Stewart, Fenn, Moss, and Hackman Oral History Interview – 4/16 & 17/2004
Administrative Information

Creator: John Stewart, Dan Fenn, William Moss, and Larry Hackman
Interviewer: Vicki Daitch
Date of Interview: April 16 & 17, 2004
Place of Interview: Boston, Massachusetts
Length: 130 pages

Biographical Note
John Stewart held several posts at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, including head of the Oral History Program from 1966-1969, Acting Director from 1969-1971, Chief Archivist from 1971-1975, and Director of Educational Programs in 1975. Dan Fenn was a staff assistant to President John F. Kennedy from 1961-1963 and the first Director of the John F. Kennedy Library. William Moss worked for the John F. Kennedy Library from 1969-1983, as an Archives Supervisor, head of the Oral History Program and Declassification Unit, and Chief Archivist from 1975 until 1983. Larry Hackman worked for the John F. Kennedy library from 1966-1975, during which he served as the head of the Oral History Program with an emphasis on the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Project, the Lead Archivist of the Robert F. Kennedy Papers Processing Unit, as well as Director of Special Programs. Hackman was also the director of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library from 1995-2000. In this interview, the interviewees discuss the history of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, including the development of policies and procedures for handling documents, the various locations the library was housed, and development of the oral history program, among other issues.

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Signature: [Signature]
Date: 4-21-07

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Date: 10-19-04
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Name: Dean H. Fenn Jr.

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 01-02-04

Signed: JOHN W. CARLIN, Archivist of the United States

Date: 10-18-04
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Dan H. Fenn, Jr.

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Signature  

Date  
6-21-04

Signed:  
JOHN W. CARLIN, Archivist of the United States

Date:  
10-19-04
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Oral History Interview

with

JOHN STEWART  DAN FENN
WILLIAM MOSS  LARRY HACKMAN

April 16, 2004
Boston, Massachusetts

by Vicki Daitch

For the John F. Kennedy Library

STEWART: ...disagree with anything Dan says. I won’t say you’re wrong, Dan. I’ll just say my interpretation is a little bit different.

FENN: Is that what you’re going to say. Boy, you have changed. [Laughter]

STEWART: Not as dogmatic as I used to be.

FENN: After a half hour we’ll say, “John, don’t say ‘literally,’ and don’t say ‘my interpretation is like this.’”

DAITCH: Just say, “You’re wrong.”

FENN: Well, listen, I was thinking, coming over, I could fill a whole tape with the mistakes that I’ve made. So I’ll try and say, yeah.

DAITCH: Okay. So we’re about to do that. And just for the transcriber, I’m going to go ahead and set up these tapes and say that I’m Vicki Daitch, and I’m at the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston. Today is April 16, 2004. And we’re
talking with Dan Fenn, Bill Moss, Larry Hackman, and John Stewart. They are going to
introduce themselves in that order, I think, so that the transcriber can get a good sense of
their voices and who they are.

FENN: Well, my name is Dan Fenn, and we’ve just been talking about how you
organize the discussion of twenty, twenty-five years of history of an
institution, and what’s the most useful way for a researcher, if anyone ever
uses this for that purpose, to get at it so the activities and, perhaps more important, some of
the thinking that went into the development of the Kennedy Library.

MOSS: I’m Bill Moss. When I came into the Kennedy Library, I never expected to
be either an archivist or an oral historian. John and Larry took me on spec,
and I had to sort of work at it and develop the ways of doing things, you
know, from scratch. And it was a steep learning curve for me. I stayed with the Kennedy
Library for about fourteen years, from 1969 to 1983. In that time I moved from oral history
into doing archives work, into working particularly with the President’s Office Files and the
National Security Files. And then, thanks to Dan’s selection, becoming the supervisor of the
archives, the library oral history project and the audiovisual section of the Library. I left the
Library in 1983 to go to the Smithsonian Institution where I headed their archives for ten
years. Retired from the federal government. Went abroad to teach in China for five out of the
past ten years. And now I am re-retired but also going back to China again in August. And
that should be enough for a voice level for me.

HACKMAN: My name is Larry Hackman. John Stewart came out to Kansas City to hire
me in 1966. He took the train because there was an airline strike. I think
having invested so much time in the trip, he figured he needed to get
something out of it, so he hired me. I can sympathize with Bill Moss trying to come on and
learn anything about oral history from John Stewart and me, or archives in particular. I sure
didn’t know much about either of those, I felt; and, in retrospect, I knew less than I thought I
did at the time.

I was in Washington doing oral history from ‘66 to 1970. I think at about that time, at
the end of that period, John moved up to the Records Center, and as the Library operations
started to take on a life here, I took off a year to get a degree at Harvard. Then went back to
work for the Library, mostly shifting from oral history over to the special programs side
when Dan came on, and we started thinking a bit about what kinds of programs a library
should have, and doing things that I think we thought of at the time as kind of pilot programs,
testing out approaches to see whether they might apply in the Library when it was formally
created; and maybe, as a second purpose, to build interest in and understanding of and
support for the Library as it was trying to figure out where it would go as well as what it
would be. And I left in the late summer of 1975 to go back and take another job in
Washington.

STEWART: I’m John Stewart. I was on the staff of the National Archives in 1966. In the
spring of that year the job of director of the Oral History Project came sort of
suddenly vacant, and the people at the National Archives were looking to put someone into that job very quickly for a lot of reasons, which I won’t go into. I was on the staff, and I was from Boston, and I was a Democrat, and they asked me if I wanted to do it. I said I would do it for a few years, but I certainly didn’t want to make a career of either oral history or the Kennedy Library. But that’s exactly what happened, sort of. I stayed from 1966 to 1999, thirty-three years. And in that time, after leaving the oral history project in 1969, I was acting director of the Library for about two years, and set up the facility in Waltham on Trapelo Road, and was sort of in charge of that for a couple of years until Dan Fenn came in 1971. Then I was chief archivist for a time. Then when Larry left in 1975, I took over the responsibility for the education function of the Library and spent several years doing that, and also sort of coordinating a lot of the exhibit design and building the liaison with the architect of the building.

Then in 1979 when the Library opened at Columbia Point, I became director of the education, a job that I continued to hold until I retired in 1999. For two years after Dan left as director, in 1986 and 1987, I was acting director of the Library. So in the thirty-three years, as I’ve often said to people, did just about everything around here. For a time I was the acting building manager and acting administrative officer. So I’ve done just about everything around here.

DAITCH: You have. Okay. Well, hopefully that will give the transcriber enough of a feel. And we’ll start off the interview in such a way that anyone looking at the interview will know who you all are that we’re talking to.

STEWART: Would it be easier if we just said our names before we spoke every time, or is that too confusing?

DAITCH: I think it’s a little awkward. But it might not hurt to do it at first, you know, here and there. But one of the first things I want to ask--and I don’t want to dwell on this too much because it’s probably not the most important thing--but the very early years of the Archives. John, were you involved? Was anybody here involved in the very first, after the assassination, what happened and what was the first program that developed?

STEWART: I was not directly involved. On the other hand, I have heard the story from different people. The two people who were most significantly involved--or the three, I guess--were a fellow named Frank Harrington, and I don’t know whether Frank Harrington is still with us or not; a fellow named Herman Kahn who died a number of years ago; and a man named Bert Rhoads [James Berton Rhoads], who...

HACKMAN: Who now lives in Kansas City.

STEWART: Oh, all right.

FENN: Yes, that’s right.
STEWART: But those three guys, I think, and maybe one or two others who were at the National Archives, had some serious involvement in physically moving the papers from the White House to the National Archives and were involved in the whole legal transfer of the papers from the custody of the White House and the president’s family to the custody of the National Archives. But, no, I wasn’t at all involved in that, although, as I say, I’ve heard quite a bit about it, both from being at the National Archives at the time and through these other people.

MOSS: And Kahn had been the director of the Roosevelt Library, if I remember correctly.

STEWART: That’s right.

MOSS: So he had a notion of what presidential libraries were and what he felt they ought to be. I don’t know how much that got into that mix at that time. But certainly he had a viewpoint at the time.

DAITCH: Right. Which was what I was driving at.

STEWART: That might be a good point to make. Herman Kahn, as Bill Moss just said, had been director of the Roosevelt Library, and had become very friendly with Arthur Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.]. And then in 1961 when Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] became president, Arthur Schlesinger really orchestrated the move of Herman Kahn from directorship of the Roosevelt Library to the National Archives. But one of Herman Kahn’s responsibilities was, in effect, to become the liaison between the National Archives and the White House.

So Herman Kahn and Arthur Schlesinger had a very, very close relationship. And so Herman Kahn was quite involved in everything dealing with records that happened during the Kennedy Administration, including the creation, I think (this should be confirmed), creation of a new White House Central Files System, which was done, I’m almost positive, with the help of some people in the Records Management branch of the National Archives at the start of the Kennedy Administration. So there was a whole new filing system that they created at the start of the Kennedy Administration.

FENN: That rings a bell, and I think it can be checked at the National Archives.

STEWART: But again, Frank Harrington and a woman [Kay Davidson] whose name escapes me, were the two people who worked at the National Archives right from the start of the Kennedy Administration, and were responsible for handling material that came from the White House and material that had come from Kennedy’s Senate office. All of the files from his Senate and his congressional offices came to the National Archives when Kennedy became president. And Frank Harrington and the woman whose name escapes me...

[- 4 -]
HACKMAN: I can’t remember her either.

STEWART: ...were in charge of those papers.

HACKMAN: There should be some decent documentation in whatever record group in the National Archives, wherever Herman’s files are. Although since he was later, the director of Special Collections at Yale, there may be some Herman Kahn papers at Yale that would have some of this in them as well.

MOSS: I don’t remember at the time whether it was a precedent. But the whole issue of National Archives courtesy storage of potential donors enters into this as well. And that comes up with us later on the Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] Papers particularly. The notion that the National Archives, following FDR’s [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] example, was the fitting place for these papers to go was unquestioned. I think it was just generally accepted; it was not an issue.

FENN: And part of that story, I think--this is Dan Fenn--I remember November 23rd, I guess it was, looking out Ralph Dungan’s [Ralph A. Dungan] office window over West Executive Avenue and seeing the rocking chair being carried across to the EOB [Executive Office Building]. What happened, Evelyn Lincoln [Evelyn N. Lincoln] initially was moved to the Executive Office Building with what papers and--just papers, I guess--just things out of the office. And at some point, she moved over physically with those things to the National Archives. And everybody always used to say that they saw her walking out of the EOB and the National Archives with paper bags full of things, which clearly, given the later history, she did.

And then Powers, Dave Powers [David F. Powers], and Ken O’Donnell [Kenneth P. O’Donnell] stayed in the White House with Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson] until after the ‘64 election. Then according to the story Johnson said, “O’Donnell, leave and take Powers with you.” So Powers then goes over to the National Archives for a while, right? And there was no love lost, I think, between Powers and Herman Kahn, to hear Dave talk about it years later. So you had mentioned, John, the sense that the National Archives had that the family was pretty intrusive. Do you remember, was there pulling and hauling between Herman Kahn and the professionals and Dave and Evelyn over the way things were being handled?

STEWART: In terms of the oral history?

FENN: In terms of, well, the whole management of the papers?

HACKMAN: Do you remember Dave Powers even being in the National Archives, John? I don’t.

STEWART: I do. And I’m not sure how important this is. But in 1964 I was working at GSA [General Services Administration] in the personnel office. GSA being
the parent agency of the National Archives. And as Dan said, after the 1964 election, President Johnson asked Dave Powers and Ken O’Donnell to leave the staff of the White House. And it was decided that Dave would be put on the National Archives payroll to perform some sort of function related to the creation of the Kennedy Library, which is putting it fairly nicely.

I, as a member of the personnel office of GSA, by great coincidence was given the job of crafting a position description for Dave Powers to justify his grade level at the National Archives, which I did. I was fairly good at writing job descriptions. So I wrote a job description which essentially was filled by Dave Powers for the next twenty years or so, I guess. But Dave Powers was put on the payroll of the National Archives, and his responsibility really was to be in charge of all of the three-dimensional objects that had been transferred from the White House to the National Archives. Then in the summer of 1965 Dave moved to Boston and, in effect, set up his own office in Waltham. Dave and Frank Harrington moved to Waltham, Frank Harrington with the pre-presidential papers. His responsibility was to process the pre-presidential papers.

HACKMAN: John, who do you think said to whom Dave Powers should do this particular thing rather than some other thing?

STEWART: Herman Kahn was Dave Powers’s boss.

HACKMAN: But I mean when Johnson said to Kenny O’Donnell, you need to move on and take Dave Powers with you, rather than Dave Powers going to work for the Department of Navy doing something....

STEWART: Oh, the family. Senator Kennedy [Edward M. Kennedy] or Attorney General Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] or someone in the Kennedy Family, or Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith], in effect, made the arrangements with the head of the National Archives, who was Robert Bahmer [Robert H. Bahmer] at the time, I believe.

HACKMAN: I think Bahmer was just leaving, sort of. Bob Bahmer left in.... Grover [Wayne Grover] was just leaving.

STEWART: That’s right. They made arrangements with the head of the National Archives to put Dave on the payroll, and to put him under the supervision of Herman Kahn. And, as was mentioned before, the relationship between Dave Powers and Herman Kahn was never that smooth.

MOSS: It wouldn’t have been smooth on another level either. And I think that Herman being essentially on the archives and history side saw the museum as something that he didn’t really want to deal with, number one, except as he had to. And number two, most of those three-dimensional objects were “gifts,” most of it schlock. [Laughter] You know, stuff that had been gratuitously sent into the president by the great public.
FENN: Should put a footnote on that saying that that’s true. It’s a fascinating phenomenon, and that’s true of all the presidents. So it’s sort of atavistic, something to the tribal chief thing. Just amazing stuff.

DAITCH: Was there already at that time this separation between library and museum?

STEWART: No.

MOSS: In the existing presidential libraries, the only difference I can think of is that the Park Service really ran the museum at the Roosevelt. No?

HACKMAN: No, none of them. They were always under the Archives. But the two sides, I mean as John suggests, the archives/history side tended to have, and still in these libraries, has very little interest in the museum side. It’s only education that begins to bring them together, frankly.

FENN: That’s something you’re going to talk about because that....

HACKMAN: That comes later.

FENN: Just one thought: We indicated earlier, you know, none of us really had--God knows, I’d had no experience either in archives or museums, and I was so interested in the stories of how you people got into this.

HACKMAN: We were young, we were brash, we were experimenting, we were trying out stuff.

FENN: And really there wasn’t any, there weren’t any marks on the trees because, as Larry says with Roosevelt, you know where the museum thing started. People went to Roosevelt; they were putting together his library, being the first one, of course. Said, “Well, Mr. President, you’ve got these ship models and stamp collections, and gifts and things, what should we do with those?” And he said, “Well, people like to see those. Why don’t we have a little museum?”

HACKMAN: Right. That precedent was a display of personal collections.

FENN: Right.

HACKMAN: Then the Truman Library, reflecting Truman’s [Harry S. Truman] view, was that this should be a museum about the American presidency and should not have Truman in it. So it was the six or seven roles of the president. And so the objects that came in, like Dan said, this miscellany in terms of types and reasons, some of it found its way on display. But that really didn’t have much to do with the presidency or
with Truman. They were just things to put on display.

But an important underlying point is that when those of us who had no museum experience started to talk about a museum, the other thing we didn’t find was attractive, good examples of presidential libraries to say, well, we want to be something like that only better. It was that we wanted to be different, by and large, because we didn’t see anything--and I probably wasn’t even thinking much about any of this at the time--but we didn’t see anything that seemed like compelling examples to us that we then could offer to the family or anyone else: Thank God, we want to be like that only better.

MOSS: That’s certainly true. Another point that occurs to me is that all this stuff, this three-dimensional stuff, with an assassinated president took on an aura of tribute that elevated far beyond the normal. And Dave Powers was the chief acolyte keeping the stuff.

DAITCH: Right.

FENN: That conflict between Powers and Herman Kahn continued spinning out. I remember Dan Reed [Daniel J. Reed] telling me I should get rid of him. And I said, “Listen, if he didn’t exist, we’d have to invent him.” Because he was a great storyteller, he was somebody people loved to come and see. He probably wasn’t the greatest museum curator in National Archives history. But he did serve a certain kind of purpose both internally and externally. But the bitterness between Washington and Powers was quite intense, both ways I might say.

HACKMAN: I think Dan underestimates, or at least maybe just in the view of one person, how much that was resented by other people on the staff, including me. I could not make Dan’s life--and I assume there were other people there more difficult than it already was and challenging in so many ways--by saying, you know, “We’re trying to become a professional organization and do things the best. We have no one on this staff who knows anything about museums. And the one person who’s supposed to knows less than any of us about museums.” So I just see that differently.

FENN: I think you’re absolutely.... No, I’m not sure you do. Maybe I wasn’t....

[Several people speaking at once]

FENN: I said earlier I could fill a full tape with my mistakes. And one of my mistakes was not doing enough management by walking around and picking up things like this. And because what.... I mean politically, you know, politically meaning in terms of the family, and I still think I’m right, that he was an important personage to have around here. But politically I couldn’t have tried to get him to retire or something. At the same time, at the same time, we probably could have devised, with John working on it, a position description that would give him something else and get a professional museum curator in there. You don’t think so, John?
STEWART: I think that would have been harder than you imagine, Dan. When Sarah Bowie came....

FENN: Oh, she was terrific.

STEWART: Dave just froze her out totally because she was the only attempt we made, I think, to bring in somebody with some experience.

DAITCH: She was a professional museum curator?

STEWART: Yes.

FENN: She was a professional designer, and she did some gorgeous stuff. She did the Campobello exhibit.

STEWART: But Dave definitely was protective of his little fiefdom. And this was his sinecure, and I think anybody who tried to budge him out of it would’ve suddenly brought down the family on them.

FENN: Well, you may be right, you may be right. He was quite vain in many ways. Very charming, but very sensitive.

STEWART: But I agree with Dan that he served a purpose.

FENN: It certainly wasn’t museum curator.

HACKMAN: We could turn over a lot of annoying visitors to Dave. [Laughter]

DAITCH: John, you were going to say something?

STEWART: With all due respect, I think, just from the pure length of the conversation about Dave, we have given it a significance in the whole history that is not justified!

FENN: That could be.

STEWART: Admittedly, just about everything we’ve said....

HACKMAN: Yes, I would agree with a few differences. But again, in the whole, in the big scheme of things, the relationship between Dave and other people was not that significant, it seems to me, in the history of the Library.

MOSS: And in most cases he didn’t mess with what we were doing.

[- 9 -]
FENN: He did not, he did not. I think that Dave would have liked, in fact we know, Dave would have liked, the whole thing to have been totally JFK-focused, and our whole approach was (and we’re going to go back and tell this story at some point later) that this whole institution, archives, museum, and education, is going to work together as an educational center to encourage carrying on JFK’s interest in politics and government, and to nurture interest in politics and government. And I don’t think Dave ever bought into that emotionally or intellectually. But at the same time, he didn’t fight it.

MOSS: Yes. And I would put it this way: We sometimes walked warily around Dave, but we did not engage, there were no confrontations or that sort of thing.

DAITCH: And no occasions when he made any attempt or in any way put roadblocks in terms of what you were trying to do?

HACKMAN: What I always felt I didn’t know....

MOSS: What he was doing behind the scenes.

HACKMAN: Right. And Dan would be the person who would have the feel for this particularly or John. I never knew what Dave was saying which could have been harmful or, in better circumstances, could have been very helpful. Going all the way back, which is prior to what we’re talking about, going back to that fundamental discussion as to whether the oral history program was going to have access to materials or not, which [Inaudible].

MOSS: Let me introduce a slightly sinister note into this because I did have one experience. You remember when I had the lunch with George Dalton in Washington?

STEWART: Yeah.

MOSS: He took me aside, and he wanted me to spy on John.

STEWART: This is typical Dave.

HACKMAN: George Dalton! But go ahead.

MOSS: Yeah. But at any rate, in the course of the lunch....

STEWART: Do you know when that might have been, Bill?

MOSS: This was when I was still in Washington. It must have been 1970. And he
said to me, “You don’t want to mess with Dave Powers because he knows some people you don’t want to mess with.” [Laughter] This sort of inference that there was something that he wanted me to be intimidated. I wasn’t. I knew I could ignore it. But there was a sense that there was something that could happen.

FENN: Well, Dalton, we ought to identify Dalton who, I think, is running a gas station in Virginia, according to Sy Hersh [Seymour M. Hersh]. [Laughter] We don’t know how reliable he is on this stuff. But George Dalton was a yeoman who struck up, in the Navy Liaison’s Office Taz Shepard’s [Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr.] office, who struck up an acquaintance, as best I can figure it out, with Evelyn. So George, [if] the senator had a party, George would serve the drinks at the party. And I always thought, I don’t know for sure, but George, they decided.... The Kennedys were like this, you know. They had these people. And George would need some money or something. So that they would send him to Waltham to take out some of those secret tapes and type transcripts; and we all know the quality of the transcripts.

But George is one of those people who specialized in leaving the impression that he was talking for the senator. And he would talk to me about things that I was doing and not doing, and how.... I finally ran into the senator on a plane once, and I said, “Hey, listen, Ted, you know, you’ve got some things you want to say to me, why don’t you say it? Because I’ve got all these intermediaries running around telling me what you think and what you like.” He said, “Hey, things are going fine. The only question that I’ve heard is what about Alice Fitzgerald being hired?” Well, it wasn’t Alice Fitzgerald. It was Alice Powers. So he didn’t.... But around everybody, we all know this, these people cluster, and they’ve got their own agenda, and George was clearly one. So that was the end of Dalton as far as my problems were concerned. But your story is....

MOSS: Well, the other piece of this is that--and you’re quite right, this sort of enlarged family group, whatever it was, had its own agenda. And we were never quite sure how that engaged with, meshed with or didn’t unless there was a problem. It was always sort of out there. We were aware of it. But to say that.... Obviously it influenced us, but only indirectly.

FENN: Very indirectly.

MOSS: Very indirectly. I can’t think of a single case of real meddling.

FENN: I agree, I agree.

MOSS: When we get to the oral history screening, that was a little bit different.

FENN: And never did Dave, in my time anyway, have anything to say about the papers. And, in fact, the only call I ever got from a member of the family about something involving the Archives and the papers was Steve called me once, and he said, “Do we have an oral history of Art Buchwald [Arthur Buchwald]?” And I
said, “Yes, and it’s closed.” Then he pursued this. And apparently Buchwald had told him that I had made available some of his closed material, which, of course, I hadn’t and wouldn’t and didn’t. And so on. But that’s the only time I ever remember any member of the family calling about the papers. And Dave never did. Dave never did.

STEWART: Before we leave this general historical period, we have to say something, even though none of us were involved, about the absolute creation of the Kennedy Library. I mean the Kennedy Library was created during President Kennedy’s Administration.

FENN: October in ‘61.

STEWART: No, long before that.


FENN: That was when the announcement was made.

STEWART: That’s when the announcement was made, but the point I’m making is there is documentation on this probably. I know there is some in the White House files, and I’m not sure where else. It’s certainly in the National Archives files someplace. But soon after the inaugural, the president of Harvard wrote to President Kennedy, and very, very specifically offered to build a library, to build a presidential library. And the way the letter was worded, the very, very clear inference was that Harvard would manage this library, Harvard would build it. It would be a presidential library at Harvard. The response that President Kennedy sent back to President Pusey [Nathan M. Pusey] at the time....

HACKMAN: Yes, Nathan Pusey.

STEWART: Which was clearly written by Arthur Schlesinger with the help of Herman Kahn, the response that President Kennedy sent back to Nathan Pusey said very specifically, “Yes, I’m going to have a presidential library. Yes, I would love to locate it somewhere near the Harvard University campus. But the Library, like the Roosevelt, Truman, and Hoover Libraries, would be under the jurisdiction of the National Archives and Records Administration.” And there was some other sort of softening language saying that he and the people at the National Archives would be happy to collaborate with the librarian at Harvard and so forth and so on in creating this.

But the specific point is that Harvard very early made an attempt, in effect, to build a presidential library for JFK. And JFK’s response was that he would have the library, he would locate it at Harvard, but it would be part of the National Archives and Records Administration. Which, I think, was the thing that was announced in the....

FENN: October ‘61.
STEWART: October ‘61.

FENN: John, that’s absolutely fascinating. I didn’t know that. And that again is one of these continuums. Because when we get to that story, Derek Bok [Derek C. Bok] was fighting very hard for the split. And Doug Bryant [Douglas Wallace Bryant], the Harvard librarian, they were acting as though they had the papers, and they were continuing to act that way.

HACKMAN: It was the Eisenhower Library. Hoover [Herbert C. Hoover] came on just a little differently and later. It was Truman, Eisenhower, and Roosevelt that were in play at that point.

FENN: Well, Johnson, too, for that matter. No, obviously.

DAITCH: Well, this all brings, the conversation about Dave Powers and this early introduction of Harvard into the mix, brings up the question that I wanted to ask about... We knew that he had already started working on a presidential library before Kennedy was assassinated. That was just something that was going on in the background. But what effect did it have on the way things shaped up, that he was assassinated?

FENN: You mean the Harvard connection?

DAITCH: Not just the Harvard connection. But the way that the whole, the project of the Library as a whole: the oral histories, the papers, the objects.

MOSS: It’s speculative, of course. But I assume a couple of things. One is that the man himself wasn’t there to honcho it. And in the other cases, he was. He may have given over the job to other people, but we have no real idea what JFK would have wanted or what he would have done had he been able to have a finger in the pie, a ham fist in the pie in setting up. The second thing is that I think two things about the assassination: One is that it lent an aura of mystique that was hard to deal with, hard to define, hard to know what to do with. And I think that contributed to the delay in defining and evolving what it should be. Along with the whole site question.

FENN: Well, I’m sure, Bill, that we will get into that. This is Dan Fenn. He had picked out a site in October of ’63, which was his last visit to Cambridge. And there’s a great postcard of him standing on the Charles River [Inaudible]. He’d picked out a site which is now occupied by Soldiers’ Field Park, which is now a dormitory by the Harvard Business School. The dean of the business school talked to me later about this, and he was somewhat irked because it was his land; nobody ever talked to him about this. But the Library was originally supposed to be on the other side of the river. But it never, in terms of what it would be, what the tone of it would be, that clearly we didn’t
know.

STEWART: The tone of the whole Library was set in December 1963. December 1963 is a very, very crucial month or period of three to six weeks in the history of the Kennedy Library, and there is reasonably good documentation on this. But in early December, again, Arthur Schlesinger with the collaboration of Herman Kahn sent out a letter to, I don’t know, two or three dozen people who were heavily involved with the Kennedy Administration, asking them for their ideas about what this institution should be, what kind of programs it should have, what kind of a focus it should have, and all the rest. And it asked people to do two things: either to come to a series of dinner meetings which were held in December and early January of 1964, or to send memoranda or letters saying what they had in mind.

And there is a collection, I think I have the collection at home, of probably a dozen or fifteen of these letters, it’s someplace in the Library, from people like Teddy White [Theodore H. White] and Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] and Galbraith [John Kenneth Galbraith].

FENN: Sam Beer [Samuel Hutchinson Beer].

STEWART: Sam Beer and a whole bunch of other people.

FENN: Teddy.

STEWART: Saying what they thought this institution should be. And it was out of those letters and then…. And I’m not even sure whether it was Schlesinger or Neustadt [Richard E. Neustadt] or who sort of refined the ideas and put them into the announcement that was made sometime in the spring of 1964 as to what this thing should be, would be. And it was at that point that it was decided that there would be an institute of politics which would be a part of Harvard; there would be this expanded museum, much bigger than anything, than any presidential library had; and an expanded archives, which would not only contain the papers of the president but papers from many others.

[END SIDE 1, TAPE 1]

[BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 1]

STEWART: It all came together in a very, very short time. In the months of December and January, the whole concept of the Library, which with some variation—the big variation I guess being the site switch from the business school site to the other side of the river, and then the whole expanded concept which would include not only the Institute of Politics but the Kennedy School of Government, which I don’t think had been part of that December 1963 discussion; but that came a little bit later in the creation of
the Kennedy School of Government, of which the Institute of Politics would become a part. That came about a year later, I think.

FENN: But, you know, the funny thing is that I never saw any of that material until well into my tenure. I didn’t even know about those meetings. And I’ve been a little curious as to why oral history, but it kind of makes sense. So in some sense, as to a break in the continuity, I wasn’t following, my thoughts weren’t following on those discussions. And one of my big mistakes, and, oh, I’ve got a lot of them, was that I didn’t sit down often enough with Steve as things were evolving here, Steve Smith, the president’s brother-in-law was the mother-in-law of this project, nor with the senator. I mean if I were going to do this again, I’d sit down with Steve every month, and I’d sit down with the senator; I never did that.

STEWART: It should be pointed out that the key figure in terms of the family at this time was not Senator Edward Kennedy; it was Robert Kennedy. I mean this was a Robert Kennedy enterprise, if you will. Again, the connection being from Schlesinger to Robert Kennedy, and there were a number of people on the attorney general’s staff who were heavily involved in a lot of this initial work. But I don’t think Senator Edward Kennedy was that significantly involved. The initial press conference announcing all of this in the fall of ’64--in fact I have a copy here--that was done by Attorney General Kennedy, announcing that Eugene Black [Eugene R. Black] was going to be chairman of the fund-raising committee. The fund-raising started in the fall of ’64.

FENN: The wonderful dream, which was Bobby’s dream and worked it out with Nathan Pusey as John pointed out in this memorandum, the plot where the Kennedy School sits now in Cambridge on the river was occupied by the MBTA marshaling yards, I remember well, and Harvard had always been interested in that site. So after the assassination, Pusey and Bobby came up with this idea of this area, this precinct in Cambridge devoted to politics and government with resources for everybody: the museum and kids and the Institute of Politics as part of the school. And it was at that point that part of the deal.... And there was some passage of funds also. Surprise, surprise.

And Harvard had had since the early forties the Littauer Center for Public Administration, and that was really just kind of a holding company for Harvard Government faculty and Economics faculty. President Conant [James B. Conant] said it was the greatest failure of his years as president. They renamed that the Kennedy School of Government. And the Littauer Family was so pleased. I mean they thought that was just the neatest idea.

[Laughter]

HACKMAN: Well, I was a Littauer Fellow for a year, and I guess they should have taken it back if they’d known I was working for the Kennedy Library.

FENN: They probably would have. So one of the buildings was called the Littauer Center. But at any rate, as you said, there was this [Inaudible]. Kennedy School of Government, the Institute of Politics, related facilities. Remember
the little stores and restaurants, and the Kennedy Library. And it was a great dream. It really
was a great idea.

HACKMAN: Larry Hackman. The word—to go back to the original question of what effect
did the assassination have and put all this together, it seems to me that—I
mean the word that comes to my mind is “more.” And that’s that there was
more done, more thought about, more that people felt needed to happen—the microfilming
and the oral history and the Institute of Politics and whatever—than you probably would have
got otherwise. And more quickly. Which meant that some of it was done, got done, because
there was that sense of urgency. But some of it got done in a helter-skelter way because they
were trying to do a whole lot so quickly.

FENN: That’s interesting.

HACKMAN: That’s why some of the themes might have gotten lost, in fact, or not
remembered because it was just, it seemed to me, so much being thrown out
at once.

MOSS: My pet oral history, not one that I did but the one between Meany [George
Meany] and Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg], is just that way. It was two old
cronies sitting down and chatting and thinking that they’d done the job.

HACKMAN: A lot of that. A lot of that.

DAITCH: So potentially an extended eulogy for Kennedy?

MOSS: There was a good bit of that. I remember the interview with the White House
butler, was it? Somebody in the White House. And the questions asked
were: And did Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis] do this,
and did she do that? And was she nice to you? And the answer was, “Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Oh,
yes.” There was some of that.

HACKMAN: But you get that in everything, or in almost everything, if you try to do
things too quickly. I mean some of it seemed to me that they were just,
compared to a president who hadn’t been assassinated, it would have
progressed at a more stately pace.

FENN: You had a lot of volunteers doing oral history, including me. I did two or
three. And one of them, I think, was pretty good, and that was with the
Regulatory Commission chairs. And some of them were just awful, like with
Bernie Boutin [Bernard Louis Boutin], administrator of GSA. But I remember schlepping
up to St. Michael’s in Vermont to interview Bernie. I didn’t have the vaguest idea what I was
doing.
HACKMAN: And then I went up later and did a couple more with Bernie.

FENN: Did you? You probably did some....

HACKMAN: Well, they were probably [Inaudible] together.

MOSS: At the same time there were some good ones done. Neustadt did a couple, and Arthur Schlesinger did some with McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] that were good. And Schlesinger did some with Robert Kennedy also.

HACKMAN: Oh, yes. I didn’t remember McNamara. I thought McNamara didn’t do any interviews for years and years.

MOSS: I may be mistaken. My memory is failing in me.

FENN: I think our memory is doing pretty well for a bunch of old crocks.

DAITCH: [Laughter] I want to talk about some of the specific things that John had laid out on this. And you can help me decide the relative importance of some of these because you know better than I do in terms of Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton], who hasn’t been mentioned yet. I take it, since we’re talking about oral history, maybe we should talk a little bit about him and a little bit about the Rollins Report, Charles Morrissey [Charles Thomas Morrissey].

STEWART: I just went over this whole story in great detail for that documentary film that was on last November, and I can’t remember the people, the company in Washington, but Allan Goodrich would know all about it. There was a company in Washington that produced a one-hour documentary sort of based on the interviews that Robert Kennedy did with John Barlow Martin and with Tony Lewis [Joseph Anthony Lewis] and with me. He did two or three very minor interviews with me. And so I was interviewed as part of this documentary and went over this whole story, as I say, in some detail. So you may sort of want to look at that.

DAITCH: Sure.

STEWART: Why don’t I just sort of describe from my own experience, not from what I know from other people, not from what I know second hand. As I mentioned, I was asked in May of 1966 to become chief of the Oral History Project. Charlie Morrissey, who had been director of the Oral History Project, told me that Charlie Morrissey and a fellow named Ron Grele [Ronald J. Grele]--and there was a third fellow....

HACKMAN: Joe O’Connor [Joseph E. O’Connor].
STEWART: Joe O’Connor. Were very, very upset because they had been denied access to the papers of JFK, which they thought it was very important to do for them to prepare their interviews. And they were blaming Herman Kahn for refusing to give them access to these papers. And Herman Kahn told me many, many times after that it wasn’t he that denied them access; it was Robert Kennedy. That whenever he raised the whole subject of access to papers with either Robert Kennedy directly or with someone on Robert Kennedy’s staff it went to him, the answer was always, absolutely no. “No one is going to have access to those papers.”

So in any case, Charlie Morrissey and Ron Grele were very, very upset. So they resigned. They resigned as of, I think, June 1, 1966, and left the Oral History Project. And the people at the National Archives were a little nervous that Charlie Morrissey and Ron Grele were going to make a big public thing of the fact that the Oral History Project wasn’t being run the way it should be run, and they weren’t being able to do their job as serious historians because they didn’t have access to the papers.

So the people at the National Archives were determined to get someone into that job very quickly before the family decided, or Robert Kennedy or his staff decided, there was a problem, and they would put someone of their choosing into the job. So I was on the staff, and I was available, and I had, I think, a week or so to decide whether to take the job. And I took it. So I started doing it, as I say, in June of 1966. The whole thing was sort of much ado about nothing because Charlie Morrissey and Ron Grele, in fact, went away quietly and never.... Well, to a certain extent they talked about it at Oral History Association meetings and so forth. But they certainly never made a big thing of it.

And the first thing I did when I became director of the Oral History Project was to look over the whole situation. Not decided. There was a need to hire another interviewer, and it was at that point that Larry Hackman was hired in the summer. You came in July or August?

HACKMAN: Probably August.


MOSS: I’m sorry. How did Dutton fit into this? I don’t remember.

STEWART: When the Oral History Project was created in 19....

MOSS: He was the coordinator?

STEWART: ...early 1964, the Oral History Project was created, the decision was that it would be done.... As Larry suggested, everything in that time was being done in a big hurry and a big dramatic way. And the decision was that, you know, a thousand people would be interviewed in the next year or so. And the way these interviews would be done is that a lot of academics and newspaper people and other scholars and researchers would be assigned to interview different members of the Kennedy Administration. It would all be done on sort of an informal basis, and it would all be...
coordinated by Fred Dutton and a woman who worked for him whose name was Nancy [Nancy Hogan Dutton].... I’ve forgotten. So Fred Dutton, for the next year or so, and coordinated the Oral History Project. And a lot of interviews were done. As was mentioned, a lot of them weren’t very good. They were just eulogies because people didn’t fully understand the purpose. On the other hand, a lot of good material was gathered. And then at the end of that year, sometime in early ’65, it was decided to hire a fellow named Rollins [Alfred B. Rollins, Jr.], who was a professor of history at Harvard.

HACKMAN: Alfred Rollins.

STEWART: To do a review of the whole project and to make some recommendations. And the big recommendation that he made was to hire a staff of professional people and do away with the volunteer interviewing. And that report served as the basis for a grant request to the Carnegie Foundation.

MOSS: That paid my salary.

STEWART: Which came up with a decent amount, four or five hundred thousand dollars, I believe, which really financed the Oral History Project for the next four or five years until the Library got its own budget which was in 1969.

HACKMAN: Do I remember correctly, John, that during that period when Fred Dutton was running the volunteer coordinating, volunteer interviewer arrangement, that he was also an Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, or something like that?

STEWART: That’s correct.

FENN: Yes. I was going to say, let’s identify him. He came from California and what he did out there for Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown], I think. He was in the White House for a while as Cabinet secretary, as I recall. But there wasn’t any such job really. Then there was a huge shift. Brooks Hays [Lawrence Brooks Hays] went from being congressional liaison at State [State Department] to a job in the White House. Brooks is wonderful, but apparently it didn’t work out very well at State. And Fred went over to do that. And Chester Bowles [Chester B. Bowles] was changed. Dick Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] went over to State at that time.

FENN: That was a big shift around. Fred now, or in his latter years, has been the major Saudi lobbyist in the United States. I haven’t seen him for years. And I think he still was assistant secretary at the time you mention.

DAITCH: So what then happened when you came in and started? What was your idea about how to proceed with the oral history?
MOSS: Call them professional historians. [Laughter]

DAITCH: Right. [Inaudible] four.

STEWART: As we said before, Bill and Larry should be telling their stories a lot more. I’m around, so I can fill in later, but we don’t want to miss....

MOSS: The irony on mine is that my historical background consisted of eight hours of Roman history as an undergraduate. [Laughter]

DAITCH: So how did you get involved with this? You might as well tell us now.

MOSS: I had a lot of courses in political science. But the only history I had was Roman history. As near as I can remember it, John and Larry, I was looking for another job. I was at the National Security Agency. Vietnam was turning sour. The job that I was doing was shifting focus from economic and political intelligence to military intelligence, and I didn’t want to do that. And I sent my resume, you know, just fired it all around Washington. One of them happened to land on John’s desk. And as near as I can recall, you guys were looking for somebody with some experience in the intelligence and Defense Department areas because you needed to fill that hole in your staff.

HACKMAN: It was when Joe O’Connor left [Joseph E. O’Connor]. Joe O’Connor left, actually, shortly after I came. But it was actually later in ‘66. He was there, and then he went off to teach at Wittenberg College.

STEWART: A minor correction. Joe O’Connor went to Europe for the better part of the ‘66-’67 year, and while there did a number of interviews for us. He was still…. He wasn’t on the payroll full time, but he did some interviews.

HACKMAN: I’m sure you’re right, John.

STEWART: So you came in....

MOSS: In August of ‘69.

HACKMAN: So this was much later.

MOSS: August of ‘69.

HACKMAN: It wasn’t related to Joe O’Connor. It was after I had come. And it was almost at the time you were [Inaudible].

MOSS: It was after the RFK Program was established.

[- 20 -]
HACKMAN: Really?

MOSS: Yes. Because Larry and Bobbie [Robert Greene] were both doing RFK interviews when I came.

HACKMAN: And, see, we had a couple—we had several other people. You hired in Bill McCune [William Fleming McHugh], who didn’t work out very well at all. And then we hired a fellow….

MOSS: Dennis O’Brien [Dennis J. O’Brien].

HACKMAN: Jim Oesterle [James A. Oesterle].

MOSS: Jim Oesterle was after. He came after Dennis O’Brien.

HACKMAN: Okay.

STEWART: Which was after you or before you?

MOSS: Dennis was before me. Dennis was in place when I came.

STEWART: Dennis replaced Joe O’Connor maybe.

MOSS: I guess. But Jim Oesterle was after Larry had gone. No, I think just about the time you went. You picked him up. You hired him.

HACKMAN: I hired him, but he was a disaster.

MOSS: Yes. Well, nearly. Back to my bit, because I didn’t have any history, the U.S. Civil Service Commission at that time had a hard time swallowing any kind of appointment for me in an oral history program. And you brought me in under the Carnegie money, which was sidecar money, so it didn’t…. And then eventually when that ran out, Dan Reed had to hire me as a “program assistant” because he still couldn’t make me an historian or an archivist. And it was not until I’d been about three years on the job they finally decided I could be an archivist. [Laughter]

DAITCH: And you came a little earlier?

HACKMAN: I came earlier. And I guess, you know, for me as…. I’d had a little more history than Bill. But I was working on a Ph.D. in American intellectual history. But I had been working with a fellow who was producing the first batch of Truman dissertations at the Truman Library, Dick Kirkendall [Richard Stewart Kirkendall]. And I happened to be working at the Office of Economic Opportunity in Kansas City in the early days next to a person who is now a priest, who was a friend of John’s. And
John somehow was talking to John Wandless [John H. Wandless] and said, I’m looking for somebody who knows something about recent U.S. History. And all of those things connected somehow.

John came out, and we got together, and I had just gotten married, and we moved back to Washington. Then I had to go to active duty for five months almost as soon as I got to Washington. My first interview was with William Batt [William L. Batt], director of the Area Redevelopment Administration in the Department of Commerce at that point. And, you know, I guess my impressions, looking back at that, were, one, as I was saying to Allan this morning, “God, I wished we’d had computers and word processors then.” We could have spent so much less time transcribing and editing, and so much more time--we could use those people as research assistants, for example.

I’m conscious, in retrospect as well as at the time, how little I really knew, not about oral history, but about American history and government and politics. I tried to learn fast. But if I had had more confidence or experience or wisdom, I think one of the things we would have done would have been to call--and maybe we even tried to do this and I’ve forgotten--would have been to call together some subject matter experts to help guide us toward what were the important issues.

I always felt, and this is what comes back to the papers issue and access to them, I always felt that I was going into important interviews, some of them not so important (that’s another point), going into interviews basing what I knew on a frantic search of the New York Times Index and a random search sometimes of agency microfilm, which usually didn’t go to the center of the agency’s operations. But really not a sense of what the key issues were or having access to what the key background was.

That’s where I believe lack of access to the papers was, in fact, a real disadvantage. That and our inexperience, collectively maybe you could say, as a staff in terms of high policy-making in the context of recent American history, academic history at a higher level than we operated then. Those were the two disadvantages that I see in retrospect. I didn’t see those at the time. But I see them in retrospect.

MOSS: Let me pick up on that a little bit. I had done a good bit of reading. I had taken Neustadt’s course on the presidency at Columbia and knew his book. I had read, you know, things about the Lincoln [Abraham Lincoln] presidency and so on. I knew the works that had been done by MacGregor Burns [James MacGregor Burns] and others on FDR. So I had some sense of the presidency. But by the time I came on the staff, there were a lot more books out than when you came on. There was a lot more stuff. And I read an awful lot. I was riding the bus between Annapolis and Washington, an hour and a half each way, and I got an awful lot of stuff read at that time, crammed in.

The other source that I used was Congressional Quarterly, you know, the CQ Annual Reports. There was a lot of stuff in there that did some identification of issues and did help to guide us a bit. Parenthetically and paradoxically, I was hired to do interviews in intelligence and the Defense Department, and my first big project was the Interior Department. [Laughter]

FENN: One piece which I don’t think we’ve mentioned, except John did in passing,
and that is the formal transfer of papers, the deed signed by Jackie, Bobby, and Ted, transferring the presidential papers and objects and so on to the National Archives. And I can’t remember when that was signed. But it’s easy to find out. That deed--and we’ll talk about the tapes later and how they became to be considered under that deed--but that deed called for the establishment of this Screening Committee. The initial Screening Committee, John, was Burke Marshall....

STEWART: Justice White [Byron R. White] and....

HACKMAN: Arthur [Schlesinger]?

STEWART: And Herman Kahn.

FENN: Herman Kahn.

STEWART: Well, no, I’m sorry. No. He came later. But it was Burke Marshall, Justice White, and.... Yes, Herman Kahn was a member. Because he had left the National Archives by then.

FENN: Well, that’s a pretty impressive group. And that Screening Committee wasn’t Dave Powers, George Dalton, and [Inaudible].

MOSS: Then Sorensen replaced White.

FENN: Sorensen comes later.

MOSS: Sorensen was on board by the time I came to Waltham.

FENN: Really?

MOSS: Mmmm.

HACKMAN: And was it two months later?

FENN: I remember Sorensen’s first meeting. That was later. And then Sam Beer. But I think it’s really important for the record because of this constant notion, unfortunately a lot of it nowadays, of the family having controlled and hidden stuff and blah blah blah. And you’ve got a screening committee like that, which is a classy screening committee. And as I remember your telling me this story, and most of it had been done by the time I came on, the staff would recommend closing things, and the Screening Committee would open them. The Screening Committee was, in fact, they interpreted the deed language of “embarrass” or “harass.” In other words, you keep everything closed, it doesn’t embarrass or harass any living person. They interpreted that pretty narrowly. Is that correct or not?
STEWART: Pretty narrowly?

FENN: Yes. In other words, you would say, well, I think we ought to close this, and they would say, “No, no. Open that stuff.”

STEWART: I don’t remember any great discussions about specific things. The only comment I ever remember from.... The very first Screening Committee meeting took place, I hate to say this I don’t even remember the date, but it was the weekend of Chappaquiddick.

FENN: Oh, yes. Was that the first meeting?

STEWART: That was the first meeting of the Screening Committee because we were meeting in Waltham. A phone call came in for Burke Marshall, who had to leave the meeting to, in effect, go to Chappaquiddick. This has been in books many times. But that was the weekend of, as I say, the first meeting. We had met that Friday afternoon, and we were meeting that Saturday morning. But, as I said, the only big comment that I can remember from the discussion of what kinds of things we should close is Burke Marshall saying that if a member of the staff says something ridiculous we have absolutely no obligation to prevent that from being known. That we didn’t have any responsibility....

MOSS: He certainly repeated that later at another Screening Committee meeting in Waltham when I was there.

STEWART: Right. Someone makes a fool of himself with the president, it isn’t our responsibility to...

MOSS: Particularly on a policy matter.

STEWART: …to protect that person, you know.

FENN: That’s a narrow interpretation.

HACKMAN: But isn’t the real....

STEWART: Go ahead, Bill.

MOSS: They accepted.... I can’t think of a situation where they overruled us, can you, John?

STEWART: No, no.
HACKMAN: But it seems to me this is beside the point. The real point is that if you were a staff member here and you were screening records, you had to be exceedingly conservative. You had to worry about embarrassing the Library with the Screening Committee. You had to worry about the Library getting the reputation with the family that the Library was out.... It's the self-imposed pressure on the staff, not what you do when you look at particular things with the Screening Committee, that makes all the difference.

MOSS: It went even further than that with me. I can remember looking, doing the Democratic National Committee papers and coming across letters in there from irate Southerners who were very pro-segregationist, and thinking oh oh, these people are now working on community action councils with blacks. Do I open this? You know, that kind of sensitivity was definitely there. But I want to back up a step. This kind of language that was in the deed was totally endorsed, totally accepted by the National Archives which in this era it never would dare to do.

FENN: Oh, really? They wouldn’t dare embarrass or harass now?

MOSS: Not with the presidential records. They can’t do it. The whole national tone has changed with respect to the ownership of presidential papers.

FENN: Yes. Well, the law has changed.

MOSS: These papers were considered John Kennedy’s, not the nation’s papers.

FENN: Right, going back to [Inaudible].

MOSS: The family could do any damned thing they wanted with them; they could have burned them.

HACKMAN: It still seems to me, to this day, that in this institution you have an archival staff that is more, for whatever reason, more conservative and more protective than any archival staff I’ve ever seen or heard of anywhere.

MOSS: I think that’s fair.

STEWART: Yes, there’s absolutely no doubt about that. And there’s one very, very simple answer: And that is that, for better or worse, the Kennedys have remained a very, very public family, a very political family. Whereas in other presidential libraries, I guess except for the Bush [George H. Bush] example, you know, that has not happened.

MOSS: And, John, we got burned a couple of times, too. Henry Raymont and the Torby Macdonald [Torbert H. Macdonald] thing.
FENN: Well, I think that’s very interesting, very important. I did not know that at the time. And my understanding, which is obviously incorrect, was that both the Library staff and the Screening Committee were pretty forthcoming on material. And that we weren’t worried, oh, what will Teddy think if this gets opened?

HACKMAN: Well, if you walk through the exhibits here, and you find still to this day nothing about John Kennedy’s health, and you were the staff who worked here, what would you think that the institution expects of you to do with regard to protecting the....

MOSS: I’ll take it a step further, and it gets into the museum because I very much wanted to do an exhibit on the Congo, Vietnam, and Indonesia as John Kennedy’s dealing with the Third World. Ted Sorensen flat out rejected that.

FENN: Well, wait a minute. How’d he get into the Museum?

STEWART: Why don’t we take that a little bit further. [Everyone talking at once] Do we want to take a quick break and have a cup of coffee? [BREAK] ...interviews where, you know, tell me, and the person would certainly describe what it was, the event or the decision or the relationship or whatever, more carefully because he knew he was talking to an idiot or whatever.

MOSS: I remember Lee White [Lee Calvin White] saying to me, “That’s an interesting question.” “No, it’s not. The answer is interesting.” [Laughter]

FENN: Sounds like Lee.

HACKMAN: There are a lot of anecdotes like that. I can remember interviewing George Ball [George W. Ball], and George Ball, who by that time was telling everyone under creation how he had been the first to center on Vietnam and policy in the administration. And saying to me, you know, “Did you ever hear that story?” I should have said, “Everybody’s heard that story.” So you could argue that it was good to get down his interpretation. But this is in about 1969 or so probably, where, in fact, I hadn’t heard the story, you know, but I should have known it by then.

MOSS: On preparation, what were the strengths and weaknesses, where did we feel inadequate, where did we feel that we fell short, I know that I basically felt inadequate and tried to make up for it by as much as reading as I possibly could. And by trying my damnedest to know enough to ask interesting questions, not necessarily naive ones, but interesting ones, that would get people interested in wanting to talk, as a tactic. Whether I was able.... There were many times when I came back several years later, and I realized I had not asked a question I should have certainly.

I think that’s part of the lack of experience, the lack of being part of the political
world that they were part of, lack of depth of experience in bureaucracy, the lack of depth of experience in politics. The kinds of question, even the kinds of questions that Dick Neustadt could ask as a professor, were not the same ones that a colleague might ask who had been through the whole drill with somebody else. The flip side of that is that colleagues understand each other too well and don’t ask the questions because a lot is understood between them.

FENN: Yes, a lot of shorthand.

MOSS: A lot of shorthand.

HACKMAN: At least just for myself, and I think all of us frequently, relied on what I thought of as “process” questions. And they were almost always useful. If you’re the assistant secretary of, well, almost anything, how did you go about dealing with the press, and what were the pressures and opportunities that the press represented to you? How did you go about your congressional relations and what barriers did you run into? And what couldn’t you do that you wanted to do? And what are your relationships up and down? And what other bureaus or sister agencies or whatever were allies and...? I mean there are all of these kinds of process or standard questions that fit many, many situations. And they’re good questions to ask.

It wouldn’t have made a difference in a lot of cases, but if you don’t have access to the papers to see what the internal positions and disagreements were, not just those that were reported in the New York Times, or you haven’t.... As you go through interviews in the Interior Department or with assistant attorneys general, you begin, as you go through, to frame some of those points of disagreement or isolate the important decisions or whatever. But a specialist would have probably seized more opportunities along the way.

MOSS: Or more specialized opportunities.

HACKMAN: Right. I agree [Inaudible]. But a second point is that I think we were guilty of at that point--and that’s where I think of my lack of experience or maybe courage is another word, forwardness, whatever, came in--we interviewed a lot of second-level people, and in some cases we interviewed a lot of third-level people. And in some cases we interviewed a lot of third-level people at great length. Because we could not get access to the top-level people.

MOSS: Or because in some cases we believed the third-level people had a particular slant and probably knew more about it than their bosses. I think Orren Beatty, for instance, knew more about the Interior Department than Stu Udall [Stewart L. Udall] ever did.

HACKMAN: Sure. I mean I grant you that. But if you’re a scholar now, and you want to go back, you want a set of good interviews with Stewart Udall or Ralph Dungan or Lee White or Ted Sorensen, not a lot of the B.S. we got from Ted
Sorensen when we interviewed him. We could not pull off, in a lot of cases, frank interviews with key people.

MOSS: True. But I always assumed that we were not going to be the be-all and the end-all; that if we opened a few doors, a few windows, and other people would come after and do many more interviews, eventually the gaps would be filled. The other thing that I tried to do, certainly I did it in the Orren Beatty interviews and tried to use it as a model for others, was to come at the same information from a whole bunch of different perspectives to see if the answers changed, and by that try and make up for deficiencies.

But back to the access to the papers, I’m not convinced that you can always find those things. I did two or three interviews, two of them specifically. I interviewed Bill Bundy [William P. Bundy] and Mac Bundy [McGeorge Bundy]. With Bill Bundy I actually sat down with him in the cage at Waltham with a tape recorder and pulled out the files. I had earmarked the files, you know, things that I thought were crucial documents. Read this. What do you think of that? Did you over in Defense have a chance to see this? Or did this ever surface on your radar screen? Because there were things obviously that were in his brother’s files over in the White House. With Mac Bundy I took my questions definitely from the papers. I would quote the papers.

With Ambassador Darlington [Charles F. Darlington], a perfect example of the papers being useful; he was the ambassador to Togo, I think. I interviewed him in his house on Charles Road off Darlington Road in Mount Kisco, New York; his name was Charles Darlington. He began to give me his standard talk that he gives to high school students, and I suddenly started quoting from memory from his cables back to the State Department. And he said, “Oh, you know about that, do you?” And he began to open up and deal with the questions a little more effectively. So, yes, there is use in having access to the papers. On the other hand, sometimes there’s not. Now, Bill Bundy sometimes just shook his head and said, “I don’t know what this means.”

HACKMAN: I agree entirely that sometimes it’s not. But to be able to go in and have the credibility, having [Inaudible] a lot of that.

MOSS: Yes.

STEWART: It puts it on a different level.

MOSS: Absolutely.

HACKMAN: Especially if you’re talking, for example, to, well, take an interview with George Ball might be an example, or Hubert Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey].

MOSS: Or my interview with General Krulak [Victor H. Krulak]. He would, I think, not have answered me very well if I had not already known about the
Mongoose Operation and was able to, you know, throw it at him.

HACKMAN: Or Ralph Dungan or.... And part of it is not just the policy, it’s not just the decision of the family not to let the staff have access. In some cases, probably if I had been, if I had had greater stature as well as experience and would have gone directly to some of these people and said to--Ralph Dungan’s a good example, “I really want to interview you, but I don’t want to do it unless you let me into your papers,” I don’t think we pushed as far as we might have to have gotten access to materials before we talked to people.

MOSS: We never got the kind of access that Arthur did before he wrote his book.

FENN: Ralph [Inaudible] because Ralph, I mean you’re not talking Kenny O’Donnell here when you’re talking about Dungan.

HACKMAN: I know. When I interviewed him, he was up in Princeton as what? commissioner of education in New Jersey or whatever. This is not a non-academic guy.

FENN: Getting back to this business of the cautious attitude of the staff, the archival people here, because I have resented all my life all these accusations about the Kennedy Library being so protective and so forth and so on. And it sounds to me as if I had the wrong end of the stick. It certainly was not coming from the family. As I said to you, there was only that one instance where Steve or anybody else ever called me about anything that we opened or our general approach to opening papers. And I don’t remember that I, at least I hope that I wasn’t conveying that we had to be really careful about how the family feels about this, that, and the other thing. Nobody ever asked me. Because I didn’t feel that way. But still, Larry, when you say this is the most protective archival staff in the system, that still concerns me.

MOSS: And we also were being blamed for not opening some stuff that wasn’t there.

FENN: Oh, we know this Library’s been attacked terrifically on stuff. And things which weren’t under our control. I mean Doris Kearns [Doris Kerns Goodwin] gets into the JPK [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] papers and Nigel Hamilton doesn’t. Well, that has nothing to do with the Kennedy Library. The family made those decisions.

MOSS: Or people talked to Clay Blair [Clay Drewry Blair, Jr.], who wouldn’t talk to us. [Laughter]

STEWART: I’m not sure this is worth going into in great depth, but I disagree with you to a certain extent: that we had no role or there was nothing we could have done. Admittedly in the final analysis, if we had tried to do something, we
probably would have lost. On the other hand....

FENN: To do something...?

STEWART: Well, take the example of the ambassador’s papers. If we had pushed...

FENN: Oh, okay.

STEWART: ...extremely hard on that, which we didn’t, but if we did, we probably would have lost. But I think sort of to back up Larry’s point, the reason we didn’t push that hard was because, you know, we, the staff, never wanted to sort of take on the family and particularly the people who sort of made decisions on these things for the family.

[END OF SIDE 2, TAPE 1]

[BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2]

MOSS: ...was on the receiving end of a couple of those. The first one was the Henry Raymont reading and publishing of the Smathers [George Armistead Smathers] interview about the assassination of Castro [Fidel Castro]. And it was at a time when I was negotiating with the, I’ve forgotten his name now, the public affairs at Defense, the assistant secretary for public relations at Defense, who I’ve forgotten....

STEWART: Sylvester [Arthur Sylvester].

MOSS: Sylvester.

STEWART: Arthur Sylvester.

MOSS: I had lined up an appointment to interview him, and I called him up to confirm the appointment. He hit the ceiling because he’d read that story, and he cancelled the appointment.

FENN: But was the story so...?

MOSS: Well, the story was that JFK had confided to Smathers one day in the Rose Garden, or somewhere, asked him, “What would you say if I told you that there was a project afoot to assassinate Castro?” It didn’t get carried any further than that, I think, in the interview. I don’t remember the exact words of the interview. But at any rate, Henry Raymont of the New York Times picked it up, and it appeared in an Op Ed or something of that sort. Or in a story.

[- 30 -]
The second one was the release of the Harvard records that showed that JFK and Torby Macdonald had had a girl overnight in their room. And it just happened that I was about to negotiate....

STEWART: A stenographer?

MOSS: Huh?

STEWART: A stenographer helping them with their term papers!

MOSS: Well, whatever it was, it came out differently with different insinuations in the paper, in the newspaper. I was trying to follow up what I thought was a lost lead there. Ron Grele and Charlie Morrissey had dropped the ball on an earlier interview with Macdonald, and I particularly wanted to try to go after the Inga Arvad story if I could. And, you know, the day after this broke in the papers, I sat in Congressman Macdonald’s office, and he just would not have anything to do with me. He ripped me up one side and down the other, and I lost the interview.

So there were some consequences when we opened things that other people, particularly people either in the administration or close to the family, thought we shouldn’t have. There was Kenny O’Donnell’s famous line about he would never give the Kennedy Library anything because it leaks like a sieve. You know, there was that in the air.

FENN: Well, sure, but I mean Lorena what’s-her-face stuff coming out on Eleanor Roosevelt [Eleanor R. Roosevelt] stuff.

STEWART: Hickock [Lorena A. Hickock]?

FENN: Hickock, yes. I mean the scrambled eggs hit the fan pretty good on that one, too. But I mean I can’t argue with you.

MOSS: Historically, all this doesn’t mount to a hill of beans. But if you’re on the firing line where you need to get things from people.... We still wanted things from the family, we still wanted things from other interviewers. And to annoy them was putting ourselves behind the eight ball.

FENN: Well, that’s true. But, as I say, I never felt that they were anxious, nervous, angry, upset. They. There’s a huge they out there. It was never conveyed to me that, hey, you guys are opening stuff that you have no business opening. It wasn’t coming from them to me, that’s for sure.

MOSS: And it wasn’t coming from you to us, certainly. But it was something there that was in the staff. I can’t remember whether Frank Harrington felt particularly sensitive on this and we picked some of it up from him. Or whether just in our coffee room chatter it got enlarged. But it was there.
DAITCH: You talked a little bit about Dave Powers earlier. He was around. Was he protective of the--as a friend of the family and a friend of Kennedy?

MOSS: No, as I indicated earlier, he didn’t meddle. I said we walked warily around him. There were things that I would have said to other members of the staff I wouldn’t say to Dave, surely.

FENN: He never.... I can’t remember one time when he said, “You know that goddamned Stewart or that goddamned Moss. They have no business [Inaudible].”

MOSS: I can remember one time he called me up on the phone. I referred to John as the assistant director, and he said, “There’ll be a cold day in hell when I let John Stewart be the assistant director.” [Laughter] But that’s off the point.

STEWART: There are two things I’d like to say. One, let me briefly explain. Bill mentioned the Smathers problem, and let me briefly explain that. But then I would really like to go into the Robert Kennedy Oral History Project which, and Larry may or may not agree, but I have always thought, and Larry was much, much more involved in this than me, that that was a tremendous accomplishment, the way it was put together and the way it was done. It wasn’t perfect, and there were some holes in it.

HACKMAN: We knew more by then what we were doing.

STEWART: But it was a very, very successful project. Let me first, if I may, sort of explain very briefly the Smathers controversy that Bill mentioned. George Smathers had indeed....

FENN: George Smathers being the senator from Florida and the president’s drinking buddy.

STEWART: That’s right.

MOSS: From way back.

HACKMAN: They go way, way back.

STEWART: But Smathers in his interview described a meeting with JFK in the Oval Office, in which they talked about the plot to assassinate Castro. And one of the things, and this is all in the interview obviously, that Smathers said that JFK got very angry at Smathers for even talking about it, so angry that he was holding a pencil, and he snapped the pencil in two sort of in disgust. In any case, the transcript, the draft transcript was done by the Oral History Project and then sent back to Smathers’s office.
And someone in Smathers’s office went through the transcript very carefully and identified probably thirty passages or thirty sections of the hundred-page interview that they wanted to have closed for significant period of time. And I think that period of time was until Castro was out of office.

Then that document came back to the Oral History Project, and again, this is in the days before computers, and it came back and was retyped and typed with different pagination. In any case, there was a very, very serious clerical error. And the deed of gift which identified the closed passages by page sort of got changed in the different versions of the thing. So that when it was opened in 1970 or ‘71....

MOSS: I was still in Washington.

STEWART: There was at least one significant passage that was supposed to be closed that because of a clerical error got opened. And lo and behold, the first person who looked at that open oral history interview was a reporter from the New York Times, Henry Raymont, and who had a front-page story talking about how JFK and Senator Smathers had discussed the assassination of Castro. Senator Smathers, who was still in office and was obviously very, very angry, called Senator Kennedy, who then called the head of the National Archives, who called me because I was in charge of processing oral history interviews and so forth. And he told me that, “If heads have to roll, yours is going to be the first one to go.”

I remember a couple or three days of anxious moments because I really thought I was going to get fired because of it. But Smathers then calmed down and never pursued it. But the upshot of the story, or at least the conclusion of the story, is that this was the first, to my knowledge, first real public discussion or public notice, if you will, of the plot to assassinate Castro.

My contention, and I’m not totally serious in saying this, is that the Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] White House saw this, and it was for this reason that they got interested in Hughes, in Howard Hughes [Howard Robarb Hughes], who had had some vague connection to Mafia and to Castro and all the rest. And it was for this reason that they eventually sort of made a link between Hughes and Larry O’Brien, which, of course, is the reason why they broke into the Watergate Apartment in 1972. So therefore, my contention is that I and Bill and Megan [Megan Desnoyers] had a role in the downfall of Richard Nixon. [Laughter] It was all worthwhile. I wouldn’t have minded losing my job.

MOSS: This brings up a little quip from the conference at B.U. with the economists on price controls.

FENN: Wage and price controls.

MOSS: Wage and price controls. And, you know, after a long session, everybody saying, “If only you’d done this, this would have happened, etc.” In front of Walter Heller was a scratch pad. I picked it up afterwards, and he had written down on it: “If Longstreet [James Longstreet] had come up at Gettysburg, there
would have been no Hitler [Adolf Hitler].” [Laughter]

STEWART: But if we could talk about the Robert Kennedy Oral History Project, and I would just like to introduce it.

FENN: Let me just one…. I don’t remember knowing anything about the Smathers thing. It’s interesting that Steve didn’t say to me, Teddy didn’t say to me, nobody said to me, [Inaudible] you’re going to make damned sure that something like that Smathers thing doesn’t happen, you know? I mean it’s interesting.

STEWART: No, I mean it was clearly.... We admitted it was a clerical error. I mean we apologized and everything else.

MOSS: One last quick comment on the RFK Project. I remember, and correct me if I’m wrong, that at the time you were not eager for it to have high visibility, at least in the National Archives because it was sort of a tag-on project.

STEWART: Well, again, let me sort of introduce the subject, and then Larry will have more to say about it because he really did it. But the story is Robert Kennedy, as we all know, was assassinated in June of 1968. And that summer Larry and I started talking about doing some kind of an oral history project on Robert Kennedy. We put together a proposal, totally on our own. And I can’t remember whether Herman Kahn was still there or Dan Reed had come by then. I think Reed had probably come by then.

HACKMAN: I think he had. I’m sure he had.

STEWART: But we did this essentially on our own. And while I guess we told Reed about it, I’m not sure we were totally...

MOSS: Reed being head of presidential libraries.

STEWART: ...totally open in telling him. And then sometime in the summer we sent the proposal to Senator Kennedy’s office. And I remember talking to a fellow named Dave Burke [David W. Burke] who worked for Senator Kennedy about it. Dave Burke said that Columbia Oral History Project had made a similar proposal. And they were very interested because Robert Kennedy, of course, was the senator from New York. I can’t remember the date specifically, but sometime in the fall one very, very significant thing happened. And that was Lyndon Johnson was, I guess obviously after the election, Lyndon Johnson was leaving office, and they were setting up a temporary Johnson Library in Austin, Texas. So the Johnson White House put in for a supplemental appropriation to finance the new Johnson Library. But for political reasons they thought it would be better to ask for more money for all the presidential libraries.

The supplemental appropriation request was huge by the standards of those days. And
the Kennedy Library had not had a big federal budget at that time. So they included several hundred thousand dollars for Kennedy Library work. And I remember the budget for the Hoover and Truman Libraries almost doubled at that time. Again, because of this Johnson supplemental appropriation request, most of the money was going to the Johnson Library.

But the point of it being that in November (I remember very specifically it was the day after Thanksgiving) and there was a big meeting at the National Archives. The subject was: How do we spend this million dollars or two million dollars or whatever it was that was sort of given to them through the Johnson appropriation? And it was at that point that I became very confident that one of the things we were going to do was finance the Robert Kennedy Oral History Project which--and again I can’t remember the exact sequence--which by then Senator Kennedy’s office had said, “Yes, you guys do it.” Larry and I went to a meeting, but maybe that was later, at Hickory Hill. No, that was in the fall.

HACKMAN: I can’t remember when that meeting was.

STEWART: It was in the fall of ’69 because I had by that time moved to Boston. In any case, we set up this project, and it was, for all practical purposes, financed by money that came to us because of the Johnson Administration, the Johnson Library expansion. And Larry was put in charge of that, and I don’t know if you want to tell the rest of the story....

MOSS: Let me just pick up on one point: that is, Columbia wanting the project. Louis Starr [Louis Morris Starr] and Ron Grele, who had been with Charlie Morrissey, were always ticked off at us for stealing it from them.

STEWART: I’m sure.

MOSS: I mean I heard this directly from Ron.

STEWART: I remember having a meeting with Dave Burke, and I know I met at one point with Senator Kennedy on it, and telling them that the logical place to do this project was the Kennedy Library, and we had the resources to do it now that we had this big new appropriation.

HACKMAN: And I think the Robert Kennedy Project, for as long as it existed--I’m not sure when you’d say it was kind of shut down or semi [Inaudible] or whatever--had some real advantages which accounted for the fact that I think it did some pretty good interviews against what its purpose was in a relatively short time.

One, we knew a lot more from doing the John F. Kennedy interviews, and we had access to the John F. Kennedy interviews on a lot of the things that Robert Kennedy was involved in. That helped us give it a lot greater coherence because we really could focus on, we didn’t restrict ourselves to, we really could focus on Robert Kennedy: the New York years, running for the Senate and being a New York senator; and the Justice Department years. So the kind of approach that Bill and I were talking about earlier, where you can learn
from talking to a whole lot of people about a set of events, worked pretty well.

The third advantage was that frankly Robert Kennedy was dead, and there was not the same perception at that early stage that Edward Kennedy probably was as much the boss as Robert Kennedy was.

FENN: Very different styles.

HACKMAN: Different styles. So it seemed like, for that or for whatever reason, most of the people we were interviewing were closer to Robert Kennedy than most of the people we’d been interviewing were close to John Kennedy. And a lot of them were young, especially the people in the Senate: Adam Walinsky, Peter Edelman [Peter B. Edelman], Frank Mankiewicz [Frank Fabian Mankiewicz], some of those people. And they were ready, willing, and able to talk at length, sometimes too much length.

MOSS: And they all had a personal stake in the events and the activities.

HACKMAN: Including their own role, right.

MOSS: Especially their own role, yes. Which you could not always say for an assistant secretary of the Interior who probably didn’t give a damn about his job. He was just there.

HACKMAN: While a lot of the people around Robert Kennedy in the Justice Department were political in some sense, there were also a lot of people around Robert Kennedy in the Justice Department who had great personal loyalty to him who were not political in the same way. One who comes to mind is John Douglas, Paul Douglas’s [Paul H. Douglas] son, who was a gentleman to the nth degree. But some of those other folks as well spoke with greater frankness and in greater length. It was also....

MOSS: John Seigenthaler [John Lawrence Seigenthaler] is still talking…. [Laughter]

HACKMAN: Well, he just wrote, I understand it’s a very good book, a biography of James K. Polk. We also had in this case, I think I recall finding that some of the Justice Department microfilm was useful on some of the more particular matters that the Justice Department was involved in. I remember Seymour Hersh calling me later at one point after I was at the Truman Library and saying, “You seem to know an awful lot about the case of the former German company General Aniline,” and all of this. And I said, “Well, if I ever knew anything about it was writing down something that I read out of the Justice Department microfilm, and I have no idea what you’re talking about at this point.” So we did have, I’m just saying, the access to materials from the time was of some help.

MOSS: I’d say that you had another advantage, too, Larry, and that is that you and Bobbie [Roberta W. Greene] were working as a team together and talked a
lot together, and you went over the same ground together, which is not true
of the population of interviewers of the JFK project.

HACKMAN: You’re absolutely right. That’s the coherence of the thing.

MOSS: That surrogate between Larry and Bobbie, both of them very conscientious,
very thorough people in their own right, you know, produced, I think, a
better ethos, a better productive ethos.

HACKMAN: There’s also the point that Bill made earlier about doing JFK interviews, but
it was magnified here. There were also some early books on Robert
Kennedy, and then there were all of the JFK books by that time. So you had
more to draw on that other people had said and thought about the same topics. Or those
books like Jules Witcover’s [Jules Joseph Witcover] and others were coming out as we
were doing the interviews. So there were a lot of advantages and a smaller challenge. Plus, of
course, a lot of the interviews that you’d done earlier in the Justice Department fit right into
this. So they were things that we could draw on, but we didn’t have to go back and do again,
the fact that they were Robert Kennedy interviews. John, you did stuff with Oberdorfer
[Louis F. Oberdorfer] and Guthman [Edwin O. Guthman] and some of those people, I
believe. Maybe not Oberdorfer. Maybe Morrissey did that.

MOSS: I don’t remember whether it was in the Rollins Report or in something that
Allan Nevins [Joseph Allan Nevins] did at one of those early Oral History
Association meetings, [Inaudible] up in New York, in which people talked
about the shotgun versus the rifle approach to oral history. And certainly I think when it is
highly focused and both the interviewer and the interviewee thoroughly know the subject,
you get a much better product.

DAITCH: Do you think that advice to, say, some of the early projects that were mini
projects, like the West Virginia interviews or something like that, were some
of those projects better than the overall groups of interviews?

STEWART: West Virginia interviews were done by a professor at....

HACKMAN: West Virginia Wesleyan or one of those.

STEWART: A fellow I came to know, but I can’t think of his name [William Louis
Young], later on. But essentially the Library had little or nothing to do with
those interviews. I mean again, those were done during the Dutton era.
Someone made an arrangement with this fellow, this professor, and I guess he was paid a
certain amount to do all of these interviews with local people in West Virginia. He did a
good job, and I think he later wrote a book. I know he wrote a number of articles on the West
Virginia primary, and looked at that as an historic subject for the rest of his career.
HACKMAN: I think another way to look at that is just sort of what Bill was saying, is that when you look at the Kennedy life and times and administration, it’s so broad that you....

MOSS: It got diffuse real quick.

HACKMAN: Yes. You couldn’t afford to just say, okay, this year we’re going to do the Interior Department, next year we’re going to do the Commerce Department or whatever. It’s just too much. So you had to do some of that and then you were constantly drawn off as an opportunity came up or whatever. And maybe you got bloody bored with the Labor Department, as I did. [Laughter]

FENN: [Inaudible] the Labor Department?

HACKMAN: Oh, I did Ewan Clague and Sam Merrick [Samuel Vaughan Merrick] and, oh, the old guy who was the head of the.... The one with the state unemployment system, Robert [Robert Clifford Goodwin].... I can’t remember his name. He’d been there for a long, long time.

FENN: They weren’t [Inaudible].

HACKMAN: No, they weren’t [Inaudible].

DAITCH: We’ve talked a lot about the oral histories. One of the things before we run out of time that I’d like to talk about is the transition to Waltham. We haven’t really talked about what was happening at Waltham and during that period what were the developmental concerns, the staffing concerns?

STEWART: Well, as I mentioned, Dave Powers and Frank Harrington went to Waltham in 1965, Dave to sort of look after the objects, most of which remained in crates for a good many years. And frankly I’m not sure specifically what Dave was working on during that period, from ’65 to ’69. But Frank was working on the pre-presidential papers. Frank was processing and did a fine job. Frank was a good archivist and spent that time working on the pre-presidential papers.

Then sometime in the summer of 1968 or maybe late summer, early fall, Edward Kennedy, and to this day I don’t know where the instigation for this came from, but Edward Kennedy wrote a letter to the archivist of the United States saying fairly specifically, that unfortunately the library at Harvard wasn’t going to be built for another four or five years--this was a gross understatement, of course--because of the problems with the MBTA, finding another site for the MBTA. And therefore it was his recommendation that the National Archives consider creating a temporary Kennedy Library at the Federal Records Center in Waltham. As I say, he wrote.... That was the instigation for that whole idea. Then that went sort of from the archivist to me, and it was decided very quickly that, in fact, this was a good idea, and it could be done.

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Well, sometime in the fall of 1968, I was given the job of organizing this temporary Kennedy Library, which was going to be in the Federal Records Center in Waltham. And so I... And I don’t know if this was done formally, but Larry was appointed director of the Oral History Project at that point.

HACKMAN: At some point in that period.

STEWART: In late ‘68, and I became, I forget what my exact title was, but something like director of Planning for the Kennedy Library or something. And I don’t know if this is that relevant, but Dan Reed and I for several months interviewed people to be director or acting director or in charge of that temporary facility because I didn’t want to do it. I had no intention of doing it. And then sometime in the spring of 1969, after talking to a number of people about taking this job and not really coming up with anyone satisfactory. Because the idea was that I would sort of suprve it from Washington. And then I remember Dan Reed sometime in the spring said, “Lookit, John, we’re not finding anyone. Why don’t you do it? Why don’t you go to Waltham and do this job?” So I said, “Fine.” And that was the arrangement.

I spent the better part of, well, I spent the first nine months certainly of 1969 recruiting a staff of a dozen or fifteen people: Bob Stocking [Robert Stocking], Bill Johnson [E. William Johnson]. Allan Goodrich came a bit later. But there was a staff of....

HACKMAN: Sylvie Turner.

STEWART: Sylvie Turner. A staff of archivists and librarians, Dan [Inaudible] and a whole bunch of people.

HACKMAN: Shirley Parker [Shirley A. Jobe Parker].

STEWART: Right. Now she came a little bit later.

HACKMAN: Yes, did she?

STEWART: And then making all of the physical arrangements. There was a lot of work to do in setting up the Waltham operation because it was a huge warehouse. I mean we had to take down stacks and build cubicles. There was a lot of sort of organizational work to do, physical work to do, which got done. Then in September the facility was sort of officially opened. And I moved up there, and the staff went to work sometime right after Labor Day.

DAITCH: When you say it was open, do you mean it was open for research?

STEWART: No, no, no.

DAITCH: Open for you to move into.
STEWART: Open for us to move into. And a plan was developed for processing the papers. I can’t remember the exact sequence of shipping material up there. But the White House Central Files.... Some had already gone there. I can’t remember the sequence. But almost all of the material that had been, that was in the National Archives, the Kennedy papers, was moved to Waltham at that point.

MOSS: With the exception of the RFK stuff in the vault of the National Archives.

STEWART: That’s right. And the vault.... All of the material from the vault wasn’t moved up until later?

MOSS: I’m not sure. [Inaudible].

STEWART: It was ‘71 or ‘72, I think.

MOSS: I think it was after I went up to Waltham.

STEWART: But again, the plan of the Waltham operation....

MOSS: Because the first time I saw the so-called Pentagon Papers was in Robert Kennedy’s papers in that vault.

STEWART: Mm hmmm. The plan of the Waltham operation was that it would be the interim archives. And one of the points, as I remember, in Senator Kennedy’s original letter was that he thought it was time to start processing and opening some of these papers. And there was some public demand. People were saying that, you know, these papers should be open for researchers. So that was certainly one of the purposes. I can’t remember when we opened the first batch of papers.

FENN: Yes, that would have been....

STEWART: It would have been in either late ‘69 or very early 1970. But we had--and this is all in the documents--but we had a public announcement, a press release, and we opened very little material: some oral history interviews and some relatively routine material. Now wait a minute. It would have been.... Chappaquiddick was in ‘69 or ‘68? ‘Sixty-nine.

FENN: ‘Sixty-nine.

STEWART: It would have been in the summer or early fall of ’69, that’s right, that we started to open papers because we had....

MOSS: It had to be in the fall of ‘69 because you and Bill Johnson were still in
Washington when I came in August.

STEWART: Right, right. So we were not there in ‘69, and in the fall of ‘69 the papers were started to be opened.

MOSS: Which, by the way, was something that the National Archives was pleased about. They were under fire all over the place for presidential libraries being holding stuff back. And they were very pleased that the Kennedy Library was pushing it. When we later opened the president’s office files only a couple of years thereafter, they were exceedingly pleased.

DAITCH: We’ve talked about these things. You were doing administrative things. You were doing oral histories. What about processing the papers? Any of you have any hands-on processing tasks?

MOSS: Not until, I had none until about ‘72 or ‘73, I think, after I’d been in Waltham for a year or so.

HACKMAN: [Inaudible] the National Security Council.

MOSS: Well, no, I started practicing on the Godfrey McHugh papers [Godfrey T. McHugh] in the presidency in the White House staff files. And I did one or two of the White House staff files just as, you know, to find out how you do the stuff. I remember Sylvie Turner being furious with me for over-processing them, being too careful, being too detailed.

DAITCH: But there were obviously people who.... Frank Harrington?

STEWART: Frank Harrington, Will Johnson, Sylvie.

MOSS: Sylvie and Will Johnson.

STEWART: Will Johnson was the first person I hired. Will Johnson had been an intern at the National Archives. Again, one of the things that the National Archives did with the money that they got from the opening of the temporary Johnson Library was to set up an intern program.

HACKMAN: Did they call it a trainee program? Whatever.

STEWART: I think it was called interns.

HACKMAN: Okay, you’re probably right.

STEWART: Under which they hired people and put them through this two-year cycle of
activities and training.

MOSS: Classes under Frank Evans [Frank Bernard Evans].

STEWART: Frank Evans and all of this. But Will Johnson was in that first group they hired sometime in 1968, I guess.

HACKMAN: I used to lecture them on oral history. You probably did more than once.

MOSS: I did once or twice.

STEWART: And Will Johnson, who was from Massachusetts, said that he wanted to join the staff of the Kennedy Library. It was a great fit, and he was the first person I hired to be part of this team of a dozen or fifteen people that went to work here in September 1969. But there were Will Johnson, Sylvie Turner, Bob Stocking, Bob Johnson.

MOSS: [Inaudible] the librarian, book collection.

FENN: Shirley Jobe [Shirley A. Jobe Parker].

MOSS: Shirley Jobe.

STEWART: That’s right.

MOSS: Ann Travis was the first assistant or something.

STEWART: And Jo August.

MOSS: That’s right, Jo August was later. Yes, that’s right, Jo August. She also came in as a librarian, didn’t she?

HACKMAN: We had four librarians. I was trying to figure that out recently.

STEWART: There’s a reason for it. It was when Bob Stocking was in charge of books, and Bob Stocking had an assistant named Carolyn O’Leary. Carolyn left, and we were looking for an assistant for Bob, and we were recruiting and found Jo August. And then we also found Shirley Jobe; we couldn’t decide between the two of them. Through some pressure on the National Archives, they gave us permission to hire both of them.

HACKMAN: There you go.

STEWART: So we hired both of them. And they both stayed at the Library for probably
the next ten years.

FENN: And Megan Desnoyers.

STEWART: Megan Desnoyers. She was a very early person.

FENN: And [Inaudible].

MOSS: She came a little bit later as an intern.

HACKMAN: Did she come up from the archives?

MOSS: That’s right, she did. She was in Washington.

STEWART: There was a whole group of people over there.

FENN: And then your great hire, Carol Macdonald[?].

DAITCH: There’s a story here. [Laughter]

STEWART: But all this time, just to sort of finish the organizational part of it, all of this time....

MOSS: He talks about his mistakes.

STEWART: Particularly after the temporary library was set up in Washington, I kept pushing people to look for a permanent director. And I remember having a luncheon meeting, with Bert Rhoads and Arthur Schlesinger and one or two other people, and they went over a whole bunch of candidates, and no one could really agree on anybody.

And I had talked to Dan at one point. We did an oral history interview, and I remember at the end of the interview we had lunch, and that was in this period. And I was telling him about the problems of finding a director of the Kennedy Library. I said to Dan, “You wouldn’t be interested, would you?” Then about a year later, we still didn’t have a director. And I can’t remember how the contact was made, but I kept pushing them to look at this fellow Dan Fenn, and finally they did. Dan was hired in 1971.

FENN: Yes, I wasn’t when you first raised it, I wasn’t.... When was that oral history? Was that 1970? I think I was back in Boston.

STEWART: No, no, no. It was in Washington. It was the summer of ‘69.

FENN: I remember the interview was in Washington.
STEWART: It was the summer of ‘69.

FENN: Just before I went back, I guess. Yes, just before I went back.

STEWART: That’s right. I remember we had lunch after that, which must have been in late ‘69 or early ‘70.

FENN: But the expression on your face was pure desperation. [Laughter] And I was just going back to.... I had been working with Dan Yankelovich [Daniel Yankelovich] on some things, over 6 years on the Tariff Commission, which was a lot of fun after the two and a half years in the White House. And I was--Harvard Business School asked me to come back in a tenured-track thing. Anyway, I didn’t have, I mean running a library didn’t, you know....

Then it began to get serious because I think Bert Rhoads, who was then the archivist, you’d been talking to them, and Bert, I guess, called Arthur Schlesinger, and Arthur said it was a great idea. The family, namely Steve Smith, was in no hurry because you remember, and we should tell this story. The turmoil in Cambridge had started; the turmoil in Cambridge had started about 1970. And the problem of moving the marshaling yards hadn’t been solved. And I think the general feeling of the family was no hurry. We’re not going to have a library for a while.

But at any rate, I got to thinking about it, and the thing that’s fascinating is that, as I said earlier, I had never read all this stuff about the museum and all this stuff. But I got to thinking, boy, you really could do something with an institution like that. I mean you really could. Not backward looking and sort of keeping papers and stuff, but you could really use that as a source of exciting programs and projects which would nurture interest in politics and government and carry forward that passion of his. And in that sense reflect Kennedy and the Kennedy years. So I began to think that maybe this would be pretty good fun.

I think…. You know, we were then going to be in Cambridge. I was deeply involved with the Business School. I had this Harvard history behind me. My grandfather was the dean of the Harvard Divinity School, and I bummed around Cambridge a lot in my life and did my bachelor’s and master’s. Actually got my master’s a little later. And I think they were looking for somebody who had the Harvard associations and knew their way around Harvard Square and had been in the administration. And somebody who consequently knew the family.

But anyway, so I began to think this would be pretty good fun and indicated that I would be interested. And I remember so well talking to Bert Rhoads, he was the archivist and he made the formal offer, and said, “Well, I’ll tell you. If your view of the Kennedy Library is that it is an exciting outreach, popular, people-oriented place, education and politics and government and so forth and so on, yes, I think I’d like to.” Bert didn’t know what the hell I was saying yes to you, you know. Oh, yes.

As Larry points out, the presidential libraries at this point were rather unhappy marriages of museums and archives, and an occasional scholarly conference. The Eisenhower people would do a conference.
MOSS: I think the complementary fit to this mood of yours was on the staff, at least among the three of us, perhaps some others, was a sense that if we were going to live in a warehouse for the next five or six years, we had to do something else to make our mark. [Several speaking at once]

FENN: And going back to something thing Larry had said earlier, my idea, and I don’t know if I expressed it at the time, one of the reasons that I wanted to come out of that box fast.... You know Frank Harrington was saying, some people were saying in the Library staff, Let’s not do this stuff until we get our permanent home. I wanted to come out of the box fast with a picture of what this institution was so that it would be, so that the Boston community and the Massachusetts community would come to expect it. I mean this is what I wanted them to see. And so we started....

MOSS: The B.U. Conference.

FENN: Oh, just.... I tell you, I was going through that book of pictures given me when I left and what we did between 1971 and ‘79, never mind what we did when we got the building, was prodigious. Prodigious! The amount of stuff we did.

MOSS: A lot of stuff.

FENN: A lot of stuff, and it was imaginative and creative. I remember the senior staff seminars/project which we never could get anything really going on. The one other thing that I’d like to say, but we ought to just for the record remind ourselves and get on the tape the things that we were doing. There was a fair amount of resistance within the Library staff. I remember some people, Frank particularly, talking about it being PR. Which it was, of course. I saw this as planting seeds and trying stuff out.

Liz Carpenter [Elizabeth S. Carpenter], interestingly enough, when we did the Community Visitor Program at the opening and all that kind of stuff, Liz Carpenter from Boston, Johnson’s person, said, “Gee, that was a brilliant idea. Great public relations getting all those big shots, Averell Harriman [William Averell Harriman] to Somerville High School and so on.” And I was quite shocked because that wasn’t the way we were looking at the purpose of the stuff at all. It wasn’t to black the Library because this is what the Library was [Inaudible] and what the Library was to do.

Again going back to [Inaudible], and you guys do much better on this than I, for obvious reasons, and not only would know how important or relevant it is. But my strategy was, “Sylvie Turner, you don’t want to do this? Fine. Fine. Which of you guys would like to do the B.U. Conference? Who would like to do the Mishkan Tefila Festival?” John started right off. I thought the first thing that we’d done was that stuff with Cambridge Teaching thing. But I think, in fact, some of those external exhibits.... The B.U. program was really early. That was November of ‘72. We started doing external exhibits, remember? I mean we had a whole bunch of exhibits out there. We had the one in the Federal Building. We had the little traveling exhibits. We had one at the Museum of Science. We had that Danforth
Museum. We had the New England Mutual exhibit and a series of programs there.

STEWART: [Inaudible].

FENN: Yes. We had some at Harvard. We had stuff at local libraries. And then the teaching packets in the schools.

DAITCH: Why don’t you elaborate on.... I want to spend some time on those things because I think they’re important. And I want to elaborate on them individually a little bit. But before we do that, can we go back to Waltham as.... I have this picture in my mind of a warehouse full of stuff that some of it is processed, some of it isn’t. It’s not in the form of an.... I don’t have this image in my mind of these nice little conferences and all of that. I have a warehouse image.

MOSS: The stacks, the shelves, were fourteen feet high. And some of the material was in square, you know, big records center cartons. Some of it had been processed and was in Hollinger boxes. Some was not. We had cubicles in an open area, sort of little fenced-in offices in a large open area.

DAITCH: You did? That’s where you worked?

MOSS: Yes.

STEWART: That’s where we all worked.

DAITCH: These are not for researchers. These are your offices.

MOSS: There was a research room up front. It was essentially the....

STEWART: There’s a cubicle. [Laughter]

MOSS: The research room was essentially the large room outside Dan’s and Dave Powers’s offices. And that’s where people came, and we brought the stuff out to them.

STEWART: I’d like to make one point about what Dan has said. And believe me, I’m not doing this to score points with Dan or anything else. We’re way beyond that in our relationship.

MOSS: And too old, too.

DAITCH: Yes. Too late. [Laughter]

STEWART: In the scheme of things, while I and lots of other people disagreed with a lot
of the things that Dan was doing and trying to do during that period, I think it absolutely has to be said that there was only one person, one person who really was the instigator of all of this, and that’s Dan Fenn. I mean if it, and I think I’m in a good position to say this, I mean if Dan hadn’t come along with the vision and the purpose that he just described, it might have happened eventually, but it certainly wouldn’t have happened then, and it wouldn’t have happened in quite that way.

I mean if, for example, God forbid, I had continued to be acting director of the Kennedy Library for another five years, none of this stuff would have happened. Because I certainly didn’t have that kind of a vision, didn’t have that kind of a push to do these things, and no one else on the staff did. I mean Dan literally brought a very, very new perspective, a very different perspective to that whole situation that Larry, Bill, or I didn’t have, and absolutely no one at the National Archives came close to having, and that other people on the staff didn’t have. So I think that’s important to point out.

MOSS: And let me push that a little further. Dan had a lot of things that he sort of threw at us and let us do. Sometimes he’d walk away from them, and I’d be furious with him. And we’d have to fill in the blanks. But he also was very receptive to ideas. He would listen and pick up very quickly on something that was percolating, that we would bring to him, and would encourage us to push it forward.

STEWART: However crazy it might have been.

MOSS: Yes, indeed.

STEWART: Again, I’ll just say this for the record. I mean there were some things that absolutely failed. The curriculum packet basically failed as a project. Dan may disagree with that, but....

FENN: There are two things, John, right? One of the very early things that we did was we put together a presidential press conference, clips from presidential conferences, which we took to the Cambridge schools. We were trying them in school things. We had a pretty good [Inaudible]. And they’d watch a press conference. They’d be reporters. They’d watch a press conference. They’d write their stories, right? And then we gave them the real stories that had come out of the press conferences. I mean that kind of thing. The other thing that we were doing was trying to encourage the use of original documents. So we put together a packet of original documents which teachers and kids had, and we had teacher training around it. So that kind of stuff.

MOSS: Well, when I say it, I was never really a fan of that part. What I was pushing was something that I called using the Library as an exercise ground for graduate students and undergraduates. Encouraging professors to come in and look at the sources, and then go back to their classes and prepare, in effect, a semester of guided research in the Kennedy Library. Some picked up on it. Bill Goldsmith [William Goldsmith] and what was his name? Patterson [James T. Patterson] at Rhode
Island did it quite a bit.

FENN: [Inaudible].

STEWART: When I say the curriculum packet project failed, I say it in the sense that, yes, some of those things sort of worked individually in classes. But it failed because no one was ever able to figure out a good way to really make the thing into a regular long-lasting project. And the fact of the matter is that after 1979 when the Library opened, we never did any of that anymore. It never rose to much of a priority.

HACKMAN: It takes an immense amount of work, not only on the materials, but also in terms of the relationships with the schools all the time.

FENN: Absolutely.

HACKMAN: In a sense you were ahead of your time in thinking of it and trying to do it. Now the National Archives has a whole division that does that. And most of the presidential libraries have really substantial programs that take something like that approach. So it’s not surprising that kind of out of your back pocket that it wouldn’t take hold, especially, in part, because we were also trying to do a whole lot of other things.

FENN: Well, that’s right. That’s right. I mean we had teacher-training programs we started when we were in Waltham with the Graduate School of Education. So we had integrated stuff. But the problem, among the other problems that we never solved, was that it takes a certain kind of teacher to say, Hey, this stuff is wonderful. I’ll get my kids into this stuff. I want to do it. And we found, just as Bill found some, in the colleges and universities we found some. We found some.

HACKMAN: One of the things I wonder about on that period--I was looking at the Temple Mishkan Tefila Program, one of the few documents I kept from that period, how many things we were doing down there for example--whether anyone had in their portfolio, other than maybe me for a couple of things, really to go from trying out some things to, in fact, operating programs. Because we tried out an awful lot of different things. But maybe none of us had the charge, you know, I mean to just say, “Take the curriculum approach, and that’s going to be a permanent program. If it doesn’t work the first time, we’re going to make it work because it’s so logical to flow from an archival institution. And we’re going to keep after that one.” That’s against trying a lot of things because we wanted to try a lot of things to see which ones served the public, served the institution the best. And I probably left before that settled down. I mean I know I left before that settled down some. But at the time that I was there, I think we had an awful lot of balls in the air.

FENN: I think you’re absolutely right. And I think now you take the stuff in schools
in the curriculum package and training teachers and so forth and so on, I think that I had this romantic notion that we'd get it out there, and we'd do the teacher training, and it would be self-actualized. And it never occurred to me to say, as Larry is saying, Okay, this is great. Goddamn it! We’re going to make this work. You know, Carol Macdonald, you be in charge of this thing and go with it. Now, of course, we didn’t have resources. We were doing this on a shoestring.

STEWART: That’s right.

FENN: As far as the National Archives was concerned, we just did it. And our boss, Dan Reed, I mean most people never.... You know, I said, “Larry, would you like to be in charge of education?” I never said to Reed, we’re going to set up a separate education thing. We just did it.

DAITCH: Right.

FENN: Because my notion was that this is a three-legged stool. Larry’s point about the thing that it was a two-legged stool; we said at the Kennedy Library it’s a three-legged stool with the educational programs. Larry made, I thought, a very nice point that that was at least conceptually the bridge between the archives and the museum. It is stuff you use.

HACKMAN: I believe that presidential libraries throughout the system now, because education has been embraced by the National Archives even though they still don’t put any money behind it, is making that happen for the first time in a lot of places. Education is the bridge because you’ve got to draw on the materials, the expertise, and use the museum usually.

FENN: That’s what I hear now.

MOSS: And it’s not just presidential libraries, and it is happening all over the country in museums.

HACKMAN: Well, yes, absolutely.

STEWART: I respectfully disagree. As far as I’m concerned, in the twenty years or so that I was director of education in this building, I didn’t see what I was doing in any sense as a bridge between the archives and the museum, in any sense, in either a sort of philosophical, higher-programmatic policy sense or in any practical sense. I mean, yes, there were some projects that we did and I did when I was director of education with the staff that involved the archives. There were lots of projects, obviously the student visits, that involved the museum. But there were one helluva lot of things, namely all of these public programs, that had absolutely no relationship....
FENN: To either one.

STEWART: To either one.

FENN: Yes.

STEWART: And I never, as I say, seriously thought of the education division as any kind of a bridge sense.

HACKMAN: But, John, what you call education at the Kennedy Library is broader and more diffuse than the educational programs in most of the presidential libraries. That will survive for the long term in those settings because it is integral to both the archives and the museum side, which are their two functions that also are abiding functions. And education, using especially the museum, and using especially the archives, but using them in an educationally effective way, especially for kids in the classroom, are becoming the things that bring those two sides together.

STEWART: It hasn’t happened here.

HACKMAN: I agree it doesn’t fit this model.

STEWART: Right.

HACKMAN: The reason I made that remark was because of Dan’s example of developing curriculum here. Because that is at the heart.

FENN: And the idea was using the museum as an educational tool. And you used to do this. You used to pull stuff from the archives. You had Sam [Sam Rubin] and Sheldon [Sheldon M. Stern] and so on.

STEWART: But again, if we’re looking at this history in terms of, you know, twenty years later or thirty years later, wherever we are, what has succeeded, what has lasted, yes, there are still student groups in the museum. But in many, many ways that was sort of a disappointing effort because it was just so difficult. The museum was never adequately designed, or was never designed with specifically with students in mind. It was to a certain extent, but it wasn’t enough. And it didn’t come out as much as it should have so that students and classes could use it. Again, at least during my tenure as director of education, it was the public programs, the conferences, forums, teacher workshops every summer and all the rest of it, that was the big emphasis. And that was the thing that I think succeeded and, as far as I’m concerned, will last.

FENN: I don’t know what they do now, but it might be useful....
FENN: ...Galbraith, Willard Wirtz [William Willard Wirtz], Stu Udall, Bob Wood [Robert Coldwell Wood].

HACKMAN: There was Tom Winship [Thomas Winship].

FENN: Tom Winship, Ed Reischauer [Edwin Oldfather Reischauer]. So we were trying to... Well, in the first place it was kind of fun for the staff, you know, to see these people and talk to them. And secondly, we were trying to sort of do some things with the [Inaudible] education. We had the Community Visitor Program. And we all know this, but the tape doesn’t. We had a whole series of people, and we put them in that community for the day. Stu Udall in Lowell and Doris Kearns in Sherborn.

STEWART: Frank Mankiewicz in Springfield.

FENN: Frank Mankiewicz in Springfield.

HACKMAN: Nick Katzenbach [Nicholas deB. Katzenbach] in Fall River. That’s the one I just....

FENN: Sandy Vanocur [Sander Vanocur] was the first one in Tewksbury. We arranged with the community leaders, and they’d do a school thing, they’d do a presentation at the Library, they’d meet with the newspaper editor. You know. So we did, oh, gosh, what, eight of those?

STEWART: I didn’t really get involved in that.

FENN: It started in March of ‘73. Now this is six years and a half before we were open. Then we had--I mentioned the external exhibits. You did that B.U. Conference, which was for college, university studies. Joe Biden [Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr.] and Ben Wattenburg [Benjamin J. Wattenburg ] and all-day affairs.

MOSS: An assessment of American politics after the debacle of the 1960 election.

FENN: Yes, yes, yes. We did a helluva show. It was a helluva show.

MOSS: I remember Howard Zinn getting up and [Inaudible].

FENN: Yes. But we did a lot of conference-type things, too, in other venues. And then we did film festivals. Allan put on a great one down at the University of
Connecticut, I remember. We had William Manchester [William Raymond Manchester] down speaking at that one. And then libraries around.

DAITCH: What kind of films?

FENN: Well, we put together a package of films around some particular theme to give people a sense of what our holdings were for one thing. And mostly on college campuses. We did some in libraries on the North Shore.

MOSS: One thing don’t forget to mention too is the Volunteer Program.

FENN: Well, I’ve got that there.

MOSS: Because bringing in particularly retired people to do work in the Library. Some of them were very, very good at it.

FENN: And great for them, great for us. But I ran into problems with the GSA Human Resources people. They said it was illegal. And I said, “Well, the V.A. has volunteers in their hospitals.” And they said... They made a big mistake at that point. The guy said, “Well, yeah, but they have special legislation.” So I picked up the phone, and I called Congressman Boland [Edward Patrick Boland], and I said, “Eddy, look, we need to get appropriation legislation for the National Archives to authorize the use of volunteers.” That was a good program, I think.

MOSS: I met Fraser Forbes [Warren Woodbury] a few years later. I ran into him down at the University of Virginia where he was volunteering in the archives.

FENN: Yes? We had quite a crowd of [Inaudible].

MOSS: The guy who helped Allan with photographs, a former postal clerk on the railroad. He had spent his career on one of those railroad mail cars putting things away in the slots. And he patiently went through as many of the photographs as he could possibly do to identify all the people in them and break them down.

FENN: They loved it. These are good people. And it gave them something to do and some contact with the most interesting.... We used to have volunteer picnics. I think the volunteers were pretty useful, weren’t they?

MOSS: Definitely. We got some transcribing done by some.

DAITCH: It’s a wonderful program. Is there anything equivalent in any of the presidential libraries now?
HACKMAN: A couple of hundred and a full-time volunteer and an intern coordinator at Truman. Some of those volunteers that I ran into had been volunteers there for twenty-five years or so. So there may have been others that were trying to get started. Maybe Dan’s authorizing legislation let them get started.

FENN: Yes, that was so funny, I mean all this program activity was a lot of work and caused a lot of controversy. Washington always looked on this askance, you know. But they couldn’t bring themselves to say no. And so we were just going with it.

DAITCH: Askance for what reasons?

FENN: Well, I don’t know. Talk to Frank Burke when he was in D.C. as acting archivist. There was just a general atmosphere. You guys know better than I. I don’t know, “We’d never done anything like this before.”

MOSS: Well, it’s more than that, Dan. Archivists are supposed to be servants and not seen or heard, a passion for anonymity sort of thing. And we were out there shoving everybody’s face in it.

FENN: Oh, we were out there.

HACKMAN: That’s part of it. But another part of it is that the National Archives always regarded, they always felt that whatever the Kennedy Library was doing must have had the general approval of the family. And that they could not oppose the family, and therefore they were caught.

MOSS: [Inaudible] they could not control. [Several speaking at once]

STEWART: Well, it was a great misconception that lasted.

HACKMAN: I’m just saying that looked at from Washington, that was part of the perception. Because not only did you want to do things different than they might have wanted you to do, even though they weren’t really opposed to them in all kinds of ways, but that they felt that you actually could get away with it if you wanted to do it. And that creates a kind of a culture of suspicion or resentment or whatever. [Several speaking at once.]

MOSS: It’s kind of like the parent not knowing what his kid is doing at the [Inaudible].

FENN: Exactly. And I’m sure that people were beating on Dan Reed and saying, “Hey, will you get that guy under control?”
MOSS: Jim O’Neill [James Edward O’Neill] constantly was on Dan Reed’s back saying, “You’re not managing those libraries!” [Laughter]

DAITCH: It’s a community program.

HACKMAN: And they must have felt, and the other libraries where they’d get resentment from, oh, those people must be using of our money to do those things.

MOSS: And, Dan, Harry Middleton was much better at schmoozing than you were. You laughed at them.

FENN: Yes, I did. [Laughter]

MOSS: And they knew it.

FENN: And Harry did one thing. They didn’t like Harry. You know, when I first came, I said to Dan Reed, “Who is your perfect library director? Who is your model library director?” And he said, “Phil Brooks [Philip Coolidge Brooks].” [Laughter] That’s true. And Phil Brooks of Truman was the man whom Harry Truman referred to as “my little archivist.” [Laughter]

HACKMAN: And deservedly so. He was followed by a larger but still little archivist. It was only after, as I was saying earlier....

FENN: Ben Zobrist [Benedict Karl Zobrist].

MOSS: Yes.

HACKMAN: It was only after I took.... I mean I knew what I was getting into when I went out there. But I’ve heard now from three former archivists of the United States that the Truman Library was the worst-led and worst-administered library in the system. Of course they never were able to answer the question: Well, then, why didn’t you change things for twenty-four years? But they claim that they [Inaudible].

FENN: Ben was the master of the malaprop. He was a nice guy. I liked him. I remember one presidential libraries conference, Ben said, “God, I don’t think we should dig up that can of worms because it could be a two-edged sword.” [Laughter]

HACKMAN: But the funny.... From what you’ve said earlier, what John said, by the time he left, Harry Middleton was their favorite.

MOSS: Yes.
HACKMAN: And the reason Harry Middleton particularly was their favorite was that he had access to a whole lot of money; that as they switched to the policy, which I hate, which is that to do their public programs and their educational programs and their temporary exhibits and redoing their permanent exhibits, those always should have been on private money. And because of the endowment at Johnson and whatever, Harry was the epitome, as long as he and Lady Bird [Claudia Alta “Lady Bird” Taylor Johnson] could talk easily and so on. I mean I think that’s a bad policy [Inaudible].

MOSS: It meant also that they didn’t have to directly involve themselves in overseeing it and managing it. They could absolve themselves from responsibility for it.

FENN: Well, that’s foundation money. Yes, they didn’t have to [Inaudible].

MOSS: And the National Archives is perfectly content to let it be that.

FENN: Yes. But I think, in fact I know, that we were doing, before we even opened, a far broader range of things than they’re [the Libraries] doing now maybe except for Truman.

MOSS: Again, I think the earlier point was true, that it was much like the early oral history in a way: diffuse, not programmatic, experimental, hit-or-miss, without a lot of follow-up. It opened the possibilities and a lot of other things have happened from it.

FENN: Right.

MOSS: But you can’t point to a single one of them and really say that this generated a continuing program.

FENN: And I think your point that it would have been much better if it had been a conscious program of experimentation and then a selection, you know, let’s take this one and really run with it. I mean we were doing a lot of very good stuff, and people were well served by it. But in terms of....

MOSS: And it was a lot of fun.

FENN: And it was fun. I mean we had a good time. There was a lot of, you know, we had those picnics and stuff at Waltham. We had a good time.

DAITCH: Was there any dissension within the--we talked a little bit about the dissension between Waltham and Washington--what about within the staff?

HACKMAN: I’d like to talk about that just a little bit.

[- 55 -]
MOSS: There was some.

HACKMAN: Because somebody mentioned earlier and Dan was saying, you know, “I said to Sylvie, ‘If you want to do this, and if you don’t, somebody else can do it.’”

MOSS: There was a lot of shaking.

HACKMAN: I think there was a feeling of the experienced archivist, people that regarded themselves as professional archivists, and I sure didn’t at that point, that those were not things that an archival organization usually did.

MOSS: The rest of us were on a binge.

HACKMAN: Sort of, when we did those things. I also think that, probably Bill and I both caught some jealousy, that because we’d done the oral histories, a lot of times when researchers would theoretically they would go to the reference archives staff and that’s who they’d work with, they’d have coffee with me or Bill, and they’d find out that we—or John in some cases—and they’d find out that we knew a lot more about the Kennedy Administration, we knew a lot more of the people, we knew where to steer them, especially in terms of the oral histories. And they’d wind up spending most of their time with us. And I think that led to some resentment on the part of the archival staff. And especially since Bill, at [the] first meeting, he had the title “senior archivist,” and he didn’t know a bloody thing about archives. I mean there were a number of reasons why you and other folks....

MOSS: When I was selected as chief archivist, both Sylvie Turner and Bob Stocking really felt that the archives profession had been done a great disservice, a kick in the teeth.

FENN: I never knew that.

MOSS: Oh, yes. I got it from both.

STEWART: When Larry left, correct me if I’m wrong on this, but when Larry left, the decision really was whether Bill or I would be the chief archivist, and the other would be the program or education director, whatever it might be called. And I guess because I was senior in terms of seniority and grade, I chose at that point to become the education director.

MOSS: I didn’t want to be the education person.

STEWART: You probably didn’t.
MOSS: For whatever it’s worth.

STEWART: And that created this big controversy because you were then appointed chief archivist, and Bill Johnson and Bob Stocking...

MOSS: And we went through the formality and selection process.

STEWART: ...and Sylvie were very, very angry, very upset. As I suspect Allan and a number of other people were. And that kind of split, that kind of resentment lasted for a number of years.

MOSS: Mm hmmm. Mm hmmm.

STEWART: To a certain extent sort of.... It didn’t really surface that often. But it was there. It was there in spades and certainly continued, you know, among people when the Library opened, and this whole business of the education program sort of siphoning staff and resources away from the archives. That was a lasting problem for many years.

FENN: I had the same problem with the museum people partly because I was spending so much time on the outreach stuff. I just didn’t.... Bill usually would come up every few days if not every day, every evening, I think. But only a couple of times I’d come and sit down and chat with the archivists and see what they were doing. But I just wasn’t [Inaudible], I wasn’t demonstrating the kind of interest. So how does one read that? Well, one reads that is that....

MOSS: Dan Fenn doesn’t care.

FENN: Doesn’t care. Disdains the archival business, which was about as far from the truth as anything could be.

HACKMAN: You were always open, you know, if people wanted to talk. But my God [Inaudible].

DAITCH: Well, the thing was running smoothly.

FENN: Yes.

MOSS: But there’s also that the archival profession has its own priesthood. And it has its initiation rites. It has its laying-on-of-hands, if you will. And if you haven’t done that, if you haven’t been that, if you aren’t part of that, if you don’t want to do that, then you’re somehow beyond the pale.
FENN: Yes, I think it’s true. Absolutely. I think it is true.

MOSS: I certainly found that museum registrars are exactly the same way.

FENN: The one other thing I’ll just throw in and mention and that is, as I said this earlier, whatever the perception in Washington was, you know, Ted’s little farewell thing that came and did the Library Foundation Board, and things that he said to me, one of the things that really surprised him, which I thought was kind of nice at the time but I don’t any more, was that you just did it, you know. We just did it without asking permission. And looking back, I think, as I said, a really bad mistake on my part that I didn’t sit down with Steve more often on these things we were doing. And that damned silly Culver Commission is one reason for, one cost that we all paid. We’ll get to that.

But I think the fact is that what they did see.... I remember Ted coming one.... Remember we used to have those things on the president’s birthday. We had a family day, and the Air Force Band, and the place was packed when we had the 10K race, and all kinds of stuff.

DAITCH: Where was this?

FENN: And he would come, and he was just thrilled with what he saw.

MOSS: Those who did the 10K race received a T-shirt that had a Special-K logo on it. I’ve got a picture of me on the Great Wall of China wearing a Kennedy Day T-shirt.

DAITCH: Now this wouldn’t have been at Waltham?

MOSS: No, this was in, we’re jumping ahead a little bit, this was at Columbia Point.

FENN: One of the other things I think that was really important is, we haven’t even touched on, what was going on in Cambridge during this period. And what was happening was that the mud was really flying and started before I became director actually. First letters in the Cambridge Chronicle from Muffy and Pebble.

MOSS: The effete elite of Brattle Street.

FENN: We are the Lord’s sweet chosen few. Let all the rest be damned. There’s room enough in hell for you. We can’t have heaven crammed. [Laughter] But Frank Burke is going to tell that story in his book, and he’s been talking to Muffy, and I’m sure he’s been talking to Pebble. But first there was the problem.... I’ll go through this real quick because anybody who wants to know about it, it’s spread upon the record. First there was the problem of getting the marshaling yards out of there. Bob Wood became head of the MBTA, and one of the first things he did was to find the Culver Street
Yards [Bennett Street Yards].

Then the problems began to arise in Cambridge. They were happy with the archives because nice people go to archives. But they didn’t want the museum, and they talked about people in Bermuda shorts and Winnebagos. And there was the one who wrote to the senator: “The point is, Senator, that when on a crisp October afternoon we walk across the bridge to the Dartmouth game, we don’t want to be interfered with by a lot of tourists.”

HACKMAN: [Inaudible] about McDonald’s in there, too. McDonald’s was coming to Harvard Square.

FENN: And they talked about the fragility of Harvard Square. And my old college friend told me, who was sitting in the middle of the Fogg Art Museum at a fancy, expensive Harvard dinner, he leans across the table, and he says, “The point is, Dan, a museum has no place in an academic community.” [Laughter] So according to Frank Burke, what the Lawrences said was it was Harvard they were after, not.... This was never Harvard. Anyway, the upshot of all this furor was that they could now [Inaudible] so that it’s on the record, the upshot of all this was it went on and on. And they were demanding an Environmental Impact Study which really they really didn’t have to have because technically it wasn’t a federal project at that point because it was the family’s until they gave it to us. But in fact it really was, of course.

So there was an EIS, and Bob Griffin [Robert P. Griffin] was deputy head of GSA at the time, our old buddy. They said it was a phony. Maybe it was, maybe it wasn’t. But they were going to take it all the way to the Supreme Court. Steve Smith saw that money shrinking because it was a time of high inflation. So he called me to 122 Bowdoin Street, President Kennedy’s old home which by now was long since been given up, but which was the headquarters for the Kennedy Library Corporation. And he said, “Well, Dan, I’m going to give up pursuing the whole option in Cambridge.” Because by this time these guys had come up with the brilliant idea of splitting the archives and the museum, and they’d keep the archives because that’s where nice people go, but stick the museum someplace else. I. M. Pei’s classic pyramid plan didn’t help!


FENN: Yes, they did that at Ford subsequently. And the archives [Inaudible].

HACKMAN: Knowing what’s happening at Ford. I just spent last weekend with Bob Warner [Robert Mark Warner], and I’ve been looking at this as part of a study that I’m doing. And Ford is the best example of a place that has no education program because the archives and the museum are not together.

FENN: So Steve said, “I’m going to forget this. And I’m going to say that I’m continuing to look for a place where we can build the whole thing, but that’s not really true. I’m just going to split it, and I’m going to find a place for the museum.” And I said, “Steve, we can’t do that.” And he said of me, “He’s got tears in his
eyes.” And I said, “You know, there’s not going to be a Kennedy Library if you do that. Because the archives are going to disappear in Harvard, and the museum’s going to disappear in whatever that environment is.” And I had exactly Larry’s point. That it would destroy the institution.

So he said, “Well, I’ve got no place else to put it.” I said, “Yes, you do, U. of Mass-Boston.” And this had happened because Bob Wood, who was then the president, and I had lunch at Maison Robert one day because I was trying to get his papers. And he said, “What about UMass-Boston if this Cambridge thing keeps heating up?”

MOSS: We’ve got this lovely dump out at Columbia Point.

FENN: Yes, right. Literally the city dump. Literally. So I went out to take a look, and, gee, I liked the place. But I was thinking of it just as a fallback position to give to the family; maybe would stiffen Steve’s spine a little bit. If they had a place they could go, they could tell Cambridge where to get off the trolley.

So I got him going on that. And they began to take a few borings, and Bob Burke looked at it, and Steve look at it. Steve said, “I can’t build out there because we’ve taken the borings.” I said, “Where I’m thinking about, you can.” Actually I don’t know where the hell that inspiration came from. And he brightened, he brightened. And he said, “Well, go see Bob Wood. See what you can work out.”

So I went out to Lincoln to see Bob Wood that night. He thought this would be a helluva caper. And of course he said, “I have to talk to Amherst as well as Boston just for my political thing.” So Steve puts out his thing. He gets offers from all over the country, including Fort Leavenworth, you could put the thing there. Lot of schlepping around, Brandeis, SMU, UMass. And finally what it shakes down to is are we going to split the institution or keep it together? By this time they’d settled on the Charlestown Navy Yard as the place for the museum and then the archives in Cambridge. So this was the thing.

And Derek Bok.... Harvard was split with Derek Bok, the president, pushing it. And I.M. Pei was pushing. I.M. Pei said, “Can’t build anything Columbia Point.” Because he wanted a building at Harvard because Le Corbusier [Charles Edouard Jeanneret] and Gropius [Walter A. Gropius] and all those guys get a building at Harvard, he wanted one. So this is then the big decision that’s to be made. Jackie.... Didn’t you guys hear this story? I thought I would have told you that.

Jackie says.... Jackie’s never seen either the navy yard or Columbia Point. So she came from New York on the evening shuttle. The shuttle is late. The traffic getting to the navy yard was appalling. Bob Burke, who was our ally--he was the executive director of the Kennedy Library Corporation--had picked out the schlockiest part of the navy yard to take her to, just all rubble and stuff. She gets there, and she’s not in all that happy a mood anyway. So she looks around sort of quickly. And then Teddy--we drive to Columbia Point, and John Culver’s in the front seat, Bob Burke, Jackie, and I are in the back seat. Ted, at the wheel, knows how to get to Columbia Point the back way. So he goes right through Southie and in no time we are there, but we’re late. We get there, and the lights are just going up on the spars on the ships in the harbor, you know, the little bay. “Oh, it is the most beautiful place I ever saw in my life,” says Jackie. Somebody up there loves me, I decide.

[- 60 -]
She was having this feud with Harvard at the time, a long-term feud over the Institute of Politics and was unhappy.

On the way over Teddy says, “Dan, tell Jackie why it should all be built together.” Well, obviously, you know, a question I should really have anticipated but I kind of burbled, Jackie sort of interrupts me, and she says, she could be pretty tough, “Teddy, there are three stages of maturity if you’re Irish: the first is when you get off the boat you want to go to Harvard. The second is when you go to Harvard. The third is when you say pooh on Harvard.” Teddy bursts out laughing. And he said, “Yes, Jackie, I’ve been cleaning up after you over there for months.” [Laughter]

So I think it’s done. And Bob Burke comes over to my house that night, and we’re having this celebration, right? But then Harvard gets back into the act. I don’t know if you’re interested in all this. Dave in the meantime, interestingly enough, had said to me, “Dan, if they want to split it, let them split it.” I said, “No way.” And we had all these straw groups going. We got Bert Rhoads into it. We got the other presidential libraries into it. All this stuff you do when you campaign. Harvard in the meantime....

HACKMAN: To line up arguments against splitting it, you mean?

FENN: Yes, yes. And so then Bok had a luncheon for the members of the Corporation Board, and Pat [Patricia Kennedy Lawford] was there. Eunice [Eunice Kennedy Shriver] maybe? Lem Billings [K. LeMoyne Billings] was there. Puts on this luncheon. I.M. is there. I.M.’s got this beautiful model of how lovely it’s going to be at the Charlestown Navy Yard with the flags flying. Chuck Daly.... When he was first names president Derek Bok said to me, “I want a government relations guy. They say you know people?” I said, “Chuck Daly.” He said, “Fine.” Chuck and I had been friends since White House years, and he’s the Harvard mastermind on this whole thing. At the lunch, Pat Lawford asked, “Well, Mr. Bok, if we decide to put the Library at Columbia Point, would you change the name of the Kennedy School?” And the answer is obvious, “Of course not.” But what he said was, “Mrs. Lawford, we’d have to look at that very seriously.” When she left, she was livid and said it was “blackmail.”

At any rate, the thing is still hanging in the balance. Then in the fall of ‘75 just before Thanksgiving, we had the meeting in I.M. Pei’s office, all the Library Corporation members there. The others fob it off on the family: “you decide, you people decide what you’re going to do. It’s your project.” They went out, and they came back, and the vote, I think, was nine to seven to do Columbia Point. But Steve wanted to, he wanted to split; Jean did, you know. It was that kind of thing. But Jackie and Teddy voted for UMass. So I think if it had looked like it was going to go the other way, they’d have weighed in on Columbia Point. And it was over this issue to build it together.

So somebody called Bob Wood who was having lunch at the Tavern Club, and tells him it’s Columbia Point. And Bob goes back to the table and said, “Well, Kennedy Library’s coming to UMass-Boston.” Leverett Saltonstall said, “Well, I don’t think very much of that.” And it was a four-year battle from when I became director right straight through ‘til Thanksgiving of ’75. Just a constant struggle. So that anyway, obviously from my perspective. We’ll see what Frank Burke has to say. But you remember going through hell
and damnation.

MOSS: A footnote: Do you know that underneath this building there is an exhaust system to take care of developing methane gas?

DAITCH: I do know that.

MOSS: So that the presidential library will not blow up on its own gas. [Laughter]

FENN: [Inaudible].

HACKMAN: If that ever happens, you want to keep one copy of this tape off-site. [Laughter] Well, people will know that Dan fought for this despite the fact that he knew about that methane gas.

FENN: Well, Bob Healey [Robert Healey], the city manager of Cambridge, at one of these endless meetings and press conferences, turns to Bob Wood, and he said, “Well, if you can talk the Kennedy Family into putting that library over methane gas on a city dump next to the most notorious housing project in Boston, you’ll be doing pretty well.”

STEWART: And there were people right along.... I have somewhere in my bag an article that Mike Barnicle [Michael Barnicle] wrote sometime in the late nineties in which he is still sort of lamenting the fact that the Kennedy Library is in this former dump and not in Cambridge and all the rest. I mean there were people who just never sort of forgave the decision-makers for what they did.

FENN: Oh, I think [Inaudible].

STEWART: Well, I don’t know how much sort of serious follow-up there was among scholars and academics. But there were people like Schlesinger, for example, who didn’t like the idea at all because they totally misread the situation of the Library, in effect, changing its relationship from one with Harvard to one with UMass. In fact, there wouldn’t have been any other relationship with Harvard than there is with UMass, which is essentially nothing. I mean Teddy White literally changed his will. And when he died, his papers, to our surprise, didn’t come here. They went to Harvard because Teddy White was so angry at the switch from Cambridge to here that he didn’t want his papers coming here to UMass.

FENN: Well, I’m sure there was a lot of bad feeling, you know. And as John points out, this relationship between the Library and the Harvard [Inaudible].

STEWART: It would be very interesting....
FENN: Symbolically....

MOSS: A side issue here has to do with the Hemingway [Ernest Miller Hemingway] Papers and where they properly belong.

DAITCH: Right.

MOSS: And, you know, many people out there believe they belong in an academic atmosphere. And that was the selling point that Jackie made to Mary [Mary Welsh Hemingway], that she should give Ernest’s papers to the Kennedy Library because they would be there at Harvard. And made a good job of it.

STEWART: I made a half serious suggestion that we give them up. They don’t belong here.

MOSS: It’s a perfectly reasonable suggestion, but the suggestion--this takes us to the National Archives. I was getting flak from the Office of Presidential Libraries that I should not devote archivists to work on the Hemingway Papers because they were extraneous to our mission. I, in effect, said, Bullshit! They are a valuable resource. We’ll do the best we can professionally with them.

DAITCH: And they’re still here.

STEWART: The one question that is still--I totally agree with Dan’s counter to all of that. But the question that I have never totally understood is Harvard. I’m not of Harvard or from Harvard so I don’t.... And if I seem somewhat cynical about the whole thing, I still think that Harvard’s major motive was in keeping the control of that site. Harvard for years had tried to get a hold of that MBTA site. And when they saw the possibility of the Kennedy Library leaving entirely, they got seriously worried that maybe something else would be done with that site, and they wouldn’t have quite the control over it that they wanted.

Somehow I don’t think Harvard was that seriously anxious to keep the archives of the Kennedy Library somewhere on the campus. There were lots of other reasons. It all obviously turned out well because, in fact, Harvard convinced the State of Massachusetts to build a park named after John Kennedy. And then, in effect, to give the rest of the land to Harvard to build the Kennedy School of Government. So everybody was happy.

MOSS: And I also think that it provided the opportunity, at least, for the Massachusetts State Archives to come in.

STEWART: Oh, absolutely. Yes. There’s no doubt that.... That’s another whole story. Well, maybe I can tell it very, very quickly. And, Dan, correct me if I’m wrong in this, but soon after the Kennedy Library opened, Paul Guzzi was secretary of state and was looking for a place for the new state archives, and they considered
a number of sites, including the old armory building outside of Park Square there.

FENN: Mike Dukakis [Michael S. Dukakis] didn’t want it there for some reason.

STEWART: The decision eventually was made to put the archives here at Columbia Point adjacent to the Kennedy Library. And then the original site was going to be on the other side of our access road. Because I.M. Pei and everybody else did not want a big building that would interfere with the approach to the Kennedy Library. They wanted that approach to be wide open so you could see the Kennedy Library. But the state archives people wanted to be as close to the water as possible. So somewhere in the middle of the night, members of the legislature who were not in love with Teddy Kennedy, put through a bill in the legislature to move the site from the other side of that access road where we all wanted it to where it is now. By the time he found out about it, it was a done deal, and he didn’t want to site it.

FENN: My recollection, John, is that’s partly right. Paul got--I’d forgotten that whole business--Paul Guzzi and I and Paul Guzzi’s assistant spent a lot of time driving around trying to find possible joint sites. We looked at one in Weston. We looked at one in Concord. Then came this decision, and it was supposed to be over on the other side.

What had happened was that John Finnegan, who was chair of the House Ways and Means at the time, Dorchester rep, had been--I didn’t discover this ‘til long afterwards. I went in to see Bulger [William M. Bulger] about getting a line item for the Kennedy Library in the state budget because the Boston Symphony did and the Museum of Science did and a lot of other places did. And I said, “Senator, what about us?” So he said, “Well, it sounds good to me. I don’t see any reason why not.”

And so he called Finnegan who was the House Ways and Means. Finnegan was tremendously helpful with Steve. I mean he got the perimeter road built, and he got the exchange of land thing worked out. I mean he was wonderful. As a part of our relationship with Columbia Point, on the morning of the dedication, a car was sent for two or three of the residents with whom we had been working, but not for him. And Finnegan said in Bulger’s office that I never returned his phone calls. But I never got his phone calls obviously, or I would have returned them.

Finnegan was.... His nose was really out of joint. He was furious that he didn’t have a special ticket and yet this elderly woman from Columbia Point got a limousine ride up to the dedication. And he just felt slighted, and, in fact, he was slighted. I mean I think, you know, the family, Steve, they’re awfully good at that kind of thing, but it didn’t work this time. So he sited it right there where it was sited, and he is reputed to have said, “That that’ll take the bloom off that rose.” It also sunk our line item. So that’s.... I mean it was John Finnegan.

MOSS: It all [Inaudible] at heart.

FENN: Oh, my. This all became interesting.... And many, many, many, many people worked on making it [Inaudible]. So it was Bob Wood was dealing
with the UMass people and Dorchester people. And you remember we had all kinds of things going in Dorchester. We had the big exhibit, Library exhibit, open houses, etc., etc.

HACKMAN: I remember that, I’ll never forget it, that dual-level, two-projector slide show that we had put together? I can remember showing that in Dorchester up there on the hill.

FENN: [Inaudible] image thing, was it?

HACKMAN: Whatever. What was most nervous was not the audience. It was always whether the slides were going to work together.

FENN: That’s right. I’d forgotten that. That’s right.

HACKMAN: I mean we were carrying it around. It was worse than carrying a Wollensak recorder around, or two of them.

FENN: That’s right. We did a lot of that stuff. And I was in and out of Columbia Point for those evening meetings of the Columbia Point Residents’ Association. And if you think that was fun, that was bloody scary.

HACKMAN: You know one of the things that all of this makes me think about, given particularly the complexity of the story and the number of organizations from UMass Boston to Harvard to whoever was involved--the Kennedy Library Foundation really ought to contract for a good institutional history. I mean perhaps this interview would be of some use along with their files. And it really needs someone who is writing a dissertation. Or to find someone who really would kind of pull it together. It ought not to.... I mean I suppose it will happen at some point. But it wouldn’t cost so much. It wouldn’t seem to me to be so difficult if the Foundation could fund it and then leave it alone and not feel the story had to come out the way they wanted it to come out. They’re used to giving out funds in support of research. It sure would be a good project, particularly while people are still around who could talk about it.

FENN: It’s a great story.

STEWART: The story of the building of the Kennedy Library has been told in print a number of times. There’s a book on Columbia Point, and there’s a whole chapter, a fairly large chapter, in that.

FENN: Really?

HACKMAN: It has a lot of the inside decision-making?
STEWART: Yes. Where else was I seeing it? Well, there’s a biography of I.M. Pei that has the story. And I’m pretty sure they interviewed you, they talked to you.

HACKMAN: But this would look at almost everything we’ve been talking about: the original ideas going back to the discussions in the White House, the programmatic things that were tried and which were used, and what people had in their minds, and what Harvard.... You know, you’d want to look at Harvard’s records, frankly, if you could get into them.

MOSS: There are the little pieces that get left out, the architectural critics, Ada Louise Huxtable and Wolff Eckert and all that crowd.

FENN: Well, Ada Louise Huxtable was a real pain because the Harvard people got to her, and she was going after the whole concept of presidential libraries. I mean we had to fight that battle. [Several people speaking at once]

MOSS: Already incensed....

FENN: Pyramid to dead pharaohs?

MOSS: Yes. Incensed by the grandiloquence of the Johnson Library.

FENN: Well, that’s true. That didn’t help.

MOSS: And then the design, which is quite literally a pyramid in Cambridge. That was just too good and too juicy an image to let go.

FENN: Absolutely.

HACKMAN: It’s not as though there weren’t a lot of things about presidential libraries, all of them, that needed criticism. So I wouldn’t pass off Ada Louise or anybody at Harvard for raising those issues.

MOSS: No. But at the same time, it was another part of the flak in which we had to operate.

HACKMAN: That we had to deal with.

MOSS: There was that side of it. There was the other side of it that had to do with the historians and everything coming out of Francis Lowenheim [Inaudible], Barton Bernstein and all the rest of them who were, you know, Bart Bernstein was one of those who was convinced that we were hiding things that we had.

FENN: Yes, that’s right. And it was against that context and stimulated by what the
people in Cambridge were saying.

MOSS: Yes.

FENN: And I was finding it excruciatingly frustrating because I thought what we were doing here was precisely not a pyramid to a dead pharaoh. I thought we had a very different mission and vision for this Library in mind. And for them to be coming after us on that was not [Inaudible]. It was a nasty, really the nastiest political fight I’ve ever been in. It was just [Inaudible].

Remember Chuck Daly at the end? Steve handled this one beautifully. Just about two days before the meeting, on the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, he was laughing actually. He said, “I just got a call from Jimmy Breslin.” No. “I just got a call from Mary Hemingway saying that if we even think about putting our library in that slum, she’ll have to think about taking Ernest’s papers out of there.” Now that was Chuck Daly to Jimmy Breslin to Mary Hemingway. And thank God he just blew that off. He didn’t miss a beat on that one. That’s dirty tricks.

I think that Derek--I’ve chatted with him about this once in a while--I think the reason Derek weighed in so heavily when he was president of Harvard was because he was just in the process of.... The Kennedy School hadn’t been built yet; it was being built. It was just getting started. I think that he saw the fact that “We have the Kennedy Papers at Harvard and the Kennedy School” was a real good fund-raising ploy. But he certainly did weigh in.

STEWART: So you don’t think there was any fear on the part of Harvard, people at Harvard, of losing that site, losing control of the site?

FENN: No, no…. Well, that’s an interesting question.

STEWART: Well, the site, as you know, the site was donated by the Commonwealth.

FENN: For the Kennedy Library.

STEWART: For the Kennedy Library. If the Kennedy Library wasn’t there, was there a danger that the Commonwealth...

FENN: Would take that back.

STEWART: ...would do something else with the site? Or wouldn’t give it to Harvard which, you know, and they didn’t actually. They built that park, and then they.... I don’t know if Harvard paid for the rest of the land or not.

FENN: Well, it’s an MDC park. Well, you know, by that time the Kennedy School that was dedicated just after us.

STEWART: The Kennedy School wasn’t built. I mean the Kennedy School existed...
institutionally or organizationally. But the Kennedy School wasn’t built for.
.
FENN: Well, certainly when the decision was made, the Kennedy School hadn’t been built.

STEWART: No, nothing. Alright. Are we through?

DAITCH: I think we should probably call it a day. Everybody’s slowing down.

STEWART: Yes. [Laughter]

DAITCH: But I’m really glad that....

MOSS: My eyes are beginning to cross.

DAITCH: Now I’m glad that....

[END SIDE 2, TAPE 2]

[End of April 16, 2004 interview.]
Oral History Interview

with

JOHN STEWART       DAN FENN, JR.
WILLIAM MOSS       LARRY HACKMAN

April 17, 2004
Boston, Massachusetts

by Vicki Daitch

For the John F. Kennedy Library

DAITCH: I’m setting up the tape recorders for our second day of interviewing with John Stewart, Larry Hackman, Dan Fenn, and Bill Moss. We’re at the John F. Kennedy Library at Columbia Point in Boston, and we’ll be beginning shortly. And I’ll add that today is April 17, 2004. This is Dan Fenn, by the way, telling us an early pre-Kennedy story.

FENN: When the family saw the model, they really didn’t particularly care for it. And they’re funny when they’re dealing with somebody like I.M. And, of course, Jackie and I.M. had a very warm relationship. And they talked about the glass pavilion, which I.M. insisted should be called the Place of Meditation.

HACKMAN: There’s one of those at the Eisenhower Library, the Place of Meditation.

DAITCH: That was Larry.

FENN: So they couldn’t bring themselves to say, “Well, I.M., think you could do something a little different?” So they talked about the glass pavilion. And they said, “Oh, it will be terribly expensive to heat.” Well, what difference
did it make to them? I mean they weren’t going to pay for it. GSA was going to pay for it anyway. So then I.M. said, “Oh, solar panels. My brother makes solar panels. We put solar panels up there.” [Laughter]

HACKMAN: I think one of the things, thinking last night about some of those programs, which is the distinction that we might talk about a bit: And that’s the difference between civic education, which I think was the central concept to a lot of what we were doing in those days, versus current affairs. There’s a distinction there. Where the decision film is civic education.... Well, anyway, it’s something I could talk about for a little bit at some point.

FENN: Well, I think Larry was the key person on the Mishkan Tefila Project, which was probably the most massive and complex one that we did; and Bill was the point person on the B.U. Conference, which was another major undertaking. Allan, are you going to join us this time?

GOODRICH: I’m just going to listen.

DAITCH: Well, actually, I turned the tapes on.

MOSS: You know Allan, he never says anything unless he has to. [Laughter] And then grudgingly.

GOODRICH: Right, right.

DAITCH: I went ahead and….

STEWART: Actually that was from a couple of years ago.

DAITCH: I went ahead and turned the tapes on so that we could get Dan’s story about I.M. Pei, and they’re still running. So as long as that’s happening, not to rush into things if anybody wants to get more coffee or anything. But we didn’t talk about [Inaudible] yesterday really. It was mentioned in passing. Can we expand on that a little bit?

HACKMAN: Is it possible to spend two minutes on Community Visitors?

DAITCH: Absolutely.

HACKMAN: Well, one of the things, and part of what I was thinking last night, was how helpful it was, how important it was, that Dan Fenn knew so many people. Because I remember going with Dan to a meeting. I believe her name was Lucy Benson [Lucy Wilson Benson]?
FENN: Oh, yes.

HACKMAN: There was a woman who was president, or had been president, of the Massachusetts League of Women Voters. And she had been, or was just becoming, president of the National League of Women Voters, I believe.

FENN: Assistant secretary of state.

HACKMAN: We talked with her about the Community Visitor Program because it was, in fact, the League of Women Voters in each community that we went into that was the lead co-sponsor, if you will. And we would always find a person and a committee from the League of Women Voters wherever we were going, to help shape the day.

The reason I pick on that is because it seems to me that it demonstrates that what we were really about. I don’t know if civic education is even the right term, but what we were primarily about was not, certainly, John Kennedy and the Kennedy Administration in those programs. But it was also not just about current affairs and current issues.

It was really more about the process of government and politics, and working with, helping, a variety of groups in a community. We started with the League of Women Voters in each community. But we always tried to include social studies teachers, students, both secondary and if there was a college like there was down at Dartmouth when we took Katzenbach down there or North Adams State, always a college connection; always a Chamber of Commerce connection, usually a local government connection. Where there was a media outlet, either radio or television or both, always making that personal available to the full citizenry through the media and, of course, the newspapers.

And then I’d say beyond those core groups or functions or whatever, there were always some odd add-ons, depending on maybe who the president of the local League of Women Voters husband was interested in. I mean there were always some quirks there or to match the interest of the person we were taking in. If it was Katzenbach, it might have been the local police commissioner as an add-on or the local....

FENN: Or Udall and the environmental stuff.

HACKMAN: Right, right. But I guess my points there are really two: One is that I think a lot of what we were thinking about at that point related to helping people understand and appreciate the world of government and politics. It’s kind of the theme of this institution in a lot of ways, picking up on the Kennedy legacy. But the second point was just that it seemed like everything we did Dan knew someone. Because when we started to do the decision film, which again was not.... The Stroke of the Pen was not made because it was a film about John Kennedy and the housing situation. That was not a huge policy issue really at that time or one of the most important things. It was because we could use that as a case study about the process, again, of government and politics and the kinds of constraints and opportunities and values and things that come into that.

But because we wanted to make it interactive, and I don’t remember whose idea this
was, we hooked up with a guy that Dan knew, it’s my recollection, at M.I.T., a mechanical engineer who did the wiring for the devices that went on the seats in the Mishkan Tefila Auditorium and wherever else it was used, so that you could go through, vote, and display the vote results on the screen. Is it a broad executive order or a narrow order? Should you do it before the mid-term elections or after the mid-term elections? All of those questions you voted on anonymously which we thought of as a way to provoke discussion.

Because the idea was that somehow teachers would use that film, not with the fancy voting devices but with the questions posed so that you could stop and discuss and move on, the way you would in a case study you were discussing at the Harvard Business School or the M.P.A. program there.

MOSS: I would absolutely agree, Larry, particularly on the civic education, and I think it’s a good term. Just two footnotes: One, having been in situations where you don’t have the networking, I know that it’s absolutely essential, if you’re going to try and get the attention of a local audience, you have to have the plug-in. You have to have not only a single plug-in, but a connection to a network that’s responsive, a committee in place that will help you do work that you cannot make up from the beginning.

The second point is that there is another kind of celebration that is not hagiography that I think we were trying to reach for, and that is that the engagement in civic activity is rewarding, fun, interesting, worth doing....

HACKMAN: The “honorable profession” kind of thing.

MOSS: Yes, that kind of thing. And fun, you know, just plain fun. That kind of celebratory aspect also, I think, has to be in it because you can’t just lecture people, you can’t just face them with information. You’ve got to have a sense of excitement going in there as well. And I think we were striving for that.

STEWART: A couple of comments. As in many of these situations where we’re talking about things that happened in the 1970’s and even early eighties, I obviously have a decent perspective on sort of how it all turned out into the 1990’s because I stayed throughout that whole decade. And, to a certain extent, looking at what ultimately happened to these things is interesting in terms of whether it was a wise move or not a wise move in the beginning.

But several things: Larry mentioned the networking that Dan was able to do, which I absolutely totally agree with. And I saw that in spades. After the Library opened in 1979 and for the first, you know, time that Dan was here until 1986, I mean he was very, very valuable in terms of the development of all of these public programs because of the people he knew around Boston.

And not to brag at all, but I have long been convinced that the only reason I was able to carry all of that on and do it, I think, fairly successfully, was because I learned so much from Dan and got tied in with so many people and organizations in those first seven years. That after Dan left, I was able to pick up on that and in many, many ways sort of expand the network and develop new relationships and so forth. So it worked quite well from that time,
at least until I left.

The other point is about this whole business of.... Well, two things. Number one, going back to the Community Visitor Program, which obviously I agree with totally was successful. I made a couple of somewhat feeble attempts to revive that in the late eighties or early nineties. And for a whole bunch of reasons was never able to do it.

But certainly one of the reasons I was never able to do it was that there was always a decent amount of resistance within the Library. To be specific, Chuck Daly, for example, and I think a number of other people on the Foundation board were not at all enthused about doing programs away from this building. Their notion, which I disagreed with, was that one of our main goals should be to bring people this building. I did develop a number of fairly extensive programs that took place in schools. But even in a lot of these, I met with resistance among both some people in the Foundation and elsewhere in the Library, who, as I say, would argue that we shouldn’t be putting too much into programs that didn’t take place physically in this building, which I disagreed with.

The other problem with so many of these programs, particularly the school programs, as Larry [said] like The Stroke of the Pen, which didn’t relate to Kennedy, one of the problems in sort of marketing programs like this is getting over that hurdle. And I don’t think in all the years that I was director of education I ever really did this adequately: getting over the hurdle that people had of just assuming that if it comes from the Kennedy Library, it relates to Kennedy. I mean as much as we used to promote our programs as political education efforts and all the rest, there was always a decent number of people who certainly didn’t believe it and just assumed that if the Kennedy Library was doing it, it related to Kennedy. We almost always had to sort of overcome that initial assumption on the part of people, that we weren’t sort of selling Kennedy or promoting Kennedy. That we really had a legitimate, serious interest in politics and the process and all the rest.

FENN: It was as though he were still running, that we were trying to sell him, Kennedy.

DAITCH: This might be a good place to do a little analysis about that, because it seems not unreasonable that you have a big fancy new building. Let’s have programs in the building now. We were only doing those community programs because we didn’t have a place of our own to have them.

STEWART: No, that’s not true.

MOSS: Your point about we have the nice, fancy new building, let’s make use of it; it’s not as if we didn’t. We certainly did. There were many things that we-- and some things that did not fit our program either. I remember the big PEN meeting on the Hemingway Award that was given out here. This huge bash with pina coladas and everything else in the pavilion. Remember that, Allan?

GOODRICH: I certainly do.

[- 73 -]
MOSS: And there were a few drunk academics before the evening was over. So we did celebrate the building, with a vengeance sometimes, and make use of it. And I think John is right, that certainly in Waltham we couldn’t have done anything in that building, and we had to do things outside the building. That may have added a certain amount of energy to what we were doing because we couldn’t do it there, and maybe a little bit of imagination, I hope, how to do it in other places. But it wasn’t as if we were driven out and had no alternative. We could have stayed in that building and been nice little archivists and done nothing, and NARS [National Archives and Records Service] would probably have been quite content.

FENN: Oh, more than content. Relieved.

HACKMAN: Well, that could have been a rational choice and not just an easy or wrong choice. If you had decided that until you had a library building or at least you knew what its capacity was going to be....

MOSS: And a foundation in place to fund things.

HACKMAN: And so on. That would have been a rational approach.

MOSS: Yes.

HACKMAN: If you had processed, been able to process, more records then, processed more oral histories and whatever, that would have been an entirely rational approach, which might have left you with a considerably smaller backlog later on. So you wouldn’t have hired Larry Hackman who knew nothing about archives. You would have hired someone who would have been able to do a better job with the Robert Kennedy Papers or whatever. I don’t think it was a right or wrong there. And part of that reflected a lot, Dan, and John, and....

MOSS: The personalities involved.

FENN: Well, as I said at the beginning, it was on my part a choice because I wanted the first view that the community had of the Kennedy Library being a certain kind of view. And I was well aware of the fact that this wasn’t totally enthusiastically greeted either in Washington or, as we said yesterday, by some of the people here. And consequently it was, at least in those first years, vulnerable. So I thought if the community comes to expect a certain approach from the Kennedy Library, that’s going to tend to hold it in place.

MOSS: Not only, Larry, is that a rational alternative, but it was not an either/or choice. We got a helluva lot of processing done, too.

FENN: Well, we sure did.
HACKMAN: Yes.

FENN: Well, tell us about, just as examples of what some of the things we were doing, the Mishkan Tefila thing was a major undertaking.

HACKMAN: I can’t remember where.... I assume that the idea for doing that or the idea for doing something was from the Temple. Which seems like, even in retrospect, an odd match.

MOSS: It seemed to be weird at the time.

HACKMAN: Came out of conversations that Dan must have had with Chet Krentzman [Harvey “Chet” Krentzman] and Mort Godine and some of those other folks.

FENN: Must have.

HACKMAN: And it seemed to me that what we decided to do was to do something big, and I’m not sure why I think that was an important criterion. Maybe the better way to think about it is we looked for an opportunity to try out almost everything we could think of. And part of that was a case study approach to, using a case study approach to policy issues from Kennedy years that nevertheless had a current, then current, application. And to do some exhibits.

This is where, as I say, we were really flying by the seat of our pants. And even in doing exhibits, not to just try to do some of them ourselves, both in terms of scripting and finding artifacts, but going to all of the other presidential libraries to borrow some things, which was even more, I’m not sure what the adjective is there, whether it’s “cheeky” or “foolish,” but ultimately effective, probably, for what we were trying to do there. And then to premier The Stroke of the Pen film there because one of the opportunities that that gave us was to try that out on a whole number of levels and types of audiences. We brought in--I don’t know whether it was mostly high school or middle school kids--but we also used it with a number of adult audiences from the Temple community. So there was kind of a piloting aspect to that. And when I think of Community Visitors, we brought in, in effect, “Temple visitors,” I guess you would say, in spades. Because it was not only the case studies, but it was Liz Carpenter and Arthur Schlesinger. And I’ve still got my yarmulke at home, actually.

But, you know, there were a lot of presentations packed into that week when I look at the schedule. The only thing that surprises me about all of this is that given the pants that I was wearing in those days [shows photo from Festival Program], that anyone allowed me to work with them in these wonderful checked pants. [Laughter] [Several people speaking at once]

MOSS: We were all a little strange in those days, Larry. [Laughter]
FENN: I can tell you the genesis of it. Chet Krentzman was an old friend of mine. I think he was president of the temple at the time. And he said to me, “Is there something we could do with the temple?” But not just for the temple community, for the larger community [Inaudible], and promote it widely. So I got thinking about this presidential festival idea, dealing with all the presidential libraries. And it was a week, eight-day-long affair. It attracted over 10,000 people. And, as Larry says, amplified this with a wide variety of programs for everybody.

HACKMAN: When I look at one of the invitations for the programs, on the back, it says, “The honor of your presence is requested on Saturday, the 5th of April, dah dah dah, champagne reception and preview, a Festival on the American Presidency, sponsored by the Hoover Library, the Roosevelt Library, the Truman Library, the Eisenhower Library, the Johnson Library, and Temple Mishkan Tefila, with the special assistance of the John F. Kennedy Library.” We were doing this for the presidential libraries. I mean that was.... [Laughter] [Several people speaking at once]

STEWART: Whether they realized it or not.

MOSS: It’s either brilliant or insane. [Laughter]

HACKMAN: That’s exactly right. Well, those two often go together. I don’t know what all of that adds up to, but there’s a lot in there that shows, I think, what we were thinking about at the time with the case studies and the film and the speakers. All of them came without fees, of course.

MOSS: And there was an opportunistic aspect to it. It was a horse we could ride, barely. [Laughter] It bounced around on us some, but it was going in the right direction, and we could ride it. And in for a penny, in for a pound. Take it as it would go.

HACKMAN: I also noted that one of the little exhibits that we did there, naturally, was on Truman or the presidency and the creation of the State of Israel.

MOSS: How did that get worked into it? Because I got saddled with doing that exhibit. And I don’t remember exactly why.

HACKMAN: I suspect that came from the temple people who said: if we’re celebrating the presidency, and it was regarded as a celebration as well as other functions, other purposes....

MOSS: I remember being, you know, feeling very awkward about it because I’d always been ambivalent about the whole thing. But went through with it and tried to put as honest and clear and as uncontroversial a face on it as I could.
HACKMAN: Yes, yes. Dan should comment on this, but I would only say…. You know, when I was trying to raise money at the Truman Library, one of the first and most important alliances that I created was with the Jewish community--and a formal one with the Jewish Federation [Jewish Federation of Greater Kansas City]. We raised some money in Los Angeles to bring in a lecturer every year. We had Elie Wiesel and other folks who came through, and it’s still an annual partnership event. And fortunately the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of Israel came along right in the middle of our fund-raising period.

But certainly in a lot of the work that I did with that community there, I had in mind fund-raising and relationships with really the key leaders in the cultural community--a lot of them are in the Jewish community in Kansas City. And they also, you know, the Soslands gave us a million dollars, and H&R Block, or Henry Block gave us a half million dollars, and there were other gifts. So my question really is whether in any way doing this in any way with Temple Mishkan Tefila also had any fund-raising at all in mind. Or maybe that applies to a certain extent to Community Visitors and other things. Were we developing, not just serving, but developing alliances or relationships that would be helpful down the line in any resource way or programmatic way.

MOSS: I can’t help you on that because, you know, fund-raising and so on was so far from my mind or my intention that I don’t think I ever gave it a thought.

HACKMAN: Well, it certainly wasn’t in my mind; that’s why I referred to Dan.

MOSS: It’s a reasonable thing to do. [Several people speaking at once]

FENN: We ought to talk about money at some point here. But money was not--that wasn’t something which we were worried about. And it’s interesting because when we did, when the Foundation finally got established, I never made the connection, you know. Well, gee, we’ve got this crowd at Mishkan Tefila. Why don’t we make sure they’re on the list. So that wasn’t on the screen. Well, of course, there wasn’t a screen.

HACKMAN: Yes.

MOSS: Well, I think it’s fair to say that we were interested in developing an interested constituency for if we were trying to sell civic education, we wanted people who wanted to buy the product.

FENN: Well, they’re still talking about it at Temple Mishkan Tefila. And it cut a wide swath. We started off with John McCormack, didn’t we?

HACKMAN: I know that John McCormack was one of the speakers, and we had John Dunlop and Liz Carpenter and Lee White. Daniel Patrick Moynihan gave the keynote. And Bert Rhoads; he was the star of the week.

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FENN: Yes. [Laughter] We did purposely.... We had an afternoon program for seniors, I think, with Dave and somebody else doing something.

HACKMAN: I think Dave and John McCormack maybe were together. “A Bit of Nostalgia,” Senior Citizens Day. A women’s day. That’s the way the temples break up their programs. [Laughter]

MOSS: I don’t know who made the mistake of giving me *The Stroke of the Pen* to take to a local--the Needham Jewish Women’s Group on Purim. There was no audience. [Laughter] Somebody made a mistake.

FENN: *The Stroke of the Pen*.... Larry is just showing me a letter. I’d forgotten. It won a bunch of awards, didn’t it?

HACKMAN: Yes. I wondered about that, Dan. I was thinking last night about the people you knew. There was a fellow named Clark Abt [Clark C. Abt], Abt Associates. I believe he had MS or something like that. He was in a wheelchair when he came to the Library several times.

MOSS: He was at M.I.T., wasn’t he?

FENN: Well, he had Abt Associates. He came from M.I.T. And, believe it or not.... I’ve forgotten, how was he connected with this thing?

HACKMAN: He wrote a book called *Serious Games*. I still have it on my shelf somewhere. I don’t remember whether we talked to him because we were talking about using a case study approach.... That doesn’t sound quite right. But I later tried to do this at Truman with a guy from the Rand Corporation when we were planning some educational programs. But bringing in someone to talk about how we could--I don’t know whether it was the film or just case studies generally--how we could draw on his theories in what he was doing.

FENN: Yes, I still see him. He and I are members of the Old Cambridge Shakespeare Association.

HACKMAN: I don’t think it went very well. But it was indicative of the fact that we weren’t just trying to do it all by ourselves. And by bringing in like Envision and the mechanical engineer from M.I.T., there were a lot of people who, especially Dan was able to bring to the table, whom we always drew something out of, even if it didn’t go so well.

MOSS: Precisely. It added to the mix. Yes, sure.
FENN: I, because I knew something case teaching and case studies....

HACKMAN: Yes. [Inaudible] that’s why I ran into a dead end there.

FENN: Doing a fair amount of that at the Harvard Business School. The Moynihan story I can’t resist telling. He was in.... We were thinking about a wrap-up, keynote speaker, right? So Pat Moynihan seemed like a good possibility--an old friend. He was away. He was still in India. He was coming home, though. And I wrote him and asked him if he’d do this. Well, I didn’t hear back, naturally. I followed it up when he came back. He lived on Francis Avenue in Cambridge across the street from Galbraith. It was called the Road to India, Francis Avenue. [Laughter]

So I got in touch with him. Then I talked to him four or five days before, and I said, “Well, Pat, do you want me to give you directions, or do you want me to pick you up?” He said, “Oh, pick me up.” So he was sitting there in his living room drinking brandy, as was his wont, and I said to him, you know, just as you do, “Well, it’s nice of you to do this, Pat.” And he said, “Yes, it is.” So I said, okay, you S.O.B. So I didn’t say another word to him over to the temple, right?

When we got there, you should have seen the place. In the first place, they had huge spotlights all over the place. They had this row of flags leading into the auditorium.

HACKMAN: Mm hmmm. All the flags or whatever.

FENN: There was a mob scene. The parking lot was jammed, and there were cars, I think, on Hammond Street. And this reception line and all that stuff, and he turns to me, and he says, “Hey, this is a big deal.” And I said, “Yes, Pat, I told you it was a big deal.” So I gave him the shortest introduction I’ve ever given anybody. He was sitting there scratching notes on the back of an envelope. He had no idea what he was doing. I thought, I’ll fix your truck. [Laughter]

MOSS: I think my Pat Moynihan story is on tape in the interview. But I remember interviewing him in his office over in Cambridge. And somewhere along the line he asked me what this oral history we were doing was all about. And I very tendentiously said, “You know, we’re trying to come at the events and people of the time from many different points of view, hoping to zero in on the elusive truth.” He howled. He just said, “Ho! Ho! Ho! Ho!”

FENN: Was he sober?

MOSS: Yeah, he was sober. He was quite sober. [Laughter] He disdained my rationale so completely; it was wiped out.

DAITCH: Before we leave these outside events, the community programs and that sort of thing.... Obviously you’re all passionate about the notion of the value of these events, maybe a few comments about how....
MOSS: They justified our being. [Laughter]

DAITCH: That wasn’t what I was looking for.

MOSS: We had to be right about that or we were making damned fools of ourselves.

FENN: You want to say something about the B.U. thing?

MOSS: I hardly remember it, Dan, honestly. I remember working with the committee of guys from the B.U. School of Communications, and being very frustrated because we could never get coherence out of those academics to put the things in place, and had to sort of invent it and make the outline and make it gel. Then they accepted it and were willing to go along with it. But we didn’t get, shall I say, a whole lot of synergy out of that group of professors in doing it. We got the contents, we got the hall, we got the venue, but not a whole lot more.

STEWART: What year was that?

MOSS: Oh, ‘74? No, no, I’m sorry, it was....

HACKMAN: Joe Biden [Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr.] came up for that.

FENN: [Inaudible].

MOSS: ‘Seventy-two.

FENN: And this was for college students, and it was packed.

MOSS: The other thing I remember is that we had tried to line up Ted Kennedy, and he didn’t show, and there were a few people who were ticked off about it.

FENN: But that was ‘72.

HACKMAN: But out of that conference, didn’t that play into and match up with a book that that guy Craufurd [Craufurd D. W. Goodwin] was writing on wage-price policies?

MOSS: No, that’s a later B.U. Conference. And where Bill Barber [William Barber] from South Carolina was involved in that. That’s a later one.

HACKMAN: Maybe I’m confusing.... I’m confused. There was a fellow that we were working with at B.U., a young guy.
MOSS: And that, you know, there’s a vague bell there, but I’m not clicking on that.

HACKMAN: And he was trying desperately to be helpful, but he did not command the faculty or higher levels of the administration [Inaudible].

FENN: Well, Silber [John Robert Silber] was a pain on that thing because he.... Do you remember he sent somebody to see the size of the crowd? We had this reception afterwards or something with the main speakers, and he sent somebody up to see whether there was enough of a crowd and enough big shots for him to bother to come. I mean he was playing those games throughout the whole thing. So I’m not surprised.

MOSS: And I was spending so much time running around making sure that everybody was at the sessions and the sessions were going on time that I’ve got hardly any memory of the thing at all.

FENN: See, this is one of the things that really--the complexity of the details of putting on something like this, which you guys are much more sensitive to than I, was just horrendous. I mean I still talk to Neil Sullivan about moving those great back-lit panels over to the temple. And he and Jim Williamson [James Williamson] and Lockhart [David Lockhart], I guess. And Sue Berk [Susan Berk] said, “Well, now get these damned heavy things and bring them to Waltham, and we’ll put the exhibits on them and then take them to the temple.” And it never had occurred to Sue that maybe you could take them right to the temple and put the things on them at the temple. I mean that kind of stuff.

HACKMAN: Well, I mean I’ve learned a lot from those experiences, including all kinds of things I never wanted to do again in the rest of my life. [Laughter] Some of the arrangements. The arrangements work is the most unrewarding but essential part. And I think when I became a library director then finding the handful of people on the staff and volunteers whom you absolutely could rely on to get that stuff done was just essential.

MOSS: Back to the B.U. Conference for a moment. Just for the record, one person who helped me an awful lot because she was there to pick up a lot of bits and pieces was Brenda Beasley. She was sort of acting as my helper on it, and she picked up an awful lot. A young kid out of Regis College, I think, and hardly knowing what she was doing herself. But did a good job on it.

FENN: But the bottom line is, and I think John’s caveat, is very well taken that, you know, where did those things go? But, oh, yes, we had some things that didn’t work. I mean we worked awfully hard on trying to develop a senior program, and that never happened. But these things worked, and the B.U. Conference worked. Mishkan Tefila worked. A lot of press, a lot of attention. And a lot of real substance,
a lot of good stuff. And the Community Visitor thing worked.

DAITCH: I don’t believe that these things just disappeared after you moved into this building. Maybe we could talk a little bit about.... I suspect that they morphed more than just disappeared.

FENN: Well, I don’t know because I don’t know enough about what they’re up to now. Except I know that.... I mean the first, now we’re sort of getting into the stage where we were in this building, but the first programs that we did here were the Boston 350, right? That set of forums celebrating the 350th founding of Boston was a part of a year-long set of programs in the city. And that was the first of the public forums for the general public, the history of Boston politics. And that has certainly continued in spades. I mean the stuff that they’re doing now with the speakers and stuff is....

MOSS: I think there was another thing that happened, too, at least from my point of view, that there was an almost self-conscious greater separation between the archival side and the education side in terms of doing things, what we were spending a lot of our time doing. Not in the sense that we didn’t cooperate with each other or that there was any split there. But I remember after coming into the building spending an awful lot more of time on things like the National Security files, the tapes, the general processing, organizing the processing, overseeing the processing than I ever had in Waltham. It just seemed to me that my focus shifted, even though there were occasional things that I nodded into on the educational side, that it became much more of a.... Maybe it was because we had a nicer research room and began to have some more researchers. It may have been that we were having more interest in the files. It may be that I knew the tapes were going to come online somehow, and we had to do something public with them. I was still pushing the so-called mandatory review of National Security classified stuff and getting nowhere with it.

FENN: Well, you [Inaudible].

MOSS: All those things I know from the time we came into the building that there was a great preoccupation with the building itself. Up until the time of the opening and the opening of the museum, we were involved in the museum design and so on. But then after that, once we got into the building, I think there was a shift, at least in my focus.

STEWART: You mentioned a split between the staff and.... As you guys were talking about Mishkan Tefila and the B.U. Conference and a number of other things, I was trying to think, fairly specifically, about what I was doing in that period. Because I had almost nothing, nothing to do with Mishkan Tefila or the B.U. Conference. I guess I was there, but I wasn’t involved--or Community Visitors. And in this period, namely from 1972 to the time Larry left which was....
HACKMAN: ‘Seventy-five. There may have been a decision at some point, John, that given the fact that I knew nothing about archives, that it really made more sense to have Larry spend his time on special programs. And at some point I got that title. So that that was more for.... I have no idea what the time on this was. That’s what I was supposed to be doing.

FENN: Well, you [Inaudible]. So when I was going to set up this education program section, it was kind of logical.

STEWART: I don’t think it’s important historically. But at the same time I should say it, that it was during that period that a very significant sort of split and some serious disagreements, I guess, took place within the staff. I mean, again, I can remember very specifically, not necessarily me, but other people who because I was in charge, I was the chief archivist at the time, being somewhat resentful and unhappy with the emphasis that was being placed on these programs.

[END SIDE 1, TAPE 3]

[BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 3]

HACKMAN: It’s also in every single presidential library that I’ve encountered, I mean something like....

MOSS: I don’t doubt it is.

STEWART: But I’m not sure it’s endemic to presidential libraries.

[Several speaking at once]

MOSS: At the Smithsonian, the exhibit people and the research curators hate each other.

FENN: And very sympathetic. I mean I thought I was going to work in such-and-such an organization, and I find myself in such-and-such and organization. No wonder. And it seems to be diminishing my importance. And naturally people are going to feel that way.

HACKMAN: There’s probably also some, feeling’s not the right word, but some use of resources. I mean when we were doing Community Visitors, for example, some of the young women on the staff--I can’t remember what they were hired to do, but Barbara Williams or Williamson.
MOSS: Waters, Barbara Waters.

HACKMAN: Barbara Waters[?].

MOSS: Nancy Williams[?].

HACKMAN: Yes. And there was a woman from Colgate, a blond woman. I can’t remember her name. Somebody mentioned her last night; Donna Smerlas did.

MOSS: [Inaudible].

HACKMAN: No, she was there just a couple of years. But in others words, some of these programs were using some resources…

STEWART: Oh, yes, yes.

HACKMAN: …that could have been devoted to processing or oral history transcribing or maybe some other things. So I think that probably could have added to it.

STEWART: There’s no doubt about that, and you’re right. My only point was that that was sort of the beginning of the resentment among a lot of people on the staff; and that continued, as I say, in various forms and ways and, I guess, at times got even worse in terms of a problem within the whole Library staff. I have no idea where it is now.

MOSS: The same. But it’s not just professional. There are things…. Different people have different personalities and things they like to do and don’t like to do. And to presume that because I am working for a presidential library I need to get into all these things even though I would rather be an archivist is kind of a tug on loyalties and on participation and on value of participation that I think bothers some people. And I know there are people on the education side who didn’t want to do archives. Donna once thanked me that I did not pick her to be an archivist. You know, I interviewed her, and I felt really her heart was elsewhere. And I think both of us made the right decision. But it’s not cut and dried. It’s not neat. It’s a messy sort of thing.

FENN: It’s an inevitable thing that. You just have to do the best you can with them.

HACKMAN: One of the things that was harder, again, before you were a library with a building. One of the things that can help in this kind of situation is to have real clarity of mission and goals captured in something like what I think of as the upper levels of strategic planning. And that was hard to do for the Library at that stage of its development. But I suspect it might have been helpful to formalize the mission and
goals and critical issues, at the same time you were formalizing for the first time the structure, by having created something in the organization chart called Special Programs or whatever. [Several people speaking at once]

MOSS: Larry, I’m trying to go back and envision that staff getting together in committee and coming up with a mission statement. [Laughter] It would have lasted forever and forever and forever.

FENN: I articulated at least where I saw us going, you know, right from the start. But articulation doesn’t necessarily produce unanimous agreement.

HACKMAN: No. And this was a longer process.

MOSS: There’s a line from Henry IV. Glendower says, “I can call spirits from the vasty deep.” And Hotspur says, “Well, so can I. And so can any man. But will they come when you do call them?”

FENN: Allan ran the film festivals. I don’t know if he wants to just mention that. Remember the one in Connecticut, for example? Remember putting those things together?

GOODRICH: Yes, we ran four or five in the early seventies. Best one was at Wesleyan. Did one at Fairfield, Assumption College, a couple of others. That was part of our outreach program, getting materials out to the public. Let people see what they were and maybe get some use out of them.

FENN: Yes. And also we did some, in small local libraries we did some. You put together a packet, too, of film.

GOODRICH: Yes, we did that. Then we had that, remember that side tape show we did on the…. Prior to when we were still in....

STEWART: On the Library, you mean?

GOODRICH: Yes. When we were going to be in Cambridge.

HACKMAN: Cambridge Seven? Or Rusty Russell or whoever that guy was?

GOODRICH: Urban Image, I think that was.

FENN: Yes, that’s right. That shows up in here.

GOODRICH: We took that wherever anybody would sit and listen to it.
STEWART: We should spend some time talking about the development of the building plans and the first museum. I mean chronologically that obviously was the last thing that was done in Waltham.

MOSS: It certainly took a lot, preoccupied a lot, of time.

STEWART: And from the time the decision was made to build at Columbia Point until roughly, you know…. The exhibit planning didn’t get finished until what? approximately a year before the building opened. I mean there was planning going on right along.

MOSS: Up to the last minute [Inaudible].

STEWART: Well, the planning essentially got done by, I guess, the fall of ’78 or so. And the plans for the building were finished what? When did construction [Inaudible]?

FENN: Well, the groundbreaking was ’77.

GOODRICH: We started talking about exhibits in ‘75.

STEWART: So that’s right. I mean once the decision was made, as I say, then there was a period of a couple of years anyway when a number of people, including myself, were heavily involved in the planning of the building and the design of the exhibits. And that whole process was obviously of great historical significance because for better or worse it gave the Library this structure. So we should talk about that a little bit.

FENN: Yes, we should.

DAITCH: Absolutely. Before we do that, just in the interests of keeping a modicum of chronological order, can we talk about acquisitions? We’ve been talking a lot about the unusual, bold, imaginative programs that were different from what other presidential libraries were doing. And I have this wonderful quote that Allan found for me. Someone had asked Dan for the acquisitions policy of the Library.

FENN: [Inaudible].

DAITCH: And he said, “We’re interested in politics and government in mid-twentieth-century America.” Which gives us a little room to move. Then they asked, “What’s mid-twentieth-century America?” And he said, “Well, you know, sort of 1905 to 1995.”

FENN: That’s right. Because, as I said, Honey Fitz [John F. Fitzgerald] was in the Congress at the beginning of the century, and Teddy still is. So that’s mid-
twentieth century. This was Reed asking me for our acquisitions policy. Never went to the mat on it. So we were pretty eclectic in our collections, and Allan’s got a whole lot of stuff up there that I don’t think anybody’s ever going to look at.

GOODRICH: Yes, our director’s wondering why the hell did we get them?

FENN: How’d we get them, or why?

HACKMAN: Why.

GOODRICH: I think it’s all Dan’s fault.

FENN: Well, you’re right. I remember going to talk to Tommy D’Alesandro [Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr.], who was the mayor of Baltimore because he was on some commission or something. And so we’ve got Tommy D’Alesandro’s papers up there.

MOSS: I’d forgotten Clem Vose [Clement E. Vose].

HACKMAN: Yes, I thought about that just a second ago.

FENN: I guess my feeling was that we’ve got the space, which we had, who knows when somebody’s going to be interested in Elvis Stahr’s papers, the secretary of the Army. Better to grab them and preserve them than let them just sort of disappear. And so I was quite assertive about picking up as much stuff as we could pick up. Now, in retrospect, I mean I don’t know how you deal with this question. Because who knows what a researcher’s going to want.

MOSS: It’s also in the context of competitiveness among collecting institutions. And the Hemingway Papers is the perfect example. Do they belong truly in the Kennedy Library or in some academic library somewhere. And probably the latter is where propriety suggests they should be. Totally off—it’s on the subject, but it’s an aside. At the Smithsonian I’d had a wrestling contest with the Library of Congress. And Billington [James H. Billington], who was then the librarian, was insisting that the Smithsonian should only collect realia. And so my retort was, “And the Library of Congress collects un-realia.” But there was that, why should the Smithsonian collect anybody’s papers because that’s what the Library of Congress was supposed to do. They were dealing in texts, and we were dealing in objects.

And I think people work that way. They like to think in neat little blocks of demarcation that don’t exist in the real world, especially in a competitive world where you can fuzz the boundaries all the time. And I think we were deliberately fuzzing the boundaries. I think we wanted that broad base of, as broad a base as we could get, not just to augment our collections, but to be the foundation of this thing that Larry was talking about earlier, this sort of civic education thing. Only with a rich set of resources can you spring
from that to do good programs. And we were looking for every opportunity we could to get our hands on anything we could.

HACKMAN: That really seems to me one of the most poorly thought-out pieces of what we were doing. In fact, to do good civic education, you didn’t need the papers of a miscellaneous, ill-defined set of actors all over the place from a long period of time. One of the things we lacked at that early point, when we were starting to do this kind of thing, was we did not have an archival presence or an archival leader on the staff who was knowledgeable enough about the archival community, its values and ways of doing things, who could speak back to Dan or could speak in a well-thought-out convincing way that would help draw the boundaries and look at particular situations in a less “we’ll-take-whatever” sort of way.

Of course, I came to feel that when I went to NHPRC and got to really know the archival community in and around the country. And then when I went to the New York State Archives and so on. The idea of presidential libraries coming in without consultation and sweeping up whatever without careful thought on their part as to why they were doing it...

MOSS: Vacuum cleaner approach.

HACKMAN: ...really, really upsets a lot of people. And it’s not competition. It’s not, if you really understand the archival perspective, it’s not competition. It’s logic as to where things primarily should be if there are institutions that can take care of them. It’s more an issue of intellectual provenance and relationships. It’s why the European archivists think that Americans are crazy in the first place to have presidential libraries because you don’t [Inaudible] these....

MOSS: Or any manuscripts collection, for that matter.

HACKMAN: That’s an area where I think we did not really think carefully about what we were doing. And our instinct, which was so, which I loved overall, which is let’s get stuff done and let’s try new things, didn’t serve us as well or the community well. Because we didn’t frankly draw in enough good advice and wrestle with it.

MOSS: I think I’d have to agree with that, Larry.

[Several people speaking at once]

FENN: My approach to this was Sam Gompers [Samuel Gompers]. You remember when people said, “What does Labor want?” and he said, “More.” And not belle lettres, the Hemingway thing, which was very competitive.

HACKMAN: That was different because we didn’t go acquire that. We inherited that.

FENN: Yes.

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MOSS: Not only that, but Herman Kahn thought it was a wonderful idea and said so in a memo.

FENN: Did he really?

MOSS: Yes, there is a memo in the file in which Herman Kahn says, “Of course, the Hemingway Papers are a national treasure. They should be in the National Archives system.”

STEWART: He said, being even more specific, that there was only one Hemingway, and Hemingway has a status among American literary figures that, whether you agree with it or not, is unparalleled in the twentieth century. So therefore we should take the Hemingway Papers.

HACKMAN: Herman wasn’t really an archivist. He was a manuscript curator.

MOSS: Yes, yes.

STEWART: I essentially agree with Larry and with Bill and Dan, what they said about how the acquisition policy happened and so forth. And I will take as much blame as anyone wants to put on me for being part of the erroneous thinking on this. At the same time, if you’re historically sort of assigning blame, you have to put a decent amount of the blame on our compatriots at the National Archives. I mean they knew, they knew what the hell we were doing in this whole acquisitions area, and I certainly don’t ever remember anybody saying, don’t do this or don’t do that.

HACKMAN: Yes, but, John, you didn’t listen to them on anything else. [Laughter]

FENN: I’ll say we didn’t!

STEWART: No, but I don’t remember having discussions with Dan Reed and other people about this. And I don’t remember their ever seriously....

MOSS: John, to be fair in this, they articulated their worry, but they did not articulate the other rational point of view very well. Not even Dick Jacobs [Richard Jacobs], who was good at it.

FENN: He was good.

STEWART: I mean they didn’t.... Well, again, it’s a fairly minor point because it only relates to who was really at fault or who was really to blame, if you will, for this erroneous policy. My only point is that it was all of us.
HACKMAN: Absolutely.

STEWART: Plus it was people at the National Archives. Because in this one area they did, in fact, have something presumably to contribute to the whole discussion. And whether they...

FENN: They never really engaged in this discussion.

STEWART: ...did it by default or whether they actually agreed doesn’t really matter. The fact is they never seriously tried. And this is true on a number of things.

[Several people speaking at once]

MOSS: And it extends beyond the papers and spills over into the oral history collection as well.

HACKMAN: This is the history of the presidential libraries. They have views on things. They don’t work them out well. They don’t challenge directly, but they’ll talk about it behind you. And sometimes they’ll raise it with you. But they don’t really....

MOSS: Engage.

HACKMAN: They don’t really engage because they could have said....

FENN: Let me just say Pat called me one time and said, do we want the James Earl Jones Papers? And I said, “No, no. One collection, one belle lettres, but we’re not in that business. We’re a political archive.” So that was the end of any.... I mean I didn’t get any pressure from it. But, okay, so you got Tommy D’Alessandro’s Papers.

STEWART: We don’t have them anymore, I don’t think.

GOODRICH: We gave them back to Baltimore.

HACKMAN: The City of Baltimore, at that very point, was struggling to try to create any acceptable city archives, which we gave a grant to as soon as I got to NHPRC. And here the mayor’s papers go off to Boston. Well, that’s not useful if you’re trying.... Good government is good archives.

MOSS: Yes.

HACKMAN: And access to the citizens who that official is accountable to is by and large where the records should be. That’s different from Walter Heller [Walter W.
Heller] going off to Washington and being a member of the Council of Advisors. But for a mayor or a congressman or whatever...

MOSS: And, you know, we definitely tried to collect a number of papers of senators who were associates, that we thought of as associates of JFK and saw in the same general political grouping. And there was some justification on that. But the question is whether the state pull is a stronger one, the state rationale is a stronger one.

HACKMAN: It’s not a question of pull. It’s the citizens who elected them and to whom they’re accountable to is what....

STEWART: I don’t think we ever went after papers of non-Massachusetts senators, did we?

GOODRICH: We had Ribicoff [Abraham A. Ribicoff] for a while.

MOSS: Yes, Ribicoff for a while, but [Inaudible] was a mistake.

[Several people speaking at once] Moynihan’s.

FENN: He was his usual cute self on that one. We had them; then we didn’t. Tip’s [Thomas P. O’Neill] papers we had, but then they went to the B.C. When B.C. set up the O’Neil Library it was clear he wanted them there but, I guess, B.C. was hesitant to ask. So I went to Father Monan [J. Donald Monan], B.C. president, to get everyone off the hook, and worked out access.

HACKMAN: Well, I mean Tip O’Neill’s down the street. That’s absolutely legitimate.

MOSS: That’s still within bounds.

GOODRICH: Absolutely.

MOSS: Smathers would have been out of bounds.

FENN: Okay, you’re living, Allan’s living with the legacy of this policy. What do you think? Have you got a lot of stuff that you [Inaudible].

MOSS: Have you got anything left that is as aberrant as the D’Alesandro or Ribicoff Papers?

GOODRICH: We’ve got a few collections we would love to send somewhere else. We’ve just de-accessioned Gregory Wolfe’s Papers (Wolfe was the general mediator for the construction of the DC-VA-MD subway). [Inaudible] the
papers we got from him are all his papers having to do with his [tenure as] president of Oregon State University [Portland State University].

FENN: You didn’t get the federal mediator papers?

GOODRICH: No. We got what he had, which was Oregon State [Inaudible] transfer them back to Oregon. And Baltimore was extremely happy to get D’Alesandro’s V.

FENN: So you started the....

GOODRICH: We were happy to get rid of them. [Inaudible] tell us they were so moldy. [Laughter]

FENN: So you started a de-acquisition policy.

GOODRICH: No, not a policy. Just a case-by-case basis.

FENN: But, you know, maybe this is the argument that it wasn’t erroneous. I mean you can give them back.

GOODRICH: No, it’s not erroneous.

MOSS: That’s a little specious, Dan, you know, to say that if we hadn’t taken them they would have been lost, which is the implication. And that’s not necessarily true.

HACKMAN: There certainly would be some borderline calls. This is not a black-and-white area.

MOSS: Right.

HACKMAN: But where there were borderline calls is where you would want a process that said we really need to talk to some other folks about this. And without that, what it meant.... When I did this when I was out doing oral history or going out to get Heller’s papers or whatever, you walk in, and if you see a bunch of stuff, like the Oregon State stuff, you don’t really have the basis to say, “That just doesn’t belong here.” And if you’re not willing to separate them or do the right thing, we can’t take the other stuff.

MOSS: And this goes back to your comment about not having a good feel for the archival community. I think in defense of NL and the National Archives, there was a sort of gentleman’s agreement in the ethos that you don’t step over this line. It was not articulated as policy. It was not consciously developed in training of
people. It was not consciously confronted in engagements with the individual libraries in a way that... Because they thought it was such an endemic gentleman’s agreement in the ethos of the community. And I think, you know, they suddenly came up against a strongly acquisitive presidential library and didn’t quite know what to do with it except to complain.

HACKMAN: Well, there are collections like that at Truman and Eisenhower, too.

MOSS: Yes.

HACKMAN: This isn’t the only.... I mean, you know, there....

MOSS: But the point is taken, I think, in terms of looking at the total picture of presidential libraries and this one rationally and carefully, you have to say that more conscientious judgments in acquisitions should be made, and they should be made on precisely the kinds of grounds that Larry was making: Where do the papers organically best belong? Secondarily, where are they best taken care of?

FENN: Well, that one, I’d rather have my stuff here than in Boston University because allegedly they don’t have the resources.

HACKMAN: But that’s one of the two worst examples in archival affairs in the United States. Or, B.U.’s the worst.

FENN: The other two.... I’m interested in Allan’s point that he’s not sure of what’s erroneous and not being defensive about those things. The other two things that I remember being told was, one, you keep a person’s papers all together in one place. Because if somebody wants to do some work on Gregory Wolfe, they know whether it’s Kennedy-related, whether it’s to do with the work he did on the Metro as a presidential appointee, or whatever. And the other one is that Kennedy-related people, if you’re working on a Kennedy issue, the more accessible they are in one place, the easier it is for the researcher. Now, I don’t know.

MOSS: These principles get fuzzy sometimes. At the Smithsonian I ran into an archivist who was arguing with an art museum director that the papers of an art collector, Hirshhorn [Joseph Herman Hirshhorn], should be all kept together. The museum director was saying, no, the records pertaining to the paintings are like a personnel record that belong to that painting, and they go with the painting wherever it may go. So these principles are not hard and fast.

HACKMAN: No, as a matter of fact there’s been a big shift. Dan is right. In those days, archival methodology said, each person’s papers together. Now it’s much more acceptable to split the papers between the Oregon State papers and the Kennedy Administration papers or political papers or whatever.
MOSS: Depending on where functionally they fit.

GOODRICH: No, but if we had Wolfe’s Kennedy-related papers, we would have kept them [Inaudible]. I still believe in keeping a whole corpus of a person’s work.

HACKMAN: I think you can argue that. Although most researchers do, in fact, [Inaudible]. [Several people speaking at once]

MOSS: I would ask the question, Allan, is anybody going to study Wolfe, or are they going to study the things that he did? If you’re going to have a great biography of Wolfe, then, yes, you’re right.

HACKMAN: Right. Most research is not biographical.

GOODRICH: [Inaudible]. [Laughter]

HACKMAN: We’ll place our bets.

GOODRICH: [Inaudible] are going to have to have some subject to write about.

MOSS: But do we bend ourselves out of shape for some remote possibility?

DAITCH: In fairness, I think we should say that I think it was probably John who wrote, you know, just in some report or another, and at least it paid lip service to the notion that you go after the documents or the collections that are reasonable for this Library, and, you know, work with the others [Inaudible].

STEWART: Yes. And I think we always felt that we what? We were being reasonable except when we were being a little naughty, I think, was the prevailing attitude.

DAITCH: And you’re saying that you were aggressively going after these papers as opposed to just waiting until they came to you?

MOSS: Opportunistically. Opportunistically, surely.

FENN: Oh, yes.

HACKMAN: [Inaudible] doing oral history interviews where you’d be interviewing someone, you’d develop a relationship, and then you’d....

MOSS: Say, “What about your papers?”

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HACKMAN: Yes. Can we look in the closet there, whatever?

FENN: Yes, and we did.... I mean I remember going after the papers of presidential appointees and political journalists. I mean it wasn’t just sort of anybody. And I’d go through the Congressional Record. And this guy is on this commission, Herschel Loveless [Herschel Cellel Loveless], whatever. And I’d go after the papers of people who.... Now presidential appointees, you’re talking about nominated by the president, confirmed by the Senate. So you’re talking about three or four hundred at any given time. More, over the course of the three years.

MOSS: Yes, let me give an example in oral history. I did an interview with Dr. Peter Hamill [Peter V. V. Hamill] who was the executive secretary of the Surgeon General’s Commission on Smoking and Health. That interview would have much better been done by an NIH historian than by me. But I had the opportunity to do it. He was a neighbor of mine in Annapolis. He was angry about the whole thing. He might not have talked to anybody else. I’m not sure that it will ever surface and anybody else will know that it is here. But I think it is a good thing that it was done.

STEWART: It would be a very, very interesting exercise for someone at some point to trace the evolution of a lot of these concepts from the very start of the Library. I have before me a transcript of a press conference that Robert Kennedy had on Monday, January 13, 1964, when he announced the appointment of Eugene Black to head the fund-raising, as chairman of the trustees of the Kennedy Library, to start the fund-raising effort. And that’s early, January 1964. And in this press conference the attorney general talks about--and this was probably the first public expression of this whole notion--talks about the Library consisting of three parts: an archives, a museum, and an institute.

FENN: That’s the Institute of Politics. That’s the Harvard thing.

STEWART: Right. I mean it’s the Institute of Politics, but my point is that clearly, I mean the idea of three parts in a somewhat convoluted way is, even when the institute ceased to be a part of the Library per se, the fact of having a third part obviously stayed with the thinking. I mean it didn’t go away, and that’s what evolved into the public programs or eventually the education department.

FENN: But as I said [Inaudible] not because Steve said [Inaudible], not because I ever saw any of this stuff.

STEWART: Right, right. No, you’re right. You’re absolutely right. And it was your sort of independent thinking....

FENN: Which happened to be congruent.

[- 95 -]
STEWART: [Inaudible].

MOSS: It was also true, John, that when the institute sort of spun off into Harvard, it left a hole that had to be filled.

STEWART: That’s right.

MOSS: We were willing to look for good ways to fill it.

STEWART: I mean I certainly, for what it’s worth, remember that in a vague and probably minor way that being part of my thinking in the mid- and late-seventies. I remember one time there was some discussion about sort of the overlap between the institute and the Library’s public programs for educational [Inaudible].

MOSS: More specifically, because the institute became Harvard, it was academic, and it left the whole public education and the civic education thing open.

STEWART: That’s not true because the institute always had a public education component to it. When it was created, the whole idea of the institute was it would not be specifically an academic program. It would have a public component. A big deal was made of the fact, but it was never really got carried out, that the programs of the institute would not be restricted to Harvard students. I mean I’m almost positive, if you look at the history of the institute, some of those early statements very specifically talked about the programs of the Institute being open to undergraduates at the other universities in the Boston area, which, as I say, never happened in the Institute.

MOSS: Certainly not out into the high schools or into local community groups.

STEWART: No, but again in a vague way. Again, it’s not that relevant, but the Institute has branched off into a number.... Seven or eight years ago, the Institute undertook some kind of a high school program.

MOSS: Oh, okay.

STEWART: And the Institute.... I had a relationship with people at the Institute, and they worked on some of the programs that we were doing. The other important point in this document--and again I think it would be interesting to sort of trace some of these ideas through subsequent documents in 1964 and subsequent brochures describing the Library--is this whole matter of papers and materials. Robert Kennedy in this statement talks about obtaining all of the materials relating to President Kennedy. And talks about making a major effort, which has been started already within the government, to obtain all of the documents and records of any of the decisions President Kennedy made and how the “Bureau of Archives” is photostating all of this material and so forth.

But again, I mean the thinking about being all-inclusive and gathering as much
material as possible goes back in a somewhat vague way to these initial statements and this initial thinking. And again, that packet of documents from December 1964, I know has, on the other hand I can’t remember who wrote it, but I know has a number of references to a very, very broad acquisitions policy. Because it’s from that that I have always had the notion, and I know it’s correct, that one of the key decisions made about the Library after President Kennedy’s death was to have an oral history project, and to have a bigger and greater museum.

And again, Robert Kennedy talks about this. He talks about there will be separate booths set up and established so that an individual who comes to the Library wants to hear a particular speech may do so. If he wants to see a particular news conference or wants to see a movie on President Kennedy’s trip to Berlin, he’ll be able to go into a booth and press a button and see that.

MOSS: And we were still thinking about that when the museum was being designed.

STEWART: Again, my point is there were a number of things that were defined in those very, very early days, in December, January and February and so forth in ’64 that related to this museum, that related to the oral history project, and Robert Kennedy talks about that, and related to an expanded acquisitions policy to gather everything relating to John Kennedy’s life. So it was going to be a much, much bigger archives than had been imagined during President Kennedy’s lifetime.

MOSS: And at that time, I venture to guess, I do not know because I wasn’t there, that from a National Archives point of view, they wanted to cooperate rather than shape the thing.

HACKMAN: They didn’t think they could shape it. They weren’t probably taking [Inaudible].

[Several people speaking at once]

STEWART: That’s an interesting point. And again, I go back to, as I spoke about yesterday, this relationship between Herman Kahn and Arthur Schlesinger. I mean clearly, well, not clearly, but I strongly suspect Schlesinger was the moving force behind so many of these early ideas. I suspect everything that Robert Kennedy said in this January 1964 press conference came from Arthur Schlesinger. And Arthur Schlesinger talked to Herman Kahn. I mean this copy that I have is actually a note to Herman Kahn from Arthur Schlesinger, and Schlesinger’s handwritten note says: “Here is the attorney general’s press conference as you…”--well, I won’t go into it. Well, I will—“…as you can see, there is no mention of Dave Powers. So far as I can gather, this was a speculation made by Sandy Vanocur on his own initiative. Please return the transcript at your convenience.” So, as I say, my strong suspicion is that a lot of these ideas that the family and other people were talking about in those very early days came from Schlesinger with the very, very active cooperation of Herman Kahn at that point.
HACKMAN: That experience, Arthur’s perspective, would have been informed by trying to write biographies of FDR at the FDR Library which Herman had directed. So they both would have seen how much better... Of course the difference in part was, and it relates to what we were talking about earlier, there you have a four-term president. And here you’ve got three and a half years. And so taking someone’s papers who had participated, for example, and there weren’t many people, all the way across the Roosevelt Administration was quite different than taking someone’s papers who had been active in the life and administration of John Kennedy for a thousand days.

MOSS: I had one conversation with Dick Jacobs on this. You know sort of the way he would question: Why is Kennedy so important? And my answer to him was: Kennedy was the transition, the change after Eisenhower and this made him a pivotal figure, and that therefore he had to be studied very thoroughly in order to understand how that change came about.

STEWART: That’s an important point. And I can’t remember if I mentioned this yesterday or not, but so much of the thinking of the family, of anybody involved in the Kennedy Library, again in those very, very early months in December ‘63 and January, February and so forth of ‘64, so much of their thinking was influenced by this very, very emotional notion: “Don’t let it be forgotten that once there was a spot....” I mean this whole notion of Camelot.

MOSS: Unfortunately, they had to add that tag line to make it sentimental instead of serious.

STEWART: This was definitely true and there’s all kinds of evidence of this. I mean this was certainly a huge part of Jackie’s thinking as is indicated in the interview with Teddy White, a huge part of Robert Kennedy’s thinking, and a huge part of a lot of people’s thinking: that these people had obviously felt cheated because their administration was only a thousand days, and they were determined that history, the world, would never forget that these three years happened, and that John Kennedy was who he was.

This may be a little bit off the subject, but I’ve always been convinced that Robert Kennedy, among others, was just obsessed with this notion that the only way people are going to remember John Kennedy forever and remember what he did in the three years was to put it all in the Library and that would insure that people would never forget him. And never forget every little detail. I mean that was certainly behind the thinking of the oral history project when it was first announced.

HACKMAN: There were a lot of details that we didn’t get. [Laughter]

STEWART: And we want to get it on tape, get it on tape before the world forgets John Kennedy! [Laughter]
FENN: Much, much later I saw—I guess you must have showed it to me; I came across it somewhere—minutes of one of these meetings. Sam Beer was at it and Arthur was there, and Teddy saying something about maybe in a few years people will forget my brother, but the Library is there. The Library will serve to carry on and etc., etc. I can’t remember the phrasing now. It was a very poignant, very sad little statement.

DAITCH: Schlesinger must have had more of a realistic understanding of the real importance of Kennedy’s administration, the historical importance, because it was an incredibly eventful time.

MOSS: I think that’s true. But I think that Arthur is not really into this more emotional sort of legendary side of it either. Arthur can use history as what I would call an impressionistic portrait to suit his sense of the image. I think that’s the fairest cast I can put on it. It’s not exactly that he’s being dishonest as an historian. But he is certainly susceptible to making sure that the history he writes is written with the colors that he has chosen.

FENN: Yes, of course it’s true of everybody, biography.

MOSS: He’s careful in his choice.

DAITCH: I think this would be a good time to take a break, and then we can come back and talk about the shaping of this building.

FENN: Yes. One thing on John’s list you’ve got under Waltham, big decisions on National Security files.

MOSS: What big decisions were they?

STEWART: I don’t know.

FENN: Okay. [Laughter]

[END SIDE 2, TAPE 3]

[BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 4]

MOSS: Larry, let’s get on the record what we were talking about on the oral history reviewing thing, screening, because I think that is worthwhile getting on now before we go into the museum building.

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HACKMAN: I don’t really know anything about it beyond what John just said. I asked the question about, or one of the things I’d be interested in hearing about, was screening of oral history interviews because I don’t know that it’s done in that way at any of the other libraries that I know about, although there may be something like that. And John was talking a little bit about how that came up with concern by Helen Keyes [Helen M. Keyes] and Dave Powers and so on.

It seems to me that that probably is a good example, not only for understanding the oral history project, but on the broader issue of access and on the broader issue that we were talking about yesterday, which was the direct hand of Kennedy people from outside the Library, or the feeling that the staff might have had that the hand was there ready to do something, whether it did or not.

STEWART: And the story is, and Dan was obviously involved in this, that the Library opened an oral history transcript--I can’t remember who was.... It may have been [Inaudible].

MOSS: Smathers.

STEWART: No, no, no, no. This was sometime after that. But the Library opened an interview; and I can’t even remember what the comments were in the interview that someone found objectionable. But in any case, Helen Keyes and Dave Powers, maybe it was just Helen that signed a letter, wrote a letter to Burke Marshall, who was head of the screening committee, very specifically suggesting that the screening committee review oral history transcripts before they could be released.

FENN: This is before my time.

STEWART: Alright. Alright.

FENN: I don’t remember a thing about Helen Keyes getting involved in such matters.

STEWART: Burke Marshall called me up and said, you know, with their story. And I explained it to him, and as he pretty much knew, that these oral history interviews weren’t essentially under our control. The interviews were done, and then people sign a deed of gift, in which they either opened it or put some restrictions on it. And that was the process, that was the procedure that had been used from the time the oral history project started. That people, the interviewee, had the total right to say whether the interview should be opened or not.

But then, and Dan this is where you come in, but Helen and Dave really weren’t satisfied with that and still sort of insisted that there be some kind of review by the Library or by the screening committee. And sort of the compromise that came about.... And I know, Dan, you were involved in this.
HACKMAN: This was after I left.

STEWART: It was? That’s right. Yes. Alright. But the sort of compromise was that the Library staff would, in fact, screen interviews, would read them very carefully with screening criteria in mind. And if we found something that was objectionable, then we would call the interviewee and try, if we could, to persuade them to change their deed of gift to close that portion of the interview or to close the whole thing. I can’t remember whether there were.... I think it happened in a few cases that in fact we called people, although I don’t....

MOSS: I can’t recall a specific one.

STEWART: I don’t remember calling people, but I’m almost positive it did happen in a few cases that people either changed their gift, deed of gift, or I think in one case the person refused to change it.

MOSS: Look into the files, because there may be a cover letter from me going out to some interviewees, pointing to things that in the interview they might want to consider closing.

STEWART: That’s after the deed of gift had been signed.

MOSS: Not necessarily. No. This would have been before.

STEWART: Well, there were, as I say, there were instances. Because as we all know, many transcripts weren’t opened until years after the deed of gift had been signed.

MOSS: Yes.

STEWART: I mean people signed the deed of gift on the basis of, in effect, a draft transcript. And in many, many instances that draft transcript didn’t get turned into a final document for several years and didn’t get opened.

FENN: No, it’s amazing. See, I have only [Inaudible] Helen Keyes, what she had to do with it.

STEWART: Well, she has to do with it because, as I say, Dave--it was, I’m sure, Dave who took exception to some interviews were open. And, as I say, I have this faint recollection, I may be totally wrong, that it was Rosalind Wyman [Rosalind Wiener Wyman] in California, her interview, and I don’t.... She was talking about money or something about.... I don’t know.

GOODRICH: Well, it can’t be Wyman because I just spoke to her last week about getting
STEWARD: Oh, alright, alright. I’m sorry.

HACKMAN: Oh, I know the woman you mean, the other California woman. She came on our board at the Truman Library Institute. There were three women: Roz Wyman, Libby Gatov, and....

STEWARD: That’s who it was, Elizabeth Gatov [Elizabeth Rudel Gatov]. She became the treasurer. But she was a political person, and I’m almost positive it was she in her interview there was something that....

MOSS: Where does this fit chronologically with the Clay Blair [Clay Drewry Blair, Jr.] book, and, you know, Dave, being out of sorts with Joan Ellen [Joan Ellen Marci] for helping Clay Blair?

FENN: Yes, that was where each felt that she had been more helpful to Clay Blair than to other researchers. That was it. And I remember him speaking to me about this.

MOSS: Particularly in pointing him to the Inga Arvad affair.

FENN: Oh, okay.

MOSS: And I’m wondering, you know, if there was a heightened sensitivity on the part of Dave’s not exclusively related to oral history but to things in general.

STEWARD: Yes, yes. This happened in Waltham several times. It was after Larry left, and it was, you know....

HACKMAN: I sure don’t recall that.

STEWARD: No, I think it was.

MOSS: But there was a much more sinister thing down at the Johnson Library, as I mentioned out in the hall, where it was a person the rough equivalent of Helen Keyes who got onto Mike Gillette [Michael L. Gillette], who was the oral history interviewer down there, telling him there were certain questions he should not even ask. So there was something out there in the air that was: if we did not obey it, if we did not heed it, if we, as I said yesterday, walked warily around it, we knew it was there, and it could be troublesome and annoying if not something more.

DAITCH: But surely the outright asking you to screen oral history interviews and actively call people and suggest to them that they may not want this to be
opened seems to me to defy archival practice.

MOSS: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Oh, yes! [Laughter]

DAITCH: Just checking.

MOSS: Absolutely. Absolutely. But political loyalty is a funny thing.

STEWART: I mean so much of this, and this is a little bit off the subject...

MOSS: And personal loyalty is a funny thing.

STEWART: ...but it is related, I guess. Someone could write maybe not a whole book but certainly a very, very interesting article on this whole phenomenon of, for want of a better term, Kennedy secrets. And immediately after the assassination, you know, people obviously started to become interested in the details of John Kennedy’s life. And for many years there was anticipation, if you will, and then the hoopla over the publication of books about Kennedy always created a lot of controversy. And you can just go through them. I mean a woman named Mary Gallagher [Mary Barelli Gallagher], for example, worked in the White House, wrote a book about Jackie.

FENN: [Inaudible].

STEWART: It was very, very controversial because she talked about a lot of things that obviously the family didn’t want to have discussed.

FENN: Well, that’s always been.

STEWART: Evelyn Lincoln’s book and the whole controversy about Manchester’s book. Well, there have been controversies about Kennedy secrets, is the only way to put it, for many years. I mean starting with November 23rd and continuing in various forms almost to this day. And again, someone could do a very, very interesting analysis of how the whole thing progressed.

It related to a certain extent to Edward Kennedy’s political career. It related in many, many ways to the sensitivity of the family, the determination of the family to have the image of John Kennedy be preserved in a totally untarnished way. All of the discussion about his womanizing and medical history and all of this. But again, my point is that the whole thing has really evolved, and with each succeeding sort of period of time the standards have loosened and loosened and loosened. I mean....

[Several people speaking at once]

FENN: Well, people change.
STEWARD: Because people change.

MOSS: People look at the Library as an accessory after the fact.

STEWARD: That’s correct. And the Library has always been tied into this public mentality of the Kennedy Family’s sensitivity to publishing or making public the information about John Kennedy’s life, anything negative about John Kennedy.

DAITCH: And to a certain extent it sounds like, I don’t mean to be disrespectful, but it sounds like the Library staff was a little bit complicit in that.

STEWARD: Oh, yes. Yes, in a variety of ways. Not in any kind of a big conspiratorial way, but sure.

MOSS: When I first ran across the Inga Arvad things, I thought it was fascinating, and I thought, what the hell do we do with this stuff? I don’t know. So I don’t do anything.

FENN: It’s funny. If Dave ever approached me on these things, it was never--it was sort of raising questions. It was never demanding, it was never instructing me every time [Inaudible] better or anything like that. I do remember his concern about.... I don’t remember that [Inaudible] Inga Arvad, but apparently it did.

MOSS: Yes.

FENN: That some researchers were getting treated better than others. I can’t remember Helen Keyes ever talking to me about that.

STEWARD: I have a vague memory of it.

FENN: About any of that stuff.

STEWARD: It may be that she never talked to you but she talked to me.

FENN: Well, [Inaudible]. But at any rate, apparently it happened.

STEWARD: I have the letter, I think, somewhere in my files.

FENN: This is a letter from Helen and Dave to whom?

STEWARD: To Burke Marshall. Burke Marshall because Burke Marshall called me up. We had a good relationship with Burke Marshall. And Burke, I remember him calling me up and saying, “What’s going on? What am I supposed to do
with this? How did this all come about?” But the letter was very, very specifically a complaint that the Library staff was opening too much material without screening it. And it wasn’t simply a matter of they should have a procedure to screen it. It was a complaint about we had opened something that contained some negative stuff about them.

FENN: Why didn’t they talk to me?

STEWART: A very good question. Talk to you or talk to me or talk to someone.

HACKMAN: Because John was meeting with the screeners.

FENN: No, I understand that. But you’d have thought if Burke had taken it seriously, he’d have talked to me.

STEWART: Well, Burke only took it seriously because it came from Helen Keyes. No, Burke didn’t....

MOSS: He needed to have an answer.

FENN: I don’t think Burke knew who Helen Keyes was, did he?

MOSS: Oh, I’m sure he did. I’m sure he did. And Burke had to have the ability to answer them.

FENN: Helen Keyes, for the record, was before Bob Burke came and took it over. As the building moved along, she was the sort of executive secretary of the Kennedy Library Corporation.

MOSS: And she surfaced, I think, more often than we presently remember. Now that you’ve reminded me of what her role was, I remember the mention of her name far more times in conversations than we would thus far have indicated.

GOODRICH: Maybe we [Inaudible].

STEWART: I mean Helen worked for Steve Smith. Helen Keyes was, in reality, Steve Smith’s person in Boston.

MOSS: For the Library.

STEWART: For the Library. And again, this is another little I guess sort of interesting story historically, and I don’t pretend to know the whole thing. But the way that Steve Smith and Ted Kennedy and other people looked on the Library, particularly in the early seventies, was somewhat different from the way we all looked at it. I mean they in many, many ways sort of saw Helen Keyes and Dave Powers as working for
them, for the corporation, and certainly me. I mean I was always described, either orally or in writing, I was always described as a National Archives person on the staff of Kennedy Library. That’s how they saw me. I know that from after the fact. Helen Keyes certainly, Steve certainly, all of them saw me as an outsider of sorts.

MOSS: That’s what we were. Yes.

[Several people speaking at the same time]

STEWART: But there was the question of loyalty.

MOSS: Yes, exactly.

STEWART: An absolute question of loyalty. And there was a suspicion of at least my work.

MOSS: At the very least, they felt that we were not as sensitive to their sensitivities as we should have been.

STEWART: More than that, it was, well....

MOSS: I say at the very least. At the very least. It boiled over into occasional eruptions of anger, occasional eruptions of petulance, the kind of thing that’s in the letter that you mentioned.

STEWART: But the assumption was that people like me, and me specifically, I guess, do not have the interests of the Kennedy Library clearly on top. That my interest was the National Archives and not the Kennedy Library.

MOSS: And to a certain extent that was true.

STEWART: Well, it wasn’t true as far as I was concerned.

MOSS: It was true as far as I was concerned. Loyalty to Kennedy was the idea....

STEWART: Not Kennedy, the Kennedy Library.

MOSS: I’m sorry. I’m sorry. The idea was one thing, but to do these things was quite another. You know, to be loyal to the idea and the kinds of things we’ve been talking about earlier, the civic education and so on. But to be loyal to Dave Powers and his interpretation of it? Unh unh. No way.

FENN: You know, it’s interesting because I had a very good, helpful relationship with Helen Keyes until the question of hiring her at the Library came up.
STEWART: [Inaudible].

FENN: Well, no, no.

STEWART: Because you didn’t....

FENN: Yes, I did.

STEWART: Well, I mean you didn’t...

FENN: Yes, I did.

STEWART: All the while.

FENN: I did until the very end. And after the building was built, she wanted to work here. And going from Waltham to.... And I didn’t purposely, I mean I thought she was very good. And I talked to Steve about it. And she was good at some things. But I don’t remember arm-wrestling with her over any of this stuff. I mean Helen Keyes, come on. If the [Inaudible] concerned about something different than Steve is.... But, as I said, there used to be a hundred people running around. So I mean this obviously happened. It’s interesting that I don’t remember it. I’d have been pretty resistant to being told what to do by Helen Keyes, for heaven’s sake.

DAITCH: Just to be clear, she was on Steve Smith’s staff, but she was working at Waltham?

[Several people talking at once]

FENN: She was at 122 Bowdoin Street, which was the headquarters of the Kennedy Library Corporation.

MOSS: But I don’t think we should carry this conversation much further because we’re kind of wallowing in it. But it is another aspect of the same thing we were talking about earlier, and it was a fact of life. It was background noise if nothing more.

HACKMAN: This may be a transition to something else: I’ll be interested, though I wasn’t involved, in listening to you talk about the permanent exhibits and the replacement of the first permanent exhibits. Because I’m a member of the public, and I want to know what the Kennedy Library stands for. I don’t know anything about the archives or most of what we’ve talked about. I went down there yesterday, and I watched the people who were coming through that exhibit. The message is: nothing critical. No mistakes. Everything terrific. A legacy unblemished. And to the public, in addition to
being a beautiful building, that’s what you get from coming to this place.

That’s not different from what you get from most libraries. So it’s not being critical in a relative sense. But that just seems to me so obvious—that the institution itself, when it reflects, needs to either acknowledge that or to say that you don’t believe that that’s the case. And to me that puts the whole discussion of exhibits and whatever in some longer-term and broader context.

FENN: I agree. And I’m not going to comment on the current exhibit because I had nothing to do with it whatsoever. I remember working very hard on the first one; we ran every bit of text past Arthur to make sure.... We were careful to have no adjectives no judgments in those texts at all. The only....

MOSS: You have to put in that gratuitous slap at Eisenhower over the highway program, though we didn’t have that in there. I forget where it was, but in one of the panels there was a, yes, in the timeline, we had never put it in there, but Arthur inserted a gratuitous slap at Eisenhower as starting the interstate highway program and causing all our pollution problems.

HACKMAN: Well, if you’re going to introduce, as I think presidential libraries should, and I think the National Archives should insist upon, if you’re going to introduce academic review of the script and treatments and so on, you don’t do that with somebody who works on his staff. You do that with....

MOSS: We did not choose him.

[Several people speaking at once]

FENN: But these instructions are clear.

MOSS: The Library staff did not design the exhibit. We participated in it. But as I recall it, we sort of scoped out the outline of the script in the sense of the things that ought to go into it. What the rest of it evolved in a lot of give and take not only between us and the family and us and Arthur, but us and the museum designers that molded the thing into the way it eventually came out.

FENN: It was a troika with Ivan Chermayeff and the Library and Pat Lawford. And Pat Lawford was the family’s representative, and it was their project at this point. So any conflicts, she had to settle.

MOSS: As one of the younger Kennedys said to me once, “We’re paying for it, it’s ours.”

HACKMAN: As the Office of Presidential Libraries still says, “Well, we’re not paying for it, so we don’t really think that we can intervene.” And that’s one of the fatal
flaws of presidential libraries, I think.

MOSS: Let me come back to the one case where I feel I was overridden on the exhibits, and I don’t remember exactly the circumstances, but I think, Dan, it was in your office with Ted Sorensen present. I was trying to push for including in the museum an exhibit that did a comparison of Kennedy’s Third World foreign policy: the Congo, Indonesia, and Indochina as the examples. And my memory is unclear, but I think what happened was that Sorensen immediately changed the subject, indicating that he wanted to have nothing to do with it, and my horse just did not run after that. And I always felt that the kibosh had been put on it. Perhaps I was oversensitive. Perhaps I should have been bolder and pushed it harder. I still think it was a good idea. But nothing, nothing on those subjects ever appeared in the museum, and they could have been somewhat controversial.

FENN: I don’t remember Sorensen being involved in the museum.

STEWART: No, no, he was heavily involved. I think we’ve all got different recollections of this same event here! But let me just sort of summarize my recollection. I guess my earliest recollection is of a series of meetings that he actually held in a conference room up in the Corps of Engineers. And I don’t know if you were involved, Dan. It was soon after Sheldon Stern came on the staff. There were a number of people, and we talked about sort of the concept or the organization subject-wise of the museum. The one thing I specifically remember coming out of those discussions, and you may have been involved in some of them, is the whole idea of the timeline. That certainly came out, whether it was Dan’s idea or....

FENN: Well, whoever’s.

STEWART: Sheldon Stern’s or mine. But that idea evolved very, very specifically from those meetings. And I remember the documentation on this whole development of the exhibits, I think, is pretty good. I probably have a decent number of those files. I don’t know if there are others here at the Library or the Records Center. But a lot of memos kept floating around. The initial sort of dispute, if you will, the initial concern was that Chermayeff & Geismar sort of didn’t fully accept this notion of the museum exhibits telling a story. We even sort of went beyond that in thinking of the exhibits as a teaching device.

FENN: Absolutely.

STEWART: Teach people something in addition to telling them, you know, in sort of an academic sense the history of John Kennedy. So we always sort of had a struggle trying to convince the people at Chermayeff & Geismar of this. And their initial thought was to, and they eventually or fairly quickly got over this, but their initial
idea was to look at the objects, and they would spend a lot of time. And one of the initial ideas, for example, was to have a “Wall of Gifts.”

MOSS: Yes, I remember that.

STEWART: That was going to be right here at the entrance.

HACKMAN: I remember that.

STEWART: It was going to have all these little niches with these little things looking out.

FENN: I loved it, and I still love it.

STEWART: Actually it was Lem Billings, I think....

FENN: Who eventually killed that, I think.

STEWART: Eventually killed that. I never liked it because I thought it gave the absolutely wrong impression of what these gifts were all about to show this little wall. In any case, that was sort of the initial dispute, if you will. Then we wrote a plan, and then Chermayeff & Geismar--I forget the woman’s name who was there--sort of rewrote what we had written. And that eventually evolved into the plan for the exhibits, the topical and organizational plan.

But the one thing that I specifically remember Ted Sorensen having impact on.... And I can remember the meeting at Chermayeff & Geismar. I can’t remember exactly how in our initial conception we were proposing to deal with the events of the administration. It’s somewhere in my notes in the files. But in any case, at this meeting Sorensen came up with the idea of “Courage, Compassion, and Innovation.” He said, you know, you could take all of these topics, and you can divide them into three general themes: courage, compassion, and innovation. And that sort of eventually became the organizing theme of the whole section on the presidential administration. Courage was, in effect, the foreign policy issues. Compassion was the [Inaudible]. Innovation, among other things, included....

MOSS: Pablo Casals.

STEWART: Economic policy, the Peace Corps, and so forth. But that was, as I say, that was Sorensen’s big contribution. One sort of minor point: Dan mentioned Arthur Schlesinger as sort of the final editor of text in the timeline. I remember this very, very well. Because Joan O’Connor and myself--and there was one other person.

FENN: Was it Sam...?

STEWART: Sam Rubin. That’s right. Sam Rubin, Joan O’Connor and myself were, in
effect, handling or in charge of all of the texts, which was the big signboards underneath the exhibits, and then the specific labels on the exhibits, and the whole timeline. And for several months, we went through this very elaborate process. We wrote it, and then it would go to Chermayeff & Geismar. They had a so-called editor there who’d sort of critique it and make sure that the number of words were appropriate for the space and so forth.

MOSS: And somewhere in that evolution, other people on the staff saw the [Inaudible].

STEWART: That’s right. Yes. We were as expansive as we could in terms of people on the staff having their comments. And I guess Dan fairly specifically said that Joan O’Connor and Sam Rubin and myself were really the core committee to handle this. After all the staff comments and the Chermayeff & Geismar comments came in, we debated them and so forth. Then the final product went to Schlesinger for his final review. But I can remember specifically after the thing was all over, Joan O’Connor and I used to talk about this, thinking that, you know, Schlesinger didn’t change that much. Schlesinger’s real role was as a wordsmith.

MOSS: Yes, yes.

STEWART: Schlesinger would frequently come up with better words and better phrasing than we could do. And we certainly looked on him not as a substantive editor but as a wordsmith, with a few exceptions. Schlesinger, along with everybody, was absolutely determined that there would be nothing negative in terms of Kennedy and Vietnam in there. I do remember having one or two sort of disputes with Schlesinger about the phrasing of things in the timeline relating to Vietnam because this timeline went all the way up to ‘68, went all the way up to Robert Kennedy’s death. And I vaguely remember having to back down on one or two references to Vietnam, but nothing else. Certainly Schlesinger’s sense of what we were writing….

FENN: I remember basic initial struggles. Gee, I have such a selective memory; it all comes out on my side. [Laughter]

STEWART: No, it comes out of mine.

FENN: The basic struggle between Chermayeff & Geismar and us; I don’t know about the other presidential libraries. I know a little bit about the Ford one. There was a terrific amount of staff involved in this, and I always thought of it as a troika. And we had from the start of it this concept of this museum being a teaching museum, congruent with everything else we thought we were doing. Chermayeff & Geismar were saying, you know, what of the objects? I liked the Gift Wall because I thought it was rather interesting reflection of how people viewed the president that they sent all this stuff. But the family didn’t like it, and he did mock-ups and everything else.
And I remember winning some battles around this and losing some; we wanted to do this interactive exhibit, and Teddy liked that idea, too. Chermayeff & Geismar, he told Pat, and Pat didn’t [Inaudible]. I remember doing different roles of the president around the Oval Office, remember, with documents?

MOSS: I think because of the precedent at the Truman Library, it went over easily with Arthur, and that’s how we got that in.

HACKMAN: That was all that Truman had basically.

FENN: Well, it was something that everybody....

MOSS: We had ten roles, I think, instead of seven.

STEWART: I think we had twelve roles.

FENN: Twelve roles of the president.

MOSS: Because we had twelve windows we had to fill.

FENN: I remember very much Jackie’s involvement. There would be meetings at Teddy’s house on the Cape, and Jackie extremely--and at Jackie’s place, I think--Jackie was extremely interested in that part on entertaining in the White House. Totally disinterested in any of the political stuff. Geismar’s trying to--he had that fancy fiber optics thing for the election which never worked, and Jackie had zero interest in it.

HACKMAN: Oh, yes.

GOODRICH: Oh, it worked for four minutes.

FENN: Oh, it did?

GOODRICH: Yes.

FENN: Perfectly?

GOODRICH: Yes.

FENN: Oh!

GOODRICH: And then never again.

FENN: So that’s it.
MOSS: Allan spent a lot of time trying to tend that one. [Laughter]

FENN: And I remember *A Day in the Life of a President* thing and getting the Kennedy schedules, the Reagan schedules, you know, to throw the focus on the presidency. The Vietnam thing, I don’t even remember how we treated it. We didn’t do a helluva lot with it.

MOSS: You got out so quickly and so decisively that, you know, we just [Inaudible] among other things.

FENN: But it was in there.

MOSS: In passing. It was in the context of Robert Kennedy in 1968, I think.

FENN: Well, there it certainly was. The Vietnam thing wasn’t that big, the importance of Vietnam, in the Kennedy years, is what happened later and the escalation.

MOSS: Well, and the indecision over what really to do about Vietnam, and how to handle it, and whether it could be effectively fought as an anti-guerilla war or whether something else was going on there, which the Kennedy Administration never did solve.

FENN: Well, not only that, the problem wasn’t that they were indecisive, they were decisive. I remember Mac Bundy saying to me, “Hey, that strategic hamlet thing is working out just fine. Don’t have to worry about Vietnam.”

MOSS: Yes. Well, they had thought the program out of Malaysia and out of the Philippines. But it was beginning by 1963.... And the famous interviews not only with Cronkite [Walter Cronkite], but there was another television interview that he did, in which there was a good bit of ambivalence about what he was going to do. And I think that ambivalence stayed with him to the end.

FENN: Oh, no, except for McNamara and the [Inaudible].

MOSS: Yes, yes.

FENN: It’s a real struggle, though, with these museums because even if you try to be as objective and just tell the story and let people make their own judgments, which was certainly our goal, some things you’re going to select to put in, and some things you’re not going to select to put in. So there’s....

MOSS: It makes a difference.

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FENN: But, you know, I was, on balance, pretty satisfied with the museum.

MOSS: Well, we got a good product despite all that. You know, we’re pointing at the things that, well, certainly the things that I felt went wrong, that were left out, that distorted. To go back to what Larry was saying, the overall impression of being only positive, there certainly were people at the time who felt that. I remember something—David Barber, was it? from North Carolina or Duke?—an historian who came in to look at the exhibits, and I walked through with him. This was one of the guys who was very big on the personality of the president being important in voter decisions.

HACKMAN: Well, he wrote that book about personality types of presidents.

MOSS: But when he stood in the Office of the President exhibit and he turned around and look at the huge picture of JFK from the back, he said, “You know, that overwhelms everything else.” And he was objecting to the fact that it was such a powerful image that it left no room for dispute, no room for doubt. And I think it fits with Larry’s comment about everything is positive. And I think that even though we had a good exhibition, I think it was a good museum with a lot of variety in it, a lot of opportunity for teaching, a lot of different kinds of things in it that were good, I think it is true that it left that impression and is part of, in that way, the problem.

HACKMAN: But other libraries....

MOSS: Do it, yes. And when museums try to do it in an honest sort of way, as the Smithsonian discovered to its pain (both in the Japanese Internment exhibition and in the Enola Gay one), people will beat them about the head and shoulders, sort of, for being honest.

HACKMAN: I think we did a lot of that at the Truman, if you see the exhibit out there now, just by using different techniques, which is having them see the main interpretation, which we say very openly in the beginning of the exhibit, “This is only one interpretation.” It’s an interpretation that, as it was written, we did try out on a number of Truman scholars and they reviewed the whole thing and commented about it. But in each section there are also counterpoints; if you go over to the flip books you can see these. There were people at the time who had different perspectives. They didn’t think Truman was doing the right thing or doing it correctly. And here, after the fact now, is how some people think about it. So you get some basis for criticism rather than only one line.

And then on some things.... I mean the one, just like in the Enola Gay exhibit, people were most worried about with Truman, of course, dropping the bomb. So what we did was we took four slices, looking at the propaganda from the American side and the Japanese side, looking at the project to build the bomb and everything that had been invested in that, looking at the saturation bombing of Tokyo and the cities. So you got four different kinds of view or factors. And then we had a lot of quotes, in audio and in text, as to what people at the
time said about it, right or wrong, and what people subsequently said about it, right or wrong.

And then we have a big book for people to comment in. You decide, in your own conscience, about it. Ninety-five percent of the people say, you know, he saved my life or did the right thing or whatever. But there’s also plenty of room—and plenty of comments that people say about the legacy. So I think there are ways to do some of those things. But maybe it’s only an older library, that has no meaningful family involvement anymore, and almost no involvement by people from that administration, that really can afford for the first time to just do it.

MOSS: And that’s the same argument, in effect, as the problem with instant biography. You know, people were very critical of both Arthur and Ted Sorensen for coming out so quickly with their books, before the dust had settled, before the things had worked themselves out so that people could have a balanced view. And I think that’s part of what we were living with also.

The other piece of this, and it’s back to Chermayeff & Geismar, is that they were designer/displayers first of all, and that was primary to them. And there were cases where—and the specific one was the steel price crisis where their notion of the big cauldron, you know, tipping over the fiery steel was the image they had to have, but it wasn’t what it was about. That’s about steel production, not about steel pricing. But steel pricing is so boring with graphs and what have you, that they couldn’t accept the reality of it. It had to be something else. And there was that tension, I think, throughout. They really didn’t like, and I don’t know how they were forced to accept it, my little idea of the stacks of telegrams on the James Meredith [James H. Meredith] thing. They didn’t know quite what to do with that. It didn’t seem to them a sexy idea for a display.

GOODRICH: He didn’t know until you brought him out to see the visuals.

FENN: Yes, constant tension. Because although Pat was very aggressive, between Chermayeff & Geismar, on I guess a couple of things. In the first place, we knew what we were trying to do [inaudible]: the teaching, the politics and government. Were we totally successful? Did we win every round? No, we sure as hell didn’t. The second one is that even the Cambridge people, who were prepared to be critical and said that a museum has no place in an academic community, I don’t remember criticism that this was a big puff piece for John Kennedy. I don’t remember people saying that. I remember people saying, you know, they really liked it, and blah blah blah. But I don’t remember us being accused of doing exactly what the Cambridge people said we were going to do. I think it was well accepted, with the exception of that one....

[END SIDE 1, TAPE 4]

[BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 4]
STEWART: Just, I guess, in the interest of historical accuracy or whatever, I guess I disagree with Dan a little bit, maybe more than a little bit, on the relationship to Chermayeff & Geismar. I spent a lot of time with those people, particularly John Gradman, Keith Helmetag [Keith Helmetag], and a young woman whose name sort of escapes me.

FENN: Pam Smith?

STEWART: Pam Smith left kind of in the middle of the project, I think. And Milton Gwirtzman [Milton S. Gwirtzman], who was heavily involved in this, you know, in fact, as a representative of the family. Gwirtzman, for the record, was a fellow who has worked for Senator Kennedy; he wrote speeches and was an attorney. But he was asked by Steve Smith to sort of keep his hand in the whole thing and at times became a little meddlesome, but overall was very helpful, certainly as an intermediary between us and Chermayeff & Geismar. But, as I say, my relationship personally with the people at Chermayeff & Geismar was pretty good. But I certainly recognized, and it used to come up all the time, my own limitations in terms of understanding exhibits and understanding how to present information that I had in exhibit form. And I certainly saw myself, and I think other people on the staff saw themselves, as kind of the substantive people that relied on Chermayeff & Geismar to do the presentation parts of it.

FENN: The presentation.

STEWART: But there were some tensions when the way they were insisting it should be presented changed the substance, which it did on occasion. But I thought it worked out pretty well.

DAITCH: Was there anyone on the staff at that time who...? I mean, for example, did you have a curator by that time?

STEWART: A curator? Well, for better or worse, I was the lead person on the staff in terms of dealing with Chermayeff & Geismar. Now, at the big, high-level meetings with Dan....

FENN: Dave was usually at these...

STEWART: Dave was what?

FENN: Usually there.

STEWART: He was usually there. But in terms of the day-to-day substance of the thing, it was primarily Sam Rubin, Joan O’Connor, and me.

MOSS: Who was the guy who went to Connor Prairie and helped to site the early
STEWART: Oh, yes.

FENN: He was a pretty good [Inaudible].

STEWART: He was only there for a short time. Bob Ronsheim [Robert Ronsheim] was followed by… [Several people speaking at once] …Sam Rubin.

FENN: Let’s see, how do I sum up my feelings for it? I was always sensitive to the fact that there was not only tension between what we wanted and what Chermayeff & Geismar wanted. But you always had to be aware of the fact that there was a tension between those in the family and those associates who thought there should be a glorification of John Kennedy and those of us who felt it should use the Kennedy story for other purposes, which in my mind was the best way to perpetuate the [Inaudible], the legacy.

And, you know, we won some, and we lost some. If we were going to design that thing and pick the designer, which of course we didn’t, and didn’t have any concerns about the family and how they interpreted it, it would have come out differently. And there would have been some stuff that would have been in there that wasn’t.

MOSS: Not necessarily.

FENN: We sure would have had that decision exhibit in there. But on balance, I’m not unhappy with that, not unhappy with that. I didn’t feel prostituted, I didn’t feel violated by it.

STEWART: Maybe it’s not worth arguing about, but I think on the decision film, we tried. I mean I can remember going through a lot of potential schemes for doing that. And what it really came down to, I think I’m correct in saying, was no one at Chermayeff & Geismar could figure out a way to do it.

FENN: Oh, we figured out a way to do it. In the day-in-the-life way we could do it. But they would not do it, and Pat [Inaudible]. And Pat wouldn’t say…. And I never went up to the senator.

MOSS: It also had to do with the concept of the flow of people through the museum. It would definitely have been a halting place, a traffic jam.

FENN: That may have been why they didn’t want to do it.

STEWART: There was the whole issue that the film was not designed to be shown without a person there. That film was only....
FENN: We did use it, didn’t we, in the Day in the Life for a while with a person there? We did it with school groups or something. And we did show it in there.

STEWART: I may have done it a very, very few times.

HACKMAN: We had the same discussions. We did two decision theaters. We were going to do three, and we finally decided not to. We were concerned about the flow of people and how you can handle that.

FENN: Yes, it’s a good point.

HACKMAN: There has to be, you know, it runs every: one of them every thirteen minutes and one every twenty minutes. It’s not an easy setup. Probably the easier thing there was--I had the luxury of being the single person in charge. I was the only person they had to deal with--and the people I brought in. Whereas here you had more things you had to balance.

DAITCH: Well, now there’s something, you know, we haven’t filled the theaters in this library and the Truman Library [Inaudible], the theater presentations of films?

HACKMAN: We’re talking about two different things.

MOSS: Yes, two different things. The introductory movie is not what we’re talking about. We’re talking about the Stroke of the Pen thing and putting it in the museum and having people have that Stroke of the Pen experience within the museum context.

DAITCH: As an interactive?

MOSS: Yes, right.

HACKMAN: It’s the most formal or explicit teaching thing because it relates very directly to policy choices and jumps to current issues.

MOSS: And is self-explanatory as the presentation on the film is; it also needs preparation and a person on site to sort of nurture it through.

STEWART: I don’t know how this relates to all we’ve been talking about, but I think it has to be said that--and maybe we’ll hold it until we talk specifically about the design of the building--but obviously this building was designed with the museum in mind and with a very specific kind of museum in mind. And more specifically, this museum and this building were designed on the assumption that approximately 800,000
or maybe even a million people would come here every year. And that was an absolute total mistake. The attendance in the museum has, I don’t think, never been over three or four hundred thousand.

FENN: The first year it was about six.

STEWARD: Well, it may have been six the first year. But it has fallen steadily below that. But the result of that bad calculation, if you will, one very, very bad mistake was made, and that is to build two 250-seat theaters. The assumption was those two 250-seat theaters would be needed to handle the crowds coming in and showing this half-hour film on a regular schedule. What should have been done, I’m not sure. But we certainly didn’t need, at least for the museum presentations, two 250-seat theaters. On the other hand, we’ve obviously made great use of at least one of those theaters as a conference space after the building opened.

The other very, very serious mistake made in terms of the design of the building, the museum part of the building, was the restrooms. There’s a restroom at the beginning of the whole tour. But the next restroom you hit is when you come back upstairs. So a person in need of a restroom in the middle or second half of the museum has to somehow find their way out and all the way back to the beginning. It was a terrible, horrible mistake. Unfortunately, we’ve never corrected the second one.

DAITCH: In this calculation of the idea that you were going to have to be able shuttle a million people a year, does that date back to the Environmental Impact Statement on the Harvard site?

FENN: Yes. That said 800,000 as I recall.

DAITCH: And so no one recalculated or reassessed?

FENN: No. And it wouldn’t have been that high in Cambridge either. It would have been about.... I always figured, just pulling a number out of the air, about 30 percent higher than it is here; because it’s not a terminal destination. But it wasn’t recalculated for here.

MOSS: Well, certainly the whole traffic flow through the museum was designed on the assumption that you had to keep people moving and that they would only have a short time in front of each exhibit. And therefore it had to have the maximum visual impact in order to carry the message. And in that respect, even though I fault Chermayeff & Geismar for being more Macy’s window dressers than museum designers, they certainly were right.

DAITCH: Is that not also a function of, I may be wrong about this, but many people don’t linger over the museum. They wouldn’t anyway linger over [Inaudible].

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MOSS: I remember a big.... And this pertains to the Office of the President exhibit there where people who said, “People won’t stop to read documents, so you should never put up a document in a museum.” But they did. You know they did.

FENN: The other thing that you might, of course this stuff is so current, but in the Office of the President we played....

MOSS: Ross Barnett [Ross Robert Barnett] and Robert Kennedy?

FENN: Yes. Played a conversation that they, Ross Barnett and Bobby and JFK…. That gave it a real bit of life.

STEWART: Another sort of a design issue, if you will, was this whole matter of docents. I can’t remember the point at which we started talking about the value of having people, staff, physically in the museum to help people, to explain things and to help people. And it was, in retrospect, a good idea. On the other hand, Chermayeff & Geismar never accepted that, never bought that. Their absolute assumption was that this whole presentation was totally self-explanatory. And therefore nothing, nothing whatsoever, was ever done with the thought that there would be a docent there.

[Several people speaking at once]

STEWART: As a result, we nevertheless plowed ahead and had a staff of docents....

MOSS: Yes. Blazers.

FENN: Blazers.

STEWART: And their big function, the way it was designed, was to be to sort of introduce the exhibits. So there would be a person standing at the first exhibit that would give a little welcome to the exhibits, and there was a big picture of the whole family. And that was the first little talk, two or three minutes, that the docents would give. But then the idea was that these docents would “interact” with visitors at various points along the whole exhibit trail, and that never happened. Never happened in any serious way, in part because it was never.... There was no sort of room for it. It’s just an awkward thing for a docent to strike up a conversation with a visitor, and visitors never seriously questioned docents about anything.

MOSS: They sort of withered away.

STEWART: Yes.
FENN: Yes, it was all tied up with the idea of a teaching museum. And so we hired two or three people: Lisa Pruitt and Steve Knott [Stephen Frederick Knott] particularly. And we did docent training in how to use it for this purpose. But John’s right. It just never worked.

HACKMAN: It’s pretty demanding, you know, to have docents who are going to be able to speak to the senior citizens’ group and then go to the fourth graders with their teachers who haven’t prepared. Especially if you’re going to have a number of stops so that you’ve got all of the stops and someone at each.

MOSS: And I can tell you from the Colonial Williamsburg experience that the emphasis has gone away from the adult visitor to the children. The docents or the interpreters, if you will, are all focused on the children and trying to give the children a good experience so the parents will say, “The children were pleased so we’ll come back.” And they don’t talk to the adults anymore. They don’t talk seriously to the adults.

FENN: Is that right?

MOSS: No, no. And people are complaining about it. So this is to emphasize Larry’s point: In order to have a good docent program, you have to have a range of skills and a range of abilities to deal with the different levels of education and different kinds of people, and it’s tough.

STEWART: We tried at various times, and never pushed it that hard to have little gallery talks or whatever you want to describe them. Sheldon Stern, for example...

MOSS: Yes.

STEWART: ...used to give a little talk on the presidency in the desk area. Dick Dollace [Richard Dollace], who was on the staff for a time, had developed a little thing on space. And he gave that presentation a few times. It never really succeeded in part because it’s difficult to schedule, although I think Sheldon’s talks continued for a few years.

MOSS: I don’t remember.

STEWART: And they would....

HACKMAN: [Inaudible] graduate student.

STEWART: No, they would just put up a schedule, and then someone would....

MOSS: Sheldon Stern at ten o’clock.
STEWART: Right. Yes.

FENN: That’s right, in the museum.

STEWART: And then again it would be; there weren’t chairs set up or anything, but Sheldon would just gather a group of fifteen or twenty people and give a little talk. And other people did that from time to time. But it never....

HACKMAN: I asked Allan this yesterday, but I’m assuming that it’s useful to hear you all talk about: why was it, relative to other presidential libraries, that you went from an initial exhibit to a complete review so early and found…. What was inadequate about the first one?

FENN: Let’s see, how early was it? When did they put the second one in, in ‘90?

MOSS: It was well after I’d gone.

STEWART: I remember specifically. After you left....

GOODRICH: ‘Ninety-one.

STEWART: After you left, I remember, well, Ed Schlossberg [Edwin Arthur Schlossberg] did some kind of a sort of technical evaluation. People had been complaining for some time about the physical deterioration and the fact that a number of things like the fiber optic map wasn’t working. And the thing wasn’t being maintained physically as well as it probably should have. And some things just got broken and weren’t fixed and so forth.

I remember writing a memo during the time I was acting director to Caroline [Caroline Kennedy Schlossberg] and members of the foundation board saying that we should seriously look into a, I don’t think I said a complete, total reconstruction, but a major, major renovation of the whole museum and that it was a very high priority. That is not to say it was my idea to do it. But everybody seemed to recognize that, again, the combination of physical deterioration and the general unhappiness among some people--Allan can correct me with his recollections--the general unhappiness of some people, particularly Ed Schlossberg and Caroline and some others, with the content. There was too much reading, there were too many documents, it was too dense.

That was sort of the general criticism of the first exhibit. And this general concept, which people used to express, that the original exhibit was designed in the mid-seventies. It was designed by people who knew Kennedy or remembered Kennedy for people who knew Kennedy or remembered Kennedy. And when we get into the mid- or late eighties, you know, more and more people coming here had no recollection of Kennedy.

FENN: That was the theory.
STEWART: High school kids, college-age kids who had no significant recollection of Kennedy. Therefore, the exhibits didn’t tell the story in the way that they could best understand it. Which was always Ed Schlossberg’s thing. That’s why....

GOODRICH: It was too static for Schlossberg. It required you to go [Inaudible]. He wanted something more....

FENN: More of a flow? I remember dealing with.... And we started talking in ‘85 about changing specific exhibits. We had a few meetings.

STEWART: That’s right.

FENN: So at that time was six years after it opened. I just think that we saw some things that we thought worked and some things that didn’t. So that process started as early as....

STEWART: You’re right. Yes.

DAITCH: Wouldn’t that be a normal museum practice, that exhibits are changed every so often?

HACKMAN: In presidential libraries, I mean you’d have to really look at them one by one, but in many cases the original “permanent” exhibit stays in place for twenty years or so. And it wasn’t the case here. It goes back to money. Part of that’s the function of the fact that the National Archives expects other people to pay for the redo, the design, the addition or preparation of the interior, or whatever. So it’s not easy for the Eisenhower Library, for example, to redo their exhibits. In fact, they find it damned hard to redo their exhibits. So they tinker around with them to make them look a little better. But you still walk in there, and it still looks unimpressive.

STEWART: We were fortunate in being able to get that money.

HACKMAN: That’ll be another interesting topic to talk about in terms of the Kennedy Library’s ability to get federal funds that other libraries weren’t able to get. [Laughter]

MOSS: I sense an issue. I’m going to have to go in a little bit because I’ve got a three o’clock plane. And I’d like to touch on one other building issue, and that’s the.... I’d like to know, Allan, if Ted Musho was right. I kept complaining to him that an archives works best in a horizontal mode, and that in a vertical mode it creates all kind of difficulties. And he kept saying, “Let me prove to you that the building will work.” Well, I knew Ted wouldn’t be around when the building was tested.
Does it work? You’ve got the stacks up there on the top level. You’ve got an elevator in between.

STEWART: No dumbwaiter.

MOSS: No dumbwaiter. Damn! I’d forgotten the dumbwaiter. I insisted on the dumbwaiter, but it was never done. That’s right. Is it a significant inconvenience? Are there those kinds of structural problems?

GOODRICH: All of the above.

MOSS: Oh! [Inaudible].

GOODRICH: Yes.

MOSS: Oh!

GOODRICH: We made it work. What we’re going to do next fiscal year is Frank [Frank Rigg] is moving the museum collection off base because [Inaudible] problem and the admissions [Inaudible]. And also we have [Inaudible] which will be attached to the side. That’s a whole other question. I’m moving the whole processing unit down to where Peter used to have his curatorial space. We’re taking over that stack area, so we’re going to have a horizontal operation. The stacks will be here, the professional [Inaudible] process them. The process will go up [Inaudible].

STEWART: So you’ll have a sort of a holding area for collections and processing?

GOODRICH: It’s going to be an archival space. There’s going to be a horizontal operation.

STEWART: That’ll be good.

GOODRICH: So the archives staff will not [Inaudible]. [Inaudible].

FENN: Where are they going to get their exercise? [Laughter]

STEWART: That’s exactly my question.

FENN: I think we ought to say something about programs in the building, just a few examples. I mean the basic pattern and what we were trying to do was continued here. And the one comment I want to make about them is I was never able to get this across to that guy Christian with the Culver Commission. By the late fall/winter the attendance was great, and we were running at about a 800,000 projection level. By May, April/May, when you should have seen an increase, you didn’t. It leveled off. And began to.... It was still great, but it was clearly the projection wasn’t right. And so....
MOSS: We kept looking for reasons for it that weren’t there.

FENN: What?

MOSS: We kept looking for reasons.

FENN: That’s right. Right. And so sometime, probably that next fall maybe or a little later, we were running low. And so then, not in John’s shop, but Frank Rigg, the director of Visitor Services, and Steve Knott and Lisa Pruitt began to design a bunch of programs which were specifically designed to build museum attendance. So you had this Culver Commission complaining that we had forums on economic policy and dancing ethnics and parading Minutemen. Well, we did. That’s right. Two different purposes.

So we get into the Polish Independence Day, we get into the Chinese Cultural Day. We got into that contest that we did with the Boston Herald Essay Contest: “My hero.” And we had the Lexington Minutemen in here to celebrate the day we gave out those awards. This wasn’t exactly an attendance builder: 20th anniversary year of November 22nd, with the Harvard Glee Club and Radcliffe Choral Society doing the Fauré Requiem; then, the years we got the Boston Ballet to put on The Nutcracker, scenes from The Nutcracker, in the pavilion around Christmastime. It was spectacular. I remember one time it was the dance of the whatchamacallit, and the snow started to fall outside. It was really gorgeous.

So we did a whole lot of those kinds of activities here which were--like the president’s birthday. That’s where the road race came in and the band and the Family Day, you know. So there was a whole lot of that stuff which Frank and [Inaudible] and Steve were working on. And in the meantime John was doing everything from puppet shows, a couple of high school things, junior high school things, high school conferences.

STEWART: Well, we can get into that at another time, I think. Anything more that you guys...?

MOSS: I can’t think of anything more really that I have.... The thing we have not talked about, and I’m not sure it’s necessary to talk about the tapes [presidential recordings] because so much of it is on the record and on the books. It’s been talked about all over the place.

FENN: But usually incorrectly.

MOSS: Not entirely. [Several people speaking at once] The Ernie May [Ernest May] introduction when he talks about it leaves a lot out. But it is there. I wrote a long memo to the file that covers what I know.

FENN: Your memory’s [Inaudible].

MOSS: Seymour Hersh keeps trying to get me to say [Inaudible]. We can’t do it.

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HACKMAN: We talked a little yesterday at the beginning where I guess I raised the issue of whether we should have any discussion of where materials are. Bill’s referred a couple of times to memos to the files. John has talked about well, I have this or that. I don’t know whether Dan has files. But that would be useful, it seems to me, to... I mean you can go ask people individually. But if there is a sense that there are files, like the Library Corporation files, I guess they’re here at this point; but I would think that would be useful for you all to talk about.

MOSS: I kept nothing.

HACKMAN: I didn’t either.

FENN: I’ve got bits and pieces, but I wouldn’t define them as files.

STEWART: I have far too much. [Laughter]

DAITCH: Why am I not surprised?

[Several people speaking at once]

STEWART: In part because when I left here five years ago, there was some confusion as to what was going to be saved and where it was going to be kept and so forth. And for better or worse, like most people, I always kept sort of in my own office my personal files which are absolutely Xerox copies of things. I mean there’s nothing original in there. Anything original went to the official files. So when I left, I took most of what I had always considered my sort of desk--I don’t know what the term is.

MOSS: Your working files?

STEWART: My working files, my office files, as opposed to the official files. So I certainly don’t have anything that could be considered official at home. On the other hand, I have lots and lots of copies of things I’ve done over the years.

HACKMAN: At some point would that be useful to come back because it’s organized in a particular way?

STEWART: It’s not as well organized as it probably will be if I can find the time [Inaudible].

GOODRICH: One thing is you never know if AO is going to do the Library [Inaudible], too.
STEWART: But there are files, again, there were mountains of program files, and I have no idea where they are right now physically. Because when I left here five years ago, I went through, and I threw out stuff that was of absolutely no value, you know, old multi copies of flyers and programs and that sort of thing, but left a fairly well-organized plan of all of the other files.

I’m almost positive that I left here, I don’t know where they are now, all of the files that I had accumulated on the design of the exhibits. And I’ve got probably a dozen or fifteen or even twenty boxes of material on the design of the first museum, and I left those here. I have probably ten or fifteen archives boxes of material on the design of the building that I left here and on the design of this wing of the building that I left here.

So there are lots and lots of things, files that I kept and that I left here. There are obviously files of the Library Corporation, Steve Smith’s files, here. And as we were saying yesterday, I’m sure I know in Arthur Schlesinger’s papers from those early days there are folders of material pertaining to the development of the Kennedy Library.

MOSS: That’s [Inaudible].

STEWART: Oh, is it? I suspect there would be other people that would have, Ted Sorensen, for example, their files, I’m sure. I know in the Robert Kennedy Papers there are files pertaining to the development of the Kennedy Library. And there would be files presumably somewhere in the Edward Kennedy Papers.

DAITCH: What about the--just quickly, I know everyone needs to probably let this wind up--but the corporation people and then the corporation working into the foundation, are there things that we need to talk about?

FENN: Yes. What happened was that we were struggling to find, either John or I or both of us, approached some cosmetic company in Connecticut to fund some programs. We were kind of scratching around [Inaudible]. I would talk to Steve about the setting up of the foundation. The senator was running for president during this whole period. And finally he agreed, and I pointed out the example of the Johnson Foundation, which was the biggest and most successful at the time. And Steve finally agreed. And we had some event that was going to be a big affair at the Ritz-Carleton to kick it off. And then he cancelled it for some reason I now forget.

So that was a long struggle. And finally--I can’t tell you when, but I would say it was about ‘83, ’84--he agreed, and we had a fund-raiser. And Steve said, “Well, I think we ought to shoot for about a million dollars for the fund-raiser.” I said, “You shoot for a million dollars, and you’ll get five-hundred dollar contributions. You should shoot for at least eight million.” So we worked with the fund-raising effort concern, and there was a big kick-off dinner, which was very elegant. And the thing was extraordinarily successful.

I always thought that the foundation should be an in-house granting group, and that we should come to them with proposals saying we’d like to do this, we’d like to do that. And then they would grant them and fund them or they wouldn’t. And they might suggest ideas. Unfortunately, the first director [Mark Roosevelt] of it was a person with political ambitions,
so he wanted to run with it. I thought we ought to do the program and the foundation do the funding. He began to do both programs and forums, and he really went off on his own.

STEWART: That’s right. You’re right, you’re right.

FENN: And they set up the JFK Library Corps which is, I guess, okay. So that was unfortunate, that the Foundation took on a life of its own.

DAITCH: So you’re saying they were literally working outside of the Library staff to develop their own programs that were held in the Library?

FENN: Yes, yes.

STEWART: Physically, Mark Roosevelt had an office downtown. Mark Roosevelt’s first foundation office was in a building downtown. The relationship was not, well, they weren’t bad. On the other hand, they weren’t [Inaudible].

FENN: Just two other things. I want just to get on tape, and we can follow it up if anybody’s interested. One is that archival use. See, right from the beginning I remember going to Roosevelt’s Library and saying to Bill Stewart, “Did you ever have a high school student in here?” And he said, “Yes, once. He was interested in ice boating, and he had a lot of [Inaudible].”


FENN: Yes, right. That’s right. [Laughter] So we had always, we had encouraged use of the archives by junior high school and high school kids. And I remember Doris Kearns saying what a terrific thing that was because she might make a handful of future historians and archivists by exposing them to these things.

MOSS: You know we were always, I think, and I’m sure it’s continued, open in terms of active encouragement of building that kind of a research clientele. I don’t recall....

FENN: We did at the beginning. I don’t recall whatever happened to that. But we had kids’ class projects.

MOSS: I do remember two guys wandering in and wanting to see the Library, and coming up to the fourth floor, and Ron Whealan [Ronald E. Whealan] encountering them and asking them what they wanted to look at. And they said, “Well, we’re interested in butterflies.” [Laughter] You know, a public library or, you know, they were playing with the idea that as a public library....

FENN: The other thing was the development of the [Inaudible].

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MOSS: I didn’t know I was that systematic about it.

FENN: And how that ever started…. The business of making the building available to communities in the evening, that’s another one of those struggles with Mother Archives [Inaudible]. But now I guess everybody does.

DAITCH: Is that part of what…? I think, did Allan mention it or John or somebody mentioned the concept of a living building or something like that?

FENN: Well, that’s right. What happened was we got started on the idea, and then discovered there was an act called The Living Buildings Program. So it was a fascinating struggle with Washington. I made a teaching case out of it. Put it in the custom house in California. The final thing I think…. This has been wonderful and [Inaudible]. The thing that sticks in my mind was when Senator Kennedy said to me when I first started here, that “the things that you people do in the next two or three years are going to determine what that place is like for the next hundred.” And so that’s why I hope some people may read this story. But that’s why I’m speaking for myself [Inaudible].

MOSS: As I felt when I was working here, I enjoyed it and probably got more than my contribution was worth. So I thank the opportunities.

HACKMAN: That’s exactly the way I feel. [Inaudible] But maybe I gave it back later at the Truman Library and elsewhere.

MOSS: That’s the way I feel. Stuff I learned here I certainly used at the Smithsonian, certainly used in Tennessee, certainly used in my lectures to Chinese archivists in China. So there’s a multiplier effect as far as I’m concerned.

STEWART: My chief value from working here for thirty-three years is that when I ran for office four years ago, I hired the person who did all our brochures. [Laughter] And I won. So he did a fantastic job. There was a huge article last fall in the [Inaudible] about political signs. They had all this beautiful array of political signs. And my sign very prominently mentions that one of the best signs of anybody....

MOSS: Right! Right! Hey! Hey!

HACKMAN: Who was this, Bob Shrum [Robert M. Shrum]? [Laughter]

FENN: Well, as for me, I got a helluva lot of good teaching material out of it. [Laughter] You guys show up, but you’re disguised.

DAITCH: Alright then.
EVERYONE: Thank you, thank you.

[END SIDE 2, TAPE 4]

[End of April 17, 2004 interview.]
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