Biographical Note
Pedro A. Sanjuan (1930-2012) was a staff member of the Nationalities Division of the Democratic National Committee and the Assistant Chief of Protocol for the Department of State from 1961 to 1963. This interview covers the Kennedy campaign’s efforts to recruit Puerto Rican voters in New York, international reaction to discrimination against African diplomats, and efforts to reduce segregation in Washington D.C. and Maryland, among other topics.

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by PEDRO A. SANJUAN

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Pedro A. Sanjuan

Date: April 19, 1971
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>First time meeting John F. Kennedy [JFK]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Being asked to write the Latin American plank for the Democratic National Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Trying to get Puerto Ricans to register to vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Robert F. Kennedy’s [RFK] trip to New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>RFK distancing himself from Police Commissioner Stephen P. Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Woman asking RFK about housing projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Increase in registration among Puerto Rican voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Being hired as Angier Duke’s assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Discrimination against African diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Conflict with Michael Cieplinsky over pamphlets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Buses to register voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Jacqueline Kennedy’s tapes to encourage registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>JFK’s trip to Spanish Harlem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Henry Cabot Lodge’s speech in Spanish Harlem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>JFK’s and RFK’s performance in front of crowds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Trying to get an appointment for Angier Duke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>African diplomats being denied service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Discussing discrimination against diplomats with JFK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Discussing the issue with the press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Trying to get desegregate restaurants in Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Lack of action on civil rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Ambassador of Cameroon committing assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Trying to keep discrimination from African diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Incidences of discrimination being leaked to the press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Freedom rides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Discrimination in the Metropolitan Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Discrimination in Washington D.C. housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Hearings on segregated housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Segregation in barber shops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Foreign Service Wives’ list of apartments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Resistance to equal employment in the Department of State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
O'BRIEN: Well, would you like to start on some of the things you were involved with in the election in New York, for example? Well, I guess the obvious place to begin is just with the question when did you first meet John Kennedy.

SANJUAN: Yes, well, I was in New York minding my own business in 1960 in the summer. I had just passed by Washington, and I was doing free-lance journalism up there and about to take a job with a large company doing fairly uninteresting things, when I got a call from the Democratic National Committee.

Apparently I had talked here in Washington, at the home of my father-in-law, [Edwin M.] Ed Martin, with India Edwards, with whom I hadn't agreed on practically anything concerning politics. She was for Lyndon Johnson in those days, and I told her I couldn't see that very well. This was before the Convention. I hadn't ever expressed any preferences to her in terms of candidates. I had just simply said to her that I couldn't see Lyndon Johnson. India's a very fair person; she's a very direct individual. She says exactly what she feels, and she was no friend of the Kennedys in those days. I don't suppose she's ever been terribly impartial, but nevertheless my not being for Lyndon Johnson
apparently didn't make any difference to her. I thought it had. I think I had said myself, "Well, this lady certainly is not going to be particularly keen on me," but I expressed my views. I just said, "Look, I can see a lot of things coming out of that Convention. I can see, you know, John Kennedy. I can see even maybe a new Adlai Stevenson, though he botched it up so badly in '56 that it's a little difficult to see. But Lyndon Johnson, I really can't see." And she said she disagreed strongly.

Yet she eventually called Ellie Clark French in New York. Ellie French talked to somebody else. And I got a call from the Democratic National Committee asking if I would like to work for the Committee; they needed somebody in the nationalities area, particularly in New York City. The nationalities question in New York was very confused, and they were worried about what was going to happen to the Puerto Ricans. I was interested, although I just didn't think the Puerto Ricans fitted into the nationality picture because I didn't think they are a nationality like the Poles, maybe, or the Germans or the Italians. The Puerto Ricans did not really quite fit into the category of a nationality.

I got another call from somebody who was working with Chester Bowles and wanted me to write or to help write the Latin American plank for the platform.

Well, in those days I was fairly naive as to what this really meant. I was terribly, terribly impressed by this business of writing a plank. Later on I learned what planks stand for; they're totally meaningless things. I also eventually learned how they arrange those things; they ask for fifty thousand contributions. However, I did a six or an eight-page paper on what the Latin plank should be (I still think it was really a great piece of fiction writing) and sent it on.

Finally, after the Convention I got a call saying that they wanted to hire me. And so I gave up all my plans, and I accepted. I saw Angier Biddle Duke first of all, and that was when I was already hired. The National Committee wanted me to work with the New York State Committee and also to work with the Kennedy Citizens group. And so I saw Angier Biddle Duke and I told him what I had been asked to do. The National Committee wanted somebody to help and I'd be very glad to help in whatever he was going to do in the State Committee. Angie and I hit it off quite well then. Indeed, he said he was quite interested in working together.
And it turned out that Angie Duke needed a secretary very badly, and he wanted somebody who spoke Spanish and English and wasn't the usual dumb volunteer. And I said, "Well, I don't know, my wife"—at that time I had no children. I said, "My wife is a first-class secretary. She's had secretarial training, and she's very good at it, and she also knows Spanish." So my wife turned out to be our secretary, Angie's and mine, over at the New York State Committee.

I also worked with the Citizens side of the campaign. I used to see a fellow named Schmertz, Herb Schmertz, who was working for [Julius] Edelstien with [Herbert H.] Lehman's group. Together we sort of conspired to keep the Puerto Ricans out of the general confusion in the sense that they didn't know what was going on between the Citizens and the State Committee, and [Carmine] DeSapio's problems with Lehman and with Mrs. [A. Eleanor] Roosevelt, and all that. The Reform group versus the Machine. It meant nothing to them, to the barrio dwellers, who basically had other more pressing needs in mind. And a big fight for these votes would have been a very difficult thing to resolve. It would have really resulted in a loss.

Eventually I got the impression that what was needed in New York and what was needed in any large urban area during a campaign was to forget the big issues and get these people to concentrate on the issues that were best for them. What do Puerto Ricans need to resolve their political power problems in New York? Well, they need registration. Now they were afraid to register and vote because if they did, they'd have to have their fingerprints taken. They thought they would get in trouble with the police. So it was very difficult to get these guys to register.

Before 1960, the last Puerto Rican registration figures had been about thirty thousand or forty thousand, something like that, during the last election, which had been when Averell Harriman got trounced. And the question in 1960 was: "How can we raise this? How many Puerto Rican votes can we get?" There were about seven hundred and fifty or eight hundred thousand Puerto Ricans and maybe a million and two hundred thousand Spanish-speaking people in New York, and the actual registration figures in 1960 were very, very low, well below the previous thirty or forty thousand.
I estimated, without really aiming at perfection, at the optimum, that we could certainly get a hundred and fifty thousand of Puerto Ricans registered, that would not be an impossible thing—and maybe more, but a hundred and fifty thousand at least.

Whenever I mentioned this, people laughed at me. There had never been beyond fifty thousand Puerto Ricans registered. And then they changed address very frequently or they got married and changed their names, and in New York, even though there is permanent registration—or there was at that time a system of permanent registration—whenever you changed your name or address you had to re-register. So Puerto Ricans and the other Spanish-speaking people in New York who move around a great deal lose their permanent registration almost as fast as they attain it. That is why they were so weak politically. They had no voting power, you see. Who would cater or care to cater to the Puerto Rican interest when there were only thirty thousand registered Puerto Ricans who could vote?

So the thing now was to get them to register and register in large numbers.

And I felt that the party that really hit the registration campaign and showed an interest in the Puerto Ricans would get the Puerto Rican vote. If a Puerto Rican decided to register because a Democrat had told him that John Kennedy wanted him to register and have political power in New York, that Puerto Rican probably would give John Kennedy his vote.

Well, the Republicans did a very poor job of doing anything with the Puerto Ricans at the time. They had Rodman Rockefeller going around the barrios speaking in his broken Spanish, and that is not the way to deal with Puerto Ricans. He went around and spoke with, you know, this, "Quieyrow hablahrleys eyn Eiszpanol." And they said, "We can speak English." You know, "Why doesn't he talk to us in English? Can't he? Does he think that we need that?" And, of course, most of them, you know, do need that. The last thing in the world you want to show them is that you know that they need it. You want to treat them like Americans, and that's the one thing that Puerto Ricans in New York do not get: they were and still are the fifth race. In those days there were whites, Negroes, and Puerto Ricans.

And I suppose that there are also yellow people in this world and brown! And we didn't need. I never felt we needed still
another race. We need to eliminate races in this world, not to create another one. But I went on the premise that we had this new Puerto Rican race, which was perhaps blue or something.

I finally met Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy]. Now I didn't know Bobby Kennedy before that time. He came to New York, and I was introduced to him. And, I don't know, he sort of— we took a little bit of a shine to each other. He said "What do you think we can do here?" And I said, "Well, I think we can nail this registration," "Now," I said, "if the vote in New York is at all close, something like the difference between fifty thousand and a hundred thousand votes might get us New York State, so this is an important thing. This is gravy. These are people who—it isn't a question of their voting for Republicans. It's either that they vote for us or they don't vote at all."

O'BRIEN: Now when was this? Time-wise.

SANJUAN: Oh, well, this must have been around . . .

O'BRIEN: Before the Convention?

SANJUAN: Oh, heavens no, after the Convention. This was July, something like that, of 1960. And then there was a big foul-up in New York, and Bobby came—first of all I came to Washington, and I talked to him. I persuaded him that he had to come to New York and make an appearance in Spanish Harlem early, that it was necessary for him to come to Spanish Harlem and talk to people there early in the campaign. In order to get him to appreciate this, I told him that the other side had Rodman Rockefeller going around and that they were ahead of us and so forth. So he agreed. He said, "Fine, I'll come."

His arrival was a pretty big thing. Consequently, some people took hold of the thing, and they prepared a schedule. I couldn't control the whole thing, nor did I want to push other people around, so I agreed. Well, the first thing they had him do when he got there was to go to LaGuardia House. You know, LaGuardia House is not where you want to talk to Puerto Ricans. LaGuardia House is an Italian project. He was quite upset. And he got very upset in the limousine on the way back from LaGuardia House, and he chewed Angie out terribly. Well, he didn't chew him out terribly. He said the
truth, but he was not mincing words. He said, "I have very little time, and I have no time to waste here, and I want to tell you that I didn't come here to go to LaGuardia House. I don't think there's any need to go there." And I was sitting in the limousine, too, and I was quite embarrassed, but at the same time there was a point to this, you see. Angie, who's a fairly charming fellow, had a hard time defending himself.

So in any case, I turned around and I said, "Mr. Kennedy, may I ask you--you know, I don't think I could ever learn as much about politics as you forgot yesterday. I mean, you know far more than I do, and so don't think I'm being presumptuous, but let me ask you a question: Do you feel qualified to run a political campaign in New Delhi?"

And he gave me one of those looks that meant, I think--to me--that he was about--that he was considering lopping my head off or taking me seriously and he just didn't know which way he was going to go. I sort of crossed my fingers, and he said, "No, I don't think I could." So I said, "Very well, You are in New Delhi. This is not the United States. This area of the United States right now, this vote here, you cannot judge what you see on the basis of its impact, of what's going to happen, so don't be too upset if the crowds aren't large in one place or another because we're trying to get a hundred and fifty thousand votes here and this is what's important." Well, he shut up. And he didn't say anything else to me; he didn't lop my head off. I wasn't sure that I was through with him. I thought maybe he'd never look at me again. But anyway, I made that statement. Apparently it impressed him.

And that evening I got hold of him, and we took him into Spanish Harlem to the district leader's place there, and it was just teeming with every type of Puerto Rican under the sun. They were just all over the place. We had a victory parade through the streets, and they grabbed both his arms and they held him to the point where I was quite scared because I felt that if somebody came to hurt him, Bobby couldn't defend himself. So I walked on the side a little ahead of him, and I tried to get the kids away in a quiet way, sort of push them out of the way. This was the first time I ever did this for him. I later did it when we went on that Latin American tour together. He spoke to this group of Puerto Ricans in the barrio and spoke in English, which was much more effective, and he had a great
success.

I remember that there was a Negro from the other side, that is a Republican and an American. Some of these Puerto Ricans are jet black, but they're not Negroes; they're Puerto Ricans in their own mind. I mean, they're Latins. They see the American Negro as an Anglo-Saxon, and consequently he represents the other side. This Negro had come to heckle Bobby, and he was doing a good job of asking him fairly blunt and fairly obnoxious questions. Bobby in his usual way is a ferocious enemy if you have him as an enemy, but he's very kind to those people whom he thinks have a right to ask him questions. So he was being very generous to this fairly obnoxious individual, upon which a very emotional Negro, or black Puerto Rican, got up on the table and started to say to the American Negro, who was making these statements--this is literally what he said, and this is offensive language, but this is what he said--he said, "You dirty nigger. Why don't you go back to Harlem where you came from," because this wasn't Harlem. According to the Puerto Rican, we were in the barrio, which isn't really Harlem. Harlem was where the other Negroes live. I looked up and I brought him down from the table on which he stood. I said, "Get out of there. What the heck do you think you're doing?" And I said, "You can't call that man a dirty nigger. He's black and so are you. Haven't you ever seen yourself? I mean, what kind of prejudice is that? This is ridiculous." And I shut him up in Spanish. I told him off in Spanish in a way that was fairly authoritative, and he kept quiet. He did say, "Well, are you going to tolerate that?" and replied, "Well, we're tolerating it. We can take it. We don't need somebody over here heckling that man. Kennedy can handle himself very well."

One of the interesting things that developed during that tour with Bobby was that we had a problem with some people who didn't want to come close to him because they thought he was another [Stephen P.] Kennedy, the Police Commissioner. The New York Police Commissioner in those days was named Kennedy, too. I said, "One of the problems you're going to have is you're going to have to convince these people that you are Kennedy, brother of Senator Kennedy, who is running for the presidency, which, by the way, they're not too aware of at the moment. The presidential campaign is not part of their everyday life. The thing that really interests them, and that you should know, is that they think that you are somehow related to the
Police Commissioner whose name is Kennedy. And they don't particularly like him, you see? And this realization was very instructive because he began to realize that there was something there that had nothing to do with politics in the U.S. It was, indeed, New Delhi.

Well, there was another situation I recall. I have a photograph of it. There it is over there. See that thing up there?

O'BRIEN: Right, right.

SANJUAN: Well, we are in a public school up in--I don't know where it was--up in Lexington Avenue, 102nd Street or somewhere, and he's trying to answer this lady. I'm next to him up there, and this Puerto Rican lady had just asked him a question. He was ready to answer questions about Quemoy and Matsu and about other foreign policy issues. But this lady said in Spanish to me, "What is the Senator, when he becomes President, going to do about the plight of the unwed mothers in the housing developments?" Well, the issue apparently was that unwed mothers were not permitted in welfare housing developments. And this was quite an issue. Around us were unwed mothers, and they loved their children. Bobby looked at her. And I said to him, "She wants to know about unwed mothers in housing developments." He looked as if to say, "What does this have to do with the presidential election." He actually said to me, "Well, I don't know what to say. I mean, what do you want me to say?" I said, "Why don't you just let me go ahead and say something?" So he said, "Go ahead." So I then in Spanish to her said, "Well, look, (in a very simple way and in a very, very devious way) you see, when Kennedy becomes president, he's going to get much more money for all sorts of welfare projects, and when there are more welfare projects, they will allow everybody in including the unwed mothers. So, you see, he's going to solve that." And she said, "Oh, thank you very much." And Bobby turned around and said, "What did you say to her?" I said, "This isn't the time. I'll tell you later."
Herman Badillo came to see us, Schmertz and me, and we set him up. We gave him some money, set him up in a store front in New York. That's how he got started. He was very independent. He didn't want to belong to anybody. He didn't want to have anything to do with the New York State Committee, and he didn't want to have anything to do with the Citizens, but he wanted some money. We saw in this guy a fellow who was going to be something. He seemed to be a difficult, tough, intelligent Puerto Rican, exactly what the Puerto Ricans needed. They had a bunch of stooges in those days for political leaders, and they needed a tough guy. This was a young, intelligent, tough guy. We got him ten thousand dollars or something like that, and he set up a store front. I'm not saying that we made Herman Badillo; that's ridiculous. He made himself. But it was certainly money well spent because that guy has really become something, and he's very good. He would have done it anyway, I'm sure, but anyway it was money well spent.

At the end of the campaign, when the whole thing was over and we won eventually—you know, I don't know how many months later we realized that the Democrats realized that they had won, but anyway we won—then the New York Times came out with a projection or a study of the registered voters, and how many Puerto Ricans had registered and how many had voted, and so did the Daily News. I think the Daily News had the first study and then the Times published it or vice versa. But in any case, both of them agreed that there had been a hundred and sixty thousand registered Puerto Ricans, and that nine to one they had voted for Kennedy.

Well, now let me first, in all modesty, tell you that, sure, there was a big campaign to get the Puerto Ricans registered, and Kennedy appealed to them, and they went and voted in large numbers. I probably had something to do with it, but with a hell of a lot of other people. I think that because of the coincidence of my having given that figure and having said that's what we hoped to get, I think Bobby Kennedy probably felt that I had much more to do with it than I did. I don't know. Anyway, he thought I was pretty hot stuff as a result of that.

And I came to Washington, and I saw him, and I told him that I was going to—well, I think in my usual devious manner, I told him that I was going to go into business and
that it had been nice knowing him. He said, "Why don't you go into government?" Well, of course, that's what I expected him to say, really, that's what I wanted him to say. And I replied, "Well, I'd like to." "Well, where would you like to go?" "Well, in the Department of State," I replied. And he said, "Fine. Right now it's a little difficult to say what's going to be what, but why don't you just come to Washington?" I was still working and getting some money from the Democratic National Committee. So I came to Washington, although I still had an apartment in New York.

And then Angie Duke got ahold of me. He wanted to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in those days, and he wanted to know if... Well, I wasn't making very much at the Committee. I think I was making something fairly ridiculous like a hundred and fifty dollars a week or something like that, and I had some money saved up. I had been living off of this hump on the camel's back for quite a while, and the hump was getting pretty full by then. In other words, we were hurting, as everybody was. And you know, I had this hotel suite in D.C. and this apartment to keep in New York, and Angie said, "I'd be interested in having somebody look after my interests. I think I'm being forgotten, I don't know. Nobody's mentioned me for anything." And I said, "Well, gee..." "So could you peddle or..." The idea was that maybe I could help Angie become Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; to which I said that it was very difficult to do that and I could not, you know, undertake something like that, but if he wanted to, I could give him an idea of where he stood.

And we agreed on that, and I had a retainer from Angie for a month or two, I think, another one hundred a week, which helped tremendously. And in the process I discovered that, indeed, Angie had been lost in the shuffle. And I moved some things to put his name in circulation. Angie moved through other quarters too, to put his name in circulation in a great hurry, and he wound up getting offered Chief of Protocol. I think that at some meeting with the President-elect the idea came up: "Well, here's a rich guy, he's got a lot of class, and he's got a nice wife. Wouldn't he make a great Chief of Protocol?" The Inter-American question had been resolved. They weren't about to give that to him or to anybody. They just kept [Thomas C.] Tom Mann for a long time. They would never have given that to Angie anyway.
Angie called me up to New York and said, "I'm going to turn the offer down, the Chief of Protocol." I said, "Well, let me tell you right now, before you go any further, that in my honest opinion if you turn that down, you're not going to get anything else. In other words, you're through." "Well, I hate this Chief of Protocol business." I said, "Well, you may hate it, but there are a lot of things that can be done creatively, and this is a beginning. If I were you, I'd take it, and then, you know, you can eventually parlay it into something else or you can go into politics. But don't get left out, because Chief of Protocol is a fairly prestigious job and it has a certain exposure and you can do something with it."

Well, Angie consulted with a lot of friends in New York that I didn't know, and the next day he told me that he was going to take it. And I said, "Fine." And he turned around and he said, "I'd like you to be my special assistant." That was a terrible thing for me because I thought, frankly, that protocol was for the birds. Anything dealing with protocol and all that crap was just out of the question. I thought it was just horrible. But how could I turn around and tell Angie that when I had just persuaded him to take it and told him it was a prestigious job. So I said, "Well, gee, I don't really know, Angie. I mean, I'd love to do this, but I have a commitment in Washington." And I tried to say that I had spoken to Bobby.

And so I rushed to Washington, and I went to see Bobby again. He said, "What's your problem?" I said, "Well, it's a question of a job in Department of State, you see." He said, "I told you that you'd have to wait." I said, "Yes, but Angie Duke has offered me this thing, and I don't want it." He said, "Why don't you go ahead and take it? Come into the Department that way, and after a month or two if it doesn't work out you come to me—or if you don't like it, which you probably won't—we'll see where else we can put you. But go ahead and enter that way. You'll solve a great problem. And, you know, it's not a bad job, Special Assistant to somebody on an Assistant Secretary level. I'm sure that you're right, you won't like it, but. . . ."
Well, I came in on that basis, and really, I must say, I disliked the atmosphere in the blasted office! I used to go around telling Angie that it reminded me of the atmosphere in the ladies' powder room at the Shoreham Hotel, you know. I mean, who could care to be around there for very long? All the problems they had, these poor Protocol people, were problems that had to do with who sat where and who proceeded whom at the table at the dinner.

I didn't know this then: The predecessor to Ambassador Duke, whose name maybe we won't mention, had a penchant for call African diplomats "jig ambassadors," and he also apparently hated everything that wasn't a white Southern Baptist from Texas. That left a lot of people out of his purview.

After entering the Department I read an article by Milton Viorst, in the Washington Post. The title was: "Washington, Hardship Post for African Diplomats"; That was the headline. I read it, and I was appalled to see what was happening.

This was a time when we were getting more representatives from African countries than ever before. More African countries were getting independence. And they weren't as nice as the Ethiopians and the Liberians, who lived here as representatives of their countries for many years, and knew exactly how to accommodate themselves in the dismal situation; The Ethiopians and Liberians didn't go into hotels, restaurants; they didn't want to go to drive-ins; they knew what a black had to put up with and they never protested, never got into any trouble. There never was any trouble, and that's the way they kept it. Well, the Ghanaians and the Guineans and all these new people didn't quite believe in a passive policy. They went wherever they pleased. If they wanted to urinate while they were in Maryland, they decided they wanted to do that, and they went into a restroom in a gasoline station and tried to get in the men's room, and they were thrown out.
And I looked at all this and found out the Department of State had no files at all. So I called in Viorst. I said, "What have you got?" He said, "I've got files that will end all files. "I've got a ton of stuff here I can bring you by the wheelbarrow." I said, "Well, be a little selective and give me the best." And he gave me my files—he gave me his files and they became my first files. And I saw what was going on. I got pretty mad about it. I wrote a memorandum, a very long one, and I showed it to Angie. And Angie said, "Jesus, Pedro, this is terrible. What are we going to do about it?" I said, "I want you to send it to the White House." Well, in those days Angie was quite friendly, and he sent it to the White House. Somehow it got to President Kennedy. And I decided I'd stay there in Protocol for a while and handle this problem.

O'BRIEN:  Well, just backing up here a little bit, picking up a few things, and getting back to this business about the organizing and registering Puerto Ricans in New York City for a minute, did you use anything in the Viva Kennedy thing that was used in New Mexico and California?

SANJUAN:  No. That was, to tell you the truth, that was not. . . . There was some material that looked. . . . There was a button that was very nice, a Viva Kennedy button, but any stuff that is used among Mexican Americans just does not work among Puerto Ricans. They have just a completely different mentality. Or vice versa: To distribute things given to Puerto Ricans among Mexican Americans, that doesn't work. There was no Viva Kennedy organization in New York, really. We called our--you know, we used the slogan, Schmertz and I, but none of the materials. The materials that were prepared in New York were put together there for New York use alone. We did not call it Viva Kennedy in New York very often. We got the newspapers to work with us, and particularly the Diario [de Nueva York], which we sort of bribed by giving them several full-page ads. I don't know how much the Viva Kennedy thing in New Mexico and California amounted to, but in New York City it did not amount to anything.
O'BRIEN: Well, in that regard, too, you had some contact with Pierre Salinger, didn't you, in regard to—was it at this time, or you had some contact with Salinger in regard to some national strategy in not only approaching Puerto Ricans but Mexican Americans?

SANJUAN: I didn't. I had some meetings with [Myer] Mike Feldman here in Washington. This was the first time I met Mike. And, you know, I think—this is a little hazy now because my trips to Washington were blitzkrieg-type things; I came in and out. I talked to Mike about the necessity to put forth a real concentrated campaign. And I got some money—I don't remember how much, but it was something like twenty thousand dollars, and that was divided evenly. Herb and I took it and divided that evenly between the State Committee and the Citizen's.

We did a very good pamphlet—in the first place, we had a fight with [Michael] Cieplinsky, the nationalities guy, because Cieplinsky wanted all pamphlets to be prepared for Poles, Germans, Lithuanians, Latvians and so forth, and the heck with the Puerto Ricans. And my theory was the opposite: The heck with all these other nationality groups, none of whom really depend on their native languages. You know, you talk to a Kowalski up in Utica, New York, and you talk to him and say, "Dzien dobry," and he will reply to you, "What the heck are you talking about?" "Where did your father and mother come from in the old country?" "I don't know." If you tell him that he's a Pole, he gets insulted because he thinks you're calling him a Polack. And he's not; he's an American. His name is Kowalski; he's just like... His name could be anything else. The same thing with a German, Mr. Schmidt, who is a doctor, doesn't want to see something in German because he can't read it. On the other hand, the Puerto Rican depends on something in Spanish because he can't read English. And therefore, those pamphlets in foreign languages, in German and Polish, et cetera were useless, you see.
Cieplinsky didn't want this, and Schmertz and I got pretty mad about it. We went down to Washington, and we were told to see [E. William] Bill Henry. Bill Henry—after we explained the thing to him—came up to New York, and it was very quick. We had a meeting—I thought we were going to have to make a big case of it. Bill Henry met with us first. Then we went to see Cieplinsky. And he didn't even let us speak. He said, "What is the problem?" So, Cieplinsky told him what the problem was, the importance of these ethnic groups and how we could lose the Lithuanian vote and we're going to lose the Ukrainian vote, and all these rather fictitious votes. And Bill said, "Well, I've heard both sides of the story, and I've decided this is the way it's going to be: therefore going to be a hundred thousand pamphlets in Spanish; there are going to be two thousand pamphlets in Polish, two thousand pamphlets in German, and two thousand pamphlets in Italian. Take it or leave it." And that was it. Actually it was too big a defeat. I was hoping for less of an overwhelming victory because I don't think Cieplinsky liked it at all. But, anyway, we got our pamphlets.

Here is the Spanish pamphlet we did. I wrote the thing. We had two pamphlets. We had a registration pamphlet which had already gone out which I did with a group of Puerto Ricans. My god, that was a terrible thing to get done because everybody was haggling over what should be in it, and it really lacked a certain punch. But the second one I did mostly myself with the guidance of a couple of friends of mine who were Puerto Ricans whom I could trust, and not with all these other people who wanted to put their finger in it. It had a lot of punch. I have copies of it.

We wanted to use this generally, but I don't know, somehow poor Schmertz could not get Sheldon—what was his name? Not Sheldon. I know a Sheldon Edelsten. This is a different Edelsten, old [Julius] Edelsten in New York. Edelsten doesn't read any Spanish, but anyway he wanted to see the pamphlet. And when he saw it, he said he didn't like it, and they put something else out of their own in English with some Spanish in it which said, "Puerto Rican-Americans." And, you know, you don't want to call Puerto Ricans "Puerto Rican-Americans," because they're not Puerto Rican-Americans with a dash; they're not hyphenated. And second, it had a picture of Kennedy with [Alfred E.] Santangelo and [Frank G.] Rossetti and all the Italian district leaders, which doesn't go very well among the Puerto Ricans.
Thank goodness this thing came out the day before the election out of the press. It was an effort that was doomed in every way. It came out a day before the election, and consequently it never was distributed—or I don't think it got distributed very widely.

We gave Badillo copies of the other pamphlet and we also gave.... Well, we made good use of those hundred thousand copies, and then we got some more printed. We even gave—what's his name—[William] Ryan, Fitts Ryan, Congressman Fitts Ryan, some copies, and I think they got distributed, as far as one could possibly tell. You know, you get a group of volunteers to distribute pamphlets, but when they leave your office for all you know the pamphlets are going into a sewer. But we had some inklings. Some barrio people brought those things into the office, and when we went out on trips to the different neighborhoods, we could see evidence of this thing having been around. So I think it had something to do with getting people interested.

The most important thing, though, in getting people interested in registering wasn't that pamphlet. The most important thing was that we persuaded the newspapers to finance buses, and these buses on the day of registration were waiting to just literally take people off the street and bus them to the registration locations. We had people in these registration headquarters checking to see that Puerto Ricans weren't turned away, because these blasted official supervisors would try to keep them out. I know, for example, that there was the case of a professor, a friend of mine at Columbia University, who was a Spaniard, head of the Spanish department at Columbia University at the time—or no, that was Angel del Rio. Yes, that was he, Angel del Rio who was the head of the Spanish department at Columbia, who was married to a Puerto Rican, a very bright woman, both spoke excellent English and both of them were turned back. They were both turned back and not allowed to register because they were told by the supervisors up there that they couldn't take the test in English as they were going to fail it anyway. The supervisor told them, "Forget it. You're not wanted here." They reported it to me, and then we began to look around, and we made sure that at most of these places no more supervisors were going to do that without being reported. Then that harassment, I wouldn't say disappeared but it became less obnoxious. And that I think also had something to do with getting people to vote.
And, of course, another thing that was important was to. . . . We published a little notice in the newspapers saying, "This is what you call a certificate of registration. It's your identification. It's your badge of honor. It makes you a real American citizen. Without it, you're powerless and helpless. It's also a very good thing for identification purposes," which was not true. And, "You should get one of these." That took the sting away from the fingerprints.

O'BRIEN: Did you have anything to do with [Lawrence F.] Larry O'Brien? You know, he had that registration pamphlet he put out that year.

SANJUAN: No. Yes, I had a couple of things to do with Larry O'Brien at the Carlyle Hotel when we were doing other things. We were trying to get Mrs. [Jacqueline B.] Kennedy to do some tapes. I did that with Mrs. John F. Kennedy, and I had some things to do with scheduling her. But no, I didn't have anything to do with the registration drive with Larry . . .

O'BRIEN: This is prior to the election in 1960?

SANJUAN: That's right. We had to get her to do one-minute spots so that we could circulate them throughout the country, and particularly in Spanish and Italian. I supervised getting her to do the Polish, Spanish, Italian, and French. Why we needed her to do anything in French is beyond me, but I've got the tapes, I've got the tapes at home.

O'BRIEN: Oh, is that right?

SANJUAN: Yes, and she was very interesting because she did the Italian—you know, it was, "Io sono la moglie d'il Senatore Kennedy." This she did very nicely because her Italian was pretty good. And then she said, "Yo soy la senora del Senador Kennedy," and it came out—it was Spanish with an Italian accent, which was far better than Spanish with an American accent. And then she said something like, "Je suis la femme du Senateur Kennedy." And then Lee Radziwill did the Polish, and she was used as Mrs. Kennedy, Mrs. John F. Kennedy. In other
words, her voice was almost the same as her sister's, and consequently we performed a bit of a ruse, a deception. We sent this tape out saying, "This is Mrs. John F. Kennedy speaking," and it was Lee Radziwill, because [Stanislas] Stash Radziwill speaks Polish. She spoke perfectly good Polish. Very impressive.

O'BRIEN: So these were done for the Democratic National Committee?

SANJUAN: That's right. And they were done in one-minute spots and then they'd be mailed, you see, to every radio station. They would be used as filler in most cases. These local radio stations sometimes have a problem with a couple of minutes or a minute that they don't know what to do with, and they would put the spots in free.

The taping was done at the Carlyle. It took us three days to get the thing set up because every time she'd sit down and start saying something, the candidate would appear, look at her--and as you know, she was pregnant at the time--Kennedy would say, "You go to your room." And Mrs. Kennedy would get up and go to her room. And we'd have to set it up for the next day. Also we were doing a TV spot with her. Finally on the third day, for some reason or other, John F. Kennedy did not appear, and Mrs. Kennedy was able to do these things. We hurried through and got them all out in that session because we knew that the next day it'd be just too much money wasted and we'd have to stop.

O'BRIEN: Did you ever take Senator Kennedy into Spanish Harlem?

SANJUAN: No. Yes, we did. That's right, that's right. He wasn't going to do it, and he was advised not to. [Theodore C.] Ted Sorensen came by, and Ted Sorensen wanted to know why he had to go into Spanish Harlem. In Ted's steel cold way he said, "You've got exactly six minutes to persuade me." So I started off at something like a hundred and eighty words a minute, and I told him all the reasons why it was absolutely impossible for him not to appear in Spanish Harlem and to go to the other Harlem, that he had to stop, and at 116th and Lexington Avenue, which was the "lucky corner"--it was known as the
lucky corner--this was it, and he had to go past that spot on his way to 125th with Adam Powell, he had to stop there, and we could really draw up a crowd. Ted said, "Fine. Thank you." And I said, "Well, are you in favor or against?" You know how Ted Sorensen is: he was an enigma; he didn't even answer; and he had made up his mind that it was going to be that way.

The next thing I heard was about, I don't know, a few days later. [David C.] Dave Acheson, one of the advance men, rolled around and said, "What are we going to do about this lucky corner business of yours?" I said, "You mean it's approved?" "Heck yes, didn't you know?" I said, "No, I didn't." So I said, "Well, let's organize this to get at least ten thousand people there." And he said, "Well, I don't particularly like the situation there because I've been sleuthing around and you've got Italian district leaders and you've got... The people are going to be mad on all sides, and we've got to keep everybody happy, and yet we want to get out the Puerto Ricans." I said, "Yes, I know. This is an area where the Italian district leaders Rosetti and Santangelo overlap, with this fellow [Antonio N.] Tony Mendez, the Puerto Rican district leader. They all overlap; and they're all going to be there. I would put them all on the stand, but don't you make any mistake about it; the people that are going to be there are not going to be Italians; they're going to be Puerto Ricans. And they're not going to be Negroes; they're going to be Puerto Ricans; black Puerto Ricans but not American Negroes, you see. And we better, you know, gear the speech to that."

Well, we got a couple of pictures of Kennedy and Johnson up, and we put up a platform, and we hired some sound trucks. And then we had to bribe the police. Nobody would cooperate, and Dave really was pretty furious, and with very good reason. We finally said, "Let's go out. The hell with planning from here in the Biltmore Hotel. Let's go out there." So we went out there. We had to do something--I don't remember exactly what--to pay extra money to get the sound trucks to stay there, and then came the police saying, "What do we get?" And we had to give, I don't know, a case of whiskey to the police. I don't know where we got the money, but I think we did because otherwise they would have interfered. Finally, the sound trucks started to cover the area and make a lot of noise and we got fifteen thousand, twenty thousand people there. It was a very, very large crowd.

John Kennedy hadn't appeared. And then he came with her
and had a very successful rally. It was registered in the New York Times as the biggest crowd that had ever appeared in that place.

There was a very good by-product. I learned that [Henry Cabot] Lodge, the Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, was scheduled, by some incredibly bad piece of timing on the part of the Republicans, to speak there two hours later. Apparently they didn't know that Kennedy was going to stop there. They took advantage of the stand and the pictures, and there was Kennedy and Johnson right behind the reviewing stand. Lodge spoke. We, in the meantime, had kept the crowd from going away. We started beating the bushes saying, "Don't go away. Lodge is going to speak here." I had the idea that this crowd was very partial to Kennedy and would not be very impartial to Lodge, that it would be a very good thing to have Lodge get a few eggs or cat calls or boos, you see. This was a political campaign; anything went.

So we kept a large number of the original crowd there. I don't know how many, but about three or four thousand people stayed. And Lodge apparently thought he was in Harlem, in the real Harlem—or excuse me, in black Harlem. That's when Lodge made his statement that if Nixon got into the White House they would have a Negro in the Cabinet. "I guarantee you that if Nixon gets in the White House, there'll be a Negro in the Cabinet." Well, that's the worst thing he could have said to those Puerto Ricans because they knew what was meant by that. It was going to be a Negro, you see, and they didn't want a Negro; they wanted a Puerto Rican in the Cabinet. They were terrible to Lodge. They threw things at him, and they booed him. And the next day the New York Times was all full of John F. Kennedy's great success and Lodge's terrible failure. It was a nice contrast, totally unfair.

Lodge didn't realize that he was speaking to a crowd of Puerto Ricans. He saw these dark faces, and he said, you know, "All these dark faces are obviously black, and they're obviously Negroes, and they're obviously interested in getting a Negro in the Cabinet." Nobody had briefed him on the subtleties of the situation. I will quite willingly tell you that had nobody briefed John Kennedy, he would have done the same thing. He would have probably said a "Negro in the Cabinet." But John Kennedy was well briefed, and he knew to whom he was talking.
And Mrs. Kennedy spoke in Spanish, too, by the way, to the group there in her own sort of subdued way. That was quite effective.

Dave Acheson, I'm sure, remembers this. Probably his account of it is far different from mine because I saw it from my own point of view. He worked pretty hard, and finally he was happy. I said, "Are you happy?" And he said, "Yes, I'm happy." But at the beginning he was furious, and with good reason. But we got everybody, all these hostile district leaders lined up with Kennedy. The Italians and Puerto Ricans and there was no trouble.

O'BRIEN: Did you get any chance to see how well either Robert Kennedy or John Kennedy responded to this kind of politics, to ethnic politics?

SANJUAN: Yes. Well, John Kennedy responded very well to popular challenge and to the groups of people in front of him. So did Bobby. Both of them have that ability, each one in his own different way. John Kennedy was enthusiastic about the crowds, and he immediately swung into some sort of association without becoming part of or trying to emulate. He was definitely the embodiment of what they wanted, and he did it well.

Bobby was quite--I saw Bobby in a different environment. I saw Bobby in Latin America, and we went through--I was with him in Peru--the stops he made were in Peru and Chile and Argentina and Brazil and Venezuela. I didn't go through Brazil and Venezuela, no point in my going through Brazil. But I was with him in Peru and Chile and Argentina. Bobby was a very shy person, and people who were strange individuals, whom he had never met before, he didn't warm up to very easily, and he looked both scared and fierce. It was a combination of reactions on Bobby's part that were not very good omens for the person first presented to him. But when he was in front of a very large, totally alien crowd, whom he didn't know at all and didn't understand, for some reason he was able to do the right thing--not just the right thing, but to do it at the right moment and do it in such a way that he would win overwhelming approval from almost everyone. And this was something that was very admirable. It was his best moment. Yes, his best moment.
O'BRIEN: You sensed that in 1960?

SANJUAN: In '60?

O'BRIEN: Yes, when he was . . .

SANJUAN: No, I didn't. No, in '60 he was a very different person. In the first place, he wasn't the candidate. He was very interested in organization. He was terribly, terribly interested in seeing things function right, which apparently didn't concern himself with as much in 1968, when he was himself a candidate. He needed a manager like he had been to his own brother. He had been very exacting and very unforgiving and very, very . . . No, he was not very effective in speaking to groups in 1960. That's the truth. When I saw him then in Harlem, when he went around, his efforts to talk to people were honest. Eventually, they liked him because he was a Kennedy, but not because he was doing a very good job of it, I must say. In Latin America his reaction was so unexpected and so well timed that, you know, he was really carrying the crowds by overwhelming votes of confidence.

O'BRIEN: I'd like to come back to that later and get into that '65 trip with Bobby Kennedy and spend some time with it. It was a rather interesting trip, as I understand. Well, you were talking, too, a little bit about getting things moving for, you know, for Angie Duke. Now what do you mean by getting things moving?

SANJUAN: Well, basically going to see Chester Bowles and saying, "Have you considered Angier Biddle Duke? Where does he stand? What do you think he's going to get?" I talked to Adam Yarmolinsky about Angie Duke's chances. And I scouted around. I think I talked to Larry O'Brien—whom I knew, but not well! I'd met him a couple of times; Larry O'Brien was always very accessible; you could always talk to him; he talked to you as if he had known you forever, but I knew I didn't know him very well—and to Pierre, whom I'd met several times during the campaign. I don't remember where I first met Pierre Salinger. And Pierre was also very affable. And then I think I—yes, I talked to, finally I talked to Robert
F. Kennedy about Angie: "It would be good if Angier Biddle Duke knew what he was going to get. What do you think his chances are of being Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs?" And the answer was, I think, a laugh or something. It wasn't very auspicious. I never knew he was going to be chosen Chief of Protocol.

And Angie had Bailey, John Bailey, or somebody else going around beating the bush for him through [Claiborne] Clay Pell and some other friends in Connecticut. And Bailey was a guy who was going around saying, "You've got to give Angie something."

Basically, I had my ears open to see what Angie might be able to get, and that's all I told him I could do for him. I said, "The most that I can do for you, if you want me to be on a retainer, is to find out, because I have no power. I mean, I can't go and persuade anybody to take you, but I can find out what your chances are." And then when I reported to him I said, "I don't think your chances are terribly good. Nobody seems to..." On the basis of that information I think he then tried to move other people to help him, because I could give him better intelligence as to what things really were than anybody else, and yet there were other people who could do much more for him than I could.

O'BRIEN: Did he get any flak or did you get any flak in the way of your appointment, any resistance to your appointment?

SANJUAN: To my appointment?

O'BRIEN: Yes.

SANJUAN: From where?

O'BRIEN: Any source.

SANJUAN: I don't know. I don't think so. Maybe one of Angie's close friends. I think one of Angie's close friends told him that I'd be the death of him if I went into the Department of State. But, I mean, that wasn't flak; that was just some guy, some public relations guy he had in New York, whom I distrusted. And the feeling was pretty mutual.
O'BRIEN: They finally gave him the rank of ambassador.

SANJUAN: Yes. He asked for it. He only accepted the job with the understanding that he would have the rank of ambassador, whatever that meant. If you really analyze that, it doesn't really mean very much. I'm not saying it doesn't sound good and it wasn't a great honor, but in terms of established practice, he was still Chief of Protocol. Chief of Protocol meant that among all the people of Assistant Secretary rank, he ranked last, and it didn't change things in any way to call him ambassador. All it did was enable people to call him ambassador, which was all right. It was a nice gesture, and it made it sweeter for him to accept Chief of Protocol, but it didn't make him an ambassador. All the Chiefs of Protocol afterwards have been given that rank of ambassador, and, you know, it really was very silly in some cases. Angie, by the way, is probably the best Chief of Protocol they've ever had there in recent times.

O'BRIEN: He had style.

SANJUAN: Yes, he had style, and that's what you need. And Angie also had a lot of forbearance. All this piddling nonsense that's involved in that ridiculous protocol procedure, he could take it and he could take it with a humor. He was born to the purple; he was a real blue blood in the sense that anybody is a blue blood. He was used to that party every day type of routine, which would kill a horse; it didn't kill Angie.

There's one area in diplomacy or particularly in the Department of State and the White House in which things have a tendency to go wrong—and when they go wrong they go terribly wrong; I mean, they go to the devil, and that's protocol. Imagine; the head of state does not have the letter of greeting he's going to give the President, that has been flushed down the toilet or something; and there's a big flap and everybody gets mad at everybody else; and the photographers are there. This sort of thing happens very frequently. Well, in moments like that you need somebody like Angie Duke. Angie Duke is very good in adversity. When things go very wrong, Angie can take it or leave it: "Well, so what?" You know. He does that. He has a good sense of humor. He makes sport of himself, and you need it in that job.
Angie could do this and could do it well, and he transmitted this to John Kennedy. He had a good relationship with the President. In a couple of situations in which I was involved, which were total fouls-ups, John Kennedy thought they were very funny. I can imagine the same situation involving President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower or Lyndon Johnson in which summarily everybody would have been executed or thrown out the window. But Angie has that sort of charm and so did Kennedy.

Angie's a smart guy, good brain, and he was a little bit wasted there. But I don't know. That's something that is not for me to say, I suppose. I do think he was the best Chief of Protocol they've had.

O'BRIEN: Let's get into that, you know, the situation and environment for these African diplomats, and diplomats in general, in Washington in '61. You were talking about the files you got from Milton Viorst.

SANJUAN: Well, I came there, and I saw these files, and I was appalled. I thought that something had to be done there. And then I looked around and thought where can I really fit here other than doing something about this. And surely my background . . . I had been to Harvard University, to the Russian program, and I had received a degree in regional studies, and I'd taught Russian and all that. I wasn't going to crack into the Russian area at State at all because that was a knit-in, tightly held sort of a monopoly. The fact that I spoke fluent Russian made it even more difficult; I'd have against me all the guys who didn't speak fluent Russian.

And Latin American affairs was an area, again, that was terribly hard to conceive of with Tom Mann as Assistant Secretary. I just couldn't see that. And I was not terribly happy about going back and saying, "I want to go somewhere else."

I was thinking of intelligence research. I liked [Thomas L.] Tom Hughes very much--I've got my chronology wrong, really, because Tom Hughes didn't come in here until after the Bay of Pigs, but somehow something had to do with Tom Hughes. Tom Hughes was working at the time with Chester Bowles upstairs, and I think he said something about intelligence research to me.
But when I saw these involving racial discrimination they really got me fired up. The emphasis on Africa was tremendous, the whole business of the Kennedy days—Africa. G. Mennen Williams was shouting, "Africa." We had to do something about Africa and to win Africa for democracy, and the United States influence on Africa versus the Soviet Union—fairly infantile concepts, but they were floating around and they were very important. They were even considering making an Under Secretary for African affairs. There would be three Under Secretaries instead of two—or two instead of one—and all these things. And in the meantime, here we had these countries sending these diplomats to Washington, new diplomats who had never been on a diplomatic mission before. The first thing that happened to them was they were thrown out of a restaurant or they were denied access to an office building, they were insulted. And they got a picture of America that was appalling. Well, of course the naive thing is to think that these are the things that made them mad. They picked up the paper and heard about the way Negroes were treated anywhere in the United States and they got mad, or they already had known this. Some of them came with a desire to stir up a little trouble. They looked for trouble, really.

During the previous Administration, instead of reporting an incident to the Department, they would call in the press and make a big production out of it and then tell the Department because they felt that they were getting nothing out of the Department and they might as well make a big noise first. Things had deteriorated. I estimated at the time that there were a number of ambassadors here from Africa who were really about to say, "Okay, fine. I'm going to pack my bags, go home, and you can bring me back when you're ready to admit Africans on an equal basis." It was really a very, very bad situation. So I put all this in the study that went up there.
And then right after that, a fellow named Adam Malick Sow, who was the new Ambassador from Chad, came to the United States. He was a very meek little fellow, a very nice guy, and he was coming to Washington to present his credentials to the President. He hadn't even been accepted yet as Ambassador. He went into a place called the Bonnie Brae diner over on Route 40, and a lady there told him to get his "ass"out and eat his stuff outside because he wasn't allowed in there. He was very furious. He came and he told me all about it. We spoke in French—and he said that this was a terrible thing, what should he do when he saw the President? I said, "Well, why don't you tell him all about it? You know, tell President Kennedy the whole thing." He said, "Well, I'm embarrassed. This is the first meeting you know, I have an official statement to make." I said, "Well, if you don't tell him then, you probably won't get a chance to tell him for a long time. We want to do something about this, and I'm sure the President wants to know about it. Why don't we just plain tell him, that's all."

I was assigned to go with him instead of the Chief of Protocol, because—I don't know what happened—Angie was busy that day. He was very generous; he let me go with Malick Sow. And so I presented the man to the President and sat down. Sow said a number of things, and Kennedy tried his French on him, which was very bad, but anyway it was an attempt. It was something like, you know, "J'ai voudrai vous—how do you say 'to say'?" The answer would be "dire." "Yes, now where was I? Dire . . . Dire quai . . . How do you say. . . ." And the poor guy would sit there trying to look at President Kennedy and thinking, "What is he trying to tell me?" But the effort came through, the honesty came through, and very well.

After all of the smiles and all the official statements, Kennedy was about ready to say, "Well, it's been nice seeing you," but Adam Malick Sow interrupted: "Tell the President I have something else to tell him." So I said that. We did not have an interpreter because I was acting as interpreter. Then Sow bared the whole question: "I was thrown on my rear end as a result of entering the Bonnie Brae restaurant over on Route 40," or something like that. Kennedy got very angry. He turned around, and he said, "What's happening over there? Was this a mistake?" I said, "No, this happens every day. This happens very frequently,
Mr. President. It's a great problem we've got." So he pointed his finger at me and said, "I'm going to take him to the balcony over there." [He wanted to show him Caroline Kennedy and some kids that were playing outside, and he wanted to clap his hands and make them look up, and the pony and all that sort of thing]. "You go and see [P. Kenneth] Kenny O'Donnell and tell him that I want him to introduce you to Governor [J. Millard] Tawes and end all this business." So I said, "Yes, sir."

I had a very difficult time with President Kennedy. I could never say very much when I was around him. He fascinated me and impressed me considerably, and I couldn't say, you know, "It's going to be very difficult to get all that done because you don't solve things by just seeing Governor Tawes," which I should have said, but I didn't. I said, "Yes, sir."

Then I went outside and told Kenny O'Donnell. And Kenny said, "Tell me, Pedro, are they looking for trouble?" I remember that's exactly what he said. And that was a rather simple sort of question that couldn't be answered simply because, you know, some were, some weren't, and it wasn't germane whether they were or were not. I mean, if I had been an African here, I would have looked for trouble all the time and created a hell of a mess because I would have been so damned insulted that I would have tried to throw bombs if necessary. So my answer was, "No, they're not. Why?" And I added, "The President's asked me to ask you to get me in touch with Governor Tawes." So he put a call in. Governor Tawes was out, but he talked to his assistant, and he said that the President wanted me to go and talk to Governor Tawes about the situation in Maryland. And it was on; you know, the program was on.

In the White House they turned the whole matter over to [Frederick G.] Fred Dutton, and Fred called me in, and we had a program going. Fred was very good. He thought that—and he was right; I agree—he thought that the way to get this problem solved, or at least do something about it, was for the government to make as much noise as it possibly could concerning the need for change, because we couldn't really bring about any real change just for foreign diplomats, obviously. But . . .
SANJUAN: Does that bother you, the air conditioning?

O'BRIEN: All I worry about with a piece of electrical machinery like that running in the background is sometimes it interferes with the recording. I tried to hear it before we started, and it didn't seem to be interfering at all.

SANJUAN: Let's see now, where were we? Oh, yes.

O'BRIEN: We were with . . .

SANJUAN: Fred Dutton.

O'BRIEN: Fred Dutton, right.

SANJUAN: Well, the thing was turned over to Fred, and Fred called me in. Briefly it was given over to Frank Reeves, I remember, a little before his demise, Frank and Harris Wofford. Both of them, you know, sympathized greatly, but finally it was turned over to Fred. And Fred said, "Look, the only way you can do anything here is to make a hell of a lot of noise and talk about what this government is going to do and how this government is interested in changing this and so on. Maybe we won't produce this terrible effect that we get every time there's an incident involving one of these Africans, because it immediately comes out in the afternoon press and there's a parliamentary question raised in Ghana or wherever it is. It's a terrible business." Fred had very good contacts with Time, Life, the Post (the Saturday Evening Post), Esquire—you name it—U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, and he used to tell these people that the best story going around in Washington was that epic thing about the African diplomats. And I'd get a call from the Post or Time or Life. Roger Tubby then was the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and Roger Tubby's idea of Public Affairs was that you told the press everything you possibly could. Of course, the prevailing theory in the Department of State later on became that you told the press only what you couldn't help telling them, and Roger eventually couldn't really prevail. Anyhow, in
those days, with Roger there, I told Roger that I had talked
to Fred Dutton and that this was the opinion. He said, "I
think it's fine. It's a great idea, and you can go right
ahead and answer the questions." And I said, "You've got
some minions over here in Public Affairs who are not going
to like my telling the press." He said, "Well, you go ahead,
and if you need to clear something or if something seems
like a problem to you, you call me, but otherwise you can go
ahead."

So whenever I was asked a question by the press I used
to give an answer and I used to appear on the front page
of every damn newspaper in Washington twice a week or three
times a week. In the Department, there were a number of
people who were quite critical of this. They thought--well,
I'll be very frank with you--they thought I was a publicity
seeker. That didn't bother me so much because, in a sense,
I was a publicity seeker: I was seeking publicity so we
could tell these Africans not to pack their bags and go
home. We thought this was a serious issue and we were
going to do something about it.

I used to use the President's name in vain almost every
time. "President Kennedy thinks..." I remember we
went to Aberdeen once to talk to a group of restaurant owners
over there, and en route Harris Wofford wrote the telegram
that President Kennedy was sending them, you know, and
President Kennedy had never seen it. I think John Kennedy
had a policy that if something was ascribed to him and it
went well fine, it was no problem; if it went badly, it was
different. Later on, if anybody ever said anything that was
not cleared fully with the President, a different President,
it was curtains. But that wasn't the policy in the Kennedy
days; it was a pretty free sort of thing, as long as it went
well. I don't know what happened when it didn't go well
because I was fortunate enough not to have anything go really
badly and therefore I didn't get my neck in a noose, on this
issue at least.

But the prevailing theory among certain types in the
Foreign Service was that I was really a bastard. They had a
very nice sort of naive idea; they had the idea--and they
told me frequently--that there was no point in talking about
these incidents and these situations because there was no
point in telling the world that there was racial discrimina-
tion in the United States. And, of course, anybody who was
in the Foreign Service and who thought that in the whole
world at that time only a few people knew the well guarded secret that there was racial discrimination in the United States—that person was beneath contempt for ingenuousness or for hypocrisy, one of the two. Among the types of obvious myths or truths that symbolize the United States—you take cowboys and Indians and gangsters and the Charleston and the Depression and the Civil War, you know, things that people outside of the United States will associate with the United States, the West, millionaires, the skyscrapers, Coca-Cola—not the least known is the issue of racial discrimination. I mean, these are things that have been associated with the United States for ages. The blacks are treated badly in this country; this has been known since the days of slavery and before. So now we were supposed to keep this as a well guarded secret. I used to laugh at them and proceed not to pay much attention to such moronic concepts.

O'BRIEN: Who particularly did you get this kind of reaction from? Can you remember?

SANJUAN: Oh, heavens, let's see. Let me give you an example of people who thought so. I know my mother-in-law thought so, but, I mean, she's not the Foreign Service. She's the wife of a Foreign Service officer; she doesn't count. I have a feeling that there was a tremendous undercurrent, but nobody dared bring it to the surface too openly. There were a number of desk officers in the Bureau of African Affairs, whose names right now I don't even remember, but they were not Soapy's men. You see, Soapy was very friendly to all this. G. Mennen Williams cooperated tremendously, and, as a matter of fact, he had me attend his staff meetings.

I had a heck of a lot of staff meetings to attend. I had to attend the Secretary's staff meeting every morning for a while because we had so many incidents that even though I didn't rank as an Assistant Secretary—and only Assistant Secretaries or office directors went to these things—I went because he wanted to know what was the latest bad news that he had to face. And these incidents were taken quite seriously at that time, as they had not been taken before.
After that staff meeting I had to go running over to the Public Affairs staff meeting in the morning where Lincoln, Link White, briefed everybody on what was going on, and I sat there at Roger Tubby's request.

And then I had to run over to Soapy's staff meeting, in the Bureau of African Affairs, and Soapy used to stop everybody when I came in and say, "Now, Mr. Sanjuan's very busy. Let's hear from him. What is the latest blow, Pedro?" And I would tell them what the latest blow was. I knew that a lot of fellows in that Bureau at the time really thought that, for one reason or another, this was a terrible thing to do: "Why do you have to talk to the press?"

But—politically, I kept my nose clean. I wasn't told to stop that campaign by anybody that counted politically, and so it was fine. And we really went ahead and made quite a noise. There were something like a hundred and eight recorded incidents during the time I was there.

O'BRIEN: The Bonnie Brae seems to be a kind of dividing point, though. You had a number of those things with some of the Howard Johnsons. There was one ...

SANJUAN: Yes, that was a previous one with little [William] Fitzjohn at Howard Johnson, but I hadn't talked to Kennedy yet. My paper, I think, had gotten up there, and they had decided something had to be done. But when the President intervened was after the Adam Malick Sow thing, and then I could launch a campaign in Maryland which I hadn't launched before, you see. Maybe I didn't make that too clear. That was the point from which time we had the power, the authority, to go and start working towards a law in Maryland. Before that all we had done is just talk.

O'BRIEN: What kind of response did you get out of people like, well, like Governor Tawes at that point?
SANJUAN: To tell you the truth, I never saw, never got to see Tawes. Tawes was afraid to see us, and I talked to his assistants. But there was one very good thing: I was able to speak to the Maryland Assembly in favor of legislation to abolish discrimination in public places like restaurants. I said I was invited to go there by Governor Tawes, whom I thanked extremely for the honor, and Governor Tawes never denied it, and therefore it stood. You see, I had never been invited by Governor Tawes. I think I called a fellow named Edmund Mester who was Tawes assistant, and I said, "Well, we're going to speak tomorrow. Does the Governor approve?" And I was never told he disapproved, because he wanted to keep out of it. And we said, "Since he doesn't disapprove, he must approve." And therefore I was "invited," and he never denied it. And that was it.

Then I spoke to the Maryland Senate, and I spoke on television, and I went to meetings. I always said I'm very grateful to Governor Tawes for his support he's given us. And by george, he never denied it, you see. I was told by Mester and others that the Governor was all in favor of this, but I never had Governor Tawes tell me. I saw the Attorney General of Maryland a number of times. What was his name? He ran for governor later and was beaten. I've got a picture of him here somewhere. Oh, my God, I forget his name now. Isn't that funny? I can see him; he's right there. But anyway, I saw him, and he was very sympathetic.

I don't know that the authorities in Maryland did a heck of a lot, but there were certain groups in Maryland that were very interested and some of the legislators were quite concerned. A piece of legislation was passed? It was not very strong, but was much better than what they had before. What was significant is that the previous law didn't say Negroes can't eat side by side with whites. It said that the owner of a restaurant had the right to ask anybody he chose to leave for any reason at all that was deemed appropriate by the owner. If you didn't leave when the owner asked you to leave, then you were trespassing and you were likely to be arrested, you see. That way the imprimatur of approval was put on a practice of discrimination which was quite objectionable. And if you insisted on staying there, saying, "I'm not leaving because you are asking me to go because I'm black," then the state troopers would come and haul you off to jail.
Now after that law was passed, the opposite was the case. It was illegal to ask anybody to leave except for reasons of conduct. And therefore even if the thing was not terribly effective in terms of sanctions, it said to the restauranteurs who still discriminated on the basis of color: "What you're doing you may get away with, but it's wrong. And take those signs down that said we reserve the right not to serve anyone because they're illegal, and we can force you to take them down."

Many of those restaurant owners, despite the fact that they were considered to be the devil incarnate, were not bad people. They were scared people and ignorant people, and they were afraid of losing a few pennies. Worse crimes than that have been committed by lower middle class elements afraid to lose a few pennies. Some of them in large, overwhelming numbers voted for Hitler in Germany in 1933. That's a mentality which is universal. They were afraid that their savings of fifteen, the net investment of fifteen thousand dollars and their yearly earnings were going to evaporate if Negroes were allowed to eat. But many of them wanted to do something; they were just afraid to be first.

This pressure, plus other types that were put on these people, eventually led to the virtual desegregation of most of these highway restaurants. So by the time the civil rights law came around, there was really no discrimination. In the first place, there was very little traffic and very few Negroes rode through Route 40; very few Negroes actually stopped and ate there. The owners saw that when they lowered the barriers, they virtually had no Negroes eating there anyway and they were afraid of something that wasn't real. In some cases, they began to notice that they got a few more customers as a result of this. They learned one thing, that a Negro paid money.

And then there were some very interesting little side effects which are sort of wry commentaries on human nature. For a while there, Julius Hobson and others were very active in trying to make this an issue—which was very good; they did a good job. Julius Hobson always felt that we were trying to make the world better for Africans and weren't interested in Americans. My argument with Julius Hobson was: "We're interested in everybody, and this is helping everybody. Stop criticizing me and let's go and fight these people on Route 40!"
And eventually Julius Hobson understood that, and in a sort of a quarrelsome way we were friends, you know. We looked at each other and glared approvingly.

I once did something good for Julius Hobson. He came in to listen to a speech I was giving in a Negro church here in Southeast with the idea that I was going to say the wrong things and he was going to heckle me. I stopped what I was saying and I said, "I have just seen a great American and a great Washingtonian and a great leader walk into this room. We need more leaders like that. Julius Hobson has just walked in. Let's give him a hand." Well, it took the sting right out of Julius Hobson. He wasn't able to heckle me at all.

Moreover, I was saying the things that he didn't think I was going to say. My speeches in those days were basically based on this: I took the very thing that Hobson and others were using to criticize me, I took that as the subject of my speech. I would say, "You think that if we prevent African diplomats from being insulted and so on, this isn't going to solve anything? You people are absolutely wrong in thinking this. The great crime that has been committed here is not to throw some toga-clad African diplomat out of a restaurant; it's to throw an American out of a restaurant. And even if you receive these black diplomats like kings and threw black Americans out, you would still insult the Africans." So you know, it was very difficult to quarrel, with that in those days. Julius Hobson had to live with it.

Actually, you know, the White House wasn't doing a heck of a lot on civil rights then. There was a sub-Cabinet group on civil rights to which belonged Harris Wofford and Berl Bernhard and John Macy and Adam Yarmolinsky, and I represented State. We were really plotting some pretty nefarious things that were never—well, some of them were carried out, and some were not. But the idea was that the President would not involve himself for the time being in this but all his departments would do everything they possibly could to see that the law was enforced. So it was a concept that I think had some validity at the time. Eventually the President realized that something had to be done, and then he proposed a sweeping type of legislation which, of course, is what really did it. This was his legislation. That somebody else was able to carry it across was fine, but it was his legislation, at least his Administration conceived it.
Then after 1964 that issue of the Africans became very dim because obviously it was no longer a frontal attack. You no longer were leading with a banner in your hands saying, "Okay, it's obvious that we must not do this to Africans because they represent their country, and they have diplomatic immunity, and they come here as honored guests. It's also obvious, therefore, that you shouldn't do it to your own fellow Americans for even better reasons." After the civil rights legislation got into the House and into the Senate, and then after it was passed, this became a ridiculous, mawkish thing and we stopped. And also for other reasons, but anyway.

O'BRIEN: You had a couple magnificent put-ons there, didn't you, one with the Ambassador of Gabon, or something like that?

SANJUAN: Yes, that was done. The Afro-American, and I suspect that—the Afro-American in Baltimore, right after we did some of these things and we got some publicity, went into a restaurant and had this guy, this American who worked in the Afro, a Negro, dress up in a top hat and tails. They wouldn't have fooled me; it was quite unsophisticated—but anyway, he looked sort of like a diplomat. And he came in and said he was the Ambassador of Goban, a different country, G-O-B-A-N, the modified Gaoban. And the restaurant owner met him there and the bogus ambassador was served and they said, "Oh, you're not an American; you're a foreigner. Wonderful." As they served him, the Afro took pictures. And the next day the Afro came out with, "Charlie Smith of the Afro staff eats in this restaurant, and he doesn't get thrown out because he's an African." It was quite funny. I think it was very funny, and also a very... And then Herblock [Herbert L. Block] came out with a couple of cartoons on this same theme. I think one of them had a couple of people dressed like Africans in a restaurant and the waiter was trying to seat them.
But the thing that was an interesting sequel to this was that right after this business several of these restaurant owners in Maryland would explain to their customers the presence of black Americans in the restaurant eating there by saying that there was nothing they could do about it; these were African diplomats, you see. They'd whisper to somebody, "I hope you don't mind these Negroes here, but they're really African diplomats." And, of course, they weren't; they were Negroes, they were American Negroes. I thought it was rather funny. This was the beginning of the end. I mean, eventually everybody was going to be considered eligible. If you were eating in a restaurant, you were an African diplomat. You were wearing a coat and a tie and had taken a bath recently, well, you were an African diplomat. So it was very easy to become an African diplomat. Eventually the whole thing was forgotten. Our purpose was not to kill the restaurant owners; it was to change their minds, you see. I didn't think it would solve anything to burn all these restaurants, though I thought they were rather ugly, most of them. One of the most unattractive pieces of real estate in the United States is Route 40.

Another thing that ended the Route 40 controversy was that they built another road, and this had no restaurants. And many people, I think people in New York whom I knew and so on, said, "What a great coup. You couldn't change their minds so you had another road built." And I said, "You know something about the highway program in the United States? I mean, you know how long it takes to get one of those highways approved? That was in the books since 1950 probably, and I had nothing to do with it." But it was very funny.

There were other interesting situations, if we must be honest. Diplomats get into a lot of trouble because they're diplomats. Diplomats are very bad actors. Their immunity, which is an eighteenth century concept, gets them into the state of mind that they think they have a right to do certain things that nobody else has a right to do, like not pay debts, park their car in the middle of the street, ruin the furniture in an apartment, get into all sorts of very, very serious trouble. They claim immunity and that's it. Smuggle liquor: buy four hundred and ninety gallons of scotch and sell it to distributors here for a profit when they get it without tax.
In any case, the Africans had, certainly, their share of difficulty, or more because they were new. And many times when I was talking about these Africans who came here to represent their country and what they wanted to do was to preserve the prestige, I'd be thinking of some of these incidents I knew about which had to do with other matters, an attempted murder here and there—not that the Argentines and the Italians weren't just as guilty—and I said to myself, "If any of these things ever get out, we're through."

There was one particular Ambassador of Cameroun who in a short period of time, in fifteen minutes, managed to commit the crimes of extortion, assault with a deadly weapon and kidnapping, and all in that short period of time. He was a very violent man. He had hired a contractor who had a subcontractor, and apparently he had paid the first, and he had made a mistake and hadn't paid the subcontractor. The subcontractor had come to collect his money. And the next day the ambassador called the contractor, had him come in and put a gun to him and took him to the contractor's house in his own official car against the wishes of the contractor and made him write a check for a thousand dollars to pay the subcontractor. Well, this is, you know, this is extortion, assault with a deadly weapon, and kidnapping—not interstate kidnapping, but still kidnapping. You and I would probably get about fifteen years up the river for all that. Well, it took us three months to get rid of this guy and send him back to Cameroun. He was then made Ambassador to Germany. His name was [Aime-Raymond] N'Thepe.

Every newspaper in Washington knew the story; the [New York] Times, the [Washington] Post, the [Evening] Star, Life magazine. Everybody knew about it, and Tubby and I were able to silence every one of these newspapers. We said, "If this gets out, this is going to hurt." And everybody understood what it meant, and nobody published it, except for that guy in Newsweek. What's his name? My God. [Edward] Teddy Weintal. And Weintal had heard somewhere that there was an Ambassador who had used a knife, he said, on somebody and he was doing an article on incidents, crimes committed by diplomats, just the thing I wanted to have published right away! I mean, this was the most incredible nonsense I ever heard. And Malcolm Kilduff was then working for Tubby, brought him down and left him with me. And Weintal wanted the whole story on this Ambassador with this knife.
I told him that I knew nothing about it, sorry, upon which he returned with Kilduff, and Kilduff said, "Aren't you going to tell him? Teddy Weintal's a good friend of the Secretary of State, he's a good friend of mine, a good friend of everybody, and I think he has a right to get the story." And I said, "I'm very busy, and I have no time to discuss this any further." Then I had quite a fight with Kilduff. I said, "Who the heck do you think you are to come down? I don't care whose friend he is. You talk to your boss Tubby and find out just how long it took us to silence every newspaper. Don't you bring that fellow to me again." That was the beginning of the very bad relationship I always had with Teddy Weintal; he never has forgotten that. But I'm sorry, I wasn't about to blow the whole thing.

And then it took us about three months to persuade Mr. N'Thepe that he should leave the country. He said that it was all a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] plot to get rid of him. We had a very interesting session with Soapy because Soapy, by the way, had learned French. Soapy could speak fluent French with a tremendously heavy American accent, but he could speak it, and he always tried to. And we had a fellow named [John H.] Ferguson, who became Ambassador to Morocco. Fergy, who was a very able fellow, but he had brumleitis, terrible problems with his stomach making a lot of noise. I know some people have that. And then we had a interpreter sent up by the Department. All of us were about to receive Ambassador N'Thepe and tell him to get out of the country.

Soapy had the idea that N'Thepe could be told, "Look, this is not declaring you persona non grata, but for your own good you'd better leave the country." It's very difficult to make that fine distinction. Soapy started, and he decided to do it in French! His French was really not very good, as a matter of fact, it was atrocious. N'Thepe wasn't very bright. Everytime Soapy would say something N'Thepe would ask me to translate, and I would translate Soapy's French into French for N'Thepe. Then finally Soapy said, "You know, you have to leave the country." N'Thepe said then that this was a CIA plot, a terrible act of, well, a treacherous thing to do to him. There was a long period of silence. At this point Fergy's stomach started to act up and make those colossal noises. That session was a total disaster. And finally a very bright guy there named
[Donald A.] Dumont (who was very able, from the African division, whom I knew quite well) and I finally persuaded N'Thepe that he had to leave quietly or otherwise he would leave under a cloud—a scandal. The papers would carry it, that we had all these strings in our fingers, but that they were going to slip out, and that this was going to become a public issue. His career would be ruined, and what a pity! And on that basis N'Thepe began to understand us. And finally, he agreed to go.

But it was things like this, you see, that made me afraid when I was talking to these audiences in different parts of Maryland, Virginia, and even down in Florida, Tennessee, and Alabama where I went to talk to people on different speaking engagements. I said, "If any of these things surface, what a fool and a liar I'm going to appear to be."

And it wasn't—let me add—these incidents did not occur because these fellows were Africans; it was because they were diplomats. We also had the British naval attache who tried to steal eight suitcases out of Woodward and Lothrop, eight red suitcases, large suitcases. How anybody could think one could grab eight suitcases and walk out and put them in a car without getting caught is beyond me. Well, this happened. The entire Argentine Embassy for a year didn't pay anything, any bills, any rent, anything, you see. And these were not Africans.

But the notion at the time was the Africans were angels, they're good, they're holy, they're wonderful. And if one of them had turned out to be a bum—and there were many bums among them—why, we would have had a lot of trouble. Nothing ever happened. We even handled two cases of attempted murder, you know, and incidents that were very close to it—usually with wives. In all cases it was with wives. The Africans got very mad at their wives and tried to kill them.

But, again, we had a German who almost beat to death one of his servants, with his wife helping him. The wife held the girl while the German beat her. You know, this is a most terrible thing. I saw the poor girl in my office the next day. She came bruised, battered, and was half dead. And the attacker was a German. All sorts of horrible, aggressive instincts are imputed to Germans. At least he
wasn't an African. But I didn't worry about the Germans getting a bad reputation because they couldn't, they already had one; but the Africans skuldruggery would have hurt our program very badly.

O'BRIEN: Going back to that original incident with Adam Malick Sow, you had a couple meetings that came out of that with state representatives, I recall, one on a seventy-two hour basis.

SANJUAN: Yes.

O'BRIEN: How did this come about?

SANJUAN: Well, you remind me now of something I'd almost forgotten; we set up a committee of state representatives to the Department of State. Particularly, we put emphasis, of course, on Western, Midwestern, and Southern states, because in places like Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma is where there was the greatest danger. There were racial incidents that occurred in New York and Pennsylvania and other places, by the way. These representatives all represented the Governor of each State. They met once or twice a month in the Department of State. We were trying to see what we could do to make for a change in conditions so that African visitors and diplomats and students could travel throughout the country and be received as welcome guests.

I think this was a little gimmicky, you know; it didn't really work too well. It worked in a couple of instances where we had a real problem. A high-level African diplomat, an Ambassador, in deciding that he was going to take a motor tour through the South—we were determined that there wouldn't be any incident as a result of the trip, because we knew that he was doing this in order to have a real scandal and have the newspapers back home, print it. And we were just not going to let it happen. We sanitized the whole trip so that nothing did happen, and we worked through the members of this committee.
But, in effect, beyond that and the reception of some students and a little bit of a haven that was provided—I know that in New Orleans we got excellent facilities put at our disposal through [de Lesseps L.] Shep Morrison. Old Shep had very good contacts in New Orleans, and so we could send somebody down to New Orleans and they'd be given such a glorious welcome that they couldn't see that there was discrimination, perhaps. There were so many things going on—the keys to the city, the station reception, the banquets. And then the airplane back home again—that they didn't have time to take a look, we hoped. Although that was not our main purpose, there were situations in which it was obviously against the interests of the United States at a particular time to have a real scandal.

And at that time, knowing that there was a certain hypocrisy involved in this, I performed my duties as a true Foreign Service might have. I was not a Foreign Service officer. At that time I was a civil servant, but these little distinctions of class are not particularly important. I was working in the same way that anybody in the Foreign Service was working. I was working in the field of diplomacy, and I didn't want the United States foreign policy to be fouled up, so I did what I had to do.

I remember, for example, the Ambassador of Ghana decided he was going to go to Houston, Texas, to the Shamrock Hilton Hotel, and he had a reservation. Those boobies down there in the Shamrock Hilton Hotel had said yes, and then they started to look and said, "My God, where is Ghana?" And they looked at Ghana, and, well, Ghana was right there in Africa. So they called him back and told him, "No. We don't have any reservation for you." And he said, "But I'm the Ambassador of Ghana." And they let it out that he was an African, and, therefore, he couldn't. He got very mad. He called me up, and I went to see him. He said that if somehow he didn't get in the Shamrock Hilton Hotel, that much though he liked me, he'd raise hell and this was Ambassador [William M.Q.] Halm. (By the way, today he's in jail. He became governor of the central bank of Ghana, and after the fall of [Kwame] Nkrumah he landed in the hoosegow). He told me quite clearly that if he didn't get into the Shamrock Hilton Hotel there was going to be trouble.
Well, I tried to do something about it. And I think I called McGeorge Bundy first, and McGeorge Bundy said he thought it was very important, very serious but he was very busy with something else and couldn't I possibly try some other channel. So I then called the Department of Justice, wanted to get in touch with the Attorney General. I couldn't; the Attorney General wasn't in. And I talked to somebody else. I talked to somebody in the White House—I think it was Fred Dutton. Fred said, "Look, your best bet over there is just to stop meddling with calling different people. Just call Lyndon Johnson." And I said, "Why Lyndon Johnson?" He said, "Well, Lyndon Johnson is a power in Texas, and Lyndon Johnson can get anything."

And so I did call Lyndon Johnson. I talked to [Elizabeth S.] Liz Carpenter, and Lyndon Johnson was put on the phone. I talked to him, and I told him what happened. By George, he did understand. He made a call to Conrad Hilton himself, and we had the royal suite of the Houston Shamrock Hilton available for Ambassador Halm.

And then the Department of State mobilized. We had all sorts of reception committees for Halm in Houston, and the Secret Service there with their guns sort of showing under their coats. I mean the Department of State security people with their pockets bulging with something. They were there waiting for him. The fear of the Shamrock Hilton Hotel was that nobody would serve him, that they would have a strike. They said, "There are a lot of these damn Mexicans here, and they won't serve a black." And so we anticipated a strike and all sorts of things. As Halm arrived he was met by the Governor or the Mayor of Houston. They received him, and they wined him and dined him and treated him very well.

He left and he came back to Washington and he called me up and he said, "I want to see you." So I came to see him and he said, "Congratulations." I said, "What for?" "That was the most magnificent theatrical performance I've ever seen in my life," I said, "I don't know what you're talking about. Where have you been?" He replied, "I've been to Houston, as you well know, to the Shamrock Hilton Hotel. And you had all your people there, the Secret Service with their revolvers bulging out of their coats." I said, "I don't know about this. I think it's your imagination. Those were just
nice people from Texas who like you very much. You know, Texans carry revolvers sometimes, but that shouldn't worry you, that's still the frontier.” And he said, "Now you are really quite a cat." I said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, those are words that are very strong. I don't know, maybe I am quite a cat. However, what was the need to go to Texas? Why did you have to go to Houston?” Well, he said, "I've never seen Houston." I said, "Well, you know, we've got some beautiful pictures of Houston I could bring to you anytime, or Dallas or anyplace else you want to go in Texas. You can save yourself a trip." "No, no," he said, "I wanted to see it firsthand." I said, "Well, you're quite a cat, but then, you know, remember me when I visit Ghana.” He was kidding me, ribbing me. Obviously he had seen the whole performance, but he didn't have anything to give that newspaper in Ghana to print, and that was the main purpose of our performance.

We had a hundred and eight or a hundred and ten incidents, very serious, major incidents, you know, really serious things. Eight of them got in the papers in the three, barely three years that I was involved in this damn thing. Now I think that's a pretty good record. And four of them were blown by the White House, by the way. They wouldn't have gotten in the papers.

O'BRIEN: How did they... What do you mean "blown by the White House?"

SANJUAN: I used to write a report of every incident and send it to the Secretary, a copy to Roger Tubby, and a copy—or no, an original to the White House so the President could be briefed if Pierre wanted to. I had an arrangement with Pierre; he could be briefed. And somehow one day when we had a whole slew of incidents--I think there were four or five incidents—somebody happened to pass one of these memos of mine on to a reporter in the White House or it fell into the hands of a reporter. The next day we had a battery of incidents reported in the newspaper.

O'BRIEN: You never did find out who leaked them?
SANJUAN: Oh, I don't think they were leaked. I think some reporter picked—you know how careless they were in those days in the White House. They left it somewhere and somebody came and picked it up, read it, and said, "Aha!" No, I don't think it was a deliberate leak. On the contrary. But still, a hundred and eight, and only eight got out. You might say, "Well, how did you do that?" Well, we did it more by making a lot of positive noise, you see. We made so much positive noise and talked about Maryland and Route 40 that that incident became less important, became less items of news. We suppressed the bad news in favor of some positive news. I don't know whether that makes much sense. It sounds like sophistry.

O'BRIEN: Well, you had this business of the freedom rides which were planned through Route 40. Did you ever get involved in . . .

SANJUAN: There never were any. There were some freedom rides planned. I don't remember now exactly why that thing didn't work out. I mean, I think there was something—I don't know they were called freedom rides in those days; I guess they were—but they didn't pan out because actually there wasn't any real confrontation. The state authorities, not wanting any trouble, sanitized the thing, and the restaurants into which they went, served the riders. I think that took the sting out of things. I'm very hazy on this, but there wasn't any real confrontation.

As far as I was concerned, to tell you the honest truth, I was delighted by the freedom rides because I thought that they would really shake things up. But they didn't pan out. There was one and then another one that was less effective and then nothing happened. I also suspect that there were more important things to do for CORE [Congress on Racial Equality]. CORE was behind this. They gave up the idea as being sort of pointless. I was quite disappointed in the freedom rides. I thought we were really going to have a mess. And you know, if you want to change something you've got to do something to create a little turmoil to make it change, and it would have helped a lot to have a little emphasis put on this. But they didn't pan out; they petered out.

O'BRIEN: Well, let's get into some of the Washington, D.C. problems like housing, and you also had a problem here with private clubs as well.
SANJUAN: Well, the private club thing was basically only one club; it was the Metropolitan Club, to which the power elite of Washington belong, and. . . . Is this going to be accessible to everybody for the next two years or so?

O'BRIEN: No, no, no. You can put, you know, you can close this till '80 or. . . . It's not going to be open to the . . .

SANJUAN: I was very nasty to poor Angie Duke, who really didn't deserve it. He deserved a kick in the ass only; I gave him a kick in the teeth. Angie belonged to this fortress of the Establishment here, the Metropolitan Club, and so did Bobby Kennedy, and so did George Lodge, and a number of other people. I hear about more and more of them every day. Hickman Price, who is associated with me now, tells me he belonged to it then, too. Angie really had a problem because Angie was Chief of Protocol, and all ambassadors from white, non-black countries—or non-colored countries; really they were white countries—automatically belonged to the Metropolitan Club. They didn't have to wait; they just came and assumed their membership, as indeed other people did. The President of the World Bank, the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, and so on; all of these people can become members of the Metropolitan Club ipso facto from the day they pay their dues and so on. They don't have to wait six years like other people do.

Africans and Southeast Asians and other darker diplomats had no access to the club, however. The Metropolitan Club, by the way, admits minister councilors from white countries and even people of lower rank on the basis of so many memberships per embassy available. They rotate them; one man left; the other one came in and took it up. But Africans were never invited. All blacks, orientals, et cetera, were excluded—not allowed in this club even as guests. Now this was a real case of discrimination. The black diplomats knew that some of their white colleagues belonged to this club, that it was a nice social club to belong to, that it had a lot of prestige and that they couldn't belong to it.
The Chief of Protocol of the United States could not
be the Chief of Protocol, cater to all the diplomats in
Washington, and belong to a segregated club; that was my
point. I said this to Angie and added; "Angie, you can't
belong to this club." And Angie said, "Well, we'll see
about it. You know, this is a private affair; it's my
family. I've been there for a long time, and I can't deal
with this like that, summarily. You'll have to let me
think about it."

Well, Angie thought about it what I considered to be
too long; it took a month or so for him to think about it.
In the process I decided... I was a real bastard. I
mean, I decided that I would do something about it. And so
I got hold of [Charles S.] Chuck Stone of the Afro-American
and then of Milton Viorst of the Washington Post, and I said,
"Fellows, we've got to get Angie to quit the Metropolitan
Club." And so they came to interview Angie, and I told
Angie that—now this is a confession of real guilt on my
part. This is exactly what happened. I mean, Angie prob-
ably doesn't even know this, or at least he's figured it
out but he's never been told. He liked to have interviews
in the newspapers once in a while, and I told him that these
two people were interested in interviewing him and would he
give them an interview. And he said, "Delighted. All the
best, old boy!" without even thinking about it.

So I brought them in one day, and Angie said, "Well,
it's... " You know how Angie talks. "It's very nice
to be here, and what can I do for you?" And Viorst led off
by saying, "You are the Chief of Protocol of the United
States and you are here to cater to the interests of all
diplomats, is this not true?" And Angie sort of thought this
was a rather naive question and said, "Yes, that's absolutely
true," "And consequently, you are quite concerned about any
slight slurs or any discrimination that is shown African
diplomats?" And Angie said, "Absolutely. This office, as
you know, has Pedro Sanjuan here doing all these things, and
I myself am helping. We really are very hot about this." They had a Bobbsey twin act between them. Stone said,
"Then why is it that you belong to the Metropolitan Club
when you know very well that African diplomats are not al-
lowed there?" Well, that hit him in the solar plexus!
Angie didn't know where to turn. And he looked at me a
little bit like Caesar must have looked at Brutus; he sort of said a visual "Et tu, Brute" to me. And he said orally, "Well, I'm so glad you've come over here because this is just one of those coincidences. I'm about to announce, and I can now give it to you as an exclusive, to both of you, that I am resigning from the Metropolitan Club because of this very thing you've said." Well, these two guys were first taken aback also and then delighted. And then they went and printed the story.

The next day—I know this from other people—Angie went to the Metropolitan Club and said, "Gentlemen, I'm very sorry but I've got to quit because there's a son-of-a-bitch in my office named Pedro Sanjuan and he's just forced me to." That immediately triggered other resignations. Bobby had to quit, and he quit right away. And George Lodge went with him. And then a few other people whom I didn't know then, like Hickman Price and so on, also quit.

I suppose that organization has always had me on its black list. I don't think I could ever join the Metropolitan Club if I wanted to, which I don't. But, of course, it's fine for me to say I don't; I know I can't. I can't convince anybody that I don't want to. They would have to offer it to me and then I'd have to turn it down, and I would, right now, because it's just as segregated today as it ever was, you know. And there are still a lot of people in that club who pretend they are in favor of civil rights, who belong to it and see no conflict. It's hypocrisy of the worst order.

The Cosmos thing was a little different. The Cosmos Club obviously was a segregated club, and they at that time were about to consider introducing one or two Uncle Toms to desegregate it in a nice, sort of genteel way. And I think it was [Robert S.] McNamara or somebody like that who proposed Carl Rowan. And there were some people who were in the Department of State, who were on the Board, who hated Carl Rowan, and I think they blackballed him, first, because he was black, but, secondly, because they didn't like him. At that point it was taken as a racial thing, which probably it had overtones of being. Then President Kennedy who was being considered for membership in the Cosmos Club because there they go through the perfunctory things of considering, "Is Kennedy worthy of being in the Cosmos Club," when they have some people there who. . . . But, anyway, they went
through that thing, and Kennedy said, "I withdraw my name. Don't consider me." And they did pick their two or three benign, octogenarian Negro history professors. I don't really know if they were octogenarians or not, but they were certainly benign. You go to the Cosmos Club today, anytime, and you'll see a Negro there once in a blue moon. And of course, if you cough loudly in the Cosmos Club, you have several heart attacks because it's one of these sepulchral places, a mausoleum!

O'BRIEN: Well, how about some of these other clubs, too?

SANJUAN: Well, I was blackballed from a club eventually here, and I was blackballed because of what I did to the Metropolitan Club—I was blackballed from the Federal City Club, you know. That's another interesting commentary that has something to do with this. [James W.] Jimmy Symington wanted me to join the Federal City Club. The Federal City Club had been established in order to create for the exiles of the Metropolitan Club and other people, a Kennedy sort of atmosphere. It was going to be racially mixed. The Federal City Club has never been integrated. The Federal City Club has had several figureheads (Louis Martin; [Andrew T.] Andy Hatcher; Clifford L. Alexander, who was with the Committee on Equal Employment; and two other Negroes) among a membership of, you know, several hundred people.

Anyhow, I was proposed by Jim Symington and by two other people in the Club, and I was persuaded that I should join this club. I didn't want to join the club. I belonged to the International Club, which is much more truly integrated. And to face it, there are very few clubs in Washington that are really integrated because whites and blacks don't have social dealings with each other anyway, so, you know, you can't really integrate anything. But in any case, I said, eventually after being prodded, I said, "Sure, okay, fine. How much is it? I'll join this club, too."
And a month later I thought it was strange I hadn't heard, so I asked Jimmy, and he said, "Well, gee, I'll inquire." And a month after that I asked Jimmy again, and he said, "You know, there seems to be a problem." I said, "Oh, that's interesting. What's the problem?" "Well, I don't know, but there seems to be a problem." And a little later I said, "Jim, what is the problem? I'm very upset about this." He said, "Well, frankly, somebody's blackballing you." I said, "Hot diggity dog! Will you take my application right out? How ridiculous! I never asked to do this." If you're aiming your pistol at somebody jokingly and it fires, somebody may think you really meant to shoot, you know; how could I say at that time that I didn't really want to join the thing when I had sent in the application.

Well, later on from Dean Markham, who was a member of the club I learned the whole truth. I told him the story. I said, "I was quite upset about this. What happened? Can you find out?" He said, "Yes, I think I can." And he found out, and he told me it was so-and-so who blackballed you because he said he never could forgive you for what you did to Angie Duke at the Metropolitan Club. I said, "Oh, well, that's fine. I'm delighted to be blackballed for such an excellent reason from this very, very democratic institution that is so well integrated."

O'BRIEN: Well, getting over into some of the housing problems, this is one of the initial things you had when you came in, wasn't it? The location of apartments?

SANJUAN: Apartments were very difficult. It was impossible really to get anybody, any African or any Department of State official who was black, into any apartment building in Washington. We created a commission, a group that was supposed to help. Frank Luchs was the Chairman of it. And I had [Robert C.] Bob Weaver, and I had Commissioner [Walter N.] Tobriner (who spoke with a nasal twang), and Norman Bernstein, Leo Bernstein, Frank Luchs, [Mark] Winkler, [George W.] De Franceaux; those were the people in Washington who were connected with it. They thought that what they were going to do was to come in there and make some very nice fatuous statements and say that everything was ducky, make an apartment available once in a while.
and they were going to get away with it. I had a clash with, particularly with Frank Luchs, whom I accused in one of the meetings of not doing anything. He turned around and said I was a communist. I said, "Well, we'll deal with that later. You can tell that to the security people in the Department of State, and they can conduct an investigation. Let's deal with the problem at hand, which is that you're not doing anything on this and you people are really wasting time." Cafritz was there, too. Morris Cafritz. You know, he wasn't doing anything. He had very few apartments, and in the second place most of them were in black areas anyway, and they were fully integrated or just black. Or at least they were not segregated because he didn't want whites there or, the whites didn't want to live there. And Norman Bernstein was the best of the group. He would have done something, and he wanted to. He didn't have the best apartment buildings available, and consequently it wasn't very meaningful because the apartments he had were not places diplomats wanted to go to. The others did nothing.

Frank Luchs was torn. He wanted to do something because he remembered that when he had come to this city he had been kept out of the Real Estate Board because he was a Jew, and he had to fight very hard to get to in, and then to become president of it. He knew there was something wrong with this business of keeping blacks out, but he also knew, or he thought he knew, that this was going to be very difficult financially and might be very disastrous, and he was afraid of that. He was, you know, he was always swimming between two, trying to ride two horses at the same time. So I pulled one horse away and said, "You can make up your mind what horse you're going to be on." And that got him very mad.

I finally decided that this whole thing just wasn't getting anywhere, and the apartment situation in Washington was absurd. There was no law. There was no, you know, ordinance that said that you couldn't discriminate in apartment buildings; the existing ordinance applied only to hotels and places of public accommodation, such as restaurants, barber shops, et cetera.
Barber shops, by the way, were terrible. They didn't cut a Negro's hair because they claimed they couldn't do it or they didn't know how or the fellow didn't have a reservation, or if they gave him a haircut, he remembered it for months afterwards because they made stairs, you see. We had some hearings on that subject, too, we catalyzed that.

Regarding the apartments, what I eventually did was to get in touch with somebody I haven't mentioned here. He is very important in all this: Berl Bernhard with whom I plotted a great deal. As the Executive Director of the Civil Rights Commission, he was in all the Route 40 things, and he brought in [Joseph D.] Joe Tydings, who was then U.S. Attorney for Maryland. On the restaurant campaign on Route 40, Joe Tydings came with us and he tried to persuade people. He did a very good job. Berl was right there with Harris Wofford and the others. And eventually Berl told me one—I think it was 1962. Let me see, I've got the hearings right here. I've got them at home. Well, anyway, in '62, I think, he said, "You know, the Commission has some money left over we don't know what to do with, and where do you think we could put it to most use to you?" I said, "Well, I'll tell you what you could do. Why don't you have hearings on the housing situation in Washington, D.C.? You know, why are apartment buildings lily white? And why aren't blacks allowed in them?" And he said, "Can you get us the Department of State auditorium for these hearings?" And so I did. I got the Department of State auditorium for the hearings.

And the hearings were held, there with [Ervin N.] Griswold and [John A.] Hannah and the other commissioners. Griswold was the most ferocious of them all, which was very good. It was an act that they were trying to perform—the real estate people—they were trying to say that as far as they were concerned they didn't care about blacks, but it was the banks who wouldn't give them mortgages if they were going to have blacks in these apartments, so their hands were tied. And the banks said, "We have nothing to do with this. It's the realtors." And they kept throwing this ball back and forth.

Finally I was called to testify together with Frank Luchs, my deputy had stolen a copy of his statement from Justin Hinders, who was Luchs' assistant. I read it, and it was a most incredible condemnation of everything we were doing and the most fantastic accusations about how they had
tried to do so many things and worked so well and we had betrayed them and how they really wanted to help solve the housing problem and that we in the Department of State had not been at all receptive to this. And he accused Mennen Williams and me and Duke and everybody of all sorts of crimes. I had an advance copy by about three hours, and I sat there for three hours in a room—I remember it was on the sixth floor—I found empty, and I had no phone. I sat there preparing a rebuttal on cards. And then I went down to my office and in half an hour I got a lot of material together that I had available.

Luchs came and sat down with his speech, and I sat down and started to deploy on the table in front of me all the materials that I needed, which had a tremendous psychological effect on Luchs. Poor old Luchs sort of looked at that and said, "Jesus Christ, what's going on here?" And then Griswold started questioning him and then me, and I started rebutting everything that Luchs was saying. I had a lot of statistics and a lot of fairly well thought out things. And Luchs lost his temper, which was his mistake, and I kept on going. Griswold got mad at Luchs and kept on. It was a debacle, really. And I've got the hearings, the whole transcript; it's right here.

This dealt a pretty mean blow to segregated housing in D.C. because the hearings were not just about diplomats, you understand; they were about housing in Washington in general, which was the point. And this began to convince the D.C. commissioners, those three not very courageous men, that they had to do something about housing in Washington, and eventually an ordinance came out that did something. Again, it was one of these compromises, but it did something about apartment buildings. Eventually there was no problem in getting a house or apartment for a diplomat. But that wasn't the issue, you see. What we needed was a real piece of legislation that said that it's a crime to do this and if you do it, you're going to be in trouble.

Now the barber shops was a very interesting episode. I had Dean Rusk get involved in that one. He gave a speech saying that diplomats couldn't even get their hair cut in some barber shops in Washington, which is a terrible thing.
And I got called immediately by the Public Affairs office saying, "Is this true? You know, barber shops in Washington are supposed to be open to everybody." And I said, "No, it isn't true. You can't get your hair cut if you're black here anywhere in Washington. We do have a lot of problems." And so I went over to Tobriner and I told Tobriner that they had to have hearings, and if they didn't have hearings we were going to make a consistent effort to embarrass him until they did have hearings. And they decided to have hearings.

The hearings were held within two months. I spent two months getting my hair cut every three days. It cost me a considerable amount of money for a poor man like me. You know, I got a lot of hair cuts. I didn't get a crew cut; I just got them to trim it every three days. And I went to barber shops in Connecticut Avenue, Northwest; I went to barber shops downtown in Washington; I went to the barber shop across the street from the Department of State; I went to barber shops in Southeast; I went to Negro barber shops, white barber shops, every type of barber shop you can lay your hands on, including some in Virginia. And I had about twenty-five barber shops in which I had taken down the conversations that had taken place.

I played the devil's advocate. I would say in someplace for example, "I guess you guys... I hope you guys don't... I mean, I'm very conscious of... I just don't like niggers, you know, and I hope you guys haven't cut any nigger's hair with, any burr head's hair with those clippers you're using on my head." And the guy would say, "Don't worry, don't worry, we don't let them in." I said, "Well, you've got an ordinance around here, don't you, in this city--I'm from out of town--you've got this ordinance that says you've got to. So how do I know?" He says, "Well, you know. We don't have to cut their hair."

And I was given all the secrets of the trade. I said, "Well, really, can you really cut a Negro's hair? I mean, after all, you know, isn't it sort of kinky and difficult to cut?" They said, "Hell, hair is hair." Repeatedly, barber after barber would tell me, "Hair is hair. You can cut it. If you can cut anybody's hair, you can cut their hair. We claim we can't. You know, we say we don't have the right tools." And I said, "Well, what happens if you finally get a Negro who sits here and says, "Cut it?"
"Well, then we give him a hair cut to remember forever. He won't come back in here again, believe me. We cut it so that it looks ridiculous."

And I even went to a barber shop here on 14th Street run by Negroes that stays open all night, and I asked these same questions, and this goddammed black barber told me that he would never cut a Negro's hair because that would ruin their clientele, and he told me what the tricks of the trade were, too, you know.

And then came the hearings. At the hearings there were all these pious barbers saying that they didn't get the right training and all this. And then Tobriner asked me to come and testify, and I said, "I have documented evidence gathered over a period of two months. I've been getting my hair cut at barber shops, here, here, and here," and I gave all the names. "And this is the usual conversation. This, I put it to you, is a complete violation of the law. And what you should do is that if somebody discriminates once and is warned and if he discriminates again, you withdraw their license and don't let them cut any more hair. They don't need to be trained. If they need training, let them get it at their own expense. You put a sign saying, 'I cut hair in Washington,' you've got to cut anybody's hair. If you don't know how to cut a white man's hair, you don't get a license. Now, you have to say, 'You've got to learn to cut a white man's hair and a black man's hair or you don't get a license.'"

My wife and I made our telephone unlisted at that time because I started getting telephone calls in the office and at home from barbers all over the area telling me that they were going to give me a real close hair cut and also would I mind if they gave me a shave from ear to ear. And I said, "Sure, you come right over, and you try to give me a shave from ear to ear. I've got an African panga sitting here in my office, and we'll just match it. I've got about a foot and a half reach on you, and I'm not at all excited about it." But, oh, it raised a heck of a storm. Fantastic thing.
O'BRIEN: Well, what, as far as the State Department in regard to both the housing and the barber shop thing—I know at one time you had the wives of the Foreign Service Association out doing a survey—what kind of resistance did you get out of the State Department in regard to this?

SANJUAN: Oh, don't speak to me about the wives of the Foreign Service. That was the most ridiculous thing I ever heard.

O'BRIEN: Okay.

SANJUAN: Those goddamned women. I'll tell you what they were doing, if you want to know something really foul. I mean, you just got my dander up for a moment. Those women were actually permitting people in the Foreign Service to advertise their apartments to be rented to anybody but blacks. I couldn't persuade anybody in the Department of State to prevent them from doing that. They were advertising segregated apartments in the Department of State. Within the Department of Defense it had been made a serious infraction of rules to have anything to do with any segregated apartment anywhere, and certainly to advertise anything on segregated terms was considered punishable. And they broke up the habit in the Department of Defense. It was Yarmolinsky and McNamara that broke it. And here in the Department of State you had these delightful ladies, who are ever so helpful, except that they knew very well that they were advertising apartments that wouldn't be rented to Negroes—in those days they were called Negroes—and by George, they avoided giving any clues to anybody. People like, well, a fellow named Aggrey. [Rudolph O.] Rudy Aggrey, who was black as an ace of spades and a very handsome fellow from, originally from Ghana, was an American citizen, he was in Mennen Williams' shop, and he had a hell of a time getting an apartment. A fellow who worked for me for awhile named Eddie Williams, who couldn't get a house anywhere, an apartment anywhere, when he went to these Foreign Service ladies, they told him they had nothing available, and I knew they had lists and lists and lists. No, the Foreign Service wives were bigots.
Now we had a group of wives of young people in the Foreign Service and people outside, among which was Sylvia Symington and Joanna Macy, who later worked for me, who was John Macy's sister. These gals did a hell of a lot to try to help, but these were not organized Foreign Service wives. The Foreign Service Wives Association, which in the Foreign Service Lounge kept a list of apartments available, kept a list of segregated apartments. . . . Well, eventually they gave it up, but it was a colossal fight.

O'BRIEN: Well, you apparently got a lot of resistance out of the kind of bureaucracy in the State Department and . . .

SANJUAN: Well, you had a lot of resistance in the Department of State with equal employment, a cause with which I was also engaged eventually. I saw that the Department of State was not employing any blacks. The top level headed by a Negro had been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and beyond that you couldn't get anywhere. Well, I wanted to have an Assistant Secretary of State who was black. I wanted to have more people Grades 15 and above who were black. The Department kept producing these magnificent statistics as to how the number of Negroes was increasing every day and the number of Negroes was increasing at the motor pool level, at the GS-3 level, but it wasn't increasing above.

They had an Uncle Tom over there whose name was [Richard K., Jr.] Fox, a Negro, who at one time when Carl Rowan left the Department was left as the highest ranking Negro in the Department of State, and he was manufacturing statistics of doom, saying that there weren't any Negroes available because there weren't any qualified Negroes. And he said, he didn't have any lists of Negroes available. I had accumulated tremendously large lists of Negroes in all professional walks of life, and I challenged him once. I sent a memo to the Attorney General saying that the problem in the Department of State was basically equal employment at the moment and that something had to be done about that because State was very bad about equal employment. And Bobby sent that memo, the cover memo, directly to the Secretary of State, just laid it on his desk. And, you know, that was a little bit frightening. And I saw Ralph Dungan
right away, twenty times, and Averell Harriman immediately called me up. I knew Averell from way back, but Averell wasn't terribly keen on this subject until then, and then all of a sudden everybody got terribly excited about it.

This Mr. Fox was very stupid. At a meeting up there he said that you couldn't get qualified Negroes and that they didn't have any lists. And I took a large file cabinet, a black file cabinet, that I had—the color was totally incidental—and I tossed it at him and I said, "Here are five hundred or six hundred names. Start with that."

And but, no, the problem in the Department was never solved and it isn't solved today. You see, the ...