Oral History Interview

Of

Charles Tyroler II

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Oral History Interview

with

CHARLES TYROLER II

March 26, 1970
Washington, D.C.

By Ann M. Campbell

For the John F. Kennedy Library

CAMPBELL: Perhaps the logical place to begin would be to ask when you first came in contact with John Kennedy or some facet of John Kennedy's career. Perhaps with your assumption of the executive director's job, was it?

TYROLER: No, the first time that I met him was with Seymour Harris. And I was up with Seymour, who was one of the key people in our economic policy committee, which served under the council. And Galbraith [John K. Galbraith] was the chairman. Of course, Galbraith got all of his economics from Harris. And Kennedy got his education—or at least he always said so—from Harris, that was a key man from the academic field. But he got eclipsed because he had suffered a heart attack after Kennedy was nominated—a very serious heart attack—so he was sort of dropped out there for quite awhile. And the Galbraiths and the Schlesingers [Arthur M. Schlesinger] and the Archie Coxes [Archibald Cox] and all these people came to the fore. But this was apparently not the way Kennedy considered it. And I can recall a time that we went up there—Seymour and I were batting around the Hill—and he said, "Come on in. We'll see Kennedy." So we did. And we spent about—oh, a long time with him. It seemed like a long time. He just acted like he didn't have a thing to do. He was just sitting there in his rocking chair and asking Seymour questions, and in depth and he kept plugging it back.

Then, he got to talking briefly about the [Democratic] Advisory Council. And, I would guess, this must have been like either late '58 or early '59, somewhere in there. I can find it out. I have diaries for every place I've been since 1940. So he expressed the view that the advisory council shouldn't issue political statements taking stands on things. "What we
fellows need up here,” and I think this is how he put it, "is a studies-in-depth, the kind of thing that you used to get from Seymour in economics. So we ought to have these long policies, you know, very carefully thought out, an academic type policy position. This would be useful. We can do all the political kind of thing." This is strictly, of course, the line that Lyndon [Lyndon B. Johnson] and Sam [Samuel Taliaferro Rayburn], of course, had consistently…. By this time, the advisory council was pretty well established and was doing very well: five front page stories in the New York Times right hand column in a row, with full text. So everybody knew we were alive at this point, including Mr. Kennedy. So I said, well, I thought that sort of thing we'd done. Had he read the pamphlets? And he obviously hadn't read them. So I said I'd... [INTERRUPTION] ... would he care for some. So I sent them to him. We were putting out things that were ten thousand words long, you know, written by such anonymous authors in long hand as Dean Acheson, you know, and Paul Nitze and Ken Galbraith, and you name it. Arthur Altmeyer, some pretty good people. We very rarely put out short political type statements. Most of our things were rather long, you know, got editorial treatment, no matter what. So that was the first time.

The second time that I saw him was when Trevor Gardner, who had defected from the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] administration--had gotten wind to him, and he had an office over here--also had thought that this business of bringing scientists into politics was a good idea. So we thought, well, he could give us some of the insight on Defense. So Trevor came into our science committee, and he was a real spirit. I guess he must've worked half time moving as a volunteer. He was chairman of the board of an electronics company out in California. But he was real bitter about the administration--not bitter about the administration, but bitter about policy and he thought that the committee handled it in a bad way. And he was instrumental in setting up a little policy group called the Pasadena Group out in California which would meet in between our meetings of our science and technology committee. Charlie Lauritsen [Charles Christian Lauritsen] was on it, Harrison Brown, Trevor Gardner and [Goddick/Gottick?], who was then with the missile center. And they pretty much came up with the germ of the idea of this peace agency. We sat around and discussed it at one of our early meetings. We used to have all-day meetings of our various committees--I think we had eleven to twelve committees--and they'd meet 9 o'clock until around 12:30. And at 12:30 they'd break for lunch and we'd have a press conference. No matter what, we'd always have a press conference. Then we'd come back and meet in the afternoon. Then maybe the next day or the day after or maybe two weeks later, we'd issue one, two or three policy statements that had been approved in the course of this meeting.

Well, this particular press conference was really a dud. We'd beefed it up. We had Harold Urey and Polycarp Kusch, two Nobel laureates, sitting on either side of the chairman, who was Pollard [Ernest C. Pollard] from Yale. So Pollard mumbled around for awhile and the press wasn't writing anything down. At which point Urey jumped in and started talking about this peace agency we'd been discussing. And it just snowballed. Everybody started writing about it--big overseas--everybody just loved it. "Scientists were thinking about a peace agency: Why didn't we?"--you've read that thing, probably--"Why didn't we devote money for peace when we were devoting so much for war." Simple idea. Everybody. All the editorial treatment was very favorable.

Then, a Congressman from Florida--who's still there, Charlie Bennett [Charles E. Bennett]--had the wit to grab this thing and have legislation drawn, which he just took the
language right out of the report, which was very carefully worked on. But the report didn't come out then for, oh, six or eight weeks to my recollection. We had it right down to the detail: how much money they should spend, how it should be set up administratively, who it would report to and everything else. But he took it along and made legislation out of it. And so did thirty-five or forty others. They all came in and followed the leader, and dumped in identical bills. Trevor and I were--it's not all that interesting for the Kennedy thing. But it is background because we then went up and we said, "Well now, who shall we sell it to?"

CAMPBELL: This is on the Senate side?

TYROLER: On the Senate side. And we agreed that we should sell it to one of our own people. And our own people at that time were only four in number. Kennedy had already joined.

CAMPBELL: He had? This is in '59 then?

TYROLER: This is '59. It's got to be like.... Oh, I don't know.

CAMPBELL: Or maybe even early '60.

TYROLER: It would definitely be in early '60 because we hadn't put out the peace agency pamphlet as a council thing. We put it out as a committee. Then it went to the council. And the council met up there on Mrs. Roosevelt’s [Eleanor R. Roosevelt] birthday. We had a three day meeting up in New York. And there's the story because that's my second time talking with Kennedy.

CAMPBELL: This December meeting in New York?

TYROLER: A December meeting. I think it was Pearl Harbor day, too. We had a three day meeting, Saturday, Sunday and Monday. Monday was the hundred-dollar dinner.

Well, Senator Kennedy had been pretty good on the business of his mail. We always had a card enclosed with the statement that said, "I approve. I don't approve." Or "Please, I disapprove." And the third one was like, "I have further comments and I will let you know." And he used to send these in. And the bottom was so illegible that it was obviously his signature.

CAMPBELL: Now, this was in response to a submission from the Democratic Advisory Council?

TYROLER: We sent everything to all of the council members and put them on record. They had a postcard; had to send it back and did. There were no alternates or anybody else who could speak for them. As a matter of fact, no alternates were allowed at the meetings. In connection with the Mrs. Roosevelt dinner, we invited all of the possible potential Democratic candidates for president, each to speak. I believe it was
for three or five minutes, I’ve forgotten, with a stop watch being held on them by former
President Truman [Harry S. Truman] at the Waldorf-Astoria, in the Waldorf ballroom. And
so, of course, Kennedy was one of them. And he accepted. He was very reluctant to come to
this honoring Mrs. Roosevelt. In fact, he had declined in the beginning because Mrs.
Roosevelt was actively opposing him in New York. And now it shows you how your
memory fails you. I have left out a time when, another time when I went up to see him.

CAMPBELL: Well, we’ll go back to that or do it now, if you’d like.

TYROLER: It was when, shortly after he had joined the council, Tom Finletter [Thomas K.
Finletter] and I went up to see him to invite him to come to this dinner
for Mrs. Roosevelt and to speak. He was very much opposed to doing it. He
said, after all, Mrs. Roosevelt was actively opposing him and had hurt him a great deal and
this and that. And also she was actively fighting Charlie Buckley [Charles A. Buckley]. And
he said that Charlie Buckley had been down the line for him. And he said, "I stick with my
friends."

We didn’t do very well there. He was very cold. We had pulled him out of one of
those labor committee [Labor and Public Welfare] meetings, and he just looked Finletter,
mainly, in the eye—I was just sitting there. Well, he looked at me too, real cold. And he just
said that he was in there and, "They’re either for me or they’re against me." Well, he had a
little streak that Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] had too under the proper circumstances. So that
was it. But finally, everybody else accepted it and so did he. So he turned up and gave a
terrible performance, which he was very bitter about, and said afterwards that he would not
again in the campaign appear with other candidates.

Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorenson] had called after he had agreed to appear and
said that he would appear on the understanding that he spoke first. There were going to be six
or seven speaking first. So I wanted to get him because by that time he was our only holdout.
And besides he was doing fairly well although nobody really thought he’d get nominated. But
he was making a lot of fuss. Sort of be attractive and also be nice for Mrs. Roosevelt to have
them all there. So I agreed that he would appear first and that I would so arrange it. And so I
did, by having them appear in the order in which the states were admitted to the Union. That
was the way I finally figured it out. It was the only way it could be. Although maybe that
didn’t work out. Was Massachusetts the first?

CAMPBELL: I would think so, considering Missouri and Texas and Minnesota.

TYROLER: And New York dragged its feet. We didn’t have a New York then.
That’s right. It was the order in which the states appeared. So we printed up
the programs. And there it was: John F. Kennedy, Massachusetts, and so
forth and so on. Well, everything was great except that when Mr. Truman got up to
introduce them, he said that it was awfully difficult to figure out how to have these people
appear. He said he thought that it should be in the direction that the trade winds take. I
believe that was what he said with that little gleam in his eye. And so he started with Pat
Brown [Edmund G. Brown] of California and wound up with Kennedy last. [Laughter]
Well, Kennedy was sitting there, I guess, boiling. He got up and he skipped a page in his
speech and did one page twice--I don't know. It was a disaster. Perfect disaster. So he was
bitter about that.

Let's 'see, now, where were we? Then we went up later on to tell--oh, yes. He called
up. He was already campaigning, practically all the time, 80 or 90 per cent, completely
absent from the Senate, almost. He called me up the night before the first session of our
thing. He had said he was coming. But he said he'd be there late. He wouldn't arrive until
Sunday night. He said that there was one thing that he really wanted: to be sure that his name
was listed as a signer on the peace agency statement. So, of course, we did. And then he
turned up a day late for the meeting, but in time to make his appearance at this hundred-
dollar dinner.

Well, the four candidates for introducing the legislation in the Senate were Estes
Kefauver, Hubert Humphrey, Symington [W. Stuart Symington] and Kennedy. And Trevor
and I decided that the best one of the four would be Symington, because he was the biggest--
although we didn't use the term then--the biggest hawk of the bunch and it would make the
most sense if Symington went along with it. So we went up to see him--besides, we
both knew Symington on reasonably favorable terms. And so we thought that was it. And
neither of us knew Kennedy. And Humphrey, we thought, would be terrible because every
body would expect it from him anyway and he was always dropping something into the
hopper. So Kennedy would be the second best because he'd never introduced anything and
would probably make more news.

So we went up to see Symington. He thought it was a crazy idea, crazy idea of mine.
Crazy people. I may be overstating it a little bit. But he thought this would be a disservice.
He was not interested, flatly. Hated to say it, but that was it. Then we trotted down the hall to
see Kennedy, and wound up--well, we saw him. He came in just as we did. And we talked
with him briefly. Then he said, "Well, work it out with Sorensen." Who was there? Well,
Sorensen dragged in Mike Feldman [Myer S. Feldman]. So the four of us talked about this.
And it finally became a Mike Feldman project.

And so we had some extra meetings with him. Feldman was always telling us--we
didn't regard him as a very high level staff member at that time. He was more like an
assistant to Sorensen. So we weren't too happy about that. But we did have meetings and it
turned out that Kennedy really, according to Feldman and Sorenson, would talk with him on
occasion, very deeply interested in the thing and was going to give a major speech on it, in
fact, really opening up his national campaign. And which, indeed, he did up in Vermont or
New Hampshire or someplace.

CAMPBELL: New Hampshire.

TYROLER: New Hampshire. And he gave a big speech. And he also released the text
in advance. So he was planning for a big to-do. And it was the only piece of
legislation, I think, that every got passed that he ever did introduce in the
Senate as it turned out. Pretty nearly. It certainly was the only prominent one. But he wanted
to change the name of it. He thought the peace agency, it was too public relations oriented
type of thing. And he wanted to call it arms control and disarmament or finally something
close to what it finally did become.
CAMPBELL: I believe the original bill as introduced was Arms Control Research Institute.

TRYOLER: Well, he had a better title than that in the early--the one that he finally introduced?

CAMPBELL: Yes.

TRYOLER: Well, then what happened, Humphrey got wind of it. And without consulting us--and we didn't go behind Kennedy's back on this--he just dropped the Bennett bill in the hopper and beat Kennedy to the punch. And Kennedy via Sorensen was kind of bitter about that because he figured that he had been had. After all, he was going to give a major speech on the big thing and Hubert just dropped it in the hopper. Well, that's the end of the peace agency thing.

The only other time when Kennedy--well, he had two other things and neither of them was.... Well, one was on the telephone. We issued a statement on foreign policy right after the Oregon primary. That's all I remember. And if it wasn't the Oregon primary, it was when Kennedy was on the way back from Oregon. That was the time that he stopped off to see Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] in Liberty. And Stevenson--and this was the only time, of course, that Stevenson, I think, missed an advisory council meeting. And everybody probably talked about this. But apparently Stevenson was very upset by that conference, that Kennedy went there and I gather said him, "I'm going to win it anyway so you'd better get aboard now. And if necessary I'll make a deal with the South to do it. And I don't want to do that. I want to go in there on a nice clean basis. Come along." And Stevenson was shocked by the thing, as the story goes. And Kennedy went up to Hyannis Port for the weekend, and we always met on weekends, the advisory council. Stevenson went to Mrs. Marshall Peters on Long Island. We had this statement in which we criticized Eisenhower for something he was doing in foreign policy--I don't know what it was. And Stevenson called up and he said that it wasn't fair to criticize Eisenhower on this because if he'd been president he would have done the same thing and so forth. Well, he called to say this, and I came down and reported his position on it. And they all said, well, the devil with it. Because at that point Stevenson's candidacy wasn't too viable. And Kennedy looked real good. He looked like he had a very good chance of winning. He picked up a couple of friends that he didn't have before, certainly in the advisory council. So they sort of brushed Stevenson's comment aside. But then, we got the same thing from Kennedy, that he wanted to write a dissenting footnote to this thing. So Butler [Paul M. Butler] said, "Call him up and tell him he can't do this. He can't oppose it. But if he wants to oppose it he ought to write a footnote and make it as mild as he can."

So I called him and got him on the phone. A woman answered, which I assumed was Jackie [Jacqueline B. Kennedy], and she got him. Whoever the woman was she called him by his first name, Jack. He came and he talked about it some more. And he worked out the language over the phone with me, me taking it down, trying to make it grammatical. We argued it back and forth until we got it. And I brought it back and showed it to Butler. Butler said, "This won't do." Said, "Call him back." So I did. And he wouldn't take the call. So I came back and reported it, "I think he's finished with that." Butler said when the meeting
was going on, "Call him and tell him that Butler is calling him." And so I did. And, "Then speak to him. Don't put Butler on, just speak to him." So I did. He said, "Well, okay. Work it out with Sorenson." So we called up Ted Sorensen and told him that the boss had told him to work this out. And the next thing we knew Sorensen appears with Arthur Goldberg in tow an hour later and we worked out the language. It was not of any great consequence. But that was that one.

And, let's see. Then, I think, only three other times I contacted him.

CAMPBELL: Let's talk a little bit about the late fifties before we go right up to the campaign.

When did you first become associated with the advisory council? Really in its planning stages or after it was already sort of a working entity?

TYROLER: I became associated with it like in late March or early April of '57 when we were writing the plan of operations. The three of us wrote it with the major contribution being Charlie Murphy's [Charles S. Murphy]. Charlie Murphy, Phil [Philip B. Perlman], and I. We were meeting with Butler two or three times a week. But we were meeting everyday. And we wrote up this plan of operation in fifteen or eighteen pages in which we tried to cover all the contingencies.

The whole idea of the council had changed. It had to change from when it was first proposed in November. Butler had envisaged it, as you know, we were going to have the Senate and the House, everybody who was anybody, and this was going to be the voice of the Party. And that was submarined mainly by Sam, not by Lyndon. Lyndon, it was originally, bid for the idea.

CAMPBELL: Is that right?

TYROLER: Yes.

CAMPBELL: In what way?

TYROLER: He agreed to do it.

CAMPBELL: Did he?

TYROLER: Yes. And I think it was either five or six--I think it was six from the Senate and six from the House. And that was supposed to be the leadership, plus one other or something like that.

CAMPBELL: It was interesting that Kennedy was included in that early selection when he was not....

TYROLER: He was not eligible by any standard except that there was an extra one there. In each case, there was an extra one who didn't have to be in by virtue of position.
CAMPBELL: Do you suppose this was Butler's early decision to include Kennedy?

TYROLER: No, no.

CAMPBELL: Who would have added him to that list?

TYROLER: It was Johnson.

CAMPBELL: It was Johnson?

TYROLER: Well, it was Johnson also who gave him the seat on the foreign affairs committee over Estes which he had no right to at all. He was helping the young man along.

CAMPBELL: In other words Johnson, then, was involved very early on in determining who would be asked to participate in the council?

TYROLER: Sure. Well, he only had a slight leeway. I think Kennedy was the only one that he cold pick.

CAMPBELL: Yes. May have been.

TYROLER: Well, he went along, or at least, Butler thought he did. And the invitations were issued. And we issued invitations long before I came aboard.

CAMPBELL: Yes. President Kennedy's invitation was dated the fourth of December in '56--the letter from Butler.

TYROLER: Yeah. That would sound about right. So they were all invited, including the House people, I believe. I think they all got invitations. But when Lyndon talked with Rayburn who was down in Bonham, Texas, apparently he just hit the ceiling. And he recognized this thing as just bad news all around and would have no part of it. And you could read about how he'd killed the council over night in Bill White’s [William S. White] columns. The story made the front page of the Times.

So the whole thing blew up. Everybody either declined or failed to accept or, I think in one or two instances had to withdraw their acceptances with the exception of Humphrey. Humphrey was what--he was a whip or whatever he was--he was entitled to be there. He was one. He accepted and stuck with it. So he was the only member from the Hill that we had when we formed with the exception of Kefauver, who was there because he was the vice presidential candidate, not because he was the presidential candidate.

When that became clear, that we were going to lose all of the Hill--and this was not a calculated decision at that time because Butler had wanted the Hill in on it. It turned out that this was the best break the council ever got, actually. Because if they had been members, we would not have been able to do what we did do, which was to make the distinction between
the Democratic party and the Southern leadership on the Hill which I think was the principal
contribution the council made, and I think certainly made a difference in 1960, in the close
election. Well, what else do you want to know about the council?

CAMPBELL: Did your efforts continue through the late fifties, then, to broaden the
representation from Congress? Were additional invitations issued ever?

TRYOLER: No. We did not. We picked up one or two congressmen in odd fashion. One
was Chester Bowles, who I think was—we got him between the time he was
governor and congressman. He was on our foreign policy committee. Then,
he became a congressman and we kept him on. Maybe, later on somebody got in by mistake
or other on the Interior Department. We never made an effort to get.... Well, we didn't have
any, let's say that. We did have a real undercover working relationship with that liberal group
that is now, I guess, called the Democratic Study Group. And we used to meet with the six
leaders of that, oh, every couple of weeks. Then we had some half-hearted moves to meet
with some liberal senators. But, by and large, we had very little effective working
relationship with the Hill and the council. We had nothing to do with it. And vice-versa.

CAMPBELL: In your operations, would it be fair to characterize Mr. Butler as rather
firmly in control? Was this....

TYROLER: Well, he wasn't firmly in control of the council, although he was the
chairman of the council by the plan of operations. And he did have a type of
physical control which was—the plan of operation said that all monies
dispersed on behalf of the council would be dispersed by the Democratic National
Committee. So we didn't have our own checking account. And he paid the bills. So to that
extent he had control over the personnel and control over what we did, which he tried to
exercise at various times.

But he made a big mistake in the early days. It was really a trick. Not a trick,
but a very clever move by Tom Finletter, who was in the triumvirate working here, who
represented the Stevenson wing of the party—we had the Stevenson wing and the Truman
wing. Then we had the Butler wing which—both Stevenson and Truman hated Butler. And
Truman hated him even more than Stevenson did. Stevenson sort of despised him, you know.
So that was the triumvirate. And he had to keep this pretty delicately in balance because we
couldn't afford to lose Truman, and we couldn't afford to lose Stevenson. And Finletter put in
the plan of operations that the council was empowered and encouraged to raise money for it's
own operations. Well, the Democratic Committee was broke. We thought this would
guarantee the survival, and to some extent, the independence of the council. Of course, Butler
let it work because he didn't have any money, and he wanted the council to operate. So we
went out and raised money for it ourselves. Well, I don't want to go into the financial
thing so we don't all go to jail. But, you know, this whole thing about you're on state money,
you can put it wherever you want and as much as you want; you can get bigger contributions
and all that kind of thing. And we did and we got enough money to pay for the committee.
As a matter of fact, we had more than enough to pay for the council. All the time....
CAMPBELL: It's been suggested you had enough to lend to the committee once in a while.

TYROLER: That is correct. So if he got a little bit difficult, we'd give him five thousand or so to help the payroll along. Actually, we wound up, I guess, in the '59-'60, the latter part of '59 to '60, helped by the Mrs. Roosevelt dinner, without about a hundred thousand bucks that we could never really spend for our operation as it was then set up. And I think sixty some of it went to Simulmatics Project which I imagine you've heard about somewhere, and some thirty to forty which was left over, finally, went to the Kennedy campaign after he was nominated. We still had it in the bank. And we made out a check to Bobby or whoever was running it.

CAMPBELL: Would you describe your role as executive director in this period, the sort of thing that you did?

TYROLER: Well, in the period until the last six or seven months, I was all by myself in this suite of offices where you... Where we sit today.

TYROLER: ...where you sit today. And that was my office up there. This is where we held all the meetings. We didn't have any staff of any kind, not even part time staff. So that my job was to try to get people to write these papers and in some instances write them myself if I couldn't; and get them to do volunteer work; and try to pick up people to keep the committees going, having quite a bit influence on who got on. It wasn't until, oh, a little bit after we'd established our two principal committees that the question of political clearance came into play. Nobody seemed to care very much about political clearance until suddenly membership on some of these committees became rather desirable publicity and all that. And towards the end, as a matter of fact, Lyndon Johnson was trying to get some of his chums on here. And we took a couple of them from Texas that wanted to be on. Whether Walter Jenkins wrote the letters or Johnson, I don't 'know. But they were just, "Dear Paul, I certainly think he'd be good on the Committee on Natural Resources."

But I had out of this constraining influence--and that was this administrative committee that was originally made up of.... Well, I said there was only one staff member. There were two. The other staff member was Charlie Murphy. He was the counsel to the committee. And he was supposed to work for us half time or whatever it was. And he was Mr. Truman's man. Murphy was tremendous. Of course he wrote an awful lot of the stuff, and he worked like the devil, and he earned whatever he got. He worked about half time, I think. I forgot about him. I would have come to him. He was terrific.

So there was this administrative committee, Butler's idea. And he was the chairman of it. And Phil Perlman was on it, who was theoretically to represent the Truman wing, but really didn't represent anybody--he was a personal chum of Paul's. Murphy was staff counsel of the advisory council. Butler trusted Murphy. He liked him very much. And he sat in with me, the two of us. And the other member--there were only three staff members at that
point—was Tom Finletter, who represented the Stevenson group. So everything that was supposedly at the policy level this group had to agree on. And they didn't override me. But we met every Monday for four or five hours. Went over everything and sat over there in Butler's office across the street. Very quickly he and I had almost complete falling outs, so that we were fighting all the time.

The way I got the job was through Finletter, who I'd known only slightly up in New York. He recommended me to Butler, and I think the reason Butler took it because he offered me the job over the phone—I'd never met him in my life—practically offered it to me over the phone, he begged me to come see him. And then he offered it to me when he saw me—if it was okay with the other two. And of course, it was okay with Finletter because he thought of the idea, that I'd work for Kefauver, so obviously I was anti-Stevenson. So he had nothing to worry about there. And obviously anti-Johnson. Because those were the two guys he was determined should never get nominated. He was bitter, of course, against Stevenson because Stevenson's people tried to throw him out at the Convention, as you remember. And, of course, it was Sam that saved his life. But Sam got bitter about, I think, about that advisory council idea. And they had a falling out. But up until then he and Butler used to have breakfast together every Tuesday morning, I think it was, and have a long breakfast, discuss everything and all like that. But then those breakfasts ceased.

Then I went to work here. I think I actually went on the payroll on April the first. Then I think we had our first meeting, real meeting of the advisory council as in its later and lasting form, over here at The Mayflower.

CAMPBELL: Mrs. Roosevelt always was retained with the title of consultant or something. I think it was originally explained because she felt that she shouldn't be a member of the council and write her column or something. Was there more to that?

TYROLER: Yeah. There was more to that. Mrs. Roosevelt was always worried about the council until about the last year. I used to go up and see her, and she felt that—well, let's see—we weren't liberal enough, I believe, domestically. And she was very much upset about Acheson being chairman of our foreign policy committee, the Acheson-Truman line. She thought that was sort of a too hard line. That was her general feeling.

CAMPBELL: In June of '59, the council did come out with what might be characterized as a hardline stand, I think, supporting the theory of the missile gap created by the Eisenhower administration.

TYROLER: Yeah. We can thank Senator Symington for that.

CAMBELL: Yes. I think recommending many more dollars for the Defense Department....

TYROLER: He was not a member at that time. But we borrowed his staff members and he—yeah, that was a pretty hard line.
CAMPBELL: Yeah. It just interested me because at the same time or about the same time your science and technology committee must have been thinking about the National Peace Agency proposal. I wondered if it was sometimes difficult to coordinate the various committees and the various statements or if that was always possible even?

TYROLER: Well, all the statements with the exception of the foreign policy committee vis-a-vis the science and technology committee were pretty consistent because the advisory council got its statements from the committees. So you didn't have that. And on the science and technology committee, once they started to get into this foreign policy field, which we had not visualized when we started out.... And then they also got into broad domestic policy later on about what to do when peace comes, the economics of disarmament, well, we had set up a joint committee between the Galbraith committee and the science and technology committee. And then when we started talking foreign policy, we borrowed some of Acheson's committee to meet with the science and technology committee, mainly the vice chairman, who was Paul Nitze. So Paul Nitze met with the science and technology committee. And I think Ben Cohen [Benjamin V. Cohen] used to, too.

Well, you picked out a good one there. That had slipped my mind. But Acheson just thought, you know, most of the stuff that came out of the science and technology committee in the area of foreign policy was blah. And Acheson dominated our foreign policy, the council's foreign policy, throughout these years.

CAMPBELL: For the whole time?

TYROLER: No two ways about it. He wrote it. And they used to argue about it, fight about it, and he was not a member of the council, you see. He just sat with the council when foreign policy was being discussed and he would very discreetly withdraw whenever we weren't on foreign policy. But he wrote the stuff. And it was good. And we used to put it out in the name of the committee and the council.

And then we'd have Stevenson and Averell [William Averell Harriman] and Soapy [G. Mennen Williams] and Herbert Lehman--I'd forgotten him. And those four would always argue back and forth about Acheson's thing. But when it finally came out, it was almost always close to what Acheson went in with. So we were generally Acheson lined.

CAMPBELL: How about on the domestic side, would there have been one person with that much influence on your domestic statements?

TYROLER: Yeah. Our domestic statements were written by Galbraith. And there were two schools of thought. There was the Galbraith school and the Keyserling [Leon H. Keyserling] school. Keyserling and Galbraith were then and continued to be rather bitter enemies. Galbraith was very tired of all this talk about economic growth and all this that Keyserling just made a fetish of for fifteen years--and he shouldn't have done. That was not the basic problem of the future; the problem was not quantity, but
quality. He was going great for quality. And the liberals, the most liberal Democrats, I think, and liberal economists, sided more with Keyserling than they did with Galbraith philosophically. But personally, they couldn't stand Keyserling, and they liked Galbraith, so that Galbraith dominated the scene with the help of Seymour Harris and Walter Heller. Although Walter wasn't terribly important; although he was a member, he didn't make a big contribution. He was good in a discussion, but he didn't write the stuff. Now, Seymour wrote rather poorly compared to Galbraith, so his stuff didn't appear very often. And, of course, Keyserling wrote much worse than either of them, just as bad as Harris did, so that when it came out the style was changed.

CAMPBELL: Ralph Lapp's book, *The Weapon's Culture*, mentions, I think, what he characterizes as dramatic confrontations through the aegis of the DAC [Democratic Advisory Council] between scientists and politicians, perhaps he refers to Symington mainly. I just wondered in what sort of context that would have occurred, at some sort of meeting that you're familiar with or...?

TYROLER: Is that what he says? I don't--I've read it, but....

CAMPBELL: Yes.

TYROLER: Dramatic confrontations?

CAMPBELL: Between scientists associated with the DAC and....

TYROLER: Well, I think he's referring to the Mrs. Roosevelt, the meeting of the advisory council in New York when we took up three or four scientists to sell the peace agency thing. And here the scientists, the representatives of our science committee were meeting at a pretty much top strategy level with the leaders of the Democratic party and discussing basic issues of foreign policy. I think that this is it. But if confrontation means fighting, not really working with them and adjusting to them and having a unique experience, I think that's wrong.

CAMPBELL: Nothing more dramatic than that.

TYROLER: I may have forgotten something.

CAMPBELL: He also, I think, reports in the book a role you had which you've already alluded to in the question of the introduction of the peace agency bill in the Senate: Humphrey's jumping the gun, and then your attempt to encourage Kennedy to come along to do something. I think he mentions a luncheon at The Mayflower.

TYROLER: Well, that was with Mike Feldman.

CAMPBELL: With Feldman.
TYROLER: Who does he refer to?

CAMPBELL: He doesn't, I think. That's what I wondered, who was....

TYROLER: I think the implication in the book is that somebody other than Feldman too. But it wasn't. I think it was just Feldman.

CAMPBELL: Feldman involved. In a way, this stand of the then Senator Kennedy seemed to go counter to his talk of a missile gap or his approach as a relative hard liner in that campaign. Did that seem to disturb Feldman, the Kennedy staff?

Was that what bothered them about the peace agency business?

TYROLER: No. The thing that bothered them about the peace agency was the name.

CAMPBELL: Simply the name?

TYROLER: The name and this tremendous status that we were giving it. It was a big fight that later developed as to whether it would come under the State Department or where it would be. We had to directly report to the president or something like that. We were really building it up.

CAMPBELL: Did Kennedy in the early months of '60, after he becomes a member, become involved in other advisory council things at that time?

TYROLER: That instance that I told you about, the....

CAMPBELL: The foreign policy.

TYROLER: The foreign policy, but I don't recall that he was.... We had a little fight sort of during the primary days when he was trying to get the intellectuals on his side. He didn't have them, the intellectuals. We used to take closed and sealed ballots, secret ballots of all of our committees when they met in 1960 as to who they favored for president. And there were eleven or twelve committees. Virtually all of them were either unanimous for Stevenson-- and surprising people for Stevenson--or maybe there were one or two votes for somebody else. And Kennedy was trying to close this gap, and he had a few people who were working with him. But some of the closest ones, like Seymour Harris, he never came out for Kennedy. And a great chum, because as long as there was a chance for Adlai, he felt he owed his loyalty to him.

He was trying to get hold of Galbraith. And Galbraith was gone to Europe. He wanted to duck the business of getting publicly affiliated with about a dozen scientists, not scientists, but academics, in signing this thing about Kennedy's great stature and how they were for him, to try and counter the Stevenson intellectuals and to make Kennedy respectable too: he was a boy and what had he done and all that. So they tried to get Galbraith to sign this. And Galbraith said, oh, he couldn't do that because he was chairman of our economic policy committee, and the advisory council had to keep out of politics. And well, where had he
gotten that from? Well, he checked it with me. And then he promptly took off for Europe. Sorensen called and just raised hell. Said, "Where do we come on saying this kind of stuff," and so forth. And, "Do we?" "No. We didn't say anything like that to that effect." So he said, "Would you write him a letter and confirm that?" I said, "Oh, sure, I would." And I did write it, but I never mailed it. [Laughter]

CAMPBELL: I came across here, while we're still on the advisory council setup, I came across, I think, the setup as it went into the '60 convention. But I see that Henry Fowler's added to the administrative committee. Was that something that happened very late?

TYROLER: No. Henry Fowler was added, oh, in the middle of the council.

CAMPBELL: In the middle.

TYROLER: In the middle or something. And he was right in the same building, practically the same building. He was around the corner where the New York Times is. We were in the corner building there at K Street. And he was a tremendously devoted member. He was present at all of these sessions and he worked like the devil. As a matter of fact, he was the co-author of a very influential paper of ours called "Can America Afford Essential Expenditures?" or something or other with Gerhard Colm, who could not be a member of ours, but he was the same as a member, he was with us all the time. He was the former chief of staff of the Council of Economic Advisors and then director of research for the National Planning Association.

CAMPBELL: How did Richard Wallace fit into council activities?

TYROLER: Well, Richard and I were old friends. And we lived together during the whole Kefauver campaign. He was Kefauver's right hand man for five, six, seven years. We got some more money. And they were saying we ought to get somebody. And, of course, I was determined to get a friend in instead of having Butler put somebody in who would undercut me. Because Butler was always undercutting me. In fact, if he could have he probably--he tried a half a dozen times to get rid of me.

CAMPBELL: So that was Wallace. Did you sense a problem at all in sort of duplication of efforts between yourselves and ADA [Americans for Democratic Action]? 

TYROLER: No. I didn't at all. ADA was really just a whipping boy during most of my recollection during those years. It wasn't very influential, didn't have any members. And ADA served a tremendously useful function as far as we were concerned because it made us look like we were middle of the road.

CAMPBELL: A voice of moderation.

TYROLER: Yeah, and otherwise they would have cut us to bits. Now, actually, our stuff
was very consistent with ADA. The Democratic party's platform has always been ADA's platform, pretty much. Not this last time on Vietnam maybe, you know. But you go down the other things, there's little difference between ADA. And we had no working relationship at all with ADA. The head of it was an old, old friend of mine. I've know him since the year one, Bob Nathan [Robert R. Nathan] at that time. And we had a little meeting very early in the thing and said we were going to have nothing to do with each other. Fortunately--we were very frank about it--fortunately they helped us by just living, just existing. That's how we've been doing it. Didn't even have Bob on one of our committees which we would ordinarily do. Kept clear of ADA, and the whole bunch.

CAMPBELL: What could you see as '59 grew older and '60 came on about Butler's stand in the race for the nomination in 1960? Were you able to get any sense of where he stood in that?

TYROLER: No. But I think we were all convinced that he was down the line and made a deal with Kennedy. There was every indication of it. I can't pinpoint it, but he started having some of these off-the-record press conferences which didn't stay off the record. And he was always saying, you know, "It looks like if Kennedy only gets one more state, he's in." He always built him up. And I think he had a real working relationship with the Kennedy office. Matter of fact, twice--and I was only in Kennedy's office three times, I think the whole time--on two occasions, Butler either came in or went out while I was there. He used to have these, I think, regular luncheons and meetings with Kennedy. And, of course, Arthur Goldberg was right down the hall from Butler. And Goldberg was certainly working hand in glove. And I think the two of them were checking back and forth. Goldberg was the secretary of our labor policy committee. So I used to see him on my way in and out of seeing Butler. Sure, I don't think there was any question but what he had picked his candidate and was doing everything he could to get him in, and continued to do it.

CAMPBELL: Did you and others consider this as sort of irregular?

TYROLER: Oh yeah. We were sure all upset about it. We were all impartial, you know.

CAMPBELL: Were you, as a matter of fact? Did you have a candidate in the early spring of '60?

TYROLER: Oh, sure. Stevenson.

CAMPBELL: Stevenson. And this is where the majority of the council would have stood?

TYROLER: I don't know. The council was made up of a lot--half of them were non-entities, you see, or they're members of the Democratic National Committee. I don't know whether they did, because some of them, to my amazement, didn't realize that Stevenson was even a candidate. This wasn't clear even after we'd really cleared it up. So I don't know how they would come out. Soapy, of course, had
already made, had reached an agreement to go for Mr. Kennedy that spring, I guess in the spring--because he was propositioned here in the kitchen one day. I was trying to get him to switch. He said no. He'd made a flat commitment. And there was nothing he could do about it.

CAMPBELL: Did you try to get him to switch to Stevenson?

TYROLER: Stevenson. Yes.

CAMPBELL: Do you recall who was arguing Stevenson's case?

TYROLER: Sure.

CAMPBELL: Can you....

TYROLER: You can interview him. He'll tell you. He was a key person. Just grabbed Soapy and got him out. He said, "No." He was definitely committed. He couldn't do it. There was nothing he could do.

CAMPBELL: There were reports printed then?

TYROLER: Oh, well. I might as well tell you who it was because we're not going to release...

CAMPBELL: Oh, no. This can be....

TYROLER: ...anyway for a long time. Because I want to write about this someday. Tom Finletter.

CAMPBELL: Finletter. There were reports...

TYROLER: Then, of course, there were Mrs. Roosevelt and Lehman too.

CAMPBELL: ...reports that Butler planned to resign right after the convention, which of course he did--very early reports, six or eight months ahead of time. To your knowledge, did he in fact plan to step down as soon as the candidate was chosen? Or would he have liked to have stayed on?

TYROLER: Well, I think he would have liked to have stayed on or at least been given some part in the campaign, which he never was, or given something in the administration, which he never was. I think they put him on the St. Lawrence Seaway Commission or something that would meet twice a year. And they ignored him during the campaign. Sent him up to talk to some Negro groups in New Jersey or something like that. He was very bitter about the way he was treated. I don't know whether he was.... He was fighting for his job all the time, don't forget. All the time I was there, the
Truman people led by his old enemy Frank McKinney and Arvey [Jacob M. Arvey] and Carmine DeSapio and you name it were just fighting like the devil to get him out. And Sam and Lyndon wanted to get him out and the Stevenson people wanted to get him out. But the thing is they couldn't agree on who would take his place. And every time the National Committee met, it seemed to me--or at least most of the time--they always had some issue which really resolved itself down to can we get Butler out and not the convention site. And it was always understood they couldn't careless about the convention site, what they were voting to was "Whether we disavow Butler." And if they could have won any of those test votes and had a candidate, they could get rid of him. But they couldn't go for a Southern candidate like Lyndon or Sam. So they never could make a deal between the Truman-Rayburn-Johnson wing of the party and the Stevenson wing. And then, of course, Truman was really in both wings, because he was ours and he always stuck with it.

CAMPBELL: How active was he as the time went on in the late fifties? Did he usually attend meetings?

TYROLER: He attended quite a few of them. I'd have to look it up. But he missed very few. He was there. Well, the reason he was there is that we had him on weekends, and we never set up the meeting until we knew that we had Truman. We always made sure of Truman first and Stevenson second. And then the others all came along because it was the rule everybody had to be present in person. There were no substitutes.

CAMPBELL: I wondered if you were in an influential position, if in late '59, early '60 any representations were made to you by the Kennedy people in an effort to gain your support?

TYROLER: None.

CAMPBELL: Were there any early indications of the then Senator Kennedy's opinion about the permanency of the council, his intention if nominated and elected about....

TYROLER: None.

CAMPBELL: None early. Do you know how Chester Bowles was selected to be the chairman of the platform committee in 1960? A great number of people that were associated with the council in one way or another seemed to get very heavily involved with the platform in 1960. Richard Wallace, I suppose, helped draft some early things.

TYROLER: I think it was a Butler selection as nearly as I can recall.

CAMPBELL: A Butler selection. Perlman came on as vice chairman of the platform committee.
TYROLER: Oh, well, that was his payoff. Yes. Sure. I remember that. But he wasn't there. He just wanted to be in the swim; he didn't make any contribution. The only time he ever made a suggestion that really followed through--he was always around and wanted to sit in on the drafting committee, but he died shortly after the convention. He was a real old pest. A real nice fellow, but totally utilitarian at that point--he came up with some civil liberties type of proposal, got us into all kinds of trouble. It was something about censoring the mail of some... We had a forty-eight hour wonder which was violating every amendment on the books. No, he was just Butler's stooge, in my opinion. Charlie Murphy feels more friendly to him. And Henry Fowler was more polite than I was. But the basic fact was that he was just around. He'd run back and report to Butler.

CAMPBELL: And was not ever really active particularly--or influential is a better word--in council affairs either?

TYROLER: Nobody took him seriously. I can't believe that anybody important did. He was an old, doddering character. In fact, he was always here, though. He attended all the committee meetings, not just the council meetings. He was strictly Butler's representative. Whenever the press was around he'd always try and get on TV and mumble on. They never used it. Butler, now, was a key politician.

CAMPBELL: Did you handle the press for the council? You certainly got extraordinary coverage in the late '50s and the early '60s. Was it just simply that it was that interesting?

TYROLER: Well, we worked on the press--we're not talking much about Mr. Kennedy. We worked on the press. After every council or committee meeting--these things were turning up once or twice a month, sometimes even more often--we'd get a really good house in Georgetown and we'd have all the top press people and press, TV and radio people there. And nobody else. No outsiders. Only the committee or the council, as the case might be. Not even the friends of the hostess. And we exposed to these people. We always had these press houses where they could actually see these fellows were meeting. Our council had about a 95, 94 per cent attendance record. By the way, the committee members were very religious on attending and paid their own expenses. We didn't even pay their travel. Some of them would come in between these. We picked them geographically to some extent, too. We got them from all over the country. They weren't all Eastern seaboard. That trap we didn't fall into. We had pretty good press relations.

CAMPBELL: Yes, you did. Did you attend the '60 convention in Los Angeles?

TYROLER: Yes. That was the one thing Butler did do for me. He put me on the platform. That was a very desirable thing, to have a platform pass, which
meant you could go anywhere. I remember that the first time since he'd gone to the convention, Sam Rayburn didn't have one. They only allowed Sam to come up and make his nominating speech for Johnson and then be escorted off.

CAMPBELL: That is right. He didn't serve as Chairman because he was going to work for Johnson.

TYROLER: Yes. But he also didn't have a platform pass. And yet, up there within this select group were friends--who was it--like Tony Curtis and Frank Sinatra and all of these people. And not all--and Peter Lawford and that kind of.... But they weren't all for Kennedy. All but one. One--I've forgotten which one--was for Stevenson. But I don't think Butler knew that.

CAMPBELL: Butler had given out the passport passes.

TYROLER: Butler had pretty'close control over the tickets too.

CAMPBELL: Is that right?

TYROLER: He was sitting there right on them in his room at the Biltmore [Hotel].

[END OF FIRST INTERVIEW]