

**Elizabeth Rudel Gatov Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 06/25/1969**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Elizabeth Rudel Gatov  
**Interviewer:** Dennis J. O'Brien  
**Date of Interview:** June 25, 1969  
**Place of Interview:** Kentfield, California  
**Length:** 54 pages

**Biographical Note**

(1911 - 1997) Democratic National Committeewoman from California (1956-1960, 1963-1965); Treasurer of the United States (1961-1962), discusses John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign in California, the political system in California, Robert F. Kennedy's 1968 presidential campaign, and time as the Treasurer of the United States, among other issues.

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**Suggested Citation**

Elizabeth Rudel Gatov, recorded interview by Dennis J. O'Brien, June 25, 1969, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

Oral History Interview

Of

Elizabeth Rudel Gatov

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Elizabeth Rudel Gatov – JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

With

Elizabeth Rudel Gatov

June 25, 1969

Kentfield, California

By Dennis J. O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'BRIEN: Well, I think the logical place to begin in any kind of discussion of this nature is with the question: When did you first come into contact with John Fitzgerald Kennedy?

GATOV: As nearly as I can recall, it was in 1956, on the night of the Democratic [National] Convention in Chicago when Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] had received the nomination and then left the vice-presidential nomination up for grabs. He had been nominated by Senator John Kennedy, who had also been the voice, I believe, on a film that was shown that evening of the history of the Democratic Party. As soon as the session adjourned, around midnight, we went back to the hotel that we were staying in and received word through the delegation chairman that the Kennedy people wanted to meet with, I think, seven or eight of us, at some hour like 3 o'clock in the morning. There was a place designated, Elinor Heller's [Elinor Rass Heller] suite, and I was among the seven or eight who were present.

They arrived punctually, I recall, and he had with him, I believe, Pierre Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger] and Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien]. I'm not sure who else. They spent about twenty minutes with us, asking very pertinent questions; in other words, "How do you think the vote is going to line up? How many people are available to come to me on the first ballot?" Well, a lot of them, including myself, had been committed to Hubert Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] for the first ballot; but we quickly ascertained that the Humphrey and Kennedy votes were interchangeable on the second ballot and the Kefauver

[Estes Kefauver] votes could not be moved. They were largely in the Southern California part of our delegation.

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Within a very short period of time we had worked out all the arrangements. People would vote for whom they wished on the first ballot, but then Humphrey's would go to Kennedy if Kennedy survived and Humphrey did not the first ballot, or vice versa. The Kennedy group started right off with at least the goodwill of the people who were committed to Humphrey who had no idea that Jack Kennedy up to that time even existed, really, for national purposes.

He was a very impressive person—extremely organized in his thinking and his procedures. Obviously this thing was worked out right down to the last split-second; they left when they said they were going to and on into the scheduled night.

Well, he didn't get the vice-presidential nomination in 1956, but I was a member of the [Democratic] National Committee at that time and we had meetings about three times a year in Washington. I found that at each one of these meetings I was always part of a group—maybe it was the whole committee, I never really found out—that was usually invited to the Kennedy home on M Street for cocktails or something like that. As time went on, John Bailey [John Moran Bailey] began to emerge as a prime mover for Kennedy so that I'd also find myself with Pierre Salinger, whom I'd known before when he was with the San Francisco Chronicle, and several others, and we'd get into pretty specific discussions about politics in California and what might be the situation in 1960. We also—and when I say “we,” I'm talking about Roger Kent and I, (he was the state chairman at that time)—invited Senator Kennedy to come out and speak at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner here in September.

O'BRIEN: That was in San Francisco or Los Angeles?

GATOV: In San Francisco. Politics in this state, as far as we were concerned then, was always carried on as if California were two states. In other words, we ran our programs and they ran their programs and during campaigns we coordinated, but not very much between campaigns. That is, on personnel. When VIPs were coming into the state, we'd work out joint travel schedules with Southern California during a campaign, but in this case we didn't feel it necessary to let them know that we'd invited Senator Kennedy to come be our speaker.

I remember very well one of my happy duties in those days was to go down to the airport and meet the VIPs who were arriving. Senator Kennedy and Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] got off the plane, and I asked for a copy of the speech so we could give it to the press, or have it duplicated, whatever it was. There wasn't a speech, which was sort of a shocker. Then we got to the Fairmont Hotel and Sorensen was dispatched upstairs

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to the typewriter to please produce a speech. Eventually we got to the dinner and he had the speech—and he worked on it all during dinner—and what eventually emerged was about ten minutes worth, which was, in our view, a disappointingly small sample. Well, he never did that again. To my knowledge at least, when he came to California he came completely equipped to handle the press; the prepackaging of the speech was there even if he didn't stick to the text and so forth.

Meanwhile, in '58, Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown], of course, was elected. What went on after that was leading up to the 1960 Convention, which, as you know, was held in Los Angeles and for which I was on the Arrangements Committee. Paul Ziffren was actually the one in charge: he was the National Committeeman and lived in Los Angeles. As part of the Arrangements Committee, I had a lot to do with the Convention, and particularly I had a lot to do with traveling around the country and meeting people who were putting together other delegations, finding out what their room requests were, and sort of logistical stuff that we wanted to have.

In the course of those travels, plus the meetings of the National Committee, plus just encountering people in general outside of California, I found that the Kennedy move was well underway, though Stevenson still was the darling of the Democrats who were running things then in California. I had been a very ardent Stevenson supporter in '52 and '56, but by 1959 it seemed to me that we had another possible candidate who could win, and it was Kennedy. The problem was going to be how to get the Stevenson people away from Stevenson. By the time the delegation had been selected—which was by Washington's Birthday or February 22<sup>nd</sup> of 1960 (it was done at the Highlands Inn in Carmel)—Jesse Unruh [Jesse M. Unruh] and several others who were not part of the delegation selection group were by this time out-loud Kennedy supporters. They were sitting in a hotel room in Carmel and somebody in the selection group was on the telephone to them and keeping them abreast of what was going on: who was accepted, who was not accepted.

O'BRIEN: Was that Rees [Thomas M. Rees], perhaps Tom Rees?

GATOV: It could have been. Jack Abbott, I know, was one of them, from San Francisco. You may know him. The procedures that we used to put that delegation together were a great handicap in the Convention, but they were designed to protect the Governor. Recognizing that these things had to be done so much in advance, the initial decision was that about a committee of fourteen—mostly the party officials, representatives of the Governor, two congressmen, two state senators, two assemblymen: this kind of a format—would start

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by inviting every elected Democrat—and of course, you know, they're only "party" from the Assembly up (lower offices are nonpartisan)—to come on the delegation. So we started with a real cross section. There were a hundred such elected Democrats. An alarming number accepted, so you started with every point of view being represented. Then the Governor at some point during the spring—I would say no earlier than April—after a number of conferences with the Ambassador [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] agree that he personally was for

Jack Kennedy, but he felt that he couldn't do anything about it publicly during the primary campaign. First of all, Jack Kennedy wasn't very well known in California, and he (Brown) would be putting himself out on a limb and not necessarily bringing any advantage to Kennedy—or this was his thinking.

By the middle of May, I'd gone East on another trip for the Convention, and I'd talked with a lot of leadership Democrats in Pennsylvania; Connecticut, of course, I knew; I had dinner at Averell Harriman's [William Averell Harriman] house and talked to him about it; and Governor Meyner [Robert B. Meyner]. I remember those particularly well. I remember Averell Harriman giving me a delegation rundown. He felt that at that time Kennedy already had something like 550 votes, which was considerably more than any of the party people in California realized he had. I believed Harriman because it checked out with everything that I had picked up myself.

I called our then-Senator Clair Engle, whom I was very close to, and asked him what he was going to do—he was to be chairman of the delegation, while Brown was the actual head of it—and Engle said, well, the one thing he knew he wasn't going to do was support Adlai Stevenson. He said, "I've been around that track twice and I'm not going again." I strongly suspected that Clair was really a Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] man but realized that Johnson was not popular in California so he was going to do something else, but however he did not respond very affirmatively to Jack Kennedy. Sort of "Why? Who? Him?" kind of reaction. I felt at liberty, knowing where the Governor was and knowing that Engle was not for Stevenson, to then really try to go to work on delegates for Kennedy. The only people that I could make any headway with were Stevenson people. The Johnson and the Symington [Stuart Symington, II] ones, for their own set of reasons, were very firm where they were.

I had a very long, and to me very personally distressing, conversation with Adlai Stevenson about the middle of May. A story had appeared in our paper, the [San Francisco] Chronicle, indicating that if he would nominate Jack Kennedy, he would be offered Secretary of State if Kennedy won. To me this was a great thing. By this time I'd been making some phone calls and found that it wasn't too difficult to get people at least

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thinking about Kennedy even if they hadn't met him. They were responsive, the publicity had been growing, and he'd been out here more and more. So I told Adlai that I was not going to support him and he said, "Oh, those Kennedy people have gotten to you." I said, "No, it's not that. It's just that California is your island and there isn't any support that I can find anyplace else in the country for you compared to what exists here." He said, "Well, I was sort of relying on California to start a prairie fire," I said, "Well, it isn't going to happen. And I think it would be a frightful thing if you let yourself be nominated and then are repudiated by the Convention that nominated you twice. It just isn't there; it just isn't going to come." Well, this went on and on. He invited me to come visit him in Libertyville and we'd talk about it further, but there wasn't anything further to talk about, so I declined. I felt very badly, personally, because he obviously was being misinformed—at least either I was or he was, and I didn't think I was because there was no reason for anybody to con me.

Meanwhile the efforts on Stevenson's behalf had begun. Mike Monroney [Almer Stillwell "Mike" Monroney] (Senator from Oklahoma) was the actual head of it, trying to put together some sort of a national group that would support Stevenson in the Convention. They reached Roger Kent, for instance, here, who was devoted to Stevenson. They flattered him by saying, you know, "We'll make you co-chairman with Eleanor Roosevelt [Eleanor R. Roosevelt]," and so forth.

Well, there was a lot done in the next six weeks with the great help of Don Bradley [Don L. Bradley] who was then the executive secretary of the state central committee, to whom I reported the results of my last trip East. He agreed with me that my information bore out his findings, that regardless of personal views, Kennedy was going to be the nominee and we might just as well get with it, so we managed to keep Roger Kent from going on the Stevenson thing, though he didn't like it very well. But, he didn't do it, in any case. Towards the end of May, Pat Brown went to a Governors' conference in Glacier Park where he kept issuing daily bulletins, not saying "I am committed to Jack Kennedy," but saying what "a splendid fellow" Kennedy was and the more he thought about it the better he liked it. Yet, there were still people who'd been reading the paper every day who said, "Well, I have to wait and see where the Governor is." This was the great shelter behind which people went, but at least, if they went that far, it meant to me that they were not committed to Stevenson.

Time went on and we finally got down to the Convention. It was a pretty brutal business as far as the California delegation was concerned because it was.... There was a lot of cynical activity going on. George Miller, Jr. [George P. Miller], who was state senator from Contra Costa County, had not been for Adlai Stevenson in '52 or '56; he'd been an ardent Kefauver man.

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He also had many oil refineries in his district and we knew that when oil was concerned, Miller had to be there. On everything else he was a free man, but this was his particular thing that he had to protect. To my great astonishment Miller started talking about what a splendid candidate Adlai Stevenson was, after telling me for eight years that he was "no damn good" and he "didn't know anything about politics," and he would have been a "disaster" as president. Suddenly after eight years Miller discovered Adlai's virtues and kept a lot of people in line.

I hadn't been in Los Angeles terribly long before it became pretty clear to me, because I knew the backgrounds of so many people who were on the delegation, that the Stevenson move in California was a Johnson move. Incidentally this was confirmed by Mike Monroney when we happened to see him in Hawaii three years later and were talking about it. He sort of laughed as though "Well, didn't everybody know that?" They not only didn't know it in the California delegation, they got very angry indeed if such a thing was suggested. Which is not to say that Stevenson knew anything about it. I don't think he did. At least, I'm willing to assume that he didn't. This was a holding operation which made enormous sense from Johnson's point of view; it didn't matter where delegates went as long as they didn't go to Kennedy on the first ballot.

Well, it was a very miserable time. The telegrams came in bales to the hotel that we were staying at supporting Adlai Stevenson. It got completely out of hand. There weren't

volunteers even to begin to distribute the telegrams. Those that were received, particularly by the officeholders, had a very upsetting effect. They were nice genial messages, such as, "If you don't support Stevenson, don't bother coming home," this kind of thing. It really shook them. It was also the first Convention for a lot of them and they determined they weren't going to any more. It was a highly emotional, highly charged, most unpleasant situation.

The first day of the Convention, twelve of our delegates lost their badges. Security for badges was of an inferior kind, particularly for men. The women wore their badges around the neck on a chain or something, but the men hooked them into their pockets. Anyway, twelve lost their badges the first day, so I had to go to the Convention office to talk to Leonard Reinsch [Leonard U. Reinsch], whom I'd come to know in the course of previous conventions. His secretary knew what I was coming for and he was very obliging about the badges.

He was very busy so I just walked in, picked up the badges and turned to go as he said "Do you know who's going to be the vice-presidential nominee?" I said, "No, I don't." He said, "It's going to be Johnson." I nearly fainted.

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This was Monday morning, opening day, and I had an appointment very soon after this with Woodrow Wilson Bean, a figure in Texas politics you may have come across, whom I'd come to know a bit in previous years. He'd invited me to join him and some Texans for a drink before lunch. I went down to the Biltmore bar (the Convention office was in the same hotel) and there was Judge Bean, a secretary from Lyndon Johnson's office and four or five other people. They were all getting ready to leave Los Angeles and fly back to Texas, conceding the nomination to Kennedy. I didn't understand. This information from Reinsch was new and really burning inside me and I was trying to think of a way to get it out without revealing the source, so I finally just said, "I picked up a very hot, and to me incredible, rumor that Johnson would accept the Vice Presidency." They sat placidly and one of them said, "Well, what's incredible about it to you?" I replied, "I don't know him very well, but I never assumed that Johnson would be a person who would rather take the number two spot to anybody; I thought he'd rather sit there as Majority Leader and screw up somebody else's administration, if he didn't like what they were doing, than move into really a zero spot."

Well, they proceeded to enlighten me. They said, "First of all, he's had a heart attack; secondly, he's a very vain person, very conscious of "perks" (perquisites) of office, he likes to be made a fuss over; and he's tired and he'd like to spend a lot of time on the ranch; so he'll take it; fits in perfectly." To them there was no problem accepting it. To me there was; I obviously didn't read the man accurately. Later, I reported the conversation to Governor Brown who didn't believe it either.

The next three days were kind of a blur, largely spent working on one delegate at a time, as persuasively as I could, informed largely by Bill Lawrence [William H. Lawrence] of the New York Times. California was down in the front of the Sports Arena because it was the host delegation. The press was directly in front of us and Lawrence was directly in front of me. I knew him so each day when we would convene I'd ask him what the count was. I felt that I could trust his appraisal better than anybody else's because he had to live with

whatever he printed the next day. So regardless of what the people from the Kennedy headquarters who were with our delegation would say, if Lawrence said this is where they are, it was good enough for me. Bill Roth [William M. Roth], for instance, who was the last delegate I was able to persuade—about half an hour before the balloting started—was so Adlai-oriented that he felt that he was deserting a great man in going for Kennedy. He felt awful but he believed, finally, that Kennedy was going to win and Adlai wasn't.

I hope I don't overplay, but I don't want to underplay either the enormous emotional content in this thing. People who

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had invested an awful lot of themselves in the idealism that Adlai Stevenson represented to them, who had gotten into politics because of him felt as though they were at his funeral. The balloting started; we got a tiny majority of our delegation for Kennedy on the first ballot and that was that. It was all over.

O'BRIEN: Let me retrace some of these things and perhaps go into some of these things in a little more detail. In the '56 Convention you had a group of people mainly out of Northern California, didn't you, that supported Kennedy? Who were some of those people, as you recall?

GATOV: Well, Elinor Heller, Mrs. Edward H. Heller; Jack Shelley [John F. Shelley] who was then a Congressman; Tom Lynch [Thomas C. Lynch], who is now the attorney general and was then the district attorney in San Francisco; Jack Abbott, a very able, very bright person, with close connections to the Heller family. I certainly hope that in the course of your explorations somebody talks to him (Jack Abbott) because he would know more of the details of what I've given you—the preliminaries—than I do.

The Hellers were very early Kennedy supporters and on two occasions at their home at Lake Tahoe they invited me up to meet the Ambassador who had come over from Nevada for lunch on these two different occasions. There were groups of perhaps fifteen of us each time, all interested Democrats—not necessarily all going to be delegates, but people who, in the Hellers' estimate, had some influence and some hope of being converted. I would say that Ed [Edward H. Heller] and Ellie Heller were the prime movers in the sense of money, of influence, though they were not the kind who would sit on the telephone and call other delegates; they would set up situations where the exposure could be made. Of course, they were both very, very close to Pat Brown.

O'BRIEN: How about Joe Houghteling [Joseph C. Houghteling] at this time, was he?

GATOV: Joe was also, yes. He was an early Kennedy. I recall one time we were up in Sacramento at something or other in the Governor's office and Joe pulled a list out of his pocket—I don't know where he'd gotten it—but it had both of us marked down as Kennedy people. We were at that point still trying not to be too overt because it was creating embarrassing situations, or could, for the Governor, who

after all we both had an enormous interest in. We didn't want him to get chewed up in a possibly mish-mash. One of the

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big concerns, at the beginning of all this was that Kennedy would come in and run and possibly defeat Brown and his delegation.

O'BRIEN: Yes.

GATOV: I'm sure Kennedy never forgave himself for not doing it. He felt that he should have done it. I'm not sure that, even today, if he had run and won it would have—I mean that if he had run he would have won, because I think the other candidates would have come in also; and in a four-way fight, I'm not at all certain that he had that much base in California that he could have put it over.

O'BRIEN: Had you know the Hellers and people like Houghteling and...

GATOV: Yes.

O'BRIEN: ...before the '56 Convention?

GATOV: Yes.

O'BRIEN: In talking to some of you, I sense that, in a sense, this is a kind of old-line association of people that's extended over a period of years.

GATOV: Well, it has. We haven't always been on the same side of everything, by any means, but I think we've trusted each other and so that if I wasn't going to go along with Ellie, for instance, who had been National Committeewoman and had been very helpful to me after I got involved in politics. ... She, I'm sure, put me on the '52 Brown delegation, the one that was defeated by Kefauver. I was on it and then, oh, magazines began to get interested because I was supported to be the next National Committeewoman if the Brown delegation won, and all this came true.

It wasn't said specifically, but it's true that—oh, Bill Malone [William M. Malone] was another one of the early Kennedys—in the north I think we enjoyed over the years an internal harmony or at least respect for each other, and the ability to sit down to talk without accusing each other of something nefarious. We haven't had any quarrels over “what became of the money;” there hadn't been charges of dishonesty, financial dishonesty. The north for a number of years, though I think it's not true anymore, really was able in party situations to dominate. Partly because of the fifty counties in the north and the eight in the south—county chairmen were all members of the executive committee of the state central committee, and so that gave us an edge of forty-two to start with. You could always find a split in Southern California; it was usually

San Diego that didn't like what was going on in Los Angeles, so you'd pick up the San Diego people. With that many you could pretty well dominate whatever the party activity might be, so that the ill will which has persisted, I think, over the years between Los Angeles and the north—they've really had good reason to not like us much—didn't exist among us.

O'BRIEN: Well, if there was one person that you conceived in '56 that, in a sense, was most influential on the rest of you, in support of President Kennedy, who would that be? Is there any one person that served as a kind of catalyst?

GATOV: By the time the Governor had come out? I don't think there was any one person. There didn't seem to be any one person who was on the receiving end of the pipeline unless it was Jess.

O'BRIEN: Well, this is '56.

GATOV: Oh, I'm sorry.

O'BRIEN: Right.

GATOV: I was talking about '60.

O'BRIEN: In this original group.

GATOV: Well, there was Ellie Heller. She was the National Committeewoman—or no, she had been—but it was in her suite that we met and you just had the feeling without asking questions that she had been instrumental in picking the people who were to be at the little gathering in the middle of the night. I don't recall now exactly who was there, but I would say probably Bill Malone, probably Jack Shelley. I would say the Hellers were the moving force there, and in what happened later.

O'BRIEN: Did you get in on any of that squabble on the Convention floor in '56? Apparently Roosevelt [James Roosevelt] was fighting for the standard or something or other.

GATOV: In the first place, no machinery has, I believe, as yet been devised by which a delegation as big as ours could poll itself on the floor. Jimmy Roosevelt had performed in 1948 in a similar fashion. The two Convention trains from the north and the south were coupled in Utah or someplace—the Northern California and Southern California

trains finally met—and to the astonishment of the north, the south was full of literature about Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] for President. Jimmy was leading the pack to dump Truman [Harry S. Truman] and nominate Ike. That was Jimmy's way. In Chicago there was probably no honest count, no accurate count, I should say—it was honest but it couldn't have been accurate under the circumstances on the floor. I wasn't sitting near enough to the standard to see exactly what happened—so I can't tell you—but Jimmy was going up and down the aisle trying to give the word to the Kefauver people to “pass.” This is what he wanted to have happen, to have California cast no vote on the roll call and wait to be called at the end. I had a feeling that if Kennedy didn't get it on the second ballot, which we were in, the Kefauver thing would move. This is my only recollection of it, but I was sitting fairly far in and not really responsive to it.

O'BRIEN: Let's explore some of those contacts you had then, from '56 on, and maybe talk about some of the meetings in Georgetown. When did you first meet people like, well, Larry O'Brien?

GATOV: I think probably in one of these gatherings in John Bailey's suite. The meetings of the National Committee were usually held in the Sheraton Park [Hotel]. Bailey would have a suite there, and somebody like Pierre would say, “Don't you want to come up and have a drink?” and there would be Bailey.

The first time I met Bailey was at the Kennedys' house. It was in the winter and there was snow all over the street. I left and he left at the same time. There were no cabs visible, so I was going to walk out to Wisconsin Avenue. I went out the door with him and introduced myself, “I'm Libby Smith from California.” He said, “I'm John Bailey, the boss of Connecticut.” I was absolutely flabbergasted because out here that was a bad word that you'd never consider using even as a joke, but in Bailey's vocabulary obviously it was not only acceptable but accurate and he wasn't joking. That was the first time I met him. From then on we began discussing the merits of the way they did politics in Connecticut and the way they did politics in California. He thought our system was frightful because it was completely uncontrollable; you just never knew what you were going to get and you couldn't possibly run a party that way. I said that his system was unacceptable out here and you couldn't work it besides, because you had no base on which to build it, since we have almost no patronage, and local offices are nonpartisan, up to the state legislature.

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O'BRIEN: In your later contact with him, did he ever come to understand or appreciate California politics?

GATOV: No, he just used to laugh about it. He came out to a CDC [California Democratic Council] convention—I guess it was in '62—and I was sitting next to him at dinner that night. I said, “Well, John, does this impress you?” The huge hall was full of people, all active, mostly young, and busy as could be doing something. He said, “Yes, you've discovered something that we haven't properly exploited in Connecticut, and that's sex.” He had it all figured out in his own mind that that was the big

reward of going to these conventions—and undoubtedly it was for many people. That’s the way he wrote it off. [Laughter] It was just not his idea at all of how to handle a political situation. John and I really got along, very well, particularly considering our rather polarized situations. He never did understand our way and couldn’t see any sense in it. Of course, this caused problems for Pat Brown because nobody could understand why he couldn’t crack the whip with that delegation and just say, “Eighty-one votes for John F. Kennedy.” Never mind counting the delegates’ votes.

O’BRIEN: How about Pierre?

GATOV: Pierre, I’d first come to know in ’54, I guess, in a gubernatorial campaign here. We’d become quite good friends and trusted each other politically in assessments of things, so when Pierre told me with great delight one day in Washington that he was going to work in the Kennedy campaign, he took me over to the Esso Building, where they’d just opened an office, which still didn’t even have any desks in it. It had telephones and the people were sitting on the floor and this was the beginning. It’s when I first met Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith]—this is back in September, I believe, of ’59. I was drawn to the kinds of people I met.

I liked Larry O’Brien immediately, because it seemed to me that he made more of an effort to understand what was going on in California than any of the others did. He seemed to be less condemning and more willing to work with the system instead of trying to get us to change it overnight, which was impossible. He came out, I guess, early in 1960 and we had lunch together. He wanted to know where I fitted in, what kind of party work I did and I said, “Well, I’m largely an organization type. I bring people in and try to get them to work together and get things moving. I’m not a fundraiser and I’m not much of a mouthpiece because we have others who like that role.” I didn’t particularly, so I was more one of those who got to know the people in the party all around the state—especially Northern

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California—and tried to establish a rapport with them and a mutual confidence so that they had a reading of me and I of them. When I’d call them and ask them something or talk to them about something, I hoped to try to arrive at some sort of an accurate assessment of what they were really telling me through that.

O’BRIEN: At this point, did he ever discuss other people in the Kennedy campaign here in the state?

GATOV: Did Pierre?

O’BRIEN: No, Larry O’Brien. Did he have an assessment of the effectiveness of the individuals?

GATOV: Yes. And I started right away trying to tell him that I didn't think that many of them knew much about what was happening. By May I guess it was, or maybe even early June, he had sort of appointed me as an unofficial reporter to him. He was stationed by that time in Los Angeles and I was to call him every day with the current reading on what was going on from phoning delegates. Jess was the one for the south. I felt that Jess, in those days, had a very heavyhanded procedure, manner, which was not going to be a helpful thing. I had meanwhile persuaded Hugo Fisher [Hugo M. Fisher], then a state senator from San Diego County, who stopped here one day with some other people from San Diego. We talked about it and he'd read something in The New Republic; and anyways the combination of things plus the fact that Pat Brown was committed convinced him that he was for Kennedy. He brought five of the six votes from his area with him, which was a pretty sizeable contribution.

Unruh's behavior I never really caught up with until we got down to the Convention into delegate meetings. It was, to me, atrocious since the people we were working on were the amateurs he so despised; they were the Stevenson people. There was no sense trying to go to work on the Johnson and Symingtons; they were there for practical, unemotional reasons. The people that you could win were the Stevensons.

O'BRIEN: What were some of the heavyhanded tactics that....

GATOV: Well, he called for an adjournment, for instance, and we did adjourn, without the next step having been taken. At the moment it doesn't come back to me precisely what that step was, but if it had been taken it would have mollified a lot of people. It was a roll call on a procedure of some sort and he didn't want the roll call taken, so he just moved to adjourn and adjourned it without the roll call.

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We stood adjourned for two days. People resented it very much because they were angry and resented such tactics, if they were typical of the way the Kennedy people were going to behave. Of course all the stories were being peddled that possibly could be, about the steamroller and all this. Jess was making it true; he was the living symbol of the thing that they resented most.

O'BRIEN: Is there anything else about Unruh at that point that....

GATOV: Not up to that point, no. Unruh emerged as in charge of the Southern California campaign. Oh, Larry and some of the others said—who talked about California politics, and Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] who was one of them, too—that “We're damn sick and tired of being telephoned to by six different people from California. We want one person to talk to. Now we have selected that one person, and that person is Jess.” Well, this didn't make us very happy up here in the north. I'm not sure that they fully appreciated the fact that campaigns would be separately run north and south, separately financed, and that there was really, except for the shipment of bodies around, mighty little communication between the two.

Then about August some of us in the campaign went to Washington for a meeting with Bobby and I think Dick Scammon [Richard M. Scammon] who was in charge of something to do with the voter turnout operation. Jess was given, I thought, a very sizeable chunk of money—like a hundred thousand dollars, or possibly even more than that—for voter turnout. He decided what he was going to do with it, and on paper it looked great, but you knew in the California sense that it wasn't going to work. He was going to hire “x” number of students at ten dollars per, and then they would recruit and the whole thing would be handled in a very business-like fashion. What he made no effort to do was to win friends, or so it seemed to us up here who had been the activist Stevenson people. He just gave the back of his hand to the people who had been CDC types, who had been Stevenson types. He didn't want them cluttering up the landscape at all and had no room for them in his operation. So, as a result, they—being temperamental a lot of them, and feeling injured—sat on their hands. Now, I'm not sure they would have made the difference in what happened, but to me it's political nonsense to even take the chance.

O'BRIEN: Well, did this kind of opposition to Unruh contribute to the fact that there was a kind of waiting period there before he was officially named chairman?

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GATOV: No, I think we assumed he was going to be. No, I don't think that made any difference. I think we knew that he was going to be.

O'BRIEN: What about the relationship between Larry O'Brien and Jess Unruh? Did you get any insight into that?

GATOV: They became very close. I remember, soon after I got to Washington, seeing Larry about something in his office in the White House and he said that he was on his way out to Los Angeles to go to a birthday testimonial dinner for Jess. I didn't say anything.

Why don't I just start talking about the reason I feel the way I do about him and did then? He seemed to feel that it was necessary for him to be at odds with the Governor, that in order to gain stature for himself he had to oppose the Governor and make him look like an ass. It may have been true, but I didn't look at it that way, and a lot of people in the north did not who felt that Brown was a good Governor. Given some support from the people who should support him, he would conceivably even be a great Governor; he certainly had good programs and the arguments were never over programs; they were over something really quite petty.

As I said, Jess made no effort to win the edgy Democrats who were prima donnas—they were a blooming nuisance, but they were available and he didn't bother to avail himself of them. An enormous amount of money, in our view, was poured into the Southern California campaign and it did not produce. It didn't produce in terms of, first of all, votes for Kennedy; it didn't produce in terms of percentage of voters turned out—it was no higher for all the dough that he put in it—and there was a constant hammering on his part about the

stupidity of trying to get volunteers to do something. Well, we had never had enough money up here to do it in a professional way, and furthermore when you could educate and train volunteers who wanted to do the thing, it seemed to us that you were probably going to get better coverage of precincts from people who cared about it, than you were if you just said, "Come around and see me afterward and I'll pay you, and turn in your sheets." This kind of thing was always a bone of contention, because Jess would then go back to Washington and sort of figuratively pat himself on the chest and say, "See what a beautiful job I did?" He hadn't.

To me Jess was then and still is, interested in building up only one person who is Jess Unruh. He latched on to the Kennedys as a very, very valuable prop to him, and they liked the fact that he talked the language they basically understood; this was the way things were done in Massachusetts and it was easier. There is no question that it was easier.

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So we get now into the primary last spring ('68). I was in New York at the time that Bobby decided to announce so I sent a telegram to Jess out here, knowing—absolutely certain—that if anything happened here Jess would be in charge of it, and urging him to urge Bobby into the primary. When I got back home there was a message to please call somebody or other, so I did. Would I go on the delegation? "Sure," and then would I please come in and sign the papers and see what I could suggest about the campaign structure?

The first thing I discovered was that there was to be no Northern California campaign. Jess was going to change the pattern that had for better or worse worked, somehow or other, over an awfully long period of years, yet this was going to be a county campaign: county, by county, by county. Well, it didn't take very long to figure out that the reason for this was that he didn't want a Northern California structure. The chances appeared to be—and I haven't checked the votes so I don't know whether this turned out to be the case—but the chances at that time looked as though Northern California was going to be better territory for Bobby than Southern California. Jess was not about to have a northern chairman up here who could say "I did a great job and we got the vote out," so deliberately there was to be nothing that was a Northern California operation. It was some kind of really screwy setup that was to be administered by vice chairmen of the delegation—of which he made me one.

But there was to be a San Francisco operation, an Alameda operation, fractured, nothing centralized. Everything was to come through his office. A very nice guy named Ray King, who was a Jess staff person, was put in charge of the headquarters they got in San Francisco. He and Bill Thomas, who had also been on Jess' staff and who was formerly with one of the papers here, took me to lunch that first day. As we were having our first sip of a martini Thomas said, "You know, if Jess can pull this off, this is going to make him Vice President." Well, I didn't say anything, but this was obviously the way they were thinking; he wasn't saying it just for effect, and King was agreeing with him, "This is going to be the greatest show ever."

So we went back to the headquarters and they suggested that I look over the list of people that they had drawn up as county chairmen for Northern California. What they had done, or what somebody had done, was make all the county chairmen legislators, where they

had them. So you had Bob Crown [Robert W. Crown] and Carlos Bee, for instance, in charge of Alameda county, this was the pattern. There's nothing wrong with those people; they're fine people, but they all had their own primary campaigns. They weren't about to divulge a source of money, if they knew of one they were certainly going to hang on tight and nothing was

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going to happen. Indeed, nothing did happen.

Several weeks went by and finally people began calling saying, "I want to start a Kennedy headquarters." King would say, "Sorry, you can't. We're only going to have one chairman. We're not going to have a lot of competitive campaigns in San Mateo County," for instance. When they talked to me I just encouraged them to go right ahead and do it. Anything is better than nothing, and we had nothing.

Finally Bill Evans came up. Bill Orrick [William H. Orrick] I'm sure you've talked to or will talk to. Well, he was very involved in this primary situation, and he is not a great lover of Jess either. He could see what was happening; the whole thing was being strangled in Jess' office in Sacramento. Nobody could be appointed to anything, no announcements could be made. Nothing could happen until it came back out of Jess' office, and he was either out of the state or busy. In any case, it just didn't move at all. Finally Evans came out. He was perfectly cast for the role of trying to find out what's going on because he's such a genial fellow, a big grin and sort of a soft manner. You'd never think that he was really looking for anything particular, but I know that he saw what was happening and it was nothing. Jess' idea of a campaign, whatever it may have been, was not visible, and it certainly did not include people.

Maybe this is the way you do it in Southern California, but in the north we've always spent disproportionately less on a media because we don't have any central media; you'd have to do it all over the north in order to have any impact. You can't just do it in San Francisco. Campaigns depended to a great extent on people who would raise their own money and buy the media time, a much more decentralized kind of campaign than Jess was thinking of putting on. Finally—oh, what was his name who got married? Chuck Spalding [Charles F. Spalding]...

O'BRIEN: Spalding, right.

GATOV: ...came out. He told me (and he felt this was a great coup) he had lined up Gene Tunney, to be a full-time volunteer—John Tunney's [John V. Tunney] brother—in the headquarters in San Francisco. For some reason Spalding couldn't call him that day—it was Sunday and he was going someplace—so would I call him and ask him to show up on Monday. So I called him and he was very nice and said, yes, he'd be delighted and what time and to whom should he report? So I told him, "King," who was in charge, and "Just sit down with some lists and start telephoning into the counties and see what's going on." I didn't go in that day for some reason, and he called me about 5 o'clock here and said, "I've quit. They

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won't let me do a thing. They won't give me a list, and they won't let me use the telephone. They won't even give me a desk. I guess they don't want me," and then he wondered why. I said, "Well, the only reason I can think of is that you've got a brother who might run for the Senate, and Jess doesn't like, probably doesn't want you sitting up here for the rest of this campaign getting to know people in Northern California and putting together lists of contacts which you would then use for your brother. I can't think of any other reason." He concluded that probably was it; I don't know whether it was or not, but in any case, I can't imagine why else you would be so rejecting of a bright young man with time and brains. We weren't that plush.

Anyway, finally I went to speak to Chuck Spalding in the headquarters and said I thought what was going on was a disaster, that there was no campaign, and to the extent that it was important to the outcome of it, well, it just was going very, very badly. We weren't making any headway because we had no way of making any headway. So the next thing I knew was grapevine, that is that had the ring of plausibility. In fact, it turned out that what I was told had happened, had happened. I was told that Steve Smith came out and met with Jess and, in effect, said, "Either you get out of the campaign, or you relinquish the leadership of it." Jess, not being stupid, just quietly faded into the background, and then things began to happen, but an awful lot of valuable time had been lost.

O'BRIEN:           We're about through with this side of the tape. I'd like to pursue that about organization.

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

O'BRIEN:           Besides the people we were talking about, did you or did anyone else, particularly in this Northern California group, have any communications with the Kennedy men and suggest that Jess Unruh's organization plan was not really effective?

GATOV:            Yes, yes, Bill Orrick was the other one. Bill kept calling back and talking to Ted [Edward M. Kennedy] and various people in Ted's office, and in Bobby's office. He knew them well because he had been Assistant Attorney General, or Deputy Attorney General, assistant I think it was, and so we sort of delegated to him. When I say "we" this included, I would say, half a dozen people or maybe more than that, some of whom were previously unknown to any of the Kennedys. It was a new group that had come up in California called initially, the Committee for California. They were men in their late thirties and early-to-middle forties who had been quite successful in their own fields—you probably know about them.

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O'BRIEN:           Well, I'd like to get down to...

GATOV: Well, Bob Harmon [Robert L. Harmon], Byron Leydecker [Byron W. Leydecker], Alan Becker [Alan D. Becker], Cameron Baker [D. Cameron Baker], and five or six others were totally devoted to Bobby Kennedy and they wanted into that campaign very badly. Orrick and I were the only two people that they knew who had any connection with the Kennedys. These people had energy, brains, secretaries, money, and political experience. They were none of them just fresh caught; they'd been active in the Alioto [Joseph L. Alioto] campaign for mayor just six or eight months earlier. They were the kind of people that anybody would want to have on their side and it was practically impossible for them to get into the campaign; there was just no way.

The word would finally come down from Unruh that, "Well, let them go back into their counties and start organizing in their counties." Well, you know the bedroom situation such as the Bay Area is though some of them lived in Marin and some of them lived in San Mateo, their roots were not in San Mateo; their effectiveness was in San Francisco, in the East Bay, it was all over the place, it was all over Northern California, but it was not confined to any one geographical area. We had many meetings in Harmon's office that Bill Orrick was at about "How do we get in?" Not me, because I was in and Orrick was in, but how could we get these people in? Galbraith [Carl B. Galbraith?] was another one who was living out here, and a young man named Traynor [Michael Traynor] who's the son of the chief justice of California. This was the caliber. They were great people. Finally they were permitted to take on the fundraising gala as their project, but they never were let in, really, to the structure. Of course, by the time they broke Jess' hold on it, nobody was worrying about structures; we were moving frantically in all directions at once and bringing people up from the south to help and so forth.

I just want to make one comment here: I have enormous regard for Jess Unruh's talents as a legislator. I think he's brilliant and he knows what's going on in the chamber that he sits in every minute, but to me it's quite a different kind of talent to put on a political campaign. I don't think he's going about his own in a very much better fashion than he did the Kennedy one, so I don't think he learned very much. But we'll see. Maybe I'm wrong.

O'BRIEN: Well, it will be interesting. Well, in this regard, particularly among the people on Senator Kennedy's staff, who were the people there that Orrick, for example, was communicating with and getting through to? For example, would they be younger people? Some of the

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older people that were....

GATOV: I presume. I don't recall the names now, though Bill and I exchanged information about every other day. Some of the time he talked to Bob, himself.

O'BRIEN: Right.

GATOV: As the campaign got going he realized that he just couldn't do that any more because he was too busy doing other things. Bill did talk to Steve Smith. I just don't really recall. I presume that they were people that he knew personally who were on the staff rather than whatever they might represent.

O'BRIEN: Well, we've sort of drifted up to 1968, let's go back to 1960 for a bit. Oh, one thing I was rather curious about when we were going through the tape a little earlier on the other side: do you recall anything of interest in your visits over to the Kennedy home in Georgetown in the way of, oh, personal insights into the family or anything of this sort?

GATOV: Well, of course, Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] interested me very much, naturally, because if there was going to be a campaign the candidate's wife is a very important factor for either good or ill—and I've been in quite a few when it was ill; you just wished she'd get on a boat and go around the world—so I was very interested in trying to figure out for myself what Mrs. Kennedy's role would be and how interested she was. I came to the conclusion that she really didn't like politics very much and she didn't really like politicians or people connected with it very much. She was, of course, always perfectly charming to everybody and made them feel as though she didn't think it was a waste of time.

She came out here several times with him and I found out quickly that she didn't want to go into a room that was full of people. Normally we have, or we used to have, a small room—oh, perhaps the size of this living room where the head table would gather and have cocktails and they'd be lined up so that they'd go in the proper order. Then there would be a large cocktail party of everybody else taking up the whole ballroom. Part of our travel folklore is that the guest of honor goes into where the mob is. Of course, he can't meet them all, but at least he's there and the people get a chance to know that he's been in that room. If the wives will, we take them along, too. Well, she didn't want any part of that. My own feeling was that she was really shy about this kind of people, that

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she couldn't relate easily to the miscellaneous sorts of individuals that you'd find in the political context. She wasn't comfortable with them and so when she was with him I'd try to find a couple of people—attractive, rather urbane men—to spend that period of time with her in the head table room and help make it as pleasant and as easy for her as possible. Well, I had the feeling that he was a very warm person and that she wasn't necessarily. I don't want to be sounding critical because I don't feel critical, but in fact I think if you're doing the kind of thing I was doing, you were always trying to assess people so you'd know what their predictability might be—to use an easy word—how they're likely to react to something that comes up in the future.

O'BRIEN: Right. Well, did she ever develop any associations or friendships with people in California...

GATOV: Not that I know of.

O'BRIEN: ...as a result of this contact?

GATOV: Not that I know of. She wasn't exposed to enough people to really know who more than half a dozen of them were, I think.

O'BRIEN: She made a rather favorable impression, as I understand it...

GATOV: Oh, enormously, enormously.

O'BRIEN: ...when she was out here.

GATOV: Oh, yes, because just the way she walked into a room or the way she stood up at a table when she was introduced and smiled, that was all she ever had to do. Oh, they adored her, but I don't think she knew who they were, any of them. In other words, she didn't seem to want to be present when political matters were being discussed, as though this was not part of her life. She was very gracious about anything she was ever asked to do, but as I say, we quickly found out that there were certain things that you just weren't about to ask her to do. It wasn't from anything that she said or any orders that I recall being given, but you just realized that she didn't want to be interviewed, she didn't want to be taken aside and have a little T.V. bit or interview with the women's editors, this kind of thing. She was a very private kind of person basically, with charm and brains and infinite capacity to win people without doing anything much more than just standing up and sitting down. It

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worked magnificently; we always wanted her to come and she was pretty good about responding. We didn't—out here at any rate—ever tax her with the kinds of things we felt she just didn't want to do at all.

O'BRIEN: In making arrangements on these visits, who did you deal with on Senator Kennedy's staff?

GATOV: Ted Sorensen was mostly the person that I dealt with initially. Then, well, an awful lot used to go on between Pierre and Andy Hatcher [Andrew T. Hatcher] and us, just because we all knew each other. I gathered that this was sort of out of the general routine. We didn't have a great deal to do with Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell]. We had a lot to do with Larry O'Brien because he'd stayed here so long. I think we just naturally gravitated toward the people that we thought we could do business with most easily.

O'BRIEN: How about Powers [David F. Powers]? Did you have much to do with Dave?

GATOV: I didn't, no.

O'BRIEN: Well, you had the Jefferson-Jackson Day thing in San Francisco, but what were some of the more important events that happened in Northern California in that pre-primary effort?

GATOV: There were two events that were extremely effective. Kennedy had come into Los Angeles and was then coming to San Francisco to a sort of candidates' night where we had Symington and a representative of Johnson's and Kennedy. I went down to Los Angeles for the Los Angeles dinner. It was shortly after the West Virginia campaign. I got the feeling from listening to him—he had, of course, a perfectly well-prepared text and so forth but he was ad-libbing a good deal of it—and I got the feeling that he had been very moved and affected by what he'd seen in West Virginia. Up to that time poverty and deprivation and malnutrition and all these things were intellectual concepts and they were undesirable, but it didn't really hit him until he got there. At least as he was describing what he saw in West Virginia it just made goosepimples come up; he was tremendously effective on it.

He came to San Francisco the next day. We had set up sort of a revolving-door activity for the Northern California delegates and alternates to meet Senator Kennedy where we could get them to come. We had a suite at the Fairmont, and it was

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scheduled about five minutes or three minutes per delegate. He, Senator Kennedy, was in an inside room and they would be taken in by me or Jack Abbott or somebody and introduced. Then we would leave them alone to talk so that the delegate had some privacy with him. We'd be standing outside the door as they came out, trying to get a reading on how it had gone.

One particularly amusing incident had to do with a couple who had come down from Eureka, which is way up in the north, and the wife was very, very pregnant indeed with her third child. They went in, saw Kennedy, came out the other side. I knew them slightly so I asked how it went and they both beamed happily and said, "You know, I think he believes in birth control." [Laughter] The timing at the moment was perfectly wonderful. This was their big thing and they apparently had asked him. I don't know what he said, but whatever he said satisfied them completely. They were a pair of Unitarians.

The husband of this pair was the delegate. This was his first Convention and he knew very little about politics. He'd been a contributor and fund-raiser for my Congressman, Clem Miller [Clement W. Miller], who decided that he wasn't going to go to that Convention, so he put Rost in, Clayton Rost [Clayton O. Rost], in his stead. Clayton Rost later, in 1968 was one of the three-man committee that held out, refused to take "no" for an answer from Bobby Kennedy's office that he was not coming into the California primary, and so they filed, at the very last possible minute, a delegation pledged to Robert Kennedy, to be headed by Robert Kennedy, even without his permission. If they hadn't done that his name wouldn't have been on the California primary ballot.

O'BRIEN: Is that right?

GATOV: He's now an attorney practicing law in Palo Alto. He understood the elections code. There was another group forming that would be pledged to Kennedy but somebody else's name would be on the ballot as head of the delegation. Rost filed a delegation to be headed by Robert Kennedy, a procedure which requires the consent of the candidate. The next day, I think, Kennedy made his decision to run in California. But if Rost hadn't filed without permission, Kennedy's name wouldn't have been on the ballot.

O'BRIEN: In that pre-election activity there in 1960, were you contacted by any other candidates in their campaigns?

GATOV: Oh, yes. You mean like Symington...

O'BRIEN: Right, Symington, the Johnson campaign.

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GATOV: ...and Johnson? Oh, sure. Because I was on the National Committee and we were certain to be delegates. The first overt approaches were made in Albuquerque when we had a meeting of something called the Western States' Conference, which was the National Committee members and the state chairmen. It was held in a motel outside of Albuquerque. Since we'd all flown in, nobody had a car; you couldn't get out of the place. It was a good spot to put this kind of a candidates' meeting on. Johnson was the first one, Friday afternoon, as I recall. It was on this occasion that Paul Ziffren, the California National Committeeman, teed off on Johnson in the lobby of the place in front of all the cameras. I don't remember what he called him but a lot of very unpleasant names and, well, he made that day's headlines.

The pressures were considerable, and there was no escape. You'd no sooner gotten to your room, in my case, than the telephone rang. It was somebody from Texas, "Won't you come out and meet them and have a drink?" So we did. There must have been seventy-five Texans and there were thirty-five delegates, one on each side. They wouldn't let you out of their sight, telling you in every possibly way what a great fellow and what a fine Westerner Lyndon Johnson was. Then we went into a room about 5:30, I guess, and he was to make a speech to us. As I recall, he talked for thirty-seven minutes, and he called himself a Westerner twenty-seven times—none of the southern stuff for him. He was making the identification as best he could, but I felt that, in my view, it was a very amateurish approach because this was not the point. The point was, what do you think about various things of importance? We wanted to get to know the man, and all we got was a pretty impressive histrionic display of his oratorical powers.

O'BRIEN: He never liked California, did he?

GATOV: No, he didn't, and he had a reason not to. Months before Albuquerque, Hugo Fisher, state senator from San Diego, and I had been at a state central committee executive committee meeting in San Diego. Hugo, who had a lot to do with Texans, asked me if I would talk to two men he had in tow to explain to them why Johnson should not come into the California primary. I can only assume that Hugo asked me to do it because he didn't wish to do it himself, because if you had to get basic about it, it was not going to be flattering to Johnson and I think Hugo had campaign contributions from them and so on. So, we sat out on a balcony that evening and these two fellows and I went through the whole catalog trying to explain that Johnson did not fit the temper of the Democrats in California as we felt they were, as we hoped they'd remain—which is

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essentially that of the Pat Brown variety of liberal Democrat. We didn't regard Johnson as a liberal Democrat; we didn't think he was right on the race issue; we didn't think he was right on very much of anything. He would find support in the central valley from fugitives from the South—and there are a lot of them down there—but he would not go over in the cities where the votes are. Therefore he shouldn't come in.

The Texans were quite sure my estimate was all wrong. Wouldn't Don Bradley and I come down to the ranch? They would send a plane for us. I said I didn't like small planes. "What would you like?" It was my first exposure to the sort of sweeping way they do things. Well, we never did go because there wasn't anything to be gained by it for any of us. Some of the delegates, like George Killion, for instance, were publicly for Johnson, and committed, had economic reasons for so being. And this was perfectly understandable but there were an awful lot of delegates who didn't have any economic reason for even being in politics. He couldn't get them.

Symington was an old friend of California Democrats; he'd been out here many times and had been very helpful to us. Some of us felt that his candidacy was kind of a holding operation, too, for Johnson; that Symington wasn't going to be going anywhere but was just an added starter to pull votes from Kennedy. The fight was between Johnson and Kennedy, and, as I say, Stevenson, who just cannot be discounted in any consideration of the pre-primary, pre-Convention period in California because his supporters were really moving.

O'BRIEN: Were any pressures or promises that you can recall from the Johnson people related to the water resources program that was underground?

GATOV: There may have been, there may have been.

O'BRIEN: Were you ever aware of any of these? Was it ever suggested to you or....

GATOV: No, Clair Engle, the Senator that I mentioned, was the closest tie that I had to Johnson. He appointed himself in charge of Johnson's campaign in California after the Convention and kept him out of the cities and so forth.

Clair was a water man and as Chairman of the House Interior Committee for many years, had had an enormous amount to do with water development in California. Clair, I think, understood the temper of the delegates sufficiently, so he didn't try to use it as a pressure. But if that was Johnson's appeal it's a natural that Clair would have been with him.

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O'BRIEN: Sure. Well, how about Ziffren's removal as National Committeeman? What were the factors that went into this? Did the Kennedy campaign get involved in this at all at this point?

GATOV: Well, Ziffren was playing both ends against the middle. He was ostensible for Kennedy, and as he later put it, "I, personally, am committed to Kennedy," but that's all he did about it. Because our seats were next to each other on the Convention floor, I couldn't help knowing what he was doing during some of the lulls in the sessions. There was a lot of hanky-panky about tickets: gallery tickets, tickets beyond a certain minimum number. I know Reinsch knew something was going on and he didn't know how to stop it. A young woman, whose first name is Barbara—and I can't remember her last name; she was not a delegate—kept popping up on the floor. Ziffren was sitting on the aisle and I was sitting next to him. When I was in my seat she'd sit in Ziffren's lap and they would confer. It turned out that what they were conferring about was the Stevenson demonstration that was going to occur, so Ziffren was maintaining his connections very well indeed with the Stevenson people and wasn't about to lose that. He, to my knowledge, never did anything for Jack Kennedy until after the Convention. As I say, I couldn't help hearing the conversations they were having about what they were going to do and when and exactly how the thing was to be programmed in the balconies, and the demonstrations outside, and the pickets, and all of it.

O'BRIEN: Barbara.... Was Don Rose [Donald W. Rose] involved in that at all?

GATOV: He may have been, I don't know.

O'BRIEN: You never saw him though at any point?

GATOV: No, he could have been, but I don't know.

O'BRIEN: Well, going back—I'm retreating a little bit—before the Convention, did you get into any of the meetings that took place down in Southern California at the Lytton [Bart Lytton] and....

GATOV: Well, I went to a party at the Lyttons' during the Convention, incredible, incredible. Bart had an amplifier he kept talking into. I really never got into Southern California maneuverings any more than was absolutely necessary for me to get to know a few people. It was much

too complicated for me, and it didn't pertain because my experience was that the relationships down there changed every four or five months and I couldn't really keep up with it.

O'BRIEN: Getting back to Ziffren, where did the real push for Ziffren's relief, in a sense, come from? The removal. From Brown?

GATOV: The Governor.

O'BRIEN: Was that move universally supported?

GATOV: Not universally, but pretty overwhelmingly. There were two sets of people counting the delegation votes. There were our side, which was the Mosk [Stanley Mosk]-Brown side, and the Ziffren side. Presumably we'd all been talking to the same people, but we had the count within one vote of what happened at the delegation meeting, and they were obviously off, according to their announcements.

O'BRIEN: Did the Kennedy people ever consider going after the CDC groups, particularly that group that met in Fresno in 1960?

GATOV: Yes. Kennedy appeared before them—Fresno was their annual convention—and was very good, though I think his topic was a little unfortunate. He was in an historical mood at that time, during those days. He had to have something to talk about and he was talking about the powers of the Presidency. It might have been better had he had a speech that was a little more geared to citizen's participation: "What we need is an intelligent electorate, and all these fine people like you form leadership groups in your communities," this sort of thing. It was an inappropriate speech, but it went over beautifully because what came through was his personality. It was so good, if we had had help from Jesse, it would have made a difference. But he was so violently anti-CDC in those days he couldn't see the usefulness of those several thousand people. Had he been able to get over that and include them in the Kennedy campaign in Southern California, I really think that he might have carried California. He came awfully close—thirty thousand votes, wasn't it? With those people involved, it could have made the difference. We certainly had them involved up here with no trouble because they were dealing with people who were former CDC's, or at least sympathetic, and had been around the track with them. They knew what they were being asked to do and were not being shut out. Kennedy carried the fifty northern counties by one hundred and fifty thousand but lost

the south heavily.

O'BRIEN: Did you get involved in Brown's decision to run as a Favorite Son, or to go the Favorite Son route?

GATOV: No. You have to go back far enough to realize that was done in the fall, about the time Kennedy was, if anything, just beginning to set up shop in the Esso Building; not much was happening. Really all they had was a few people like myself who kept going back to Washington, coming out with these messages, saying, "He is going to run," and so forth. The more Pat heard about the fact there were going to be a variety of candidates, the more sensible it seemed to him to put together a favorite son delegation rather than have a lot of competing ones, which in the past have had a very unfortunate effect on the general election campaign no matter who wins.

The primary we're getting into now in the governorship—Alioto and Unruh—looks as though it could be a bad one. Even if Reagan [Ronald Reagan] were politically weak, which he's certainly not, neither of them would win the general election because they would so cut each other up. We get so bitter and vitriolic in interparty fights, we can't unite and win. The Republican nominee simply picks up what was said about the Democratic winner by the loser and adds that to his own troops and he's got it. [Interruption]

The test of the Presidential primary in California is essentially a self-defeating thing. I'm not sure people understand that in other parts of the country where apparently they're able to get through these things with less vitriol and few casualties. It has been demonstrated over and over again that you can win the primary all right and get the delegation and get all those nice votes, but you don't necessarily win the state, which is what you care about in November. I have never felt that Pat's position on this was adequately appreciated outside of California; I think many people in the state do understand it. He was not trying to dominate the thing; he was, God knows, never running for President, but in order to head the delegation you have to be a favorite son in this situation. The only excuse that you have to prevent other bona fide candidates from coming in a primary is party unity. Of course, the charge is always made that the voters are being deprived of their right to express their views. [Interruption]

I feel that Pat thought he was doing the best possible thing for the Democratic Party and for the candidates by putting together a broadly representative delegation which he would head with no idea of ever being placed in nomination.

O'BRIEN: Well, is he aware at this point, in 1959 and 1960,

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of the dangers of a primary fight?

GATOV: You mean, dangers for him?

O'BRIEN: Well, dangers for him and dangers for the whole Democratic Party.

GATOV: Yes I think so. I think it was because he didn't want to see the party fractured with a lot of competing delegations and people who would hate each other forever after. For instance, his delegation in '52, again a Favorite Son one, was defeated by Kefauver. At that time Pat kept running around the state saying, "I just want it made clear that I'm not the candidate for the Presidency." So, running against a living, breathing candidate, to nobody's surprise, he and his delegation were beaten something like two-and-a-half or three-to-one—the Kefauver people, if I may refer to them that way, stuck together as an embattled minority within the party for really quite a long time. They were still a problem in 1960, some of the same individuals who never got over the feeling that they'd been defrauded of the nomination in 1952 by a lot of "goings on" in Chicago. I went to that Convention on the delegation train with some rather flimsy press credentials. It was an absolutely fascinating excursion for me, because I saw how paranoia can affect people in a closed environment. There they were on the train, subject to all sorts of rumors, and some of them never got over those rumors—"They are out to manage me." And as I say, they were still a trouble eight years later.

O'BRIEN: Did you ever try to communicate this to people who were in the national campaign strategy, people like Larry O'Brien?

GATOV: Oh, yes.

O'BRIEN: Did they ever really develop a sensitivity to that?

GATOV: No. They developed nothing, it seemed to me, but contempt for Pat Brown, called him weak and shilly-shally, he couldn't seem to make up his mind what he was going to do. "Why didn't he come out and announce that he was for Kennedy?" As much as I wanted him to do all these things—and I certainly understood their desire—I also had to understand his point of view and why he felt that it would be politically bad for him to do it, until the time that he finally did it, which was after the primary.

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O'BRIEN: He was always personally rather nervous or on edge when he was around either Senator Kennedy or some....

GATOV: Oh, yes.

O'BRIEN: Did that extend to some of the people around Kennedy as well, like Larry O'Brien?

GATOV: I think so.

O'BRIEN: Ever have any particular insights into any of these meetings?

GATOV: Well, yes. The best insight I had was when Pat came to Washington—I think it was about the eight of January 1962—to talk to the National Press Club. This was the beginning warmup on any high level for his campaign for reelection. As you know, they don't let women into the National Press Club, but some friends of mine, women in the press, arranged for me to join them in the balcony. So, I sat up there and looked down on this array. The place was packed. The White House staff was very well represented; just about everybody I knew was there, sitting at the head table.

Pat was introduced in a very rude and offhand fashion by somebody, I don't know who it was, but Pat was such a decent guy it just rolled off him. I don't think he knew that he was being badly treated. He got up and gave a recital about what happened in California in the last four years. It was so good that when he finished and they got to the question period, there was a long pause and finally somebody stood up and said, "Governor, what's the cost of a one-way ticket?" There were hardly any questions because he had covered everything in such detail. They didn't know enough about what was happening in California to be able to ask him any more questions about the water situation, or education, which was big at that time. He really was sensationally good. It was the best I've ever seen him. Direct and thorough.

I went later with him to the White House and we went up to the President's private living room. He'd been well briefed on the luncheon and he gave Pat a very warm welcome. He said, "I hear you've stormed Washington and it's yours." Pat was very happy about it, but there he sat with his trouser legs half way up his shins, the socks down, his tan shoes, and you knew that he was uncomfortable but he was trying not to be. He knew that the Kennedys just didn't like him and he wasn't their kind of guy, but he wanted to be; he wanted to be their friend. He could never have been anyplace else except for Kennedy in 1960, but they never would accept that. I know in their frame of reference you can't leave anything to chance; it has to be signed and

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sealed and witnessed in blood, practically, but Pat could never have wound up anyplace except for Jack Kennedy at the Convention.

O'BRIEN: Well, how about the people around Pat Brown? I'm thinking primarily of Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] and Tuck [Richard G. Tuck]. Were these people ever ambitious for him?

GATOV: I don't think they were ambitious for him; they were ambitious for themselves through him. Dutton is a very gifted man, but I never felt that he was able to put anybody's fortunes ahead of his own. Loyalty was something that had to have some other ingredient besides just loyalty. He was one of the reasons that Pat Brown was thought so poorly of by the Kennedys.

O'BRIEN: Oh, is that right?

GATOV: Yes.

O'BRIEN: But then Dutton finds his way on the White House staff. What? How?

GATOV: Well, when you meet him you'll realize you're meeting a person with a mind about as fast as any you'll come across; a real computer, keeps everything tidily in order. He's very articulate, good political instincts. You'd have no differences—I shouldn't say "you," but I would have no differences with him on any political basis at all. What I object is his using a person and sort of standing on his neck while he takes the next step up.

He was advancing himself at the expense of Pat by ridiculing Pat all the way through this winter of 1960. He would say such things as, "Of course, Pat Brown's an ass. The only sensible political moves he's ever made are those that I told him to make or was able to persuade him to make," this kind of non-specific slighting. It's easy to make an ass out of a person like Pat who essentially is a simple person. That is, I say "Simple" in the best sense because he likes money; he likes power, but has a great sense of responsibility about power. I should have said he's uncomplicated. He agonized particularly over judgeships, which he felt were the most important decisions he made. He was under terrific pressures all the time about them, and he would keep saying, "I want to get the best man because he'll be there when I'm

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gone." To me Pat's legacy has been tremendous, but a person with a brain like Dutton's can always make somebody who's not facile, not defensive, not sarcastic, look sort of stupid. Pat's rather simple origins and so forth were used against him.

O'BRIEN: How about Dick Tuck? I think the Kennedys were a little irritated at Tuck in that campaign as I understand.

GATOV: Well, you couldn't help but be irritated with Tuck at times. He was a student of mine when I was on the staff of Coro Foundation. He was an intern, so I got to know him initially there. He's a great second-story man. He learned how to forge passes to the Convention floor, for instance, in 1956; within twenty-four hours he had a whole handful of them and probably more besides. He would just casually say, "Well, I knew where to go get them," and they were delegate badges. You know, all carefully conceived with the most intricate security and you moved them around Chicago as though you were in a Brinks truck: signing in, signing out, everybody knew, everybody accounted for, and here was Tuck with a whole briefcaseful. Well, it's a special kind of talent. You know, he lives by his wits and by Dutton's wits. And wherever Dutton goes, he goes, too.

O'BRIEN: Oh, they're closely tied together?

GATOV: Oh, yes, very. Dutton, when he was in Washington, was always worrying about Tuck's employment, what he was going to use for eating. He managed to get him into consultant jobs and this kind of thing.

[Interruption] He's uncontrollable.

O'BRIEN:           Apparently, a fascinating personality.

GATOV:             Absolutely fascinating, engaging type.

O'BRIEN:           I think there's some things in the campaign in 1960 that might be interesting to pursue. When the campaign was organized for Northern California, you had the regular Democratic organizations and then you had the Citizens for Kennedy movement. Did you get into any real problem of conflict, or....

GATOV:             No, I think we looked on the Citizens with a sort of a mild contempt and felt, "Well, I guess this is useful and we'll just keep track of them and be friends with them and hope that they don't create problems.

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Admiral Harlee [John Harlee], who was in charge, is probably the most serious minded man I've ever met in my life. He was so earnest, and he wanted so hard to do the right thing and have everything go well, that pretty soon we got to be friends with him. He got over his initial mistrust of us, so then he just calls up, and says, "This is what I want to do. Is this all right?" We didn't have any trouble with them. They filled a niche, but I don't think it fooled anybody because we're not that partisan a state; it didn't matter that much.

O'BRIEN:           Who organized the campaign for Northern California or ran the Kennedy campaign for Northern California?

GATOV:             Well, Don Bradley was the pro, the campaign manager. Jess wouldn't let him into Southern California.

O'BRIEN:           Did you get a good deal of cooperation from ethnic groups in that campaign?

GATOV:             Yes. Very good, and we went after them, but we had had them with us before; it wasn't a new adventure, though I think the emergence of Kennedy gave impetus to the Mexican-American political development which had been almost nonexistent up to that time. They didn't vote, really, and they didn't register and their women, you know, never participated at all in anything. The Blacks were with us anyway at that moment because they'd been for Brown so hard in '58 that they just moved in. Kennedy did give new life and self-esteem, and hope, I guess, and a lot of professional help, in organizing the Mexican-Americans.

O'BRIEN:           Who were your contacts, contact person, your person that dealt with the Mexican-Americans here in Northern California? Do you recall?

GATOV: It's the same one we had last spring. A very handsome man, grey hair and...

O'BRIEN: I know his name, too, and...

GATOV: ...looks like Ezio Pinza. It was Bert Corona. [Interruption] Sorry about this.

O'BRIEN: How about blacks? Who were your contacts with some Negro groups and, I guess, particularly in San Francisco and....

GATOV: That has been handled on a fragmented basis, more

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fragmented, increasingly as time's gone on. I'm trying to think back to 1960 and who it would have been. Well, Cecil Poole [Cecil F. Poole] was very close to Pat Brown. Kennedy then made him the first black United States attorney in the country.

O'BRIEN: Yes. No, I've got him confused with someone else.

GATOV: Well, Cecil Poole, who had been on the attorney general's staff and then went to Sacramento with Brown as clemency secretary, was appointed U.S. attorney. That's the big federal legal plum, isn't it? It's not the bench. I remember Bob Kennedy discussing it with me before the appointment: Did I think it would go over, be accepted without much repercussion? I thought it would, and it was.

A man who's a dentist named Dan Collins [Daniel A. Collins] and Byron Rumford [William Byron Rumford] in Berkeley—these people do not have much leverage in the black community currently, but this was nearly ten years ago. They were the leadership then, as far as doing business with them was concerned, and some others that you couldn't seem to get along with like Dr. Carlton Goodlett. There were some ministers who were very helpful but I don't remember their names, unfortunately. One was Rev. Haines.

O'BRIEN: Well, a little while later I'd like to come back to '68, particularly on these communities, and perhaps talk about some of the changes that have taken place.

GATOV: They've been considerable.

O'BRIEN: How about the Chinese-American community?

GATOV: We don't do terribly well in there, and part of the reason, I think, is that we've never gotten—when I say “we,” the Democrats, in general—have never gotten into the Chinese community sufficiently. They get very

nervous at any threat of reassessing the situation vis-à-vis Chiang Kai-Shek, the community here is all Nationalist China oriented. They're more anti-communist than Rafferty [Max L. Rafferty], so, by and large, they felt the Democrats were too soft on this particular issue. For years we've done business with the same people, a man named Jack Chow [William Jack Chow], and then his brother who died. Chow probably has imported more Chinese into the United States than anybody else in the country; he brings them in from Hong Kong in droves. He owns half the restaurants in Chinatown, and that's where they start. There is a young group there, and I'm not sure they didn't go for Bobby Kennedy. One of these days I'm going to look over the election returns, but I just haven't yet, to

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see where he did come through. John Burton [John Lowell Burton], for instance, an assemblyman, a very liberal assemblyman, brother of a Congressman, has Chinatown in his district and carries it regularly, but we're just missing something as far as the statewide campaigns are concerned. Burton isn't, naturally, interested to share it with everybody that comes along.

O'BRIEN: I don't imagine you had any problem with the Italian community in that election either.

GATOVE: No, no.

O'BRIEN: They're normally Democrats. Well, how about the issue of religion here? Kennedy's Catholicism, was it much of a factor?

GATOV: Well, that is one reason that Kennedy did better in Northern California. It's not that we did that much better at campaigning, but there are simply more Catholics in Northern California and there are far fewer Bible Belt types. The Protestant community is far more ecumenical here; partly it's the personalities involved, I think. Father McGucken [Joseph T. McGucken] is the Archbishop of this Diocese—I believe that's his title—for Northern California. He's a very genial, tolerant, wise, urbane man. Quite a different kettle of fish from Cardinal McIntyre [James F.A. McIntyre], who makes racist pronouncements. McIntyre is all that the liberals don't like, so he loses them to start with, and then just collides with rigid people like the Fundamentalists. We have very few Fundamentalists around here, so it really just isn't much of a problem. We're more of a racial and religious ethnic mix.

O'BRIEN: In 1960, did you use—I shouldn't say "use." Let's put it this way: Did you put any emphasis on Kennedy as a Catholic in the campaign?

GATOV: No, we thought that subject spoke for itself; the Catholics knew very well that he was Catholic.

O'BRIEN: Right.

GATOV: It was not of any great concern to anybody else.

O'BRIEN: Did you have much trouble getting into some other groups? Did you have much trouble with CDC groups and...

GATOV: Far less than they did in the south. I can only remember one person, for instance, in a CDC grouping

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who said, "You didn't take Adlai Stevenson, so you've lost me." I'm sure there were others, but I only happen to be aware of one. In those days the clubs were still alive and perking and a useful political instrument; we could call in to them for workers to various chairmen and we had no trouble.

O'BRIEN: In the late fifties and certainly in 1960, where in Northern California are you raising money?

GATOV: Where?

O'BRIEN: Yes. Are there any groups or prominent individuals, in terms of financing the campaign?

GATOV: Well, Ed Heller was alive in those days, and he was the head of the fundraising for Democrats. Ben Swig [Benjamin H. Swig] was the number two, and Bill Malone was very active in it. We've retained the same group of fundraisers pretty much, though a group of these bright young men are going to replace them before too long—quite soon, as a matter of fact. In 1960, perhaps forty people went to each other; they knew who had how much, and they would get advance commitments.

I think it was about the second of September when Kennedy was on his way to Alaska that he flew out here and stopped at the airport for a fund-raising lunch. We took a room in the upstairs part of the airport, the International Room I think it's called, and eighty-two thousand dollars (\$82,000) came out of the lunch. The candidate said he'd never seen anything quite like it, or at least so fast and so relatively painlessly. Well, of course, the reason it was painless was that it had been worked on since July. They knew exactly who was going to come up with how much. It used to be—this will surprise you I imagine—that we shipped money south from Northern California to help finance their campaigns because they couldn't seem to raise any. Now, it's completely reversed.

O'BRIEN: It's almost a kind of club, this group where the money was coming from, a patrician group of Democratic politicians.

GATOV: Of Jews.

O'BRIEN: ...well, Jews.

GATOV: Jews.

O'BRIEN: Is that right?

GATOV: Largely. Well, Ed Heller was Jewish; Cyril Magnin [Cyril I. Magnin];

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Ben Swig; Malone was Irish, but he's about the only exception. Walter Shorenstein [Walter H. Shorenstein]. Adolph Schuman. The Jewish community in San Francisco has been extremely generous to the Democratic Party; you can just say that categorically. There have been other individuals, but not groups.

O'BRIEN: Well, how about interests, economic interests, businesses? Are there any prominent businesses or real estate operations that....

GATOV: Yes. The real estate operations have, to my knowledge—I'm not the best person for you to talk this over with because I really have never been deeply involved in the finance part. Shipping people, transportation has been a fairly sizeable block, the rice growers, the different commodity groups, and home builders to a certain extent. Banks, absolutely zero. Some from different insurance people, but it's been a one at a time kind of thing.

O'BRIEN: In 1962, of these groups and individuals and everything, where did most of the money come from in financing that campaign that fall?

GATOV: The general in '60?

O'BRIEN: The general in '60.

GATOV: Well, it came from the Swig-Heller-Malone-Magnin operation. And like most fundraisers, at least in my experience, they don't seem to talk very loudly about who their sources are. They jealously guard them and don't say very much about who gave the money to them. They've tended not to make their contributors part of the Finance Committee. In other words, these people would prefer to just collect it and hand it in. We've done fairly well, for instance, in Santa Clara County, which, as you know, is growing enormously. We had a lot of labor money—really a sizeable chunk—and this is handled primarily by Tom Pitts, at least as far as Northern California's concerned.

O'BRIEN: And that comes out of any particular unions or....

GATOV: Oh, he's the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations]. The Auto Workers [United Auto, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implements Workers of America] are mostly in Southern California, I doubt if they had any Teamsters' [International Brotherhood of Teamsters] money, but.... Oh, and then IOLWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union] which is not

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so strong on money, but very strong on personnel. Beyond that I really can't tell you a lot.

Our traditional method, beyond this airport lunch thing, is to then have a dinner and people will take tables, that's the other way. But I don't think we get it in chunks as they do in Southern California. For instance, I forget his real name, but Jake the Barber [John Factor] down there who was reported to be Kennedy's largest single contributor, I heard that he gave \$80,000.

BEGIN TAPE II, SIDE I

O'BRIEN: How did you get appointed Treasurer of the U.S.?

GATOV: I could tell you how I think it worked, at least to the extent that I knew anything about it working. There was an agreement originally between Pat Brown and Clair Engle. They got along very well, those two, as quite different kinds of people but they were able to communicate well. They decided early in December that they would go to Washington, pay a visit to the President-elect, as it were, with a list of deserving Democrats they worked up between them. I presume each one then added his own men. They went back, and I don't remember whether they had dinner or whether they spent the evening, but the next morning Senator Engle called me. It was about 7:30 our time; my son had just gone off to high school, as I recall. He told me that he and Pat Brown had spent the evening with Kennedy, and then Clair said, "How did you ever get to know Kennedy so well?" I didn't want to say that it was because Clair hadn't paid any attention to him all the way through the campaign. He was so in love with Johnson that he couldn't see anybody else.

Clair had been given the job of calling me to ask me if I'd go back as Treasurer. After I recovered my consciousness, I began mumbling around: "It was perfectly lovely of him and so forth, but I really didn't want to go." Clair wasn't listening at all; he thought I was just having hysterics. He was coming out to California on Saturday and we'd talk about it then. He told me that he and Pat had gone together and had a very pleasant evening, "But," he said, "It wasn't until we got you on the list that he had a name he apparently recognized." Well, I may have been number three on the list.

In any case, the other one that came up at the same time that was of a political nature was Hugo Fisher, who was supposed to go back, I believe, as Postmaster General. I'm not sure, but I think that was it. Hugo eventually was shot down by Unruh. I don't know why; I gathered it was: If Unruh wasn't

going to get it, Hugo wasn't going to have it. There were more appointments out of California than any other state. To the point that you sort of had to make jokes in Washington about "I wonder how many we would have gotten if we'd carried for him?" Pennsylvania was particularly unhappy because they did carry and they weren't getting the appointments. The same was true of Connecticut; we heard lots of complaints from them. I think, essentially, they had a talent scout team out for what I would call the nonpolitical jobs, which was where the California emphasis went, to such people as—oh, the Atomic Energy [Commission] chief, Dr. Seaborg [Glenn T. Seaborg], from the University of California.

O'BRIEN: Yes, right.

GATOV: You know, a tall, angular face, he used to be Chancellor of the University. Halaby [Najeeb Elias Halaby] (Head of F.A.A.) is another one. Ed Day [J. Edward Day] was a political one; he was the Postmaster General. I think that was his reward for being the, well, the first prominent Stevenson man to move, because he had been connected with Stevenson's Illinois administration. But, by and large, the California contingent was not political. As I say, there were about three of us, so I don't think they had any big trouble. I think Pat and Clair just agreed generally. They worked from the same base. They didn't have conflicting appointments to suggest, I'm sure.

O'BRIEN: You didn't run into any opposition, did you, in your appointment, that you know of? Either in the state or on the national level?

GATOV: Not that I know of. I did decline it and then accepted it later, but it was for a very personal reason. I just was really not.... It didn't suit my personal plans to go back to Washington. I wanted to stay here and continue my romance that was just getting off to a nice start. I had a very good job, which I liked, as Assistant Labor Commissioner that the Governor had given me. It was just perfect, and aside from the glamour and all.... I want to say this to the credit of the press, two political editors, one was Earl Behrens [Earl C. Behrens] of the Chronicle and the other was a man over here. Both heard the rumor that I'd been offered it, and both called me up and said they'd heard it. I said, "Well, I would rather you didn't mention it because it's been declined, and it makes it embarrassing for the next person that the Administration offers it to." They both said the same thing: "All right. We won't unless it comes on the wire." And they didn't.

I think that's quite remarkable—because it was a week later....

O'BRIEN: Well, when was the next time you saw the President?

GATOV: When I went to the Inauguration, after the election. He wasn't back out here before I went back to Washington. It was very cute. We had a California party the night before the Inaugural.

O'BRIEN: Was that Lyttons'?

GATOV: It was Lyttons'. It cost him twenty thousand dollars. The President was just glorious, and he not only remembered me but he remembered some personal things: Had I found a place to live? All this warm human capacity which was just his greatest asset. With all the brains and everything else, it was this thing I think—the strength, and warmth, and concern—which he projected to an incredible extent.

O'BRIEN: Did you see him again after that?

GATOV: Oh, yes, I saw him several times after that. Several times out here, as I came out usually when he did, seemed like a good idea. A couple of times I came out on the plane with him. Then I was appointed chairman of the savings bonds drive for the federal employees, so I had to go in to see him and have my appointment signed. Then there were several other occasions where Brown was there. There were several things that went on in the White House that for some reason or other I was included in.

O'BRIEN: Let's go over some of those, if you can recall. Do you recall anything specific about any of those that....

GATOV: Yes, I recall, after a trip that I had taken back to California very early in '61, like March, the, well, what then seemed like the far-out left, which had always been a piece of the CDC, was gaining power. I had gone out to a convention, and they hadn't yet begun their real love affair with Kennedy; he was in and they were suspicious and a little bit hostile. They were passing resolutions that were just not good. I remember after I got back getting a call from somebody saying, "The President wants to know what went on," so would I come over and tell him? So I did, and it was just in a very informal way. "I don't think our cause advanced any in that particular group. They seem to be restless and want

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things yesterday and aren't in the mood to wait." He was always interested in anything political.

To go back some to the beginning of that whistlestop train trip, which I don't think he liked and certainly didn't like the thought of, and which White [Theodore H. White] dispenses with in the book as a waste of time and unimportant, to me, psychologically, it was extremely important because the man changed in the course of it. Some of us from here went up to Portland which was where the trip was to begin. He was in a private car hitched on the

back of the train. He had a bad cold, he'd been having trouble with his voice, and he felt lousy.

We had, in the Northern California office, calls from San Diego that morning that they were being cancelled from his forthcoming schedule, and it was, in their view, essential that he come down. They had it worked out, on a time basis, by taking three hours from Los Angeles which had twenty-five hours or something. Los Angeles, of course, wouldn't give it up for San Diego. Anyways, I went back to see him, because I'd said I'd try and said that I hoped that he would reinstitute San Diego, that it was important. It was a different press area, a whole separate thing, a piece of California that doesn't get covered by any other piece, and the votes there are just as good as they are anyplace else. He was feeling cranky and grumpy and said, "Sometimes I feel the people I depend on most don't want me to win this election." Of course, he was just feeling badly.

The next morning I woke up at a switch stop, Dunsmuir, way up in the Sierra—it wasn't a scheduled stop—I got dressed while the train was stopped. It stayed there quite a long time. I got off and there were Kennedy and Pat Brown in their pajamas on the back end of the train in a private car, greeting all these people who were connected with the railroad who had known the train had to stop there; they had passed the word apparently and there was a tremendous collection about 7 o'clock in the morning. They, Pat and Kennedy, hadn't expected anybody.

Well, Kennedy was very stiff, you know, "Good morning," kind of thing and Pat was a little bit better. Then they got down the track to Roseville, which was, I believe, the first official stop. In any case, he first was able to say, "I'm sorry Mrs. Kennedy can't be with me." Then he moved on, "I'm sorry Mrs. Kennedy can't be with me because she's going to have a baby." Well, that took a great deal. John Bartlow Martin was trying to get these things into his speech, sitting there writing it all for him, and Kennedy would look at it and hold it in his hand mostly. By the time we hit Bakersfield he had so loosened up, and the doctors had been able to do something about his throat, and so on, that he was able to say, "I'm sorry my wife can't be with me"—or "Jackie can't be with me because we're going to have a son in November. The reason I

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know it's going to be a son is because she told me." Now, that's quite a ways in a feeling of rapport with people and the ability to let go on some of the New England sense of privacy—fastidiousness, whatever you want to call it—that he just had to shed at some point, and he did shed it.

O'BRIEN: It was from that point on in the campaign.

GATOV: From then on he seemed to be a much looser, more relaxed and funnier, able to say whatever came into his head.

O'BRIEN: During the period between the election and, well, the Brown election in 1962, you had some insight into the relationship between Lyndon Johnson and the Kennedys. Would you care to go into that?

GATOV: Well, I hadn't known Lyndon Johnson, as I've said, really as a person at all before that. He was put in charge of a program whose name escapes me at the moment, but it was equivalent to the Equal [Employment] Opportunity hiring policy. To my amazement, he really got into the thing. I don't know whether he was given it—I don't know why he was given it, it just seems like a curious thing to have given to him, but he moved. The first thing I got in my office was, "How many minority members do you have on your staff and what are their grades?" We sent that back and it had hardly been received before the next one came. "A very poor showing. They're all in the lower grades. What have you done about recruiting for higher grade jobs? If you haven't done anything, please do, and tell us what you're doing." So, we started, and did send teams of people out from the Treasurer's office to Negro colleges and private institutions—anyplace that you would hope to find qualified people. We had some success, not a great deal.

Then I began getting copies of speeches, not only of the President, but the Vice President, and discovered that he was saying things in Florida, of all places, that I never would have dreamed that he would dare mutter at the Reformed Democratic Club in New York. He really went out on this business of racial equality, and particularly employment. This is what he was hitting hardest—and education. I began to revise my personal prejudice really, recognizing two things: He had won the election for Kennedy—if anybody else had been vice presidential candidate Kennedy probably wouldn't have won; I don't see how he could have won; and that Johnson in his own fashion had sold the power centers in the South and he was entitled, really, to good treatment. When I found out that he really

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meant it on this race business, I began to quote him in my speeches, and I'm sure a lot of people did.

Then when the invitations would come, as they did, to come to events at their house—the Elms—to lunches and receptions and so forth, as they got into a lot of that, I did everything I could to go because I felt that I had been pretty well identified as a Kennedy person and I just wanted them to know that here was one, at any rate, that did not share this need to kick him.

I didn't want him for president in 1960, but once he was a member of the team, it seemed to me he performed beautifully. He didn't second-guess; he managed somehow or other to submerge that ego, which I presume was a very difficult thing for him to do.

O'BRIEN: Did you see any evidence of this kind of antagonism?

GATOV: Well, you heard it. I didn't see it particularly, but I heard it because there were a lot of small parties, informal kinds of dinners that were given by Kennedy people for other Kennedy people. You know, just twelve people in for dinner, all part of the administration in some way or other, and no press, and no long white gloves, and just talking. Really, it was brutal, the stories that they were passing, and the jokes, and the inside nasty stuff about Lyndon. I didn't protest, I don't want to pretend I did,

but it seemed unnecessary to me at the time. It was a pretty heady period and they were young people mostly and they were going to run the country for the next decade.

O'BRIEN: Where was it coming from particularly, or do you remember any particular situations in which there was a great deal of antagonism towards Johnson?

GATOV: I didn't hear as much antagonism as I did just ridicule. He wasn't in a position to hurt them, and he was doing—he was behaving, as far as I could tell, just as he was supposed to behave, and as Kennedy wanted him to. He didn't appear to be intruding himself into the office of the Presidency at all, but they were just treating him well, frankly, the way they treated Pat Brown. Maybe this is why I responded: here again was somebody without the education, without the background and the polish and the comfortable sense of familiarity with each other. He is a gauche kind of man; they didn't miss an opportunity to harpoon him. I was told, for instance, that he had two life-sized oil paintings on his walls in his private office. I don't know whether he did or not, I never go into it to see, but this was the kind of stuff that was going around. It didn't advance the cause any.

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O'BRIEN: Well, getting into the election of 1962, here in the state, how much help did Pat Brown get out of the national administration that year?

GATOV: I think all he wanted. Pat had taken some lessons; I don't remember the names of the people in Los Angeles who gave them. He had up to that time not handled television particularly well, and he hadn't been sufficiently self-conscious about where his feet were, and what he did with his hands and you know, this kind of thing—and his diction. So, he went to school with these two men and he worked with them for, oh, at least a month, maybe longer than that, in a very intensive way. He'd do something and it's photographed and it's replayed immediately, and then he'd... The net result was that he gained enormously in confidence and he sounded better and he looked better, and I think he lost fifteen pounds, too. The polls kept inching him up, starting the fall before, and by about February, I guess, he was in pretty good shape.

As I recall, there was never any outward, any public thing that the Kennedys did to him that could hurt him. But what was happening was the gossipy kinds of things that were coming out of the White House. During the early fall of '61, Pat Brown and Clair Engle and several others and I met at Roger Kent's house, which is right in here (Kent Woodlands); he was the Democratic state chairman. It was to go over who should run for what and sort of "Let's get together" kind of meeting. At the end of it, Don Bradley, who was there, said that he had had three telephone calls from members of the national press in Washington, people that he knew personally. I can't name any of them because I don't remember that he ever named those names. He had talked to them earlier saying, "Why do you run all this garbage about Brown? Why don't you come out here and find out what a good governor he's being, instead of taking gossip from back there?" They said, "Look, until the White House turns it off, we're going to run it."

I went back equipped with three different, specific instances; I can't remember now what they were, but it was the story by so and so on the matter of such and such, and in each case the source they admitted was Fred Dutton. The person I went to with it was Larry O'Brien and I don't know whether he ever did anything about it or not, but very soon after that Dutton moved to the State Department. I don't put the two together, but it was in the time of, oh, two or three months, I guess. Well, I don't connect the two necessarily, unless they had something of their own.

O'BRIEN: Was there any effort to recruit people to come out? Well, for example, you, did you come out and...

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GATOV: Well, they obliged me.

O'BRIEN: ...for Pat Brown that year?

GATOV: Yes, I did. But it suited my purpose because I wanted to resign and come home and get married. My husband had his business here and I was there, and when I discussed this with Clair Engle (he knew Al [Albert W. Gatov] very well), he said, "Well, why do you have to resign?" I said, "Well, Al's not going to come back to Washington and be the husband of the Treasurer." He agreed that that was most unlikely. They were both—the Brown and Kennedy people—most cooperative in helping to keep it quiet. We had both been married before, and in my husband's case his former wife was an alcoholic; it was a miserable, just a terrible situation. I felt that if it ever got to the press before I was out of office there was going to be all this digging around and interviewing of our children—a mess, which I just didn't want to have happen. Instead, my resignation was put on a basis that I wanted to come back and participate in the Brown campaign, which I did. I did not feel that it was appropriate for the President and his administration to be involved in my activities in California, so therefore, I was going to tender my resignation. The next day it was announced that I was the co-chairman of the Brown campaign and it was just handled very neatly and I was most grateful all around.

O'BRIEN: Were there other Kennedy aides that came back that year that...

GATOV: Nobody else that felt it necessary to resign. But then they weren't in the—perhaps, well, I wanted out. It's just that. It wasn't that I didn't like it, but I didn't see why I had to remain single the rest of my life to be of some use. The President understood it very well. He was lovely, you know, when I went over to say good-bye and thank you.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any meetings, in the time that you were there before your resignation, with people like Sorensen and O'Brien, when the President wasn't included?

GATOV: Well, I had many because I had lots of requests both by phone and in writing from people who wanted something for other people or were themselves interested in a federal job. The National Committee had ceased to function in this capacity, if it ever did function in it, by the time the White House staff really got going, so it was the White House

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staff that made the appointments. That was where I would go with them, and I talked not so much to Sorensen in those days because he was pretty much solidly in speeches and so forth. I had even more to do then with O'Brien and O'Donnell, and did right up to the time of the assassination. They were always wonderful and most cooperative. I don't know how they figured us all out back here. They seemed to be willing to give me the time of day whenever I asked.

O'BRIEN: Did you ever talk about California? About California and California politics?

GATOV: Oh, yes. That was what they always wanted to talk about because it seemed to be such a fetish in Washington at that time. You know, there are all the other states and then there's California, which nobody understands; somehow, I had sort of survived over a period of time and therefore, I must know all about it. Well, of course, I didn't know any more than anybody else. They had by this time come to recognized that it was really two states and that they would take Unruh's recommendations on Southern California provided he didn't make either the Senator or the Governor mad. They were very punctilious about this. Neither Brown nor Engle wanted to be picky and I don't recall either of them ever vetoing anybody. It seemed to me that they were quite responsive. The President would make pleasant little remarks, such as, you know, "You may wonder why there's so many nice Californians. It's because there's so much that's innovative that's going on out there. That's where there's an awful lot of talent and...."

O'BRIEN: Was there a strategy for '64 evolving in those years?

GATOV: Umhmm.

O'BRIEN: For California? What did that entail?

GATOV: Well, it entailed, really, pretty much of the same because the polls were showing by this time, particularly after that remarkable fiasco of the Bay of Pigs when Kennedy emerged 83 percent—probably one of the worst miscalculations ever made, but it was his handling of it that so won people—that by the time of the assassination there was no doubt in anybody's mind that he would carry California. He was just as solid in the south as he was in the north. I don't think there was a doubt.

O'BRIEN: No. In the time you were out here, in relation to '62, and in the campaign in '62, did you feel that the missile crisis in any way helped Brown?

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GATOV: It didn't hurt him. It didn't appear to be of much moment in the gubernatorial situation. It wasn't that it was not on people's minds, but he managed to secularize the campaign to the extent that it was in state issues only. That's why he really didn't encourage a lot of out-of-state visits.

O'BRIEN: Passing on to the.... Unless, do you have something, anything more...

GATOV: No.

O'BRIEN: ...in this period that you should put on the tape?

GATOV: Well, except that I think that Nixon's [Richard M. Nixon] recent defeat by Kennedy, two years earlier, and Kennedy's tremendously ascending popularity in California had a lot to do with the fact that Brown beat him. I don't think this had been really looked at adequately. It's been looked at more as Brown attacked him because he was going to use Sacramento as a steppingstone to Washington, but I think there was something in there of an apology to Kennedy, "We misjudged you. You were a better man than we thought you were. We voted for Nixon; we're glad he wasn't elected." It was sort of a repudiation of a fellow that they had come to be glad wasn't elected.

O'BRIEN: Well, passing on to the '68 election, did you have any contacts with Robert Kennedy's staff, or Robert Kennedy from '63 on?

GATOV: Yes. He came out here periodically. When he did, all the Kennedy men—I should preface the whole thing by saying, all the Kennedy men are perfectly wonderful to women, publicly at any rate, and they make you feel great. They think there's something a little odd being deeply involved in politics, but they like you anyways. If you're a friend they let it be made quite clear. The first time I saw him after I'd left Washington was probably two or maybe three years later and I wasn't a bit sure he'd even remember me, but he did, and he made quite a fuss about it. You know, "Oh, hello, Libby," and "So glad to see you," and "How are things?" and "We miss you," and a big whoop-de-do. They've always been that way, it seems to me, in my experience with them, though I've been with men on a visit to them when the man has been just really lacerated—and I'd be right in the same position. We were asking the same thing, but they didn't go for me. This was something in their rationale that I can't begin to figure out.

O'BRIEN: Did you talk to the Attorney General about California politics any time he was here?

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GATOV: Yes.

O'BRIEN: What did he have on his mind?

GATOV: Well, he wished that we would become more orderly; and he wished that we would develop a system where they could only deal with one person because it was.... It was the same old record that we'd heard during the '60 campaign. "Why are you people so fractured? Why can't you all just get together and run a decent party and strengthen it?" He never showed the slightest indication of having any more appreciation for our ways of doing things than he had in the first place.

O'BRIEN: Did you have much contact with his staff?

GATOV: Not in those years, no.

O'BRIEN: Where were you in the election of 1968?

GATOV: Physically?

O'BRIEN: Well, physically, and...

GATOV: Otherwise?

O'BRIEN: Otherwise.

GATOV: Well, I was promptly put on the delegation—and from the 6<sup>th</sup> district, which is a kind of tough one because there are so many Democrats in it. They moved a lot of people to their country addresses and ski-shack places in order to get them on, but they left me alone. I had another address in the 1<sup>st</sup> district—which I presume they knew; I don't know whether they did or not really—that I could have registered from, but anyway, they left me here. They warmly—I took it as warm—invited me in, and sat me down, and you know, "Here's the telephone, here's some lists, and this is what we want you to try to set up." I think my value to them was somewhat the same as Bill Orrick's, which was a certain transfer from Jack Kennedy to Bob Kennedy. They wanted a lot of young new people, which they got, but they also wanted someone with a little....

O'BRIEN: Had you been involved in the McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] campaign prior to that?

GATOV: Not at all, never.

O'BRIEN: Or any efforts for Humphrey?

GATOV: No, my husband was for Humphrey, but I was just not.

O'BRIEN: Did you get into any conversations with other people in the Democratic Party out here in regard to the candidacy for Robert Kennedy?

GATOV: Oh, yes.

O'BRIEN: Who were some of the important groups who were pushing for...

GATOV: Who were pushing for him before he announced?

O'BRIEN: Right.

GATOV: Well, nobody was pushing for him before he announced except this little group headed by Mr. Rost—the lawyer that I told you about who had filed the Kennedy slate—just a three-man holding operation. There were some young people who, as I say, like him, wanted Robert Kennedy, but nothing was going to happen and nobody was going to do anything. There was no delegation going to be put together for him, if he hadn't made the move himself. The McCarthy thing was sweeping. Well, it had just about everybody else. There were Humphrey people, or the Johnson—the sort of official people—and then there were the McCarthy people.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any conversations with Jesse Unruh about a Kennedy candidacy?

GATOV: Yes. As I mentioned, I sent him a telegram because I was in New York at the time. Rather than try to get him on the phone I thought I'd just send him a wire urging that he try to get Kennedy in, and whatever use I could be I wanted to be.

O'BRIEN: What was your chief role in the campaign months when you were here?

GATOV: Well, sort of a coordinator and an organizer. I raised some money but nothing spectacular. Mostly it was to bring people in touch with each other who hadn't previously known each other. I'm not being very clear about that, but I knew, for instance, this Mr. Rost whom practically nobody else did, just because he was originally from my old district. He knew me and trusted me some, so I introduced him to a lot of people and got him going.  
I called into the counties a lot, really to find out

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who was still available, who had not signed up with the McCarthy people—which was where most of the people we were looking for had gone—and was helping put together lists of the

people who were money people, were people who could run a headquarters, who were people who could organize registration voter turn out, deal with ethnic groups. I just found the political people that I knew to see where they were and how many of them were simpatico.

O'BRIEN: Were most of them still pretty active in politics?

GATOV: Yes. Well, it hadn't been so very long because I was in the Brown campaign of '66. I had been in the Cranston [Alan M. Cranston] primary in '64, and to a certain extent the presidential in '64, so I had really not lost it all. I just don't know any other way than to call people, kind of cold, and start off by saying, "I'm in the Kennedy campaign. I'd like to talk to you." They would say, "Well, I'm for McCarthy," and I'd say, "Gee, well, perhaps we'll meet in the general." You know.

O'BRIEN: Were your friends pretty well split?

GATOV: Oh, yes.

O'BRIEN: Over McCarthy and Kennedy?

GATOV: And some for Humphrey.

O'BRIEN: And Humphrey?

GATOV: Humphrey had many, many friends out here, personal friends, who were all delighted when Johnson pulled out and now they could go for Hubert.

O'BRIEN: We talked a little bit about Jesse Unruh's organization of the campaign and some of the more specific criticisms, particularly the fact that he relied on a very tight-knit kind of grouping.

GATOV: Personal group.

O'BRIEN: Personal group.

GATOV: These are people whose only loyalty was to him, or basic loyalty was to him. The same thing, I gathered just a few minutes ago this morning, is happening again in his own campaign. He doesn't have a broad base of support here, and in all these years he hasn't

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cultivated it. When it comes to events in the north, he's not comfortable and happy. He sort of makes people feel, I think, that they're, oh, sort of rural types; you know, smug, which they are, I guess. He doesn't adapt to them; he expects them to adapt to him. His humor, which can be really very gay, falls flat when he speaks at dinners. Alioto can get them

roaring, and Jess just doesn't know how. It isn't because he can't, but he's just uncomfortable.

O'BRIEN: Who did you work with in the primary campaign specifically?

GATOV: Well, I started working with Ray King who was the manager of it, and Bill Evans when he came in. Then Tom Braden [Thomas Braden] came up from Southern California, and he has lots of friends up here. I worked with him. I didn't work on any specific, single thing; I called the friends I had in the black community to get hostesses, for instance, for Mrs. Kennedy's [Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy] reception, Rose Kennedy's reception. I called all the wives of the black legislators and judges and so on because mine was a familiar name to them. I was used in these sort of special ways. I helped on the whistlestop—that was Memorial Day. It started in Fresno; I've never seen anything like it. It was a holiday but he drew—this was the third whistlestop I'd seen—bigger crowds than I've ever seen. Mexican-Americans were out in droves because, I guess, it was a holiday.

The rapport that he could establish off that back platform was fantastic. He had them in stitches, as well as talking to them seriously. The theme was a telegram which he had sent to Johnson on some particular item to do with the war. Then he would say, "Has Vice President Humphrey been here? He hasn't? Has Senator McCarthy been here? He hasn't? Now what do you make of that?" And then they'd roar with laughter. He'd get this dialogue swinging that was perfectly enchanting, and he was exhausted with it. [Interruption]

O'BRIEN: How about the involvement—well, Robert Kennedy and the minority groups?

GATOV: Oh, yes. I wound up by describing his impact with the Mexican-Americans who were not only there, but were just enchanted; they just adored him.

O'BRIEN: How's the leadership now in the Mexican-American communities?

GATOV: Well, they wanted in the Cranston campaign to do a repeat of what they had done in the Kennedy

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campaign in terms of money, and in terms of what they said would be delivery, but in the first place we had a rather limited budget, and furthermore the rapport simply was not there. We couldn't expect the kind of demonstrative enthusiasm for Cranston that they lavishly bestowed on Kennedy, but, as nearly as I know, the political results came out very, very similarly. I'm not sure the percentage of turnout was quite as high but—and we certainly didn't spend as much money on it, because we just weren't able to—I think the Mexican-Americans have come of age politically here now. I don't think they'll ever go back in the woodwork.

O'BRIEN: How about the Robert Kennedy campaign in the black community?

GATOV: Excellent. In both minority groups, as nearly as I can tell, or heard at the time, there was not only no holding back, but there was enormous support and enthusiasm and, I think, a very high turnout and a very high percentage of positive votes. Robert Kennedy, for instance, carried every one of the valley counties that he visited, which meant from Fresno up to Sacramento—you know, Modesto, Madera, Stanislaus, San Joaquin, Sacramento. He could not possibly have carried that without a tremendous outpouring of Mexican-American votes, because the white Caucasians in those counties were not for him, the majority of them, I mean; of course there were some. He took the side of Cesar Chavez against the growers; it was very hot at that time, it was a very hot issue. The whole valley economy is opposed to the grape strike, so that I'm sure that he lost the little businessman and, well, the small merchants in all of those towns—which is essentially the backbone of the town—and the small farmers voted with them.

O'BRIEN: Did you see Cesar Chavez during the campaign?

GATOV: No. He's been ill, really ill for the last, oh, more than a year. And he's moved around very little.

O'BRIEN: You didn't happen to get any insight into that meeting between Bobby Kennedy and the Black Panthers?

GATOV: No.

O'BRIEN: I understand it's supposed to have taken place. In this campaign we've—where's Dutton? What's Dutton doing?

GATOV: In the '68 primary Dutton was at Bobby's elbow, the

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Whole way through, state after state after state, and that was true on the train. Dutton was never here without—at least I never saw him separated from him, is the way I should put it. As far as I could tell, he was the guy who was with Kennedy every minute of every day. Others came and went but.... I presume Frank Mankiewicz [Frank F. Mankiewicz] was also.

O'BRIEN: How about Sorensen? Did Sorensen get out here?

GATOV: I didn't see him.

O'BRIEN: At all?

GATOV: Well, the fact that I didn't see him doesn't mean a thing because the headquarters of the campaign was—where Steve Smith sat—in Southern California and I never left Northern California.

O'BRIEN: How about Walinsky [Adam Walinsky] and Edelman [Peter B. Edelman] and some of these younger guys?

GATOV: I kept hearing about them and I never personally met them, but then I didn't go to a lot of the things. I don't enjoy getting pushed around in crowds and I really didn't think I could contribute anything by being there, so I stayed home and watched it on television. Anyway, my husband was for Humphrey and so it just seemed simpler not to....

O'BRIEN: How about Don Sherry and Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno]—Jerry Bruno—and those people?

GATOV: No, I didn't see them because I wasn't out in the streets where the thing was going on. I was in headquarters.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any conversations with Steve Smith?

GATOV: I think I did have one. But that would have been the extent of it. I wasn't trying to—in fact, I was very consciously trying not to be, again, sort of a lightning rod against Unruh. I thought I played that out, and it wasn't very effective, I didn't think, really, in the 1960 situation. I remember going back after the '62 election when Unruh had taken charge of the voter turnout—the identical thing that he'd done for Kennedy—for Pat Brown. I knew how much money he'd spent. The results were equally, well, darn near equally dismal. I took a number of copies back to Washington and gave them to Larry and Kenny and the

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National Committee and so forth, without any particular comment except my covering page which said that these are the amounts spent, these are the people in charge, and this was the vote count results. I didn't want to, again, get in the position of “that harping female in Northern California who seems to want to fight with Jess,” where I could find anybody else. And I could with Orrick, for instance, who was more intimate with Robert Kennedy than I'd ever been, and with the staff. Orrick was perfectly willing to do it, and then when Spalding and Evans were here they would listen to me, at least, long enough to let me say it. I just didn't choose to personally carry the message. I thought I'd.... If they believed it and could see the evidence and they believed it, it would have some credibility. Otherwise, it wouldn't work.

O'BRIEN: Well, we've covered a number of national and state issues, and I've really exhausted all questions I have. Is there anything that you, in reflecting back over this, feel that we've missed?

GATOV: No, I can't, I really can't think of anything. It was a marvelous experience for me to be associated with them in any way, and like a lot of people, I'm waiting for Ted.

O'BRIEN: Well, thank you Mrs. Gatov for an excellent interview.

GATOV: Thank you.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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