

Henry Cabot Lodge Oral History Interview—8/4/1965
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Biographical Note

Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts (1947-1953) and Ambassador to South Vietnam (1963-1964, 1965-1967), discusses his 1952 Senate race against John F. Kennedy, his appointment as Ambassador to Vietnam in 1963, and the final months of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in Vietnam, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

with

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

August 4, 1965
Washington D.C.

By Charles Bartlett

For the John F. Kennedy Library

LODGE: I first heard of John Fitzgerald Kennedy in 1943 at the time of his heroic conduct in the Solomon Islands. Then I got to know him when he became a Congressman from Boston. I always enjoyed seeing him.


Then came the 1952 campaign. I remember thinking at the time—and I think I probably said it—that we have a two-party system in America, that it was a good thing when the parties put up men of quality, that I realized that, of course, I was going to have an opponent, and that it was in the public interest for him to be a fine man, as John Fitzgerald Kennedy was. Although

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it was an energetic campaign—both of us, I think, worked long hours—I never had anything but the most amicable feelings. I always found him an extremely likeable man with whom it was impossible to be angry.

I did not feel particularly put out on election night, because I thought John F. Kennedy was an excellent man and would make a good senator, as indeed he did. Also, I was very pleased that Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] had won.

In June of 1963 I went to call on him in my capacity as Director General of the Atlantic Institute. I had accepted this post in large part because I had received a telegram from Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk], when I was on a trip in Africa, saying that the President



was interested in the Atlantic Institute and thought it would be a fine thing if I were to accept. I was coming in to present him with the Atlantic Institute's first publication. After I had done this and given him this book, he then said that

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he would like to persuade me to go to Vietnam.

This did not come as a surprise to me. In January of that year I'd seen President Kennedy at a dinner at the Mayflower Hotel being given by the Atlantic Council in honor of General Lauris Norstad, who was then retiring. President Kennedy had come to the cocktail party beforehand so as to meet and talk with everybody and did not stay for the dinner. I thought it was an excellent arrangement for him; he got to see everybody and at the same time didn't have a long, drawn-out torture of sitting at a banquet.

He seemed surprised to see me and asked me how it happened that I was there. I was at that time in Washington on a tour of active duty in the Pentagon because I was a Reserve officer. This was before I had retired as a Reserve officer. He asked me what I was doing in Washington, and I said that I was on a tour of active duty in the

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Pentagon. Then he left with his aide, General C.V. Clifton [Chester V. Clifton, Jr.].

I learned later that he had said to General Clifton, "I didn't realize that Lodge was a Reserve officer." Clifton said, "Oh yes, he's been in the Reserve a long time."

A day or so later I received a call from General Clifton. We met at the Army-Navy Club and he asked me whether I would be interested in a post. I said that I really didn't want a job; that I had a job. But if there were some service that I could render, or some job that was interesting, important and difficult, that I would be glad to do it. So in January the President knew that I was willing to take on something.

I also had had a talk with Dean Rusk in which I told him, having an eye on Vietnam, that, if it ever got to the point where young Americans were in combat, I would certainly volunteer my services

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because I feel that, when young Americans are in combat, older Americans, if their health is good and if they can afford it financially, should volunteer their services.

When President Kennedy said in June that he was going to try to persuade me to go to Saigon, he had every reason to believe that I would say yes. So I did say that I was very much honored to have him ask me and that I wanted to consult my wife [Emily Sears Lodge], because it had been some time since the matter had come up. I did consult her, and I wrote the President a letter the next day saying that I would be glad to go.

The next time I saw him I found him very much concerned by what was going on in Vietnam. He referred particularly to the famous Associated Press picture of the Buddhist monk, Quang Duc [Thich Quang Duc], burning himself alive. I suppose that no news picture in recent history had generated as much emotion around the world as that one had.

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President Kennedy referred to that picture, to the overall importance of Vietnam, and to what was going on in Saigon—to the fact that apparently the Diem [Ngo Dinh Diem] government was entering a terminal phase. He also mentioned the extremely bad relations that the Embassy had with the press. He said, “I suppose that these are the worst press relations to be found in the world today, and I wish you, personally, would take charge of press relations.”

In Washington, before going out to Vietnam, I had a talk with a very eminent Vietnamese who said to me that—and I’m quoting now—“Unless they leave the country, there is no power on earth that can prevent the assassination of Madame Nhu [Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu], her husband Mr. Nhu [Ngo Dinh Nhu], and his brother Mr. Diem,” that the oppressive acts of the regime—the arbitrary arrests, imprisonments and executions, and the general reign of terror that was going on—would make assassination

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inevitable in any country. I remembered that and I found, not long after my arrival that it was true. Mr. Nhu and Mr. Diem were both assassinated, much to my regret, and Madame Nhu certainly would have been had she not left the country.

In August I left Washington after saying goodbye to the President. I was in Japan—because I was told to stop in Japan and Hong Kong on the way—when I got a call from the White House in the middle of the night in Tokyo, it being daylight in Washington, saying that the police in Saigon and the special troops had entered the Xa Loi Pagoda and had shot some of the worshippers in the Pagoda and that I should cut short my trip to Japan and get down there right away. The President ordered a plane in Japan put at my disposal immediately.

So we left immediately, made an eleven-hour flight, non-stop, from Tokyo to Saigon

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and got in there late that night. There wasn’t any doubt that that Pagoda incident marked the beginning of the end of the Diem regime. They had ceased to exercise the effective powers of government since April of that year, but when the troops went in and fired at people who were worshipping, it was just a matter of time before they would be through.

President Kennedy’s policy was not, as has been carelessly said, to overthrow the Diem regime. The Vietnamese were doing that for themselves and didn’t need any outside help. What he was trying to do, and what I was trying to do as his representative, was to get them to change their policies, change some of their personnel, and try to rehabilitate themselves so that they could function as a government as long as they remained in power. There isn’t any secret about that. President Kennedy said it on television.

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In fact some people criticize him for saying it on television, although I didn't share in that criticism. He wanted to change the policies and the personnel of the Vietnamese government so that it could get a new lease on life and become a valid government.

The decision to withhold commercial import payments was an attempt to put pressure—and an attempt which began to show signs of success—on this government so that it would give up the idea that it had us “hooked” and that therefore we were totally without influence. It was a step that was begun before I was appointed ambassador. I had nothing to do with the origination of the policy, but I thought it was correct. I think we have an absolute right frankly to use legitimate pressure and influence as part of a bargain with another government, just as they have a right to bargain with us. When people accept our help, we have a right to make

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stipulations if we want to. The other party doesn't have to accept them. In conducting our foreign relations, we have our own purposes, of course. The recipient government must decide whether our purposes and theirs coincide. The talk about “no strings” is a rather artful bit of propaganda.

Another reason for making stipulations is that we must take responsibility for what is going on. I met many Vietnamese out there who said: “You Americans are responsible for this reign of terror that's going on now and you must try to use your influence to prevent it.”

So, we did withhold the commercial import payments, and on the last weekend before he died, President Diem, for the first time in all of my many contacts with him, said he was willing to discuss the matters that we wanted to discuss. Up until that time he would simply look at the ceiling and talk about his childhood or

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talk about Vietnamese history and would absolutely refuse to discuss the matters with me that President Kennedy wanted me to discuss with him. I thought this was not a proper way to treat the representative of the President of the United States.

It was because we withheld commercial import payments that, finally, he realized that his position wasn't quite as strong as he thought it was, and he became willing to discuss some of the things we wanted to discuss—the most important of which was to have his brother, Mr. Nhu, take a vacation.

Now, if Mr. Nhu had taken a vacation and had gone away for awhile, Mr. Nhu would be alive today. So that President Kennedy's policy, far from being one which led to the liquidation of Diem and Nhu, would have saved both of their lives. There's every reason to believe that the generals, who were trying to bring about a change of government, would have included

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Mr. Diem in a very honorable and prominent capacity so as to make a bridge between the old and the new. That also might have happened had President Kennedy's policies been followed.

The thing that did happen was what this Vietnamese in Washington had predicted. The hatreds that were caused by these police state tactics resulted in Mr. Diem and Mr. Nhu being assassinated. You can't have the police knocking on the door at three o'clock in the morning, taking sixteen-seventeen year old girls out to camps outside of town where they may be molested and so on; you can't do that in any country—regardless of what country it may be—without laying the basis for assassination. That's precisely how you do it. And those were the insane policies that were being followed at that time.

So, I was trying to persuade and advise the government, and I was beginning to make

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progress when the coup finally came.

I believe that continuance of the Diem regime, as it was when I arrived, might have led to a communist takeover. Either the Communists would have come in because of the public revulsion against what was going on, or Mr. Nhu would have made a deal with them. I believe that what happened gave us a few more years of grace which I think we are using—and using in a way which will ultimately lead to a satisfactory outcome. I think this aggression is going to be warded off, and when it is warded off, Vietnam is going to have an era of prosperity such as it's never had before. In all of that President Kennedy played a very wise role.

When it became evident that the Diem regime was in its terminal phase and when we were receiving all these rumors of various efforts by various groups of Vietnamese to take power, my instructions from President Kennedy were "not to thwart"

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a coup. That, I think, was very wise. For example, I believe it would have been reprehensible for us to have communicated all rumors that we heard to the government. For one thing, the government had infinitely greater facilities for knowing what was going on than we did, and, if they couldn't keep themselves informed about these coups, there certainly was no reason to think that we could. But, also, it must be remembered that in a country like Vietnam it does not occur to most people that an election is a good way to decide anything important. Their history records a succession of tyrannies lasting eight or nine years, and then the tyrants get tired and elderly and get more cruel and more arbitrary, and then there's an overthrow. When we read in our newspapers here about a coup in Vietnam, we think in terms of a coup in the White House, and we're horrified. But it doesn't horrify the Vietnamese. In fact, when that coup

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came there were smiles on everybody's faces, and they just wanted to be sure that some of these officials who'd been torturing people and incarcerating them were going to get punished.

President Kennedy would have been interfering with the normal method in Vietnam for getting a change had he tried to prevent a coup. He couldn't have done it in the first place, but even if he could have, I think he would have been wrong in trying to do it, and his instruction to me "not to thwart" was a sagacious instruction, showing an awareness that the ideas that men live by in Vietnam are not the same as the ideas that they live by here. I think he was sophisticated in his realization that he was dealing with a different kind of a civilization, with a different kind of a culture.

I should say this final word. In everything that I did, I was in the closest

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possible contact with Archbishop Asta [Salvatore Asta], who was the Papal Delegate in Saigon. When I first arrived, I had great difficulty in finding out what was really the truth and what was going on. I didn't find that the Embassy was very well informed. There were a number of individuals who seemed important to me that were unknown to the Embassy. In casting around for some way to get dependable information which I could report to Washington and on which the President could base his decisions, I became friends with this very remarkable man, Archbishop Asta—a young but very wise man with great gifts of leadership and courage—who had a relationship with the million and a half Vietnamese Catholics which was quite remarkable. They placed a degree of trust in him which I thought extraordinary. The result was that he had authentic reports of conditions throughout the country. He and Professor Patrick J. Honey, formerly of the University

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of London, were two people whose reports I always found to be accurate. He was absolutely convinced that the Diem government had to reform itself, had to change its ways, that Mr. Nhu had to leave the country. I was present in the room when he told him so. I also was present in the room when he told Madame Nhu this on the telephone.

This absurd idea, which some people have promoted, that President Kennedy's policies were adverse to those of the Church, is absolutely fantastic and absurd on its face. And, yet, you know of people (and I know of one or two here in Washington) who still promote that idea. The truth is that everything we did had the approval of Archbishop Asta who was the Papal Delegate and spoke with authority and had a diplomatic as well as an ecclesiastical status.

Equally absurd is the statement that the President did not know a coup was coming. He was thoroughly informed about

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everything. Of course, neither of us—and no American, to my knowledge, knew in advance of the assassination of Mr. Diem and Mr. Nhu.

BARTLETT: Can I ask you a few questions?

LODGE: Is that of any interest to you?

BARTLETT: That's great. I think that's exactly what they wanted. I was wondering, on the 1952 campaign Kennedy's success against you has generally been attributed to the fact that he got such an early start while you were out around the country, he was making speeches to those small Rotary Club meetings around the state, and you were doing the Eisenhower campaign nationally. Is that your view of that election?

LODGE: No. I have a view which I think I can substantiate. What lost me that election were the Republicans who were angry at me because of the defeat of Senator Robert A. Taft at the Convention. If you study the election returns, you'll see that in the

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Democratic cities I ran ahead of Congressman Herter [Christian A. Herter], who was the Republican nominee for governor, and he ran way ahead of me in the Republican towns. I was cut by Republicans. The immediate reason was that the head of the Taft Committee in Massachusetts openly came out for John F. Kennedy.

BARTLETT: Was that Basil Brewer?

LODGE: Brewer, yes. He had always opposed me through his newspaper, but that had never seemed to have done me any harm; I always ran well in New Bedford, which is where his paper was. He'd been opposing me for years—just one of those things that you have in politics. But when he came out in the open for John F. Kennedy in his capacity, not as a publisher, but as the Chairman of the Taft Committee, that, I think, is what tipped me over. I got many letters after the election from Republicans saying "I didn't mean to defeat you; I wanted to punish you." Of all things!

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That is what did it, I think. Of course, President Kennedy was an attractive man. He worked hard; he had a fine war record; he had plenty of money and all that. But I don't think it was the tea parties; I don't think it was all that. I think it was this cutting by the Republicans. That was just a bonus for him.

BARTLETT: How do you rate the factor of your preoccupation with the Eisenhower Campaign, because that certainly had something to do with it?

LODGE: Well, I wasn't in there as much as perhaps I should have been, but I

think in a statewide contest (a state as big as Massachusetts) it's easy to exaggerate the importance of personal appearances. I believe that when many Republicans read in the paper that I had said that Senator Taft wasn't playing fair—which I never did say—but they read that I had said it, that it made them angry. Then they decided to vote against me. And I think all the personal appearances

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and all the Rotary Clubs in the world aren't going to counterbalance that. I had spoken at many Rotary Clubs anyway.

In November of 1951, I had, somewhat to my surprise, become the leader of an intra-party fight. I was the leader of the Eisenhower movement in a year when I was up for reelection. I thought it was the right thing to do. I also thought that with Senator Taft, whom I personally esteemed, the Republicans would not be in a competitive position—that you couldn't expect Senator Taft's views on foreign relations were not modern and realistic, and that General Eisenhower's were.

BARTLETT: For this record it might be interesting to know at what point you thought of John Kennedy as a dangerous adversary.

LODGE: I always thought he'd be dangerous. You see, I had defeated Jim Curley [James Michael Curley]; I had defeated David I. Walsh; I had defeated Joseph E. Casey. None of those three men

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could ever get united Democratic support. All three of them for different reasons. All of them were talented men, and they were friends of mine, too. In all of our contests we never had any feeling—particularly Jim Curley, we became great friends afterwards. But none of those three could possibly get united Democratic support, and they couldn't get any Republican support. I knew that Jack Kennedy would have united regular Democratic support. He was absolutely certain of it. I could still have beaten him with the Independents who supported me plus the Republicans. You see, Brewer could make the difference of thirty thousand votes. That's what he did. I was beaten by seventy thousand. If thirty-five thousand had gone the other way, I'd have been in the clear.

BARTLETT: Those thirty thousand votes—are they spread pretty much through the state?

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LODGE: They're spread in so-called "station wagon" communities. The Republican towns.

BARTLETT: Not just the western part of Massachusetts?

LODGE: No.

BARTLETT: Certainly nobody that saw you after January 1953 had any feeling that you really missed the Senate at all.

LODGE: Well, what I liked about the Senate was the chance that it gives you to focus public attention on something, but that slow pace, that interminable talking wasn't quite my dish of tea. It used to make me impatient sometimes. But I greatly admire and believe in the place of the Senate in the American system and I made great friendships there, men whom I miss seeing. The truth is that President Eisenhower sent me to the United Nations, and I was so busy—I got plunged into something else—and I never had a chance to think about it.

BARTLETT: General Clifton was very impressed by your attitude on this question of taking a

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diplomatic post in the Kennedy Administration. He told me many times of your emphasis on the fact that you would not go to any of the sort of cushy diplomatic posts.

LODGE: I didn't want to do that. I think those ought to go to the career diplomats, anyway. I think this gives them a good chance to get experience and so on.

BARTLETT: You don't remember how you phrased that?

LODGE: Well, I said, "I don't want a job." He said, "The President would like to know whether you'd be interested in a post of some kind." I said, "I don't want a job as such, because I have a good job. But if there's something that's difficult and important, where you think what modest talents I have can be useful, then I would be very glad to help."

BARTLETT: Now, I had the impression, just from this end of the wire, that Kennedy in his relationship with you as an ambassador—that you had a rather special relationship; it was a...

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LODGE: I thought it was. I was instructed by him to send my telegram directly to him, and he would decide how to distribute them. Usually, they come up through the State Department and go to the President. He sent me a question—five or six questions—to which he wanted answers every week. They were very, very searching. I'd get one done on a Wednesday afternoon, heave a sigh of relief, and then

I'd start collecting material for the next one. Those telegrams were due to his impatience, I think, with the fact that he was being required to read telegrams from a wide variety of government agencies, all coming in on different days, and none of them focused on exactly the same things although rather close to being on the same things. It put an impossible burden....

As I understand it, he said, "Look we've got to get some one man to pull all this stuff together and give me one telegram,

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and the man best placed to do that is Lodge." So I would take the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], the military, the State Department, U.S.OM [United States Operations Mission], U.S.IA [United States Information Agency], everything we had, and I would pull it all together. It was one man's telegram, written by one man, which I think is the only way anything can ever be written anyway. Then sometimes there'd be things I'd want to get supplemented, and I'd call the military, or I'd call CIA: "Well, what have you got on this? What have you got on that?" So, he was getting the distillation of the very best material in the government agencies, but it was all pulled together by one person. It seems to me that he was absolutely right; the President should depend on the ambassador to do that job and have it done out there, not have it done in Washington.

BARTLETT: I even further gathered, since you were the man on the scene, and you had lived with the situation and were closest to it, that he was very anxious to stick as closely

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as he could to your recommendations. Did you have that feeling at your end?

LODGE: Yes, I did. I felt.... Well, as I said earlier, I have telegrams from him saying, in effect, that I'd done what he'd hoped would be done. He encouraged original recommendations. I made several original recommendations which he said he liked.

BARTLETT: During this period, actually it was only four months, really...

LODGE: Well it was from August to November 20 because I went to Honolulu on November 20, and I had an appointment with him for Sunday the 24th. I was in San Francisco, on my way, when he was assassinated. I was at San Francisco in the Saint Francis Hotel when I got news that he had been killed.

BARTLETT: So we're really talking about exactly three months, from August 22 until November 20.

LODGE: Yes, less than three months.

BARTLETT: Less than three months. During that period were there any divergences between you and the President on major issues?

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LODGE: No. I remember once he said he wanted to retain control of events as late as possible before things began to happen. I wired back that I always conducted things so as to keep his control right up to the very last minute and to get as much room for him to maneuver as possible. I remember warning him that, once these generals started to move, the thing took on a life of its own and nobody could stop it. I remember telling him of that so that he wouldn't think that he could have his finger on the button right up until the end—that these things tend to take charge of themselves sometimes. There was never any difference of opinion. But I was advising him all the time. I was trying to advise him and inform him. He did all and more that any advisor can hope for. That is, all the advisor has a right to hope for is that his advice is considered. You can't expect all your advice to be taken. You do have a right to have it considered.

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He always considered it, and you knew that he did, and, in fact, he took a great deal of it.

BARTLETT: How much warning did you and he have on this overthrow when the colonels moved?

LODGE: You see, the colonels were very clever in that they deluged the town with rumors. There were so many of them that you didn't know which one was the good one, which was a new way of going at it. Diem, the day I saw him on that Friday—I saw him about twelve o'clock—he was dead the next day—I was making a farewell call about to leave for Honolulu—he said every time the American ambassador goes away they always try a coup. He said, "I know they're going to try a coup," but he couldn't tell where, couldn't tell who it was. There were rumors in the air. I thought there was going to be one, and I would have guessed within a day or two. When I was sitting at lunch and heard the cannons that

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Friday, I was surprised at that moment although I knew that a coup was imminent.

BARTLETT: You didn't know the individuals...

LODGE: Oh, I knew the individuals who were running the coup; then, I knew of individuals who were not running the coup whom we thought maybe would be. They can always fool us with that.

BARTLETT: Just the identity of where the conspiracy is coming from?

LODGE: Yes. They're very clever at that. We haven't got anybody in this country that knows the coup business the way they do.

BARTLETT: What options did you have as these rumors developed? Could you cut off the coup?

LODGE: I could not possibly have cut it off. I offered to get Mr. Diem out of the country; I offered to give him asylum; and I said I thought it could be arranged to get him an important place in the new government. His downfall was that he would not cut off in any way from Nhu. I didn't want him

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to turn his back and repudiate Nhu. I wanted him to let Nhu take a trip for six months—it really wasn't much we were asking—and then put in this man, Thuan [Nguyen Dinh Thuan], who was a very good man whom we all liked, as prime minister and get the thing less on a family basis and broaden it out a little bit.

BARTLETT: Nhu was really much more the irritant?

LODGE: Oh, yes. Diem was not an irritant. Diem was an attractive man. He had a nice personality and had a kindly side, basically. Nhu was the irritant, yes, very much so.

BARTLETT: As thing unfolded, you and the President were really in the grips of it; you didn't have many options.

LODGE: Well, those last two days. You can't—that's a very hard thing for outsiders to influence. They're on their home ground, you know.

BARTLETT: Mr. Ambassador, there's one point. In the last month of the President's life I noted

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a deep concern on his part, he used to say, "My God, the government is coming apart." I think he was very concerned by the divisions between the State Department and the CIA.

LODGE: Out there.

BARTLETT: Well, I think here, too, of course, but...

LODGE: We got that pretty well on the track.

BARTLETT: Towards the end, yes. It was pretty bad there in October, wasn't it? There was some question in my mind at that time from the outside whether this was maladministration in Washington.... In other words it seemed to me...

LODGE: Well, you see, everybody out there had been trained on the idea that Diem could do no wrong—uncritical support of him. Everything rides on him; everything he wants, we do it. I think we went overboard; we went too far.

BARTLETT: This was the military view, mostly?

LODGE: Well, everybody.

BARTLETT: State Department?

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LODGE: State, and yes, the Embassy, CIA—all U.S. agencies. Of course, President Kennedy was changing that. He said the Vietnam government ought to change their policies and change their methods. But it was very hard for the people who had been there through the previous policy to change. It became a very difficult adjustment for many of them.

BARTLETT: Including the CIA? The division is extremely sharp here in Washington, and I'm sure it was in the field, too.

LODGE: Well, the head of the CIA, Mr. Richardson [John H. Richardson], was a very fine man. He'd been instructed to help Nhu as much as possible. They'd built up this big Vietnamese counterpart. He was carrying out instructions. When the change in policy came out of Washington, obviously, he had to go. There was and is nothing against him personally. I always esteemed him, but he couldn't turn around and carry out the exact opposite—the

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policy Nhu ought to leave, Nhu ought to take a vacation, Nhu ought to get out of the government—when he'd been building him up as much as possible. This is a commonplace in the conduct of foreign relations.

BARTLETT: But the point I'm trying to get at is that you lived through the more formal National Security Council approach of the Eisenhower years.

What you had in the Kennedy years was a much less formal, the task force thing was a basically much lower level type of operation than the National Security Council thing. Well, you didn't have the regular meetings of the National Security Council, and there is a feeling that the coordination on crisis policies sometimes faltered in this arrangement.

LODGE: I can't say much about that at first hand.

BARTLETT: Was this task force vehicle pretty satisfactory?

LODGE: I don't know about that.

BARTLETT: The Vietnamese affairs were handled through a sort of task force—what they called a task force.

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LODGE: That was in Washington.

BARTLETT: In Washington, yes.

LODGE: I got my instructions signed from Rusk, or signed, from the President.

BARTLETT: You didn't deal with the task force?

LODGE: I couldn't tell. That was a Washington thing.

BARTLETT: But your problems of coordination in the field were not that...

LODGE: Oh, I had problems of coordination, but we finally—when I started getting that telegram off once a week, that took a lot of coordination. That was a good device to pull everything together.

BARTLETT: Were there improvements in the organizational setup that you could see from where you were that should be proposed?

LODGE: We created the U.S. Mission and the U.S. Mission Council. When I got there, there wasn't a room in the Embassy, physically speaking, in which the agencies could have a proper meeting. Of course, the Ambassador's supposed to be the chairman of the whole

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thing. We created the United States Mission and the United States Mission Council which Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor has carried to a very high pitch now. That was started when I was there.

BARTLETT: Can you think of anything else you want to say?

LODGE: I can't think of anything.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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