

Mildred Jeffrey Oral History Interview – JFK#1 01/25/1970
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Biographical Note

Mildred Jeffrey was the Director of Community Relations, United Automobile Workers Union, a member of the Platform Committee, Democratic Party (1955-1960), and a delegate from Michigan, Democratic National Convention (1956, 1960). This interview focuses on John F. Kennedy's [JFK] Presidential campaign, the nomination of Lyndon B. Johnson as Vice President, and formation of the Peace Corps, among other things.

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Mildred Jeffrey – JFK #1
Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1	Meeting John F. Kennedy [JFK] and the 1956 Convention
4	Senator JFK, the United Automobile Workers, and labor legislation
5	Potential candidates for 1960 Democratic Presidential nomination: the Michigan state convention, the Midwest Conference, Jefferson – Jackson dinner, and other events
18	Michigan’s reaction to JFK’s primary results in Wisconsin and West Virginia, next steps for the JFK campaign, and questions raised by Michigan
21	Resistance to support JFK: politics and religion
23	Michigan meeting at Mackinac Island and the decision to endorse JFK for as the Democratic Presidential nominee
25	The black community’s reaction to Michigan’s support of JFK, addressing their concerns, meeting with JFK, the NAACP, and civil rights
29	Delegation caucus and voters support for the Democratic Presidential candidates
32	Projections and events leading up to the Democratic National Convention
33	The Democratic National Convention and announcement of Lyndon B. Johnson as Vice President nominee
40	Organizing the Kennedy campaign: nominations, Labor Day celebrations in Michigan, the Kennedy Girls, civil rights, security, and financing
49	The Kennedy family’s role in campaigning in Michigan
49	JFK returns to Michigan to campaign and the Peace Corps
53	Reflections of the election

Oral History Interview

with

MRS. MILDRED JEFFREY

January 25, 1970
Detroit, Michigan

by William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right, Mrs. Jeffrey, let me ask you first of all--the way these interviews have a habit of starting off--when did you first meet John F. Kennedy?

JEFFREY: I first met John F. Kennedy at the 1956 convention. It was a very brief meeting.

MOSS: Do you recall the circumstances of the meeting?

JEFFREY: I met him outside the convention hall when he was on his way--I'm not sure where. Somebody just introduced me, so that was all there was to it.

MOSS: Did you have any feeling at the time as to his vice-presidential aspirations at that convention?

JEFFREY: I had no feelings--I had no personal feelings about John F. Kennedy at that time. The 1956 convention was my first convention. I was a member of a delegation that had very strong sentimental attachments to Estes Kefauver. Many people in my delegation and in Michigan felt that Estes Kefauver had been cheated out of the '52 nomination, and, by-jiminy, he deserved the vice-presidential nomination.

MOSS: Right. Let me stop here just a moment. . . .
[Interruption] There was some consternation, wasn't there, when Adlai Stevenson opened the convention for the vice-presidential nomination? Do you recall your reaction and that of the Michigan delegation?

JEFFREY: Yes. Let me point out that at that convention: (a) it was my first convention; (b) I was on the platform committee, and therefore almost all of my attention and interest revolved around what happened in the platform committee. We had a minority report on civil rights, and I spent most of my time working the language, getting the necessary signatures; and after that, talking with other states in an effort to mobilize support of the minority report. Secondly, I would say I was pretty naive and didn't really know what conventions were all

about.

What I recall most vividly, of course, about Stevenson opening it up was that Hubert Humphrey was the victim. Hubert Humphrey and the Minnesota people were very unhappy Kefauver had won the Minnesota primary. As a matter of fact, one of the key persons I worked with on the civil rights minority report was Bob Short [Robert E. Short], who was a Kefauver delegate, and who joined with us in the minority caucus--he was one of our speakers in the convention floor debate. I got to know Bob Short at that time fairly well.

MOSS: Do you recall just what the Humphrey reaction was, what the circumstances were, what was said?

JEFFREY: What I recall about that, most vividly is. . . . We have thought of Minnesota--Minnesota and Wisconsin we think of as sister states. Michigan Party--has had a simpatico relationship with them. Secondly, Hubert Humphrey was a great friend--he had campaigned in Michigan a good number of times to assist us in elections, so we had a very friendly feeling toward Hubert Humphrey. On the other hand--and I don't recall what the votes were at all at this moment, and I haven't tried to reconstruct any of this or look at notes--our delegation was solidly for Estes Kefauver, so that I don't recall any great dismay when Stevenson threw the VP nomination to the floor. What I do recall, of course, is when the delegates were voting, the votes were being taken, and since we were--I do recall that Neil Staebler was working very, very hard with the Minnesota delegation to try to get them to support Kefauver. I don't recall; Neil would recall all of this.

MOSS: There's a famous story of Governor Williams [G. Mennen Williams] and Neil Staebler taking Hubert Humphrey back into Sam Rayburn's room behind the platform and really giving it to him and telling him to come out for Kefauver strongly. Do you recall anything of this?

JEFFREY: I knew about it, but I wasn't a participant in it. I do recall meeting with John McCormack, the chair of the platform committee, at four o'clock in the morning to discuss our civil rights minority report. Mr. McCormack would not tell us one word as to what was going to be in the majority resolution on civil rights. Absolutely obdurate. Our delegation included Governor Williams and Richardson Dilworth, Mayor of Philadelphia, and Orville Freeman, Governor of Minnesota, and I'm not sure who else. That I recall very well, and I was very, very unhappy with Averell Harriman and the New York delegation because Congressman Celler [Emanuel Celler] was one of the two members, the male member, of the New York delegation who were supporting the majority civil rights platform.

This is all against a backdrop I was for Adlai Stevenson, as were most of our delegation, but Governor Williams had not

released us. He was for Averell Harriman, and so was Congressman Charlie Diggs [Charles C. Diggs]. There may have been a few others, but very few; our delegation was overwhelmingly for Stevenson. One time in the elevator Mennen said to me, "You would like to have a Stevenson button on, wouldn't you?" And I said, "Yes, I would," and I opened my purse--I'd been carrying it in my purse--and I said, "Here it is." When Michigan finally had a caucus, the pressures were building up and building up and building up to have Mennen release the Michigan delegation, so that we could conduct a vote in the delegation for the presidential preference of the delegates, it was Leonard Woodcock who gave the great speech that morning that unlocked it.

You are going to be seeing Leonard Woodcock, and he played a very significant role in that convention and in the '60 convention. Paul Weber, the brilliant press secretary of Governor Williams, told me afterwards that he had said to Mennen, "I can write the press release on the Michigan caucus now,"--that's before it's held--"because I know what's going to happen." And that's what did happen.

MOSS: Do you recall Governor Williams' response to that?

JEFFREY: No, I don't. Paul didn't tell me what it was.

MOSS: Now, on the floor vote for the vice-presidential nomination. It went through one ballot that was inconclusive, and then at the end of the second ballot things began to switch. Do you recall what set off the switch, because nobody really seems to have been able to pin this down. Just what turned the tide at the end of that second ballot?

JEFFREY: Well, Tennessee--I do not recall, and I haven't tried to even think about this because I had no idea you would be interested. Senator Gore wasn't for Kefauver, so the game plan was to get Gore to announce for Kefauver.

MOSS: Yes, this was part of it, but there were things that happened with the California delegation, for instance.

JEFFREY: I don't recall. What I have to contribute on this is really worth nothing.

MOSS: Okay, fine. Do you recall your impressions of John F. Kennedy at the end of the convention, particularly with a view towards his political future?

JEFFREY: My mind was totally closed to John F. Kennedy. I really didn't care that much about Estes Kefauver as a person, but I did respect the sentiments of Michigan people who had a very strong loyalty to Estes Kefauver. And it was my belief that it was my responsibility as a delegate to reflect those sentiments, so there was never any question in my

mind that I would be for Estes Kefauver.

Secondly, as I'm sure happens in any delegation at the convention, Massachusetts was sitting just back of us on the convention floor, and we were saying, "Oh, here are those big Massachusetts goons coming over to try to persuade us to vote for John F. Kennedy." Now that was the kind of conversation that went on. Congressman Marchrowicz [Thaddeus M. Marchrowicz] gave me the impression--he's now a federal judge--that he was for Kennedy. I'm not sure about this, but I know my impression was that he was at least friendly to John F. Kennedy.

But we were for Estes Kefauver, and none of those Kennedy people were going to have any influence on us. I made no effort to find out about John F. Kennedy. I had barely met him; I knew very little about him; and I was totally uninterested.

MOSS: Okay, fine. Now, in between the 1956 convention and the 1960 convention several things happened. I suppose the most significant thing from your point of view as a UAW [United Automobile Workers] person was the labor legislation in '58-'59. This put John F. Kennedy on the hot seat as a Democrat. He had to be friendly to labor, at the same time there was this pressure for strong labor control legislation. Now do you recall the feeling here in Michigan, and particularly of the UAW, of the labor legislation at the time and Senator Kennedy's position?

JEFFREY: Since the UAW was called before the McClellan [John L. McClellan] Committee on Kohler [Kohler Company] and Perfect Circle [Perfect Circle Products]--along the way it became known to us that John F. Kennedy was a senator on the committee that was going to be fair with the UAW, was going to be fair with Walter Reuther when he testified. And at the time he testified it was John F. Kennedy that protected him against Senator Curtis [Carl T. Curtis] and Senator Goldwater [Barry M. Goldwater], who were members of the McClellan Committee and out to get Reuther.

I think that's a very interesting time insofar as UAW attitudes toward John F. Kennedy are concerned, because the people like Kenny O'Donnell [P. Kenneth O'Donnell] and Pierre Salinger became so impressed with the UAW. They just couldn't get over how clean the UAW was, their standard being the Teamsters [International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union] and they had been totally repulsed by what they had found out about the Teamsters Union. They treated almost with awe. . . . They respected us more perhaps than we were entitled.

But of course, as you know, there was a thorough investigation made of the UAW. Carmine Bellino and his auditors spent many weeks at the UAW going over every scrap of paper, every receipt, every expense account. People like Woodcock can give you much more about this than I. So that as far as the perceptions of people in the UAW are concerned of Kennedy as a

senator, I believe that there were friendly attitudes toward him. But this was at that time, without, I think, any respect to his running for the presidency.

MOSS: Well, when did you first become aware of a determined race for the presidency by Senator Kennedy?

JEFFREY: In June 1958. One has bench marks--in June 1958 Adlai Stevenson gave the commencement address at Michigan State University in East Lansing.

I was a fervent Stevenson supporter--the '52 campaign was one of the greatest campaigns--as a campaign worker, not being close to the throne or anything like that. And '56 was a fine campaign, but it was nothing like my first love, 1952. I still enjoyed working for Stevenson, believed in Stevenson, I suppose, I still was thinking of Adlai Stevenson as the 1960 nominee, but no solid views, except that I did know in 1960 we had to win the presidency.

After this commencement address, Governor Williams invited a few of us to his home in Lansing. Neil and Tom Quimby [Thomas H.E. Quimby], Nancy Mennen, and I believe Adelaide Hart were there. It was just before Mr. Stevenson was going to Russia--you remember Bill Attwood went with him on that Russia trip. It was also at a time when there was great backlash in our state against foreign aid, and thirdly, we had no national spokesman for the Democratic party on foreign policy or programs.

In the course of the conversation we were talking about this and Neil and I were trying to persuade Adlai Stevenson that when he returned from Russia that he speak at weekend conferences in five cities, any five cities: New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, naturally we'd want Detroit, Los Angeles--five cities of his choice. We would set up a weekend conferences to discuss foreign policy, foreign aid, etc. He would be the centerpiece; he'd make a speech at each one of the conferences and he would be the centerpiece, he would be the attraction that would get the people there. And we wanted it for two reasons: one, to educate our party leadership and party activists, whomever we could attract; secondly, we wanted it for public relations. If we went to five cities, we thought that with Stevenson we'd get press, media attention, and that this would be a good forum on important public policy issues. I shall never forget: Adlai just wasn't buying this at all. I was sitting next to him, and I remember turning to him and saying, "Mr. Stevenson, you do like to go out to the people, don't you?" I'll never forget, he turned his head, and he said, "Frankly, no." At that split second I left Adlai Stevenson for the presidential nomination forever. When he said that it turned me off because all of these years you'd been hearing or reading stories about how Stevenson really didn't like to mingle with the people, including Mrs. Roosevelt [A. Eleanor Roosevelt] trying to guide him. So this was it for me.

My responsibility as an officer of the Michigan Democratic Party is to try to find out what's on people's minds. You have

to make your own judgement, but you've got to respect that you are simply a spokesman, for where the people are. So when I say "I", I'm just one little person, and not very important. But I did say to myself, "I've got to start looking at every candidate."

In a few months--this is 1958--Senator Hart [Philip A. Hart] was running for the United States Senate. John F. Kennedy offered to help him. I recall very well a meeting of the leadership in which this was being discussed. But I recall that we made a decision--which I didn't participate in one way or another, but I certainly didn't disagree with it--that, "Okay, Kennedy wants to come to help Phil Hart: We'll send him to Siberia; we'll send him to Grand Rapids," which I think suggests to you the general attitude toward John F. Kennedy in our state was zero, and I'm sure I shared that in an unthinking sort of fashion.

Well, JFK came to Grand Rapids. It was the day of the Ford [Ford Motor Company] and UAW settlement. It was September 23rd or September 28th, 1958. And I remember that most at Solidarity House were going to go to the Leland Hotel [Leland House]--that's where the negotiations were held--because we thought there might be an announcement about noon. But I decided, no, I'd go to Grand Rapids. So on the way up to Grand Rapids, listening to the radio, I remember I heard John Bugas, who was then president of Ford Motor, and Walter Reuther announcing a settlement. I got to Grand Rapids a little bit late, for a reception before the dinner at the Old Row Hotel. I recall that I had the opportunity of telling both Senator Kennedy and Governor Williams that the Ford Motor strike had been settled.

In those days many people thought that strikes in an election year could be very damaging politically. The UAW was always very sensitive about that--not that it deterred any judgment that the UAW made or any decision. We know now that they don't make that much difference, strikes in the auto industry.

So we stood there--this was a reception line--and then we went in to dinner. And for the first time I listened to John F. Kennedy, knowing that I had to look at other potential presidential candidates, other than Adlai Stevenson. I shall never forget his speech. I was sitting at the head table. He had a prepared speech, but he departed from it, and I was very impressed with his delivery. I could see here was a man with a mind, and intelligence, and the sorts of things he were saying appealed to me.

Well, after--and this was the time of Quemoy and Matsu--arrangements had been made for him to go on WOOD, a local TV station in Grand Rapids. Some of us had gone to the bar after the dinner, and Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] came by. I had met Ted once before, but you know these casual things, like you meet somebody at a cocktail party or something, it isn't really a meeting. Ted came by the table, and he said, "Would any of you like to come up to our room, and we can see the senator on

TV." Two of us, Florence Peterson and I, accepted his invitation, we went up to the room and watched John F. Kennedy on TV.

And we spoke to Ted about the same problem, that we had discussed with Adlai Stevenson the backlash against foreign aid. You know, Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] was speaking as president. We discussed with Ted the need for a Democratic spokesperson on foreign policy and mentioned the conferences in five cities that we had discussed with Adlai Stevenson. We had severe unemployment in Michigan by then, and that's why a lot of rank and file labor people and Democrats were opposed to foreign aid. "Let's spend it at home; why send it overseas," and that sort of thing. So we talked to Ted about John F. Kennedy becoming a national spokesman for us and getting on some TV, "Meet the Press", that sort of thing. Well, Ted was very receptive, and I haven't the faintest idea what was going on in Ted's mind, but he was very receptive. He made us feel we had a good idea. When the senator came back, and we had chitchat--I don't remember that very much at all--but we didn't stay because he was tired, and we shortly excused ourselves.

From that time on I made it my business to try to read everything Kennedy said and secondly, to get to know his staff. One of my important guidelines in life is that one way of finding out about a principal is to see what kind of staff he has. Is it an able staff, is it a "yes" staff, or is it a staff that says "no" sometimes? As time went on I got to know Ted and Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman] and others. I don't mean I sat out and consciously planned this, but this was always something in my mind. . . .

MOSS: Under what circumstances would these opportunities occur?

JEFFREY: I don't think I did anything in '58, but beginning in '59, I would stop in and see Ted Sorensen or Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.], Mike Feldman, and Kenny O'Donnell. Then in '59, the Michigan Democratic party had invited. . . . The Michigan Democratic party, the Michigan Democratic party. . . . Oh my, it just occurred to me, something else. I just recalled that we had in the Midwestern states, an organization that was called the Midwest Conference [Midwest Democratic Conference]. Mennen became governor in 1949 and Williams' forces took over the Democratic party in '49 and '50 and '51, and in that period Michigan had not paid much attention to the Midwest Conference. But along the way Neil raised that question about whether or not Michigan should affiliate with the Midwest Conference and become active in it.

I know why Neil was getting interested. It was because Mennen Williams was running for the presidential nomination. And this must always be kept in mind because we are Michiganders, and we support our governor. I remember at Mennen's home the party leadership began to discuss in strategy sessions how to launch

his campaign for the presidential nomination. At one meeting I recall India Edwards was a consultant. I remember talking to India afterwards because she and I had the same view, we thought Michigan was provincially oriented. We knew so little about the rest of the nation and the Democratic parties in other states. So, to get back to the Midwest Conference. We had started, I suppose, in '58 going to Midwest Conferences--perhaps in '57. The Midwest Conference. . .

MOSS: Could I interrupt just a moment? Did the idea of a presidential candidacy for Governor Williams go back as far as '57 and '58?

JEFFREY: Oh, yes.

MOSS: Do you recall when it began?

JEFFREY: No. You see, people were so devoted to Mennen in this state. And it certainly went back to at least '57, perhaps earlier, and the reason I'm so certain of that is: because in 1958 Mennen did not let anyone know what his decision was as to whether or not he was going to run for governor or senator. We had weekend meetings at Haven Hill in which party officers and party leaders, including judges were invited. And Paul Weber, press secretary, would generally present a paper, projecting the presidential campaign. In '58 there were a good number of these. Mennen would call people in and ask them what they thought he should do. Whether he should run for reelection to the governor or run for the U.S. Senate.

I happened to be in the school that urged that he run for the United States Senate. And I recall there were several of us--we were a minority--but we felt that it was a political myth that the nominee had to be a governor. We felt that if he ran for the Senate, even though he'd only be there two years, that it would give him a platform, that he could begin to deal in national issues. And in our view, at least, we believed this would be a wiser decision, although I knew that my dear friend Philip A. Hart would be unhappy if he had to run for governor. But Mennen kept everybody, including Phil, dangling. He went to Poland. When he came back from Poland and announced his decision to run for governor.

And then people--just as I said earlier--are so devoted to Mennen they naturally would think of him, labor people and blacks, and ethnic groups, "Mennen Williams for President". Oh yes, we worked hard when we'd go to national meetings of the National Democratic Committee we would have a suite and invite people in. We must have been working ever since '56. You know these things develop gradually. Nobody announces that G. Mennen Williams is a candidate and opens a campaign headquarters, you just do all of these things to build your man.

Neil Staebler was a great party chairman. He was thinking of this Midwest Conference as a natural base for Mennen. The

Midwest Conference at this time was controlled by Jake More. I don't know whether you've ever heard of Jake More from Iowa. Jake More's daughter married Barney Baker. He's a great big, big, big--use the word slob. But that's the way he appeared. He had been before the McClellan Committee, and he was involved in some of the Teamster shenanigans. Jake was the attorney for the Teamsters in Iowa. He ran the Midwest Conference. There were no bylaws, no officers, and every time there was a conference he would load it with people, and particularly people from Iowa or other states that he controlled, at least these were our perceptions of it.

So, working with Kansas, Frank Theis, who's now a federal judge and Minnesota, and Wisconsin in particular, we decided we were going to do something about the Midwest Conference. We had a series of meetings and letter writing and a campaign plan. Well, the historic meeting took place in Milwaukee in, I believe, February 1960.

MOSS: It must have been '59. The '60 one was down in Lincoln, Nebraska, wasn't it? Or am I thinking of a Midwest Governors' conference? I think I'm thinking of a Midwest Governors' conference.

JEFFREY: I think you're thinking of a Midwest Governors' conference. This must have been '60. I believe the Humphrey-Kennedy campaigns for the nomination were very evident.

Ted Sorensen had been invited to be one of the speakers, and I remember Ted's speech at breakfast because the first part of it was traditional political ritual. I sat there listening and said, "Oh no, terrible, awful", thinking a typical Boston politician. Well, then Sorensen pulled a "Sorensen" or a "Kennedy", and then he threw it all aside and went into what Sorensen would do, a really alive, alert, "new politics" approach.

MOSS: Once he'd gotten through the ritual?

JEFFREY: No, you see, he was really spoofing the traditional rhetoric.

MOSS: Oh, I see.

JEFFREY: He spoke very seriously, It was a great speech because when he shifted. And he talked about Kennedy campaign techniques, and as you know, Kennedy really ignored the party in Massachusetts. You remember his family organized many tea parties throughout the state. And I don't recall whether Ted said this precisely, but what he was saying was, "You really can't rely on the county chairmen." It was kind of an upsetting speech to some. I was impressed, and I got a chuckle out of it because he did it with a great deal of humor and a great deal of

grace.

At these affairs there are always lots of parties in various rooms, receptions. Reception means you get some liquor and you invite people in. I remember Ted, so well, I can see him moving around in those rooms, and he only drank ginger ale. [Laughter] But he was working, you know, he was working.

And then I remember that's where I first met Paul--oh dear, the one and only Paul. He was kind of an unusual guy, his name will come to me. He was all out Kennedy by that time. Harvey Kitzman, a UAW regional director, was all out for Hubert. I don't remember much about Symington [Stuart Symington] and, of course, nothing of Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson], I had predicted to Neil Staebler--he didn't believe me--that the contest would be between Johnson and Kennedy. In any event, there was quite a little good-natured competition going on.

I was really getting hooked on Kennedy, without any question. But I had to be very careful, G. Mennen Williams "is our man". But at that Midwest Conference, I remember Ted never could understand why West Virginia was classed as a midwestern state. I remember sending him the longitude and latitude of West Virginia, and Ted writing back--because West Virginia is an odd place for West Virginia to be, with Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, etc. And I think from that time on I really had a very trusting, personal relationship with Ted, as the senator's principal man for us in Michigan.

Oh, there was a snowstorm, and Jake More's trainload of people didn't arrive, so we took over and we got bylaws adopted and we restricted the voting to the officers of the state parties--the chairman, vice-chairmen, National Committee people from each state. It was quite a successful conference from our viewpoint. And Frank Theis was named chairman, the state chair of Kansas. Kennedy wasn't there, was he? No, I think Robert [Robert F. Kennedy] came. In any event, what I recall is that Ted was, so to speak, operating for John F. Kennedy in the Midwest Conference.

MOSS: Did you feel at this time that Governor Williams was in fact building a base? You had the organization now that you'd taken over from Jake More, but do you think that there was a real base in this conference for him, or were you doubtful?

JEFFREY: I was doubtful.

MOSS: Now let me ask how. . . .

JEFFREY: That's my perception. You would get very different views, I think, from others. . . .

MOSS: You mentioned a little earlier that Governor Williams kept you all hanging. In going through his papers, I

noticed on the first of February his secretary Julie Lawler was frantically asking. . .

JEFFREY: What year are you speaking of?

MOSS: 1960.

JEFFREY: No, no, no, no. '58, I said he kept us hanging. There's a great difference between '56 and '60. '56 was what I was talking about.

MOSS: Oh, all right. Because in 1960, I get the same impression. Julie Lawler was asking Quimby and Sid Woolner [Sidney H. Woolner], for instance, "How do I answer the question, 'What's he going to run for?'"

JEFFREY: In '60.

MOSS: In 1960. Because you. . .

JEFFREY: Oh, I see what you mean. Hanging--I thought you meant on the presidential nomination. No, in '58--oh, I'm sorry, I did say he was--that was right for '58. I misunderstood your question. I do not recall when Mennen announced that he was not going to run for governor. But at that point. . . .

MOSS: Did he discuss it with you beforehand?

JEFFREY: Mennen Williams always discussed any major decision with a great number of persons. He would do this in party conferences, which might include the state and party leadership, the officers of the state central committee, National Committee people, Wayne County chairmen. He would call people in, and my recollection is that, well, I know that in 1960 what he did, he must have said that he wasn't going to run because the conference. . . . As I recall, he invited people from all over the state, in groups, to come into his home, to discuss--now, I'm not certain whether the question was, "What should I do," but I do know that in these meetings he'd also call people, there's nobody like Mennen for doing this, and I think this is one reason people felt they were really involved--or was, "Who should run for governor if I do not?"

MOSS: His public announcement was on the second of March.

JEFFREY: Oh, all right. Then this was after that. So he was calling people in, as the leader of our party, as the governor, to see whether or not there was consensus on in the party--what candidate would the people in the party be for. Granted there's a primary, Mennen did this with a high sense of party responsibility--that if it could get worked out,

it would be less divisive for the party. March second, you say he announced.

Well, then I remember that night a meeting with John Swainson. John Swainson was a man that we had gotten to run for state senate--he's from the 17th congressional district--in a senate seat that we were sure we could take, but we needed a young, attractive liberal. I was personally very close to John. If it were March second, then it must have been the night of March second that John came into town, and there were three allies of his that met with him. We were encouraging him to run for governor.

Meanwhile, the--what appeared to be the strong man for the nomination was Jim Hare [James M. Hare]. I think Mennen in all these conferences found out that--at least this was my impression--that Jim Hare was not the consensus choice of Democrats. None of us will ever know who Mennen Williams voted for in that primary. We always like to think he voted for John, but we don't know.

MOSS: Let me ask you just a minute about Jim Hare's position in the whole thing. As secretary of state, and with the automobile license business and so on, he sits in a pretty crucial position in the state, doesn't he? Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

JEFFREY: Jim had been elected in 1954, and Jim had a record as a liberal. He had been on the ADA [Americans for Democratic Action] board in the early fifties. He was an excellent secretary of state. I think he performed the job and has continued to perform all the responsibilities delegated to that office efficiently and--a high record of performance. And this is, I say, in view of the fact that he does have the one state office that has a sizable number of political appointees. Not all branch officers where the license plates are sold are appointed, but most are. It was political patronage, and when you consider that there's been no breath of scandal all these years, I think it's quite a remarkable record. I feel that way about Mennen Williams, to be governor for twelve years and never any scandal of any kind.

Now if you go back to this period of the 1960 gubernatorial, Jim was highly respected, but he, in the view of some, was often "going his own way". You never knew for sure where Jim would be. And some people felt he did not work as closely with the party as he might. But there was, let's say, divided viewpoints on that.

Swainson had been elected state senator--you haven't met him yet? Well, I think you'll find he's an attractive person. In his first term in the state senate he'd become a leader in the fight for FEPC [Fair Employment Practice Commission], even though there wasn't one black person living in his district. He had taken many liberal positions, and there was no question he was showing leadership. In '58 he ran for the lieutenant-governorship and was elected. He presided in the Senate as the

lieutenant governor and had a coterie, let us say, of very devoted friends and followers--to some extent those that had elected him and worked on his campaign for the state senate. Then he had created a statewide campaign committee in the '58 election when he ran for lieutenant governor, at that time they were not combined on the ballot, lieutenant governor was separate from the gubernatorial position. Great pressure, enormous pressures were put on John not to run.

MOSS: Who was putting on the pressure?

JEFFREY: Well, you can ask him that because he would know better. But Neil and Sidney, everybody was worried it's going to be a fight, and that's not good for the party. I remember writing a long letter to Mennen and Neil--why I thought primaries were good, that they would enhance the party, etcetera. But there was sort of a horror at having a Democratic primary between two outstanding Democrats. That first week after John had announced that he was either thinking or was going to run, announcement, I remember he had lots and lots and lots of calls. But he ran, and much to everybody's surprise, he won.

Now we were all neutrals, as state party officers. I was unbelievably ethical about that, never went to one Swainson meeting, never did anything. [Interruption] I remember on primary election day there was a campaign meeting for Pat McNamara [Patrick V. McNamara], who was going to run for the United States Senate. With the public relations firm showing us billboards that they had developed, beautiful ones. . . . [Interruption] I remember I went at noontime because I always worked the polls.

And incidentally, labor did not endorse either, which was a very interesting period. I remember saying afterward--Al Barbour, president of the Wayne County AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations]--saying, "You know, maybe this is the way we should always do it," because when the local unions are given their head, and they could do whatever they wished. There was a tremendous local union committee for John B. Swainson, and those fellows and gals really worked and got their locals working. It was their thing; it wasn't the Wayne County AFL-CIO as a body that endorsed. It wasn't, you know, "coming here" so to speak, "from the top." Everybody was free to do their own thing. John aroused that kind of enthusiasm. He was a very straight shooter; he was never ashamed of the fact that he had labor support.

This whole bit of labor and Mennen is another whole long story, the charges were constant that labor controlled Mennen Williams, and that Gus Scholle [August Scholle] ran him. As a matter of fact, in 1954, which was then only six years ago, the *Detroit News* had run an editorial on the front page, upper left-hand corner, saying that if Blair Moody, or Pat McNamara were elected, blood would run in the streets of Detroit. Just an unbelievable editorial, but that's the way Mennen was perceived.

You know, a political Charlie McCarthy, of Gus Scholle and the labor movement, and. . .

MOSS: This is practically an endorsement coming from that newspaper, though, isn't it?

JEFFREY: Well, these days it doesn't make so much difference. Getting back to the meeting on the McNamara campaign. They--Neil, the PR firm, Helen Berthelot--were talking about a bumper strip--Kennedy, McNamara, and a four-letter word--and a space for four letters. And I remember saying to Neil, "Neil, what makes you think Jim Hare is going to win today?" And Helen Berthelot said to me, "Millie, haven't you given up yet?" Because, even though we were neutrals, everybody knew--because of my associations with John--that I was for John. Well, John Swainson won that primary.

MOSS: Just for the record, since we've been skipping around chronologically here, that primary was on 3 August in 1960. We've been jumping around a little bit. Let's get back to the period between March second, when Governor Williams said that he was not running for governor again, and the state convention on 7 May. Now, do you recall the way that the Williams candidacy developed? At that May seventh convention there was a favorite son vote for "any office", was there not, an endorsement of Governor Williams?

JEFFREY: Yes.

MOSS: Now, how did it develop that this was an "any office" vote, rather than a favorite son for president endorsement? Do you recall what led up to that?

JEFFREY: Not very well. Let's see, the convention was on May seventh. Yes, I remember the resolution. My recollection is that we were thinking about the vice-presidency as well as the presidency.

MOSS: Now let me ask this: Do you recall the activities of the Johnson and Kennedy people and so on in the period from March through April?

JEFFREY: Well, let's just back up to the Midwest Conference sponsored by the Michigan Democratic party on or about March 27 1960.

MOSS: Okay. You talked about Ted Sorensen.

JEFFREY: At the Midwest Conference--no, that was the Milwaukee one. Now I'm talking about the one that was held in Detroit, and we were the host to the thirteen other states in the Midwest Conference. The conference is something

that's for educational purposes, for public relations, etc. And Arthur Schlesinger and Chester Bowles and others spoke at that conference. It was a terrific outpouring of people. It was capped by our Jeff-Jack [Jefferson-Jackson] dinner, to which all the delegates were invited; the delegates from outside of Michigan. And it was a jam-packed dinner. You could barely move in that auditorium; there were over three thousand people. Speaking at that dinner were Sam Rayburn, Katie Loucheim, Wayne Morse, Bob Meyner [Robert Meyner], Stuart Symington, John F. Kennedy. Gene McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] spoke for Hubert Humphrey. As a matter of fact, Senator McCarthy's after me now to still get the record of the tape of that speech, because people keep saying it's the greatest speech he ever made. Hubert Humphrey came the next day.

MOSS: Even better than the nomination of Stevenson?

JEFFREY: I don't know. It was the greatest Jeff-Jack dinner probably in this century. We invited all of the presidential candidates, plus Speaker Sam Rayburn sort of representing Lyndon Johnson. Adlai Stevenson was in Brazil, and he had not assigned a spokesman, but Rabbi Wine gave the benediction and used it to promote Adlai Stevenson. I'll never forget it. He called Adlai Stevenson in Sao Paulo the night before; he reached him in the home of Margaret (Michigan National Committeeman) and Hickman Price. So in effect, we had in that one night either all of the candidates for the nomination or spokesmen for them--Johnson, Stevenson and Humphrey. Humphrey came in the next day and spoke at a fair, Sunday noon. It was a great evening. I remember I was assigned to Wayne Morse, and he said, "Here's my speech," going out in the car. All speakers were limited to eight minutes. I looked at that speech, saying, "It's a little bit long", he cut it because his friend Pat McNamara--Senator McNamara--was the timekeeper, with a great big alarm clock. It was a delicious night, just great.

Let me just point out that in 1959, for our Jeff-Jack dinner--our Jeff-Jack dinner is the largest gathering of Democrats across the state. It's larger than our convention, and so it's sort of--for anyone interested, it's a prize. Our leadership had voted Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown] as number one choice and Tom Quimby had the assignment to invite Pat Brown, and the second choice was John F. Kennedy and that was my assignment in 1959. Pat Brown couldn't come. I always write a letter, and then follow it up with a telephone call. I wrote, I remember, a one-page letter inviting John F. Kennedy. I didn't have time to even pick up the phone and call before we had the acceptance. (Laughter) And that was very good for John F. Kennedy because we were still an anti-Kennedy state.

I remember when we put Kennedy in the car to go the airport he said "Well, you really didn't need to escort me to the airport," and I replied, "We did. We want to be sure you get out of town." Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] and Ted [Ted

Sorensen] went back the next morning. . . . Was that the time-- yes, '59 I was beginning to think of '60. And so I went out in the car--we had a car from Ford Motor with a chauffeur--with Mrs. Kennedy and Ted, and I remember that he wanted to know what the reaction of the Jeff Jack attendees was, and I said, "Well, there's still quite a few skeptics." I remember Ted saying, "Yes, and one is sitting in the front seat." I was in the front seat. But I went on to say, which was really the truth, "But he won a lot of friends."

And he did, he won a lot of friends that night, a lot of friends, and particularly people who weren't, you know, up here at the top. Anybody who's at the top doesn't ever really perceive themselves that way, but others perceive them. I remember all the people that went up that night, to have photographs taken, with him or to get his autograph. That was a big, big plus for John F. Kennedy in our state, and having it happen in '59, was very good in terms of people getting to know him because our state had a closed mind on Kennedy. Well, anyway, to get back to 1960--now what was your question?

MOSS: Well, I was thinking about what happened between March second and May seventh, and let me ask this to get you back on the track: What was the impact on the Michigan party of all these people who attended this Jefferson-Jackson dinner?

JEFFREY: Oh, yes. You see, the conference was held at the Statler Hilton, and--oh, what's his name came in for Johnson, from Texas, a very nice guy. He worked in the National Committee. I can't think of his name; it'll come to me. Carter. And they had a Johnson room where they--you know what people do; anybody who's a candidate or has people representing him, they get a suite, and they try to get everybody they can up into that suite. And I remember I wouldn't even go to the suite, that's how strongly I felt about Lyndon Johnson. Hobart Taylor, who is Negro and who Johnson had in the White House, also had a party in his home, and he invited me. Hobart and I were very good friends, but I wouldn't go to his home. I was busy with the conference, anyway.

I don't recall Humphrey's campaigning particularly there, but he must have been. I just don't recall that. But the conference was full of discussion, about the presidential nominees, and where people were, and there was lots of anti-Kennedy sentiment.

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

MOSS: Let's go ahead. You were saying. . . .

JEFFREY: The Midwest Conference, so to speak, ended with the Jeff-Jack dinner on Saturday evening. The following day there was a luncheon of the nationalities. This

was where Hubert Humphrey had the opportunity of making the big speech.

MOSS: Governor Williams was chairman, and Green [Charles Green] was honorary chairman.

JEFFREY: I'm sure that Mennen was chairman. But since Hubert hadn't been with us on Saturday night, his was the principal speech. It was at the Sheraton-Cadillac, and there were three hundred people in attendance from the midwest states. Symington was to speak, and Kennedy was to speak. I kept in touch with the Symington people and the Kennedy people as to when they might want to go in the ballroom.

John Bailey was also there, and John was sweating profusely. He was so worried about the upcoming Wisconsin primary, that the campaign had peaked too early in Wisconsin. And he was really nervous about what was going to happen in the Wisconsin primary.

But I remember--this is a little thing about John F. Kennedy--he came down and Hubert hadn't finished. I guess Hubert was doing one of those third closings, and I had misjudged the time a bit. He said he would not go in, it would be impolite to. I remember we put him in the ballroom because he wanted to work on his speech--it was on the same level. John Bailey and I stood outside the door so that he wouldn't be deluged by people, so we could signal when Hubert finished speaking in the assembly room.

This was important in his becoming better known in Michigan. Hubert was very highly respected in Michigan; Symington a little bit, he had come in to campaign several times. That afternoon the UAW had a tremendous rally with 15,000 people on Medicare in the Coliseum at state fairgrounds. Symington, Humphrey and Kennedy spoke. That was another great event, and there are lots of photographs of those three at that rally. Walter Reuther, UAW president, was the presiding officer and made a speech too. This gave Kennedy additional exposure to UAW retirees, members, families and friends--a sort of firsthand intimate exposure.

MOSS: With all the potential candidates running around at this point, did it shake the Williams for President position any? Do you recall any leading specimen of that at that time?

JEFFREY: I think that all of us in Michigan--we were simply going to wait for the governor's decision. I'm quite certain that some leaders both in the party and labor felt that Mennen wasn't going to make it. And then there were others who loved Soapy so much--and this included blacks, who were totally devoted to Mennen that they couldn't see anybody else but Mennen Williams for the nomination.

Of course, it was nothing like '68. When I look back on it now, it seems to me that there was no bitterness or viciousness. We loved to be courted. It was beautiful to have all these candidates paying so much attention to us, to our state, and to

people as individuals. I think that was the atmosphere. It was totally different than '68. THE weekend was an exhilarating experience. I'm sure that when the UAW decided to invite Humphrey, Kennedy, Symington, they were considered serious candidates. It was an exhilarating, ebullient period. We didn't know what was going to happen, but it was great fun having all this attention paid to us. Being wooed made us feel important.

MOSS: Now obviously, everybody was watching the Wisconsin primary very carefully. Do you recall the reaction of Michigan people to the Kennedy victory in Wisconsin? Were Michigan people involved at all in the primary?

JEFFREY: If you recall, Hubert Humphrey at his press conference the night of the primary turned defeat into victory with his statement, so it blurred the outcome. I recall my own reaction. On their way from Milwaukee back to Washington, Jim Loeb [James I. Loeb] and Joe Rauh [Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.] called, and at that moment I was still being very careful not to suggest--I'm sure a lot of people guessed it--that I was for John F. Kennedy. It would be disloyal to Mennen, among other things. And in addition to that, as I've suggested, Hubert Humphrey had been such a good friend of Michigan. Before Pat McNamara was elected we used to call him our second senator. When Joe told me that Humphrey was going into West Virginia, I was furious because I felt that John F. Kennedy had won the Wisconsin primary--and that to go into West Virginia, a state that John F. Kennedy couldn't possibly win, that Protestant state was unfair.

In reflection I say, and have for many years, that was the greatest thing Hubert Humphrey could have done for John F. Kennedy because John F. Kennedy learned so much in West Virginia. He never forgot the eyes of women and children living in those terrible coal mining villages and in the barren mountains. That's why, I think, his first act as president was doubling the food stamp allowance.

But once it was known both of them were going to be in the West Virginia primary, then Michigan was going to wait for West Virginia primary results. We had the comfort that we're for Mennen Williams, and that is a security in this kind of situation because you can't give your commitment to anybody else.

When Ted Sorensen visited the UAW about this time and we met in Leonard's [Leonard Woodcock] office: Doug Fraser, Jack Conway, and myself. Yes. I remember Ted's saying, "Well, what should we do in Michigan?" There was silence for a few seconds, and then I said, "Stay out until we invite you." And that's what they did. The Kennedy people never came in to make any kind of a hard drive for delegates, and it was the wise thing for them to do.

MOSS: Okay, you say that they never came in. I've been given to understand that Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver] did come in at one point. Now was this later?

JEFFREY: Gee, I don't know. Kennedy, Symington and Humphrey spoke at the UAW International Union Convention in Atlantic City. This was prior to the Wisconsin primary, I do believe.

MOSS: It can be checked out.

JEFFREY: That can be checked. And that was also. . . . The people put on a great show, and the saying on the platform was: "Humphrey took the convention; Kennedy took the platform." Sitting on the platform was the UAW office and board members including Walter Reuther and Leonard Woodcock. Leonard introduced John F. Kennedy and had him as his breakfast guest before he took him over to the convention hall. Ask Leonard about this. But this is when I think Leonard really became sold on John F. Kennedy, sold in the sense respect for the man, for his mind, for his viewpoints and all that Kennedy projected: humor, wit, not the usual pol. [Interruption]

And I remember also, this was at an earlier time--since the UAW is very important and since Walter Reuther signs my paycheck, I was of course very interested in how Walter felt. Walter had been so devoted to Adlai Stevenson, and they were very dear personal friends, and I had no idea whether Walter was going to stay with Stevenson. I remember one meeting in his office in which we just were chatting at the end of the meeting, and I'll never forget what he said. "John F. Kennedy,"--Jack, he called him Jack--"is a brave young man." And when Walter said that I figured, "Well, maybe I'm not going to get into too much trouble." What it told me was that he had a favorable, friendly attitude toward the senator.

Kennedy's short speech--twenty minutes--that's another thing Leonard liked about him, was brevity. He said things in as few words as possible.

MOSS: In contrast to Hubert Humphrey.

JEFFREY: In contrast to Hubert. Now this is prior to the convention. We're going to the state convention.

MOSS: Secondly, let me ask about the impact of West Virginia.

JEFFREY: Well, let me back up. The Michigan Democratic party convention was the weekend before the West Virginia primary, on May tenth. There was a consultation. I was working very closely with Ted Sorensen by this time. They wanted to know who to send in, and I suggested Ted, and Ted came to the convention and he just moved around in his usual skillful fashion. I remember I was on the platform--as chairman of the platform--and I remember I adjourned the meeting so I could hold introduce Ted to delegates. I'd asked Red Roche to meet Ted at the airport.

Ted moved around, and Phil Hart helped as did Leonard Woodcock, those were two of the principals that we all knew were very favorable to Kennedy, but nobody was saying anything. It was a long time after that before I even told Ted he didn't have to worry any longer, I was for Kennedy.

Around four o'clock in the morning we had a meeting in Mennen's suite, with Mennen and Neil, and Adelaide Hart, Tom Quimby, and a few others. What it was was an assessment. . .

MOSS: This was the famous "inquisition of Ted Sorensen" that's been reported?

JEFFREY: Yes. Ted later on that morning after that had a private meeting with Nancy and the governor. The questions dealt with Kennedy's position on McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy], his position on civil rights, his position on civil liberties, and labor. But I think those first three-- the McCarthy thing was something that was very much talked about, and what was his record on civil rights. We were very much a civil rights state, the programmatic Michigan party.

I should point out that in 1956 we had adopted the Michigan Declaration. I carried hundreds of copies of it in a bag to the platform committee at the Chicago convention. Oh, I was so naive. It would be nice to be that way again. Michigan had the reputation of being a very liberal, programmatic Democratic party. But back to this session. I remember very well that the conclusion of it sort of was, this was the conclusion: "We'll see what happens in West Virginia." Ted said "We don't know what's going to happen."

MOSS: How did Sorensen satisfy things like the McCarthy question and civil rights positions?

JEFFREY: He did not at that time satisfy many people.

MOSS: What sort of terms did he put his answers in, evasive, equivocal, or what?

JEFFREY: On the McCarthy thing, my recollection is that he kept pointing out that the senator had been out of the senate for so long--that was the time of his recuperative period after that last back operation. On civil rights, Ted had several Kennedy quotes. Ted did not suggest that he'd been a great leader in the civil rights field. I don't know. There was a certain forthrightness and frankness and directness about the Kennedy people. My recollection is he didn't try to gloss over anything, he recognized that these were serious and legitimate questions.

MOSS: Was the Southern support for Kennedy in '56, and I forget whether the breakfast with John Patterson had occurred at this time or not. Did this come up?

JEFFREY: Some of those things were mentioned, yes, especially the Patterson breakfast. And that would be raised particularly by blacks. There was still great questioning of Kennedy's position on civil rights, I would say at that time, May sixth or seventh, whatever it was.

MOSS: It was reported that there was a forty-one part questionnaire that was sent back with Ted Sorensen.

JEFFREY: Tom Quimby--by the way, Tom is in Washington--developed that. That was typical of Michigan, we were very thorough about issue positions. That's true, that is was given to Ted, and I'm sure the senator sent it back to Mennen.

Mennen is a, in a way, sort of an unfathomable person. Mennen always kept his own counsel until he was ready to make known his decision. And he kept it from everybody. I would suppose the two people that were most likely to know or to guess were Neil, who is the state party chairman, and Paul Weber, and perhaps, John Sweeney, a very bright young man, one of the governor's assistants.

MOSS: Let me ask this: Was there any attempt informally to poll the convention on presidential candidates because there was at the same time a professional poll of Democrats which showed Kennedy at 63 percent?

JEFFREY: Yes. I was going to mention the fact that those polls also played a part. After the convention, we had a meeting at the old state central headquarters, next to the Porter Hotel one late afternoon. And that was Mennen and Neil and Quimby, and I'm sure Adelaide was there, and Gus Scholle, Leonard Woodcock and myself. My recollection is this was an important meeting. It was, I would guess, the middle of May. Leonard and Gus Scholle and I drove from Detroit together, and we had planned it this way. Gus was for Stevenson at this time. His wife was very bitterly anti-Kennedy because he was a Catholic. The Catholic issue was always around.

MOSS: Against on religious grounds or on practical political grounds?

JEFFREY: No, I think there were two, both were prevalent. There were many people who very sincerely believed that a Catholic would not be a free man as president. They truly believed this. This includes people who felt very strongly about separation of state and church, particularly as far as education is concerned. They had genuine, sincere, deep, deep reservations about Kennedy as a Catholic.

Then there were those who just thought as Dave Lawrence [David L. Lawrence] was thinking, or DeSapio [Carmin DeSapio],

or so many of these people who may have been Catholics themselves. I remember Dave Lawrence very well, before the Pennsylvania primary, saying it would be disastrous for them in their own state. This didn't mean Dave Lawrence was opposed to John F. Kennedy as such, but politically he felt it would be disaster--and so did Emma Guffey Miller--for Kennedy to be on the ticket. Pennsylvania would go down the drain. And the primaries, even though lots of people did not participate, at least the feeling was that the primaries helped begin the change this fear, this political fear that Dave Lawrence and many others had--and a very understandable and realistic one, I think, at that time. Certainly, I had great respect for Dave Lawrence. I became very, very fond of him.

In any event, at this meeting, I remember saying to Leonard, "Let's take Gus up with us, and you work on him on the way up." And we got to this meeting, and I remember that I also said to Leonard, "Now watch Neil, he'll fuzz it up," because while neither Leonard nor I had said to one to the other that we were for John F. Kennedy, sometimes things are unspoken but known. In this meeting that Neil proposed that--he was worried people were beginning to talk rather seriously about John F. Kennedy.

In retrospect, I really don't understand this. It was the polls, it was other things. Interestingly enough, there just wasn't enthusiasm for Hubert, including a person like Adelaide Hart, who is a wonderful person, who in '68 was all the way for Hubert, but Adelaide, in my view from what she was saying, was very pro-Kennedy. She happens to be a Catholic, but I can't believe that was why Adelaide--because I have great respect for her--I'm sure that Adelaide wasn't coming to this conclusion, certainly not in her mind, because of the fact that he was Catholic. However, the fact that he was Catholic and he might have a chance did influence Catholics.

Well, we left that meeting, I think, quite unclear as to what was going to happen next. Neil proposed that he contact progressive midwest states and see if we could form a bloc of uncommitted delegations. We shot this proposal down. And in my recollection--I'm sure other things happened, and I'm sure Mennen and Neil were talking with lots of people. The next major thing was when Mennen said, "Come to Mackinac."

MOSS: Okay. Now there. . .

JEFFREY: Now there were lots of things that happened in that period, but I am not knowledgeable about them.

MOSS: For instance, do you know of a Staebler-Williams trip to Washington to talk with Kennedy?

JEFFREY: Yes, that's one of the things that happened, that's right.

MOSS: But you don't know any of the details of that at all?

JEFFREY: No, I just knew that Mennen and Neil were going to meet with the senator. I do recall that the--I suspect it was Ted--said that he felt that the meeting had gone fairly well. And what Mennen, of course, was having to weigh was whether he should stay in the race for the presidential nomination. I don't precisely remember what any of us argued--and it had to be done very delicately--but trying to suggest that if he was going to move, that this was a good time to do it. West Virginia had been clearly a great big plus.

And--I was in Washington and going over to see Mike the morning of the West Virginia primary. There was a national woman's conference sponsored by the DNC. I remember Mike saying to me, "Do you think if we make 45 percent we'll still be in it?" And I remember saying, "Mike, if it's 45, yes; but if it's below 45, I think not." Mike invited me to his house to hear the returns, and I said, "No, I can't do that, no." I was still being very discrete. But when Mennen called--and he called personally--that's one of the tremendous things about Mennen, and I'm sure he called everybody--inviting us to Mackinac Island, and of course that was a great day.

MOSS: Yes. First of all, he invited the state people up. Why was the candidate summoned, as it were, with all this formality and trappings? Teddy White [Theodore H. White] makes a great deal of this, that everything was really decided beforehand, but you had to go through the waltz, through the minuet, to have the candidate come out.

JEFFREY: Part of all of this is just as in 1956, to get Mennen from Harriman to Williams, "they" meaning, and I don't know who, but I'm sure it was Neil and Paul and Mennen, and it may have been Neil's idea--they had Mennen have a long meeting with Chester Bowles. And that was the justification Mennen used for his switch, so to speak, from Harriman to Stevenson. And in this session with Bowles, who knew Stevenson very well. . . . What I'm saying is, there had to be a rationale, there had to be steps. This was in keeping with Mennen's image of being a very thoughtful person, of being a person who, when he came to a conclusion came to it on principle and if he changed his mind there had to be very solid reasons for his changing his mind, also, I think, so that people would never lose faith in him as a principled person versus a "politician". Likewise, for Mackinac, because the whole setup was that we were going to be again asking John F. Kennedy a whole series of questions. But clearly, of course, Mennen had made up his mind, and this was something that was going to be gone through with. Secondly, it was dramatic, it was colorful, it was great PR. I believe to this day pictures from Mackinac Island are better media visuals than the governor's home in Lansing. The meeting in Mackinac was at the governor's home on Mackinac Island, so it was still his home. And it was Mennen Williams doing this; it wasn't twisting

Mennen's arm, it wasn't inside party pressure, it was Mennen Williams' decision. It was Mennen Williams coming out for John F. Kennedy. In my view it was brilliant. I think it was very good.

MOSS: Do you recall something of the atmosphere, the color, the circumstances, and so on, of that meeting on the island?

JEFFREY: Well, of course, first of all we land in Alpena, which is a little tiny airport, and then we take the ferry. Going over on the ferry was lots of fun; the reporters are there, and you have a chance to talk to the candidate. Then we met in his home, and we sat out on the porch, and we went through all our questioning again, including the standard question, and that is: What is your view of what kind of a Democratic National Committee would you develop and promote and support? That was one of our standard questions.

MOSS: Yes, you were pushing the idea of a national democratic advisory council at this point, weren't you, you and Staebler and some others?

JEFFREY: This was, let's say, a principal concern of Neil's, which many of us shared. I think some of us did not feel as deeply as Neil did, but we all respected Neil's concern and certainly did believe that the Democratic National Committee should be a meaningful instrument. It had become that, we felt, under at least the last couple of years of Paul Butler. Neil had been chairman of a party participation committee, and Paul Butler had appointed a field staff, and under his leadership those last two years I think really a great job was done. We knew that with a president that the role of a National Committee is altered, it is different when you're out of power and when you're in power.

John F. Kennedy, the last--not the last time I saw him before the election, but I happened very accidentally to ride out in the car with him, and it was Neil. . . . Very accidentally, he invited me in when the caravan started rolling, and I was looking for Margaret Price because I didn't know whether Margaret had gotten in the car where she was supposed to--because, you know, you haven't any idea what it was like wherever John F. Kennedy was. But the same question was asked him, and I remember Neil was sitting in front, and I was sitting in back with him. I remember putting my hand on Neil's hand and saying, "Neil, it isn't much longer, now." Neil in his dogged fashion was still asking "What would he do with the Democratic National Committee?"

And John F. Kennedy--I'm sure at Mackinac, and I know this last time--in his fashion, would say, "Well, there are really only two Democratic parties in the United States, and that's Michigan and Minnesota." And what he was saying to us was--and he always made it sort of clear, whether saying so directly or

not--that he didn't have a hell of a lot of respect for the Massachusetts Democratic party. He would give, however--he would give some affirmative answer, yes, that he did want the National Committee to be an organization which would stimulate the states and carry out an active, vigorous leadership role in the party organization and party fundraising and party education on the issues.

Back to Mackinac, there are no cars, there are horse-drawn carriages. For example, from the ferry we rode to the governor's home in a procession of carriages. It was very, very colorful, very colorful. And, of course, lots of fun and very exciting. We all knew that what was coming came, and so it was a great high point in history for us in Michigan.

MOSS: Okay, now this endorsement, of course, was still not binding on the Michigan delegation because you don't have a binding situation.

JEFFREY: No, this was an act of Mennen Williams. And as I said at the time, I said, "Sometimes God speaks to us."

When I got back to Detroit, I started calling all the black leaders. In those days you could talk with less than twenty Negro leaders and get the feel of the community. Of course, it's very different today. Every person I called was uniformly upset, disturbed and unhappy. They just couldn't understand why Mennen had done this. They were very unhappy about John F. Kennedy, if not antagonistic. I called Mennen and said, "We've got to do something about this," and I suggested we have a meeting.

MOSS: This was because of Kennedy's apparent lukewarmness on civil rights. Okay.

JEFFREY: Yes, plus the fact, as I have suggested earlier, that there were one segment of Democrats that really to the tips of their toes believed in Mennen and really believed that Mennen would get the nomination, it was the Negro community. Their loyalty and devotion to Mennen at that time--and even to this day, I would say--was beautiful.

MOSS: So they felt let down by their hero. . .

JEFFREY: They felt let down by their hero, right. I don't know, you can find this from Mennen, but my impression was that Mennen--and I think understandably so--had not called a lot of people as he normally would have done. They had not been called by him and told what he was going to do. Understandably I think, because he couldn't. As I say, Paul Weber was a genius at this sort of thing, really a great man for what he did for Mennen. I don't know how--I simply don't know; you'll get that from Mennen.

But in any event, so I called him, and the next thing I knew

it was agreed that Mennen would call a meeting. Tom Quimby and I decided where we were going to have it and who we were going to invite. We made up a list of about thirty-five, forty people, and about thirty-five showed up. One of the persons that was involved in this is a young man whose name is Charles Brown, a black man who was on the governor's staff.

MOSS: Charles S. Brown, yes.

JEFFREY: Yes. Charley, we called him. Well, at the meeting we came armed with Kennedy's civil rights record, some documents about McCarthy, it was all mimeographed, and we distributed them. And, of course, Mennen was the person who was chairing the meeting, and he explained his position. But the people were not satisfied. They wanted a personal confrontation with John F. Kennedy. And they said to Mennen, "You get him to Detroit. We want a face-to-face meeting with John F. Kennedy." And I mean they were hot, they were emotional about it, and they were strong and they were vigorous and they were determined. And I mean, that was it. They weren't about to buy even Mennen Williams' endorsement of John F. Kennedy. Very, very interesting.

The next thing I knew Mennen called and said that he had asked for the *Caroline* to come out. I didn't call Washington because I was certain they were going through hell trying to decide whether or not it would be a good idea to send the *Caroline*; the *Caroline* being that private, renowned plane of the rich symbolizing Kennedy money.

And then we had to decide--but there were only eleven seats on the plane--and then we had to decide who would be invited among the Negro leaders. That's where Charley Brown's and my recollection is a little bit at variance with his. We had dinner--I believe it was a Saturday evening--at Mennen's home, and jointly we went over the list, and jointly we arrived at the numbers of persons that were to be invited to go to Washington on the *Caroline*. Even in those days it was very delicate and full of danger and risk. However, I thought it was such a good idea that I wasn't going to disagree; it wouldn't have made any difference anyway. We ended up with two additional persons, and we arranged to have them go commercial and meet us at the. . . . I suspect we picked them up at the airport, I don't recall that detail at the moment. This group included Bill Patrick [William T. Patrick, Jr.], the first Negro member of the Detroit City Council elected city wide, Reverend Dr. Burton [Malcolm K. Burton], Horrace Sheffield, and others.

We came in, and we were escorted to the senator's home, and we sat in that little living room. One of the persons I remember so well was Horace Sheffield, who was from the UAW. Horace was sitting next to the senator, and I can see it yet. The people were very articulate and vigorous in their questioning, and Horace is that kind of person anyway, and he would be hitting his fist or the palm of his hand on his knee, but every once in a

while it would get over on Kennedy's knee. Mennen was very helpful in that meeting because he stated what he believed so strongly that civil rights was more than a political issue, it was a moral question. Kennedy picked up some of the language that he used, in his own words. After the meeting we had lunch, and there was great kidding about that because it was fried chicken and watermelon.

Now remember these were all people that came in with fire in their eyes and how they were going to tell John F. Kennedy off. Well, let me say this, interrupt myself, to say that the impression that I got--and I'm sure I didn't say a word in that meeting, I was just there, I was listening--was that John F. Kennedy, was that he was treating everybody as his peer. That's my greatest impression of that meeting. It was just as if we were sitting down and talking among ourselves. There was that kind of free interchange, and he was never pontifical, he was never defensive. He was very interested in what any one member of the group had to say. As I say, it was a peer relationship.

Well, now to go back, they were, you know, fire in their eye against John F. Kennedy, going to tell him off. When we leave, what's outside the house? All the media: TV cameras, radio, press. Some people would describe it as saying they were fighting among themselves to see who would get up front to say he was for John F. Kennedy. And so a number of the members of the group said that they were persuaded.

Then some of us went down--we took some of the people to the Esso Building. I had always said to Kennedy's staff--I hadn't been over there--"I know when we get to the Esso Building it's going to be all white." And that's exactly of course what it was. My recollection is now very vague. I don't know when I wrote a long memo to Bobby on civil rights. . . . After we left the senator's home, we agreed on a departure time, which I believe was six o'clock. From the time we left--whatever time it was, 3:00--we were all on our own until we met at Butler Aviation to return to Detroit.

In any event, the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] convention was coming up within a few days in St. Paul, Minnesota. When I went in--it was in the senator's office, and Mike Feldman and Harris Wofford were there. Harris had just come on board, and I met him for the first time. I asked "Who are you going to send to the NAACP convention?"

At this time John F. Kennedy had no Negroes except Marjorie Lawson and a fellow from Massachusetts whose name always slips me, who had been in the fairly recent past president of the Massachusetts NAACP. My point was that, fine if Marjorie comes, fine, excellent, but there must be somebody there from the Kennedy family--very close to the senator, at the convention.

Along the way Frank Reeves had come in. Frank had been with Humphrey, but after West Virginia he switched to Kennedy, but he didn't want anybody to know it yet; he wanted to have some time to ease into it. Frank was listening to our conversation. At this point Mike said--oh, Mike had been trying to get me to say,

I think that he or Harris should go. Well, I wasn't going to respond to that. It wasn't up to them to say whether Mike Felman or Harris Wofford, whom I'd just met and who I knew had worked with Father Hesburgh [Theodore M. Hesburgh] and all that, but I just met him. So I wouldn't respond to that. I kept saying, "It has to be somebody who is really identified with the senator."

Mike said, "Well, we're going to send Sarge Shriver." I didn't know Sarge Shriver. I went over to the side of the room and was talking with Frank, and I said, "I don't know Sarge Shriver, do you?" And he said, "No." I said, "Well, I'll bet he belongs to the Chicago Urban League, the Catholic Interracial Council, and does not belong to NAACP." Harris Wofford came over, and he said, "What are you talking about?" So I told him. He said, "You're right. He doesn't. But he's warm." And that's all I needed--"He's warm." Okay, no more questions. He's warm. I say that because one of the problems with John F. Kennedy was, all along the way--so many different things are threaded into people's attitudes and feelings--was that we did not know whether he had a heart. On the civil rights thing we used to say, "Massachusetts is different: you don't wear your heart on your sleeve as we do in Michigan." In those days Negroes would say that when they went to New England they weren't discriminated against. They could go into hotels and they could go into motels, and I'd heard many Negroes say that's why they went to New England for their vacation. But I remember saying at the time, "I could not say whether he had a heart--for a president must not have only a mind, but a heart--and I don't know whether John F. Kennedy brings deep emotion and deeply felt convictions to this." So that's why when he said "warm", I didn't have to ask another question.

Now, I will say one of my principal points for history is that in my view the greatest good, or the greatest contribution that Michigan performed for John F. Kennedy was in the civil rights area, was in getting it all started for the involvement of Negroes. I think that, in many ways, is our greatest contribution; getting the Negroes in, and the very fact that Mennen Williams was perceived not only in Michigan but across the nation, as a true friend, a true advocate, a true fighter for civil rights. But as you can see, in Michigan that wasn't even enough, so that's why we had to do these other things. But we couldn't have done it, John F. Kennedy did.

In any event, we went with Sarge Shriver. Plus the fact that we had agreed--perhaps going back on the plane? I think it was going back on the plane we were asking, "What can you do now?" So black leaders really were excited and enthusiastic. They were going to get in touch with their fraternities and their sororities; they were going to get their Christmas lists out; and they were going to write to people all over the country, which they did, this small group made a difference.

A number of them, including Horace, also went to St. Paul, and so it was that the NAACP convention became the first setting at which Negroes from all over the country were gathered together

and many were persuaded to work for John F. Kennedy. I think this was--I believe that this was the first time a national gathering in which Negroes were advocating John F. Kennedy. . . . Sarge, in his own inimitable fashion--had a small suite, and there were constant meetings all the time, various gatherings, and of course we'd go out and work in between.

One of the things that we all spoke about a great deal were Negroes on the campaign staff. I remember at one time Sarge said, "Well, there's Andy Hatcher [Andrew T. Hatcher]", and we said, "But Andy Hatcher isn't enough. There has to be more. There has to be a civil rights unit." And what I always remember is Sarge then, in this particular gathering, asked who. And even in those days, as a white, I generally waited and waited until everybody had spoken. They went around the room, and various people were suggested. Carl Rowan was one who was suggested; and Cecil Poole of California, but Louis Martin's name had not been suggested (and we're old, old friends from Michigan), so I just waited. He was just back from Nigeria. I'd heard an ugly rumor he was going to be for Rockefeller [Nelson A. Rockefeller], which turned out to be simply a rumor. But I felt Louis was very important and I knew terribly able. So since nobody suggested Louis, I did, and I could see the lights going on in Sarge's eyes. Sarge knew Louis from Chicago--within hours Louis Martin was on board. It seems to me it was just hours, that's all.

Sarge talked with the senator regularly. See, he did just what I had thought was necessary; he was close to the senator, and anybody that had a suggestion, he'd get the senator on the phone and talk with him about it. I remember he had me calling Mennen Williams, and I had to find Mennen Williams, because that's Sarge, he was a leader. And so all sorts of plans were made, and people went back to states across this country with a very different attitude toward John F. Kennedy.

Very shortly thereafter--the civil rights office was announced, and Louie, together with Sarge Shriver. . . . Sarge was in over all charge, and Louie was the director. And Charley Brown was assigned by Mennen to work in the Washington office. I'm sure this was getting very close to the Democratic convention. . . . Mackinac was June second, and I think the NAACP convention was June eleventh, but the events were moving very fast now.

MOSS: There was a delegation caucus on the eighteenth of June, was there not, in which there was sort of a breakdown of--let's see, I think they all, all the people were polled.

JEFFREY: Let's see, we had fifty-one votes, and we had forty-two and a half, as I recollect it.

MOSS: Right, there were--well, the figure that I have on the poll had sort of an unofficial one; a hundred and ten out of the hundred and fifty-two delegates and

alternates, and it broke down to eighty-four for Kennedy, ten for Stevenson, eight for Symington, and eight abstentions. Okay, and you did go forty-two and a half in the convention. At this caucus on eighteen June, there was an appeal by Governor Williams for the Kennedy candidacy.

JEFFREY: For Kennedy, yes.

MOSS: Okay, was this a--I presume it was a pre-planned, calculated kind of thing, trying to drum up the support.

JEFFREY: Yes. . . . You see the other thing that had happened, it wasn't just among the delegates, it was becoming clearer and clearer that there was a real, kind of enormous sentiment for John F. Kennedy in our state as shown in public opinion polls. . . . As you went around talking with people you found strong interest in Kennedy, that Kennedy independently of the party--by everything people were reading and seeing--was. . . . If anything, I expect we were behind the voters, if there had been a primary.

MOSS: What sort of people in the delegation were the Stevenson and Symington holdouts?

JEFFREY: The Symington people--and I had at that time, and I still do, a great deal of respect for Stuart Symington. Stuart Symington came in and campaigned in Michigan, and our position, by the way, which I'm sure will be our position in '72, is we welcomed all candidates. By the way, that was always our position. We welcomed all candidates. Even before Mennen was out of it. Stuart Symington's delegates came mostly from southwest Michigan. They were for Stuart Symington in the beginning, and they never changed. Those same eight votes were always Symington votes. They came to their conclusion fairly early, and they never budged. And as I recollect it, we did not make any efforts to change their allegiance; there was certainly no arm twisting; if this is where they were, that's where they were.

The Stevenson people are a different thing. They were--this isn't wholly accurate--but they were the intellectual type, particularly from Oakland County, who felt very, very strongly on the McCarthy issue and the civil liberties issue. Harriet Phillips, who subsequently became vice chairman, was one of the very strong, strong Stevenson people. These were people, of course, who had been for Stevenson before and simply weren't persuaded that John F. Kennedy was a liberal, and they could not, therefore, bring themselves to support him, and no amount of suasion changed them. There may have been some of them. As I suggested earlier that Gus was for Stevenson. But people like Gus came around for Kennedy considerably before the convention.

MOSS: What about consideration of Johnson at this caucus?

JEFFREY: I don't recollect it.

MOSS: I have a note that there was a voice vote of no.

JEFFREY: Well, I simply don't recollect it.

MOSS: I don't trust the source of that particular one; it's one of the more. . .

JEFFREY: You see, it wasn't wholly clear that Johnson was in it right at that time. I don't recall a vote; there may have been one.

MOSS: He was still saying that he was tending to his duties as majority leader at that time.

JEFFREY: Right. Whether there was a vote or not, in 1960 Lyndon Johnson--I don't think it was possible for him to have one vote. He and Mennen--and ask Mennen about this--he and Mennen had stand off positions.

BEGIN SIDE I TAPE II

MOSS: Now, you were talking about the lack of enthusiasm for Lyndon Johnson in Michigan in 1960. Is there anything else you want to say on that, or do you think you've covered it with the remarks on the last tape?

JEFFREY: All I would say further is that the feelings toward Lyndon Johnson, fair or unfair, were very strong, and these were shared not only by the Democrats. And as I suggested, my recollection on why Mennen felt this way is not--is incomplete. It was also shared by many people in labor and particularly in the UAW, and there particularly by Roy Reuther, who had had a number of run-ins with Lyndon Johnson and with Bobby Baker [Robert G. Baker]. These were largely over civil rights issues in the Congress, including rule changes. As you may recall, at the beginning of each session for a number of years we tried to have the gag rule changed. There was just a very strong feeling that Lyndon Johnson was conservative in every respect and that he was certainly not a friend of civil rights.

MOSS: Okay, now let me see from my notes here where we are. We'd just gotten through with the eighteen June caucus. Do you recall any talk of the attempt at the governor's conference at Glacier Park on the part of the Johnson people to pressure Governor Williams into opening up the delegation a bit?

JEFFREY: Yes, but again, I remember it and. . .

MOSS: Let me just try to prompt your memory a little bit. The story that I have is that Eliot Janeway threatened a Medicare bloc if the Michigan delegation didn't open up a bit. Anything?

JEFFREY: No, but now that you've mentioned that, going back to Sam Rayburn, whoever it was that called Walter Reuther, it was the Medicaid issue, that was what was involved in that. I think that's why Walter was upset, because he thought it was too early, we would lose support for Lyndon Johnson if Michigan went for Kennedy on June second. While Walter Reuther--and this is the truth--does not involve himself in Michigan politics, regularly, when he does it's things like this. But Walter, in Washington--since the UAW has such a large membership in Michigan, anything the UAW does in Michigan, people think Walter Reuther has either ordered it or can unorder it. And I'm sure, now that you mention it, it was the Medicare issue that had gotten Walter upset, that we were risking a favorable vote, on Medicare. I recollect this Janeway bit, but I have very limited knowledge.

MOSS: Okay, is there anything that you can recall of importance between, say, the end of June and the convention in Los Angeles, because I have a . . . I'm sorry, July eleventh. Anything between the end of June and July eleventh that is important because I have a gap here in my record. Let me ask you, then: What were your expectations as you went into the convention? How did it look; first, for Kennedy; second for Williams?

JEFFREY: It looked very good for Kennedy. There was generally a belief that Kennedy was going to make it. There wasn't any great uneasiness that he would not make it. Perhaps this is because we couldn't possibly believe that Lyndon Johnson would, nor did we believe that Stevenson would have that much support. Well, let's say I think we were cautiously confident.

Secondly--and you asked me about Mennen--I think we perceived Mennen as being our leader, who was by this time an identified and intimate friend and supporter of John F. Kennedy, and that as such he would have a significant role to play in the convention. And that if we won he would have a significant role to play in the Kennedy Administration.

Thirdly, we had worked very closely with Paul Butler, in preparation for the convention, and we had worked closely with Kennedy people. . . . Paul Butler made all the decisions, and he did not communicate in advance his decisions to us on who was to be the permanent chairman, who was to be keynoter, who would be chairmen of the committees. But we were pleased with his choice. This was in great contrast to the 1956 convention when John McCormack, for example, was chairman of the platform committee. In 1960 Chester Bowles was chairman of the platform committee.

Chester Bowles had started several months before in developing the platform. We didn't have a John McCormack with a Bobby Baker as his principal spokesperson. Credentials, credentials, there were no major fights. It was Puerto Rico and the civil rights--there was a challenge in Mississippi--but it did not become a crunchy issue. What I am saying is that generally the operation of the convention, the management of the convention, the persons holding key positions of power in the convention, were liberals.

In my own view, incidentally, I believe that Paul Butler did this in part for John F. Kennedy, in part. I think he did it because this is what he believed in. He was terribly criticized, of course, by the Hill. As a matter of fact, they were hardly on speaking terms, the Hill leadership and Paul Butler. So that, for example, on the platform committee we were in the majority. Phil Hart and I represented Michigan and Phil was on the executive committee. So different than 1956.

And I can see Roy Wilkins [Executive Director NAACP] yet, after the platform committee came out--there was still great secrecy in holding it back, as to what the precise language was--Roy Wilkins was so happy because we got a good civil rights plank in the platform. Oh, he was beaming. And again, this is in contrast to '56, because Roy Wilkins and a lot of people were involved in the minority fight which we made on the floor then and lost. And it just seemed like a new day in. . .

MOSS: Perhaps my recollection is wrong, but wasn't it the civil rights plank that really touched Mississippi off and made them nominate Rose Barnett in that rather silly show?

JEFFREY: I believe it was, yes. And Michigan, as a caucus group at this time--now we haven't come to the blow up, of course--but at this time was reasonably happy. We had gotten the Statler Hotel as our headquarters; Paul Butler. . . . We campaigned--I did, and I'm sure Neil did too--for a solid year on Paul Butler to give us a good hotel. The Statler was always the one I asked for with Paul, but he'd never say a word.

I drove Paul Butler in his car around this state, and Paul Butler would never, even after you'd driven quite a few hours and just two of you in the car, he would never give you one inkling that he was for John F. Kennedy. I may be wrong, I just feel that Paul Butler was for Kennedy and was going to structure the convention in a fashion--which would help Kennedy I believe--and it may or may not have made any difference--but John F. Kennedy went into a convention in which the management was not anti-Kennedy. I'm sure that Paul Butler tried to do it fairly for everyone, but it's a little hard for me to believe that in his heart of hearts that he liked Lyndon Johnson because the Hill had been so rough on him.

MOSS: Your delegation was all in one hotel?

JEFFREY: We had the Statler Hotel. We had nice rooms; there was a place to eat. It was perhaps a little more expensive, but I remember I used to say this, "It's all right if it's not the cheapest hotel if there are clean rooms, decent rooms, good service, a place to eat after midnight." And they had more than one place to eat, but their coffee shop was quite large. And it would be open after we came back from the convention, which was also important. All of those things make a difference, a great difference, in keeping your delegation in humor.

So that my recollection of that delegation--and I didn't have the responsibility; Margaret Price was the national committeewoman--I didn't have the responsibility at that convention as I did in subsequent conventions. And we had the problem that our alternates, who were sitting up high--but we took care of that problem; we got them down on the floor. You know, everybody breaks the system, just as we did even in Chicago when we found out how to break the system. So we had problems with the alternates being unhappy and guest passes, but on the whole, we were a pretty happy delegation.

And since we weren't pressuring the Symington people, they were happy. The Symington people weren't well known persons with a statewide reputation. The Stevenson people were uptight, but we had rather peaceful caucuses as I recollect it, no great heat.

MOSS: Okay. With such a happy delegation. . .

JEFFREY: Until. . . .

MOSS: We'll get to that; we'll get to that. Were you involved in the Kennedy roundup of delegates in other state delegations?

JEFFREY: Tom Quimby was. Tom became sort of a roving ambassador or a delegate vote collector in the Midwest states. Tom could give you a lot of this if you wish to speak with him, and I would think you ought to get his recollections.

MOSS: Yeah, we have one interview with him and I read it, but I don't recall this particular thing. Did you have any contacts with the Kennedy staff people yourself during the immediately preceding. . . .

JEFFREY: Oh, yes.

MOSS: What kind of things?

JEFFREY: Oh, Margaret Price was chairman of the orders of the day committee, I believe, at this convention. I remember working with Mike Feldman, and Margaret on how to handle the credentials issue. But I wasn't a principal in

that; Margaret was the one who really knew past party practices. Mike and Margaret did a lot of things together, Margaret was our national committeewoman at that time, a great lady, very dear friend.

We had arranged for a Midwest headquarters in a trailer right outside the convention hall, and we used that as a place to report and see how we were getting along in other states. We assigned our delegates to special states. One of the problems at a convention is that delegates come thinking they're going to be, in on every high-power decision, and that just doesn't happen, and particularly when you're in a delegation where you know pretty much where people are. So we assigned various Kennedy delegates to work with other state delegations on behalf of Kennedy.

MOSS: Do you recall the impact of the . . . [Interruption] I was just about to ask you if you recall the effect of the Stevenson ground swell. On two occasions, I believe--one, of course, when he came on the floor. . . . Do you recall the . . .

JEFFREY: I am sure that, let's see, Ted Kennedy to a Michigan caucus after we were in Los Angeles. We were right across the hall from Minnesota, by the way, and they caucused endlessly, just endlessly, endlessly. You had Humphrey, you had McCarthy, you had Freeman. They're remarkable people those Minnesotans, because despite all their differences--poor Hubert, you know, '56 was so bad for him, and then '60 was so bad for him--but they'd get together and carry their state, you know, after the convention. Now, what was your question?

MOSS: The question was the impact of the Stevenson ground swell.

JEFFREY: Well, of course, none of us will ever forget when he came in. And one's feelings at this point are so subjective that you are anything but a good observer. And I remember Mrs. Roosevelt, of course, in the box, and I think my own feelings were simply sadness.

California was seated in front of us, we called them the "leaning tower of jelly". They were sitting right in front of the Michigan delegation in Los Angeles, and they were all mixed up. I guess in part, we had, again, the security of--we knew where our delegates were. Our delegates weren't going to change; we weren't going to lose one Kennedy person in Michigan. And I think my blinders were pretty much just Michigan.

I think we thought, well, let Stevenson do it, but we didn't like the way he did it, it didn't seem quite in keeping. What was his first remark when he got up on the platform? We didn't really think that sounded quite like Adlai Stevenson. But we weren't very upset by it nor did his appearance create a ground swell. I'm sure some of the people that were very much for

Stevenson were very excited about it.

MOSS: On the ballot for president, did things go pretty much as you expected them to, both within the delegation and generally?

JEFFREY: I remember running into Robert Kennedy in the hallway the night before the balloting, and there were rumors that things were not going well for Kennedy, but he felt very sure and he said he thought it would be on the first ballot. Nevertheless, there was great tension and great excitement. We were watching where Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] was or Ted Kennedy was, but at that stage it's those people who have to be calling the shots. And we had all sorts of telephonic communication. We had telephone to our trailer, and we could telephone other states. Mennen was the leader of the delegation, and Mennen was the person who sat by the telephone. We elect officers of our delegation, so that there are assigned responsibilities. Neil was a vice chairman; first vice chairman. And we had some others to fix things up, so everybody was happy. So I would say it was Mennen and Neil who were doing the communication, and Tom, too, since he had been in some of these states prior to the convention.

MOSS: Okay, let's move on then to the question of the vice-presidential nomination. What were the . . .

JEFFREY: On this you will get fifty stories if you talk to fifty people.

MOSS: I'm sure, and probably we never will get the real story of what happened. After John Kennedy was nominated, after the vote, what were the expectations of the Michigan delegation as to the vice-presidential nomination?

JEFFREY: I suppose that there were several expectations. My own was that it would be Stuart Symington. I remember talking with Ted; and saying that I was for Stuart Symington and got the impression that he did too. I believe Leonard had a meeting with Symington or some of the Symington people. There was some support for Hubert Humphrey in our delegation.

We had a caucus that morning, and Mennen reported on his meeting with the nominee. My recollection is that Mennen simply reported that he had met with the senator. Generally people, I think, felt that Mennen was our chairman, he would be the person with whom there would be continuing discussions if not negotiations.

I recall that after that caucus, which was held in the Statler, I happened to meet Leonard Woodcock and Doug Fraser and other people were around, but it sort of seemed like, you know, we were over it. What was this, a Thursday? And I remember

saying to Leonard, "I don't have a thing to do." I had no responsibilities; I didn't even have to stay in the hotel. We talked about lunch, and I remember he said that Doug--Doug Fraser is a board member-at-large of the UAW at this time, now, and a great guy--and he said Doug was downstairs with a couple of other people and we could go down there, and he said Bob Oliver [Robert T. Oliver] was with them. And I said, "Well, I'd just as soon not be seen with Bob Oliver." And we went to a hotel where the press stayed--I can't recall the name of it--and we had a nice, leisurely lunch and we met a number of people we knew and came back to the hotel.

And from this part on I shall never forget it. I was standing--we had just come near an escalator that went down to the lower level where the coffee shop was located. We were standing at the, just the top of the escalator and here is Joe Rauh, and the tears are streaming down Joe Rauh's face, so I know the rumors are true, that LBJ is the VP choice. Somebody hits me--I have no idea--and says, "Walter wants to see you," and somebody else hit me and said, "Mennen wants to see you."

So I remember both Leonard and I went up to Walter's room, by the time we got to Walter's room, we knew that the nominee had said Lyndon Johnson, that was it, at least I thought so, and the room was full of labor leaders, and I think it was Alex Rose who was declaiming. I remember I didn't stay very long because I figured there was nothing I could do there. I'd better see what was happening in the Michigan delegation, and by the time I got to our caucus room, Mennen had left, and people were going to the convention.

So somehow or other, Tom Quimby and I got in somebody's car, to drive out instead of taking the bus, we were going directly to the convention. And I recall saying to Tom, "Let's turn on the radio." So we turned on the radio, and we heard Stewart Udall and Edith Green supporting LBJ and the candidates decision. And I remember commenting on that, because, of course, at that time, Edith was still thought of as quite a liberal, and so was Stewart Udall.

And we get out to the convention, and oh my, everybody is running around just like mad, and oh, such emotion. And Michigan is having a caucus outside the convention floor in one of those not soundproof caucus rooms, and everybody's standing up. So I missed some of that, but Mennen asked for a volunteer, someone over to the Midwest conference, the trailer. And I knew that Leonard was there, and I just knew Leonard would be calm, cool, and collected, and Ted Marchrowicz was there, and I was sure he would be, and so I volunteered to go to the Midwest conference. And I know in my own mind I volunteered, because I thought if Minnesota was raising Cain I was really going to let them have it after what Minnesota had done--I don't know why that came to my mind, but it did, partly because there was great talk about where was Minnesota, and somebody had said before I left that Orville Freeman was supposed to be on his way over to the convention hall.

I went over to the Midwest trailer, and it was calm as all get out. No one was excited there. My recollection is, but I may be wrong, that Geri Joseph was there, and Ray Hemenway and some other states, Nebraska, Iowa, and so on, not a lot of people. Everybody was talking about it, but nobody was the least bit upset. In comparison to the Michigan caucus, it was like the calmest sea one had ever been on. But they didn't know about Orville Freeman, either.

So I went back to the convention floor--I think our caucus was over by then. Seats were assigned in the front row, to party officers and members of Congress. Mennen and Neil were running all over the place, and my concern, truthfully, was for Mennen. I didn't see Mennen Williams acting like a Boy Scout. The candidate had named Lyndon Johnson, whether we liked Lyndon Johnson or not. Feelings about LBJ were very sincere and very deep. It goes back, as I suggested earlier, to the very strong anti-Johnson--the image of conservatism if not reaction. I just sat there with Phil Hart, because there wasn't a thing you could do. The TV people. . . .

I saw Larry O'Brien, and I spoke with Larry and I talked with Edith, and Kenny O'Donnell, and I remember looking at all their faces and then just speaking to him--what question did I ask Larry? It had to do with whether or not any arrangements had been made with Lyndon Johnson on who was going to be the National Chairman, I believe that was the question I asked Larry. And he said, "None, none." Whatever it was, it was reassuring. But everybody was running around, and there was no point of holding anyone up. I remember I spoke to Larry in his ear so nobody could overhear it. But everybody looked as if they'd been through hell; I mean, their faces showed it.

Then I just went back and sat down. And Phil Hart was there and Marchrowicz was there and Charlie Diggs was there, and now we were all people who were not upset.

Michigan had a reputation back home--I know what was in my mind, and this came from particularly the '52 convention--of acting like wild men. And sometimes when the delegates returned they were chided about this, and, "Do you know how you looked on television?" And that was what was in my mind, particularly as far as Mennen was concerned. Oh, before this I remember in the hotel I saw Nancy, and Nancy was fuming. She was the angriest I've ever seen Nancy.

MOSS: There's a story that she turned in her JFK buttons.

JEFFREY: That was the story, yes, and I don't know whether that's true or isn't true, but Nancy is a person who has very deep feelings, and was very outspoken and direct in her views, which I think was a great tribute both to her and to Mennen, because Nancy would go after General Motors sometimes; the governor wasn't ready to.

During this time while we were sitting here Sarge Shriver came over, and he knelt down, and he--I mean he got on his knees

at this time--Phil Hart and I were sitting side by side--and Sarge said, "I just want you to know that an awful lot of blood flowed on that rug today." And we had some other conversation.

Some of us would say--as a matter of fact, we said this to Neil, a couple of us, not so long ago--when they announced the Michigan vote, some of us maintain that no poll was ever taken. You see, we could poll on the floor; the secretary would just read off everybody's name, and we would vote. Whatever the vote was--you must have it there--it showed more votes against Lyndon Johnson than really were, because a number of us feel that we were never polled. We were a screaming delegation. People were standing up and shouting and many of the Stevenson people were. .

Well, then we went back to the hotel; we were going to have a caucus; we weren't going to have a caucus; we were going to have a caucus. At one point I remember going to--Phil told me that Janey [Jane C. Hart] had a headache and wanted to know whether I had any pills. At this point I thought we weren't going to have a caucus, and I remember giving Janey some headache pills and then going back downstairs and finding out there was going to be a caucus. So I got hold of Leonard, Phil Hart, and Jim O'Hara [James G. O'Hara] and told them the signals had changed and Michigan was going to caucus right now and "Please we need you. You are going to have to speak."

The first part of the caucus was just declaiming, the principal point being that Mennen Williams had been sold down the river, Mennen Williams had been double crossed by our nominee. Many people felt this way; it was a combination of being against Johnson and that John F. Kennedy in his first act had betrayed Mennen Williams. You can understand why people felt so strongly about this. Then in the course of the evening Jim O'Hara spoke and did very well, Phil Hart spoke and did very well. I always say that most decisions at a convention are made on emotion, because it's compressed so in time, and frequently with inadequate information. I wouldn't say that about this because there was only one fact and that was that Lyndon Johnson was now our vice-presidential nominee, because, of course, the vote had been taken.

One of the things that shook people up a little bit was that Orville Freeman had not declared that he was against Johnson in a press conference, before the voting was--or while the voting was going on. We were also, incidentally, in communication with the District of Columbia, and I remember going over to the District to find out if the District to find out if the District really was as upset as our reports were back in our delegation. And when I talked with people in the District of Columbia I found out that they weren't as upset as we were being told, because the idea was that Michigan and the District of Columbia was going to unite against Johnson.

In any event, Leonard Woodcock started out his speech by saying, "In 1948, I sat up all night on election day--in November 1948--to find out whether or not a young liberal had been elected

United States senator in Texas." That's the way he started his speech. Leonard is a fine speaker, not in a great big oratorical style, but he always commanded great respect in the delegation. He's got an excellent mind, he always has persuasive arguments. The caucus broke up without any decision--what decision could you make?--but it had calmed down a bit.

By the next morning, some people had either called home or had received telephone calls, telegrams from home, saying, "Congratulations, how could you have been so bright," or that sort of thing, "to put Lyndon Johnson on to help carry the South." There began to be very positive reactions from back home. And the back home reactions, incidentally, in a convention are very important. They are another kind of input into decisions that a delegate body will make. That was true in 1968 here or in Chicago, to some extent. Let's see, this was now Thursday, right? I guess we were leaving on Friday. That morning Robert Kennedy called a meeting of all state party leadership people. That was when he named Roy Reuther in the middle of a meeting as director of registration for the campaign. But there were still lots of feelings around but it had subsided somewhat. Then we came home.

MOSS: Was there any reaction to the choice of Jackson [Henry M. Jackson] as the national chairman?

JEFFREY: I don't recollect it. I know what my own personal reaction was: Well, the Kennedys are going to run the campaign. It was that he would be more of a figurehead chairman and that it represented, perhaps, some recognition of Jackson's support, to put it gently.

MOSS: Okay, let's get on then to the campaign.

JEFFREY: I guess our reaction was that Robert will be running the campaign.

MOSS: You say that he named Roy Reuther the registration chairman in the middle of a meeting?

JEFFREY: I'll never forget that meeting. Roy Reuther, in a sense gave his life to registration and get out the vote. This was a meeting--and there must have been a hundred people there, supposed to be people from all the states--to talk about how we're going to get organized for the campaign. Larry and Bobby and, I believe, Kenny, were up in front at a table, and it was a very dull meeting. Nothing much was going on, according to my recollection.

Roy gets up to make his registration speech, and Roy always pulls out from his pocket figures. And he gave the registration figures for New York City and he gave the registration figures for Philadelphia and he gave them for Cleveland and he gave them for Detroit and Michigan and he gave them for Cleveland and he

gave them for Los Angeles, in other words, he was digging at all the large, particularly the large states, or the influential-- Chicago, Daley [Richard J. Daley] was the influential then, too--and he was really giving people the business on our failure to do a good registration job. And when Roy speaks on registration--as you know, he's dead now--he put as much emotion in that as a McCarthy anti-war speech.

And dear Bobby, after Roy finishes or very shortly after Roy finishes, he just calls a conference with Larry and I believe it was Kenny, in front of us. They started talking among themselves. And he turns around and announces to the meeting that he is asking Roy Reuther to take charge of the registration and get out the vote for the campaign. Roy, he was so cute; his eyes would sparkle and sort of roll, you know, he was very pleased. He doesn't know what Walter thinks, and he doesn't know what George Meany thinks and George Meany liked Roy.

Well subsequently, Frank Thompson was made the national director in name, but Roy was the one who worked at it. But that's what Bobby did in the middle of that meeting. It turned out to be a very good meeting because Roy had really charged it up. I don't think any of the Kennedys began to know organization the way Roy did; I mean, they knew how to organize for John F. Kennedy, but in terms of a nationwide party effort, I think Roy knew much more.

MOSS: Did you participate in any other strategy consultations and so on on the national level, or did you immediately come back to organize in Michigan?

JEFFREY: There were two or three other meetings, but these were all larger meetings and I wasn't in on any small meetings.

MOSS: Okay, getting to Michigan and organizing: Teddy White in his book calls, quote, "Staebler's citizens politics organization", unquote, the best in the Midwest, and that he didn't want outsiders messing it up. Is this a fair assessment of the feeling?

JEFFREY: Yes. I don't know what Neil said to the Kennedy people. What I said was, "Don't let a coordinator come in and stay. Coordinator, fine, we will run the campaign." And maybe they told us by then it was going to be John Carver. "Have your coordinator come in and out, don't have him stay, because if he stays, he's going to get the blame for everything that doesn't come out right." And there's just inevitably things that you ask for that you don't get, inevitably mixups and that sort of thing. So John came in, but he wasn't here a great deal. He worked on setting up Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson. Margaret and I worked with him on that, and what we did with Citizens, we always--it was supposed to be a citizens' effort, but we generally had as treasurer a known Democrat like

Avern Cohn.

MOSS: What sort of role did John Carver fill? They called him coordinator, but what did this amount to?

JEFFREY: Well, he was the man we called on if we had any particular problems. John was very cooperative and we got along just fine. I think his role was liaison between Citizens and the Party and the national Citizens Committee and to some extent, with the campaign. My recollection is that when Kennedy came in that the Kennedy people were in charge. John was very good natured. He never told anybody what to do; he was very skillful in this. To my recollection John Carver didn't make any enemies, which is very difficult if you're a coordinator.

MOSS: Right. Now there's a question as to . . .

JEFFREY: A coordinator, in my view, is to coordinate, not to do.

MOSS: Okay, there's a question as to whether the Kennedy people generally understood the way Michigan politics operate, what you have to do to win an election. Could you sense this at all? It's a question of the Massachusetts style of winning an election versus the Michigan style.

JEFFREY: In my view, I call it the Kennedy style. The Kennedy style had a great deal to offer Michigan. Now of course that's all pretty much in relationship to the candidate's visits to our state. We also had surrogates--John Gronouski on the National Committee staff. You see, let me say this, when you get into a campaign, I always say you get in your own little rut, and you do that. And my assignment was national speakers, and that meant Kennedy. I worked with the advance people. In addition John Swainson and I were named coordinators of the campaign for Michigan. Margaret Price had been selected by Kennedy as vice chair in charge of the DNC Women's Division.

MOSS: What about the activities of, say, Jerry Bruno?

JEFFREY: Oh, well, let me tell you. A decision was made that John F. Kennedy should come to Michigan on Labor Day. Harry Truman, if you recall, opened his campaign. . . .

MOSS: It's almost a tradition, in Cadillac Square on Labor Day.

JEFFREY: It is tradition, lucky, lucky. The meetings I recall are the ones with Walter Reuther. The first thing that had to be done was to get people enthusiastic about having Kennedy on Labor Day. In Pontiac they weren't going to have a Labor Day celebration, and in Flint they weren't going to

have a Labor Day celebration. Well, through Walter Reuther that was turned around, it takes some turning around; even Walter Reuther can't push buttons, believe me, and have things happen and have people change their minds. The UAW worked on that, so it was agreed that we would have Detroit, State Fair, Pontiac, Flint, and Muskegon. Muskegon has a traditional Labor Day, out on Lake Michigan on the beach and then a dinner for the leadership, labor and political leadership.

I guess Kenny O'Donnell came in. I remember one meeting at the UAW with Kenny and Jack [Jack Conway] and Alex Fuller from the Wayne County Council in which we were arguing about whether the candidate belonged to labor or belonged to the party. And I got in a little trouble because--not too much, but a little--because of course I was arguing that he also belonged to the party and we had to schedule in some party things along with the Labor Day. Somehow we had to get this worked out, which we did.

MOSS: Let me digress just a moment here and ask you about the relationship between labor and the party in Michigan. Is there a kind of friction there as far as initiative and control are concerned?

JEFFREY: Well, let's say it's a friendly disagreement at certain points and at certain times. I do have to say this, that unfortunately, I think Mennen Williams and Walter Reuther never had a personal relationship or a working relationship. Walter Reuther was always. . . . Strange as it may seem, the Williams people sometimes, I think, felt that Walter overshadowed Mennen. Walter Reuther would issue a statement on something or other, and he would get a national press. I remember one time Paul Weber and I were talking about this and I asked, "What are you suggesting, that Walter Reuther move out of the state of Michigan?" Paul responded, "He's in Detroit; he's the president of a union. When he issues a statement it gets great coverage, and maybe national coverage. We sit in Lansing, and I issue a press release in Lansing, and it takes hours for it to even get to Detroit." And so there were some--and Walter and Mennen are just such different kinds of people.

We were talking last night about--I was with some people from Washington, Jim Loeb and Joe Rauh. They were reminiscing about Adlai Stevenson in 1948 and when Harry Truman--because Jim was then in the White House--and he was talking about when Stevenson was going to Washington after the mine disaster to meet with the secretary of interior. And Charley Murphy [Charles S. Murphy] told Jim that Harry Truman said that, "He's governor of Illinois, and I'm president of the United States." Stevenson had said he had no interest in meeting with Truman through all kinds of seconds and Harry Truman said, "He's governor, he's a Democratic governor of Illinois, and I'm the president of the United States, and he will see me when he's in Washington." They did work it out. And I said, "But did they ever get along?"

Jim's response was, "No, they were such totally different kinds of persons, Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson."

This, I think, is one of the great problems in the world, that sometimes it would help so if principals could really sit down and talk things over. But the little argument we were having really had nothing to do with that. The relationship is sometimes strained, but it's within a family strain. And with Gus Scholle it was entirely different, because Gus and Mennen got along personally very well, although they're different kinds of personalities, too. But there were points of strain.

MOSS: Okay, now you were trying to set up the opening of the campaign. . .

JEFFREY: A lot of younger people felt that Mennen never really would stand up and say, "I'm delighted that labor supported me," but rather to somehow get himself up above labor. But that's because of the climate that was created by the media, in my view.

MOSS: Okay. You were talking about trying to get the Labor Day opening as a joint party-labor thing rather than the candidate just belonging to labor.

JEFFREY: Not joint, because the event had to be labor sponsored.

MOSS: Okay, I just wanted a little background on that.

JEFFREY: There were points at which the governor would do things, like sending in the state police in a strike in the upper peninsula, or when Gunaca, who had been in the coalers strike and the governor signed his extradition papers and didn't notify anybody, including his attorney, and I know Al Fitt [Alfred B. Fitt] told me he didn't sleep that night afterward. I mean, there were things like that that would produce some strain with leadership people, but the rank and file of the labor movement, by and large had enormous love and affection for Soapy.

In any event, back to Labor Day. I was informed that the campaign was sending in advance people for Labor Day, and I was to train them in advance. I picked five of them up at the airport. It was Jerry Bruno, Marty McNamara [Martin J. McNamara]--an attorney with ten children--Ron Linton and Chuck O'Brien and Mel Cotton. You see, Jerry came from the Wisconsin campaign, from Kenosha UAW; Marty McNamara was this attorney from Washington who had volunteered; Ron Linton, who had been in Michigan and was working in Washington at this time. Mel Cotton came out of the West Virginia campaign, the son of a miner; and the fifth fellow O'Brien. There were all quite different people.

Jerry, of course, had had experience in Wisconsin and Mel in West Virginia, but none of them had been outside of their home states, and this was really their first big advance--imagine

being with Jerry Bruno on his first advance. I remember we stayed at the Book Cadillac Hotel, the old. . . . That's where Pierre Salinger stayed when he was with the McClellan Committee investigating the Teamsters, for a long time. I remember we sat around when we got to the hotel in the evening, talking, just talking generally about this, and it became clear that Jerry was the leader even then. That was the night that--and the assignments were made: Ron was to do Flint, Marty was to do State Fair, and Mel Cotton was to do Muskegon, and Jerry was staying here to work on Detroit, and O'Brien was assigned to Pontiac

That was the night that we talked about the Kennedy girls. There had been, you know, some at the convention, but their costumes were much too expensive. We needed to use Kennedy girls at these events. And my point simply was the costume had to be something that almost any girl had, so we settled on a white blouse and a dark skirt--it didn't even have to be navy blue, just so it was a dark skirt, most girls would have white blouses--and that we would get hats and put the Kennedy strip around the hats. And it was O'Brien--I'll never forget him--he wanted white gloves, white gloves. That decision was made so that everybody that was going out, wherever, they'd get the Kennedy girls, and they would have white gloves. And the reason I speak of these white gloves was I can see these girls with the white gloves, many of whom saved them to this day. Also a cardinal rule that they had to be integrated--black and white.

MOSS: Yes. I was going to ask about that.

JEFFREY: Yes. John F. Kennedy once told me that I even had Ken O'Donnell talking about civil rights. So each staff went to their assigned communities and met with the labor people and worked out arrangements for the Kennedy visit. Detroit was very good. State Fair was tremendous. Flint was marvelous with the Kennedy girls lined up, and Muskegon was beautiful. I get tears in my eyes just thinking about it. Coming in from the airport, nine long miles, there were people all the way to the city just to wave at John F. Kennedy. It was wonderful. . . . That's when I really was sure, from that point on, that we were going to carry Michigan, in spite of all the religious problems.

Flint was a seat of anti-Catholic feeling. We'd been working on that already, because in the plants. . . . You see, in Flint so many people come from the South: Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia--whites; the border states. There was all kinds of anti-Negro feeling. Even in August we had been working at counteracting the hate literature with leaflets and position papers.

As I say, Jerry was definitely in charge of Detroit; he was a natural leader.

BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE II

MOSS: I had heard that the Kennedy staff generally were rather apprehensive at the beginning but then when Muskegon came along they sort of brightened up.

JEFFREY: Well, their apprehension was shared by all of us. Even in 1960 some of us had questions about Labor Day celebrations, and as a matter of fact, after this was all over, I remember saying to Kenny, "In 1964 let's think twice before we do this again." It's just that those apprehensions weren't fulfilled; it wasn't a self-fulfilling prophecy. The reason is very simple. Labor Day had begun to have much less appeal for members of organized labor. The competition to go away for the weekend was one factor, and I think another factor was it's just the style was changing. Big Labor Day rallies didn't mean that much to many members of organized labor.

MOSS: Solidarity breaking down?

JEFFREY: It's partly that. However, since 1960 some cities have reinstated Labor Day in the cities. And where because of the ILG [International Ladies Garment Worker's Union], I think, largely, was enlarging so they had enormous numbers of people on Labor Day. But Labor Day has continued to diminish, as I say, in Detroit, and many places don't have it at all. But the Kennedy rally was marvelous. I wanted to tell you about the night before, Sunday night. Of course, at that time senators had no Secret Service, and we were very, very, very concerned about security, knowing what John F. Kennedy did, he aroused such an enthusiastic reaction from people. We put Billie Fornum in charge of security for the party and worked with the Detroit Police, the state police and the Wayne County Sheriff's Office for the airport. The sheriff's office was the one who had security Sunday evening at the airport. I remember saying to Billie when he told me that there were going to be no fences up, and I remember saying, "The people are going to break through; it's not going to work."

In the meantime, on Saturday, I felt something had gone wrong. We were in the Leland Hotel. Andy Hatcher had come in to handle publicity. Something was happening about Sunday night. Here we'd made all the arrangements for Kennedy to come in from Alaska Sunday evening. We had had circulars out, ads in the newspapers so people knew John F. Kennedy was going to land sometime about half past nine--Jerry was not going to tell me what was wrong. So I spoke to Andy Hatcher, and I said, "Andy, you've got to tell me." So he told me. He said, "The senator is going to be flying to California Sunday evening and then come to Detroit in the morning."

Well, Neil Staebler happened to be in the office. This was Saturday afternoon, in the middle of the afternoon. I was furious. We tried to get John Bailey paging him in the airport at Nome, Alaska. It turned out we were paging the Kennedy party just as they landed. I called all over asking how we were going

to get in touch, and finally I said to Neil, "We're going to call Bobby." I called Washington and found out that he was in Hyannisport; put in a call for Hyannisport and he had just left the big house to go to the little house; you call the little house, they told me that he was taking a shower, and I left a message to call.

Well, Bobby called back, and the first thing I said, "Neil's on the phone." I didn't know Robert very well at that time and my next words were "I understand that you get angry. I want you to know that I am angry, very angry." and went on. He didn't know anything about the change in the Kennedy plans. Bobby simply said, "Don't worry, I'll get it straightened out." And he did. And John F. Kennedy came in Sunday evening. It would have been disastrous for us--it would have just been awful.

He comes in; the plane lands; the people broke through, and he couldn't get off the plane. And there was a group the Tutro Post of Veterans of Foreign Wars organized by John Tutro for his brother who had been killed in the war. And it was all labor people. I had said that they could come out--they wanted to know if they could come, and I said, "Of course, and be sure to wear your cap." Well, I want you to know it was those Veterans, just by locking arms and surrounding a panel truck on which Kennedy was supposed to say a few words, you know, if there was a big crowd. John F. Kennedy and John Swainson got up on top of this small panel truck with the people all around and John Tutro's veterans locked arms and sort of formed a circle around it, just to try to keep people from all being massed in there. There was Swainson, a double amputee, on top of that truck, and John F. Kennedy with his bad back--we always took care to have bed boards, when he came in. It was scary. Anyway he made his speech; John introduced him, and he made his little speech, and we finally got him into his car, and then we got down to the Book Cadillac Hotel, and we had a reception.

The next day at the big thing in Cadillac Square, again people massed around. When he got off the platform, he shook hands with a couple of people, just as he was going out. We were to exit, through the back of the building, but not John F. Kennedy--he started shaking hands and all hell broke loose. Again, it was some of the labor people who saved the day by forming a human cordon around him. But people were just--I mean, knocked down and trampled on.

I remember saying to Kenny O'Donnell in the hotel when we got back there, "At State Fair, every policeman that's available has been assigned. We can see if we can get some more, but it's our understanding that every policeman in the city that is available has been assigned to State Fair." We'd carefully checked State Fair out; we'd checked the seat of the car--and Marty was in charge of that. He never found anything but he was just like a child with a beautiful new toy to put together, he put every piece so--it was just delicious. And I said to Kenny, "If he starts shaking hands in State Fair, we just can't tell what's going to happen." I said then--I learned that if you had

any responsibility you do feel responsible for the safety. And this was the beginning of a campaign. But I remember saying, "I've learned that John F. Kennedy campaigns dangerously and that all any of us can do is the best we can. We must be as careful as we can in providing security police but there is a limit." I remember George Edwards told me he spoke to the police commissioner and said to him the same sort of thing that I said to Kenny. They did get a few more police out to the state fair. His car drove through State Fair at ten miles an hour to a band shell where he spoke. He got caught as he left the stage and the car was attached to the car that was parked behind it, and he had great trouble getting in the car.

He made it, and we were on our way to Pontiac. When we came to Pontiac, there was about fifty to seventy-five girls. I shall never forget it; that's where these girls really showed up. On both sides, lines up, along a walk--with their white blouses, dark skirts, John F. Kennedy hats, and white gloves, and it was so nice when we were driving through. And it was so nicely integrated, too, nicely integrated. That was Chuck O'Brien's doing and he was ecstatic. Afterwards, those girls literally--I heard this from dozens--they took those gloves, and they hung them on their living room walls because John F. Kennedy, you know, as he went by touched those gloves.

You know when I tell you this. It gives you a feeling of the whole atmosphere of that campaign and how devoted people were and how hard they worked. I remember saying to campaign workers--they were so tired--"In '64 it won't be the same. No matter how tired you are--you're going to say after this is all over, I helped elect him. It'll never be the same again, even if we're working for him in '64, because he'll be president then. It'll be different, it'll be so different."

Then we went on Flint, and then I'll tell you about Muskegon. Flint was pretty good. They didn't fill the great big outdoor stadium, but it was an enthusiastic crowd. Mennen, and John Swainson, and candidate for governor Phil Hart, and Lieutenant Governor John Lesinski, in the cavalcade.

On the whole, the day was absolutely magnificent. It was a great send-off for his campaign in Michigan. We had great TV coverage, radio and press coverage, and by--we did the whole state except the upper peninsula and it was a great shot in the arm to recruit campaign workers. Actually, five stops. At State Fair on Labor Day, of course, there were thousands, or a hundred thousand people there at least. Not that they all heard him, but they all knew he was there.

MOSS: What about the financing of the campaign? How much National Committee money was coming into the state? Any state money going out?

JEFFREY: Well, Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson produced their Citizen material. My recollection--and you'll have to speak with Avern or Neil to be sure--but my

recollection is that we got no money from the Democratic National Committee, none. Let's see, generally the rule was that we, the state party, covered the expenses when Kennedy visited the state. You see, now on Labor Day, labor paid for the P.A. equipment and whatever was necessary, and labor paid for leaflets that were in every community--we did a lot. There was a lot of the hand painted signs going on, too, but labor, there, took care of all of the costs. Whatever costs the party had--the reception, which I know we paid for because that was ours. But I think all of the Kennedy advance mens' expenses were covered by the Kennedy campaign. I don't recollect having to pay any hotel bills. This isn't my particular assignment. We have our state party treasurers, who handles expenses. I have no recollection of how much money the Citizens Committee raised.

MOSS: Okay, let me come around to something else, then, and talk about the . . .

JEFFREY: But I don't recall that we had big arguments over money in '60.

MOSS: Okay, let me talk about the Kennedy family coming in and campaigning. Could you describe these visits?

JEFFREY: Well, Adelaide Hart, who is vice-chairman of the party, was in charge of the Kennedy women. Mrs. Shriver [Eunice Kennedy Shriver] went to Marquette, Michigan--and it was a sensational meeting. They had something like two thousand people in Marquette. And then we had Mrs. Kennedy, Mrs. Rose Kennedy, a reception for her at Masonic Temple. We had a reception at the Sheraton Cadillac, and Pat Lawford [Patricia Kennedy Lawford] was here for that. I can't remember whether Eunice Shriver came back or not. I know Mrs. Lawford was there. Whatever we did--that reception, for example--there were some people who never even got into the hotel. There was such a jam that people would have to drive and drive around to find a parking lot, some people never got into the room. I think that was sponsored by Citizens. It was great for recognizing and involving women.

MOSS: Later on Kennedy came back into the state and they had the famous business of . . .

JEFFREY: Twice, he came back in twice.

MOSS: . . . and the Peace Corps thing.

JEFFREY: Ron Linton was in charge of the second visit, which was October 5th and 6th. And when Ron came in, it was one of those things when ideas jibe. We had talked with Pat McNamara about a train cavalcade through Michigan. Some of us had had this idea, and it was good enough that Bob Perrin

[Robert Perrin], who was McNamara's man, had investigated it a bit and had talked with the senator. The senator, however, said, "No, who's going to come to see me at a railroad stop?" So we mentioned this to Ron when he first came in, and Ron had had kind of the same idea. So there was just no disagreement about it; we all said, "Let's figure it out." And as the advance man--I always used to say to the advance man, "You're brass, and you have to make some decisions." They were brass; they were the representative of the candidate. So Ron handled, to my recollection, all of the arrangements with the railroad, as it should be.

Kennedy came in that night as usual--I shouldn't say that because the last time he was here he was on time--but as usual he came in late. Now remember in all this planning you always try to take your candidate where he hasn't been, so it was decided that he would land at Willow Run Airport this time. He'd landed at Metro on Labor Day, Sunday evening. He'd land at Willow Run, near Ypsilanti, and the then mayor of Ypsilanti had been trying very desperately to get a stop in Ypsi and the answer had been no, no, no. But somewhere along the way, after he got here, John Burton--the mayor--won, and Kennedy stopped in Ypsilanti, which further delayed his arrival in Ann Arbor.

I don't know whether I drove by myself--I don't recall. We always put him in a car with a senator, McNamara, John Swainson or Phil Hart, or Mennen, generally John, because he was the candidate for governor. I remember going to Michigan Union, and I got there before they did, and I fought my way through that massive crowd--oh, what a crowd--up to the steps of the Michigan Union where the platform was. Well, John F. finally got there. It was after 12:00 a.m. It was the first time that Dean Bacon [Deborah Bacon] had given permission for the girls to stay out after midnight from the dormitories--my, how different things were eight years, ten years ago. I met some people I knew who were there from Washtenaw County Democratic Party and some of the students. One of the first things they said, one reason the crowd was *still* so good was that the girls could stay out. . . . How long they had been waiting? They must have been waiting an hour, two hours, I'm not sure at this.

Well, John F. Kennedy was very weary, but that's the night--we always, I always called this the "Afriker" trip. He got started--there were some Nixon kids there, and there were some Nixon signs. This was also at a time when still, in October, at the University of Michigan, both among faculty and among students, there was still great skepticism about John F. There was still hangers of Stevenson people who were not ready to go to Kennedy. That's one reason this Ann Arbor visit was so important. There were some jeering or booing by the Nixon people, very mild. I thought then it was mild, but in the perspective of today, I would say it was just barely audible. This sort of got to Kennedy. They were challenging him, so he turned the challenge around, and that's when he talked about, "Are you willing to give two years of your life as a doctor to

work in Africa or as a teacher?" They challenged him; now he was challenging them.

If you want me to follow through on this little story for a moment, I will. It was Judy and Allen Guthrie. Now I'm going to talk on about the Peace Corps bit. The following weekend, Judy and Allen Guthrie had a party at their house. They were both graduate students--she was in English, and he was in psychology. They had some fellow graduate students over at their home, and they started talking about what Kennedy had said. Now this is what I get from Allen and Judy. One of them said, "He challenged us." And they talked about a lot of this stuff--for two years and so on. And out of this evening's group discussion these grad students organized Americans Committed to World Responsibility.

They mimeographed petitions; they started circulating them on the campus; they got publicity in the *Michigan Daily*; they exported this to the college campuses around the country; and they collected a large number of signatures. Candidate Richard Nixon was going to be in Ann Arbor. This was a non-partisan effort, and they tried to present the petitions to Nixon, and they never got anywhere.

The Friday before the election, John F. Kennedy was to be in Toledo, and I think they called me about it. They wanted to know whether they could present the petition to the candidate in Toledo. So I called Washington.

Oh, prior to this, we had been hammering that the candidate had to make a peace speech, and then I had personally been hammering on Mike Feldman for him to say something about this group in Ann Arbor, tying it in with his peace speech. It also happened that General Gavin [James M. Gavin] was interested, so I sent him the news clips about ACWR and written him about this group. I was trying to get some press coverage. There was a short story in *The New York Times* about it. I remember when I saw Mike in Washington, still pounding on, he just hadn't made a peace speech yet--and this was particularly important for the Stevenson people--Mike had told me that he was going to make it in, San Francisco? I wanted to get the Ann Arbor group into it too, and he did say something finally in the San Francisco speech about them--not very much, but a little. They were such wonderful young people.

Anyway, I called Washington, and I got the schedule for Toledo, and they had no objections. So we went to Toledo in a caravan of cars leaving from the Michigan Union. We arrived when we thought Kennedy would be leaving, but he was arriving at this time. So I spoke to. . . . Ted and Dick Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] who were on this trip. They talk about the well-oiled Kennedy machine. But Ted and Dick hadn't heard of the plan to present the ACWR petitions to JFK. I said, "Well, we're here, and we're going to do it." So we just stayed at the airport while Kennedy was making a quick tour of downtown Toledo, and when he came back on the airstrip, Judy presented the petition on behalf of the Americans Committed to World Responsibility. He said, "Judy, if we will think about our country from now until

Tuesday, I promise you that if things turn out right on Tuesday, we will do something about it." And of course it was the Peace Corps. I don't know whether he used the peace corps term then or not.

I was mentioning that General Gavin had also made the same suggestion. You know it wasn't that novel, actually, Hubert Humphrey had suggested something like this several years ago, and so had the UAW. But this is what he said to Judy, and everybody was so thrilled. I remember seeing him walk up those steps and disappear into the plane, the *Caroline*, and I thought, "It'll never be the same again, because when I see him next, he will be President of the United States." Well, that's--and Judy and Allen then went into the Peace Corps. They were in Thailand. They served their time in Thailand. When they returned from Thailand, they were volunteers for VISTA [Volunteers in Service to America]--it was before VISTA had any staff--and they worked helping set up VISTA, on a volunteer basis. And then both of them were on VISTA's staff for a while. They're both back in Ann Arbor now. Allen is teaching at the residential college, and I guess Judy's teaching, too. And they've got a baby now. They were in our Bobby Kennedy campaign. And then subsequently Sarge Shriver came to the Michigan Union and the university and the plaque was put up on the Michigan Union building. You've seen it.

MOSS: Oh, yes.

JEFFREY: Sarge came up for that. But it was--it was very exciting, and that's how it all happened. And that was a great night when JFK spoke there.

Then we went on the train, which, of course was very exciting; on the back platform, Pat McNamara, John Swainson, John F. Kennedy. John F. Kennedy liked John Swainson very much. They were simpatico people; whereas, he and--another person who didn't like John F. Kennedy was Pat McNamara. Pat didn't like him, I think, because of labor and McCarthy. Pat never really warmed up to John F. Kennedy, at least during the campaign. Well, in any event, I think Pat became kind of an admirer of--and there was no hostility, let us say, after he was president. It just wasn't a warm relationship; whereas Phil Hart had a very warm relationship with him. They're different styles of people--I sometimes say it's chemistry. You relate to some people and some people you may relate to but you don't have the same kind of--I don't know what. It's a particular kind of relationship.

MOSS: You don't feel the "vibes", in the current jargon.

JEFFREY: Yes. And I feel this way about teachers in school. I always said when my kids were starting in a public school that all I really asked for was that they are--I subsequently changed it to two, but--one teacher would touch them. It's no reflection on anybody; it just happens between

some people, and some people it doesn't.

MOSS: Let's just tie this session up, by think, with some of your reflections on the election itself, the way that you expected the vote to go and the way that it actually went.

JEFFREY: In Michigan?

MOSS: In Michigan, particularly, and the rest of the country as well.

JEFFREY: Well, I believed at the time--and then you ask me why--I believed at the time that John F. Kennedy would carry Michigan, so said on his last visit here. In Michigan the unknown factor was how much anti-Catholic feeling there was. I spoke about the fact that in August there'd been a rash of anti-Catholic literature, which had gotten into the plants. And the UAW and others had put on a campaign to counteract this hate literature. This had begun to come up again toward the last two weeks on the campaign. By the way, we didn't mention one thing, which was not only his visits, but in my view, was critical, and that was the first TV debate. And I remember that so well. I sent a telegram to Ted--they were in Toledo. I'll never forget John F. Kennedy's first eight minutes. I remember he got the Teamsters in those first eight minutes.

I remember the next day, the elevator operator, the cab driver, no matter who you asked--an uninvolved person--the reaction was just uniformly so good, and that's why I sent the telegram to Ted, never knowing whether he'd get it or if it would mean anything if he did. But people who were down there told me later that he had carried it around in his pocket and would show it to everyone. It just shows, no matter where you are--I've learned that even the big people appreciate little things like that. I just wanted him to know what the reaction in Michigan was--Ted and I were very good friends, still are, I would say.

But in any event, to your question. There were two things; one, that this had begun to emerge again, the anti-Catholic stuff, the dirty stuff; secondly, you had a feeling we had peaked too early. We just began to get that uneasy feeling in that last week. However, I still really believed that he was going to carry our state. What evidence do you have? I think the polls were pretty close in Michigan, as I recollect it, very close. And I didn't expect we were going to have a runaway, but I thought we would carry Michigan.

And part of it, I'm sure, is just that in a campaign you must believe this and you must talk this way. I thought Neil Staebler was going to win for governor, but I was wrong. I was predicting by twenty-five thousand votes. I think on Kennedy I was saying Kennedy would carry by fifty thousand. You have to keep up the morale of people, because that last effort is crucial in getting people to the polls. And perhaps, as I say, it's just

what you do to yourself, but there was really no question in my mind that he was going to carry Michigan.

What the outcome of the nation was going to be, I didn't know, but I firmly believed he would be our next president. I could never believe that he was going to carry Ohio. I just couldn't--knowing Ohio a little, tiny bit. The Kennedy insiders were very optimistic about Ohio.

MOSS: I'll bet they were upset when it didn't come across.

JEFFREY: Of course, the crowds had been enormous, just enormous in Ohio. I suspect they felt they were better in Ohio than they were in Michigan. We're not a particularly good crowd state, and Detroit's a miserable place to get a crowd out, just miserable.

MOSS: And then with California flip-flopping the way it did, and Illinois so close. . . .

JEFFREY: Yes, I believed he was going to win. As I'm suggesting, this may have been self-induced. I have a deep faith in the wisdom of the people of America. I believed it was so crucial for the future of our country and the world that we had a John F. Kennedy and not a Richard Nixon that I believed the people would make the right decision. There were times when I used to ask to take the phone in the state party campaign office every once in a while so I could hear what people were saying. The people would call in with--or just sometimes odd conversations you get in with people, and when you'd listen to them, you wondered, for example, how people's attitudes on foreign policy or Africa or whatever it might be were so uninformed and then say, "How's he ever going to get through? How is he ever going to get through?" But I know as I look back on it that I truly believed he was going to make it. I just felt the people of our country were going to be that wise. As I say, that's my wholly subjective judgement, feelings, emotions, or whatever one might say. In addition, when you're that far into a campaign and the outcome is that close, you'd just as well keep on thinking that way. Why not?

MOSS: Okay, well, on the point of the election, I think we might as well break this one off.