Theodore J. Musho Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 11/12/2002

Administrative Information

Creator: Theodore J. Musho
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Biographical Note
Theodore J. Musho was an architect at Pei Cobb Freed and Partners from 1961 to 1980 and a partner from 1980 onwards. This interview focuses on the original designs for the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, the original plan for it to be built in Cambridge, and the process of building it, among other topics.

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DAITCH: I’ll set up the tapes. I’ll just say that I’m Vicki Daitch, and I’m talking with Ted Musho, who is an architect and worked with Mr. Pei [Ieoh Ming Pei] on Kennedy Library. I guess the first question is how did Pei, Cobb, Freed come to be the people who were working on this?

MUSHO: Okay. So we want to go right back. But, all right, let me start that way then. I started at Mr. Pei’s office back in 1961, which is some 41 years ago. As you’re probably aware, there’s been several books written about the whole Kennedy saga. What I mean by that is the number of years that it took Mr. Pei. But when he received the job back in ‘64 or ‘65, I happened to be one of the young designers in the office, if you will, and I was assigned to the job along with several others. I mean there were half a dozen people assigned to the job: one to do traffic, one to do planning, one to do programming work. There were several people involved at the very beginning, including, obviously, Mr. Pei.

We’d either go to meetings together or separately, depending upon what the occasion was. As years went by, Mr. Pei and I were the only ones left. So I think it’s important to state at the beginning that there were a great many people that Mr. Pei brought in to focus on this job. For example, oh, he had a very good friend, a Mr. Muser, who specialized in soils. I’m thinking he was Muser, Bill Muser [William J. Muser], and
he used to come to talk to Mr. Pei. And one day we were contemplating the building, either on the barnyard site or here and so on. Although finally Haley & Aldrich out of Boston did the foundation work.

But what I would refer to at the very beginning, that Mr. Pei was already an established office, I mean there were 50 to 70 people in the office. They were doing buildings in Montreal, the P.V.M. Marie, which was being done by Harry Cobb [Henry N. Cobb]. They had work around the United States. It was a big office to garner various talents to work on the job. And included in that were planners, and we did a lot of planning.

The office was associated with Bill Zeckendorf [William Zeckendorf, Jr.], who was a developer, and he required planners and traffic engineers, for example, like Warren Travers Associates, who were virtually working on every job in the office, if you will. He was involved in the early days of the planning when we were still in Cambridge or trying to do a building in Cambridge. So there was a tremendous amount of interdisciplinary work done at the very beginning.

So at any rate, one of those people, I mean Vincent Ponte, who was at Harvard at the same time as Mr. Pei and at the same time as Harry Cobb, as the design nucleus of the firm, that there was, in fact, as I mentioned earlier, a bringing together of certain talents to put some work on. One of them was Vincent Ponte, Barton[?], Rogers[?], and the other was a Ken Carruthers[?], who I believe was a Canadian. But at any rate, he was in the firm. He worked on the program. And then there was a fellow named Bill Chaffee[?], who also was working on it. His special talent was to coordinate the programming to, in effect, bring together what the requirements might be. Because as the idea grew about the Library....

Because at that time there was no idea about what a presidential library should be. There was, you know, the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] Library and the Truman [Harry S. Truman] Library and then, you know, Grover Cleveland’s [Stephen Grover Cleveland] Tower down in Princeton. So there was really no idea. Oh, there was. I mean obviously those are viable presidential libraries. But that was not the thoughts that they had. The Kennedy Family wanted a place where “programs” could be brought together, educational programs, government programs, young people and politics, and so on.

So there was this whole idea. And, of course, then we, Mr. Pei, began relating with Richard Neustadt [Richard E. Neustadt] from Harvard, whom we met many times, you know, talking about the Institute of Politics. So that emerged as one of the ideas. And then the idea that there would be an Institute of Politics associated with a great university, namely Harvard. Then that grew to the School of Government because Harvard said, “We’re going to name the School of Government after the president, the deceased president.” So there began to be a lot of pressures or a lot of ideas, you know, as to what is this “program.” You see?

DAITCH: Right. So originally they were thinking about maybe having the Library be part of the Harvard Institute of Government?

MUSHO: Oh, yes, yes. In other words that was the whole idea was that there was a
so-called “Big Plan.” One of the ideas I had for this morning’s interview was to maybe just go this far with that idea, that there was this bringing together of a lot of ideas. Brought together primarily to create a living memorial, if you will—that’s such an overworked word—but the idea it contained was that the Institute of Politics would bring young people in from undergraduate work and with the resources of the Archives and the resources of the Harvard University School of Government, that they would bring together these ideas. And indeed that idea is what is represented in Harvard’s building over on the original site was, in fact, the Institute of Politics, which, of course, we all occasionally picked that up on TV, you know, the debates and so on. The senator comes and many people come, and of course they emblazoned over the dais the “John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Institute of Politics.” So that would have been part of the building. But that was the germ that was established by the family, you know, Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis] and....

At the very beginning most of that programming work was done with Mr. Pei and Richard Neustadt, and I really wasn’t involved with it that moment. But I began to get involved in it, though, when one needed to give it form, if you will, you see. I may just say parenthetically, by the way, and then we’ll try to take a different attack on this because it gets very complicated; it’s very difficult to understand. The program when it was put down on paper on a room-by-room, idea-by-idea, what does this idea physically require? was in the neighborhood of 150,000 square feet and would grow to 200,000 square feet, depending upon how it attached to the School of Government. And, for example, were there going to be rooms at the Institute of Politics that the students could stay? So it would be like a house, you see, in a normal university. So that was being generated. And then the question was, well, gee, let’s see something. If I can see something, you know. So that’s when I... I was on the job early on, but fundamentally the “let’s see something” is where the work began.

So when the site went from what is now the area of the Business School over to the other side; I wasn’t involved in the Business School site at all. But when the site came over to the Yards, Mr. Pei sent me out to find out about the Yards and what its relationship to Harvard Square is and so on. How many people go by, and how many cars go by? Where are the best views? What about those trees? What are those railroad tracks supported on? Who owns it? Et cetera, et cetera. So all of that, natural things that an architect does, began to focus. At the same time the team in the office was doing the program in a more finite way.

Now I think it might be wise, however, now to take a completely different attack on how to explain all of this. Because what I have done is put together an itemized list of what it is that we actually did. Now, over the years we did in Cambridge a scheme on that site. Now, I’ll go into about how the site was broken up and all that. But I want to just go broad stroke. I could illustrate those for you, and we can give them names so that you would understand what it is. There is the so-called Big Plan.

That Big Plan really relates to the big program idea. That is identified—and you’ll see in the books that have been published already like the Carter Wiseman [Carter Sterling Wiseman] book has a section on the Kennedy Library. The Big Plan was the first plan that, it was the first physical manifestation of Mr. Pei’s concept, that Mrs. Kennedy
saw. And that model of that object was this.

Now let’s explain it. And I don’t want to get into it too deeply because I’ll get back into it in a different way. I think we should identify is it was a crescent, half round, facing the sycamore trees on Memorial Drive. And then within that crescent and facing a public space was an inverted, truncated cone. Now, that was the first thing that she had seen. We showed it to her in her apartment on Fifth Avenue in May, and I’m trying to think if it was ‘66 or was it later? I don’t have the exact date. It might have been as late as 1970 that she actually saw that because.... And I’ll tell you what happened from ‘65 to ‘70 in a bit. Now then we did another scheme right after that.

DAITCH: She didn’t like this one?

MUSHO: Oh, no, no, no. Oh, no, no. Let’s not get into likes or dislikes. No, I’m just going to register....

DAITCH: This was the original....

MUSHO: Yes, the facts of the resources that we have about what we did. Because otherwise it’ll get too…. It’s going to get awfully complicated in a minute.

DAITCH: Okay. [Laughter]

MUSHO: Because you won’t understand otherwise. We can call this Item 1 if you want, but it’s the crescent with the inverted cone for the Museum.

DAITCH: Yes. And this is on the same site where the School of Government is now.

MUSHO: That’s right. This is the so-called barnyard site, the MBTA [Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority] site.

DAITCH: Okay.

MUSHO: Now, we’re still on the MBTA site. Second scheme after a lot of public discussion, which we’ll talk about later. There was another scheme emerged to respond to the criticisms about that scheme. I’ll talk about the criticisms of that scheme in a little bit. But let’s just get the schemes together because people will get confused, I think, if we don’t name them. That’s the crescent with the inverted cone.

DAITCH: Okay.

MUSHO: Now the next scheme that we did was a crescent that was substantially smaller than that, but which has the glass truncated pyramid in it. This is Scheme No. 2 we’ll call it, just for the sake of discussion. Now it’s significant that these are quite different because they represent a substantial input of
Harvard and the community. So that was Scheme 2. Now at that point there’s something very.... Something happens and this scheme was priced out. And for various reasons it became unaffordable because there was a lot of coordinated work that had to be done. And I want to just leave it at that point, and we’ll go back to it in a minute.

Because then there was another scheme that was put forward on the same site, basically the same pieces of land, the same land use. And it’s this scheme, which is the Library and Museum is completely separated from the Institute and the School of Government.

DAITCH: That looks completely different to me.

MUSHO: Completely different, yes. And the crescent is gone. So that each of the parties on the site, the Library-Museum, Harvard Institute of Politics, and the related facilities--related facilities is the code word for anything besides what we were doing, parking, a hotel, apartments, etc., that was related facilities, that was going to take place on another part of the site. This is Scheme 3. Now, something happens now. This date, you see, now, this is ‘74, and we could maybe track them. This I would call 1970, the first scheme. I would call this 1973.

DAITCH: The second scheme.

MUSHO: And this is now 1974.

DAITCH: Okay, the third scheme.

MUSHO: The third scheme. Now we have a problem. There now enters into it a programmatic issue that didn’t exist at all for the first three schemes, basically the first two schemes, really. And this date is when the Environmental Impact Statement Law was passed. So you had to do an impact statement. An impact statement was actually done on this Scheme 3 back in ‘74. It was just torn to pieces and dissected like a cadaver. I mean it was just absolutely rigorously understood: how many people, how many toilets, how many cars, how many buses, how long do they stay, where they eat?

DAITCH: And who does this?

MUSHO: I’ll get into that, because it’s going to get a lot more complicated. But I want to just lay out the schemes first. Now one of the key elements in the Environmental Impact Statement process is that you have to do alternatives, including the alternative of not building at all.

DAITCH: Oh, right. Yes.

MUSHO: So the Kennedys then turned…. The Kennedys, their friends, the
Kennedy.... I was just saying it’s more than friends. There was a.... We should have a separate talk about who was involved, and I have a list of people who....

DAITCH: Oh, great!

MUSHO: You can get some feeling for who was involved in this. There was really an outpouring of help. It was extraordinary. And one of those things during the EIS was you split the job, put the archive, the brains of the presidential library, at Harvard. But the museum, which caused so much turmoil as people looked at the original scheme, put the museum somewhere else. Where else is the question?

One of them was to put it in the Charlestown Navy Yard, right in the building adjacent to the berth space for the U.S. Constitution. That was thought to be at the time, and indeed it was, a very charming idea, and we looked at it, and we did some work on it, and so on, but not very much. One of the alternatives then, which I don’t have the document.... I think I just put an empty paper in here.

DAITCH: This is ‘74-75?

MUSHO: Yes, that’s right. When the EIS was being done, yes. And that other alternative on the same level as that was to put the museum in the Kennedy Center in Washington.

DAITCH: Okay.

MUSHO: This we need to talk about because there is a....

DAITCH: At the cultural....

MUSHO: Right in the Kennedy Center.

DAITCH: The Kennedy Center, huh!

MUSHO: Right where the symphony plays and so on. Yes, we’ll talk about that because that’s.... See, I’m over here now on this split scheme, you see. I’ve got the reduced scheme here, Scheme 1A, 1B, 1C. Then I’ve got the split scheme where I’ve got the archive in Cambridge only. Then I’ve got the museum; one of them is in Charlestown Navy Yard, the other one is at the Kennedy Center. And the other one was Barnstable. That was the split scheme. Then the alternate was to literally put the whole thing in Amherst or in Barnstable or Fall River or the University of Massachusetts at Columbia Point.

DAITCH: Here.
MUSHO: Yes. So now you understand why....

DAITCH: [Inaudible].

MUSHO: But now you begin to understand I’m not through yet, you see.

DAITCH: Absolutely.

MUSHO: Of why we did all these schemes, why I think it’s necessary to use this as the ladder for approaching likes, dislikes, what’s the program like, who was against it, how did we do it, and so on. Because then we can begin to refer. Indeed it may prove extremely useful because there are some people that criticized what we did here, for example, based on what we did over there. So there was baggage that we had developed, in fact, you see.

DAITCH: Right, right. Yes.

MUSHO: So then finally when we came to this site, we actually did a scheme next to the university. We did one on the far corner. We did one over here over the outfall pipe. And then we finally did this scheme. So there were in fact four issues that needed to be resolved on this site.

DAITCH: Right. Wow!

MUSHO: That was done after the alternate site was theoretically to put it at U-Mass. And, you know, it was a university just like at Amherst; there was the University of Massachusetts. We actually went out to Amherst and looked at a site. Barnstable seemed like a good idea, too, and so on. But we didn’t do any work on any of these four at that time. It was only later that we decided that U-Mass was the clear choice at that point, for very complex reasons, that we went over here and then did all this work. And then you can see we had to do it four times before we arrived at the answer. So now that, I think, gives us a little something to hang our hat on, you see.

DAITCH: Yes. This is wonderful. I don’t suppose there’s a chance that I can get a copy of this?

MUSHO: No, I think you can. We’ll see where.

DAITCH: Okay. Great.

MUSHO: Now, I think the thing to do now maybe is to.... Let’s see if we.... Maybe now the best thing would be to do is to talk a little bit about our client, if you will. Because, you know, when the job started, of course, Mr. Pei worked directly with Mrs. Onassis. She had a gentleman, a Bill Walton [William
Walton, who came very often relative to artistic matters, something to bounce things off of. And Bill and Mr. Pei became very good friends, as well as Jackie became very good friends with Mr. Pei. But when on a day-to-day arrangement, or week-to-week, whatever it be, you were more likely to call Mr. Walton up than to call Mrs. Onassis obviously.

And of course if we had a meeting assigned, we might have a preliminary meeting with Mr. Walton before we met with her. Or other members of the family like Mrs. Lawford [Patricia Kennedy Lawford]. She would come over on occasion. Or Eunice Shriver [Eunice Kennedy Shriver]. That we’d try things out on before. We didn’t have many of those. But the point is I think it’s important that after the family suffered the loss of Bobby as well, there was another moment there when one had to regroup.

Then Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] became the key member of the team, if you will. And that’s when I started relating, because Steve and I related throughout the life of the job after that. You know, obviously Mr. Pei. But on a daily basis Steve would have no problem calling me up anytime he wanted to. In fact, he gave me the opportunity of calling him up anytime I needed to. So there was at least a connection there. Then I would run to Mr. Pei, you know, as soon as it required and so on. So there was a close link there. Then, of course, Steve Smith hired a full-time man named Bob Burke [Robert E. Burke] after that. So on a daily basis Bob Burke and I related, and then, of course, he related back to Steve, and I related back to I.M.

Then as the scheme developed—or schemes, I should say in plural, or plurals—it got involved. Then when.... I’m just trying to think in my own mind how to best now.... Let me stay with the people just a while longer because obviously Bill Walton, Bob Burke. There was LeMoyne Billings [K. LeMoyne Billings], another friend of Steve’s particularly, that also occasionally came by.

Okay, then there was the Harvard group. There was Dick Neustadt, and there were other members of the faculty of the School of Government that Mr. Pei related to, and I have those names, but they’re not that familiar to me. But the notion that the program for the School of Politics had to be done up and that the School of Government had to be done, Mr. Pei and I interviewed several people at the School of Government about their offices and how they conceived of this working and so on. But that comes on its way. It’s not a high point necessarily because they wanted to see what it would be first before they’d say, well, you know, I want that spot. And then, of course, how would it be paid for and all that kind of stuff was another issue.

But there was at that time also then Dan Fenn [Dan H. Fenn, Jr.] from the Library, who was the director of the Library at the time, and he had his group. And of course Allan [Allan Goodrich] was one of those people that I met. John Stewart. And then, of course, there was Dave Powers [David F. Powers]. Then on a daily basis.... Now, that was the government group, you know, Dan Fenn and this. And then there were people from the GSA [General Services Administration] that I met whose names I could think about, but I don’t know off the top of my head.

DAITCH: The GSA?

MUSHO: Yes, the GSA. Well, the National Archives & Records Service [NARS].
think they were, were not, I can’t recall, part of the GSA at that time. There was some kind of organizational change that took place at that point. And then, of course, I think what happened was when.... Maybe this is the time to mention that we did a tremendous amount of studies from ‘65 to ‘70 and into ‘73, wherein which we developed a tremendous amount of information about how to get the MBTA out of that yard. And, of course, there was an incredible effort of frustration because, you know, those people, they more than occupied this site. I mean there was no way you could do anything with them there. I mean we’d studied whether or not we could build on top of them and stuff like that.

DAITCH: This MBTA, is that transportation?

MUSHO: Yes, that’s the people that occupied the site.

DAITCH: The public transportation.

MUSHO: That’s the very same. This is the site. That’s why I showed you, you see. Most people don’t even remember anymore. But you see....

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh!

MUSHO: Hold on just a minute because I think there’s something that.... Well, let me insert a few more people because I think it’s important. Here, you see there was Steve Smith, you know, and the Kennedys. And then Helen Keyes [Helen M. Keyes] was the administrator for the Kennedy Library. She’s dead, as several of them are. But she was my daily contact with the Library, before Steve Smith actually came on the scene. I mean he was there all the while, but on meetings in Boston, I would come up, meet with Helen, and we’d go see the MBTA. We’d go see the MDC, the District people. We would go see the politicians over in Cambridge. We would write minutes and report to Steve. And as things began to warm up, then Steve would come and various other people.

DAITCH: So this would have been in the early years.

MUSHO: This is very early years, yes. This is going back from ‘65 to at least ‘72. Now then when they had a Planning Committee, I would use some heavy names, you see, over here: Mr. McNamara [Robert S. McNamara], Eugene Black [Eugene R. Black], and Douglas [William O. Douglas]. Those are heavy names. They only came when.... I mean they had meetings at Steve Smith’s apartment or up in Boston here. But they were instrumental people.

And then there was the Building Committee: John Driscoll. John Fallon [John T. Fallon] took a strong role. He was the friend who was also.... And by the way, they’re all sailors. And I insert that in here because we’ll talk about sailing later on as a significant item.
DAITCH: No kidding!

MUSHO: The Museum Committee: Dan Fenn, of course, Tom Johnson [Thomas Johnson], Mrs. Onassis, of course, Steve Smith, and then there was William Walton, you see. Then there was the Screening Committee. This is the people that were involved in the choice of Mr. Pei as the architect. I mean I could talk about that, but that’s not one of my strong points in that sense at all.

But then, you see, we had Museum advisors: Milt Gwirtzman [Milton S. Gwirtzman] who was a Kennedy aide. Ed Martin [Edwin M. Martin] was involved, Milton Gwirtzman. Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] and so on, less so. I mean he became more involved later on when the building starts going. But then other people that we met quite often, was Ropes & Gray, which was the firm that I worked with quite well. That was Paul Perkins [Paul F. Perkins, Jr.] and Paul was doing a lot of the legal work involved in it.

Then there was Curran & Black, who were insurance people and that’s Jack Fallon; that was his company. And then there were the people from Harvard. It has Derek Bok [Derek C. Bok] here. Before Derek Bok was Nathan Pusey [Nathan Marsh Pusey], and Derek Bok was made president during the whole number of years there. So really Nat Pusey should be in here. But at any rate, Hale Champion [Charles Hale Champion] then became the vice president for Financial Affairs. We worked with him a little bit. Then Charles Daly [Charles U. Daly], you recognize used to be, or I think still is, on the board of the Kennedy Library. And Charles Daly used to be with Harvard for a while.

Then there’s John Dunlop [John Thomas Dunlop] whom we met several times. Richard Fryberger [Richard N. Fryberger] and Harold Goyette. These two people here, Fryberger and Goyette, were planners for Harvard, and we worked very closely with them. Richard Leahy, we worked with him. Then Ernest May [Ernest R. May] and Neustadt and Price [Don K. Price], these people here were involved in the Institute of Politics and writing the program. Then let’s see we’ve got the university, Hale Champion we mentioned already. Charles Daly, we mentioned him. Harold Goyette, we mentioned him. But these are the Planning Committee, you see.

And the Joint Building Committee, these are the joint--this is when we’re going to do the Big Plan, which we’ll go back again in a minute. But you see why now mentioning that first gives us a little something to hang our hat on once we refer to it, you see. Because the Big Plan was a very real idea, and I’ll tell you the virtues of it in a minute. All right, well, Stanley Hoffman was part of the School of Government, and we’ve interviewed him and so on. And there was J. Q. Wilson [James Quincy Wilson], who was very famous. But we interviewed a lot of these people at one time or another.

DAITCH: And those people you talked to because they were going to be part of....

MUSHO: Part of the building, yes. And also how do you enunciate the virtues of this program? Where might they go? There’s all sorts of interesting nuances where people go at buildings in Harvard.
DAITCH: I’ll bet.

MUSHO: They don’t want to be associated with the Museum with a lot of hordes of people. They’d like a quiet corner, etc., etc. And which property should go to Harvard? And while all this was swirling around, I was back there trying… Mr. Pei and I were trying to figure out how to juggle this site in order to resolve a lot of those issues, political issues, if you will, or political whatever you want to call them.

But at any rate, these people were all involved in it, Harvard…. Let me turn. I’ve got a.... Now, this is the group here, Dan Fenn, John Stewart, Dave Powers, James Rhoades [James B. Rhoades], Dan Reed, and Richard Jacobs. Those people we met on occasion, especially later on when it became an EIS problem. See, because you couldn’t enunciate for the environmental impact people what this Library is. I mean why is it called a library? Why don’t you just call it a museum? Well, it’s not a museum, it’s an archive, too. So the umbrella word is “library.” But there’s a very strong component of public-related museum. Also, archival-related aspects.

So those two things had to be married. And that caused a lot of consternation to understand that, you see. I mean Harvard, you know, has classroom space, but they also have museums. They have Robinson Hall, or they have the Widener Library, but you go inside the Widener Library and see Houghton inside it. So there is a very familiar relationship here. But the Museum was, in fact, the public-oriented, political characterization that obviously you had to talk about and deal with it because it was not an easy thing to overcome.

DAITCH: So from the perspective of an Environmental Impact Statement, they care about this issue because of traffic patterns and what types of people?

MUSHO: Oh, it’s unbelievable.

DAITCH: How many people?

MUSHO: Yes. I can give you a quick paragraph on that. Maybe this is not exactly right. Let me get past this for just a second.

DAITCH: Okay. Let’s finish talking about the people.

MUSHO: Yes, the cast of characters. Because I think it’s important.

DAITCH: Absolutely.

DAITCH: In this process. Now, here we’ve got the Citizens Committee of Harvard; not of Harvard but of Cambridge. Cambridge Citizens Committee. We then began to meet the people that we were going to be facing. There’s a couple people
here that if I never meet them again in my life, it would be too soon. And I don’t mean that in a selfish sense. They did what they had to do, and we did what we had to do. Unfortunately, we parted ways. But I mean the Planning Commission, business association. … Well, this is a list of … Theodore Monicelli, who was a professor at Harvard but also then became the planning man for Cambridge; we worked very closely together to see if we could make something work.

Then, of course, the director of…. The fire commissioner, which we’ll talk about later, about how do you do a fireproof building? Et cetera, et cetera. Cambridge Conservationists. Harvard Square Business Association. And some of these people had a greater connection obviously with Bob Burke, Steve Smith, and let’s say Dan Fenn. It’s only when those gentleman turned to me and said, “Ted, you know, we’ve got a problem here. How are we going to solve it because it’s physical?” that I became involved or the office became involved.

Well, here’s the MDC. We didn’t get involved with the MDC until we came to this site. But John Sears [John Winthrop Sears] and a couple of these people here I worked with when we came to the Columbia site here.

DAITCH: What’s the difference between the MBTA and the MDC?

MUSO: The MBTA is the Metropolitan Bay Transportation Authority. The MDC is the Metropolitan District Council. Now the district is something…. Gee, I think I might have thrown that piece of paper away. But they run the sewers, a very important issue.

DAITCH: Oh, yes.

MUSO: I’ll talk about it. You go across a sewer every day when you come into this space. They don’t talk about that because that is…. I spent a lot of time with those people. And I spent a lot of time with the MBTA relative to the old site here. But when we came to Columbia Point, I no longer saw the MBTA. Although Steve Smith, you know, retained the Kennedy Park over there. So he still worked with those people. But at any rate…. Now, let’s see. So we have…. Let me just try to summarize. We have the family, the family’s friends, you know, a separate group of people that worked with us. We had the City of Cambridge and their community. We had Harvard University. We had the Planning Committee that the Library set up, you know, professional people as well as their friends, if you will.

That was an incredible team because we used to have meetings, for example, run by Ropes & Gray, by Paul Perkins, you know; there were the lawyers. He would turn to some of these people, who now I’ve forgotten names. But he would turn, for example, to…. I mean, you see, Ed Hanify [Edward B. Hanify] was the big man at Ropes & Gray. But Paul Perkins would turn to Jack Fallon, for example, or he would talk to Harvard, somebody like Hale Champion. And he would get a reading from them about a certain problem, you see. Then he would turn to me and say, “Well, Ted, where are you on this?”
you see. Especially when we did the EIS. So you had to frame an answer for certain questions of the EIS. So we'll get into that now.

All right. So now we've got the cast of characters. Now there's one other entity, and that is C.E. McGuire. C.E. McGuire is a company that was hired by the GSA, the government office, in fact, to do the Environmental Impact Statement.

DAITCH: So they didn't go through...? When was the EPA established, '69 or thereabouts?

MUSHO: Something like that. It was during the Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] Administration. It's one of the cruel....

DAITCH: I know. An irony there.

MUSHO: But, yes, it was interesting. But at any rate, yes, it happened....

DAITCH: So they hired an outside....

MUSHO: Well, it's an enormous job. It's not something you can do in-house. In fact, Pei, Cobb, Freed couldn't do it. No, it's an interdisciplinary deal. In fact, Arthur Little [Arthur D. Little, Inc.], out of Watertown, you know, specializes, let's say, in acoustics, they specialized in air quality, etc., etc. C.E. McGuire [Charles E. McGuire, Inc.] has a similar thing, and I don't quite understand how they got the job. I mean that wasn't my, I mean, it was GSA hired them. But they brought an enormous team of people on board.

All right. Now those people here, I've got the names, a lot of those people. And see what I've done here I have a chronology going back from '64, telling you what the subject that these people discussed on certain dates, you see, and so on. And these people here.... Well, you'll see Mr. Chaffee that I mentioned earlier, Mr. Neustadt, Mr. Ponte from our office, and Chaffee. Here's Carruthers from our office, you see, and Mr. Pei, of course.

Then, as it gets further down here, here's Neustadt, Pei, Goyette. As soon as you see Goyette, you know Harvard is involved. Trottenberg [Arthur Donald Trottenberg], you see. So these people were here. “Harvard briefs on the Library’s intentions. Certain proposal regarding Institute made by Mr. Neustadt.” So we had to do this for the EIS. So, in other words, where did this thing come from?

DAITCH: You had to go all the way back to the beginning?

MUSHO: Well, we had to give them the papers that we had worked on to substantiate the program. Because why are you building 100,000 square feet? The community wants to know. Why aren't you only building 50,000 square feet? How many parking spaces do you need for these people? How many people are going to come to that? So what we had our office do was to organize the documents. And
then here, Bowdoin Street is where Ms. Keyes had her office. Twenty-two Bowdoin Street, by the way, was the apartment that President Kennedy had in Boston as his address.

DAITCH: Really!

MUSHO: Yes. It was a little apartment that she had her offices in.

DAITCH: No kidding!

MUSHO: We used to have meetings there, related facilities and potential developers on 11 March ‘66. So all those early years, you see, we were collecting information, writing letters, you know, accumulating all of the information. Here’s one here: Office of the Mayor of Cambridge. Ms. Keyes, Mr. Lavin[?], the mayor, city manager, Mr. Pei, Mr. Ponte, and myself. There’s probably a letter related to this—this is hyphenated—where we tried to organize the points made and questions asked.

DAITCH: So we’re talking here about....

MUSHO: We explained our insertion of “a new road parallel to Memorial Drive will relieve the congestion at this intersection and avoid the need for such an underpass.” There was a question there, when we got into it, why aren’t.... I mean this is big stuff, fellows. Why don’t you deal with it on a larger scale? Well, obviously a larger scale would have physical implications about the Library. So we tried to do a finite study about the traffic and see whether or not it was absolutely necessary. Because all of these things involved, you know, money issues, too, because we had budgets and so on.

DAITCH: Sure.

MUSHO: So that’s one list. Now we have another list here going from ‘67 going on up to ‘73, and this here are all the peoples that are involved, you see. And here outlined the course of events necessary to move the project. In 1970, five years later, we’re still having.... And this gets.... Here: “MBTA acquisition of the New Street property. The building of the new yards. Withdrawal from the Bennett Street Yards.” That’s the site there. Thirty people were at that meeting, you know. And I usually kept the minutes, but at any rate.... Or actually Paul Perkins from Ropes & Gray did more of it than I did. But in any case, all of that stuff....

Now here’s a meeting at Harvard that Holy Oak’s Center. Here’s the MDC offices on Memorial Drive. All the people. There was another gentleman from our office, a John Sullivan [John L. Sullivan], who was also involved in the job early on, and later on he was not. Here’s another fellow from our office, Alan Terry[?]. Here is soil analysis. This Mr. Sal DeSimone [Salvatore V. DeSimone] worked for Muesler Rutledge [Muesler Rutledge Consulting Engineers], and we were there working with the soils engineers.
about the effects of those trains and whether we could build a building on top of it. Okay, so that’s the list of... That’s another list. Then from ‘74 to.... Wait a minute here, there’s a date on this thing. Is this the same?

DAITCH: It looks like the second one went to ‘73 or ‘72.

MUSHO: ‘Seventy-three. Maybe there’s a slight overlap here on this group. But this here, I believe, is the package that we sent to Charles E. McGuire. Oh, no, wait a minute. I know what this is. No, no. This is the list that relates specifically to a scheme. This now relates to specific alternatives. For example, here’s a list of people that you haven’t seen before. When we finally got to the University of Massachusetts, Bob Wood [Robert Coldwell Wood], Dan Robinson[?], William Rawn [William Leete Rawn, III], and Carlo Gallino[?], who was the chancellor of this campus, William Meehan[?], Charles Eliot[?], all of these people were new people. And then here, Steve Smith, a memo to Steve Smith from Bob Burke, all of the things that we needed to do to get back up to speed to build the building here as opposed to there.

DAITCH: Right. So here’s where the switch was.

MUSHO: In ‘74, yes. Well, the switch took over a long period of time. It didn’t happen overnight, I can tell you. I mean we still had a foot there and a head here. Sometimes we had our head here and foot someplace. It’s a terrible.... Now here’s Charles E. McGuire, 1976. This is when he was doing the second EIS when we moved here. In other words, once you decide to make scheme so-and-so, the Columbia site, once you’ve started to make that the primary site, you have to do another EIS. So we did all of these early studies, and that early study for the EIS in Cambridge was done on Scheme 1C. 1C includes the alternatives of the split and alternative sites. One of those alternate sites includes Columbia Point, so you gotta do another EIS.

DAITCH: Okay.

[END SIDE 1, TAPE 1]

[BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 1]

DAITCH: But you don’t have to do an EIS for every alternate site? It’s just like a....

MUSHO: No, no. Once you adopt a list of criteria, and those criteria are better brought to focus, or brought into being, i.e., U-Mass here, then you go back here and do a complete EIS for this site to be sure you don’t overlook something or there may be something lurking, and so on and so on. And, of course, you already have what you’ve done on the other sites as your alternatives.

DAITCH: Oh, right. Oh, I see. So you don’t have to do an alternative report.
MUSHO: No, no, you don’t have to do it. But these fellows.... See, McGuire did not take all of the things into consideration. For example, we never talked to the MDC on the other site. But the site had a lot to do with this over here.

DAITCH: Oh, really!

MUSHO: Well, yes, because we cross the sanitary sewer pipe, this dumping.

DAITCH: Yes, I see.

MUSHO: Now I think we’ve got all of the physical and the personalities at least on the table.

DAITCH: Right. Yes. This is wonderful that you’ve spent the time to organize the thing.

MUSHO: Well, I took a lot of.... I mean I don’t know if I got all of it yet because a lot of my sketches and Mr. Pei’s sketches are someplace else, or he’s got them someplace else. But okay. Now let me, here, you see what we did, I got the list of the schemes, the list of the participants. Now let’s talk about the program. I mean there was a lot of work done on the program because we went down to the Truman Library. We went to the.... I mean actually the Truman Library and the Eisenhower Library are, in their own way, extraordinary places. But we couldn’t decide whether they had programs. They didn’t have programs like we wanted to do, and they didn’t.... I mean it was not media-conscious at all.

When we did the research for Dan Fenn and Dave Powers about all of the memorabilia and all the papers and so on, I really never, I mean I never sat in a research room like these people here and literally look at these papers. However, I did do that on the Eisenhower Library trip. And I meant, literally, not just sitting down. But we actually were talking through the archives, and I turned to the gentleman who was walking us through, and I said, “Hey, let me look in one of these things.” And I saw these gray boxes, you know. He pulled one out, and there was this original letter, you know. And like wow!

DAITCH: It’s amazing, isn’t it?

MUSHO: You’re really.... You get an appreciation fairly quick about what’s happening.

DAITCH: Absolutely.

MUSHO: Which was terrific because it gave us a new impetus, and it gave us a level of.... Well, I mean we were all very serious. But there was a level of
historical impetus gripped us, you know. Because here we’re doing something not for today but for a long time, for historical reasons, and so on. And then, of course, occasionally we met people like Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] and Schlesinger, and there’s a certain headiness that comes with being with people who saw him before it was in the newspapers. And of course Mr. Pei, who was touched more by that than any of us, indeed thrived on it. Because those are the people, as he knew better than any of us, that were the people that were going to be the judge of what we had to do.

So the programming. We know something about programming obviously, and it fell to us. We then went and interviewed people like Stanley Hoffman; I remember interviewing him at Harvard with Mr. Pei and Mr. Lipset [Seymour Martin Lipset], the social scientist. They had marvelous insights into what a university should be and how the program should be run. They weren’t involved in the physical, you know, by the way, I want 128 square feet. You know, I mean they weren’t involved in that. But they gave Mr. Pei the kind of input that he needed, a characterization of the importance of and potential importance of this whole effort.

DAITCH:  Right. So what is this building going to do?

MUSHO:  Yes, yes. Then we recognized the public side of it, “But you’ve got to remember, Mr. Pei, that we’re in a university atmosphere. You know it’s not a circus here,” and that. So there was that blend of need with a larger purpose. I know as a young man, I mean I was only in my early thirties, I was much taken with the connection with those people. And to go back and translate into square feet through Harvard’s Planning Group, too, Harold Goyette and Dick Fryberger, both seasoned people on the Harvard campus, because, you know, they built buildings for these people or in other schools. The Harvard group is a tough group in the sense that they know what they want, and you’re the architect, and, you know, you’ve got to find a way of giving it to them. And what does that mean? I mean here we are now, sitting in this office looking at the water. I mean, you know, this would never have happened in Cambridge. And I say to myself, later on when we talk about the virtues of this site, clearly this is one of them.

DAITCH:  Absolutely.

MUSHO:  On the other side of the coin, we sat and talked about looking out on the Charles River where the president indeed walked as a young man. And we looked at the sycamore trees, and after some discreet pruning, would be a little more transparent. And then, you know, there’s Eliot House over there and a short walk up to Harvard Square. So we were getting inoculated with the attitude that was necessary to make this thing real in Harvard Square and Harvard campus. At the same time, recognizing the constituency of a museum and so on.

Then the relationship with the museum and the archive…. You see, none of the places that we went to had a really first-class museum. Now, except, but in different ways, the Roosevelt [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] Library has a fantastic ambience. The
old house to look over the Hudson River. I mean you came away there really understanding the character of this man, the president. So when we came back and had a skull session amongst us about what a delightful environment, you know, and then tried to relate that back to our site in Cambridge, you know, obviously all of these things are boiling around in your head.

In any event, these numbers, these square feet, 30-, 35,000, 45,000 square feet of exhibit space. It’s worth mentioning, by the way, that the memorabilia and the archival stuff is beginning to be collected out at Waltham. So I was taking trips out to Waltham to sit with Alan and John and Dan and Dave, and they started talking about what they needed: trucks to unload, you know, real stuff.

DAITCH: Yes, permanent stuff.

MUSHO: Something solid, yes. And, oh, by the way, there’s got to be air-conditioning. So we were beginning to collect the environmental needs, the poetic needs, the truck needs.... To go back to the trucks on this building, by the way, we’ll talk about that at the end of the day. That’s an interesting story about how the trucks get into this building.

So we had in the.... In other words, the program is something more than the physical collection of room by room, elevator by elevator, trucks by trucks. There’s something way beyond it. That was my job. Mr. Pei will tell you that’s.... He will tell you to be sure that that works. But he was burdened with a lot more than that. The real architecture is poetry. In a sense, what is the building telling you? What is the environment that you made for the ambience, for the ensemble?

So we met with the family, we met with Harvard, we met with the friends of the family, which is different than the family in a sense. Because things are bouncing off all the time, you know, and these people would be connected to Cambridge or not be connected to Cambridge. And there were all sorts of things.

Now, at the same time, literally on the same time, it happened simultaneously, when Mrs. Rose Kennedy went to the state and asked for them to put the presidential library on what is known as the Bennett Street Yards and that was accomplished, there then began an enormous discussion with the MBTA of getting those people off the site so we could occupy it with the Library.

DAITCH: Now when was this?

MUSHO: This is ‘65, right at the very beginning.

DAITCH: At the very beginning, okay.

MUSHO: At the very beginning. And I have a series of drawings that illustrates that event. Now, this set of drawings here, this is the job. That’s what I showed you about the.... We decided to call this the 1966-1970 scheme, No. 1. This is No. 1.
DAITCH: That’s the inverted cone.

MUSHO: Well, the grand scheme.... It’s still in there. Well, the Scheme 1, 2, and.... Hold on. What did he say? I marvel that some people even having any.... Here. The big crescent and then the smaller crescent. And these two schemes here are the Grand Plan. The Big Plan.

DAITCH: Right. One Big Plan.

MUSHO: One big thing. Now whether it’s a pyramid or a cone is a separate issue. But these two, there’s a significant difference between these two. But then we get into the ‘74 and ‘75, and you’re still on the same site. But you’re now doing the EIS, and this is the full complement. It’s still the Grand Plan, but it’s fractured. I mean it’s broken into a lot of pieces. It was a significant thing to do that. Then at the same time, we then split it literally. So it was a shake-out, a split, and then alternate sites. So this effort here is like.... So if you were to do it, you can call this I, II, III.

DAITCH: Right. Okay.

MUSHO: Then in I you have Scheme 1 and 2 if you want to call it that. And then over here you now have Scheme 1 here. So you’ve got I and Scheme 1. Then you’ve got the split, which could be called 2. And then you’ve got the alternatives, which is 3. And then 3, of course, is sub-headed with an asterisk that has five alternatives. Then one of those alternatives becomes the alternate site, and that’s then effort No. 3, which has four pieces to it.

So now when the Grand Plan was being concocted.... There’s one other issue that I’ve got to talk about that I failed to mention. When architects or any city or anybody works on a piece of architecture, you’ve probably heard the old remark: There’s only one thing that you judge a hotel by, or there are three things you judge a hotel by. One is location. The second one is location. The third is location. And location has to do with place. And whatever it is the place, your place.

That “place” is the “essence”, from a.... I’m trying to plug it into the public world. The plug into the public world: Architecture is a profession that is registered, that is regulated by public authorities. And the reason for that is that architecture is a public safety, “technical” feat. In other words, you can build a piece of poetry, but it has to have stairs, it has to have elevators, it’s got to be fire proof, it’s got to be water, so on and so on, keep the rain out. So that the authorities, in fact, grab you by the neck and say, “Okay. You can keep your feet running. But, by the way, you’ve got to do all those other things besides.”

Now, along with that, obviously, you’ve got to get your water and electricity and parking and road curbs, cuts, and so on from the city. So you’ve got all that to deal with. Than on top of that, the city regulates how big the buildings can be on the site that you’re building. It’s regulated by the area of the site or how high it’s going to be. Also, there’s
regulations that you’ve got to go see certain community groups. You’ve got to go see them for political reasons, or you’ve got to go see them because that’s the way the laws have been written: that you’ve got to satisfy the community that you’re not unduly disturbing their peace of mind by this new effort that you’re putting in.

So there’s not doubt, and indeed there was no hesitation there, I mean that’s part of what Mr. Pei brought to the table was our capacity to relate to the community. Because we’re urban architects. We do buildings for people. We’re not doing buildings as monuments. Although obviously there are people who would dispute that. But anyway, in any case, it should be said that, and must be said and must be emphasized, that there is a lot more to this process than simply putting something out on the table. Because everything that we showed on any scheme that we did was completely thought out within the obligations, or beyond the obligations, that we were required to do by our professional ethics. I mention that not for any vainglorious idea, but simply to ratify, if you will, the amount of time and effort that it takes to do it.

DAITCH: Mmmm hmmm. I noticed on these lists that you showed me of the various meetings and things, it looked like you were meeting with people sometimes two different groups on the same day. Sometimes three or four meetings a month.

MUSHO: Oh, no. I mean from ‘65 to ‘77, you know, 12 years of doing the architectural form. At the same time, responding and keeping everybody up to date. I mean Cambridge expected and indeed they deserved, and so did Harvard and so did the family, that we keep up. “Ted, what are you doing?”

DAITCH: That’s right.

MUSHO: “I want to see something. But what are you doing?” And not to me, Ted, “Mr. Pei, what are you doing?”

DAITCH: “Mr. Pei, what is Ted doing?”

MUSHO: Yes. Sometimes that’s happened, yes. But mostly the other way around. “Mr. Pei, what are you doing?” because he’s the heavy hitter. Having said that, there is one characterization that comes out of that, and that is land use. Land use is regulated by the state. If you have a parcel of land, there are certain things you can do with it and certain things that you cannot do with it. In fact, one precludes the other or whatever. That declaration of land use is an extremely important characterization.

There is one other characterization that.... I want to go back, I have to go back a little bit, but it bears on this. And that is when the State of Massachusetts consented to buy the land from the Transportation Authority [MBTA], and then give it as a gift of the people of the State of Massachusetts to their “Favorite Son” who was assassinated, that piece of property could not be deeded to the John F. Kennedy Library Corporation. It had
to be deeded to a higher authority than itself. Now there’s a lot of reasons for that, and one of the reasons is obviously politics or graft or whatever else.

DAITCH: Sure.

MUSHO: You don’t have a state run by somebody taking pieces of property and whatever....

DAITCH: And handing it over privately.

MUSHO: It has to go to a higher authority. Now that is an extraordinarily.... I mean I’m not so sure they couldn’t have given it to the Library. I don’t really know enough about it. But it’s an extraordinary characterization because it was, because the property was owned already by the federals that when the EIS law was written, they were obligated by [Loud bang; smacking the EIS stack of papers] that they had to do an Environmental Impact Study.

DAITCH: Oh, so they wouldn’t have otherwise.

MUSHO: They may not have. I mean it’s a very important issue because.... I say it’s important because I just find it enormously interesting that.... The Library Corporation was, by its charter, going to build the John F. Kennedy Library. As soon as it was built, it would be automatically, well, I don’t know automatically, but in fact would only be built by being transferred to the federal government, i.e., the building, the physical building.

In this case, if they had built it on the property that they owned, literally, they would give everything over. But they would be a corporation, or a nonprofit corporation, that was in fact building a building on a piece of property and then turning it over. But in this case they were building it on federal property. A very different animal! Because you not only are building it in the City of Cambridge, and you’re not.... Not only that, you’re connected with other buildings that are going to be owned by Harvard; but, in fact, you are in fact building on federal property, which is a whole other set of facts that you’ve got to run down.

Now, the reason I mention this.... I mean we do this all the time, so it’s not such a big deal for us. But I think it’s worth mentioning because it just simply takes more time for an architect to do that. So I have in my own agenda here today, whether or not it’s an appropriate use of this time, that the work that Pei, Cobb, Freed has done on this effort should be looked [at] under the light of levels of complication that you just don’t ordinarily get into. I mean whether or not that’s.... I’m not trying to get out of the fact that I’m an architect and life has all those complications. That’s not the reason I’m saying it. What I’m saying is that every time we turned around there was another constituency. Which, of course, made the Library that much more potent. Because when we finally had emerged, you know, either you liked it or you didn’t, but there were a lot of people involved in it.
DAITCH: That were interested, yes. So now you’ve got to deal with the Feds, and this is basically the new thing that’s....

MUSHO: Yes, we had the GSA. The GSA was very cooperative. I mean obviously they’re a political organization as much as anything. But they had their rules to live by. Then, of course.... I’m not certain of this, but it seems to me that at that time the National Records Service became part of the GSA or vice versa. I’m not quite sure. There was something that happened there that we were talking to GSA, and all of a sudden we were talking to.... No, we were talking to the Archives Service, National Records & Archives Service, and then all of a sudden we were talking to GSA. I don’t exactly know how all that happened. If I did at one time, I’ve forgotten or lost track of it.

But, in any event, there was another layer of characterization. So when we got into the seventies there, when we finally cleared up what the property is going to be and how it was going to be broken up, we had the Environmental Impact Statement. And we were working for the Kennedy Library, being paid by the Kennedy Library, but, in fact, answering to the GSA because we had a different setup of requirements.

DAITCH: Right. So still nothing had happened on this original piece of property on the river.

MUSHO: Now I’m ready to talk about the property.

DAITCH: Okay.

MUSHO: Now, this piece of property is 12.2 acres. It is bounded on the south side by.... Wait a minute, is it the south? [Laughter] Don’t even have a North arrow on this job, isn’t that something? You know its south on the river?

DAITCH: Yes, it should be the south side, the river. [Too soft to hear] Is this Memorial?

MUSHO: Yes, this is Memorial Drive. Anyway, it’s located on Boylston Street and Memorial Drive. Then on the side facing Harvard Square is Eliot Street. Then on the far side is an empty property which Baird Atomic manufacturing plant, and so on. Then there was a church on this corner. Then across the street from us there was a hotel and then some apartment buildings. So this site, roughly half of it was depressed to take the trains that came from Harvard Square, the last stop on this line. The trains then moored, if you will, overnight, lag time during express hours, and parked here in half of this site.

So if you walked down Boylston Street, you’d be facing a brick wall on three, four of its sides. Now when you get onto the Memorial Drive side, you can actually look into it because the land dropped down. But this was surrounded, as a closed space; and as
it dipped down, went down under a tunnel under Eliot Street all the way to Harvard Square. Now, the middle part of the site was occupied by cars, the parking... [It] was occupied by parking for the public actually. So when we took possession of this site, there was great pressure to keep that parking viable. And indeed there was bus parking here. Then there was this train; this repair yard on the far side which was, I believe, a bus repair depot and so on.

Now, when the state gifted this to the Library Corporation and to the GSA, the stipulation was that you could... Part of the 2.18 acres can go to Harvard for the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Institute of Politics. Where that parcel was was generally going to be between... On Eliot and Boylston. But the limit of it down on the south side around the... I don’t really know what that direction is.

DAITCH: I think you’re right. I think this is south.

MUSHO: I think it is, too. Oh, wait a minute. Oh, here it is. Yes, yes, yes. No, it is south, you’re right. Here’s north. This is the other plan. Okay. I’m sorry. So the south side of Commonwealth.

DAITCH: Yes.

MUSHO: So the stipulation was that Harvard would get a property as close to the campus as possible; that generally on the Memorial Drive and Boylston, that corner would be the fulcrum upon which the whole site reverberated. And then finally on the back side, facing the community buildings, or the commercial buildings, would be the so-called related-facilities buildings. Now the related-facilities was not spelled out. But related-facilities in the profession means those buildings that are adjunct to the prime purpose of the site, namely the Kennedy Library and Harvard School of Government.

So there would be retail, offices, perhaps a hotel, perhaps apartments, and the mix of which we can determine. And we’ll talk about that because there was a whole episode, as we move through the job, of the height of that building, how big it is, where it should face, how it should relate to the river, how it should relate to Harvard Square, and so on. That was a big component in Mr. Pei’s approach to the job. I mean he is an urbanist, and with confidence in the form of that giving new life to the community

DAITCH: Sure.

MUSHO: As well as providing that life for the Library because he wanted the library to be part of the community, to be part of the scene, if you will. And people would walk by this thing and be inspired. At the same time, would be able to get a cup of coffee and sit out there and enjoy the view over the river and so on. So there was a growing appreciation of what this site had to offer.

Okay, now, there was a tremendous amount of meetings with the MBTA, and the reason for it is this: That they could not abandon this site unless they built an alternate
site to park all those trains somewhere else. And in order to do that, they had to build a
tunnel out from Harvard Square in another direction out to Somerville. I don’t know
exactly. I’ve forgotten where they went anymore. I mean once we moved to Columbia
Point, I lost all contact with what they actually did.

But they actually did move, and the site became available. But there was a
tremendous amount of studies by soil engineers technically and then formally for us how
we might manipulate things. Could we reuse what we already had there? If it supports
trains, why wouldn’t it support buildings? And just parenthetically, the two are not the
same because trains move, and when they move out the tracks would come back up
again. When the trains are parked on it, the slab just goes down a few inches. But a
building can’t do that.

DAITCH: Right!

MUSHO: So, I mean we actually tried to use it. Steve Smith said, “Why the hell can’t
we use it?” I said, “Well...” So I’d answer the question, you know. So we
had soils engineers, and we looked at it. Then we got drawings of the thing.
We talked with the MBTA and so on. Then, you know, we said, “Well, you know, we’ll
put a building on top of it so you could stay down there.” Then, of course, that would
increase our costs because you can’t put columns where you needed. You had to put them
according to the way the trains are.

So the long and the short of it was that, no, we can’t live together. You’ve got to
get out of there. They kind of liked the idea, too, because they’d be getting a new facility.
Et cetera, et cetera. Okay. When can you get out? Well, okay, now the problems start.
Because they kept delaying, delaying, and delaying and delaying, and, you know, it was
‘72, 1970, before they gave us a final answer, you know, which was five years. Then they
wouldn’t be out for another couple more years. Then other things began happening. What
we did in the interim was to see if we could build the Museum independent of the rest of
it.

DAITCH: Sure.

MUSHO: Because, you see, something happens now in the mood of this job that I
think is important to relate to it. That is that if you have a Grand Plan, you
know, all Grand Plans, somebody’s got to slog the field. There’s a lot of
work to do, and that work has got to be very serious and cogent and at the same time add
up. You know, step A, B, C, D, E, F, when you’re through with all that, you don’t want
everybody to look at this thing and look like it’s a bunch of steps that don’t.... It’s not a
dance.

So you have to be very careful about how you structure these events over time.
And Harvard had a very special problem: and that is that they had 2.18 acres now; and
the building of the School of Government, they didn’t have the money to do that in one
piece, you know, to create the whole crescent. We thought, well, you know, you can’t
have this thing open up with the Museum here and just a blank thing over there. So there
was an appraisal going on about the Grand Plan. There was never any doubt about its worthiness as a concept. But there were serious concerns about whether or not it would ever be whole, if you will, and come together into a piece that would be commensurate with the effort.

DAITCH:  Doubts arose because of the timing it takes?

MUSHO:  The timing of acquiring the land, the timing of Harvard building their buildings in whatever sequence might come along. As it turned out, we interviewed a whole, I don’t know, four or five.... The Library Corporation hired a bunch of developers to give my views about what that development would take place. I mean when I think about it now, Harvard Square has grown so much from that time. When I think about the timidity of putting whatever on that site at that time, I’m almost scandalized because Harvard has grown 20 times what we would have done to it. And they would have had a spectacular public place. And what have they got now, you know. They’ve got a bunch of little individual ego trips, and it doesn’t add up. Everything that we thought might happen did without the effort to bring it all together. Now that’s a bit of politicking for Pei, Cobb, Freed, but okay.

But I think that there’s nobody that doubted what the outcome might be if we didn’t pursue this thing in a more rigorous way. So what we did to try it was did a whole series of drawings and model-making to show how we might put the public space and Memorial on a progressively evacuated site. In other words, you keep this much, we would take over that much, and soon.

DAITCH:  So you’re doing a piece at a time as the trains are moving out basically?

MUSHO:  Well, yes. I mean that was the idea. It was a little bit naive. But the hope was that by demonstrating a willingness to be flexible about this thing, we might garner some good feeling all the way around, and indeed it may, you know.... You see, in these complex jobs it’s very important.... I mean most people call these compromises, but it really wasn’t a compromise on our part; it was working to see what we could do together. And I think that the MBTA were very forthcoming about what they could. Then, of course, the question of parking came up.... Now, we’ve got to stop, and this might be a good moment just to take a breather.

DAITCH:  Yes, that would be fine. [Pause]

MUSHO:  So we had the.... Oh, by the way, I have to leave her at four-ish. So we have a good two hours.

DAITCH:  Oh, good. Okay. That’s perfect.

MUSHO:  I’ll get a cab downstairs, something like that. We left it where we were doing alternate work on the first scheme. I won’t give you the specific date
because we can find that, but let me just say that we did all that research about trying to get the MBTA out of there. Talked to the City of Cambridge, talked to Harvard, conceived the Grand Plan. Harvard had no problem with it. The physical characteristics necessary to build a building like this, of course, requires that you come to some understanding about the visitation that you would anticipate, both first on and long term and so on and so on. That, just as the EIS Law being signed, that and gaining an understanding of the visitation are probably the two key elements.

If you were to point to the big headaches on this job, was the EIS and the potential number of people because it affected the politics of it, it affected the public impressions about it, it affected Cambridge’s relationship to the job both from the city government side and from the community standpoint. It would affect the economics of it because obviously building parking you’d want it out of sight because you didn’t want to go out and look at all those parking spaces out there. And unless you covered it, you couldn’t make an ensemble that was commensurate with the Big Idea.

So coming to grips with that, there’s an enormous--a lot of effort. Warren Travers Associates; Barton-Aschman [Barton-Aschman Associates], out of Chicago, whom we’ve also used in the office over a period of time; local traffic consultants; and then eventually Charles E. McGuire, stated the question: What visitation would you expect that the presidential library would attract first year, second year, over long term? What would be the highest day of attendance that would happen at that time? And what is the mix of grownups to children? Would they arrive by car, by bus, by train, etc., etc.? What is the mix in the transportation mode and so on?

That subject is so complex I won’t even attempt to clarify it. It’s very complex, about how people arrive and so on. But there are some very simple equations used. If you guess, or if you do a study and you find out how many people might attend for the first year or second year, you take 1 percent of that, and that’s usually your worst day. So people had to guess. You know, well, a million sounds good.

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh!

MUSHO: Devastating statement. That’s 10,000 people a day. Now the 1 percent comes from studying other organizations that usually 1 percent is their worst day of their total year. And, having said that, those 5,000 show up. Between the hours of 11 and 1, 50 percent of them arrive by car. There’s another thing. So you wind up needing a helluva lot of cars, an awful lot of toilets, and a lot of food service. No matter what you do, there is no way you can wiggle out of these numbers. So the question is: What is the number? Is it one million, is it a million five, is it 600,000, is it 200? Nobody would believe you if it was below 500,000. Nobody would believe you if it was below 800,000?

So sort of a million became this terrible knot of judgment. It was a judgment call, but it also became an albatross hanging on our neck. Because in order to entertain parking space for 10,000 people, children, buses from remote parking spaces, who would arrive by subway, who would do this, and so on, it’s an enormously complex problem. And once you start mentioning this to the City of Cambridge, they want to know where the
parking is going to be.
So everything has got to be laid out in a very, very detailed way. And, of course, don’t forget now, you can’t forget that this is now a EIS we’re looking at because these kinds of questions, while they were brought forward over these years, we hadn’t had a site yet because the MBTA hadn’t figured out how to get out of there yet. So no serious answers to these questions were emoted until the EIS began clicking off all of the relevant questions in their implications into the seventies, early seventies.

DAITCH: So it’s been discussed in the sixties and....

MUSHO: Oh, it’s been discussed. We visited all these places. They did research. There’s organizations that in fact do that kind of thing. And then Chermayeff & Geismar [Chermayeff & Geismar, Inc.], who were going to do the interiors for the display, also have worked around the country for museums in Baltimore, Arizona. They had a lot of display, public museum work experience. So they tapped into that.

Then, of course, Charles E. McGuire did a whole bunch of studies themselves, you know, other presidential libraries, places in Washington, and so on. But that 1 percent of a yearly total evidently happens throughout. So the 1 percent you couldn’t very well squeeze out of. It’s the number at the beginning that had the relevance for belief: Many people. It’s got to be pointed out as a great building. I mean there were all of these characterizations you knew were going on in people’s heads when you presented a scheme.

In any event, okay, having said that, people wanted to see what this was going to look like, and that’s when we began to work on creating a scheme that in fact would sit on the site. Even as we saw the MBTA move out, we tried to, in effect, put the Library on some other place besides the tracks and then put the plaza above the tracks so that we didn’t have that much foundation expense. Then we had parking underneath the whole project, you know, underneath the Harvard building, underneath the plaza, underneath the Library, underneath the related facilities so we would bury all of that.

Then, you know, Harvard would build a School of Government, we would build the Library and Museum. And then as things became clear about what it is, there’d be the Institute of Politics, there’d be the related-facilities buildings with the garage access along the back. You’d put a new road in here. We would widen Memorial Drive. Then you could see back here, where this has still got the yard in it, Harvard would build out the crescent when they could. Then, of course, they would back off against Eliot Street and do as much as they thought was feasible.

DAITCH: So the crescent is just the outer edge of this?

MUSHO: Yes. So the inside edge is really the background for the Library. You enter underneath an arcaded zone so people could wait before they get into the Library. You could create public space as sort of the.... The Institute of Politics is really the bridge between the Library and the School of Government. I mean
philosophically that was the whole scheme; that the Institute of Politics was a sort of bridge between academia and the real world, I mean the real world as represented by the Archive and Museum. Then you had the School of Government being academia, and the Institute of Politics being this one foot in each camp, if you want.

DAITCH:  

It is a wonderful conception.

MUSHO:  

Well, conceptually it was very well demonstrated. Now at that time, that scheme was this first scheme here. That’s what Mrs. Kennedy saw. We brought this model up to her apartment on Fifth Avenue. It was a big event. I brought it up with another person in the office. We left it there with Mr. Pei, and Mr. Pei demonstrated this to Mrs. Kennedy. I wasn’t there. I met her, but I didn’t stay for the meeting.

DAITCH:  

Was that the first time you met her?

MUSHO:  

It may well have been. I may have met her before that. I don’t recall anymore. But I do remember specifically setting up this model. It was on a circular model so that we could turn it around. Fortunately, you know, she.... When I arrived with another friend of mine from the office, Arthur May, you get off in her apartment in this very large reception room. She was off in another room talking to Leonard Bernstein. The maid or whoever brought us into a little library room off that reception room. The room was one of these rooms where it just had a thousand objects of a personal nature. And we had to move them around in order to find enough space to put the model down. But we did that, you know, got it ready to be shown....

[END SIDE 2, TAPE 1]

[BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2]

MUSHO:  

…..because then Mr. Pei showed up, and he realized what we’d done, and, oh, boy, we were in trouble. We had all this room, and we organized our model....

DAITCH:  

Shoving everything off the table, yes. So this was a three-dimensional....

MUSHO:  

Oh, no, no. There it is, that’s it, this model right there. It’s a three-dimensional plot. There’s the river, there’s the stadium. I mean you knew exactly.... There’s Harvard Square. I mean we built that whole thing, the trees and everything. But I gather she liked it, you know. It was the Big Plan. And on that basis we then showed it to Harvard.

We went and had a meeting, I remember, in what is it? University Hall in that building that’s right in the middle of Harvard Yard, up on the second floor, this spectacular room that Harvard has, with seats arranged around the outside wall. And it
was right at that moment that Pusey was stepping down and Derek Bok was taking over. And I think everybody liked it. But obviously the commitment that Harvard would have to generate in order to respond to that was obviously a major, major commitment.

How that all would take place, the legal problems of getting MBTA out of there. Where was there 2.18 acres? Where is the related facilities? In any event, all of that effort now could start because we had some idea when the MBTA would move out.

DAITCH: And this was around ‘70, ‘71?

MUSHO: Yes, a little later than that. I think it was getting already ‘73 or something like that. Because between her seeing it, we then went back and did the revision, which then became Scheme 2, which is a modified version of that with a good deal more.... [Papers being shuffled]

DAITCH: It was one little stack. One on top of the other. That was just Scheme 1, 2, 3.

MUSHO: Then we went and got more discreet about it. Here was the MBTA; here’s the site, tracks and trolleys, and here was the subway. Then here was Harvard’s 2.18 acres. So this became the parcelization plan.

DAITCH: Yes. So that’s the corner basically of Eliot and Boylston.

MUSHO: Yes, Eliot and Boylston. And then the back side was related facilities’ three acres. So we had an entrance coming in from Eliot Square, and then we took the whole property along the river, and then Harvard was up here facing the dormitory across the way.

Then we modified this. You can see it through the paper there. We modified the crescent in order to put this building, the School of Government, right up against Harvard, and Harvard, of course, obviously could build something behind it. Then we had the arcade, which is the Institute of Politics, and then there’s the Library. Then that was developed, and the Museum was the Presidential Pavilion, the so-called Dedication Room. Then it was just on-grade parking. Well, there was parking underneath the building, but on grade there was parking until such time as the related facilities would be built. We couldn’t get anybody that had the vision that this could be developed in a reasonable way. I mean it’s hard to believe at this point.

DAITCH: Really!

MUSHO: But at any rate, so then that became a scheme which was then, you know, we carried some work. That’s this picture here. That’s this one.

DAITCH: Oh, beautiful!

MUSHO: See?
DAITCH:  Mm hmmm.

MUSHO:  That became the scheme that we actually presented to the city; we actually presented it to the public. It was priced out, etc., etc. Then the very complex problems began with the cost, the commitments, the MBTA getting off the site or it was going to be delayed. Then the EIS began. And then we had to shrink it because the... You know at this point it’s worth mentioning, socially, that this was in the seventies when there was in fact 12 percent, 13 percent inflation. It was eating up the endowment faster than you could possibly draw it. So there was dwindling resources at the same time that we had this Grand Plan, which, you know, in fact ate it up by 12-1/2 percents.

DAITCH:  Right.

MUSHO:  So we were then faced with doing the EIS and dwindling resources. Then we came up with this one which is then separating the Library-Archives, and then allocating the 2.18 acres to Harvard off on the Boylston-Eliot Street side. And then leaving this end of the site fallow until such time that it would be come viable economically. We did all of that again with plans. This is the model again that was done.

DAITCH:  So this is completely different.

MUSHO:  Oh, yes. This is an isolated building, no big pavilion. There was.... All of the plans were done.... Here it is, 124,000 square feet. Archives entrance floor, ground floor Museum and so on. And all of this was done in some detail. The EIS was done on the basis of this building. In other words, the EIS, if you do something, you’ve got to do an alternative even on the site. You know, the big plan and the small plan and so on. So that was done. Then, we then did the alternative cutback was to split it, which, in fact, is this. Here is the Archive only, with an arcade with the Institute of Politics over it, and this is Harvard’s first phase. So this would be the John F. Kennedy Plaza or Memorial.

DAITCH:  Right, and no museum.

MUSHO:  No museum. The Museum then went over to Charlestown Navy Yard as one alternative, which was a very pleasant one, I must say. When we did that, I mean Steve, I remember being, you know, taken with the idea of the water, the Constitution [U.S.S. Constitution].

DAITCH:  Steve Smith?

MUSHO:  Steve Smith. Also their friend Jack Fallon, and so on. I mean it seemed like
a.... And Chelsea was where Senator Kennedy won his first seat. Dave Powers, you know, was obviously, I mean he was in his neighborhood, you know. So there was a possibility of a developing love affair there. It was not what I mean.... But the dilemma now crept in that it was a double-edged sword. In other words, here, when we showed this scheme, people said, “Oh, well, people are still going to come see this thing. They’ll all know the Museum’s someplace else.”

On the Museum side you were swallowed up because it was a very small building. You were swallowed up by the Constitution. Not to mean that commensurately; I mean obviously things are things, you know. But, for example, one of the alternatives was to go down to the Kennedy Center in Washington, which I did. And there’s a very funny story about that. It’s worth mentioning because it leads to a cryptic remark that was made by Dave Powers, which was synonymous with the dilemma at the point.

That building in the Kennedy Center has a peculiarity about it which I found, which even the director, Roger Stevens, didn’t know about. This building, you enter on one side here, and underneath it, underneath the plaza, is a whole series of garages. And here’s the road that passes by the Potomac. And then up above, here’s the theater’s big lobby. You walk through the building between the three auditoriums, and in plan it looks like this. You know, there’s three rooms, big rooms. You walk through these big corridors. There’s a lobby here, and it looks out over the river with a terrace.

Then, as you come in here, you can come up stairways here from the garage into the main room, and then you go into the opera or into the orchestra or whatever. Anyway, there’s a space here that is empty. I said, “Well, how could this space be empty?” Well, it turns out that this space was made as a garage for the VIP’s, so when they got out of the car they would just have to walk up one floor. And when they leave, they would be down only one floor to leave. So this became the VIP parking area.

DAITCH: Really!

MUSHO: However, the drivers of the VIP vehicles realized immediately that they in fact could drive through the garage and get here, no problem. But when they picked up their fares or their owners, they couldn’t get out of the garage because they had to go wait for everybody else to get out first.

DAITCH: Oh, the traffic.

MUSHO: So nobody parked there. They parked down in the garage. They dropped them off, and they parked down here so they could go and get the hell out. It’s something that happens in every garage, you know, like what’s new? So Rogers said, “My God! You found space in the building we didn’t know existed.” So we put the Museum there.

DAITCH: Neat. Good.

MUSHO: Well, that was one of the ideas, right? So I remember it was a great event.
DAITCH: That’s funny.

MUSHO: Because it was very funny. The Kennedys that sat on the board didn’t know about it, and how the hell did he come up with this damned thing? But anyway, so we made a big presentation, I remember, at Steve Smith’s house, and we had everybody there. Douglas Dillon I remember being there. I was really so thrilled to meet these people. But then I had to get up. Mr. Pei said, “Ted, okay, explain what you wanted to do down in the Kennedy Center.” So I explained this situation, you know. And Dave Powers, when I was through, he says, “Are you telling me you want to put the president’s library in the basement?” And at that I mean the whole place just—I mean I felt like some kind of traitor. So that was the end of that.

DAITCH: Oh, yes, I guess. But you found space.

MUSHO: I found space, yes. By the way, we don’t need it, we don’t want it.

DAITCH: That’s funny.

MUSHO: But in the larger sense, there was nobody that was going to split this facility and thereby lose it. I mean let’s face it, we were already working into it about seven or eight years now, you see. And all of these consequences of the EIS, everybody understood the legal need to do all this. But they sure understood as well that they weren’t about ready to give up their character by diffusion, in fact. So that became a litmus test for the job: There was a, “Listen, we may be at this a long time, but we’re going to do something terrific.”

So now the other alternative we looked at was Amherst, and we went out there. We didn’t actually do a scheme at Amherst. But there was, you know, with the impetus that you belong to a great university, that you become part of the social life of the campus and so on, Amherst was a very attractive place. I mean Amherst, of course, is a little remote relative to Boston obviously. The visitation would never have been as potentially as high as it could be anywhere else. Amherst is quite all right. I mean, you know, Smith College, Amherst. There’s a lot of fancy places there. But, you know, Amherst doesn’t want to be nor will it ever be a major city. So that was clocked in.

Then we went down to Barnstable, the idea being that the Museum in Barnstable would work very well with Hyannis in the sense that this is where the president spent his summers. It would be a nice relationship. But again, putting the Archive down there, I mean there was a community college down there, but it was a little bit light. There was even talk about putting it in the Otis Air Force Base because there was more land, and the facilities were there, and so on. But that didn’t last very long. Then there was Fall River because of Joe Kennedy’s, the destroyer down there with his name, and the idea of the two brothers, and so on. I mean it felt good. But there was no generation of heat.

The Charlestown thing looked good because they did some work themselves. But
the building that they had to put us in, the old rope-making building, was a very sparse building, and it didn’t. You’d have to do a lot of work. And you would never be able to create a building that you can say, “That’s the Kennedy Library.” I mean because you were surrounded with too much stuff that was…. You know, I mean nobody was going to remake this place, even with the park in front of it. Now, I haven’t seen it. It may have grown differently. But it just…. It was lost.

DAITCH: And still, that’s separating the Museum and the Archive, right?

MUSHO: Yes. Well, you could’ve put the Archive at Charlestown, but that was a pretty long bet because…. Harvard was very anxious for that scheme. I mean, you know, it had all the best in there. But the idea that there was a room there that would, let’s say, display some of the finest papers, you know, some topical thing, that even Mr. Pei’s best of trying to explain that obviously you have a foyer place, people weren’t buying it. They felt that it was a subterfuge, and it wasn’t. I mean the big Museum had to be someplace else. But the point of the matter is that it was difficult…. In fact, it would be more money because you’d have to build two buildings, and you’ve got to operate them separately. I don’t think the National Archive Service liked that idea very much themselves because it would split everything up in half.

DAITCH: Sure. Now, would the National Archives have been responsible for the Museum, too?

MUSHO: Oh, yes. That was one of the problems, you see, because you’d be building administrative places in both locations. You’d have to build maybe a third again more than you would if you put it in one place, you see.

Okay, then came Columbia Point. You may not be aware, but U-Mass is on this site because they couldn’t build it in the middle of downtown Boston. The community didn’t want them. They’re over here for almost the same reason we’re here: because nobody else wanted them. I mean it’s an anachronism in a sense. But, now, you have to go back a little further, though, to understand about this property, and I did bring the MDC map here.

Are you aware that this piece of property…. We’re over here. See, the edge is over here. We’re actually at this end. That edge here was the last thing to be filled in. And this whole piece here at one time was only this spit of land like that. This is all filled in.

DAITCH: Wow!

MUSHO: And this exists because of that pipe that goes out to Moon Island. Where the hell is Moon Island? Someplace here.

DAITCH: Is that little dot it?

MUSHO: I don’t know where it is. But, you know, that’s the sewage pipe?
DAITCH: So they didn’t bury this thing. They just laid it on whatever piles they could put down in the muck. So this water’s not very high anyway, you know. And of course this is hardly used anymore because they take the sewage out someplace else because they go into a settling tank. But at any rate, this whole property, it should be known, is relatively new. Now, U-Mass wanted to build a campus right down near Copley Square near the.... In fact there is some U-Mass facilities there. But they couldn’t build this whole thing because of community opposition, etc., etc. Turf war, whatever. I don’t know what it was. But they moved here.

DAITCH: Was it already filled in at that point?

MUSHO: No. This was, this half was.

DAITCH: The half was, okay.

MUSHO: Now, in order to live along a place where you’ve got tides coming in and out, you have to protect that edge, which they did. If you go by, you can see all that stone. But in order to put room for the stone, they had to excavate all that fill, and they put it here, and that’s how this piece was here.

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh! Is that right?

MUSHO: Yes.

DAITCH: So they’re moving the fill from the one side, the south shore....

MUSHO: The south side, that’s right, to this northeast corner. And then that’s why we had to then put stone around it to protect our edge. The property line actually goes farther out than that. See, the property line for this building, in fact, is much farther out. See, here’s the building. But the property line actually goes out to the water. And I think that’s the line at low tide.

DAITCH: Oh, I see.

MUSHO: So when the tide comes up, it comes up against the stone here, you see. So a lot of our property is actually under the water. But at any rate, okay. Now, you’ve got to remember that when.... Let’s stay for a while on the EIS and so on. Let’s talk that through so that we’re back into Columbia Point.

DAITCH: Yes. Because I think I’m not quite.... One thing that I want to get clear about is exactly when....

MUSHO: All this took place.
DAITCH: Yes. And what was the final determining thing.

MUSHO: Well, there was no final determining thing. There may have been between Mrs. Onassis and Steve Smith and I.M. Pei. I have not heard it enunciated. But I don’t think it ever reached that point. It happened over a period of months when discouragement got to a point where it was no longer palpable and where the alternative of moving to U-Mass became more attractive.

DAITCH: So originally that whole idea, did it initiate just as sort of another alternative proposal for the EIS?

MUSHO: Oh, no. Well, when we did the EIS in Cambridge, there had to be alternatives, and they went around looking for them, Amherst being one. Well, the university idea, Bob Wood, who was an old friend and was secretary of urban affairs in the Kennedy Administration, who was then president of the U-Mass, suggested the idea. Because they’d already built the campus here. Everybody said, “Well, gee, they’ve got the Kennedy Library here.” And, you know, subsequently the Library....

By the way, that new student union building has got to be the most extraordinary thing. Where the hell did they get the money to do that? I mean it pays no.... I mean, I will never come here with that.... I will never come back again. That building doesn’t even bat an eyelash towards this building. That really is discouraging.

DAITCH: Yes.

MUSHO: I mean it doesn’t enhance the whole peninsula. It [Inaudible], you know. But anyway.... The answer to your question is something that I’ve struggled with, and I’ve been to a couple of events where certain people expressed things more by looks and feelings than they did by words. I think the best way to describe it, in my estimation, is that there was no way that the MBTA was going to move out of that site in a reasonable amount of time any longer. And they’re still there in ’72, ’73. Those plans and a lot of other things.... Because the Kennedys were helping them to make their plans to go elsewhere, doing what they could to help them, you see. Harvard, you know, there was bad economic times. There’s 12 percent in escalation. Yes, we can do what we can. You’ve got to understand, etc., etc., etc.

The cost was dwindling the Library’s moneys that they collected. Every day it was diminishing. Then this site, there was a seminal moment that took place on this site. Well, let’s go look at the alternative. Supposed we have to live there. Let’s go look at it. This is an event that took place, and I might just mention at that this moment that in the Carter Weitzman book, I told him about this event; namely, that the family and the co-Kennedy directors came out to the site, to the university. Then we drove a truck over to the pipe at that point.

And you looked out at this area here which was really a mess. There was no edge
on it or anything, you see. Then of course you’ve got that bad housing over there, and nobody.... There’s a big fence, you know. Then there’s that pump house that’s still quite disreputable. And the university had its ass, and if you will, excuse the expression, facing this way, so all they saw was concrete block. Now it’s obviously fresher. And I think this new building, I mean whatever I think about it, it’s not important. The fact is that it does face the water now. I mean if anything, you should get credit for facing the water because these guys suddenly woke up to what their front door should be.

DAITCH: Right.

MUSHO: Having said that, we went out, drove a truck out. We got a big flatbed truck. You know it was about 10 feet wide and 20 feet long. I mean Mrs. Lawford there, Pat Lawford. Mrs. Kennedy, you know, Bill Walton and so on. And we’re standing on a truck looking out on the site. So everybody was higher. This has grass, and there were pheasants flying around that site. Because pheasants, you know, go after the rats. But anyway, Mrs. Kennedy said to me, “Where do you plan on putting the Library?” I said, “Down there on the far corner.” And she said, “Well, let’s go down there.” So we walked through this, broken bottles and everything else. And Mr. Pei and several others went down there.

Now this is where the sailors come in. We walked out there, and at that point.... And you can go out there now. You can’t see it from this point, you have to be down at that corner. You can see the lighthouse out in Boston Bay. Have you seen it down there?

DAITCH: Oh, I haven’t noticed.

MUSHO: Massachusetts Bay?

DAITCH: No.

MUSHO: Well, you go down there and look out in that direction, you’ll see. You will see past these two islands there the lighthouse that separates the Atlantic Ocean from Massachusetts Bay and Boston Harbor.

DAITCH: No kidding!

MUSHO: And that light goes on and on. I saw it when I just came in. Jack Fallon took a transit out there, and said, “Yeah, that’s it. That’s the thing.” And there suddenly felt like they found a place. Now, what you have to imagine, in my estimation, because it happened to me. I don’t know whether it happened to anybody else. But at one moment I’m thinking, geez, that’s terrific. And the next moment we’ve got problems coming like alligators up in Cambridge. So at one moment, you know, I think that the balance just tilted. And they said, let’s go here. Now who said that? I don’t know. Mrs. Kennedy, I guess, or Steve Smith or Ted Kennedy [Edward M. Kennedy]. I mean the whole bunch of them, I guess, got together and said, “Hey, look, this is it.”
DAITCH: Excuse me, just for a second. But you said Mrs. Kennedy was with you. You mean Jackie Kennedy?

MUSHO: Oh, yes, yes.

DAITCH: Okay. I’m just checking which Mrs. Kennedy.

MUSHO: Mrs. Rose, no, she was already hospitalized; not hospitalized, but at home.

DAITCH: But she wasn’t involved? She was elderly.

MUSHO: No, no, no, none of these things. I think after the transfer of the land back in ’64, ’65, I never saw her again. But at any rate, I never saw her at all, as a matter of fact. But, you see, now there’s a curiosity that happened when we went out there.

Now, something else happened that you have to back up now. Now the university is located over here, and this new building is over here. Whatever. One of the prime problems, or one of the problems that Mr. Pei faced when this alternate became stronger as a possibility, was that you can’t see the building from the road. Now you could see it from the Old South Street, the old Boston area here, with the L Street Baseball Club. Do you know about the L Street Baseball Club?

DAITCH: Mm hmm.

MUSHO: You know there’s a famous Irish.... There’s an Irish community over in there. It’s all over Irish over there.

DAITCH: Oh, really. Oh, I didn’t know that.

MUSHO: Oh, my God, yes. This is the L Street Baseball group over here. This is one of the hot places. But at any rate, you could see it terrific over there. Have you been over there to look at it from the Library?

DAITCH: No, I haven’t.

MUSHO: Oh, you’ve got to go over there. If you go here.... If you go.... This is a new courthouse that Harry Cobb did a couple of years back is over here, right? You get on that road, and you come back, and you go down here, and you come right out at this point here. I think it’s L Street. Or M Street. There’s the M Street over there. L, M. I think this is M, and it’s L back here.

So L Street is the famous baseball club. But anyway, it’s a fantastic view from here, and so the building sits there. But the advantage that we have is that you look out of here you see really deep water. However, you cannot see it as you come up the highway.
You can see a glimpse of it here, but the old housing over here interrupts it. And, of course, with the trees around here.... It was actually quite nice this morning when I arrived; it was quite nice. So the first idea was to put it on that corner so you would see it from the highway.

DAITCH: From the south, yes.

MUSHO: But, unfortunately, the water in here, when it goes low tide, there’s nothing but mud here. So it was an impossible situation. Then another architect was hired to do a scheme attached to the university, and that had the same problem that Chelsea had. You get swallowed up by your own environment. Then when we’d done these several studies, this 1, 2, 3, 4, moving to the end was the end of it. There was no more, you see. And it’s like when you go to a pier, you know, you always want to walk to the end. I mean it’s sort of a natural instinct is to go as far out related to water because there’s water and me, that’s where I can go. That’s where I want to go. And that’s what I took great pleasure in, the fact that Mrs. Kennedy said, “Well, let’s go out there.” Out there meant the end. When we saw it, that’s where we should be. Then the sailors, my God, you can see the lighthouse. And that to me cinched it. Because it gave us a direction. It gave us a connection to something larger.

DAITCH: Something that resonates with the image of Kennedy.

MUSHO: Yes, resonates. Well, exactly right. The water, the view out there. From a site-planning point of view, this building, in spite of the fact that it’s not urban, has as many site, fundamentally sound, site inputs in it than any building that Pei, Cobb, Freed has ever done, in my humble estimation. We connected, we connected. That now, you get to the point where Mr. Pei makes his statement of a building, and through his manipulation of geometry created this glass box. Now the glass box is worth a separate discussion because it went way back to the first, second scheme.

DAITCH: I saw it in the....

MUSHO: The pyramid, you see, grew out of a need to symbolize a light. I mean something that you could see from outside in as well as from inside out. You know, this couldn’t be anything but glass. And that characterization was something that Mr. Pei felt very strongly about. And at one time it was the sloped glass.

But there’s one other thing that’s often, often overlooked, or actually there’s two things that are overlooked. One is that in the pavilion the--and I made a little sketch of it here--this pavilion, you’ve got to remember there’s this leg of space that comes down. The square moves in, and then the glass pavilion comes around it.

Now, that’s a very important feature because, in fact, you see, the Archive and the glass, which symbolizes the Museum, is one thing. And the fin, the fin physically, and the flag poetically, represents this immobile and mobile characterization of the man: at one
moment has principle, the next moment has flexibility. It’s that kind of water, trees, combination of things. And resonates, you know, like on the landscaping. When they convened a meeting in the office when this project was being developed, Mrs. Kennedy brought Bunny Mellon [Rachel Lambert Lloyd Mellon] into the office. And she emoted, and looking at Mrs. Kennedy, that she thought that the president was a “wind man.”

DAITCH: A wind man?

MUSHO: A wind man. Holy mackerel! I didn’t get into this one, right? But it made absolutely perfect sense because she’s the one that thought of that dune grass out on the curb. Oh, it’s fallen into such disrepair, it’s almost... To a point from when it was built to, I would say, five, six years out, that dune grass moved with the wind. Then the rosa rugose, which was behind it, created this aroma. When you drove up that path, or preferably got out of your car and walked up that curve, the aroma of that rosa rugose with that wind moving this grass, it was absolutely magic. Absolutely magic. No question about it that Mrs. Kennedy and Mrs. Mellon....

And Dan Kiley [Daniel Urban Kiley] was there, the landscape guy was there. Dan Kiley flipped. I mean he’s a great landscape architect. But that woman had everyone by the--holding them by the hair. I mean she was electric at that. A wind man! Okay. I’m not saying anything. I don’t know what it is, and if I get into it I’m dead.

DAITCH: Right. Exactly.

MUSHO: But there it was, you know. And I saw it, I mean I experienced it. I remember Steve Smith--he wasn’t at the meeting--when he heard that our landscaping plan had been trashed. “Mrs. Mellon had another one!” He, “Oohh....” But Steve right away understood exactly what she was talking about. We changed that plan, and put that dune grass along the embankment formed by the curved road. Now, you see, that hill, that site plan with that hill, is another thing. When this building was built here, we had to come around, you see, the road around the perimeter, and we had to cross over this pipe.

DAITCH: Right.

MUSHO: Now, I’m going to digress for a little bit because there’s another thing I failed to mention. One of the facts about building this, the program, was that the Museum takes about 30,000 square feet, 40,000 square feet. You know, if it was bigger, people would have used more, if it was less.... You know, it’s a movable thing. But fundamentally, you can’t do much, and people start traversing all of these objects and so on, the family as well as the installation fellows. Ivan Chermayeff really was the prime mover. And then, of course, Charlie Guggenheim [Charles E. Guggenheim] with the movie. I mean those people are just fantastic.

DAITCH: Fabulous, yes.
MUSHO: And I mean it’s been changed since that time, but, okay, you know, things grow, things change. But they really, with us as the architects, we worked that together. I mean that’s all a very interrelated orchestration. And we made mistakes. I’ll never forget walking in and finding everybody standing in front of the portrait of the family, and nobody can get down the steps from the theaters because they’re all bogged down, mesmerized with this photograph, you see. You know, okay, so there were mistakes made. But on the other side of the coin, there was something said. I mean the family liked it, and they were given countless numbers of presentations, of slides and so on, of how it would be. Models were built and so on.

But the fundamental thing from an architectural standpoint, it’s on a flat piece of ground. Now, if you enter a building and then go into this, and go through, traverse it, and then come back out, it’s just anti-climactical. I mean it just doesn’t work. Because you can’t make.... I’m sure you can. We couldn’t, or at least--I don’t know. You wanted to separate this event from the entrance of that from the memorial event. I mean there’s.... In other words, you get very few chances in life, and one of the things you do is separate them out so you don’t get confused.

On the Cambridge side, now don’t forget something: Not only is this on a flat site, but in Cambridge, as well as here, you can’t go down into a basement because there’s water down there. So this building is five feet above the highest recorded tide. The platform down there for that pavilion is five feet above it. Now that five feet could have been ten feet. But, you know, everybody there thought five was all right. Now, it just so happens when we were built, by the way, we had about six months before the building was open, we had the highest recorded tide, a full moon took place, and there was a storm, and water came up, and picked those stones up, and moved them.

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh!

MUSHO: Oh, yes. Fortunately, the building had not been taken possession of from the contractor. The guy had to fix all those damned things. But that five feet above the highest recorded tide, it happens that the land.... Then the pipe is over here, and then the university is back here. You come over, and you go over this pipe, and instead of coming back down, we filled it up.

DAITCH: Level with the pipe.

MUSHO: [Inaudible], and we put the Museum there. So, in fact, you arrive on top of the Museum. So, in fact, you look past this almost acre of flat space, look out to the water, and then you do your thing. You’ve got your auditorium. You come in, you come back down on the corners. You come down through the Museum, and you come back out into the glass box, and you look out right at the water’s edge onto the water.

DAITCH: Mm hmmm. It’s beautiful.
MUSHO: So that procedure was the same, right down through Scheme 1, Scheme 2, Scheme 3. Scheme 3, however, we had to go up steps because we were isolated from the Eliot Street side already, you see? If you look at it closely, you realize that the Eliot Street side is higher. This intersection up here is higher than the river. So we came up a few steps, but we were on high ground. The Museum was down in the low area at that point, you see?

DAITCH: I see. Yes.

MUSHO: That was true here. It was true for the truncated pyramid. It was not true for Scheme 2 or Alternate 2. It was not true for this scheme here. This scheme we had to go up. We had a ramp that brought people up. Looked out to the river and went through the Museum, then came back up again. But that procedure.... And when we got to this site and understood that we could do that, we realized that we had a trump card. We had something to deal with.

Now, when we built the Smith Center on the back side and you walk out to the terrace.... And this is what I was kidding Alan about. When the Smith Center was opened, Mrs. Kennedy asked to see me. And we went out there and stood on that deck. And she said, “Look, isn’t that the craziest thing in the world, looking down at trucks? You should be ashamed of yourself.” And I wasn’t going to get into an argument with her. But there’s no other way. You can’t have a basement that says “water” down there. And I said, “All you’ve got to do is step away from the edge, and you don’t see that, you know. You can look out at the water.” But she really let me have it. But at any rate, it was one of those.... It was in the best sense because she obviously had nothing but the Library in mind, the quality of the Library.

DAITCH: Right.

MUSHO: But all I could think about is the water. So, in any event, it was a good exchange.

DAITCH: It sounds charming. [Laughter]

MUSHO: But, at any rate, that was the dilemma that we faced. That we’re out here.... The reasons there are no buildings around like this is because you’ve got to be slightly crazy to be out this far into the water. Having said that, we didn’t take any chances, obviously. We’ve got this methane gas layer underneath the building to keep the.... You know, we’re on a garbage pit. Garbage, when it.... Not so much garbage garbage, but, you know, old trees, accumulation of stuff, gives off periodically.... The same with the university, gives off methane gas. And what we have.... The same in the university, when you have all that stuff....

DAITCH: It’s decomposing under there?
MUSHO: Decomposing here, you put crushed gravel over here, several feet of it. You literally put pipes inside, and you blow fresh air into those pipes. And you have another set of pipes where you exhaust the air. Then you put.... And that’s exhausted all the way up to the roof. Because sometimes.... I mean it can lie dormant for ten years, and all of a sudden you’ll smell that gas.

DAITCH: No kidding!

MUSHO: There’s actually gas meters that tell you whether that gas is building up. It depends whether the humidity is high or whether there’s a lot of rain. It depends on a lot of things. And they get it over at the university, too. Then there’s an impervious membrane here that keeps any of this from out of the building. But you have to deliberately blow fresh air in here. Because once you mix it with fresh air, it dissipates.

But, on the other side of the coin, if you didn’t do that, you’d get a flash. But those are the consequences of living on this site is all I’m saying. Same way with the parking. When we did the parking, we had to put a pile of dirt several feet thick on this to push the site down. Because this stuff, as it decomposes, shrinks.

DAITCH: Oh, so it’ll shift?

MUSHO: No, it just goes down like a sponge.

DAITCH: Oh, okay.

MUSHO: See, so what we did is you’re forcing.... You put a lot of fill on it, and you force it. So that when you finally put your parking on it--and then we took it off again--you would never reach that level of pressure again.

DAITCH: It’s already compacted.

MUSHO: It’s already compacted. Now, the edge of it is another matter. And that gets back to my road, now. The reason we got that edge here is we wanted a drive that would then expose people to the view, and then put the building here. That edge, then, is this exposed edge. And that’s why the grass has very good roots and holds that edge from washing down into the bay. But, of course, I mean you have, here’s this, and then you’ve got this riprap and you’ve got a path here, and then you’ve got another little wall here. And then this goes up, and the road is here.

So this elevation is about 35. This down here, I believe, is elevation 20, I believe. And then the pavilion is elevation 25. No, no, this is 20, and so this must be 15 here. Yes, 15. This is 15 feet between the first floor and the ground floor, and five feet between this and that, and then it drops down. Then this is five feet to high tide, and then it drops down, but the tide comes up. But that decision was made, you know, in consultation with
soils people and everybody else so that we weren’t creating any risk.

Now, the next problem, and it would have been true also in Cambridge, was that this building, all of the foundation for this whole building goes right down, big concrete columns all the way down, from 120 to 150 feet down to rock point. This whole building is sitting on a bunch of stilts.

DAITCH: Really!

MUSHO: You know, just like Venice. I mean Venice all sits on stilts. However, these are out of concrete.

DAITCH: And this goes through the fill?

MUSHO: Goes through the fill, through the gook, through the sand, through the clay, all the way down to rock: 150 feet below.

DAITCH: No kidding!

MUSHO: So this building.... I mean they’re talking about putting an addition on this thing, but they’d better know that that building is going to have to have piles on it because this building will not move. And if they put another building adjacent to it that’s not on piles, that thing will move. So what I’m leading towards, I mean aside from the design of the building, was that we had a lot of premium to pay. We had to pay for the stone, we had to pay for the fill behind this, had to pay for the pile foundations, which left very little money for the building. I mean this building was built for a mere $10 million. I mean Clinton [William J. Clinton] now is building a $50, $60 million dollar presidential library.

DAITCH: Obviously you’re talking about all these things, and obviously they’re expensive. Is this more or less than the Harvard site would have been?

MUSHO: Well, no, I think the premiums may not have been. The riprap along the water’s edge wouldn’t have been as high. You might’ve gotten some pluses on your utilities and so on, which wouldn’t have been as far away. We do piggy-back on the air-conditioning for the university. But since that time, we’ve built that subsidiary cooling tower out here that divorces from the university, because we weren’t getting the kind of chilled water that we had originally anticipated from the university. So I don’t know how that’s resolved itself. It’s been, like I say its been 25 years since we literally, worked on it. More than that....

[END SIDE 1, TAPE 2]

[BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2]
MUSHO: All right, so we talked about the Big Plan, we talked about the split plan, and we talked about the final building site. Okay. All right, we’ll talk a little more about that glass box because I wanted to just illuminate that a little further because it seems to me that there was something missed by everyone on that, and maybe it’s.... As a young man I worked with Mr. Pei, and he had his fount of ideas.

But under the pyramid, there’s an item in there that really resulted, finally, in the fin that’s in the pavilion down below. I mean not many people see it as I do. But at any rate, for what it’s worth, you see, that curve, that notch out, which is created by this fin and this cavity, obviously you can’t have this cavity unless you have the fin. But it seems to me that you’ve got to look at these things together. That you can’t have this exposure of the Archive into the public Museum portion, i.e., the pavilion, unless you create a.... In other words, if this is a negative, this is a positive. And I think the combination of those things is what makes that space. And nobody says, oh, I like that fin.

I’m reminded of a story. You have a great time when you’re doing buildings about columns. People can’t stand columns. They think there getting in the way. And my famous story is that we were doing a building for Pitney-Bowes, and we had to deal with that problem because the vice presidents were mumbling under their breath they were getting columns in their offices, and they didn’t want a column in their office because they thought it was demeaning. So we built an office, and the chairman of Pitney-Bowes came, and he walked over and he leaned on the column. That was the end of the story. We didn’t have to.... A column has.... It was so amusing. He said, “Well, what do we want to talk about?” I said, “Nothing.”

DAITCH: The column suddenly has value.

MUSHO: Yes, I mean.... That, and we did a job for Mobil Research Lab right down in Farmers Branch in Texas. We had these enormous columns going up through the atrium holding the roof up. I talked to the vice president, I said, “Boy....” I had to convince the chairman to paint them Mobil red. I said, “Here these columns, I mean somebody’s got to celebrate this column, you know.” And that’s what it was. And I think that you’ve got to see this pavilion. You’ve maybe seen it in a different light now. But that column is a positive gesture relative to the flag and the glass pavilion. And the reason I’ve, what I’m leading to, and I want to hark back to the first scheme, but I’ll jump in the other direction first.

Mrs. Kennedy, if I’m aware, saw three models. One of them was that early scheme which was the truncated cone. That was one. Number two, she saw the glass pyramid. She might have seen the half scheme. I don’t recall. I wasn’t there when she did see it. And then finally she saw the scheme that was.... You know, the scheme for Columbia Point was actually a model. We actually built that model. Here. I don’t think you ever saw that. This is the model.

DAITCH: Oh! No, I didn’t see that.

MUSHO: That’s that scheme.
DAITCH: That’s beautiful.

MUSHO: And that’s the corner there. Anyway, in every case she accepted Mr. Pei’s definition, which was terrific. Especially in the glass pyramid because that was so big anyway. I mean you could see through it so you knew it was not a. You didn’t have to take anybody’s word. I mean if you hadn’t any eye at all, you could see what it was.

There was something in here, however. There was a triangle. This wall was here. It’s a triangle here, and there’s a column. And then the flag was behind that triangle. This triangle, or fin, made that thing. I mean it was an incredible section, you know, with this thing that actually came over to kind of a column. That column went down into the Museum area, and here was the glass, you see. So there was something to shield you as you went up and down into the Museum area. Just like this column goes down to the Museum level. So when you come in, you see this column. I mean you’re beginning to understand the building. You’re never lost in this building. I think you....

You know, one of the things that the pavilion does is, as Mr. Pei says, when you’re through with that Museum, you’ve had enough. You’ve got enough in your head. You need quiet. You need serenity, you need the water, and your own thoughts. Maybe you’re not with your own thoughts, but at least you’re in a place where you don’t have to apologize for being alone. I mean there’s a very important sequence in the position.

That idea grew very first out of the first scheme, only to find fruition in here, you see. But during this time, there was this great move. And the one thing I didn’t mention earlier is that the program for the original building, which was much larger, was what LBJ [Lyndon Baines Johnson] built because we gave him our program that we developed, and he actually built a building that big.

DAITCH: Oh, really!

MUSHO: Yes, his building is much bigger than ours. But that program, you see, had this combination of things. And after you get by all those things, yeah, “Mr. Fenn, are you happy?” “Yes, I’m happy.” “Dave Powers, are you happy?” “I’d have much more storage space.” “Yeah, but you’re happy. Okay.” The Archive is here. You’re happy. Everyone’s happy.

But when all of that is said and done, there is one other element outside of the architecture, it’s well, you know, should we have a great artist do a bust? We ought to do something, you know. That’s when Chermayeff got into the scene as well, and that’s why we got that inscription on the wall, you know: “All might be done in a hundred days.” That was done, actually, when we went to see Arthur Schlesinger, and he floated that up. And I think the family said, “Yes.” And we put that on the all. Because the feeling was that a little thing would be nice.

DAITCH: Yes, it’s beautiful.
MUSHO: But there’s something else. Mr. Pei was rolling around in his mind what to do or not to do, or was this enough or not enough? And, you know, all of the decisions about whether the building should be relative to the water and everything else was all major decisions that everybody could take for granted now because there it was. Or will be. It was under construction. I have some construction photos, some glossies. But at any rate, let me stay on my thoughts here.

DAITCH: Oh, are these them?

MUSHO: Yes. But there’s further ones. No, when it was being built, you see.... Here’s the road coming in, and there’s the building. Oh, no, I guess I didn’t bring the other ones. There are some construction photos of this site. But at any rate, the one thing that was still not.... Mr. Pei was struggling with, like I said, is this enough, is it appropriate? And Bill Walton and he obviously consulted together and then Steve Smith. And do we put a plaque on the wall? Should we have money set aside for an artist? And so on like that.

At any rate, what was decided, just as it was with the landscaping, we built, you know, a three-foot-high model of just the pavilion, and then the fin, and the stairway. Just that piece. The rest of the building wasn’t in it. We set it up in the conference room down in our office. We’re not in the same place. We were at 600 Madison Avenue. And there was the space frame, actually we painted it silver. It’s actually a dark color. And we had the wall of the Archive with that scoop and then the stair.

And she came, I don’t know, after lunch. As a matter of fact, Mr. Pei might have had lunch with her. I don’t recall. But it was all arranged but unarranged. She arrived, she sat down, we closed the doors in the conference room. We just had coffee and some cake or some little cookies. And Bill Walton was there, I.M. was there, Mrs. Kennedy, the model on the table. Nothing else. And I was sitting off to the side. And we sat there, I tell you, for it must have been three hours. Not saying anything.

DAITCH: Really!

MUSHO: Yes. Because, you see, all of it’s all been said. I mean they knew what it was all about. I’m sure they must have talked before, you know, before they came in and saw this thing. And everybody knew what the problem was because, you know, they were going to be faced with the answer to that question because people would ask it. And this particular point, by the way, happened when the job was designed basically. But leaving it.... Well, at any rate, she then emotes, at the end of these three hours, “Mr. Pei, I like it just the way it is. Leave it alone.” I.e., don’t put a presidential seal on it. Just a flag. No bust. And so on.

Now, those little things with the letters on it happened later, down on the bottom there. That happened because Steve.... When the younger generation of the family became involved and then also, I think, the archivist felt like they wanted some rare things around, and those things happened. That wasn’t there originally. In fact, Steve had, at one time, the idea of putting the food service down there, or something.
DAITCH: Oh, no!

MUSHO: Well, no, there was a question of it. That’s why it was finally built downstairs. It was not built where it is now because it was rejected. I mean that’s not a new idea. But at any rate, that’s neither here nor there. But the interesting thing was that the question about the appropriateness of that room, that was the issue. And she turned to him and said, “Mr. Pei, I like it just the way it is.” She took another look, and that was the end of that. Now we’re going to build the building, you know.

But in Carter Weitzman’s book, I think that that statement was used when she allegedly saw the first model, which was three or four years before that time. But be that as it may, it’s not a crucial point. But all I’m saying is that her enthusiasm for the architecture, as expressed to Mr. Pei in my presence, on two occasions was in walking out to the site and then saying that that plan was the way she wanted it.

And then, of course, we had the groundbreaking and, you know, the big party and so on; like they had fireworks and…. I have one other observation to make, and that was once when they were all piling into the theatres. Guggenheim and I happened to walk by Eunice Shriver. And Eunice Shriver turns to me, and she says, “Ted! Ted! I like those stairs going down to the waterfront there.” She said, “I didn’t even know about those.” And then she turns the question around. She says, “Maybe it’s a good thing. I would have told you not to do it.” Or some words to that effect. Because she was very conscious about the cost of the job and the money it was costing because every dollar that we didn’t spend on the building obviously was available for her work with the disabled. But anyway, it was quite an experience for me. And I think I’ve exhausted myself.

DAITCH: You have such wonderful organization. That’s great.

MUSHO: Well, I don’t know about that, not the organization.

DAITCH: It helps so much. Is that all normal in terms of how long it…. Well, I know it’s not normal because every situation is unique. But it is often true that such a large-scale project would take that long?

MUSHO: No, no. I mean this was perhaps…. Well, we did other buildings simultaneously, too.

DAITCH: Sure. Of course.

MUSHO: Well, not simultaneously. You know, when there was a low period, you know, when the MBTA just simply wasn’t going anywhere, I was doing other things. But this was always the first piece of work. I mean nothing took precedence on it. And then, of course, when Steve got on it after they lost Bobby, things turned up. I mean Steve is a doer, you know. I mean he and I enjoyed each other. I
mean I enjoyed Steve. Steve was a helluva character. But he also was not a man who
shunned away from challenge. I mean the guy would put his head down, and he’d just go
like wildfire. But, you know, there was just an element in Cambridge, it seems to me, that
just didn’t want us.

DAITCH: Really!

MUSHO: Oh, there’s no question.

DAITCH: Because I wondered about that. From what you were saying earlier, it
sounded like everything was great, and it’s....

MUSHO: Well, yes. We got the site. I mean Harvard was never able to get this site.
We got it.

DAITCH: Well, yeah!

MUSHO: But, there was a lady there. I don’t think I’ll mention her name. But I had no
idea, although I did have an idea in the sense that these ideas you have
about what social conflicts there might be are better left undealt with
because, you know, it’s un-American. She accused me of not understanding that people
in her part of Cambridge didn’t drive to that other part of Cambridge.

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh!

MUSHO: I looked at her, and then, oh, my God, oohh ooh!

DAITCH: That other part of Cambridge.

MUSHO: Stay out of this discussion, you know. And that level of vehemence is, you
know, I don’t think it does anybody any good. I think, in retrospect, the
friends that we had there, which were many, I mean some beautiful people,
especially related to Mr. Pei. I mean everybody felt that Mr. Pei, and indeed correctly so,
that he would do a sensitive piece of work if anybody else could. But they were
powerless, those friends in Cambridge. Part of it is, I think, that some people thought that
to thwart us was to thwart Harvard as well. So I think some of that rubbed off.

DAITCH: Aaahhh. So you think these are non-Harvard people.

MUSHO: No, they were Harvard people. They had graduated from Harvard. No,
that’s a separate thing. The alumni were coming from two or three camps
from Harvard. But, no, no. Look, I don’t have.... I can’t point to anybody
because it wasn’t my role. Although I was there. I mean people would, I mean people
when they couldn’t get a hold of I.M. to say something or to explain something, it fell to
me. And I must say that the press, you know, they were itching to find out who was doing what to whom. There was a real game.

But Cambridge is that way. That goes on all the time there. They’re fighting M.I.T. and fighting Harvard simultaneously. They’re out to get whatever they can, and I don’t know that they wound up with a great city as a result or not. I don’t have any idea. I mean I enjoyed going to M.I.T. when I was there, but it had nothing to do with the politics. It was just the joy of going to a good school. In fact, I lived in Boston. But the fact that that big a site was undeveloped and it could be developed....

DAITCH: And developed in a very organized way with a central theme.

MUSHO: Well, you see, nobody disputed the architecture. Nobody disputed the land allocation, Harvard, whatever, related facilities. Nobody disputed that. Nobody disputed the idea of a park along the trees. They knew that the key unknown was also the key to their objection: i.e., this same woman who said to me, “We don’t want anybody running around chewing gum with Hawaiian shirts.” Hawaiian shirts are back in, by the way. Everybody has Hawaiian shirts on. But, I mean she was not bashful about telling me her point of view. I mean, fine, hey, lady. So I went back to New York on the evening airplane.

But those things, you know, are not unusual nowadays. I mean that’s.... Development is a tough road, you know. But aside from that, I mean after all, we were moving a railroad out of the downtown. That was a big piece of work.

DAITCH: Sure.

MUSHO: We were going to put a building there that had a high premium of foundation to.... We’re only building, at the most, a five-story building. It’s like this, you see. One of the advantages of this eight- or nine-story Archive is that it puts.... You know, when you put a foundation down that deep, you’d better put something on top of it because it could take a building twice the size. You’re already putting the foundations that far. So that there is very little premium more to put a heavier building on it. So that was going to be the case at Harvard, too. That in fact we were probably going to spend more for foundations than we would in a normal.... Now, what is normal? I don’t know what normal is.

On the other side of the coin, it didn’t seem to me that there was anybody going to give us credit for having a difficult time. I mean, they’d say, “That’s your problem. Oh, by the way, I’ve got more for you.” So I mean it was a revelation to I.M. I mean I.M., seems to me, approached it purely as a long-term commitment that the presidential library belonged at Harvard University. That’s where the president would have wanted it. And he thought that, and still feels, I think, that the combination, without giving any of the quality up, could still be made.

Now why did it finally come here then? Well, because the money was running out. I think that if the community organizes itself in a negative way, there is no reason to be there. I think there’s a lesson to be learned there. But it seems to me that it’s very clear
that you can’t--especially for a political family, I mean, you know, after all, the Kennedys are politicians--that you can’t call up the tragedy as a reason for being there. Because those people weren’t buying that, they really weren’t buying that.

I don’t recall anybody--and there may well have been, by the way, people saying: Look, we owe this to our “Favorite Son.” I’d never had that experience. It was always objection upon objection. I never felt that there was anybody there.... Now that’s my own, and maybe in a sense in not having a building in that position, even though it might have been modified, let’s say, and were still there, I don’t recall anybody defending the poetry of being there. It’s not part of....

There was here, though. When Mr. Pei had his first public meeting here, people got up and said, “Mr. Pei, I want you to know right off, before you say anything, we want you, we love you.” Come on! I mean it was unbelievable! What happened, you know? I mean it was unbelievable. It felt so good. I’m sure Steve was thrilled by it, Fannheiser[?]. And the fisherman who looked out on the water. They were all thrilled. We faced nothing but negativism over there.

DAITCH: That’s interesting.

MUSHO: Now, was it politics? I don’t know. Was it a plain obstreperousness?

DAITCH: Yes. Maybe academic types, not that they’re all academics, but maybe they’re just hyper-analytical.

MUSHO: Yes, I mean there was nothing, there was never positivism. The only thing positive was a fantastic site.

DAITCH: Yes, it’s beautiful.

MUSHO: It’s a great site; there’s no question about the site. And that’s why the kept the park. And I haven’t been over there. I haven’t been over there since. I haven’t been over to the site.

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh!

MUSHO: I’ve never seen the damned thing. I saw so much of it....

DAITCH: Right.

MUSHO: That I didn’t want to see it again. But, no, I mean it would have been great. I think I.M.’s ideas about tying it back to the university through the houses and so on was an elegant idea. I couldn’t believe that anybody.... Now, okay, let’s see if we can find some positive reasons for their negativism, and that is that the pyramid may, in fact, have been overly generous. That could have been scaled back. I mean I don’t know that.... It was a schematic sketch, you know. But I don’t recall
anybody saying that, as there has been said here about this, that to be here is a piece of poetry. I mean people have said that. I feel that when I come down here. You know, you turn your back to everything else, and you see the water, you see Boston off of the skyline, and it feels terrific.

DAITCH: Sure.

MUSHO: Now, okay, there’s not a million people. There weren’t going to be a million people. There may not have been a million people over there before, you know.

DAITCH: That’s right.

MUSHO: I mean that’s why I say the fateful decisions about quantifying the estimate, doing an EIS were fateful characterizations that permitted the negativism to rise higher than it might have in a natural builder-community relationship. Because, you see, once the government does the EIS, there’s something that changes. And I can tell you that this is.... There is no.... You know, in New York they have this phrase, “as of right.” A developer buys a piece of property, everybody around him has got ten-story buildings, he can build a ten-story building. Now “as of right” doesn’t mean that he has to or that he could supervene, contravene all of the codes and so on, so on, so on. If he wants to go to 12 stories or to split it into a tower and so on, then he’s got to talk: Well, I’m doing this for that reason. Oh, but I object to that reason. Yeah, but there’s other contrary reasons that that would be better than.... So he talks with that person.

We never got to the point in that discussion where you could say, Look, I don’t like that pyramid at 89 feet because once you’re over 70, I can see it over those houses. We’ll pull it down to 70 for you. There was never particularization of their position. There was always too many people, etc., etc. So there was never a discussion. There was basically negativism. And I think that’s what the Kennedys, in their own political sensitivities, finally felt about it, that this was a no-way deal.

While when they came here, they not only were amongst friends, but they had this level of, I would call it, you know, we leaned on the university tremendously to come out here. I mean you wouldn’t be here if the university wasn’t here, even though you have problems with it. You wouldn’t be here if that housing wasn’t here. And it goes back to Eisenhower, that housing, in spite of the fact you may not want to be married to it. Because it seems to me that there is a location. I mean this is a place, you know. And it’ll get better over the years. All right, it’s been 20, 25 years already. But okay. But it’s still.... This is magnificent.

DAITCH: Absolutely!

MUSHO: Now, has it curtailed the programming? I don’t think so. I mean you’re running downstairs now a naturalization course down there for future
citizens. I mean that’s fantastic!

DAITCH: It’s amazing.

MUSHO: If you did that over at Harvard, you’d have to get permission from the city to have that many people. I mean seriously. And most of those people won’t know Harvard from a hole in the wall.

DAITCH: That’s right.

MUSHO: But over here they know. So I think that the fact that you could talk this way about it at this point, I mean, I wish Steve were here. Steve would so enjoy it because that guy worked his whole butt off. Steve worked hard. And so did the rest of the family, for that matter. But Steve and I, you know, connected on several levels. So in that sense I... My own sense is that it’s a great success. I wish I didn’t have that argument with Mrs. Kennedy.

DAITCH: It sounds like it wasn’t a permanent rift.

MUSHO: No, it wasn’t permanent. But anyway.... Well, you know, I mean letting technical difficulties interrupt with your better judgment is a.... I can understand that. But nonetheless, if global warming continues to take place, we will not be five feet above the highest recorded tide. [Laughter]

DAITCH: Exactly!

MUSHO: By experts.

DAITCH: Talk about a technical difficulty. Oh, yes.

MUSHO: Oh, goodness. Funny.

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh! It sounds so much, though, like, although there may have been negativity amongst the Harvard, not just Harvard, but the Cambridge people, it sounds like you had a wonderful working relationship, I mean you and Mr. Pei and the family.

MUSHO: Oh, yes. Oh, we did. We did. No, question about it. Oh, we had countless numbers of meetings. I have literally found in my files, because I mean it’s 25 years ago, these files that I took with me.... And I think if you would want to, or if you think it’s relevant to take this, if you could Xerox them and send them all back to me. Is that all right?

DAITCH: Oh, that would be wonderful. I would appreciate that. This is wonderful
You could put numbers of them. You can start from the top, put them any way you want and number them, and then send them back to me, and I would have them, and then you’d have a copy. There’s nothing here that’s confidential by any manner of means, I mean what I brought. This is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the act that transferred the property over. There’s nothing here that’s.... By the way, one thing that you.... These documents, the reason why I say they’re not confidential, I know they’re not. All of this is in the EIS document. You can get it from the GSA. And you may have a copy here in the Library.

DAITCH: It wouldn’t surprise me. Surely we do.

MUSHO: And so that would be that. So I have no inhibitions about giving you these things, and making a copy, and then send them back to me. Because all of this literally went.... All I’m giving you is the organization I put together, which anybody could do.

DAITCH: But you can do it better.

MUSHO: Well, I mean I try because it seems to me it’s a mountain of stuff that has value. If you organize it one way, other people organize it the other way.

DAITCH: It absolutely does. What happened to this property after the Library…?

MUSHO: Well, Harvard got their piece. The Kennedys still have the other piece. And the other piece is still the related facility. I don’t know what’s been built there if anything. I haven’t been there.

DAITCH: There are buildings, but I don’t know if the Kennedys built.... You know the Harvard School of Government is there.

MUSHO: Oh, yes. The Institute of Poly and the Government is there, yes. But I don’t know what else is there. I haven’t been there. I don’t know what’s underneath there, whether they put.... I know the park is, some part of it is still a park.

DAITCH: Yes, part of it’s a park. You know, I’ve driven....

MUSHO: And there’s a piece of sculpture, I gather, too. I don’t know by whom.

DAITCH: I’ll have to pay attention. I’ve driven by there, but I had never really looked at it with this perspective.
MUSHO: I think there is one thing to be said, though, just almost in closing, is that State Archives is in the wrong place. It should have been perpendicular to us, not in front of us. Because right now, when you come around the corner around the course, you don’t see the building.

DAITCH: No, you don’t.

MUSHO: Which is not fair at all in my estimation. But okay, you know. I do think, though, that.... I don’t know where the entrance to this new building is. Is there going to be a big circle or something, driveway, to this new building in the backside facing the water?

DAITCH: I don’t know. You’d have to talk to Debbie [Deborah Leff] about it.

MUSHO: Yes. I’d love to see that site plan.

DAITCH: Yes.

MUSHO: You don’t know where the new building is going attached to this, do you?

DAITCH: I don’t know any of that. You know what somebody had suggested, though, and actually who was it that told me this? I think it was Kenneth Galbraith [John Kenneth Galbraith]. No. Anyway, somebody else that I interviewed. I can’t remember who. But he told me that someone else had suggested that they have a ferry, you know, like for tourists.

MUSHO: Oh, no! That’s what we put down here.

DAITCH: Is that what they’re going to do?

MUSHO: Oh, that was Steve’s little pet project.

DAITCH: It’s a fabulous project!

MUSHO: Oh, yes, yes. Well, in the summertime, that was what the plan.... I don’t know if it was used this summer or not. Was it used at all?

DAITCH: Not that I know of. And again, I don’t know. I’m just peripherally attached to the Library.

MUSHO: But, no, Steve Smith went through great effort to get that. He asked me where I should put it, you know. The easiest way is to put it further down near the outhouse out there, the outfall house, so that the university could use it as well. But putting it here relates very nicely to this, and then people could come
on those tours in the bay, and come here and walk to the Library. Come back and go out again. So that’s where it was. And this is the first time I’ve seen it. I’ve never seen it; I haven’t been here for years. So Steve worked very hard, just before he died, on that subject.

DAITCH: I think that’s wonderful because it’s also.... As you say, coming in it’s difficult to see the Library. You don’t really get a feel for it. But when you come from this direction....

MUSHO: No, but you see like this path, you see this path didn’t go all the way around the edge before. You see it actually stopped at the corner. We put a little light there that revolved around it. But that’s been taken out. Then they put the bell in, and then you could walk around. You see, there is a law that says you cannot build along the edge unless you make it public. That’s all public right of way. Of course this being a public building anyway, that’s fine. So you can come up the ramp there off the steps, and come around, and hopefully will continue all the way around to Columbus Cove there one day.

So things accumulate, and, you know, the society accumulates their treasures, their legacies, and it gets better all the time, it seems to me. I think that’s the important characteristic about it.

But anyway, the university is obviously getting better. I wish that building.... When I came around, I didn’t have the sense. I’d wait until it’s finished to see whether or nor it pays a nod to the Library. But my first impression is that the State Archive building is even more poorly sited than I originally had thought it was.

DAITCH: You probably have such a proprietary interest in.... I mean any architect designer. You couldn’t help it.

MUSHO: Well, you know, you work on it. Well, not only that, the question of proprietary, I know how that building got there. Steve Smith told me. He said, “Ted, my enemies changed it from that side to that side between the time it was approved and going into printing.”

DAITCH: Really!

MUSHO: I mean that was.... Now, I don’t know if that’s confidential information or whether it’s hearsay.

DAITCH: Not anymore.

MUSHO: But the sense that this building was not.... Look, I mean it’s sitting on top of the outfall house. You’ve got to be crude to do a building on top there anyway or anywhere near that thing. Having said that, there it is. Be my guest. But, you know, you can turn your back on it. I mean the fact that there’s granite
paving being put down in the front of this building is beyond my comprehension.

DAITCH: It’s pretty amazing.

MUSHO: Because Steve Smith called me on the phone one day and said, “Ted, find out what it cost to put granite on that pavement.” And I said, “Steve, you just told me to take it out six months ago when we were working on it.” He said, “Ted, I’ve got the money now. I didn’t have the money then. Will you please shut up and do as I tell you?” So I hang up the phone. I get a call from I.M. two minutes later. And he said, “Ted, the family wants us to try to put granite on the front. They were at the National Gallery, and they saw how beautiful the paving was, and they thought it would be nice up there.”

But as it turned out, we couldn’t afford. When we got the prices, all we could afford were those small blocks. There was no money. So we put the small blocks up. But they’re nowhere near as beautiful as what they’re putting up there. So I compliment whoever has seen the light. I mean these materials and characterizations affect your visitation, you know. And we got.... That’s the granite, by the way, that’s in the pavilion. That’s Cold Spring granite from Colorado. The wall is pre-cast white concrete with white silica sand, and everybody thinks it’s a marble building. Well, it happens to be concrete. We couldn’t afford anything else. I mean it was unbelievable.

So I mean after spending so much money on it.... There’s a million dollars in the foundation, and there’s a million dollars in that seawall. There’s two million dollars out of ten.

DAITCH: Yes. Not even part of the building yet....

MUSHO: Well, you don’t see it. I mean it’s certainly part of the building.

DAITCH: Yes, yes, it is part of the building, but not the building you see. Yes.

MUSHO: I mean we.... Steve went through some real agonies with the cost of buildings at that moment. And, look, I’ll end on another note, I’ll give you another turn of construction. To this day when I see those people, and they’re still around, that built this building, I keep reminding me that they lost money on this job.

DAITCH: Really! Oh, my gosh!

MUSHO: They lost more money than they bid.

DAITCH: Oh, my gosh!

MUSHO: And they feel like they made a very legitimate contribution to the Library, but were never recognized for it.

MUSHO: But if they’d come in with the right price, they wouldn’t have built it at all. So you can’t credit them for it too much or they’re liable to get--their head would get swelled up too much.

DAITCH: Yes. But that’s nice. And it’s actually nice to make it part of the record, too.

MUSHO: No, Turner Construction, Hal Parmelee [Harold J. Parmelee], who was the president of Turner at the time, he’s no longer there. He’s someplace else, and he’s retired there. But he reminds me, he says, “Ted....” In fact, Turner Construction wrote a book about their firm, and it has that item in there. He called me up and wanted to know if I would be offended. I’m delighted that there was someone else that went through it.

But, no, Turner did a good job, I think, with all things being considered, and the people that worked on this job. We had a fellow who’s now retired, Harry Barone, who was the architect-in-residence on the job, you know. Then there’s Bob Milburn [Robert Milburn] that worked on the job, and Fritz Solzer who worked on the pavilion. All people who....

We had what we called the Olympic Team on this job. We had all of the top guys in the office because I.M. put them on it because he wanted a first-class job. But I mean the pavilion was done by Fritz Solzer. All the working drawings were done by Bob Milburn. Fellow by the name of Lloyd Ware[?] did the pre-cast concrete. A person by the name of Kellogg Wong[?] did the layout for the exhibit downstairs. Who have I left out? Well, there’s Harry Barone. Then, of course, Turner.

Then there was Art Cement [Art Cement Products], a company in Quincy, that did the pre-cast concrete walls. So we had a.... Then the space frame was done by a company called Space Frame. I can’t recall the exact.... Space Frames, or something like that. Sky.... [Butler Manufacturing Company].

DAITCH: What are space frames?

MUSHO: Well, they call that structure, you know, when they build up out of small tubes, and then build it up into pieces, and then support the glass. They call it space framing.

DAITCH: Oh, I see.

MUSHO: It’s sort of after the.... Buckminster Fuller [Richard Buckminster Jr. Fuller], you know, the mathematician who did all those shapes, those circles that created this synergetic mathematics. Instead of putting a lot of strength in pieces far apart, you put a lot of small pieces sort of like space frames. They call them space frames. But, you know, it was an accumulation of knowledge that resulted. That
space frame was used on the Rochester Student Union, the University of Rochester, done by Mr. Pei’s partner, Harry Cobb. So there was that residual, that information already in the office by Bob Milburn, who then translated it into this building. So we had a lot of people. We had a big party for the people that worked on the building. We drove them all up here and came to the opening.

DAITCH: Sounds like a great team.

MUSHO: We had a good time.

DAITCH: Do you have any feeling for... Well, I’m sure you do. But Mr. Pei.... I don’t know that much about architecture; I know a few famous names or something, but would you say that there’s any influence behind his work in general, or his work more specifically, or you work on this particular building with reference to other architects or other types of architecture?

MUSHO: No, no. It’s a question he can answer better than I can. But I think it’s important to... You know, we’re modern architects. We take a great deal of time to understand where we are. What I mean by that is to investigate the site in such a way that we celebrate it with the building.

DAITCH: I like your.... When you were talking earlier about program, too, and it sounds to me like, if I’m interpreting this correctly, that you spend a lot of time with the site and figuring out how to place the building on the site and how the building grows out of the site.

MUSHO: Oh, absolutely. It’s like you say, the site is what you have. It’s the biggest resource you have. Obviously the fact that the person wants to build a building is obviously bigger in the sense that it’s going to happen. But to be in this place has got to be celebrated, because otherwise why be here?

DAITCH: Right.

MUSHO: And if you don’t celebrate it, you’re a donkey, as Steve Smith used to say. But in the act of celebrating it is very human because the building becomes very human in the sense that, you know, like we said at the beginning: You walk out to the edge because it’s just human nature to get as far out into the water, because at that moment the water precludes your being out there. So therefore you’re in a confrontational point of view almost, and yet it’s not confrontational because, in fact, you both understand the limits. So that’s not confrontation. It’s a melting of desire in many ways.

Mr. Pei is.... And that’s why I’m still there after 41 years, because I think we understand that instinctively. I mean do work by myself now. Mr. Pei is doing other things with other people, and Harry Cobb is doing other things with other people. Right
now I'm working on a job in Taipei, a bank, and we're on a circle. And that building, how it meets the circle and dealing with the Feng Shui, the Chinese methods of dealing with site, are very similar.

I mean Feng Shui is not some kind of esoteric Oriental notion. It is good common sense. But the difficulty is to be successful common-sensically, which is very different than just common sense, because you've got to be able to pull out of that site those things that people feel impelled by. That, in fact, he got. What does it mean, he got it? Well, he did it. He turned it into an advantage. And that is Fung Suwe. I keep saying they ought to rename it. They ought to call it not wind and rain, wind and water, but a good dousing. A fresh....

It's so funny, you know, you're supposed to enter a building from the south side. But you couldn't, the circle and all the people are on the north side. He said, “Well, that’s okay, Chinese supercedes the sun because they want people.” So people are the sunshine. So you just take it. There’s nothing oriental about that, that’s common sense. I am, of course, Chinese. But I understood I.M., when you're looking for the key to turn people on. And, of course we all understand that about each other....

DAITCH: It sounds like something to me that is very much in line with the Kennedy, what I would perceive as sort of the Kennedy spirit, too. In terms of their enjoyment of nature and the water and...

MUSHO: Well, there’s more than that. I.M. related to the Kennedy’s on a political level. And I don’t mean partisanship as [Inaudible]. All architects, for example the Louvre in Paris, to get that resolution in a society, that complexity....

[END SIDE 2, TAPE 2]

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