place—nobody knew exactly what was happening—the President's sister, Jean Smith, was shoved aside and couldn't get into a car and damn near got left at the airport after she had come out to meet him. In the first place, they wouldn't let her in and when she finally did get in, she couldn't get a car to get back to town in the motorcade. Well, all I can say is, from a logistical point of view, it was pretty much of a complete fiasco. Looking back upon our arrival, it must be recalled that the Pope [John XXIII] had recently died and there had been a tremendous funeral. The new Pope [Paul VI] had been crowned, the Italian people were in the middle of their election campaign, and

emotions of the crowd were pretty frazzled. I imagine those are the reasons why the crowds were so thin; in fact, the streets were empty, as we entered Rome. This was quite a shock to the President, I think—it certainly was to Pierre Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger], with whom I talked about it at some length later. He believed that what they should have done was to have a helicopter come from the airport and land with the President in the Coliseum or some great square in the center of the town which in itself would have gotten a crowd out. Well, later the press reported quite closely what happened to Pierre Salinger and myself and Mac Bundy [McGeorge Bundy]—somehow or another when the President's immediate party got into the Quirinale, which was our first point of arrival in the city, the Italian security people closed in behind him and didn't let the other members of his party follow. We couldn't get in, and no matter how many passes, badges and certificates we showed them, we got pushed around and were forcibly kept out; and with a certain amount of glee, the press took this up and played it up to the hilt. This was due to the fact that they themselves, particularly the White House press, were getting treatment which they didn't think they deserved and which they didn't get in any other capitol, so they played our plight up to dramatize their

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own. I tell that story in some detail because of two incidents that happened later. First of all, the story of our so-called manhandling—Salinger and O'Donnell saw that would be the major story in the American newspapers the next day and they wanted to do something to counteract it. That evening I went up to the President's room in the Villa Tabrena, and the President, O'Donnell, Salinger and I talked over what could be done to counteract the story in the American press. The President thought—I think he was the one who suggested writing a letter to the Chief of Police of Rome. It was also suggested that I would ask the Chief of Police to come around and the President would thank him personally—he would then present him with such a letter—thanking him for the splendid security arrangements—the marvelous arrangements that had been made for his safety and security and well-being while in Rome. That was the first plan that occurred to him—he felt we could build up a little story around it. So I got hold of Ambassador Correa at the Foreign Office to talk the idea over and I found that there were about four Chiefs of Police—there was the Prefecture, there was the City Police, there was the Provincial Police, there was the National Police—and it turned out he didn't think it was too good an idea at all. In fact, he didn't like it a bit, and it came out in the conversation that what he really wanted was such a letter for himself. So I went back to the President and talked it over again, and I suggested that the President might want to send a silver, framed photograph of himself with a dedication expressing gratitude for everything that had been done for him in Rome, and that I would deliver this in full view of the press and so forth—on behalf of the President, to Ambassador Correa, the Chief of Protocol. So this is what subsequently was done, and I think it took a little of the edge off of what the press would like to have continued into a second day's story. As a matter of fact, in my talk with Ambassador Correa, he told me that the opposition in Parliament were desirous of turning this into a political story, stressing the inefficiency, the incapability and incapacity of the government police, and would have liked to make a political issue of it—and so the government welcomed the President's gesture of giving them a pat on the back. So I think the major effect of that story was blunted. But actually what really blunted the story and what

really wiped it out of everyone's memory was the second day's welcome to Naples. Rome was a very disappointing experience from where I stood. Rome, of course, has been receiving visitors for 2,000 years from all over the world, and I am sure that it takes a lot to shake them up and bring them out onto the streets. But when we got to Naples, this was a wild excitement—a more passionate excitement than even in Berlin. Children lay down in front of the President's car—women absolutely threw themselves—were projected over the crowd to try and get at the President. It was the most remarkable crowd scene I have ever witnessed. I know that Berlin had its own style and its own massive

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impressiveness—but for personal delirious excitement, there was nothing like Naples, and the press was terribly impressed by it, and this was the big story of the day. The Roman vacuum was forgotten in the story of the Naples reception. Both coming from the airport to make the NATO speech in town and then back to the airport again—magnificently done—it was a great way to have left Europe.

SIEVERTS: Did he then fly from Naples back to the United States?

DUKE: Yes, that's right.

SIEVERTS: Was that from a military airport?

DUKE: No, it wasn't because we had a departure ceremony—you know—with the Mayor, the Prefects; President Segni [Antonio Segni] accompanied the President down from Rome; we had a full-scale ceremonial farewell. It was a sort of lackadaisical kind of thing in some ways but splendid in terms of response and enthusiasm from the vast crowd.

SIEVERTS: Were you with the President on the plane flying back?

DUKE: Yes, I was.

SIEVERTS: Did he convey any impressions of the visit, as a whole, during the flight?

DUKE: No, he had that marvelous ability to compartmentalize himself. In other words, he was able to cut out and curl up in a bed and go right to sleep.

SIEVERTS: Then he slept on the way back?

DUKE: Yes, most of the time. Jean Smith, Pierre Salinger and I stayed up, and the President joined us at some point during the night and had a drink and kidded about it all—and there was a certain amount of reminiscence. But you could have such a glow of achievement of what had happened, and it did carry over naturally into anything he did. The President, though, had a dry manner, and he was not given to self-

delusion. It was—all right—that's that—that's been done—now what's next—that kind of thing. And what was next at that particular moment was sleep and rest because tomorrow was going to be some other episode or problem or

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situation. When we got to the Azores for refueling, I think it must have been two or three o'clock in the morning, the President stayed asleep, and Pierre Salinger, Jean Smith, LeMoyne Billings [Kirk LeMoyne Billings], and I got off the plane much to the disappointment of the 5,000 or so servicemen and their wives gathered on the field. But Jean Smith went around and talked with the families and Pierre made some jokes and—well, we did the best we could—delighted to have the President get some sleep—I might add.

SIEVERTS: You were delighted—but the crowd?

DUKE: Well, it was two or three o'clock in the morning, and they were Americans, and that isn't what the President came to Europe for. We were glad he slept. Well, that's the highlights I can remember after a year later.

SIEVERTS: Yes, that's fine—very good.

[END OF INTERVIEW #4]

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