

Joseph Houghteling Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 06/19/1969
Administrative Information

Creator: Joseph Houghteling
Interviewer: Dennis J. O'Brien
Date of Interview: June 19, 1969
Place of Interview: San Francisco, California
Length: 19 pages, 1 addendum

Biographical Note

Joseph Houghteling was a newspaper editor; California political figure; delegate to the Democratic National Convention (1956); member, Citizens for Kennedy, California (1960); and worker, Robert F. Kennedy's Presidential campaign (1968). This interview focuses on rallying support for John F. Kennedy prior to the election of 1960, Robert F. Kennedy's campaign in 1968, and John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy's roles in ethnic politics, among other topics.

Access

Open

Usage Restrictions

Copyright of these materials has passed to the United States Government upon the death of the interviewee. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

Copyright

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any

concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation

Joseph Houghteling, recorded interview by Dennis J. O'Brien, June 19, 1969, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

Oral History Interview

Of

Joseph Houghteling

Although a legal agreement was not signed during the lifetime of Joseph Houghteling, upon his death, ownership of the recording and transcript of his interview for the Oral History Program passed to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

The following terms and conditions apply:

1. The transcript is available for use by researchers.
2. The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.
3. Copyright to the interview transcript and tape is assigned to the United States Government.
4. Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request for a fee.
5. Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the John F. Kennedy Library.

Joseph Houghteling– JFK #1
Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1	Politics in California and the 1960 Democratic National Convention– split views turn to unity
2	Rallying Support for John F. Kennedy [JFK] in California prior to 1960
5	Gaining support from key California leaders – [J. Eugene] Gene McAteer, [Thomas C.] Tom Lynch, Governor Pat Brown
6	Catholicism and other factors influencing votes for JFK in California
6	Voting results of the California delegation
7	The club movement in California
8	Structure of California politics and support
9	Keeping promises under pressure – votes for JFK in 1960
10	Formation of the California Democratic Council
11	Meeting JFK at the 1956 Convention and reflections on JFK’s growth as a politician
12	Two states in one – political differences in California
12	Meeting Ted Sorensen
13	Robert F. Kennedy’s [RFK] 1968 campaign and California politics
15	Mourning the deaths of JFK, RFK, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr. and others
16	Use of media by the JFK and RFK campaigns
17	Conflicts with the Citizens groups during the 1960s
17	JFK and RFK’s role in ethnic politics in 1960 California

Addendum I: Joseph Houghteling 1960 Speech, “After All, Who Won the Election,” delivered at the Democratic Club, Los Altos, California

Oral History Interview

with

JOSEPH C. HOUGHTELING

June 19, 1969

San Francisco, California

By Dennis J. O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'BRIEN: Just continue. You were talking about the. . . .

HOUGHTELING: Yes. In northern California--you've got essentially two states in California, so I think down south you can put another dimension into it--but in the north

there are a lot of people who have worked together going back to Adlai Stevenson's days, and in my case back to [Harry S.] Truman in '48. A great many who throughout northern California have worked together--even though in primaries we might take different sides--still have enough confidence and enjoyment with each other that then we can all gather together in the general election. Just as an example, you know that in the pre-convention period there were lots of people--indeed my late wife was very much for Adlai Stevenson--and others who were for Stevenson and others for [Hubert H.] Humphrey, but yet who, in perfectly good spirits, could join together after that tumultuous '60 [Democratic National] Convention in Los Angeles where, the emotion of the Stevenson people trampling around that arena and the volume of mail--I must have gotten four or five hundred letters as a delegate that year--yet we could all gather together.

I can remember as soon as Kennedy was nominated, although some of the Stevenson people took a little while to come around, that by and large the unity was almost immediate. And interestingly enough, after that convention I went up to my friends, [Elinor

R.] Ellie and [Edward H.] Ed Heller's house up at Lake Tahoe--they have a beautiful place--and Stevenson appeared with Borden [Stevenson]. My wife had been all the way through for Stevenson; she never changed, as both the Hellers and I. Stevenson was rather relaxed at that point. I think, he had faced the thing, that he had one foot in wanting to go and one foot not wanting to run again and now it was past him. We had a delightful time for about four or five days up at Tahoe. His friend Marietta Tree came over from Reno and stayed with the Hellers--she had been up there filming with Clark Gable in "The Outcasts". It was just a great time to think about the convention and, as I recall, Stevenson was constantly wondering whether John Kennedy had the maturity to do this. And I think there's always the feeling of the older man as to whether the younger man has got the sensitivity; but I think Kennedy did.

I first knew Kennedy in '56 when I was a delegate from California on that delegation which was committed to Stevenson--and we came back from that nominating session at the Stock Yards. I was driving back with the Hellers, and we were going back to their suite at the Morrison when a chauffeured car pulled up and John Kennedy stuck his head out that window and said, "Could I come up to see you, Ellie?" I think it was mainly to her, Ellie Heller, he was directing the question, or maybe it was to Ed [Edward H. Heller] because both had been very active in politics and one of them said, "Sure." We went up there to the Heller's suite and he showed up. Roger Kent was there, who was then and still is a very active Democratic leader--I think he was state chairman at that point, Democratic chairman-- and the Hellers, Roger, perhaps others, discussed for awhile, that Kennedy was going to go for the vice-presidency; and they all agreed to support him.

[Clarence E.] Clary Heller and I were then delegated to see what we could do in the remaining hours of the night with the Californians, but that's quite a difficult thing to do at 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning to find anybody anywhere; but we did sort of go around and try and talk to as many people as we could. When we had that California caucus the next morning it was hilarious as various people got up to announce for whom they were. And of course there was a strong [Estes C.] Kefauver group out of California; [James] Jimmy Roosevelt was one of the major people there.

I can remember that people like [Benjamin H.] Ben Swig spoke on behalf of John Kennedy. Then suddenly [Thomas M.] Tom Rees appeared out of southern California to announce he, too, was for John Kennedy. I got to know Tom out of that experience, who was a very fine young assemblyman who just two years previous had won his seat by ninety votes because his Republican opponent went to jail. [Laughter] But anyway, Tom was the seconder, and as I recall further, there was a famous ballot box that was put together in which all the delegates of California deposited their

votes. It was a red, white, and blue ballot box; this was supposed to be an expression of the delegation's opinion. But as far as anybody knows that ballot box never was opened, so when we came to the floor of the convention to cast the delegation vote, it was chaos.

And I remember that there was gathered around the microphone a band of Kefauver people afraid that [Edmund G.] Pat Brown was going to throw the whole delegation to Kennedy and the like, and great turmoil, I forget how or if California ever voted on the vice presidential nomination. It was just so chaotic and uncertain and, as usual, if one knows California delegations, they are going to end up in chaos.

The nature of our politics is individualistic, anarchy. There is no power a governor has, really, in the state--or a senator--to move many people. But our politics is essentially non-machine. This is something I feel the Kennedys never did learn about California, and I still don't think understood it; I don't think Robert Kennedy understood it. They tried to approach California almost as if you were dealing with Massachusetts or New York, that if you dealt with a leader like [Jesse M.] Jess Unruh, this then took care of California. Well, it doesn't take care of California. We're too big. We're, what, nine hundred miles long and two hundred miles wide and twenty million people. It just didn't work that way. I'm just continuing if you have no objection to. . . .

O'BRIEN: Oh, go ahead, go ahead.

HOUGHTLING: . . . say, what happened out of the '56 convention is Clary Heller and I were very taken by John Kennedy. I sometimes wonder why because our allegiance had been to Stevenson both in '52 and in '56. But there was just something there that made us feel that here was somebody who had a great potential. But the first time he came to California after that convention he made a speech up at the Fairmont which was just atrocious. It was on behalf of the Stevenson candidacy, and he could hardly wait to finish the dinner. He had a prepared text, but he started to shuffle it around with sort of a gaiety; "Well, I really didn't want this part in," or "I wanted that part in." It was just a dismal presentation because he wanted to get off with friends of his like [Paul B., Jr.] Red Fay here in town. I can remember afterwards that those of us who were interested in his campaign just raising hell to him, probably directly, perhaps through Ted Sorensen, about this casualness because it was an insult to those who had come really to hear him, and to the campaign too.

But after that there was a small cadre of us who did a considerable amount of scheduling whenever he was out here between the '56 convention and the 'convention of '60; in the

first instance, to simply get himself better known wherever there was a speaking opportunity. After Pat Brown came to be Governor in '58, people like myself who became Brown appointees, and others, knew everybody in the Governor's office; thus our effort was to convince Pat Brown and his people that John Kennedy was the man to support. We used to help people like [Lawrence F.] Larry O'Brien and [Hyman B.] Hy Raskin, who would come through, and [Theodore C.] Ted Sorensen occasionally.

I came across some correspondence the other day where I introduce by letter [Frederick G.] Fred Dutton to Sorensen, saying Fred was coming back to Washington--this was right after Brown had become Governor--and that Fred would be calling on Ted to introduce himself. And after that point, then, there was some contact between Brown's office and the Kennedy office in Washington.

We were in a very tip-toey situation in California in '59 and '60 because Pat Brown had several things going, one of which that, I think, he began to take himself quite seriously as a possible presidential candidate; and for good reason; after all he was the Democratic Governor of the largest Democratic state, and he had put through a rather good program in his first year. He had something like thirteen items in his plank in '58, including the Fair Employment Practices Act, the water program, a whole variety of things, and most of which he put through; so he had an excellent record. There were these aspects going on, plus the aspect of Brown wanting to avoid an intra-party fight in '60 because he could see that if we had a Stevenson delegation, and a Humphrey one and a Kennedy one on the June ballot, we would end up in a shambles because it seems fairly definite that if we Democrats get into a knock-down Democratic fight in the primary, we're going to lose in the general election. We don't have that many resources remaining to then mount a general election campaign, having spent millions in the primary. So there was this difficulty in working with Brown who, on the occasions I would talk to him--because at that point as I was on the California [State] Park Commission, I would be up in Sacramento often--would find him very sympathetic to Kennedy, but still very aware that there was this latent Stevenson support in the state, plus some Humphrey support.

And so the effort was made to bring O'Brien and Hy Raskin and all the rest of the key Kennedy people around to talk with the Governor. There was one trip that I can recall--and I think it was '59--that we scheduled where John Kennedy went up to Sacramento and had breakfast with the Governor. I think it was in May because then he went back to southern California and came up to the World Affairs Council at Asilomar, a conference ground in Monterey. Kennedy made a speech on Algeria at that point, interestingly enough, where he called for independence for Algeria. And I remember it very well that the State Department people who were at this World Affairs Council were mumbling

something about this terrible thing that Kennedy was doing and he really didn't know what was going on.

O'BRIEN: Now, this was in '57 or '58?

HOUGHTELING: '59, in May of '59. But Kennedy did an excellent job down there, and this is a very excellent conference to have anybody come to because it's sort of the San Francisco-northern California-international establishment. And he made a very good impression. I was so amused since the first question or second question, he got, was something on birth control: "Well, how do you as a Catholic feel about birth control in foreign aid? Should the federal government provide birth control subsidies for foreign countries?" And his answer, which I thought was very good, was to the effect that it would seem to be up to the foreign countries to make that determination rather than us. I thought that was a very excellent way he handled that.

Then we flew back up to San Francisco and had a lunch for him the next day, and then he went out again, but every trip we were trying to have him meet more people who would be influential in '60 in the delegation and with the Governor to build a base out here. As we got into early '60 we set up Friends of John Kennedy--with Clary Heller, myself and two men who are in San Francisco public relations, partly political, John Abbott and Joe [Joseph] Paul--and we raised a little money in our effort. We had little cards printed, you know, "You are hereby a member of Friends of John Kennedy, 1960." And this was the vehicle through which the Kennedy support was mobilized, of which there was a great deal in California, though not to the degree Stevenson had it.

O'BRIEN: This was mainly outside the party?

HOUGHTELING: Oh yes, although most of the people were Democrats. In fact in the Friends of John Kennedy we tried to make all Democrats. I remember telling Red Fay who at that time was a Republican that "as for now we put you in the closet, that you do no good in the Democratic Convention." Instead, we were working on key people. The Governor at his level was very difficult to convince; only Kennedy himself could work on Governor Brown. But there were two in northern California who were very key. One was [J. Eugene] Gene McAteer, who was then state senator from San Francisco--a tough, hard guy--and the other was [Thomas C.] Tom Lynch, who was then the district attorney and is now our attorney general. And these were two very key figures that John Kennedy had to have, and I think both of them had the delight in the idea of an Irish Catholic running for President but still were a little concerned; he had to prove himself generally and he had to prove himself especially about the Catholicism issue.

O'BRIEN: Did you see the Sorensen memo at any time during these years?

HOUGHTELING: Oh, about the Catholicism? Yes.

O'BRIEN: Yes, right, and the vote factor. When do you first recall seeing that?

HOUGHTELING: I don't remember it, and I didn't think it made much difference in California. I think, our Governor's being Catholic--this hadn't made this much difference in his election. And in as new a society as California is, I just don't. . . . At least it didn't have any effect on my thinking. It may have had on some who were Catholic and officeholders; it may have had an effect on Pat Brown, but I don't think this had much effect.

I think that what had an effect in California were the Democrats wanting to win. We thoroughly disliked Richard Nixon; we have had too much experience with him. I mean this was a negative side. Politics runs as much from a negative side as a positive. And secondly, for those of us who had grown to know John Kennedy, we thought there was the positive side of being able to win. But, of God, this thing with Brown that he was, you know indecisive to the last minute. There was this meeting in Carmel to put together the Brown delegation and John Abbott went down there with Larry O'Brien, up-and-down lots of back steps and maneuvering around to see exactly who was going to go on the delegation. And I would go on, and Ed Heller would go on, and others who were Kennedy supporters and signals to him, then other people would have to be put on too, you know, to give an indication of Stevenson's strength so that Brown could, within the delegation, capture enough people to hold hostage that no one else would come in the State primary.

I was very much against Kennedy coming in, and I was delighted that he did not choose to come in, that we didn't have the resources for a fight, and I think he might have lost against Stevenson if Stevenson had chosen to come in. But it wouldn't have been worth the effort. As from the Brown delegation, Kennedy got something like thirty-eight California votes, which was larger than most states cast in total. And the Stevenson votes, of course, were just sort of thrown away along the way. What Kennedy needed was, I believe, five hundred and some odd votes, and he got thirty-eight of them from California. And the way we tried to work on the delegates was almost one-to-one. There was one opportunity to schedule John Kennedy up here just before the convention, and we put him into the Fairmont for the day--we invited every delegate from northern California to come in and, by districts, ran them through Senator Kennedy's suite; they all got a chance to talk to him.

O'BRIEN: Now, who was "we" at this point?

HOUGHTELING: Well, at this point, again, the "Friends of John Kennedy" people. We were Clary Heller and [James F.] Jim Thacher, who were the co-chairmen of Friends of John Kennedy, then myself, Joe Paul and Jack Abbott, and a woman named Betty Cook who's the wife of Paul Cook who lives in Atherton, the president of Raychem; who is very interested in this thing. And we set up the structure and Clary Heller and Jim Thacher sent out the telegrams to ask the delegates to come. We financed it just by bits and pieces; this isn't a very expensive operation to run. And the delegates all came in and had an opportunity to talk to Kennedy. And he was very good.

We had, as I recall, [John F.] Shelley at that point working with us, Tom Lynch and Gene McAteer came around; you have people like this and they give a real substance to an effort. And as you look at the vote of the California delegation, you'll see that Kennedy did very well in the Bay area and in northern California. We got, he got, his votes up here. Southern California to a native San Franciscan like myself is a strange place, and that's where delegates began to fold and go to Stevenson or to [Lyndon B.] Johnson, as a holding point, something of that nature. But I always thought that John Kennedy did very well in northern California; people liked his style.

O'BRIEN: The club movement has never been as strong in northern California, has it?

HOUGHTELING: Yes, it has been. It was founded up here essentially in Santa Clara County, which is just south of San Francisco, but of course they were strong in Los Angeles. This was one of the things Brown always had to consider was the club movement which grew out of the Stevenson campaign of '52. When Brown, if you recall, went around the streets of California doing his shoe-leather poll of who people wanted to be the Democratic nominee, I always described that poll as a "nip-and-tuck" one; [Richard G.] Dick Tuck being the "tuck" part about it, as the Brown advance man; because somehow at the end of the day it always ended up that Stevenson and Kennedy were just about even-steven in the results of the people that Brown had talked to. And I'm sure that somebody was running ahead making sure it came out that way on the thing. And, you know, it was funny because we all knew at that point Brown had given his pledge to John Kennedy, with Ed Heller as one holding the pledge. And yet Brown, if you know him well, is apt to be just this way. He will fulfill his promises, but the undulations between here and there are just horrendous because he has other problems to worry about: the legislature, the club movement, and what have you. And I knew that he had

made the promise to John Kennedy that if Kennedy didn't come in to the primary, that he, Brown, would come out for Kennedy.

O'BRIEN: He made that through Heller, as I understand it.

HOUGHTELING: That's my understanding, yes. Well, this is what the Hellers told me. Now, I have heard that the same thing was repeated through other people, but I gathered that the essential pledge holder was Ed Heller, that the call was set up through him.

O'BRIEN: Now, this was at or just after the Carmel convention?

HOUGHTELING: My recollection was that it was before the delegation selection. But you see there again the Kennedys made a mistake. They assumed because the Governor would come out for John Kennedy, other people would follow. Well, it didn't work that way. The Governor does not have that sort of leverage in California. The only major sorts of patronage appointments he has is judgeships; but once a man gets to be a judge he's out of political activity. So that's where the Kennedys made, I thought, a great mistake, in assuming that the Governor could lead anybody. And this is what we tried to point out. And I think they began to get an understanding because when we were at the convention they left the California delegation largely alone. We never saw hide nor hair of the Kennedy "musclemen."

We were out at the Hollywood Knickerbocker sort of talking to each other, and occasionally Jess Unruh would disappear downtown and report back to this Kennedy caucus we had. And it was quite an interesting caucus, which included those of us who were fully committed. As I think back--we had in there Fred Dutton who then went on to become Under Secretary of State and Secretary of the Cabinet; we had J. Edward Day, Postmaster General; we had [William H., Jr.] Bill Orrick who was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division; we had [Elizabeth R.] Libby Gatov who went on to be Treasurer of the United States; we had [Clarence D., Jr.] Dan Martin, who became Under Secretary of Commerce. So it was quite a group of people.

But essentially we worked and worked to swing half-votes in the California delegation. And finally through this one-on-one effort, really using every sort of appeal, we got it up to a plurality of the delegation that Kennedy got. And it was very, very difficult to get at that. And I somewhere in my files have--we kept an informal record of who voted what--and I started to dig out into that record, but I couldn't find it. We stored it away, thinking we would use it in the future--but then we never did--although we thought there might be a useful thing if people knew that a record was being made at the vote. I forget where

that record went, but it was interesting.

What was interesting, too, and impressed me about Jess Unruh I can remember being up in Sacramento, it must have been in '59--it was during the legislative session--and I drove Larry O'Brien to Sacramento from San Francisco. We met with several people, including Jess Unruh and [William A.] Bill Munnell, who was at that point Democratic state chairman and an assemblyman from down south. And, by God, Unruh gave his word to Kennedy at that point: he was going to work for Kennedy and be for Kennedy. He may have given it before, but he repeated it to O'Brien, as did Munnell. But you got down to Los Angeles and you found that Munnell just folded, and backed off . . . yes, to Johnson or [Stuart] Symington or Stevenson; the pressure was so great. But Unruh kept to his pledge and he worked hard. I've always felt that there are a lot of things that are said about Jess Unruh, but when he gives his word, he keeps his word. And I was tremendously impressed by that experience dealing with Jess.

O'BRIEN: He's in some respects what a Massachusetts politician might call "pols," as I understand it, at least in the eyes of some of the Kennedy people.

HOUGHTELING: Oh yes, and you know again they sort of look at California in a pyramid structure, with the boss on top and then it comes down with a lot of people on the bottom. Well, we just aren't that way. There's just a lot of people involved and very few pyramids. Again, the pyramid we have in northern California--which, in a sense, we're trying to put together now for John Tunney for the Senate--if of people who have worked together for years who can differ occasionally on candidates, but yet have a friendship association. The more new, younger guys who come in the better off we are.

O'BRIEN: Okay, we're talking about a kind of liberal Democratic establishment here that has some continuity. Let's start placing some of these people. Yourself, the Hellers; you mentioned Roger Kent.

HOUGHTELING: Libby Gatov; Bill Orrick [William K.]; Bill Coblentz here in San Francisco, who is an attorney and regent; [William M.] Bill Roth, who was another appointee who became, under [Christian A.] Herter. . . . Then later took Herter's place in the Kennedy round of negotiations. I remember Bill [William Matson] Roth at the Convention was one of the guys we were just working and working on because he wanted to go for Stevenson, and finally he was convinced to go for Kennedy as an effort of helping Brown--to whom he felt very close--and he switched his vote. And there were other people like that who voted for Kennedy, a few, simply because this is what Brown wanted to do and they felt they'd

oblige for at least one round of voting. . . .

Another person I thought was really excellent on this was Alan Cranston. As the founder of CDC [California Democratic Council] and at that time as state controller, he had promised Brown that he would go for Kennedy for one round at least. And, by God, of all the people, he had the CDC pressure on him because he had been the founding president--he had been not only the founder but then a special person to the CDC because of his victory in the controller's spot--but, by God, I can remember him sitting there in the Convention just with all this pressure on him, but holding to his word, which was just, I thought, excellent on his part.

There were other people like this. Betty Lawrence was a delegate from San Jose, and she was virtually in tears most of the time, but she had given her promise to follow the Governor on this and, by God, she did under all this pressure. You know for me there were at least four or five hundred letters and phone calls and wires; it made no problem because I had already given a promise. My wife was the problem. [Laughter]

O'BRIEN: Was this an organized effort to change your mind? I understand that Tom Rees had a lot of this kind of pressure, too.

HOUGHTELING: Oh, yes. And he would, particularly out of that Beverly Hills group. Oh, yes. It was, you know, this whole Stevenson magic again. The California Democratic Party is really Stevensonian in its quality.

O'BRIEN: Who put this effort together in '60? Did you ever get any insight into that?

HOUGHTELING: Oh, I can name people like Alan Parker, who was very active in the CDC and some of that leadership. Alan was on the delegation out of San Jose. Again, this was the people's movement, the same way in '52 it was, just people who felt deeply and an ad hoc organization being created. Our mailboxes, you know, were just jammed with Stevenson mail. . . . Some close friends would call, and it was just a tremendous tribute to Stevenson.

I can remember that my wife and I almost got a divorce then because it was our room where we'd stuck all the Kennedy paraphernalia--the big banners, the hats, pictures, and the like. She was just for Stevenson completely, emotionally, wonderfully, and she left a day early she got so mad at me on this. But we were all reconciled, and after Kennedy became President this all vanished. The Stevensonians were brought over, and Kennedy fulfilled, I think, what they would have hoped that Stevenson would have been.

It's almost painful to go back; I try not to read the memoirs of those years. I've got Sorensen's book and [Pierre E. G.] Salinger's book; you know, the only book worth a damn of that whole bunch is Red Fay's because he gives you a living, breathing John F. Kennedy. I've talked to Red--I've known Red since I was a child; our families have been great friends--and the snubbing he took from the Kennedy family for a period because the "God", the Kennedy of their eyes, was somewhat less than a god after all. You know, the god was a man in Red Fay's book. It was described as what, a locker room picture of John Kennedy? Well, in a way it was, because Kennedy sweat and he swore and he was a man, and this was the way I could remember him as an individual, not as a President. You know the Camelot character that has now evolved out of it. . . .

O'BRIEN: There's kind of a myth or an aura that's grown up, very much so.

HOUGHTELING: Yes, that's why Red's book is good. Red has some things that were funny. He describes a meeting at the San Francisco airport--this was a meeting we had carefully set up so John Kennedy could meet with Gene McAteer and Tom Lynch--and Red suddenly tried to burst into the room. And we knew that Red was anathema, as a Republican, in those days for McAteer and Lynch. We threw him out of there. And he describes it in the book, and it's quite a different view he had of the occasion than we did. We were just trying to keep him the hell out of the room where this private conference could go on; John Kennedy had no better supporters than McAteer and Lynch.

O'Brien: Right. Was '56, the Convention, the first time that you met Kennedy?

HOUGHTELING: Yes.

O'BRIEN: You hadn't met him through Fay before that?

HOUGHTELING: No. In fact, what was interesting, too, as I look back. What was it about Kennedy? Because he wasn't the same man he was in '60 that he was in '56. There was just a feeling he grew up tremendously in those years. He was in 1956 a personality man, and I think the way he handled the first speech in San Francisco with just sort of a casualness and an off-handedness without recognizing the role he was going to have to fill. This was true about [Edward M.] Teddy Kennedy. You know, he came out in '60 to run the Western States, and he was a disaster at that; he ended up doing ski jumps and bulldogging bulls at carnivals to attract attention to the Kennedy name. And he was good at that, but his efforts to do any organization were disastrous. Eventually he was eased out, and I forget who it was who came out to run the operation, but it ended up with Roger Kent and these people running it in California.

O'BRIEN: When did you first get in this effort, or did you have contact with groups in southern California beginning to organize back in '57 or '58?

HOUGHTELING: Well, you learn in California that you bring the northern Californians and southern Californians together at most once during the campaign because they are a different breed. We ran directly out of Washington. As I look back--I glanced through some correspondence that was to Sorensen and O'Brien and [Stephen E.] Steve Smith--we worked directly out of there. California really is two states. For the contact, we would go to Sacramento and see Jess Unruh and some of the southern Californians like Tom Rees then. But there was no unified situation. It was all run out of Washington.

O'BRIEN: How about Ted Sorensen? When was the first that you came across Ted Sorensen?

HOUGHTELING: I think around '57 or so, that there would be correspondence back and forth on scheduling. But you'll find with all these guys that they start out with a very simple structure. You'll be, say, writing to Ted Sorensen and eventually you find somebody else coming in. They get the structure of a campaign and as a result you're writing to quite a few people. I think it was fairly early on with Sorensen. I've got somewhere in my garage--I sort of saved all these things, but I couldn't dig them out the other day to look at it.

I went back to Washington a few times and talked to Kennedy, and, of course, their interest all after '58 was what Brown was going to do in the--you know, whatever information we could get out of the Governor's office and out of him in the direction he was going to move. Hy Raskin, the "Silver Fox" would appear every now and then as some sort of a mystery man--a delightful guy, as is O'Brien.

You're dealing, when you're putting together a campaign or a delegation, with a limited constituency here that you're trying to reach. Maybe there are three or four thousand people in California who are the activists, and these are the ones within whom the politicking went on. Of course there was reaching out, as a by-product, to the general public to get Kennedy better known and the like. But there is a very limited constituency in putting together a delegation for anybody.

O'BRIEN: In regard to Larry O'Brien, did he ever get a grasp of California politics, or a sense of the difference in California politics from Massachusetts or an Eastern. . . .

HOUGHTELING: I don't think so. I still have the feeling that they still don't understand because when Robert Kennedy came into the state in '66 he turned it over to Jess Unruh and [A. Philip] Phil Burton--Phil Burton in San Francisco and this area--and they're people who build political pyramids that are narrow both top and bottom. They deal only with their own sort of retainer-type, and instead of running an umbrella, circus tent type of operation which welcomes everybody, they're very narrow based. And I think that even Robert Kennedy . . . Well, Robert Kennedy's campaign in '68 was a disaster; he damned near lost the state of California. Well, it was a disaster for many sad reasons, but the campaign itself was terrible.

O'BRIEN: Well, Steven Smith came in for that reason, wasn't it, to . . .

HOUGHTELING: Finally. And he ended up down south, and added to the confusion because that Jess Unruh had an assistant who was also named [Steven E.] Steve Smith. So there was a certain amount of confusion as to which Steve Smith was doing what. [Laughter] John Seigenthaler finally came up to San Francisco and finally let people into the campaign and broke it loose from this very narrow view that Phil Burton and Unruh have had. Unruh tried to run the state as if he could run it with one chairman, one treasurer, one finance committee, as against our common way of dividing it with one north and one south with sort of an armed truce between the two.

O'BRIEN: Were you communicating with--jumping to '68 rather rapidly here, but I think that's fine--were you communicating these things back to people in the Kennedy camp?

HOUGHTELING: No, because my own feeling in '68 was that [Robert] Kennedy shouldn't have come in. I was so much against Johnson that I was one of those who stayed up to midnight and signed the [Eugene J.] McCarthy petition. Indeed, I was riding in [G. W.] Joe Holsinger's car and Joe was saying, "Would you like to be northern California coordinator for McCarthy?" when news came over that Robert Kennedy was holding the press conference and there was an anticipation he was to announce. And I said, "Well, Joe, if Kennedy gets into that I'm going with him because he's the only one who can really take the convention. I don't think McCarthy could." But I had wired Steve Smith and Jess Unruh saying don't come into California; let the anti-Johnson forces be united behind McCarthy. I conveyed my views to Seigenthaler when he finally got out here because that Kennedy operation was chaos.

O'BRIEN: How about the Hellers, people like this? Where'd

they end up in the campaign of '68?

HOUGHTELING: Well, Clary ended up on the Lynch delegation because Robert Kennedy--Clary had asked Robert what he should do, and he told Clary, "Get on that Lynch delegation," which he did do. And Bob Coate who shares offices with me, was the Humphrey man in the north, and he helped put together the Lynch delegation. I kept urging Clary on him, but Clary had to pledge his full vote to Humphrey to be on the Lynch delegation and not to create a disturbance. On this Robert Kennedy thing, I just sat in on things up north as they went along. It just was such chaos. They asked me to be finance chairman for the north, and I took a look at the way it was put together and I said, "No, thanks. You just put it together so poorly you're not going to raise any money." And, indeed, this was the case. I think [David] Halberstam's book [The Unfinished Odyssey of Robert Kennedy] shows the best indication of California politics--that delegation was composed of Jess Unruh, his relatives, his retainers, and that was about it.

O'BRIEN: But in many ways this group of people that were rather influential in Robert Kennedy's campaign were, because of their commitment against the war and prior commitments, pretty much caught up in other campaigns, the Lynch delegation for example.

HOUGHTELING: That's right. Tom's heart was with Robert Kennedy. I was Tom's statewide campaign chairman for attorney general in '66, and I was close enough in talking to him to have a feeling that he was terribly embarrassed. He was out in Hawaii during the period when all these ads ran on behalf of the uncommitted Lynch slate and the like. But it was quite hard for the people like Libby Gatov, Coblenz, Orrick, and myself--who were all John Kennedy people--to really fight our way into that Robert Kennedy campaign once Unruh and Burton had gotten a hold of it. Eventually it was only by appeals by such as Bill Orrick back to Robert Kennedy, with whom he had a very close relationship, that it began to break open. And they sent Seigenthaler out here, who appeared as the only man with any sense.

The Kennedys--and this was true in '60 as well as '68--had this great faculty that they'd have old college chums or friends who would say, "Gee, Jack", or "Gee, Bob, what can I do?" And they'd always say, "Go out to California and organize!" So you had a great influx of these Easterners from God knows where all coming out to be generals and none of them knew a damn thing about California. This was a great way to get rid of people. But some, like Seigenthaler, proved eventually to be very, very good. Teddy Kennedy in '60 didn't prove it, but Ted's been out here since then, and I think he has a great reservoir of people ready to go here.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any contact in '68 with some of the old, in a sense, pros of the Kennedy camp; people like O'Brien, [P. Kenneth] O'Donnell, and [David F.] Dave Powers, and perhaps Sorensen?

HOUGHTELING: No. I really didn't feel they were that "in" in California. I just don't know what they're doing. I'd see Fred Dutton quite often and express my views to him because Fred's an old friend, one whom I admire very much--but not these others. Again, the Halberstam book I thought, gave the feeling that they had become Establishment people. I think that you look through most of the people I mentioned, like Coblenz and Roth, who both are regents, myself and Clary Heller, we're sort of on the side of the students. [Laughter]

I saw Ted Kennedy when he came out here for this deficit fundraiser--oh, it must have been in January or February, earlier in this year--and Ann Tunney, who is John's sister-in-law, gave a party. He really seemed very, very sad. . . . It had been his first time back to California, and the pain he must have felt--as all of us have in bits and pieces of this thing--must be tremendous. It's really too much. You know I was home watching TV, what was at the Ambassador Hotel; and whom the gods make mighty they make low. There was a beautiful tableau of Robert Kennedy, his wife, Jess Unruh, and I think Tom Rees was there, and one of two others--the moment of triumph--and then to turn, and just be ended. I can't soak up any more of that pain.

O'BRIEN: I think that's been a strain on anyone who started in the early sixties and got caught up in the Kennedy movement. With Malcolm X, [Martin Luther, Jr.] King . . .

HOUGHTELING: My daughters had seen their mother die over a period of time, and I think that they found it very difficult to have these things happen. They knew how I felt about Robert Kennedy and John Kennedy, and we felt very deeply about Martin Luther King. I just wonder how many tears they have left to shed.

O'BRIEN: In that campaign . . .

HOUGHTELING: Which one?

O'BRIEN: The '68 campaign. Did you come across some of the younger people that had come into the Robert Kennedy campaign, like [Adam] Walinsky and Peter Edelman?

HOUGHTELING: No. They didn't come out here particularly. They

were so busy in Oregon and those places, and it seemed to me that they had turned it largely over to Jess and then eventually to Seigenthaler up here. And Seigenthaler, really I can't say too much about him. Northern Californians, at least San Franciscans have an air about them, and he fit beautifully into this. I really wasn't much a part in '68. I run some small newspapers which endorsed Robert Kennedy; I made my contribution; but the way that thing was run I just didn't want to get day-to-day into it. It was just a confusion.

O'BRIEN: You had an opportunity to take a look at the use of media, and not only that, certainly over the sixties you had a perspective of the changing uses of media in elections. Is there anything that stands out?

HOUGHTELING: Well, I could . . .

O'BRIEN: Your observations on this. . . .

HOUGHTELING: Again, looking at '68, I think this is where Halberstam was just perfect in describing how badly the Kennedy people used media. They made Robert F. Kennedy a celebrity, a matinee idol, and that's all you got of him, in contrast to McCarthy who quietly went around and was talking about issues and what people were thinking about. I have a feeling that we're in a period where people want some more substance than just hoopla.

I was up with John Tunney for a couple of days up at the Tahoe area to look at some of the problems up there, and he had a camera crew with him to prepare a campaign film. And I think this is the approach: you try and give the best side of a man in a half-hour to show that he's interested and he has some ideas on issues and he's learning about them and he's able to talk about them. I don't think this shouting at people is going to work, tearing at people's cuff links and things like that. I know that, Kennedy--John Kennedy, you know the few occasions after he was a nominee I was with him--really. . . . The effort to keep people away, the jumpers that they were described as and the like. . . . I'm not so sure, though; that that's the most effective way.

We had the funniest campaign up north where we had Citizens for Kennedy with Rear Admiral [John] Harllee USN (ret.) in charge who didn't know really anything about politics, but he was given the Kennedy manual. And, by God, you went right down the list of instructions. Harllee went up into Alpine County, which has 280 voters, and spent a day or two there because the book said you had a chairman in every county--and he finally found somebody to be a chairman in Alpine County. [Laughter]

Let's see, I went in as a vice-chairman of that Citizens for

Kennedy to be sort of a liaison between that group, which was pretty freewheeling--it had all the nonpartisans and people like Red Fay who was then a Republican and the PT [patrol torpedo] boat gang--and the regular establishment which was Roger Kent and Tom Lynch, Libby Gatov, and Brown. Really, the arguments we would get into as to who would be in charge of the Attorneys for Kennedy, whether it be a Citizens operation or a regular operation--because you were dealing, too, with money, because you could get money from these groups and who would be able to get a hold of that money? We had quite a thing going on that. But the Citizens was a good operation--it brought a lot of people in with excitement and interest, and it was very, very exciting.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any real conflicts with the Citizens groups in 1960 in the regular Democratic organization?

HOUGHTELING: Oh, sure. But you'll have to understand, again, the Democratic Party in California is a pretty disorganized bunch; we're in a Hiram Johnson state without effective parties. One thing about northern California I think is very true, that there is such eagerness to welcome anybody who wants to work for John Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or you name it. This has sort of sapped any citizens organization because the leaderships can be so quickly acquired in this loose structure that the party represents. So the conflicts in '60 were more or less to make sure that both the Citizens and the regulars weren't organizing the attorneys, and the same thing for the farmers, and who was going to do the students. It was that sort of mechanical thing rather than any ideological view of the race, and I think a lot of the people who went into the Citizens for Kennedy then would work on into the informality of the Democratic Party. Really it's too bad we haven't got that spirit now when you end up with a campaign of Hubert Humphrey against Richard Nixon.

O'BRIEN: How do you see what you might call the ethnic politics here in the sixties in California? For example, Robert Kennedy had a rather charismatic appeal on Mexican-Americans. This really begins in 1960, doesn't it?

HOUGHTELING: It seems to me John Kennedy did that. I was so amused. One thing I remember that his last swing he came into Moffett Field, which is Santa Clara County--and we joined the caravan there and went down to San Jose for a great rally. Then it got late in the evening and we worked back into Oakland--it was November and we were in the Negro section of Oakland--and we parked the buses. You couldn't see a damn thing outside since it was a dark evening, but you could just hear all these people--it was the Negro community so you saw no white faces, and in the dark you could occasionally see a

match being lit or some light--you could just hear all these people being there and for him, but the color of their skin meant in the darkness they were not as apparent as would a white audience be. But you could just hear them out there; they're just waiting. You know, as the campaign goes, we were probably an hour late. I was on the news bus, which I liked to be on; that's fun--and they're all saying, "How many people are there?" and somebody like Tuck would always say, "Oh, probably twenty-five thousand," since you never could find out. [Laughter]. Yes, the Kennedys had that, and it's funny that somebody out of prep school, Harvard background, could have this empathy.

And, of course, Robert Kennedy was walking with Cesar Chavez. It made these people feel that somebody cared because this group I speak of in northern California were all sort of white, Protestant Americans. We might be Jewish instead of Protestant, but we're all sort of entrepreneur-, professional-, investment-, lawyer-types. Kennedy, however, brought this group in, as did Robert Kennedy.

O'BRIEN: Where did the idea for the Viva Kennedy movements
 . . .

HOUGHTELING: I couldn't tell you that. But that was a great thing going on. I don't think even there the Kennedys ever tapped the full potential because you never get the minorities registered the way they should be. But it's awfully hard. One of the problems in dealing with the Mexican-American community or the Negro community, as I see, in practical politics is that they're terribly balkanized as to who's the leader; and there's a lot of maneuvering that has to go on to make sure you exclude no one; everybody has to get aboard. And I think those who feel they're leaders feel very fiercely about it, and you, at your peril, ignore them. But the Kennedys, I think, had a very good sense of this sort of thing.

O'BRIEN: Here in northern California did you have anyone that served as kind of contact between your Kennedy organization--in the pre-convention period and even on into the election in 1960--as contact people with the black community or with the Mexican-American community?

HOUGHTELING: I don't recall so because, in that constituency of two or three thousand people who were maneuvering around on the delegation thing, there aren't that many. . . . I mean, there are people like [William] Byron Rumford who was then an assemblyman and some other office-holding Negroes, but I don't think there was much concern here because you weren't dealing with masses of people; you were dealing with just a very few. So I can't recall any particular effort in that direction. Indeed, by the time you ended up, you just had the Brown delegation on the ballot, which meant you didn't have a

primary fight. What you were doing was working with--what do we have?--one hundred and ninety-six delegates, and just working with those people. These were mainly the only people the Citizens for Kennedy were trying to influence--you went beyond them and tried to get to their friends and neighbors and what have you, but these are the only groups we were trying to influence.

O'BRIEN: Pardon me. Let me reverse this tape. . . .

[END OF INTERVIEW]

Joseph C. Houghteling
Dec. 1960 speech, Los Altos (Cal)
Democratic Club

Dec 160
Election 1111

"After All, Who Won The Election)

I make no claims about being an expert -unless you wish to define an expert as one who is able to finish last Sunday's New York Times before the next one arrives. To be a true expert you have to be somewhat like the true ^{prophet} ~~expert~~ who has to be more than fifty miles from home and I am on homegrounds.

And what I say is conditioned by a reluctance to say the title "President-elect" before the name Kennedy. I will only feel confident when the electoral college holds graduation exercises. Admittedly this is a superstition; it does make it difficult ~~to~~. I must say, in writing the ~~day~~ following election ~~the~~ editorial to avoid mentioning the President-elect by ~~the~~ name. Fortunately all newspapers always have ready a comment where the name of the victor need not even be mentioned; you know that editorial...it runs that we must all close ranks since the people have spoken.

The trouble this year is discovering what they said.

So not as an expert, I'd like to comment on two aspects of the campaign which seemed quite remarkable to me.

The first was the personal development of John F. Kennedy as a candidate. This is something many reporters have noted and it is true. For the man at the beginning of the campaign was somewhat cold and automatic as candidates goes yet by the end of the campaign ^{out} with/changing himself, he reached his audiences to evoke an almost uncontrolled response.

There was all the difference in crowd reaction between those along train side through the central valley in ^{early} September and that ~~was~~ when the candidate visited California in November.

more

It wasn't that he was saying different things. The "America must be first..not first but, first if, first when...but first" was the theme throughout the campaign. Yet the crowds which were friendly in September were the wild demonstrators of the late campaign.

I think those ~~of~~ ^{of} us who went into San Jose ~~one~~ ^A week before election day went ~~there~~ with considerable concern the Kennedy rally would be a flop. San Jose has always had the reputation of being a political desert in the middle of an oasis and going back a bit I can remember in the campaign of 1948 having Senate Barkley speak there when all sorts of efforts wouldn't even fill the small Montgomery auditorium. In addition, all of us were aimed north for the ^{Kennedy} Cow Palace rally at 7 p.m. and the San Jose rally was set for 4; the local stop was a late decision.

To me, the rally was wonderful. Once I saw the crowds which had parked cars on Bayshore (which is taking life in hands) for the briefest of glimpses of the candidate, the day was made. ^{disappointment} The only ~~disappointment~~ was the national press; they'd seen this sort of demonstration so often it wasn't unusual. The only thing which concerned them was the ineptness of the San Jose police which so badly handled arrangements the press couldn't get anywhere near the speakers stand. And as many of you know, this sort of reception was duplicat~~ed~~ ^{ed} that evening at the packed Cow Palace.

So we had a fine candidate with great popular appeal going for us.

The second observation I wanted to make is that

so far as Northern California was concerned, we had the best organization that has ever occurred in my experience.

For example, Citizens for Kennedy had a chairman in each of the ⁵⁰northern California counties - and I'm sure this was the first time in history a county like Alpine with some 250 voters was included. The N. California chairman Rear Admiral Harllee, a complete new~~comer~~comer to politics, got the national manual which said each county should have a chairman and by gum that was exactly what was going to happen. He dispatched a volunteer to Alpine with instructions ~~to~~ to walk the sidewalks until he found a local chairman. The first communication received back from our agent was, where are the sidewalks.

But chairmen the Citizens did have and in many counties, good work was done in two areas, bringing into the campaign newcomers and in certain cases, providing the agency through which so-called dissent Democrats could work for Kennedy.

The regular organization, as usual, was excellent. One gauge of activity is money raising and certainly the 1,400 people at the Kennedy dinner in November at the Palace - \$100 a plate - was a record for Northern California. At that late period in the campaign when regular donors had been more than bled red, white, and blue, it's amazing the response there was to the sale of these tickets.

In our county, the same sort of activity was evident. We had the first \$50 a plate dinner, a great success with Senator Kefauver. The Citizens had Governor Williams in San Jose and with

election 44

about three days notice, the Sunnyvale-Cupertino Citizens put on a lunch for Governor Edmundson of Oklahoma with about 125 present. Functions of this sort are a good gauge of activity; so were the successful results, the record results of Dollars for Democrats, the registration drive, the results of precinct work which helped produce an amazing 90 percent voter turnout.

You may say at this point, so what? We lost the State, we lost the county.

Such is sadly true. But let's look a little deeper into the election returns.

For example, divide California in its traditional way; eight counties south, Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Ventura. The balance, the other 50 counties, constitute the jurisdiction of northern California political organization. If you breakdown the state total between north and south, you will find Senator Kennedy carried northern California by 92,095 votes.

It was in that difficult southern political jungle where Senator Kennedy lost and lost by 127,718.

Let's take a look too at county results. I made some computations to discover what percentage of the Democratic registration Senator Kennedy would have had to carry to have won the State.

It works out, state-wide, that if Senator Kennedy had had 35,624 votes more, that ~~that~~ ^{would give him} one more vote than the Nixon majority ^{and} he would have carried California. Working this further, we find the Senator

(mo)

Kennedy 55

to get this total,
needed 75.8% of the Democratic registration.

How did the ten counties in the State with over 200,000 voters stack up not only against the percentage but also against one another on this "K" index.

San Francisco was carried by Senator Kennedy by 54,733 votes and working out the K index, San Francisco gave him 78% of the Democratic registration ...fine.

Alameda county, he carried by 31,818 votes and computations make the majority 77.5%, the K index. In Contra Costa, a lead of 10,700; an index of 76.6%. In Sacramento, a lead of 25,443 and an index of 78%. In short in these large northern California counties, which he carried the Senator received between 76.6% and 78% of the Democratic registration.

How did it work out in the two large counties in the north he didn't carry. San Mateo county went to Nixon by 7,416 yet the Kennedy total, the index, was 81% of the Democratic registration. In Santa Clara county where we lost by 14,000 votes, the K factor is also 81%.

So judged by the percentage of Democratic registration gained for Senator Kennedy, San Mateo and Santa Clara counties

mate

election 66

led this group of the larger northern counties. No so bad at all.

But now look down South; in Los Angeles, the Kennedy factor is 76%. In orange county, 73%; in San Bernardino, 71%, in San Diego, 73%. Only in Los Angeles did the factor equal what Kennedy needed and this result was lower than any of the large northern California counties.

So in a sense, we can pinpoint, at least so far as these ten large counties are concerned, where Senator Kennedy lost. I suggest, too, that when the intensive study is made, almost precinct by precinct in the State, a good look be taken at some of the ~~SAN JOAQUIN~~ San Joaquin counties where the results were, most ~~surprising~~ *and past record* surprising in the face of registration, most discouraging. I worked out the K indexes for some of them and found: Fresno, 71%; Madera, 71%; Kings, 70%; Tulare, 65%; Kern, 64%.

There's a significance here for it is in these areas where I believe certain factors were working against Senator Kennedy, particularly the religious issue.

Perhaps indeed Clair Engle is right when recently he pointed out the effect of the religious issue showed in returns from ^{the} San Joaquin area and the ~~perimeter~~ perimeter of Los Angeles where there has been heavy immigration to California from the "Bible belt, the border, and southern states". The same ~~areas~~ ^{areas}, he noted, also gave the greatest support to a referendum two years ago to tax parochial schools.

1 m

editorial 777

What I am suggesting is that when the historian writes the definite volume on this election, ~~the~~ one of the factors working against Senator Kennedy - at least so far as California is concerned - was the religious issue.

Another I might suggest is that in 1960 there was a tremendous advantage going to the ~~incumbents~~ incumbents, We can see that in returns up and down the state, not only in this area where ^{our} local candidates ~~didn't~~ *but everywhere, Republicans + Democrats* didn't do as well as two years ago. And Mr. Nixon, the closest thing to an incumbent in the presidential campaign certainly had the advantage of this factor. Why the incumbents; because there were really few dramatic issues. Prestige isn't a gutty a matter as say right-to-work; the level of unemployment wasn't as great as in 1958; and by let's call it coincidence, the gold crisis could be blamed on Senator Kennedy and only after the overseas vote was counted did the administration put into effect the drastic means to curtail the outflow flow of dollars.

All these things made it most difficult for Senator Kennedy even in a nation which by registration, by preference in Congress is a Democratic land. And when the book on the campaign is finally written it could be titled either "How Kennedy Won" or "How Nixon Lost"

Handwritten mark