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Raymond Hare
Archivist of the United States

January 30, 1974
February 12, 1974
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O'BRIEN:  Well, I guess the obvious place to start is with the question: When did you first meet John Fitzgerald Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]?

HARE:  I first met him right here after he became President. Because I came back to the Department [Department of State] in '59, and I was Deputy Under Secretary at the end of the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] administration and the first of the Kennedy administration. So, I first met him then during that period after he came into office in 1961.

O'BRIEN:  While you were involved in Near East affairs in the Eisenhower administration, did you take any note of his criticisms of Eisenhower-Dulles [John Foster Dulles] policy after the Suez Canal crisis?

MARE:  Of President Kennedy's?

O'BRIEN:  Yes.

HARE:  You see, at the time of the Suez crisis, at the very beginning of it, I was then Director General of the Foreign Service up until the latter part of '56,
September, '56. At that time I went to Cairo. So as Director General, I had no political responsibilities. I did, as a matter of fact, have a certain amount of contact with Secretary Dulles during that period because every so often—I suppose this was sort of a bootlegging operation, or moonlighting—Secretary Dulles would call me in to discuss Near Eastern things on an ad hoc basis. But it was sort of an in and out type of a relationship. I had no continuing contact on it at that time. So that was my knowledge of it at that time. After that, I went to Cairo and saw the scene from there. Now in specific

answer to your question: I do not recall anything that involved what President Kennedy, at that time Senator Kennedy, may have said.

O’BRIEN: Did the Egyptian government take any rote of some of the criticisms of people like Kennedy, Senator Kennedy, towards U. S. policy in the Middle East?

HARE: Of course, the subject that I remember the most clearly was the question of Algeria.

O’BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: And I think the Algerian thing was quite well-known publicly. As far as the Near East generally is concerned, I do not recall there having been an element of any consequence.

O’BRIEN: Yes. How did your appointment as Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs come about?

HARE: Well, I don't know; it just...I'd been in Cairo, which is rather an important place, and if you're in a fairly important place, why, sometimes a fairly important job comes along and, if it's empty and you're free, you may be tapped for it. There were no particular reasons, no personal reasons of any kind. That's the way the cards fell at that time.

I might add, in this connection that all through my career I've never in any way been associated with any particular group or person. I've been like a professional baseball player or football player—which I think is the role, really, of a public servant of the career tape—so I've deliberately never tried to tie my fate to any stars. That's the way it's worked.

O’BRIEN: Well, I know in the group of people like yourself who make up, well, what might be called the Middle East group or the people around NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern, and South Asian Affairs] in the State Department, you seem to have a certain élan—I guess that might be the proper word—or at least you know each other pretty well. What was the feeling among these people here in Washington and also
in the field in '60 towards the presidential election of 1960 and the candidates? Did they take any particular interest? What were their reactions at that point to Vice President Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] and Senator Kennedy?

HARE: This may sound strange to you, but, if you are professional in this business, you normally watch

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matters with a certain interest but with a great deal of detachment, a great deal of detachment. I tried to do so, and I think that's characteristic of a lot of what you might call the professional people. You serve a president, an administration, whether it be Republican or Democrat. I think you condition your mind that way. And a sort of a spin off from this is that you don't focus much on the American political scene, perhaps not as much as you should.

O'BRIEN: Sure.

HARE: Now, I know in my own case, for instance, I never voted till the last election. Some people said that was a mistake. I maintained that that was the way I wanted to play it. When I was called upon by a president, whether he was Republican or Democrat, I didn't want any hint of anything that would indicate that I wasn't entirely his man. Just like a player and a coach, he's calling the shots and you're there to play the game with him.

O'BRIEN: What's morale like in the late fifties in the Foreign Service and in the Department on the eve of the presidential election?

HARE: It had been rather low during the early part of the Eisenhower administration—I shouldn't associate it with President Eisenhower, but there was the McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy] period—that was a very unhappy period.

O'BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: By the end of the period, and very often in any new administration, the career people usually find that their loyalty is not understood. It takes a little time to be appreciated but part way through an administration, you usually find that the career people get into a harmonious adjustment with the people who come in from the outside. As far as the career itself was concerned, it was not a bad period, but frankly, there were too many reorganizations, and that is still the case. There's too much tinkering with the machine. Nine times out of ten, there was nothing particularly wrong with the machine except making it work by getting the right people in the right jobs. That's what decides things. But people insist on tinkering with the machine. Very often it is done by
people from outside who are technically qualified in terms of an abstract approach to personnel problems, but as a whole, you'll find that your Foreign Service Officers—these are the ones who are there Saturday afternoons and Sunday mornings and late at night—don't think of the job in terms of slots and positions abstract personnel procedures. It's like a doctor or someone who is...It's a career, a twenty-four hour a day job, a 365, 366 day a year job, and one that you feel you're really dedicated to. If you don't feel you're dedicated to it, frankly, I don't think, you're a real Foreign Service Officer. This doesn't gee very well with someone who may come in from the outside, who talks in terms of man-hours and how much does it cost to get out a telegram and things of that kind. You just don't work that way. So that there had been—and regardless of administration—too much of that in many ways.

As you recall—while we're on this subject, and then we'll get back to the main subject—the so-called Wristonization [Henry M. Wriston]. I was Ambassador in Beirut at that time and was called back as Director General of the Foreign Service by Saltzman [Charles E. Saltzman], Under Secretary Saltzman at that time, particularly to implement the Wristonization program. Now, I think it was the right idea, there should be a unified service that includes the Department [State Department] and the field. I also think that it had to be done quite rapidly because unless you conduct one of these operations a bit on a crash basis, you get stuck halfway through. Then you never know whether you've really given it a chance or not. Ambassador Henderson [Loy W. Henderson] came in after that, and I know he and I both felt that this thing should be pushed through.

But the mistake that was made, it seems to me, was they took as a criterion for integration essentially salary rank, and there wasn't enough attention to what the types of jobs were. For instance, there are certain political types of work in INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] for instance. What you might sometimes call cubicle jobs. A man who is really a great specialist, say, on Hungary, and he knows everything about Hungary but he doesn't know much about any other areas, but he's invaluable on Hungary. Now, there is a place for a certain number of these highly specialized people. They're not the run of the mill. But it doesn't mean that they should be integrated and have to go out and be economic counselor in Timbuktu. It's quite a different proposition.

However, there was one aspect of it that was very important and that was that this operation should be headed by a very senior, respected Foreign Service Officer, and the choice as the first incumbent of that position fortunately fell on Ambassador Henderson.

O'BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: This was a very happy thing to do. He was a very experienced man; he knew the service; he was a motivated man. He was just the type of person that should have been in that job. But there was never another
Loy Henderson in that position. There were different types of people. So even though there were some difficulties in the Wristonization program and some difficulties that have risen since that time due to these various reorganizations I've mentioned, the difficulties could have been attenuated and greater stability assured if you had had somebody like that. I am not saying anything against any single person who has occupied these jobs since. There have been some very qualified people, but they haven't been that type—nor has that type been really sought. There I think was their mistake.

O'BRIEN: Loy Henderson must have been quite a person on the job.

HARE: Oh, yes. Tremendous person, tremendous person.

O'BRIEN: While you were the Deputy Under Secretary and had a new administration coming in, did you take any responsibility at all for briefing any of the new people coming in or any of the new administration people, appointees in the Department as well as the White House?

HARE: Oh, yes. At my level we had meetings of various kinds with Rostow [Walt Whitman Rostow] and Secretary McNamara [Robert S. McNamara]. We'd get together at the Metropolitan Club, or in small meetings and things of that kind. Then there are always regular briefings, briefing books, etc., that are prepared. I didn't have anything to do with those particularly, but that is always done. And it was a normal transition in that sense.

O'BRIEN: Do you remember, is there anything outstanding in your memory about these meetings, in perhaps the questions that were asked by people like Mr. Rostow and Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk]?

HARE: The only thing I remember that was perhaps unusual was I went to a little lunch we had at the Metropolitan Club. There was a man sitting beside me and at first I wondered who he was. It was Bob McNamara. I never had met him before, I didn't know him. There was nothing that particularly strikes me. As far as the Department is concerned, the aspect of the thing at that time that perhaps stood out more than the others was the very personal interest that President Kennedy took in foreign affairs, to the extent, originally, of calling up desk officers and asking the questions. This was when he first came in. And you can imagine a poor, little desk officer—I said poor little desk officer—although these are very capable fellows, but men who essentially worked for somebody else in the hierarchy—all of a sudden, the telephone rings and this is President Kennedy calling. And particularly if you're asking this man a question of policy, this is embarrassing. But after awhile President Kennedy, changed that, he raised the level a little higher, higher up the ladder.
But, this was the hallmark, I think, of President Kennedy, the intense personal interest. He followed the traffic very attentively over there at the White House. Sometimes the telephone calls would come through almost before the man in the State Department had seen the telegram himself.

O'BRIEN: There were also some task forces that were established to ease the transition here and, not only that, to give the incoming administration some idea about major problems. Did you have anything to do with this? It was John Sharon's [John H. Sharon] operation, George Ball [George W. Ball], Myer Rashish, and I believe J. Robert Schaetzel [J. Robert Schaetzel] was involved.

HARE: I remember these various people and, as I said, there were various types of briefings and dimensions but nothing of specific importance comes to mind. I was sort of in the operational side of the thing, perhaps that's the reason.

O'BRIEN: As I understand it there were some talent lists that were drawn up for ambassadorial posts. Did you ever encounter these?

HARE: Yes. Chet Bowles [Chester B. Bowles] worked on that particularly.

O'BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: As a matter of fact, you see, I wasn't there, very long after the new administration came in because the position of ambassador in Turkey, and I was designated for that position. I went over there in April. So, it was only a few months that I was actually in the Kennedy administration, in Washington. In this general change-over, I went back to my old area of specialization which was the Middle East, whereas, as Deputy Under Secretary I had worldwide responsibility for the first time. And so I sort of got back into my own groove, you might say, and I was not unhappy to do so either.

O'BRIEN: Was there anything in those few months you were there and back in the Middle East thing, was there anything that came up that was of major importance? Middle East was pretty quiet in those years, in some respects, wasn't it?

HARE: I can't recall anything particularly at the moment that stands out. Also, the duties of the Deputy

Under Secretary vary a great deal. At the time I had it, we had certain specialized functions such as, liaison with [Department of] Defense. That was one of the things that I worked on very hard and if I had a hallmark at all, that was it; because during the
end of the Eisenhower administration and the beginning of the Kennedy administration, it was perfectly obvious that Defense and State were operating in similar areas without full knowledge of what the other was doing. This wasn't intentional, it was simply a lack of adequate means of communication. Previously certain specifics like overseas bases that had been under the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs had brought us in contact with the military. So, we decided at that time to extend our relationship. Also, it was at that time we decided to exchange a certain number of Foreign Service Officers with Defense, and a certain number to go from Defense to State. Also I had contact with labor organization to the extent there was any such thing.

Aside from that, we had certain fixed responsibilities; then there were other responsibilities that were sort of an ad hoc type. You had, say, a Soviet representative that was going to be expelled in two days; somebody had to call in the Russian Ambassador to tell him the bad news and very often I was the one who had to do it. Also, another function was a sort of liaison with the Assistant Secretaries, including keeping them generally informed of what was happening. Space, for instance, was just beginning to be thought about and nuclear matters, things of that kind. We'd have meetings that did not necessarily have to do with any operational problems; this also was an idea of my own, frankly. I thought that aside from coordination of action, there also was a field for a sharing of knowledge regarding common phenomenon that we ought to know about. For example, we got the man from Protocol [The Office of the Chief of Protocol] in one day to tell us about visits from foreign dignitaries—every Assistant Secretary wants to get half a dozen of his own heads of states in every year and it just can't be done—and to know how the process works, what's involved when an invitation for an official visit is actually extended. It may sound simpler but in fact it’s a complicated problem and one that is often of considerable magnitude.

O’BRIEN: Sure. I imagine so. Okay, how about your own appointment as Ambassador to Turkey. How did that happen to come up?

HARE: Well, Chet Bowles called me up one day and asked me if I wanted to go to Turkey and I said, "Yes."

O’BRIEN: Turkey. Then you went?

HARE: I went to Turkey.

O’BRIEN: Did you run into any resistance in the incoming administration?

HARE: No.

O’BRIEN: At all, or on the Hill?

HARE: No.
O’BRIEN: You don't happen to know how Bowles came about…

HARE: Selecting me?

O’BRIEN … selecting you or asking you or making the recommendation?

HARE: Well, I don't know, I never talked it over with Chet. We sat together because he was Under Secretary and I was Deputy; we had these morning meetings, some larger and some smaller, and he knew me. Chet also knew that my interest was the Middle East. I'd begun as a young Vice-Consul in the Middle East in 1927. It was quite a normal process.

O’BRIEN: Did you find any conflicting views on Middle East policy between the incoming administration and people in the Eisenhower administration, any chance to talk with Secretary Rusk about Middle East things?

HARE: Any administration coming in, I think, wants to see if they can't initiate some new departures just as the present administration did. Everyone that comes in wants to take a look particularly at the hard things. And this really happened a little later, but there was a tendency to try to see if there wasn't some way of getting more personal contact between President Kennedy and the heads of state all over the area there.

O’BRIEN: Yes. What’s the state of U.S.-Turkish relations at the time you assume the ambassadorship in Ankara? What are major problems in U.S.-Turkish relations?

HARE: Well, you see, in the early years right after the war and as a result of the Truman Doctrine—as a result of which we gave aid to Greece and Turkey and recognized that they held a special position of importance to us, and this led later on to both countries entering NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] several years later—there was developed a relation with both Greece and Turkey that was very close and very firm. It wasn't firm just because of documents that we were signing; it was firm because there was a real honest mutuality of interest. On their part, they had been threatened from the north traditionally far many, many years. This was the only source of their concern. In a formal sense it was more true of Turkey than of Greece. The Greeks had been driven by subversion to a certain extent. As far as we were concerned, you recall, we had been disturbed in those early years right after the war about physical Russian push to the south; we sometimes forget that now. And as I recall it, I was in Saudi Arabia at that time, and I was sent there especially to talk about the air field at Dhahran.
some feeling that 1952 was a critical year at that time. This was in terms of a physical Soviet move down into the area. So, with that in their minds, this traditional... There had been these moves, of course, by the Soviets against both Greece and Turkey which were very current—demands made on them which were very current—and our own very clearly held concern about the area; there was real common ground. So, as a result of the Truman Doctrine, which I think was one of the most successful of any of the policies which were adopted by the American government, Greece and Turkey got into NATO, and there was a very firm foundation of understanding in these two countries.

However, as times go on and mutuality of interests is implemented and is successful, there tends to be a back current developed because of success. This is the old story. And things which were accepted in recognition of immediate concern and immediate danger, once the danger is a little further away, don't look the same way. Now, one of the things for instance and this is the direct answer to your question—I'm doing a lot of circumlocution—was the question of the American military presence in Turkey. The previous Turkish government, that is the government which had been ousted in 1960, but was in power at the time I'm talking about...

O'BRIEN: That is the Menderes [Adnan Menderes] government...

HARE: That is the Menderes government. A number of sort of privileges and agreements had been made. Privileges had been accorded and agreements been made that weren't entirely formalized and in a standard pattern. Documents were in various places. Sometimes they might be even oral types of agreement. So as a consequence we were engaged in Turkey in a very—thousands of people there in various places, but very often this wasn’t too clear. This came out particularly on questions with regard to status of forces which is a great problem, a very sensitive problem, one which has just been straightened out very recently. As a matter of fact,

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I was very amused recently to see that this had been settled after three or four years of discussion; well, I know that when I got there in 1961 it had already been discussed for a long time and was a problem. During the four years I was there it was a problem. This is a type of problem that you have when you have this closeness of relationship.

Then there is the matter of aid. Military aid and then economic assistance to supplant and complement military aid is never welcome in times of crisis but it doesn't maintain the same high priority after a period of time. As far as Turkey was concerned, I think our programs were more favorably treated than many others. But even then it involved understandings which in Turkey’s eyes didn't seem to be consonant with what they thought our relationship was to be. This is the type of problem basically that you had, the problems that evolve from initial and very fundamental and intimate relationship, very basic, very real. As time goes on the reason for it tends to weaken. And these things become magnified, magnified.
Another thing that happened also at this time was that greater freedom was given to the press. Then labor legislation was enacted shortly after I got there. And you'll find that if the press has been restrained over a period of time, there's a certain amount of bile that accumulates, that erupts and it isn't too pleasant. This is what you can expect; then it tends to develop a sort of a warped mentality on the part of the people who write. They find it almost impossible to write objectively afterwards.

O'BRIEN: That's right.

HARE: When they're free, they can't write objectively because they have been warped, you see. So this is the type of problem you had. Then labor, when all of a sudden the right to strike, that sort of thing, was recognized, the labor movement as a whole—the Turkish labor movement as a whole—developed extremely rationally and very well. But there was one sector, one sort of political particle, called the TLP, Turkish Labor Party that developed along quite Marxist lines. And that becomes a feed line in for things from the outside. So these various things, more freedom, changing attitude toward the basic relationship, all these gradually, gradually caused problems. And when I was there, I could see this thing coming. Frankly, I think I saw it clearer than the people who later on made a lot of noise about it.

O'BRIEN: How?

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HARE: Because if you're an old hand at this—see, it's like playing a game. You can recognize when the things start going wrong. You feel it.

O'BRIEN: Was the Department concerned—well, how did they view the military government that had taken over and was in office when you went there in 1961? Of course, there had been a coup against an elected government.

HARE: Yes, it had been. But there's a strange thing in Turkey. I think this depends upon who were doing the thinking about it.

O'BRIEN: Oh, I see.

HARE: Because it involved a certain degree of knowledge of Turkey and a certain sophistication that isn't vouchsafed to everyone, frankly. Because in Turkey the military traditionally have been regarded—and it's actually provided in the constitution—with a certain special position as guardians of the public conscience. This probably goes back to the old days when there was really no distinction between military and civilian in the old Turkish government. In the old days, if the sultan would go off to war there was no distinction between government and military; it was essentially the same thing. And the military in Turkey, also, although they're very military,
they're not militaristic—that's interesting, they take them up through the ranks, and they are not a militaristic people. Also, the Turkish military are not a conservative people, even though these are the old-time people that come out of traditional military establishment, they're not conservatives. This is very surprising to some people. They're very liberal in the idea of development, and progress, and specialization, things of that kind. Just the mere fact that the military takeover in Turkey doesn't have the same connotation as say in South America. Thus in the 1960 coup or revolution or whatever you want to call it, it was done essentially with a considerable degree of idealism and solitude for the people. I don't mean to say there was no personal interest involved, that would be naïve. But basically, I think they felt that the situation had arisen where something had to be done.

When I arrived in Turkey—that was a year later in 1961—they had said that they would have a new constitution and elections. And a lot of people who were supposedly experienced observers, didn’t believe it. They just laughed at this. In a very short time, I did believe it. But I had an advantage, because I had come there with my mental photographic plates you might say, very sensitive. When you come to a place, you

try to cover as much ground as you can, all of the social and political spectrum. And sometimes you have an advantage there which the person who's been there and lived with the problem doesn't have.

O’BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: But the Turkish military did what they said they would do. They did have a constitution, it wasn't a very good constitution; there was too much legislation in it. But, it was sincerely done. They had elections; the elections didn't come out the way they expected them to, but they accepted them. They played the game through as they had said they would, despite the doubting Thomases.

O’BRIEN: Any one in a policy making position here that didn't clearly understand that about Turkey or was particularly apprehensive that you recall?

HARE: Not that I recall, no.

O’BRIEN: How were people like a…What kind of a person is—please excuse my pronunciations—like General Gürsel [Cemal Gürsel] is it Gürsel?

HARE: Gürsel?

O’BRIEN: What kind of person was he?

HARE: Well, he was a delightfully frank, jovial, a basic sort of person. Of course he had these series of strokes of which he had this last massive one here
after having made a very hopeful recovery. Gürsel, of course, was not one of the original revolutionaries although he was with the revolution; he was chosen I think partly for his rank, partly for the fact that he was respected and was a very fine person. General Sunay [Cevdet Sunay], now, the present president is a really fine, solid honest-to-goodness Joe, really a good man. He sees the basics. You go talk to him...I used to see him when he was the head of the military establishment. You can spot a man of basic intelligence, because when you get half-way through he is already looking like he seems to know you're going to say next.

O'BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: He was that type. He had the ability to stick to essentials and not get bogged down in details.

O'BRIEN: Sure.

HARE: So both of these men are very basically fine people.

O'BRIEN: Well who really held political leadership in Turkey in those years?

HARE: Well, it was held really by the officers themselves, this group. Some of them, of course, dropped out or were forced out as is usual in these cases. So for a time they as a group held the power. Then, of course they turned it over at the end of the elections.

O'BRIEN: Who were some of the particular people you remember as being powerful at that point?

HARE: It was more as a group; they didn't emerge too much as individuals. There were certain ones who were more active but it was quite a whole group.

O'BRIEN: How was the foreign minister Sarper [Selim Sarper] to deal with? Is it Sarper?

HARE: Sarper. Oh, he was marvelous, he was marvelous.

O'BRIEN: He had a rather long, distinguished career.

HARE: Yes, he did; he did. He was a great friend of mine, a very, very fine man, very fine man. As a matter of fact, the Turkish foreign service as a whole was and still is an excellent foreign service. They're highly qualified people. They work hard, they delegate and they work very much on a smaller scale like I'd
like to think that our own State Department works. Perhaps being smaller they have some advantages that way. They're in their offices Saturdays and Sundays and nights when there's a crisis. Each man knows what his job is; they're very well qualified people. And Sarper was an excellent product of that group.

O'BRIEN: Were you at the...I understand NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] has a meeting every year somewhere in the Mediterranean area.

HARE: Not every year but in principle, yes, that's true.

O'BRIEN: Was there one in 1960?

HARE: 1960, let’s see, 1960...

O'BRIEN: That would have been while you were still Director—Deputy Under Secretary?

HARE: I don't recall.

O'BRIEN: Do you ever recall the coup in Turkey coming up at any of these meetings?

HARE: No. No, I don't.

O'BRIEN: For discussion? There was, as I understand it, a separation of the military faction in Turkey just after you assumed your post as ambassador, some divisions among the military as far as the leadership and elections.

HARE: Yes, there had been. And some of them had gone abroad, remember…

O'BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: …as attachés and that type of thing…

O'BRIEN: Oh, they sent one to Washington, didn't they? It was an Air Force general as I recall.

HARE: That one I…Who was that?

O'BRIEN: General Tansel [Irfan Tansel].

HARE: He didn't, he never came.
O’BRIEN: Oh.

HARE: He was supposed to come but there was a question there, but Tansel didn't come.

O’BRIEN: Oh.

HARE: That was reversed.

O’BRIEN: The Turks and the Prime Minister, again excuse my pronunciation, İnönü [Mustafa İsmet İnönü]…

HARE: İnönü, İnönü, yes.

O’BRIEN: …were constantly pressing you for more aid as I…

HARE: Well, it wasn't an individual thing on the part of the Prime Minister. It goes back to what I was talking about. This period began some time ago when it was more difficult…And they needed it very badly for their development because they had a very good development program. We were trying to assist them as best we could. As a whole it had worked well, it had worked very well.

O’BRIEN: Yes. At this point in 1961 and ‘62, were you receiving any instructions, or on your own were you attempting at all to mediate any of the differences between the Turks and the Greeks?

HARE: No, because you didn't have really any…This really broke later in its serious aspect and I only became involved in it then which was in December of ’63.

O’BRIEN: Yes. There wasn't anything at that point going on about Cyprus that…

HARE: Not that I was involved in, not that I can recall at that time. But Christmas morning, 1963, I was very deeply involved in it.

O’BRIEN: I imagine so. Well, Vice President Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] came out in that year [1962]. Did you do a good deal, or was there a good deal in the way of advance preparation for his visit?

HARE: There certainly was. There always was for the Vice President.
O'BRIEN: What kinds of things are done in a, let's say, for that type of thing?

HARE: Well, I'll tell you, President Johnson, the Vice President at that time was quite a demanding person. And he had made it known to his subordinates. As a consequence, and you find this very often, the subordinates wanted to make sure and they asked you to do about ten times more just to make sure that everything is done. So as a consequence you never know quite, to what extent, the demands are those of the President which are presented to you as those of the Vice President at that time and those which they think are insurance, that are just to make sure that things go alright. But generally speaking, for instance, he did not like going to stay in an embassy; he wanted to stay in a hotel. And if he stayed in a hotel he wanted to have the whole floor to himself, his own style. He wanted to run his own show. He wanted to have any personal services relayed on ahead of time. Of course, he always carried a number of press people. And press facilities had to be set-up which nobody ever heard of before and that type of thing. So it was quite climactic, quite traumatic. But actually when he came it worked out very well.

You may be interested to know, you mentioned President Inönü. We say President because he was President at one time, he was also Prime Minister at another time. The Vice President arrived on a Sunday afternoon. I think it was in August; it was hot anyway. And at around 4:00, at that time on a Sunday afternoon, in Ankara, there isn't a person on the streets. Everybody is asleep. And when it cools off toward the end of the day, Ankarans just promenade; there's one main street there, Ataturk Bulvorz, and they go up and down the street. So we did the best we could to let people know he was coming and that sort of thing but when I went out to the airport it was just like going through a deserted village. And shortly after I got there President—Prime Minister Inönü arrived and he was extremely troubled. And he said "Catastrophe, Mr. Ambassador, catastrophe!" And I said, "What's wrong? What's wrong?" He said, “Nobody in the streets, nobody in the streets!” Well I said, "Don't worry. Something will happen." "Oh no, its going to be terrible, terrible, nobody there."

Well what happened was, as we got in toward the edge of town, the Vice President stopped, as he so often did, and would go over into some sort of native hovel of sorts, or talk to some people. And the Chief of Protocol there at that time, Ismail Erez, had a perfect command of English and Turkish, had a strong voice and he did a splendid job, and he'd stand up and do the translation. The crowds would crowd in. There'd be nobody, you know, then all of a sudden there'd be a crowd. What happened then was that as he moved in, stopping several times, the crowd built up ahead. And by the time he got into Ankara, they were practically hanging off the chandeliers. The whole town was just jammed by the time that he got in; he could hardly get into Ankara. And it was the same thing in Izmir but in Istanbul he deliberately played it cooler and tried to avoid a big crowd. So it worked out extremely well in the end.
O’BRIEN: How did they respond to it? How did the Turkish government and how did the Turkish people respond to Vice President Johnson?

HARE: Well, they were sort of surprised, this technique of talking to people and being in contact with people. I remember the last night we were in Istanbul we went to see the Vice President and his wife, and had dinner with them. They were in sports clothes. And the Vice President pulled up his trousers and showed us, I think it was his right thigh, and it was just burned from frictions, from the crowds. And if he hadn’t been a big man, he couldn’t have done what he did. He’d stand, bracing himself, and put one leg out in front. That leg that stood out in front was actually burned from friction of people pressing against him.

This, I make mention of as sort of a graphic illustration of this intimate connection with the people. This was new in Turkey, this wasn’t done. There are very few people that do this sort of thing and then there are the few who are proponents of that you might call grass-roots politics. They were saying: why can’t we get out our own people to act the way this other man can do it? So he made quite a personal imprint because of this being not only accessible, but he had a really, a great technique for pulling people in toward him. It was really effective and fantastic.

O’BRIEN: Who came out in that time? Was there anyone you recall from the Department of some prominence in American politics?

HARE: This is an embarrassing question. I probably shouldn’t… Not prominence, no. He had some very responsible people with him but not, say, at the senatorial level or something like that, no. Their names don't come back to me for the moment. They were responsible people but not people who would share the spotlight shall we say.

O’BRIEN: Yes. Well, he discussed a number of things, I understand, while he was there in terms of military relations, aid, and also this aid to the economy, I suppose, was a part of it?

HARE: Well, yes but he didn't come on a special mission to Turkey. He took advantage of the opportunity to discuss things, but he didn't come there for discussion of specific subjects. So his visit didn't stand out as a political highlight in the relationship sense as much as it did in the public relationship sense.

O’BRIEN: Sure. Was there anything in the way of agreements or understandings that he arrived at with…

HARE: We signed an agreement there at that time. It was what I would have
signed—somebody would have signed it anyway. I mean it was…But we took advantage of his being there. I can't for the life of me think what it was now but it was for the…

O'BRIEN: Was it something on the Peace Corps?

HARE: I think it was Peace Corps. I think that sticks in my mind, it was for the Peace Corps.


HARE: That's right. I think it…I didn't want to say so because I wasn't since of my own memory, but it lurks in my mind that it probably was the Peace Corps. But there were various things we were doing. We had the big PL 480 agreement and things of that kind. But I rather think it was the Peace Corps.

O'BRIEN: While we're on that Peace Corps program, did you have much difficulty convincing the Turks of…And I'm sure that you did a lot of the work in pulling that thing together.

HARE: Yes. To tell you the truth, the Peace Corps had a tremendous appeal to me because we're always hearing that whenever new administrations come in they want to do new things. They come round with a great list of all these new things they want to do but they're really old things, even though they may be new to new people. And it's very seldom, very seldom that you ever see an idea that has even a verisimilitude of newness. The Peace Corps did have… Although that wasn't really entirely new because you had this experience in international living and the 4-H people who used to come out there. I think the 4-H people introduced to come out rather looked down their nose a little bit at the Peace Corps because they said we started it all. But it was the first time it's been done on this magnitude. And I was very keen about it and pushed it very hard.

Turkey was I think probably the first large program that we had. We didn't know where we were going, frankly. They didn't know where they were going, the Turks either, and we had to do a certain amount on speculation. It seemed to me the idea was right; they had to take the risk and put it through and hope that some of the things that were not agreed would work out. Just like you build a hotel; you can't have it all working perfectly before you take the guests in. It was that type of program. But we did take it on spec and it worked out extremely well.

Our first concentration was, on my recommendation, English language teaching which is very important because it was something they wanted. It's something that is quite essential in a country where you have a language like Turkish which has a very rich literature
and that sort of thing but for purposes of education you have to have access in your libraries to other language. So English, French, or German, it was almost essential to have one of them. English, of course, was paramount that way. So there was a great conscious, there was actual demand for it. And these young Americans came there; initially, with some instruction, they could teach the language. They were in a comfortable milieu of action whereas, if you get young people into some things it may give them much more of an idealistic release, helping out for instance in social problem and things of that kind, and agricultural problems but you run into all sorts of local prejudices and also knowledge and sophistication that these youngsters don't realize exists among less educated people. It is always a great mistake to assume that lack of education equates with a lack of intelligence. You coming to the end of this?

O’BRIEN: Well, we have some time left on this side of the tape and then we’ll turn the tape over. No problem.

HARE: So that during this first phase it worked out very well and since they got out all over the country, this did give them the possibility of meeting people and they got into athletics and things of that kind. And as teachers they had the advantage of occupying a respected position. It gave them contacts and it worked so well there that at the end of the first period the Turkish government offered to hire the whole group and pay them themselves. Later on, as they spread out and got into social and other things, difficulties began emerging and then people would begin suggesting that they were there for intelligence purposes, which was not true in any sense of the word. But this is, again it goes like back to your NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] relationship which starts out by being something that seems so fine and good but doesn't seem to last the way you'd like to see it. I think it's still going on but not with the same degree of complete satisfaction.

O’BRIEN: Oh, let me just pursue one other thing, and I'll turn the tape over, and if you have some more tune we can pick up the missile thing. But before that, how about the PL 480 program? Was there a real need for it in Turkey?

HARE: Oh yes, a tremendous need. There had been a period when it appeared to the contrary, actually. And this had been slightly embarrassing in a way because we had insisted that, due to the fact that they, the Turks, were in earlier years developing marginal lands, which they shouldn’t have done, like a dust bowl, for a time they had an export surplus in the earlier fifties. And it looked at that time that this was going to be a continuing thing, but it was not. With the growth of population and the fact that this had been an unhappy experience, they were facing a great deficit in grains. It’s
better again now due to the fertilizers, using a different strain which AID [Agency for International Development] has done. So actually there were some "facilities put in, envisioned originally in export, which could be used for that purpose.

O’BRIEN: Did it disrupt the traditional patterns of agriculture in any way by bringing it in?

HARE: Oh no. This was only brought in to meet actual need, not to supplant. We tried not to do that. They didn't want it either. They wouldn't ask for any more than they needed. Although sometimes governments will try to build up a little surplus, just to prevent profiteering, if they build up a little reservoir of reserve of grain, or any product that they may need, it's a sort of a hedge against inflationary prices.

[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

HARE: If you don't allow for a steady inflow of young people, qualified young people who have trained, every year, you're going to be in trouble. The personnel balance got way out as a result of various things, promotion policies and other things. If you cut down over a period of time on your intake of young people, this gets known all over the country. These people, the professors who are interested in the future of their students, no longer encourage them to go into the Foreign Service. And whereas, of course, the Department may be getting far more than you can tape, it may need these forces later on. But going back to what you were talking about before…

O’BRIEN: Well, all right, I think it's probably a logical time to go on to talk about the Jupiter and the missile crisis and I guess the Jupiter is the place to begin. Why did they put them in Turkey in the first place during the Eisenhower administration?

HARE: Well, there was a considerable feeling—this was before my period out there—that the installation of Jupiters in Europe was a very important defensive step. There were only two countries, as far as I can recall, that were convinced of the utility of the Jupiters; they were Italy and Turkey. When I got there, there had been agreement on this program and the crews were over here from Turkey and the installations were in the process of being installed, planning was going on. We were in the installation period.

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Now what had happened was that apparently the new administration, when it came in—and I suppose this is quite confidential because I'm not quite sure of the extent to which it's fully known—had reached a different determination about the Jupiters. When Secretary Rusk
came out in April of '61, just after I arrived—because there was a meeting of CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] there at that time—I had the job of being host to the secretary and his group. I must say he's a very pleasant person to be a host to and a very easy person to be a host to, otherwise it might have been very difficult. My wife had not arrived at that time. He came to the CENTO meeting and in the discussions with Foreign Minister Sarper—I was there at the time—he indicated that we had had reservations about the Jupiters and would be inclined to stop the program. But the Turks did not want to do so. Perhaps we had convinced them too well, or at least very well, by that time…

O’BRIEN: Now this is 1961?

HARE: This is 1961, April.

O’BRIEN: In April.

HARE: April, 1961. This is a background that people don't know because they think that these things happened later. I was there and this was done and I can tell you. But Sarper and the Turkish government were not inclined to call off this thing. So we proceeded with the program.

Now apparently, later on—and this followed the Cuban crisis and was oftentimes associated with the Cuban crisis, and I'm told, I haven't read it, that Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] indicated that it was rather directly related to the Cuban crisis. You'll know better than I because you've gone into it. I just haven't checked this out, but I've seen a reference to it—the assumption was that our insistence on withdrawing the Jupiters came by some sort of a deal with the Soviets. What I believe happened, however, was that this came up in the course of a general review of the situation at the time of the Cuban crisis. I can't tell you this was true, this would be subject to verification—Secretary Rusk would know if you talk to him about it, he'd be the one person that could be certain about this—that President Kennedy had rather assumed, he knew about whether the previous approach had been made, he didn't realize that it had not been implemented, I'm told. And when, in this review it was found out that it had not been done, he felt, the time had then come to do it.

Therefore, there was in the earlier part of the next year, that is '63, there was an intensive effort made to call off the program. This was done basically with the idea of exchanging land missiles for submarine missiles as being a better thing. Now the Turks were very diffident about doing this because some people may be very timorous about being lightning rods for the Soviets, but the Turks aren't that type. They weren't at all intimidated about this, and they really weren't too keen about it. They didn't have any qualms about it but eventually they agreed to it. It was along toward the midpoint of the year when it was finally completed.

O’BRIEN: Well, going back to that Rusk visit in 1961, was that the principle reason
for his coming out to Turkey at that time?

HARE: Oh no, no. He came out for the CENTO conference; he attended all CENTO conferences.

O’BRIEN: Yeah. Okay, now after CENTO was there anything else he took up at that time with the Turkish government?

HARE: Not that I recall at the moment, no.

O’BRIEN: He just raised at that point, he just raised the question of stopping the development of…

HARE: That's correct, that's correct.

O’BRIEN: And then ran into resistance. Okay, how about from that point on and your instructions from the department in Washington.

HARE: Well, we were making headway on a different program, you see.

O’BRIEN: Yes. And all during this time, the department did not issue any instructions to approach the Turkish government?

HARE: No, not that I recall. Of course, were moving ahead with the program. The training was going on, construction was going on.

O’BRIEN: And you were recommending the continuation of the program.

HARE: No, I wasn’t recommending it, it was just going.

O’BRIEN: It was just going?

HARE: The question of its discontinuance hadn’t come up and it hadn't taken that form and it just kept going. It was just a natural force. There's one more thing here and that pretty much concludes the Jupiter thing but I think it’s significant. Perhaps it’s the most significant thing that I've had to say this morning, and that is, that I came back to Washington at one period, I can't remember here, that is in ’63…

O’BRIEN: Fine.

HARE: …and I went to see the President alone. And as we were going, to the door, he said, "You can tell anyone in the Turkish government, if there's
any question, that this question of the Jupiters,” that's what I came to talk to him about, "is not part of any deal with the Russians, is not the result of any deal with the Russians," and he authorized me to say that as coming from him to the Turkish government.

O'BRIEN: Okay, now let's go to the Cuban missile crisis just for a moment. When were you first informed of the Cuban situation?

HARE: That was a very unhappy story. I was down on a beautiful beach in southern Turkey, presumably out of touch with the office. But one of these awful telephones did find me, and it was my Deputy Chief of Mission in Ankara saying this had happened and he thought I'd probably want to get back and I said I thought so too. So I got back into clothes again and headed for Ankara. But that's how that was. It broke up a lovely vacation.

O'BRIEN: When did that come? Did that come prior to President Kennedy's public announcement? You don't happen to recall the time schedule?

HARE: I'm not quite sure, well, just as the story broke. It was a crisis, obviously. In a crisis, you get the hell going back to home base and that’s what I did. I wasn't instructed to, I just did. And then, of course, you had instructions to explain this thing, and all that sort of thing.

O'BRIEN: And then you made contacts with the Turkish government, explaining the situation?

HARE: Oh, yes, sure.

O'BRIEN: What were their reactions? Did they immediately

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sense that they might be in some imminent danger of attack by the Soviet Union?

HARE: You know, that's not in the Turkish temperament. Even if they did, they would take it for granted. They're very strange in that way, perhaps, but danger does not bother them. They take danger as being part of life and in consequence oftentimes they're much happier, I guess.

O'BRIEN: Well, in your own embassy as far as preparations for the possibility of war or an attack on Turkey, did your MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] groups or did the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], for example, take any unusual precautions or make any moves that you recall?
HARE: I would be greatly surprised if we didn't but I don't know what we did, to be frank with you. I mean you do certain things in times of crisis that are so visceral that it's hard to sort them out sometimes.

O'BRIEN: Did you sense anything on the part of the Russians, any unusual activity on the part of the Russians during that?

HARE: No.

O'BRIEN: Did the Turkish government at any time ever try to get the United States to back off the Cuban situation…

HARE: Not that I recall and I'd be very surprised because I think I would remember that.

O'BRIEN: Did you get any reactions on the blockade idea, the blockade at all?

HARE: Not that I recall.

O'BRIEN: Well, I think that’s interesting about Rusk approaching them in 1961. I’d never heard that. I think that’s highly important.

HARE: It is important, it is important. So you see, the decision had been reached regarding the Jupiters a long time before the Cuban thing. The only thing is, it hadn’t been run through.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any direct contacts during any of this time, or particular during the Cuban missile crisis, with the White House, or people in the White House?

HARE: Not that I recall during the Cuban thing, no.

O'BRIEN: Did discussions over uses at that point of Turkish air force bases for reconnaissance things, did that ever come up while you were there?

HARE: Not that I recall, not that I recall.

O'BRIEN: How about questions like, on recognition of the UAR [United Arab Republic], as I understand Turkey…

HARE: Well, I’ll tell you. What usually happened….These CENTO conferences come at a certain time, they're not of the Secretary’s choosing, obviously.
So what he does in these conferences—did rather, and he did superbly well—is he would take the group to a considerable extent in his confidence, and he was an expert at presenting what concerned us and why. Then he would meet privately with the various ministers also and discuss…You took the advantage to sort of cover the waterfront to a considerable extent. As a consequence these conferences weren’t limited to the thing of the moment on which he'd give the greatest stress. Now I just happened to recall what happened in ‘61.

O’BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: The other things were sort of….The Vietnam thing, I know, I can recall in Tehran went very clearly, a very excellent presentation indeed developed there. But that was because that was top priority at that time.

O’BRIEN: Well, in regard to Turkish, U. S., and NATO relations in those years, did you sense any loosening of ties to NATO as a result of the test ban treaty?

HARE: No, actually aside from these erosion phenomena that we were talking about earlier—that you did see, you could foresee rather, and perhaps see some initial sign—the real problem came at the time of the Cyprus affair. That was the real crunch. That arose essentially out of that part of the so-called famous Johnson letter, at that time, which indicated that if due to precipitate action Turkey would become involved in hostilities, with which we had nothing to do—which we weren’t consulted—that we wouldn’t necessarily think that that brought NATO into the picture, because that wasn’t the score. It was the part of it that the Turks took particularly hard. And frankly, it was a good thing finally when they published it because even though the language was tough it wasn’t as bad as people had thought about it. So long as you don’t have the actual form of the thing, your imagination always makes it bigger and worse than it really is. It’s like a dream at night; the next morning it may not be too good, but it’s better than it was in the middle of the night.

O’BRIEN: Passing now to some economic things, did you ever become involved with this chrome problem?

HARE: Oh yes, yes.

O’BRIEN: Is that something that was constantly with you while you were there?

HARE: Yes, it was one of many problems.

O’BRIEN: That was related to stockpiling, wasn’t it?
HARE: My memory’s a little bit hazy. We had bought a lot of chrome, you see, preclusively to the war.

O’BRIEN: Yes.

HARE: And, of course, we didn’t have need for it after the war. That question came up, as I recall, of maintaining chrome purchases of which we didn’t have the need. The chrome exporters wanted to keep up their exports. That’s roughly what I remember about that one. At the time it was quite clear, but that was quite some time ago. I don’t have one of these photographic minds, unfortunately.

O’BRIEN: How about oil? There were some discoveries of oil in those years and some questions about how to develop it?

HARE: Well, there were some but they were unfortunately rather small. When the story first came out it sounded promising but as the follow-up came you didn’t know whether it was all that good. Turkey still hasn’t really hit big. They’ve hit some but nothing major. They’ll probably hit it sometime but they haven’t yet.

O’BRIEN: Well, if you’re going to go to some of the economic aid that’s coming in…As I understand, the United States attempted in those years to kind of shift the burden of aid to a kind of consortium arrangement rather than assuming a burden of supporting Turkey in a unilateral way.

HARE: That’s correct…

O’BRIEN: What are some of your reflections on that, I mean, the arrangement of that consortium?

HARE: Well, a consortium doesn't give aid itself. It could, I suppose, but basically a consortium is where certain people from certain countries get together and agree what their individual governments will try to do. So they work and negotiate with each other in a way, each trying to get the other fellow to pick up a larger part of the tab.

O’BRIEN: That’s an interesting way of putting it.

HARE: It's sort of an implementation of bilateral aid with the various government thinking in terms of limiting their contributions while the Turks have been trying to get the different countries to give more. There was a greater emphasis on the consortium toward the end, trying to bring in people that perhaps you hadn't
thought of originally, Japanese, for instance, things of that kind. If they had any in the oil business and that sort of thing in the area, in the business side of the area, well, then maybe they ought to kick in too.

O'BRIEN: Sure.

HARE: As the Germans became stronger, a lot of pressure was put on them to be more forthcoming.

O'BRIEN: Did you ever encounter any resentment on the part of the Turks that the United States was not doing a little more?

HARE: Oh, yes. Because although you have the consortium conflict, they're always comparing what you do this year and what you did last year and the year before. If it's any less, regardless of what anybody else is doing, why you have a problem.

O'BRIEN: Passing on to some of what I guess you might call administrative things, in these regional meetings that took place—of the NEA people, and the ambassadors, and the State Department people—can you recall, perhaps, some of the people and some of the issues that were taken up at a few of those while you were out there as ambassador?

HARE: Well, I’ll tell you. Usually they come periodically and sometimes there may be a particular theme. I remember there was one in Athens where Phil Talbot [Phillips Talbot] had just taken over as Assistant Secretary. As I recall it, I think I’m correct on this, it was Athens, where

the question of the Hawks for Israel came up. That raised the same question; we’re talking now about the nuclear phase, that is, to what extent does raising the defense raise the ante, because it does.

O'BRIEN: Sure.

HARE: As you raise your defense, you raise the ante because it makes you less vulnerable. We went over that at that time; we particularly discussed that particular aspect. Now we couldn’t decide anything, but this was Phil Talbot talking to us about this problem. Generally speaking, if there is some particular thing at the moment, we discuss it. But it’s very useful, once a year, to get together and talk with your people and sometimes you’ll find you have conflicting interests. For instance, the man from Israel and the man from the UAR may find that they have to cope with quite different circumstances.
O’BRIEN: Sure.

HARE: And it’s good for them to get together and talk things over, or one of the so-called progressive countries versus one of the more conservative countries. It’s very useful to get together and talk such things over. Then also, it’s very helpful for the men in this area to have several people from the department there, to sit there several days and for them to hear something said that they will have seen in print before and not paid too much attention to and now do. It’s the same thing for us in the field, when you’re in the field, to be able to get it from the man and he can give it to you with nuances, little things you never thought of before, you understand what the department’s doing much better. And some of these conferences may have no highlight at all, may be more in the nature of a general review and exchange of views. As far as circumstances are concerned, a crisis is apt to make it difficult to have a conference that we’ve wanted to have because there was a crisis; and holding a conference at that time could give rise to misunderstanding. So it works backwards sometimes.

O’BRIEN: Speaking of crises, when the Kennedy administration came in, they changed the whole structure of decision-making in national security matters by the so-called, well, the Bundy [McGeorge Bundy] changes, you know, where they did away with the old operations coordinators board. Then they started this business of crisis management. Did this affect you at any time when you were there as ambassador? Did you ever assume direct contact with the White House or a task force, in a sense, or crisis managers, in a sense.

HARE: No. I dealt directly with the department and the only time there was any difference in that was when I’d come back and go over to see the President personally.

O’BRIEN: President Kennedy supported the idea that Ambassadors should have complete control over the U.S. operations in the country. Did you have any problems with the country team idea?

HARE: Well, to begin with, the country team, it’s a body that doesn’t officially exist!

O’BRIEN: Yeah. Why?

HARE: It doesn’t exist, but it does. You can’t find really a piece of paper that says there is such a thing as a country team. Yet the department will say that
this is the country team recommendation. Actually, what the country team really is, it’s the Ambassador and council. It’s not a voting group. The Ambassador has the power of fulfilling his function of being the representative of the President and therefore the representative of all agencies, having an overseeing function for all agencies. Therefore you meet with them and what does that mean? Well, sometimes people figure in just a weekly meeting. Now that is the way this is most manifest, but actually the country team is working all the time. It just comes into sort of a sharper focus once a week when you have a country team meeting than if you didn’t have it. This is of particular importance in countries where you have other agencies that have significant functions and more particularly, where you have a big aid operation, either economic or military.

Now in Turkey, we had both. So this was a country par excellence where the country team was very useful in making sure that all these things are being coordinated. This had to be done all the time, day by day, because you’ll find that your troubles usually do not arise with people willfully not doing certain things, but unknowingly going off on tangents. If you let it go too far, it’s awfully hard to get things back again, very hard to get back. So this is the purpose of the country team. It’s directive in the sense that it is a device by which the Ambassador establishes policy, but it’s 95 percent coordination, and coordination is a thing you work on day after day and day after day. And this is the Ambassador’s biggest responsibility. In a post of that kind, it is just being conscious of the necessity for coordination and then doing

something about it. At the same time, making clear though you are trying to understand everybody’s opinion and get a consensus, and you almost always do. But, if for any reason there isn’t agreement, then you decide.

O’BRIEN: What were your major problems with, let's say, your MAAG group?

HARE: Curiously enough, more problems will arise over silly things like uses of the cinema, PX's, how long do you keep a car before you can sell it, things of that kind. You have more things that in many ways affect people's way of life often that become the most difficult to handle. Big problems very often are not as difficult to handle as the little ones. But I must say the most important thing is making sure, in a place like Turkey, that your economic people and your military people are in close contact because they will tend not to be. But you will find in many, many things that they ought to be because there are certain things... For instance, you may be promoting industrialization, well, armies use all sorts of things. They use cloth and all sorts of things, and very often it's quite important that your military and economic people are working closer together. That's one of the reasons, I suppose, in the old days, they used to call economic assistance in Turkey, defense support. They didn't call it economic assistance, they called it defense support; they looked at it from that angle. They did it in other areas too, for a time.

O’BRIEN: What were some of the major problems that came up with aid?
HARE: Well, the major problems aren't so much with aid itself. Aid has the problem of trying to assure the fact that it's asking the right thing and making the right recommendations, the most reasonable ones that are justified; and then once you have resources to work with, that they use them most advantageously. And in both processes—in the anticipatory stage and in the implementive stage—you're in contact with your local vis-à-vis. Their way of looking at what they need. This, I suppose, is usually the biggest problem in aid, the different way of looking at what they need. This, I suppose, is usually the biggest problem in aid, the different way the recipient country and serious people would look at it, the way you look at it. And this is bound to happen because you take two intelligent people, one American and one Turkish, or any other two nationalities, they can have the same degree of intelligence and the same degree of training perhaps, but they're going to look at it from a different point of view.

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O'BRIEN: Yeah, well, as I understand it, you had a Congressional committee, back in about '61 or '62, get on the Turks for not building some plant that was an ammunition plant or something that they were supposed to build at one time and never did.

HARE: I don't recall that.

O'BRIEN: How about the CIA? Did you have any major problems with the CIA?

HARE: Never did, never did.

O'BRIEN: Were their operations basically intelligence gatherings there?

HARE: Well, I don't want to talk too much about CIA. I'll say this, that their function is different in different countries and the degree of secrecy that's involved differs in different countries. In countries where your relationships are very close, there are some things that are quite on the surface. You may be helping police, something of that kind, you see. Other things are different, but still they're cooperative. And then, of course, in certain areas, you get to the things where you'd be embarrassed perhaps if the local government knew what you were learning terms of intelligence even though you weren't doing anything about it.

O'BRIEN: Well, were you fully informed about what they were doing in Turkey?

HARE: As much as I felt was...I didn't want to know every little thing, but I never quarreled with there at all, I don't even think there was any tension. There might have been some teensy-weensy things that I wouldn't have agreed with. But, no, I got very good cooperation.
Now a lot of people may not agree with me on this. There's some people that don't get along with their military, but I find that frankly, everybody's trying to do his job as best he can, really he is. You get occasionally an official, in your own organization or in the military or CIA or USIA [United States Information Agency] or any place, that is hard to get along with. He's just difficult. Sometimes, perhaps, you can't really get that fellow in line. This doesn't happen very often. Most people want to cooperate and pull their weight, and as soon as your Ambassador makes it clear that he wants to work with them that he realizes they've got problems and he has problems and he wants to work these things out together, they usually get worked out.

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You were asking me generally about the CIA. And I won't become specific and I won't name names or I won't name countries. But there are several types of things, many types of things that they can do. One type of thing that they do that I don't think they need to do and shouldn't do and that is, get into the just ordinary political collection game that your own political and economic officers are going to do. Now the only use of a CIA officer in that case is to put him in your own political section and make him work for you. So you might make sure you don't duplicate, otherwise you'll have one man for your political section, and a man from CIA quite overtly, invite the same fellow to lunch and that sort of thing and ask him the same questions. That makes you look sort of silly, it seems to me. This is the open and innocent side of CIA, but I think of that as quite unnecessary and it needn't be done. You don't have to do that through a special agency. If you want to do that, we should beef up the regular organization. It looks better too, it's more dignified. I mean they've got some darn good men; I've seen some excellent political men that they have had that I'd like to have on my staff. As a matter of fact, I've used them in exactly that way. I'm not so sure they're always happy back home that they got used in that way, but they're good, very pleasant fellows and very well trained, good political observers.

Now you get into the question then, I suppose, of intelligence of a semi-secret nature such as files on names of people, biographies and things of that kind. This is not really super-covert work at all. It's useful to a certain extent to keep your biographic stuff up, and if you can't do that in the political section it's all right to do that. But once again, this could be done by somebody else also. This is not important.

Then there's the question of maintaining contacts. Of course it gets more difficult with the type of person who you may find difficult to maintain a contact with if you're an ordinary officer, something of that kind. He may be a man in the opposition. He may be a person of rather strange character, strange role or something of that kind where you wouldn't normally be in contact. And an intelligence officer can be helpful there.

Then there's a type of thing called political action where an organization of this kind may attempt to influence local domestic political problems. There may be cases where that's useful, there may have been cases where it's useful. I have never been in countries where I thought it would have been useful, and I've always felt that it might become a drag.

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I'm not making a general judgment but I'm quite certain that in the countries where I worked that it wasn't only a question of losing the confidence of people through being found out, and they usually are in this type of thing, but it wouldn’t have served any purpose even if it had worked. It wasn't even worth it.

There's another type of thing. There are occasionally types of things where you have defectors. CIA has trained people to know how to question these people and sometimes they know how to get aid to them, promote their onward journeys and things of that kind. This is the type of thing that would be very difficult for you to do. So you run from doing things openly that there's no sense in their doing, and you work over into a series of things or do things that only a covert organization could do and also a trained organization could do. I've worked with them, in a number of places and I found that they always work extremely well with me.

One day I was over at John Foster Dulles' and Allen [Allen W. Dulles] was there. I forget the meeting some Saturday or Sunday. But there had been some sort of a crisis. I forget what it was, what my position was at that time even. I was telling Allen that I appreciated working with his people, they'd been very cooperative. Allen pulled me over and he said, “John Foster listen to this fellow. He's gotten to like my boys." It was quite true.

O’BRIEN: Well, let's, if you don't mind, let's get on to some of the people in the Near East section, people that you dealt with at the department level. First of all, did you have a pretty good desk officer when you were in Turkey?

HARE: Yes, yes.

O’BRIEN: Who was that, out of curiosity? I should have checked that.

HARE: I can see him as clear as I can be, but….Kay Bracken [Katherine W. Bracken] was the head of this thing but she had another man working, particularly on Turkey. He was a very brilliant fellow and I can see him as clear as I see you now, but I can’t give you his name.

O’BRIEN: Well, how was Phillips Talbot?

HARE: Phil was a very good man; he was a very highly intelligent fellow and a very good man to work with.

O’BRIEN: Had you known him before?

HARE: No, I hadn't known him before.

O’BRIEN: How about Robert Komer [Robert W. Komer] in the White House?
HARE: Well, Bob I knew after I came back primarily, and I was Assistant
Secretary and he was working particularly on Near Eastern affairs at that
time. I used to work with him a great deal. He's very much of an activist,
had some very good ideas. But he had a lot which were rather speculative; so obviously you
had to winnow out. But that was all right with Bob. He was a generator, a spark generator.
Also he had a damn good head. He was very prolific, but he would venture to float things,
wouldn't just hold back on them. That was his way of operating.

O'BRIEN: You mentioned you met Rostow once. Did you have very much to do with
him?

HARE: Oh, yes, from time to time.

O'BRIEN: Did he talk to you very much about the Middle East and Turkey?

HARE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: Did he seem to have a pretty good grasp of the area?

HARE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: How was Bundy, McGeorge Bundy?

HARE: Mac also. They're like two peas in a pod in a way. Perhaps….Well, I can't
compare them really very well.

O'BRIEN: Is there any real philosophical difference, or philosophical differences I
should say, or political differences, in regard to the people who were at
policy-making positions and influencing positions in the Near East on
policy towards countries in the Near East? Of course, this could go, I guess, several ways,
like support of traditional types of rulers in a place like Saudi Arabia as well as the Israeli-
Arab thing.

HARE: I think this, like so many things, tends do get a bit stylized. There’s a
tendency to think about the pros in the Near East as being sort of opposing
change, sometimes people think they understand the Arabs better than they
do the Israeli point of view. They're horrified at the idea of having certain types of more or
less absolute governments. Actually, the real core of the whole thing is, and what makes these
people tick is, by the time they have risen to a certain position in the organization they've
served in several areas there, they've served back here, and they've been thoroughly sort of
immersed in this whole thing, from every point of view. And as I saw when I was there, and as I still believe, interests in the area are very broad, and the fact that you have certain things that are highly important, like the Arab-Israeli confrontation, does not wipe out the rest of other things that you should be thinking about. But the crises tend to overshadow your other interests. So your professional...When somebody who is just working on the crisis and just seeing the specific problem he has before him...The pros happen to be saying, "But let's wait about this." The others act maybe a little impatient with him because he's bringing in other things, but I think quite justifiably because this is a part of the picture. But we tend to look just at the highlight and focus our spotlights on the immediate and not the whole picture itself. This is basically such a difference as you may find between somebody in the White House or on the seventh floor, something like that, who is handling the thing on a crash operation period—this is the problem. You can understand that he gets a little bit impatient if it's pointed out to him that that something that may look like a pretty good idea actually is open to question.

O'BRIEN: It is sometimes suggested by people in the State Department that, because of domestic politics, Israel has a good deal of influence on U.S. policy towards the Middle East. Is that a fair characterization?

HARE: It's a different thing here. I've had a lot of experience with this thing. Actually, when I was Assistant Secretary, the Israelis did not really need anybody to argue their case. They do an awfully good job themselves. They have a very fine service. I used to have tremendously long and very animated talks with the Israeli ambassador whom I respected very greatly and also his staff. They're usually very good. So you're a lawyer, but you may be in agreement like you are oftentimes with other governments in what things we can or can’t do. Maybe it was something you didn’t approve of, or where you have a basic difference but it’s not personal, not personal, but government to government. I always found that it was a very satisfactory relationship, tough but frank.

There are also, of course, a large number of persons of

the Jewish persuasion in this country who are tremendously interested in Israel. Now these people sometimes are more difficult to talk to because they’re not as close to the subject. There’s a sort of haze in this thing that you don’t run into when you’re talking to an Israeli. The more emotion gets into it, and more difficulty perhaps in understanding it gets into it, because you don’t depart from the same degree of clarity that your Israeli does. There’s a tremendous difference here. But as a whole, though, the higher you go in the Jewish community, the more understanding you get.

For instance, there’s a group up in New York they call the council of presidents, of all the big Jewish organizations. I went up there….We usually go up about once a year to have lunch with them. And you’d talk perfectly frankly with them—that’s what they want—talk perfectly frankly with them. They encourage it and I think they find it useful and we find it useful. But it is still often easier to deal directly with a representative of the Israeli embassy.
They have real interests, something like say, an imminent hanging of a Jew in Iraq or Damascus or something, this is a very real thing to them and so you discuss this very sincerely. But generally, speaking, there’s no problem, provided one is dealing with responsible people, these Israeli diplomats or senior representatives of American Jewish organizations. As a matter of fact, the direct impact, as I saw it, on the Executive is not as great as it is on the Hill and pressure on the Executive is then often exerted from there.

O’BRIEN: Well, on the other hand, some people on the Hill, and I know the spokesmen of Jewish organizations sometimes make the charge that the State Department is pro-Arab, particularly people in the NEA section. Is this fair?

HARE: No, I don’t think it’s fair. In fact, I know it’s not fair. But, you see, if people feel intensely enough about a thing, looking at a thing objectively, and looking, I think from the standpoint of the American interests generally in the Near East, is not understood. I think I can say that quite categorically because I’m one of those people….

O’BRIEN: Sure.

HARE: …and I know what in my own…In fact, I’ve said, and I do say now, this is very true. I probably know more leaders of Israel up till recently than perhaps most Americans because I was in Cairo during the war and London after the war. I knew Eban [Abba Eban] when he was—we called him Aubrey Eban before he [37-]
became Abba Eban, and Shertok who became Sharett [Moshé Sharett], Zaslani who became Shilo’ah [Reuven Shilo’ah]. These were all key people. Teddy Kollek [Theodor Kolleck], people of that kind. I knew them very well, personally. I’ve kept in contact with them every since.

I’ve always said that you have to know a certain number of Arabs and a certain number of Israelis, personally, whom you like as individuals and respect, and respect their integrity. By good fortune, I have that. It makes it very difficult for me, however, because you can’t…What pulls you one way is going to pull you the other way around. But if you have that point of view, and this may sound a bit platitudinous, and I apologize if it does, it gives you a balanced point of view which is very useful and helpful, although it is, of course, much easier to see only one side and be spared the difficulty of trying to strike a balance.

O’BRIEN: Well, backing up to Turkey in this regard, how does Turkey fall into the Arab-Israeli conflict?

HARE: Well, as a whole, the Turks haven’t wanted to be particularly involved.
There is a Turkish representative on the Palestine Conciliation
Commission which is now defunct. I guess, it still technically exists, but
the Turks are rather ambivalent on that. I know all the time I was in Turkey, the Israelis had a
chargé d’affairs, and he was always going to be recognized as an ambassador very shortly, as
soon as the appropriate time came. But the appropriate time never came and they still don’t
have an ambassador. So they maintain representation, but it is a matter of going the half mile
but not the full mile. Basically, they don’t have any particular feeling about it, they don’t
want to have troubles as such. It isn’t a question of persuasion, it’s a question of just not
doing anything.

O’BRIEN: Well, in between the Kennedy administration and the Johnson
administration, did you sense any change in policy towards Turkey or the
Middle East?

HARE: Well, I’m not sure it had anything to do with the administration, but the
events, at least, and particularly the events of ’67, took us much more into
a position of a closer identification with Israel than we had before. This
doesn’t mean that the degree of closeness with Israel is a problem, it’s the degree to which
you lost your contact elsewhere. There’s the problem. That was the major change. A lot of
us who have been, as I say, working on it over a long time, see the interest as a regional
matter and therefore a policy should be a regional policy into which these various things will
fit in a reasonable way. We have

always been worried about the possibility of getting into a position which we’re actually in
right now. We don’t have much maneuverability right now. Lack of maneuverability,
incidentally, is also to Israel’s debit because we can’t do much for them on the credit side.
This is one of the reasons why, when I was ambassador in Egypt, I advocated the PL 480
agreement which we concluded in 1958; that is to say in order to keep the channels of
communication open. Fortunately, I had a useful relationship with President Nasser [Gamal
Abdel Nasser], but it was also helpful to have some substantive and constructive basis as a
sort of underpinning. If you’re going to have an ear, somebody to listen, you have to set the
stage in some appropriate way. Then the play can go on, or, put in political terms, occasion is
afforded for representation and negotiation.

O’BRIEN: We’ve ranged over a number of things. Have we left anything out that you
feel we should put in the tape?

HARE: I’m afraid there’s already too much on it.

O’BRIEN: I really don’t think so. Well, thank you Ambassador Hare for a very
informative interview on Turkey and Middle East politics in the Kennedy
Administration.
[END OF INTERVIEW]

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