

William F. Haddad Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 06/21/1968
Administrative Information

Creator: William F. Haddad
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Biographical Note

Associate Director, Inspector General, Peace Corps, 1961 - 1963; Special Assistant to Robert F. Kennedy, 1960 Presidential Campaign; Campaign Advisor Robert F. Kennedy [JFK] for President, 1968. In this interview Haddad discusses working with Sargent Shriver, Jr. for the Peace Corps during JFK's administration, funding and support, and it's relationship with the White House and Department of State, among other issues.

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Date: 6-5-02

William F. Haddad – JFK#2

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Second Oral History Interview

With

William F. Haddad

June 21, 1968
New York, New York

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: What about these annual reports, why don't you just take off on that, what you can remember.

HADDAD: Right. Well, on the first annual reports—well, first of all, we—I don't know where the decision was made but it was probably made in close cooperation with Sarge [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.] and it was our general attitude about the Peace Corps that we ought to not put anything down

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in writing that people won't read, etcetera. We decided that we'd do a kind of a journalistic, honest, evaluation of the Peace Corps and put a picture in the annual report. Why should it be a dull thing nobody reads? So we put together a document which was journalistically written but kind of like a *Wall Street Journal* in-depth story, but readable. And then we got some great pictures and we stuck the pictures in it. And our contact at the White House, since it was submitted, evidently, by—it's submitted to the Congress by the White House—the White House was rather concerned. Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman], who is a marvelous guy, was rather concerned about, you know, sticking something like this in to the Congress. And we went back and forth and back and forth and we finally—I don't think it was ever resolved—we just did it. And, of

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course, we sent it over and all the letters came back from the senators that they had taken the thing home and they had read it and they found it fascinating and all that kind of thing, and which, I think, kind of broke the way, broke the ice to do little less conventional things than ordinarily you would do in government. To get the people to do this we—I know the government types that we ran into were, not all of them but a lot of them, were very stereotyped and frightened and uncreative, etcetera. So Stan Pleasant, who I'd recommended for USIA [United States Information Agency], had come out of Young and Rubicand, and he was Deputy General Counsel of USIA, later went up the ladder there, I called him and I said, "How are we going to do this thing? How am I

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going to get some great guys to help me in the Peace Corps, who will work on that as an avenue, and who are not fags and who are, you know, interested and etcetera, etcetera?" So he put me in touch with the key guy at Y and R, for us anyway, and he was enormously important to the whole development of the Peace Corps. It's a guy named Bill Colihan. At that time I think he was assistant to the president or anyways, he was a high executive there and I told him our problem. And he immediately recruited a great group of guys right within Young and Rubicam who, in effect, became our resource on materials and a whole variety of things. And they became in it just to help us and everything. And so we could not spend government money, we wouldn't have to spend government money on creative layouts and pictures and all that. They just did it for us, so that nobody could say we were

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spending a lot of government money for that type thing. The second thing he did, he put us in touch with some guy who grew out of Y and R, who was head of the Advertising Council, Ted Replier [Theodore Replier]. Now, those two people did as much as anybody in the country to help shape the image of the Peace Corps. And we really went about shaping the image of the Peace Corps. For instance, we were not even authorized by Congress when we started working and Replier, for instance, had to get a vote of his board to take on something as a project for the Advertising Council. He just did it as executive director on his own authority, took us up as a project so we began to be able to put out advertisements about what the Peace Corps was even without approval of his board, which I thought was—he's never done that before and he hasn't done it since, but he was enormously

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helpful, those two fellows. And I think we touched on that one point of the image of the Peace Corps. The first article written on the Peace Corps was in *Life* magazine. And I'd come down to see Shriver, and he was very busy, and he was worried about this *Life* article and I said, "Why in the hell don't I write it?" And I went in the next room and I banged out that article on how touch the Peace Corps was going to be and everything, and that really began

to be our bible about the combination of toughness and, you know, "...idealism does not have to be weak..." you know. So began to do that. And these other guys helped us, Colihan, Repplier, and.... Through them, for instance, we were—we had a big problem about recruiting and we just called up the heads of the networks and said, "We need this put on. The Advertising Council has authorized this as a

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project." Which was able to—the legal thing that triggered the use of this. And sometimes within forty-eight hours we'd be all over the country on the radio and TV about Peace Corps recruiting because they just did it. And guys, I remember over the first Thanksgiving we had something, first Thanksgiving after the Peace Corps, and we had about half of Y and R working over the weekend in Washington, over that long weekend, and all through Christmas sometime, even Christmas day. We just had all these people in New York that were willing to come help on all kinds of things, everything from layouts and designs to advice, to shaping arguments, to placing of articles, to critiquing what we were doing, to making contacts with the head of the networks. So we were able to get out our message so quickly and so effectively that it reduced some of the opposition to us.

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HACKMAN: Did Shriver have a lot of ideas in this area? Was he good in publicity, or...

HADDAD: Superb. But he wasn't, you know, people didn't consider him that kind of front man. He's a tough administrator. He administers in the Gardner way, which is a different way of administrating. I mean, he relies on people and he keeps close touch and we were a vast organization and he was a tough administrator as well as a good front man who went around and talked to people and said all the things in a nice way and won confidence and all of that. He was an idea man but he never stifled, his administration never stifled creativity. And he could take an enormous amount of criticism. I mean, I was a paid critic of the Peace Corps but I did more than that, I mean, I really got abusive to him sometimes, and told him to go screw himself. And one time I slammed his door and

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broke the damn wall down. And five minutes later he came by and we went out to lunch. It was that kind of an attitude. I guess I was the most aggressive. I was usually—although I think most like Sarge, I mean within the Peace Corps, we were related in terms of ideas and he would assign to me the carrying out of the ideas, rather the new ideas, and I'd set up a special projects operation for it. Still, I would be his severest critic. And Moyers [William D. Moyers], Bill Moyers, was frequently the arbitrator between various viewpoints. Warren Wiggins [Warren W. Wiggins] was the rock on which the Peace Corps was built. He came out of government, he knew how government worked, he was a superb administrator, was more traditional, he was as traditional as I was untraditional. And we would sometimes be at

gogger heads and Moyers would be the one who would resolve it or find the way to make us work together.

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But despite the intensity of the argument, and the abusive language, and the directness of the approach, it never became personal. It never—everybody was always close personally and respected everybody else's arguments. And it was that kind of cohesiveness that kept us together. I mean I'd be furious at Moyers for a political decision sometimes. I thought he'd compromised the whole integrity of the Peace Corps and I'd really give it to him. And then ten minutes later we, you know, we'd be doing something else. I mean, it was always...

And Shriver allowed that kind of administration, he didn't have any fear of his subordinates and he believed that his subordinates would replicate themselves. And many government organizations have a—particularly the State Department—has a declining degree of competence. You get a very competent guy who's frightened and hires a less competent

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guy, and go right down the line. And in the Peace Corps Shriver would never promote anybody unless his deputy was equal to the person who was moving on, or better. So you enforced an enormous—you set up that everybody became a strong man, and you can't subordinate strong men. So, in other words, if you wanted to move on to something else, the guy that replaced you had to be as good, or preferable better than you were, which prevented you from hiring weak guys underneath you. So you had a Frank Mankiewicz [Frank F. Mankiewicz], who has now become famous in his own right; you had Bill Moyers; you had a Frank Williams [Franklin H. Williams]; you know, that kind of thing.

HACKMAN: You were talking about the whole publicity operation...

HADDAD: Publicity is a bad word, but that's exactly what it was.

HACKMAN: All right. Bayley [Edwin R. Bayley]. That guy Ed Bayley was over

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there. How did he fit into all this?

HADDAD: Well, I'll tell you. Ed Bayley came along later. The first guy that was our press officer was Tom Mathews. Tom...

HACKMAN: It's the other way around. Bayley came from Gaylord Nelson to the Peace Corps right after....

HADDAD: He did, right.

HACKMAN: ...Tom Mathews came over, Bayley went to AID [Agency for International Development].

HADDAD: That's right, right, you're right, that's right. Bayley.... I'll tell you one other problem—I remember now, you're absolutely right, and he's over at NET now and he's a hell of a guy—one of the biggest problems that you'll find after talking to him—hey, that looks pretty good—one of the big problems in OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] was that Sarge frequently used me on the press thing and the image thing, and all of that, and even

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though he had a line operation and we had a very successful relationship with Bailey [John Moran Bailey] and everything, there was a tendency of Shriver to turn to me for that. And another reason, I developed a special project shop, the whole reason I put that together was because anything that came into Shriver's head he'd put in our office and a lot of it had to do with press and everything else. But, again, the general personalities of the people like Ed Bayley, who did come from Governor Nelson. I remember, he came over night practically. He was involved in these decisions. Tom Mathews played an enormous role. He's now public collections Director of Lincoln Center and became a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Ed was a stable, professional, good administrator, had been through a lot of tough courageous political battles, he was one of the first guys to go after Senator

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McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy]. He was a, you know, good level head. And Tom was a creative, bubbling personality. And the anecdote about Tom was he got at telegram from Pierre Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger] or Shriver, I can't remember who signed it. He's a buddy of Pierre's, saying: "The Peace Corps needs you. Come as you are." And Tom Mathews was skiing in Altha and he arrived on the fifth floor of the Peace Corps building with those boots and a Russian hat and he said, "Here I am." It was that kind of attitude. And he played, he had an enormous thing.

I'll tell you one of the things I did for Shriver which is important. I decided that—not I decided—but it was obvious, how does news get out of Washington? Well, so I said I'll do a systems analysis to find out how news gets out of Washington. So I did a chart and there are

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about fifty places that news goes out of Washington to all over America. So I had that chart and then is said, "Who is in that spot?" Bill Lawrence [William H. Lawrence] of AP [Associated Press] and all that, just who is it? So I put all the names against it. And then I went to see all these guys, and we kept, I kept a relationship with all those guys that continues to this day. And that's how news got out of Washington and that's how our news got out of Washington, and I must say they were extremely hospitable.

Another accident of time, and which helped us enormously was the one of the guys who was covering for the *New York Times* in the Peace Corps, Peter Braestrup, was the best man at my wedding, and he lived two doors from me, and we were able to—well, I'll tell you, you know, it's something that will be closed. One of the biggest battles

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in the early days of the Peace Corps was whether we were going to be under AID or not.

HACKMAN: Or an outright thing.

HADDAD: What's his name?—over in Jersey now—Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan], had put together this brilliant plan to coordinate the agencies. And here we were, Peck's [George Wilbur Peck] bad boy, saying, "Your plan is marvelous, we approve it, but we don't want to be under it. We don't want to get hit on legal sort of thing. We want to run our own show." And, of course, he was adamantly opposed to it, and the White House staff was adamantly opposed to it. And we were slowly being squeezed into a position where we would become a subsidiary of AID. And it got pretty heated. And I don't know how this came about, I think I leaked it to Peter or I may have told it to him as—I don't know—whatever happened, Peter Braestrup had a front page story which laid out the fight, which the

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President [John F. Kennedy] read, and the President immediately called together the two—we used Peter Braestrup to reach the President, because we knew he read the Times—and it was on the left hand column on the bottom, good headlines, tough story, honest story, laying out cold the fight between the White House staff and the Peace Corps and the problem. And I'm sure the President had never clearly heard or seen those arguments and so he said he wanted to have it solved by himself. And it was that story that promoted the thing. Incidentally, there's a second half of that story with two other parts. One was that Shriver was out of the country at the time and Moyers went to Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] to represent us. So the conference was President Kennedy in the middle, Lyndon Johnson at one side and Ralph Dungan on the other. And Johnson really banged away for us as to, you know, even calling

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Ralph Dungan a little boy at points. Saying, "I remember in 1938..."—or something, whatever it was or '28, when he was running, something in Texas and—all those kind of long terminologies, using all his prestige and all his influence that forced through a decision that the Peace Corps be run by itself. And Johnson played a key role in that. And the second thing was that Ralph Dungan sent a note around to—if you don't mind profanity on this thing—sent around a note to the Peace Corps saying, "Who had talked to Peter Braestrup?" and who had leaked it, in effect. And Warren Wiggins, who was acting for Shriver at that point, sent

around a note to everybody saying what your contacts were. And my answer back was, “Fuck you, Ralph Dungan.” And they sent it back over to the White House with my reply. And, you know, they said, “You, know, you can’t do that in government.” And I said, “Well, I’m not going to stay in government if I have to answer questions of who I go to the bathroom with.” And that was the end of that. I rather suspect that they think that

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I did it with Peter and they were very upset about it, but it did what we wanted to do.

HACKMAN: What was the...

HADDAD: Oh, incidentally, before I forget it, Tom Mathews played poker every Monday night with Pierre Salinger and all the top press guys in Washington. And we had transacted more business that Monday night poker game, it was an all night Monday poker game, for the Peace Corps and its image than almost anywhere else.

HACKMAN: How was Salinger usually in helping you guys out?

HADDAD: Well, he was pretty good. They treated us—the guys who professionally had to report to the President on foreign aid were relatively skeptical about us and our Peck’s bad boy attitude. The other White House guys were pretty good. For instance, Ken O’Donnell [Kenneth P. O’Donnell], you know, teased me about all, you know, the kooks, and you know, all that kind of stuff, but he really was helpful when we—when we were in a pinch they all came through. I mean, when the chips were down, Pierre—anybody would respond to us, I mean, they were very good and they would

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tease the hell out of us and all of that, but when it came to a showdown, we got support. When we needed support we got it.

HACKMAN: Do you remember that first spring there was a task force working on AID reorganization. Did you have lines into this operation?

HADDAD: Yes, we did. I’m sure. I remember being involved with a lot of Wiggins stuff. Warren Wiggins handed that to us. We took up—there were a couple of major decisions where we disagreed with them and we had the access to Rusk [Dean Rusk]. I remember, for instance, there was some kind of stipulation, a regulation, that all foreign service people be compensated at the same rate, live a certain way, and that. But we wanted deviation from the norm, and the Department was one way and all these task forces and others trying to get a uniform policy and all that in. We just took it right up to Rusk. And as soon as Rusk said, “Oh, my God, the

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last thing you want to do is to make the Peace Corps a typical foreign service thing.” So we had our, you know, we could get up to the top. We had a lot of battles with the State Department. I mean, I—insane, stupid, inept. I’ll tell you, you had guys talk about niggers, who were on the State Department African Desk. You know, talk about the niggers or the kooks—Gooks. You know, that had the Korean War term, the Gooks. And it used to shock the hell out of me to be talking to some guy, you know, because he thought he was talking to a fellow compadre. We’ve just, frankly, just went our own way. We just put our head down and we went, and when we ran into something, we ran into something. I remember one situation where I’d recommended Bill Delano [William A. Delano] to be general counsel of the Peace Corps, a marvelous guy. Rooney [John J. Rooney], from Brooklyn, who was on our appropriations committee who later

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became an enormous supporter of ours, was very disturbed about it and he was loaded one night and he’d—first he’d called Ken O’Donnell, I believe, and then he was loaded and called the President one night and really got the President very upset about it and the President talked to Shriver. And Shriver said, “You’ve got my resignation on your desk. I don’t tell you how to run the White House, you don’t tell me how to run the Peace Corps.” And it was this kind of real independence that enabled us to chart our own course and follow it. Now we followed it with political sagacity of a Bill Moyers, you know, we did what we wanted to do and we didn’t always force the confrontation, and we avoided confrontations. Except for, we pretty much adhered to what we wanted to do as distinguished from what the State Department. The State Department didn’t want us to send

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Protestants to South America, Negroes to Africa, or Jews to the Middle East. And I remember one time Kennedy was meeting with—oh, what’s his name?—the head of... Bourguiba [Habib Bourguiba]. And Bourguiba’s assistant, Cecil Hourani, Hourani being the Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] of Bourguiba’s administration, and they were talking about the Peace Corps and everything, and Kennedy says, “Oh, I’ve got an Arab in my Administration,”—this is the thing that later plagued me—“and why don’t you go over and talk to him.” So Hourani comes over and talks to me and I said to him, “Look, I’m not going to fool—play games with you. If you want Peace Corps in your country, Tunisia, you’re going to take what comes out of the computer. You may get a hundred Jews, you may get no Jews. You’re just going to take everything that’s there. So if you’re going, you know, to do anything, you’ve got to understand that.” He said, “Well, that

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doesn’t bother me.” And he started saying other things, and I said, “Well, it bothers the State Department.” He said, “Well, but it doesn’t bother us.” So I said, “Fine. If you’ll take

whatever comes out of the computer, let's talk about running the Peace Corps program in Tunisia," which was a breakthrough in the Middle East for us. And he was great, a superb guy. Well, the State Department put together a team to deal with us on this. And they were really adamant against us sending Jews to the Middle East, I mean adamant. And I was the chairman of that Task Force and the one time—oh, I must have met forty times with those guys—and one time I had two of their guys over and we had a, at Shriver's Board Room at the Peace

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Corps, and we had all the Peace Corps guys there and I was looking for, really, a confrontation with the State Department to cut it off. I didn't have enough time for all these meetings. And they gave me the opportunity because they turned to me because of my Arabic sounding name and said, in effect, "Well, you must have sympathies, because you understand what the problem is." And I just said, well that's the time to break it off, I just said—excuse my language—"Fuck you. And I'm not going to pander to that kind of thing and such and such." And I really just said, "The meeting's over and no more meetings. We're finished. We're doing it. Period." And walked out of the room. Everybody looked at me, the two State Department guys really were stunned, you know, I said, "You just can't say because I'm an Arab, I'll have

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sympathetic.... You know, that kind of stuff. I'm just not going to go for it." But they made the mistake that enabled me to have the confrontation. I had the confrontation and we just went ahead. It was in plain ink. It's done. Period. You know, "You've got to violate it, you've got to change it. That's all. You've got to take the...." And they went up the Hill from Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] and others and everything. But we just put our head down and we just went. And I think there were several Jewish guys in the first group to Tunisia. And the State Department was very upset about the whole damn thing. But, just take a clear example of just putting your head down. You can't do all this stuff without Shriver's support, and you can't

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do it without political sagacity, and you couldn't do it unless you had good public pressure behind it, and you couldn't do it unless the White House wanted to go along. And, you know, we did it. We could do those things, although the—plus perhaps the best of all, the climate of the times. Kennedy had aroused a generation to self-service. And the whole attitude was one of change in the things. The irony of it is I dealt with the same people, many of the same people, when I came back to be Shriver's Deputy in the Poverty Program, some of the identical people. And in the Peace Corps they would never really challenge me because they thought they would—they'd challenge me, but up to a point, because they knew there was a damn good chance that when I went upstairs to the bureaucracy they would be overruled because the top

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guys—and the bureaucrats don't like to get over ruled—so they tried to conform and we got away with murder because we pushed our point, we pushed a confrontation, we'd make it go out of the thing to the next level, to the next level, just push it up. And in the Poverty Program when we dealt with these same bureaucrats, some of the same guys, literally, they knew that the decision above them would be different than us.

HACKMAN: Was this primarily because they were worried about the Shriver-Kennedy relationship? Or they knew Rusk was sympathetic, or....

HADDAD: I think they worried about the Shriver-Kennedy relationship, but they were also worried about the Kennedy appointees that were being put in above them, who really

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had the line authority in State. And they, just, you know, once you got out of that traditional bureaucracy you began to get the fresh air of the Kennedy appointees...

HACKMAN: What level are you talking about? How high would they have to go?

HADDAD: I'm talking about the Desk Officer who would be generally, nine out of ten changes in the beginning, be opposed to what we were going to do, no matter what it was. And then you'd have to get up to the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. And the difference between the Kennedy appointees and some of the other appointees was the Kennedy appointees knew how to use power, they had the power, the bureaucracy did not have the power. I mean, the bureaucrats fool you, like in the Commerce

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Department where it never gets up to the top, but the sign of the power was, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Secretary, all that kind of stuff. And so the Department, we knew how the Department ran and we knew where the ultimate power was, thanks to Wiggins, and we kept forcing the decisions up to the Kennedy people who knew how to use power which was, as distinguished from some boob that come in and becomes Deputy Assistant Secretary.

HACKMAN: Was Dick Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] much help after he went over there, or did you have much contact with him?

HADDAD: Well, the President put—it's still confidential I would guess, not that confidential—but the President assigned me to AID at the same time that Goodwin—Goodwin recommended to the

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President that he move me in AID for a short period of time—that's where I met Mike Suidoff—short period of time, enough to tell him what the hell was going on, and to shape the first report on the promise of a billion dollars for Latin America. I was still in the Peace Corps, but the President called me and said he'd like me to go over. In fact, he caught me in somebody's.... The Deputy AID Director, who helped me greatly, called me over. It was the Alliance for Progress that he sent me over for. And at the same time Goodwin went over as Deputy Assistant, and Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] went over. But he called me, I guess he got me in Frank Coffin's office, who was the Deputy of AID. And he called me and we were talking about something else, about something the *Herald Tribune* had done, and then asked me to go over and do it.

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And I told him, "Yes, I'd love to do it but I don't want to go around, you know, I have enough trouble with Ralph Dungan and everybody else who thinks the Peace Corps is always...." They call it typical Peace Corps and run. "I'd love to do it but I want to report to you directly and I don't want to have to go through it." "Well," he said, "it is directly to me." And I said, "Fine," in fact I worked it out, I never met him in his office. I would call his magnificent secretary...

HACKMAN: Lincoln, Evelyn Lincoln [Evelyn N. Lincoln].

HADDAD: Yes. Evelyn Lincoln, marvelous gal. And I would meet him in the Cabinet Room, and talk to him in the Cabinet Room the few times I reported to him, so we wouldn't be, you know, Ken O'Donnell or someone would walk in.... One time, the next to the last time I reported

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to him he said, "Ah, that's silly, why don't we go in the office?" So we went in the office and in walked Ken O'Donnell in the middle of something I'm talking about, some Latin American, obviously a Latin American situation. And I walked out of Kennedy's office and Ralph Dungan said, "Typical Peace Corps end run." Ralph didn't talk to me for about a month or six weeks. And it was that kind of a problem. But Dick was over there and Dick and I worked together. Dick and I worked together mostly—I asked him to come over and be the Deputy Secretary General of the International Manpower Conference that I set up. It was an idea of a guy named Silverman, a very good guy. I was put in charge of pulling it together, and I asked Dick, who was having a lot of trouble at State, to come over with me. Then Dick got involved in the Peace Corps. Dick

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was not involved in it at that stage, I mean, he was having his hands full at State, but I did work with him on that AID thing and then later in the International Manpower situation and subsequently worked with Dick down the line. Dick didn't have that much power in those days, they used him on the intellectual side, on the cultural side, they hadn't really fully.... He came into his own more than ever in the Johnson Administration, surprisingly.

HACKMAN: Did any of those disputes with State reach the Rusk level, to be resolved?

HADDAD: Yes. With several.

HACKMAN: What kind of thing? Can you remember?

HADDAD: Oh, privileges and immunities. We didn't want any privileges and immunity. A lot of them reached Rusk. Let's see, what else. I guess it was on the general nature of our operation. He made a couple of statements

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which let the other people know where he stood. But we always had access to Rusk. Warren Wiggins would know precisely which ones reached Rusk and did not, because he was more operational. But I know we always had access to him. If we had to escalate it, we could escalate it.

HACKMAN: I've heard that Shriver and Rusk always had a very good relationship personally.

HADDAD: Excellent. Excellent. And it wasn't only Shriver that could talk to Rusk, other guys could talk to him in the operation. And Rusk had some guys in there, you know, he pulled out some of the old Kennedy guys, like the Executive Secretary of the State Department at one point in there was an old Kennedy guy. Obermyer? Ordoctor? Who it was over there.

HACKMAN: Lou Oberdorfer [Louis F. Oberdorfer]?

HADDAD: No, it was Bill...

HACKMAN: Not Battle? Lucius Battle [Lucius D. Battle].

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HADDAD: No, Luke Battle was very good to us. Luke was superb. Luke was really good, understood what was going on, everything.

HACKMAN: I've forgotten who followed him, but...

HADDAD: No, it wasn't at that level. It was the Executive Sec.... It was Bill.... Somebody that came out of Justice. Anyway, but it gave us an opportunity to deal at the bureaucratic level of State, you know, where we could get some decisions, and everything. Luke Battle was always good because he came into be— Luke, we did more when he was Assistant Secretary in Cultural Affairs. We had a major meeting in his office once with Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] and Shriver and myself, and some other Cabinet guys and everything, and to figure out what we could do about the youth problem around the world. You know, that whole bit. And Kennedy put together a Task Force and Luke was very important on that Task Force. It was the one...

HACKMAN: I've heard a little about that.


HADDAD: And this is the part that ought not to be revealed for years and years and years. The one place where we, there was a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] representative on

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the committee, and it was not—he just sat there—and about five, the Defense Department, CIA, State, myself, and it was about youth problems and it was not, you know, contrary to what anyone would believe, we wouldn't give anything to the CIA, we gave them nothing, and they were madder than hell. And, of course, we'd get in these meetings and I'd have bitter battles about the stupidity of CIA. And they'd say something, and I'd say, "You're wrong. Prove it." And then they'd come back with some stupid proof and we'd tear it apart. And we used to have really bitter battles with them. And they'd say, "Well, god damnit, don't throw bricks if you live in glass houses. Why don't you tell us some of this?" I said, "Why don't you find it out yourselves? We're not going to tell you." "Do you work for the United States government, or not?" I'd say, "Well, I don't work for the United States government, I work for the Peace Corps." And then Kennedy would say, "Well, you work for the United States government." And then I'd say, "Well, I guess I

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work for the United States Government." And then they'd say, "Well, then how can you criticize us and say we're so stupid?" or something. I remember, I used to make a bet. I'd say, "Your guys don't think that country's going to go down. I tell you there's going to be a revolution over there in three months. I'll bet you a cup of coffee." And God damnit, we'd have a revolution there in three months. And they'd adamantly deny it. And we had a lot of that problem, because I'd.... Dick Ottinger [Richard Lawrence Ottinger], who is now a congressman, and I went down to Ecuador. In Latin America you really can't do anything unless you've got the President's [Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy] name on a piece of paper. So I went down there to get the Ecuadorian project moving and Dick Ottinger, who was in the Peace Corps at that time, we went all the way up to the president and we got it all set up and everything. But the project worked out and we went back to the hotel and there's



the President sitting and drinking, drinking in a place

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over there with...

HACKMAN: And he usually did.

HADDAD: Yes, as he usually did. All right. And nice guy, a hell of a guy. And I walked by, said hi to him and went in the bar and I said to myself, "God damnit, if I was a newspaper man I'd go sit over there with him. So I went over to him and said, "Mr. President, I'll buy you a drink." And he said, "No, I'll buy you a drink." So we sat down and we drank til about two o'clock in the morning and then we—he took me back to the palace with Dick Ottinger and we drank all night. I'm an old seaman, I'm not much of a drinker anymore, just an old seaman, and I'll be God damned if he was going to drink me under the table. And we sat up all night drinking and poor Ottinger slipped under the table and all his sides slipped under the table and he was very adamant and every

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drink he had I had to have a drink. And I guess I was absolutely loaded, but I wouldn't admit it to anybody. In fact, I don't know how much we put away, put an enormous amount of liquor away that night. And we had a long, long discussion about—I knew what the, I had had a briefing from the Ambassador, I know what we were worried about and everything, whether his relationship to Kennedy, and how close he was to the communists, all—and he told me a lot of anecdotes and stories and he was enormously interested in Kennedy. And we were afraid to invite him to America, because if we invited him to America he might turn it down, and all that kind of stuff. So I got an enormous amount of information out of him, in a very open way, and he told me anecdotes. He said he went to Russia and all they did in Russia was put him on a platform, and he got a pain in the neck looking at their airplanes and that when he goes to a country he likes to sample their wine and their women and they kept all that blocked off. He

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said to me, he said, "I fixed them," he said. "They've got a delegation here now." And he said, "I told my two secretaries," who were male secretaries, and supposed to be communists, "that I'd give them all the spicy food and all the liquor, but no women. Make sure there aren't any women." He said, "I got back at them." And he said, "They're worried about a Cuban trade delegation," that was down there at the time. And he said, "I really fixed those guys." He says, "Proletarians, hell," he said, "I showed up at the beach. I had them come down and see me on the beach and I had my sun glasses and my shorts on and they came out in their green uniforms." And he said, "They were insulted because I met them with no shoes, in my shorts, in my sun glasses, and they tromped out. And I said, 'The hell with

them, they're phony proletarians.'" Oh, and plus, he was interesting company and I said.... I saw the Ambassador about three or four hours later—I guess I was still crooked—on my

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way back to the states and I thought I'd say something to the ambassador. I said, "I think you would do well to ask him to come to the United States, and I don't think you'll have any problem." And he said, "Why?" I said, "Well, I went over to the palace with him last night and stayed there all night and we had a good time together and talked and stuff." And he was stunned because no one had ever done that before. And I could tell you a lot of anecdotes about the whole story in itself. And then I gave him a little bit of information. And then I got off to the airport and the State Department officer that was escorting me said, "God, that was some night with the President last night." And I'd sworn the ambassador to secrecy and—not that I had the power to do it, but I said I don't feel very

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easy talking about personal conversations. I've got relationships with this guy, I want the Peace Corps here and all that. Anyway, he was going—good ambassador, superb ambassador. I think it was Burn.... I forget who it was. Burnseed [Bernbaum] or something like that. A ham radio operator. A hell of a guy. And this guy, a big stupid State Department officer, in a loud voice said, "Well, you had some night with the President last night, huh?" And I said, "Well, how in the hell did you know about it?" He said, "Oh, the Ambassador told it to us at the staff meeting." And I said, to myself, "God damnit." You know, and then I went back to the States and because there was other information developed and Goodwin called me on this one, and then Dungan, about whether they ought to

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invite him or not and all that kind of stuff. And I said yes, and then Dungan wanted me to tell him all about what happened and I wouldn't do it. And he said, "What in the hell? Don't you work for the United States Government, or do you work for....?" That old business. And I said, "No, I work for the Peace Corps." And that's the kind of stuff that got them madder than hell. I never did tell them. I never did tell them. And I never would tell the CIA, would never be involved. Every time the CIA came near us we'd call the President. Did twice, they screwed around with us and we called the President, and he put out two orders about it. And anything they did like that we really were very touch and yet, at the same time, I wouldn't exchange any information with them. Call them stupid, but wouldn't give them any information. Like Ralph, it was very

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important about Arosemena. I mean, we used to tell him where we'd invite him. We eventually invited him. I talked to Dick and I said, "Dick, yes, you can invite him. I'll tell you, he has enormous respect for Kennedy. And I think you could do it because of the

Kennedy Administration. Remember this,” I said, “You’ve got the kind of problems that you know you’ll have to watch out for, but he’ll accept. He won’t turn us down.” And so we invited him. And anyway, he—an anecdote about that—he’s in that square with the church and the bells are ringing all the time, and there’s clocks all over the damn palace, and bells ringing all the time, and he says he gives his son money to go stop all the clocks all the time. He said the Cardinal, or whatever his name is, is trying to drive me out of my mind by ringing those bells all night and there’s bells all over the place and his kid

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is always stopping them. I said, “Gee, there’s a fabulous thing that my mother-in-law uses that jet pilots use, they stick in their ears, you can’t hear anything.” And he said, “What is it?” I said, “Some kind of wax or something. You put it in your ear, you can sleep a million—nobody’ll bother you. You won’t even hear the church bells over there.” So when he came to this country we gave him the—that was the present we gave him, the wax to seal his ears against the bells in the palace. But there was that kind of Peck’s bad boy attitude that was distinctive of the Peace Corps.

HACKMAN: What do you remember about his trip up here. I’ve heard several interesting...

HADDAD: Yes, he was wild. He was wild. He likes his women and his liquor and all that. But we knew that. I mean, Christ, a foreigner is no

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better—we’re no better overseas either. We got congressmen running bare assed naked down London hotels and we’re no better. We just blame—he was a drunkard. He told me he didn’t want to be President. He said, “I don’t want to be President.” He said, “My father was President, my grandfather was President, my wife wants me to be President, but I don’t want to be President.” He’s just not happy being President. He said, “But I have to.” And so he was—all that kind of stuff. But, you know, he was no better, not worse than the rest. He was loaded a couple of times but, Christ, I’ve seen our ambassadors loaded overseas. I know I wouldn’t mind a drunken guy chasing broads, I think you have more understanding of that than some straight leg, straight laced, mid-western puritan being stuck in the middle of Africa to deal with Africans. Six of one, half dozen of the other.

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HACKMAN: Can you remember anything about the reaction of other people, of people other than Rusk, at State at the high level, Ball [George W. Ball] in the early period or...

HADDAD: Ball was good. We knew Ball. I knew Ball from the Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] campaign, we’d—I was part of a ten man group that went out

to try to deny John Kennedy the nomination. I was part of the Stevenson group and George Ball was part of that. So I got to know him. He was pretty good. He put me in touch with a magnificent guy in Venezuela, Mendoza [Eugenio Mendoza Goiticoa], who is a philanthropist down there and he was very helpful to us in the Peace Corps there. I don't remember too much. Bowles [Chester B. Bowles], of course, was very good, but he didn't have any power. They really, they cut him off. At the top level of the State Department we didn't have too much trouble.

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Then Williams was over there, we had talks with him, he was very, very good. Who was Latin American? I can't remember who Latin America was.

HACKMAN: Well, Tom Mann [Thomas Clifton Mann] was still there at the beginning and then they appointed—they had a hell of a time trying to get somebody to fill that post, eventually Woodward [Robert Forbes Woodward] and then Martin [Edwin M. Martin]. Bob Woodward and then Martin.

HADDAD: Martin. Yes, I knew Martin. Martin was one of our poker player buddies. We had another poker game where—I used to play poker with all the State Department guys—and Martin was one of those poker playing buddies. He was pretty good. He was ambassador to Venezuela at one point, wasn't he?

HACKMAN: Yes. He was brought back when Woodward went out.

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HADDAD: Yes.

HACKMAN: A big burn over the Chile trip or something. I remember that time when Goodwin was going to Chile.

HADDAD: Dick, he just wrote something about that in the *New Yorker*. I haven't seen it but he showed me the text of it, but he did a draft of it on the way out to Indiana to help Kennedy. We had great—we had the Kennedistos as ambassadors in Latin American which were enormously helpful. They made that first trip with Shriver, some of these...

HACKMAN: Fall of '61.

HADDAD: Yes. Pardon me.

HACKMAN: It was in the fall of '61. Is this...

HADDAD: Yes, right at the beginning. Yes. Jack Fawn came with us. Fawn, Sancho-Bonet [Rafael Snacho-Bonet] from, who is now Deputy Chief of Protocol,

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who I stole from _____, and Sarge and myself, and we went down there. But we had these Kennedisto ambassadors, and they were great. The State Department Latin American thing was a stupid operation, as I recall, very.... And Goodwin had a tough time, he was always fighting with, I guess, it was Woodward and some of the others. But they didn't restrict us, for some reason they didn't restrict us. We had the President down in Colombia, who was great, oh...

HACKMAN: Margo [Alberto Lleras Camargo].

HADDAD: Yes, Margo, fabulous. He put a—when we went to visit him we sat in his office and he had a map and he did it like a political campaign, he said, “Your volunteers ought to go in this town because this town's got a good priest. That town has no good priest.” And he

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really picked where we went, politically, like he knew all the precincts. And he said, “Here, there, and there.” So we had great cooperation. And in Peru we did very well, and Chile, and we did pretty good all over.

HACKMAN: Asking you something about Peru. Can you remember how this developed because Loeb [James I. Loeb] was down there and the coup came about. I've heard a rumor that the Peace Corps was delayed for a while until a coup came. Do you remember that?

HADDAD: Yes, yes. Frank was down there. Frank Mankiewicz will tell you that story. It was. I did the investigations on that. I can't remember all the details. It's one in the Peace Corps reports. But we did delay, there was some delay and I don't know, it was at one point,

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I don't remember, it was going down at some period, yes, we delayed it and we used it as—we didn't want it—it's a very important story because we didn't want to use the Peace Corps as a tool of foreign policy. And by withholding the volunteers it became a tool of foreign policy and it was resolved by Rusk in our favor. Jack Fawn and Frank Mankiewicz know the story. I did the investigation of it, the facts, but I can't remember the details. But it was a very.... I do remember that it was one of the turning points because Rusk made the statement that it's most useful to foreign policy by not being a tool of foreign policy, that's the famous

Rusk statement about the Peace Corps. I'm not a big fan of Rusk's now so, I mean. But he was, in terms of the Peace Corps, he was fabulous.

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HACKMAN: Can you remember State's attitude on any of the really early projects, Tanganyika and the Philippines, anything? Were there any problems with State in getting approval on them?

HADDAD: Yes, everything. Everything was a problem. Wiggins would know more to that than I do, but everything was a problem. I remember, you know, they were nice but they were stupid. No, stupid's the wrong word. They had the wrong attitude. I mean, they—you would expect trouble. That's all, period. And so you just went there and then just went and did what you wanted to do. They didn't like anything we did and ambassadors were upset we were going to send a bunch of kids around. They had some great stories about ambassadors saying we're going to have all these kids running all over

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this country; they're going to destroy our relations and...

HACKMAN: This is a cable coming back?

HADDAD: Oh, yes. It's in my reports, it's in my inspection reports. And they wanted to put them in compounds and control them, and all that. God damn, they were just as bad as some whites in the South who think all the Negroes would want to screw a white woman. And it was that kind of attitude about Africa and about.... Oh, some of the stuff's awful. And it's all in the reports. I mean, because, you know, we had a very tough newspaper men.

HACKMAN: I've read somewhere that it was decided in the early period that the first project was going to be in Africa. Was that decision made? Is that true, that you definitely were going to do something in Africa first?

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HADDAD: Oh, well, the whole, everybody was focusing on Africa as the, you know, the undeveloped world thing. All these new nations were coming about, and there was all this turmoil at the UN, and we were kind of Africa oriented at that point in our history. I don't know if we actually made.... I can't remember that. I know we always sided with Africa because it had lions and tigers, and the image was good, and Nkrumah [Kwame Nkrumah]—not Nkrumah.

HACKMAN: Sékou Touré?

HADDAD: No. Nyerere [Julius K. Nyerere].

HACKMAN: Oh, Nyerere.

HADDAD: Nyerere was great. Nyerere was one of the first guys to tell Shriver that he wanted.... He went with—Frank Williams could tell you about that trip—Frank went. He's now up here at Colombia, just back from Ambassador to Ghana. He made that first trip with Sarge.

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And he first went to Africa and I think they stopped in Ghana, and saw N_____, who's half and not, and then they went to Niari and Niari is a most positive about the Peace Corps and it was very important. I think he had just gone into Tanzania, I think it was still Tanganyika in those days, embayed Tanzania, and his support was enormously helpful. And the first project went there. I think it was one of the first places offered, it helped shape the image of the Peace Corps, lots of things. Whether we decided—actually, it was a toss up—literally, I think our first approved project was Colombia, and our first in-field project was Tanganyika. There was a race between those divisions. I don't know what.... I think we wanted to take one education project one community development, and all, the, you know, all the little pieces.

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HACKMAN: Show what could be done.

HADDAD: Yes. Yes, we did it. I remember—Sarge probably doesn't even know it—but when we picked the first twelve Peace Corps volunteers, I picked them like—I was involved—they were all selected and we had maybe thirty selected and I was putting together the press release with Bailey, I guess, and others, I put together like a Hollywood World War II infantry platoon group. I had a Negro, and I had a Jew, and I had a Catholic, and I had a farmer and I had a Brooklyn East guy, and everything. Anyway, the thing that fooled us was some guy with a two hundred per cent white Protestant American name from Connecticut who was a surveyor and he turned out to be Negro. But, you know, it was one of these kinds of things. And just picked them in

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that way so we would show the—we did it for not bad reasons, the reasons were we wanted to indicate that the Peace Corps was not just education, the Peace Corps was not just white, the Peace Corps was not just young. And we were trying to emphasize that it wasn't one particular thing. We were trying to get the image of it being tough, that not just education but surveying and things like that, and that it be old people and young people, white people, you know, all that thing, so we just did it in the—we knew, for instance, that the most publicized story in the first year of the Peace Corps would be the first group going somewhere. So we

just did it. And I guess we did it illegally. And just laid it out. I remember being in Bailey's office and

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doing it. We did it in advance for *Life* magazine because they were going to send out photographers. That's how I found out this guy up in Connecticut was a... But did great stories, I mean, about these guys, they're marvelous people and it turned out later to be the truth about the Peace Corps. What we kind of created in our minds turned out to be the truth. And we set a standard, it was a pretty tough standard, all of that, did pretty good.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any problems in getting money for those first projects, getting some sort of sign up procedure?

HADDAD: Yes, the President gave us, illegally, not illegally but semi-illegally, we operated off a fund that he set up in the White House which got the Congress madder than hell. It was

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some kind of a...

HACKMAN: Financial....


HADDAD: Yes, there was...

HACKMAN: Financial Security Act...

HADDAD: Well, he had funds that he administered, the White House administered and before we got legislative authority or legislative appropriation we were living off that budget which got the Congress madder than hell. It took us a long time to live that down and I remember in the early days of the Poverty Program the congressmen kept saying, "You're not going to do what you did in the Peace Corps." So they were made about that. But it gave us a chance to start. I'll tell you what the theory was. The theory was that we would not deal with the image of the Peace Corps when it came up

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for authorization appropriations but we would have real volunteers doing real jobs, you know, so it wouldn't be kooks and communists and beatniks and fools and everything. We wanted to show the countries wanted us. They invited us on that trip around the world. We wanted to show that there would be recruits, that Americans would respond. They did. We wanted to show that we could do real jobs and that we could train them. See, we wanted to do all the things so that we'd have pictures of people doing things so some guy like Gross



[Harold Royce Gross] from Iowa couldn't get up and say, "Well, they're all going to be communists," and nobody could do.... So we moved and we paid a penalty. That was one source of funding. The second source of funding for the Peace Corps was the credit card of the Merchandise Mart. Sarge had all his credit cards from

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the Merchandise Mart and he had no authorization to spend money, even the money you had, in the way you needed to. And we kept inviting people from all over the country and taking them out to dinner. So it was the credit card of the Merchandise Mart that was another source of income for the Peace Corps. We could take thirty guys to dinner and Sarge would put that down. And so I guess Joe Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] helped subsidize the Peace Corps. We did have a lot of informal sources of money. Every time I ran up on something that either would be a public relations bad idea to do or was not copasetic, I'd pick up the phone and call some guy Watts at IBM and say, "We need money for this," or I'd call Ben Swig [Benjamin H. Swig], who runs the Banmont Hotel, I'd say we have a hundred and fifty volunteers on their way to the

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Philippines, we, you know, we can't do anything with them in Los Angeles, in San Francisco, wouldn't you like to feed them and show them around the town. Or, I wanted to print something and I didn't have the money, so I called that Colonel, whatever his name—General Dynamics guy, that Colonel something, I forget what his name is and say, "Would you do it for us?" I did all those kinds of Mickey Mouse things, which really helped us because they could never catch us on doing anything. Fiscal soundness was our key, you know, all the kooky ideas, but fiscal soundness. And we operated off that fund. And then we had tremendous—oh, what the hell is that guy's name?—the one Peace Corps guy with the beard that caused a problem in...

HACKMAN: Kamen [Charles Kamen]?

HADDAD: Kamen. That cost us ten million dollars.

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HACKMAN: That guy from the Rotary Club thing.

HADDAD: Yes. And we got the true story. Smathers [George A. Smathers] was great on that. It was a phony story. What happened was he stood in the meeting, got us at a meeting in Florida, and he had a beard on and it was Castro [Fidel Castro] guys and anti-Castro guys and they had just shown an anti communist movie and when he stood up with the beard, he never said a word, contrary to what the Rotary Club said, he made a communist speech or some stupid thing, and Smathers—a judge who is a friend of Smathers, was sitting in the front row. Smathers called the judge and the judge told

him what really happened. The guy stood up and they saw the beard right away the anti-Castro guys raised hell, anti-Castro Cubans, and for his own safety they got him

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out. He never said a goddamn word. It was that House on Unamerican Activities movie. And all the Rotary Clubbers got all the Chamber of Commerce, got everybody, all the Kiwanis, unbelievable pressure. And I still don't know the true story of what happened. I'm not so sure we didn't make some covert agreement that they didn't know about. This really caused a strain in relations between Shriver and myself and Moyers and everything. I guess the guy that really knows it is the guy who was head of selection, the guy who did it for the Air Force. I'll think of his name in a minute. But what we did, they said we, there was a call made from the heads of the committee to Shriver's head, "If you'll drop Kamen, you'll get another ten million." So we got thirty million instead of forty

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million because we didn't drop him, or something. We could have gotten another ten million. I don't remember what...

HACKMAN: And that's the reason for the cut?

HADDAD: Yes. We could have gotten—they called him when they were voting and...

HACKMAN: Is this authorization or appropriation?

HADDAD: I think it's appropriation. I can't remember the whole thing, it was such a... It's still on my mind because I really said, "We would destroy the image of the Peace Corps, we wouldn't get any recruits. We couldn't capitulate," and all that stuff. And I said, "I don't give a god damn what it is, we ought to judge him on his merits. If he's good keep him; and if he's not, don't. But don't drop him, you'll never get a volunteer." We made the same.... We stood, I think, courageously, at least

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as far as I was concerned we stood courageously. I don't think we had any covert agreements that I didn't know about. I chewed some people up at one point because Kamen was later dropped. The Poverty Program fired Yarmolinsky [Adam Yarmolinsky] in the beginning in result of Congressional pressure and it destroyed any chance of getting really fabulous administrative talent that would have been available. But the Peace Corps did not make that mistake in that stage of the game. And we kept him and we kept our image about being independent. We could have destroyed the Peace Corps right on that rock and that related to that ten million. I was in Sarge's office when they called him from the Committee Room. They were either voting on—I think they were voting, I'm not sure, on the authorization

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or appropriation, I can't remember whatever it was. One of the senators said, "Sarge...."

HACKMAN: I know it came up in the authorization, so it was probably at that point. They cut, and that's when they cut it from forty to...

HADDAD: To thirty.

HACKMAN: No, let's see. The authorization went through as forty, and when it got to appropriations Passman [Otto Ernest Passman] was trying to cut it to twenty and it wound up being thirty.

HADDAD: Passman is zero.

HACKMAN: Well.

HADDAD: Sick man. Passman's a sick sick man. You're right, and Rooney, well, you know, you might as well throw in the anecdotes, Rooney was our biggest defender and Rooney got...

HACKMAN: First time around?

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HADDAD: No, a little later, because I'll tell you what happened. A guy named John Court from Boston, who we hired for the Peace Corps in the Philippines, and I flew out with him actually, had about nine kids or something, thirteen kids or some huge amount of kids, and we put them on the airplane and everybody got the.... Passman really murdered us on it, and we said it all averages out, some guy with—we're not going to discriminate against.... Anyway, what happened was Rooney interpreted Passman's remarks as being anti-Catholic and so he got up his Catholic stick and he really began to bat for us. But he really became one of our great defenders. I mean, Rooney was very good to us, he'd cut the balls off everybody else but he was great to us. He became our

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you know, he really did.... And he was mad about hiring Bill Delano, just madder than....

HACKMAN: What was the objection to that?

HADDAD: Bill Delano had been a Reform Democrat in his district and that was what the whole thing was. Stan Pleasant, I recommended Stan Pleasant to him. I remember Sarge saying, "God damnit, can't you recommend anybody but

Reform Democrats?” And then I...

HACKMAN: Well, you know, Josephson [William H. Josephson] started out as the General Counsel, what was his...

HADDAD: No, it was Morris Abram [Morris B. Abram], was the first General Counsel.

HACKMAN: Morris Abrams, right.

HADDAD: And then.... And Josephson became Deputy General Counsel. And Bill Delano came in.

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I can't remember how Bill came in. I think he came in as General Counsel.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything about Abram's decision to leave?

HADDAD: No, no. He just came in for six months. He was excellent. He did all the sel.... I worked with Abram on these selective service stuff with Percy. Abrams gave it a tone and a quality and an independence, a superb guy, blended in perfectly. He had an easy going, he had a flexible personality. I might be mercurial, he was never mercurial. He was always an easy going guy, a hell of a guy, brilliant, respected and admired, courageous.

HACKMAN: All those people that came in in that early period were there any political pressures?

HADDAD: No.

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HACKMAN: Any political people that came in, like how did Moyers.... I was wondering about Bayley.

HADDAD: Moyers.... Bayley? No, no, Bayley, we wanted Bayley. We wanted Bayley because we wanted guys with administrative ability who had.... No, no, we wanted Bayley. There were no—I don't think we ever responded to political pressure in the Peace Corps. We may have, I'm trying to remember. But, now, you know Sarge said, "Sure, we'll take as many guys as you want who want to go to work for fifty dollars a month, recommend them." You know, that's how he did it. I remember my brother Fred [Fred Haddad] came in to help me at one point and he started a list of the two hundred top leaders in this country, you know, and put them on a chart and

then we called them and asked them for names of people who they would recommend who were not in their companies

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And...

HACKMAN: And this was the start of the talent search on that...

HADDAD: That's exactly where it started. All our top guys, we called them and just asked them that. My father-in-law, John Hay Whitney, told me that the way that they got rid of their lousy vice presidents was the big send off and send them to the government, you know, you get a letter from the government saying, "Will you contribute?" And they found out their problems and they send them off to the government and they feel relieved. And with that in the back of my mind I said, "I don't want anybody in your own company, but the best guy on the other side." And that's how we started it, that's how it all started. And so there were political recommendations, but I don't think there were any political pressures to take—I don't think anybody in

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that first group was political. Tim.... No. There are some State Department guys that we didn't like and which.... Well, we....

HACKMAN: At who's insistence, or...

HADDAD: Nobody's insistence. Warren Wiggins felt they were needed and some turned out and some didn't. But no, I'm looking at all the names here, nobody. Nobody came. Dick Ray was a Republican from—I recruited him, I think—he was a Republican from Wisconsin, and he was co-chairman of the Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] drive, something like that. He was a Republican, officially in the Republican party.

HACKMAN: There was no problem of bring a Republican in?

HADDAD: No, oh yes, we got a lot of criticism. Oh, yes, we loved it. We leaked—everytime I got criticized that I leaked it to the papers.

HACKMAN: From whom?

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HADDAD: From Democrats. How can you hire a guy....

HACKMAN: Was it mainly the Committee people?

HADDAD: Well, Democrats, political Democrats. I don't know who specifically. But every time I got one I leaked it to the newspaper. I'd give it to Drew Pearson or to.... And we always leaked it saying, "The Peace Corps' under intense pressure today for hiring a Republican." And we had two of them. I mean he was great, and he was a four engine bomber pilot who was a computer guy who had to give up all his patent rights to certain discoveries, processes and everything to come in the Peace Corps. A marvelous guy and he is now head of the Teachers Corps. No, I don't see anybody. Nobody, no pressure at all. Or zilch. I can't remember it—I don't know of anybody

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in that first group, I'm trying to.... Actually, I called guys like the assistant to—Carl Hayden [Carl T. Hayden], I can't remember, the guy who's going to run as a Senator now....

HACKMAN: Yes, I can't remember his name.

HADDAD: Whatever his name is. A____. A____. I said, "Look, I've got a problem, I've got to find talented Spanish speaking Americans and I don't want any hats. Give me...." And he really responded that way, you know, and I said, you know, "Don't give me what you give everybody else, I really want good people." And I did call a lot of guys like that on the Hill who had specific, you know, knowledge because he was in the Southwest, he's a hell of a guy and I hired a couple of people out of that kind of operation. [Phone rings, tape stopped]

HACKMAN: On the talent search. Let me see, what else.

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HADDAD: We also—Shriver had an enormous amount of contacts. We just kept calling people from their lists of names and piles and piles and piles of resumes. I became—I set up an operation called the Talent Search, and we—not only talent search for the Peace Corps, but frequently for the other parts of government.

HACKMAN: Yes, I wondered how this carried over from the original Shriver talent search that had operated during the _____. Had you been involved in that at all? Or when did you come to talent...

HADDAD: No, a little bit, peripherally. Not the McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] type things but below that.

HACKMAN: At what point had you—I know you had come back to the *Post* for a little bit, at what point did you come back there? What was the deal

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on that?

HADDAD: Well, it was a funny thing. I had made a pledge to the *Post* that I'd be back the day after the campaign. And at Hyannis Port I sat on the steps right the day, it was one o'clock, Bob Kennedy said, "Hey, you know what you ought to do? You ought to go down with Jack to Palm Beach. And everybody else is going to be swimming around and spear fishing and stuff and on their vacations." He said, "You go down there with him and in three days he'll be so bored of resting and you'll be the only one around there and you'll really work out a relationship. And you ought to do that." And for some reason, foolish reason, or whatever it was, I said, "Naw, I don't want to do that. I'm going back to the newspaper. I don't want to

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go into government." Whatever that attitude was, it was.... And he tried to talk to me about it. Said, "No, you know, there's great opportunities." And I just didn't know enough, didn't understand, you know, I just didn't have enough of feel of what it was and probably a sense of my own impotence or confidence, or whatever it was, you know, I just didn't, just didn't feel, I didn't understand what the power of government was. He really tried to talk me into it. He said, "You'd be the only guy there with him. You'll work out a good relationship with him, all the basic decisions are going to be made while everybody's spear fishing around the world," you know, "do it." And I said, "No, I'm not." And went back to the *Post*. And then I got assigned to covering Kennedy and the one thing I got

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excited about was the Peace Corps and I kept banging away at him, all of the time. Kennedy and O'Donnell when they were here in that transition period at the Carlyle Hotel, O'Donnell said, "Here, God damnit, you shake it loose." I pin pointed it down. I went through all the mess and what held it up. What was holding it all up was the report from Millikan [Max F. Millikan] at Harvard. And he said, "Well, you shake that out and we'll move ahead." I think they were moving cautiously, there was a big debate about whether he ought to do this kind of kooky experimental thing or not. And Kennedy was for it, Bob Kennedy was, and the rest were, you know, fooling around and didn't know what to do with it and stuff.

HACKMAN: This is at what period exactly?

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HADDAD: The transition. November, Dec.... Whatever that was, right in that immediate period. And you know, they weren't sure because they didn't want to take a chance before they built up some credibility. Not for the

wrong reasons, for the right reasons. They said, "Let's get credibility. Let's do something, then take on experimental projects." Well, anyhow, I drove them out of their minds. I talked to the President and all of them. And they said, "Well...." So they said, "You shake loose the Millikan report and then we can move." So I started shaking loose the Millikan report. It was a lousy report. Six hundred volunteers tied to the university and all that. Then I went up in smoke and let myself be heard and wrote a note to the President, and caught Bobby in a corner, and

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you know, anyway, lobbied like hell, because I was covering him. I was sitting outside the Carlyle Hotel and really sitting in there making phone calls and calling the paper once in a while giving them four paragraphs on what the President was doing. And but really working there. And it was fun. And got a little taste of it at that point, but I still didn't want to go into the government. Then Kennedy called, Robert Kennedy, called me from the airport at some period, maybe February, January or February, he actually said, "Do you want to run the Peace Corps?" And I just said, "Well, I don't know if I can run the Peace Corps." I said, "I'm very interested." He said, "Well, you go tell Ralph Dungan to get you an office down there and go down and try to set it up." And I said, "Well, I'll talk to Mrs. _____." And there was some delay in there and I got

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a six month leave from the paper and I went down and Sarge was there and I went to work for Sarge. And I remember Kennedy called me from a pay phone, Bob Kennedy called me from a pay phone booth at the airport. I think he said, "You were raising so much hell about it, why don't you do something about it," you know. Or something. I think I actually called him to raise hell about it again, I think. Either it was the spur of the moment, or.... I think it was something he had thought out. I'm not sure, but anyway, I went and I got six months leave.

HACKMAN: What was the hold up on the Millikan report? Just...

HADDAD: Oh, screwing around. I mean, it wasn't really a hold up. It was—they weren't getting it

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done and I was, you know, I wanted it quick, quick, quick. And it really was just a delay tactic. They were.... You know. Not with any premeditation, but I wanted it yesterday, you know, let's get the damn thing moving, period. You know, I thought there was such a—the mail and the.... You know, really, I could tell he touched a chord. I was there when he made the speech.

HACKMAN: Yes, going back to that, during the campaign, you said you were there at the San Francisco speech. Can you remember how this issue developed, what...

HADDAD: Well, I know the whole chronology of it now, I don't know if I told you about it before.

HACKMAN: No.

HADDAD: Well, there's a lot of floating about about the idea....

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[BEGIN SIDE II OF TAPE II]

HADDAD: A lot of floating around about the idea of Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] and Reuss [Henry S. Reuss]. But General Gavin [James M. Gavin] gave a speech in Atlanta, and the Governor of South Carolina, Hollings [Ernest F. Hollings] heard it, and as he walked out, he heard Nixon people saying, "Hey, let's get a hold of Nixon, it's a great idea." He got in a phone booth, or telephoned, Hollings did, and he got me a copy of the Gavin's speech, by some chance floating around somewhere. And he tried to reach the Kennedy campaign and said, "The Nixon people are going to do it. It's a great idea. You do it." And he couldn't reach anybody. He finally reached Bill Walton [William Walton] and then Walton reached somebody else, and by that time they were up flying around in

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Massachusetts somewhere and got Sorensen and someone in the phone booth. And then it began to develop on that trip from Massachusetts to the Midwest and Michigan and then out to California and then up to San Francisco. So it developed, the stimulus, the immediate pressure, I believe was the phone call from Hollings to Walton, and Walton got a hold of somebody else and he couldn't find anybody, he found Walton here in New York. Walton got a.... I've got it written down somewhere. Walton maybe got a hold of Sorensen or somebody, he got a hold of him in an airport phone booth or something. And then it developed, and that's where it came. Evidently Nixon's people rejected the idea. They did get it and rejected it. And then it developed, and

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the excitement, I think one of the things that moved it along was the response that, you know, he did that midnight thing at...

HACKMAN: Michigan.

HADDAD: Yes, at two or three in the morning. And then the response to that from the students, setting it up themselves, and then playing with the idea as he did around, and then watching the response in it. The great speech in San Francisco which I think I told you I heard, standing between Kenny O'Donnell and...

HACKMAN: The Oregon thing.

HADDAD: Yes, two dollars a vote. I'll never forget that. Boy, that was a weird set up!

HACKMAN: Can you remember anybody in the immediate group around you who was opposed to going on with this at all?

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HADDAD: No, no, no. I didn't get that involved. I was—my role was, the liaison between Robert Kennedy and Jack Kennedy and I didn't get involved with all those guys. In fact, Evelyn Lincoln really helped me again, too, because any time I had something to do, Robert Kennedy wanted me to walk right back in the office and talk to the President and complain. I did that once and boy, they cut my balls off, you know, because everybody gets jumpy and so Mrs. Lincoln, I'd tell her. I said, "Bobby wants me to talk to Jack about, the Senator, about something and would you get it so that he calls me." So he'd call me and I'd go back there and whatever.... You know, you'd have to walk on a plane through Sorensen, all those guys, you know, and I was an outsider, in a way, I mean, I was.... And then suddenly, you know,

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everybody gets jumpy. So I didn't get involved with them on any of that theoretical or the speech writing. My greatest contribution to them was that I found a book of Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] quotes...

HACKMAN: Yes, you said that on the first one.

HADDAD: I told you that. Yes.

HACKMAN: Sticking with the campaign for just a minute, and tying in the earlier work you had done with Stevenson, were any of the people immediately around Stevenson, Ball and Blair [William McCormick Blair, Jr.] and all these people difficult to get aroused for Kennedy?

HADDAD: Oh, yes. The Stevenson people were very difficult to get aroused for. But it changed. There was some snapping point about.... See, I thought the same thing would happen with Robert Kennedy, that's why I reviewed it in my mind recently. But some snapping point about a month.... A combination of what Nixon represented and

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what Kennedy was saying. Kennedy began to catch on. Kennedy became a man in that campaign. Really immense, rather than a man, and he really began to say it. And the same way Robert Kennedy was coming on. And the McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] people were similar in my mind to the Stevenson people. And it's parallel, and I had no doubts that he would capture them as he was talking and I don't know where it broke. It broke somewhere and it was rough in the beginning, rough, rough, rough.

HACKMAN: And nobody stayed really cold?

HADDAD: Well, they—withdrawn, petulant.

HACKMAN: I'd wondered particularly about Ball's feeling in that period.

HADDAD: Well, I rode with Ball, we had—no I guess it's still confidential, we didn't release it—

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we had a great thing that might break it for Stevenson, one of those old ladies around Stevenson, in her big mansion somewhere in L.A....

HACKMAN: You put that on the first one.

HADDAD: Yes, with that car ride?

HACKMAN: Yes.

HADDAD: Yes. But he—I can't remember his role later on. It was that whole bit in there with Ball. Newt Minow [Newton N. Minow] was excellent. There were a couple of real Kennedy guys in that law firm. Bill Blair was the one that got me involved in all this. I saw him at the funeral, reminded him that it was his call that got me to see Bobby. And like I say, the second Kennedy funeral. Anyway, it was difficult, but it broke. It broke and it broke rapidly.

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And it broke on the basis of antipathy of—worry about Nixon, but I think mostly it broke on what Kennedy was saying. He was beginning to—that charisma began to catch hold and that's what did it. And then you had no problem. He had a few petulant intellectuals that went off and locked themselves in their towers or.... But basically, they helped us. Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] was good in that. Schlesinger never had much power in the Kennedy Administration, as you must know by this time, but he was very helpful in

that whole area because he was still a spokesman for that class and his banging away.... Galbraith [John Kenneth Galbraith] was helpful in that class. They began to set the climate for receptivity.

HACKMAN: You'd also mentioned that as things developed

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you came to have a relationship with Stevenson. What can you remember about his feelings during the campaign and then maybe carry that over in the Administration while...

HADDAD: He was a great admirer of Jack Kennedy, an enormous admirer of Jack Kennedy, and he had his hang ups about, you know, he wasn't too happy with the UN sort of thing and everything. But, he was an admirer of Jack Kennedy's mind. He'd always been—he had a lingering hope to be president—which they never got over—but he was beginning to settle into his life. He was beginning to live his own life and kind of a security that comes.... But he still always had a lingering ambition. But, actually, that, you know, my, you know, he might have been even careful with me, he might have been careful with me about Kefauver [Estes Kefauver], and he might have been careful with me about

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Kennedy. But he was awfully nice to me. And I had some very open discussions. He helped me on a couple of decisions that I had to make about myself, about what the hell I wanted to do and things. He was very open in discussion. The cord in my mind that this strikes is a great admiration for Kennedy, and a kind of slight admiration for the toughness and pragmatism that people think the Administration had. It didn't really have it. The Kennedys are awfully disorganized, but compared to everybody else they're phenomenally organized.

HACKMAN: I don't know what kind of relationship you had with Mrs. Roosevelt [Eleanor R. Roosevelt], but something in the same way. Do you know anything about how this developed after...

HADDAD: Yes. I talked to her about that.

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My wife [Kate Roosevelt Whitney] was Jimmy's [James Roosevelt] daughter and she was always anxious to reunite the family, and I knew Mrs. Roosevelt separately than my wife, and knew Jimmy separately. And she used the occasion of our marriage to try to bring all the family together back up at Trenton. And so she was particularly, you know, it was a combination of mix, the personal and everything. She knew I was working for Kennedy and I have some letters she wrote me about it

somewhere around, and it was a plus. A plus. I think she came out with that this was a man with a potential of greatness. And I think maybe the word that was underlined was potential, I don't think she underlined it in the letter, but, I mean, the chord in my mind was here was a man that had the potential of greatness.

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Whether he would use it and use it properly, or could use it, or would want to use it _____. And I think they even used me with her a couple of times. They used me a lot with the liberals and the reformers and all that. Talked to them and stuff.

HACKMAN: Have you got time to go on or should...

HADDAD: Yes, go a couple....

HACKMAN: Going into the period, then, when you went over to the Peace Corps, was your role spelled out to you in any clear way at the time you went over, or what the hell happened? Did Shriver...

HADDAD: No. No, I was always trying to get it to be spelled out. I spent three years over there trying to get it spelled out, and I hacked it out, you know. Shriver always used me as an alter ego and it was obvious what he,

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you know, and he always used me to carry out his ideas and that type thing. I always wanted to be administrator and he'd want me to be a writer and he'd always want me to work on the image instead of.... And, you know, all that kind of.... And I finally, you know, became top bureaucrat and set up my departments and got them staffed and since, he was throwing things like, you know.... I shouldn't have done the annual report and all that kind of stuff. But he wanted me, he knew I had—he had that same Kennedy respect for newspaper men and I had all these newspaper types around and so he threw all those things.... I build a special projects job. I really was an extension of Shriver in that job. I think most people viewed me as that, an extension of Shriver and also a good

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relationship with him. Of course, we would scream and yell at each other.

HACKMAN: You were talking about that Millikan report being held up, can you remember what the reaction was with some of those other reports that you used? The Colorado State report and Sam Hayes [Samuel P. Hayes] and...

HADDAD: Jerks. You know, we laughed at them. Nothing, zero, zilch. Shriver, I don't even think read them—he probably did—but one time. Nothing, nothing, we used nothing. They were all so rigid. It was like they were, you know, just nothing. They were just stupid, inane, theoretical statements which said, “Don't tackle the problem. Give it to the universities,” or something. Or, “Give it to that.” Or, “It's impossible to do,” or you know. The whole damn thing. The fact that

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Shriver could go through all that stuff and just push it off the table was remarkable. Also, you know, I guess.... I don't think too much of it came because he was the brother-in-law of the President. I think a lot of it came out of Shriver's own personality.

HACKMAN: What was the reaction, you know, to the Wiggins Report then? I think that Shriver was...

HADDAD: Yes, that was—he liked it. Sarge really liked it. And it turned out to be disastrous about the Philippines, but Sarge really did read it in the middle of the night or something. Warren knows the details. I know when he—he either called in the middle of the night or in the morning, I don't know. Sarge exaggerates a little bit he thinks he called him a two o'clock in the morning, I think Warren said he called him at eight, or something, but anyway, he was enormously impressed by it, and Wiggins was the rock

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on which the Peace Corps was built. He never gets the credit that he should get. Without a—and Sarge never gets the credit he should get—without Wiggins there wouldn't have been a Peace Corps. He was the rock. He was our stability. He was our rudder. He knew the government.

HACKMAN: Yes. I'm wondering what you can remember about the discussion of size in the first year and then eventual, because Wiggins had the big size idea.

HADDAD: Yes, he had the big size. Yes, and we always felt we'd grow as quick as we could get volunteers, really. And we always did grow as quick as we could volunteers, I mean, it became apragmatic.... Sarge is always in the number game, you know, and then Frank

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Williams [Franklin H. Williams] and Bill Moyers and other would argue with him about the numbers game. But he was always in the numbers game. He always kept throwing things out that, you'd say, “Jesus Christ, how the hell we going to salvage that? Sarge, you cast that thing way out there, we'll never be able to get it back. What are you....” He always did it on

purpose and we were always running to catch what he was throwing out, and he'd get madder than hell because they were playing the numbers game on him. You know, let's get slots and all that. But it worked out. He got—we equal the people we could attract, I mean, we always were able to grow as quickly as we could attract people. And we could get budget on the numbers we could attract. I always put a lot of effort

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on recruiting. You know, I think we grew as quickly as we could possibly grow, no matter what the theoretical discussions about size were. We could have always contracted and squeezed in for the Millikan size, something like six hundred, and been a little extension of some voluntary service. Everybody kind of had the grand design, but the grand design, a hundred thousand or ten thousand, whatever it was, it was always a grand design of playing an important part in history. It was never a fourteen guys going somewhere. I mean, it was always the theory that you wanted to move things.

HACKMAN: I've seen a memo from—a Dave Bell [David E. Bell] memo on the early period, saying he and Shriver had agreed that five thousand would be the aim by mid '62, I believe, and then when legislation was presented, it suggested like twenty-seven hundred by mid '62.

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What was holding it back at that point? Was it...

HADDAD: I think we—I don't know what in the hell, I don't remember, I just know we could, we always had the pressure on recruiting and we were very tough on selection and we didn't want to reduce the standards to take people. And I don't know about all this. There was a big numbers game going on, but I'll tell you what the underlying principle was, the underlying principle was we could grow as fast as we could get volunteers and Congress—and it became very apparent that Congress could give us money as quick as we could get volunteers. I mean it became very apparent. We had immediate success. I mean, Goldwater [Barry M. Goldwater] was great, you know, he was a big symbol of the right and he began to support us.

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And all the daughters and sons of famous people began writing letters home saying how great it was and Saltonstall [Leverett Saltonstall] would get up and read a letter from his niece and, you know, a lot of guys like—what's his name?—S_____ of California, who banged our head in on the Poverty Program, said, "You know," he said, I told you, he said, "I looked in my office at seven o'clock and there was Shriver walking down the hall looking in doors and stuff. That's how we got the _____." He got a lot of credibility for doing his homework that way. I think we grew as quick as we could attract people and I know there was all kinds of discussions and fights. And if you went through the staff minutes, it would

be all kinds of stuff, but, anyway, the underlying principle was safe selection and going as quick as we could get volunteers.

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And what we wrote Battle, what Battle wrote us, and what was in the legislation was basically geared to that, even though Sarge would _____ on the figures.

HACKMAN: Yes. Were there any points in that first year when it looked like you were really going to be in trouble as far as this...

HADDAD: Oh, hundreds of times. Oh, with recruitment? Well, we never knew. We kind of threw it up in the air and didn't know where it was going to come down, like taking a parachute jump, you never know where you're going to land. No, we were cocky as hell. I mean we got a lot of points for being cocky. Yes, we had some concern, you know, but it began, you know, too many of us had confidence in our own judgment about this country to have any

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fears. If we'd had any sense we'd have never started it.

HACKMAN: Let me ask you about something else. On the selective service thing, Hershey [Lewis B. Hershey], you said you got involved with Hershey.

HADDAD: I set it up.

HACKMAN: Yes.

HADDAD: He was great. He's changed a lot, but he was great in those days.

HACKMAN: I believe when President Kennedy had first mentioned this in the campaign there was some suggestion that there might be the opportunity for alternative service.

HADDAD: That's right. Yes, and we said no. We rejected it because we didn't want to confuse the picture. So we said, "No draft deferment." But then we went—Morris Abram and I went down

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to Hershey and we talked about it. He said, "Aw, they aren't going to get drafted." He said, "Don't worry about it," he said, "what you can't handle formally, I'll handle informally." He said, "You keep appealing and it finally gets on my desk, then I'll have the say." And he said, "Let me work on the Congress for you." He said, "I've known all these guys up there for

twenty years.” He was fabulous, he was marvelous. And I’ll tell you, we’ve never had anybody drafted. Every time I had a problem he gave me a colonel to call and I called the colonel and the colonel worked it out and, you know, we had an informal deferment policy and so we never had to have a confrontation of whether it would or would not be. And Sarge didn’t want it as a—I think they really did want alternative service later on, when we began to talk about a

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Domestic Peace Corps and Shriver and Wiggins—Wiggins gave some speeches on that, marvelous speeches, more of the pro-McNamara stuff. But we just didn’t want to complicate the process. We were, you know, we were reacting to, you know, a very tough pragmatic, if you want to come you come. So Sarge would tell the volunteers who’d bitch, he said, “Nobody asked you to come. If you don’t like it, go home.” It was that kind of, you know, kind of a masculine attitude about things, kind of a bravado. But Hershey was excellent, superb, never let us down, never once, and helped us. I called him a couple of times about a Midwest congressman and said, “Hey, do you happen to know that guy? He’s really banging our head into the....” Talk to him, and he’d go over and talk to him and got us some votes.

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HACKMAN: Did you do much work yourself on the Hill in this earlier period?

HADDAD: A little bit. A little bit. That was Moyers’ bag. Moyers and Sarge would be up on the Hill all day long and then they’d come back about eight o’clock or something like that and we’d work a couple of hours, three or four hours and then go out to eat dinner about midnight. That’s the way it worked. And I was back in the shop and Wiggins back in the shop, or something like that. I don’t think they trusted me too much, I was too liberal. I was one of the most liberal guys in that operation and they weren’t sure I’d know how to deal with congressmen.

HACKMAN: You mean the rest of the staff in the early period as far as going on the Hill?

HADDAD: Yes, they—Moyers was a, you know, pragmatic guy. And, well, I think Sarge, you know,

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Sarge said, “You’re just like I was.” Sarge was always a liberal guy in the Kennedy operation. They always felt I wouldn’t know how to deal with congressmen.

HACKMAN: How did the White House staff people react to Shriver, personally, as far as the liberal...

HADDAD: They never took Shriver seriously during the campaign, mistakenly so. They weren't sure, he was a handsome brother-in-law, deprecating. They began to take him seriously when he started running with Ball.

HACKMAN: Did he take a lot of things to them? Or have you take things to them? Or did he usually try to go to the President? Or....

HADDAD: No, no, wouldn't go to the President. I tried to get him to go to the President a half a dozen times. Wouldn't go, just wouldn't go. I said, "It's stupid, Sarge." I said, "We're paying the penalty for your personality hang ups."

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And I said, "You ought to get somebody in here who can talk to the President." He had an implied power and we got a lot of—an enormous, a lot of people wouldn't take us on because they thought he would. We did White House clearing—Wiggins did a lot of that stuff. On problems, I would talk to the White House, but we never—we didn't even clear too much, I mean, just went ahead and did. We weren't really concerned about—we just really thought we'd go for broke. We kept saying, Moyers said, "What the hell, I'll go back here." I said, "I'll go back to the New York Post. Sarge, you go back to the Merchandise Mart." That kind of stuff.

HACKMAN: Were there things that Robert Kennedy could help you on? Did he get involved in these things?

HADDAD: Oh, yes, he definitely...

HACKMAN: Like what?

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HADDAD: The political muscle in the conversations about whether there ought to be a Peace Corps, his absolute commitment to getting the thing going, which kept all the wolves away; he helped me on that conference which Shriver and I invited him and then I had to disinvite him. A lot of little problems I called over to him. He called over sometimes too because we had had the son and daughter-in-law of a police chief somewhere and they were caught in limbo and the police chief would call him and he'd say, "Holy Christ, will you guys make up your mind." Or something like that, you know, he said, "Tell the guy what the hell's going on." No influence about the volunteers and stuff, but his support was essential for our freedom from political restraint.

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HACKMAN: You had talked about Vice President Johnson being, helping out in this AID decision. Were there any other things he got involved in?

HADDAD: Yes. Every time we had a problem, he talked to Moyers once a day. Johnson, we wouldn't have had that international conference if it hadn't been for Johnson. Johnson was our ambassador all over the world. He did everything we wanted him to do. He was—you know, I'm not a Johnson fan—he was superb, the Peace Corps, you know, like Warren Wiggins was a rock, he was our political rock. He was very good. He was just—he was the Chairman of our advisory board, too. He was very good, he was just very good, we could use him in a lot of different ways. Just ask him to do things and he'd do them. Moyers always asked him to do things, talk to congressmen, senators, do everything. Anything we needed,

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he was just superb. And unselfish. I mean he was really superb in the Peace Corps. I don't know what happened to him later on, but he was, in terms of the Peace Corps, he was one of our best. Everybody liked him in the Peace Corps, and it even hung over to the, some of the Kennedy people who liked Johnson after the assassination were out of the Peace Corps because we had a _____. We'd never run up on that other side of his. He never showed us that other side.

HACKMAN: What about the Advisory Council? Did this work out well, or was it...

HADDAD: Oh, it was always arguments about how to use him, and it was always a big summit meeting when we all decided to use him we'd have a meeting and then we wouldn't use him. We used a few, but we never used him, we were window dressing. We never effectively

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utilized him, at least, when I was there. We never, we never got—I don't know what we could have, we kept making great decisions on how we would use him and stuff. We used him politically and used him on programs and supporting them, but he was not a function on the Board. Actually, the freedom march started it with a discussion between Jay Rockefeller [John Davison Rockefeller, IV] and Bill Coffin [William Sloane Coffin, Jr.] and somebody else.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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