

**Wesley Barthelmes Oral History Interview – RFK #2, 6/2/1969**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Wesley Barthelmes  
**Interviewer:** Roberta W. Greene  
**Date of Interview:** June 2, 1969  
**Place of Interview:** Washington, D.C.  
**Length:** 63 pp., 1 addendum

**Biographical Note**

Barthelmes, press secretary to Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) from 1965 to 1966, discusses press relations, trips that RFK took to Latin American and Africa, and RFK's presidential campaign in Oregon, among other issues.

**Access**

Open.

**Usage Restrictions**

According to the deed of gift signed April 23, 1971, copyright of these materials has been passed to United States Government upon the death of the donor.

**Copyright**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

**Transcript of Oral History Interview**

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

**Suggested Citation**

Wesley Barthelmes, recorded interview by Roberta W. Greene, June 2, 1969, (page number), Robert Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Wes Barthelmes

to the

JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

I, Wes Barthelmes of Washington, D. C., do hereby give to the John F. Kennedy Library, for use and administration therein, all my rights, title and interest, except as hereinafter provided, to the tape recording and transcript of the interviews conducted at Washington, D. C. on May 20, 1969, June 2, 1969, and June 5, 1969 for the John F. Kennedy Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The interview is to be closed to general research until April 1, 1981, or until my death, whichever is the later.
2. During the term of this restriction researchers may apply to me for written permission for access to the interview, and those receiving my written permission are to be granted access to the interview by the Director of the John F. Kennedy Library.
3. Further, for a period of ten years researchers may not quote from the interviews, in whole or in part.
4. Researchers who have access to the transcript may listen to the tapes; however, this is to be for background use only, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase or quote therefrom.
5. The interview and its restrictions may be listed in general announcements of the Library's collection.

Page two

6. I retain literary property rights to the interview until April 1, 1981, or until my death whichever is later, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to the United States Government.

7. This agreement may be revised or amended by mutual consent of the parties undersigned.

Wes Barthelmes

Wes Barthelmes

April 21, 1971

Month, Day, Year

James B. Rhoads

Archivist of the United States

April 23, 1971

Month, Day, Year

Wesley Barthelmes – RFK #2

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
79, 124	Antagonism with members of the press corps
82	Screening certain articles from Robert F. Kennedy (RFK)
83	Books about RFK
86	Preconditions on certain interviews
88	Upstaging other senators
91	Press access to RFK's staff
92	Reporters as sources of information or contacts for certain groups
95	RFK's interview habits
96	RFK and staff book writing
96, 100	Preparing RFK to meet the press
99	Television news
102	Trip to Latin America
110	Trip to Africa
116	Polls
117	Grooming other New York State politicians
119	Barthelmes departure as press secretary
121	Changes to press staff and operations after Barthelmes' departure
123	Barthelmes orientation to the job by Edwin O. Guthman
129	RFK's presidential campaign in Oregon
Addendum	Subject Index

Second of Three Oral History Interviews

With

Wesley Barthelmes

June 2, 1969  
Washington, D. C.

By Roberta W. Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Project of the Kennedy Library

GREENE: Let's begin by my asking if you would agree with those who say that Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] was hypersensitive to the press and press criticism? Would you say that this is an accurate evaluation?

BARTHELMES: No. I wouldn't say that he was hypersensitive. I would say that he shared the same sensitivity, I think, reflected the same sensitivity that all elected officeholders, or probably all public officials, have to newspapers and to printed accounts of their activities. And obviously he had the same interest that everyone does in having an accurate and hopefully a positive construction placed on these activities. But I would think that, as I may have said before, I really expected a hypersensitive attitude, particularly in view of the stories I'd heard secondhand about President Kennedy's [John F. Kennedy] reaction to the press and his supposedly canceling the subscription to the *Herald Tribune* and the rest. As I may have said before on the earlier tape, I know of, in my own personal experience, only one case where he intervened with an editor in opposition to a reporter--in protest against a reporter. That was the result of what he regarded, and I think accurately, as the constant stories of an harassing nature by Ted Knap, who then covered the Senate for the *New York World Telegram*, which is now defunct. He did intervene on that. He did make a telephone call to the editor. But that is the only case of his personal intervention--that I know of.

The only other case I know is where he was disappointed in the play that the *New York Times* had given a news account of what he regarded as a very substantial floor speech in the Senate in 1965, in respect to pollution and the problems of environmental control and what should be done about it. He was very disappointed at the play, and he phoned me at home early in the morning and tried to find out why Warren Weaver [Warren Weaver, Jr.] played it as he did, which was very small. But he did not complain to Weaver's superiors. Those are the only two instances I know of.

GREENE: You were never aware of sensitivity as far as his family went or JFK or his Administration?

BARTHELMES: No. I think he showed the same perplexity that a good many politicians have as to what they regard as priorities that reporters assign themselves as to what's news. At that point in time the Senator was very new in the Senate. It was during his first year and he was receiving heavy press coverage. A good many of the questions, I think, that came from the press people could justifiably be categorized as minutia or trivia--such as how many rooms in Hickory Hill? At the time when the family had purchased a cooperative apartment in the United Nations Plaza, *Time* magazine evidenced a great interest. They thought they were being subtle about us, simply about asking questions about how many dogs and parakeets and eagles and tarantulas and black widow spiders and children and nursemaids and staff there were. After the third question, it was quite apparent what they were trying to do. They were going to write a story, which they did, seeking to prove that the cooperative apartment in the United Nations really couldn't accommodate the Kennedy family and their pets. And that therefore, once again--ergo, Senator Kennedy was really a pseudo-resident of New York State and really lived in Washington. It was a very transparent attempt. There were a great many examples of the type of questions that were submitted, where reporters would come in.

Women reporters, I think, were particularly notorious for that. And by the nature of the women's pages, they wanted to do stories about Mrs. Kennedy [Ethel Skakel Kennedy], Mrs. Robert Kennedy's activities--how she ran the house; literally how many pounds of hot dogs

were consumed. The Senator made it very clear from the beginning, when I was first employed by him, that in any inquiries that related to Mrs. Kennedy, I was to deal with Mrs. Kennedy. It was for her to say whether or not she wanted to sit still for an interview or whether she did or did not want to answer. But he was not to be any sort of court of appeals. He would not intervene and say, "Ethel, go ahead and answer the question or grant the interview." It was quite apparent that Mrs. Kennedy generally did not at that time wish to be exposed to these constant sitting for interviews that were so tiresome and were so repetitive. And I think the variation in the request from the women's pages for interviews is that in each such request, the reporter wanted it for herself. It wasn't a matter of a group or mass

interview where Betty Beale and Maxine Cheshire, and Helen Thomas [Helen A. Thomas] and various others would go to Hickory Hill or some other mutually convenient place and interview her/ Each one wanted one "exclusive item" or column for Sunday. The Senator was covered for the most part, newspaper reporters were content to come in on a group basis and interview him.

No. I didn't think he emphasized any great, any more than normal amount of sensitivity that I've found with other persons I worked for on the Hill. But he certainly, and I think with justification, expressed a great deal of mystification about the nature of their interest. He simply felt that--I think this was so during the first year, at least the first months in '65 of his Senate term--the questions indicated to him (which I think disappointed him more than anything else, although he did get riled occasionally) that he was some sort of curiosity piece and some sort of bauble that had arrived in the Senate. And the whole feeling he thought was that he was to be picked up and turned around and held up to the light as if he were some sort of case study in NIH [National Institute of Health], rather than the reporters coming in if they wanted to talk to him about Vietnam or pollution or state issues or a bridge across Long Island Sound and a whole variety of issues that were within the ambit of his duty as Senator. That would have been perfectly fine. I've never know him to--he may be pressed for time--but I've never known him really to say "No" permanently to an interview request.

GREENE:                   How much of what was written about him did he actually see?

[-81-]

BARTHELMES:       Well, you know the volume of items that were written about the Senator in many languages that came in. We didn't need a clipping service; they were always volunteered. Either a reader would cut them out and mail them, or else a correspondent, if he felt it was a particularly favorable story, whether he would be an Italian correspondent or Slovak correspondent or someone here, would submit the article on a "for your information" basis. He, the Senator, did not see each and every one, obviously. There wouldn't have been time in the day. I think it was a matter of selectivity on the part of the press secretary. The stories would be read with an eye as to: (a) Did the story reflect a misunderstanding of the Senator's position on an issue? or (b) Was there beginning to show up in stories a repetition of Robert Kennedy's years when he was on the Senate Operations Committee? Or were we beginning to get a flurry of stories that were rehashing Robert Kennedy's work in connection with the investigation of union malfeasance? Then he would be told, or if there were a good many of them, he might be shown one article saying, "This is typical of what we're getting now." And also in the specialty press--if the labor press began to evidence some interest.... And conversely, as was the case in the labor press, a lack of interest. This is one of the contrasts. You found in the first five or six months of Senator Kennedy's first term, very little attention or coverage given to his activities (in the labor press). Many of his activities, I think, were worth coverage by the labor press in terms of the bills he had introduced: the social security, the minimum wage, and other bills that would be of interest to the labor movement. And all of these for the most part--without exception, not for the most part--without exception were bills

the labor movement could legitimately support. But this is one of the contrasts of those first few months.

GREENE: Was there any actual screening process of what he saw beyond what you thought was useful to him? Were there things that he preferred not to see? This has been written. I think Penn Kimball [Penn T. Kimball] says that he deliberately had certain things kept from him that he did not care to see. Is that accurate?

BARTHELMES: Well, there may have been a screening, there was probably a screening process that was set up by

[-82-]

press people on his staff--but not under instruction. I think it was just a matter of exercising judgment that if someone were.... There were these relentless stories about the Warren Commission [Earl Warren] and about the District Attorney Garrison [Jim C. Garrison] down in New Orleans, Louisiana, and all the various conspiratorial theories that were being woven and had particular prominency. There was the Epstein [Edward Jay Epstein] book [*Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth*] for one. I know there were various others. These weren't called to his attention. Simply, my judgment was that undoubtedly if other members of the family were aware of them, and if there was any need to discuss them, why it would just take care of itself. The anniversary, in November you always got the anniversary piece--you know, "Two years ago today, John Kennedy was assassinated." Obviously there was no need to bring those to his attention.

I think it was just a matter of good judgment. With a good many stories there's just no need of it. Gossip column items--once or twice there was an item in the.... There was a gossip column in one of the New York daily papers to the effect that he danced the frug until the 3:00 a.m. in the morning at the Peppermint Lounge, which then enjoyed great chic popularity. More for my own guidance and curiosity, I asked him about that. It was very much a, "No!! I don't only not do the mashed potato, and the monkey, and the whip and whatever the others are, I really don't dance." And that was enough. So when other calls would come in subsequently about, "Does he dance?" or, "Does he do this?" I had some guidance. That's the only reason that I had brought that up.

GREENE: Can you recall any articles while you were there that he particularly liked, that he thought were the type of thing that should be written?

BARTHELMES: No. I don't think so. One book was published, at least one I can think of in that first year. That was by Nicholas Thimmesch, who is now the bureau chief at Newsday, the Washington bureau of *Newsday*. It was called *Robert Kennedy at Forty* as I recall. That passed muster so to speak. I don't think there was any great enthusiasm for it, but it certainly was not upsetting. There were two or three books that he expressed appreciation about.

But they were not books that dealt directly with Robert Kennedy. They did peripherally or in a treatment of a larger issue. The one book probably that he was appreciative of, and voluntarily mentioned to me--presumably to others--that he thought was a first rate book, was Elie Abel's book [*The Missile Crisis*] on the Cuban missile crisis. He said he thought.... As I recall, Senator Kennedy said in effect that as much as can now be written about that episode, Elie Abel's book was the most competent and the most authentic of any that he had read. This was one of those occasions when he did give a verbal glimpse into his own role because he did, in the course of praising very briefly, the Abel book, he said, "I had a little something to do with that situation, and I know it is a very good book," which is a case of understatement in respect to his role that he played.

Then there were one or two books, I don't remember the titles. One [*Kohler Strike* by Sylvester Petro] was the story of the very long and bitter strike at the Kohler [Company] plumbing plant in Wisconsin. I think this set one of the records for long work stoppage in this country. It involved, as I recall the UAW [United Auto Workers] and Kohler. I think the strike, the work stoppage probably lasted two or three years. There were considerable acts of violence apparently that were involved. Someone did a book on the Kohler strike--I have it at home, I don't remember the title--in which Senator Kennedy, Robert Kennedy then, was mentioned when he was at the Justice Department and also at the McClellan Committee [John L. McClellan], as to his open-minded attitude toward the strike. This was just one or two paragraphs, but he was very pleased with that because it's on the record that he was held in somewhat minimum regard by some of the older (i.e. senior) labor people. So he was very pleased at that. There may have been another book or two where there was a passing reference. These pleased him. But the one outstanding book was the Elie Abel book.

GREENE: Did he cooperate with Abel at all in the writing of the book?

BARTHELMES: I would think so. I have that impression without knowing because Abel had done most of the writing and the book was in process of being published by

the time I came on. Abel, I think had been in London for the NBC network. But I had the impression that he had interviewed the Senator about it at one point. And I think one of the reasons he was pleased about it was that Abel had expressed Senator Kennedy's views accurately, which wasn't always the case in other accounts.

GREENE: Were there any articles or books which particularly upset him? Did the de Toledano [Ralph de Toledano] book [*The Man Who Would be President*] and the Lasky [Victor Lasky] book [*RFK: The Myth and the Man*] come out during that period? I'm not sure of the dates.

BARTHELMES: Yes, they did. But he just sort of wrinkled up his nose and said, "Well,

what can you expect?” They belong to the cadre of Kennedy knockers. There wasn’t anything else you could expect.” The one article that was very upsetting, that was written sometime during the ‘64 Senate campaign appeared in *Look* magazine. It was written by a woman, an Italian name [Oriana Fallaci]. It made him out to be what he wasn’t, you know, sort of a fool. It just didn’t ring true anyway. I wasn’t there at the time of the interview, but....

GREENE: Was that the one that said, “Robert Kennedy Answers Some Blunt Questions”? That was by an Italian journalist. I’m not sure if it’s the same.

BARTHELMES: I don’t know if it was the one or not. But I remember there was really a problem with that. It did appear in *Look* magazine. It made life just more difficult. I think there was every reason to believe it was not authentic in the sense that she rewrote what he had told her. It was a rather bitchy piece. There was a great deal of unhappiness about that. I think that was probably the outstanding example of considerable unhappiness about a magazine piece or a book.

But as for de Toledano and Lasky, the Senator was just sort of fatalistic about them. I think generally the attitude of the Senator was somewhat in keeping with his general attitude

[-85-]

that he really didn’t expect a great deal from the press. It was more in sorrow than in anger. When he did get comments on an article that he felt faithfully reflected his position or his activities, he was pleased. But it was sort of unexpected. It was, “Thank God for small favors” type thing.

GREENE: Can you ever recall granting an interview to a reporter with the understanding that it would be screened somewhat before, that you would have the right to read it and edit it if you liked? Did people ever do this in desperation as an effort to get in?

BARTHELMES: Usually it wasn’t quiet desperation. It was sort of open disorder. But it wasn’t--my recollection is I can think of three or four and I don’t remember the individuals. But it wasn’t a matter of saying, “Yes, you may see him if there can be some sort of pre-publication ‘censorship’.” It was a case where there was such an open desperation, overt desperation to obtain the interview, that this was sort of thrown in right away—“He can look at it and anything. He can read it through and shape it to his, but take out anything he objects to.” So it was thrown in. There was a great haste to do this. One or two of the requests for articles in which this was a condition were not of any great import. One was an article on automobile safety for *Popular Mechanics* or *Popular Science*, I believe *Popular Mechanics*. This was a term of a condition that was volunteered.

Then there was an article that was to be done by a writer who was doing a book, which I don’t believe ever was published, called something to the effect of *Sons of Famous*

*Fathers.* You had Ralph Bunche's [Ralph F. Bunche] son and Billy Graham's son, and Robert Kennedy's son, Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.]. This permission to interview young Bobby Kennedy was given very quickly. After consultation with Mrs. Kennedy, the mother, Ethel Kennedy, this permission was forthcoming. I met the writer at the airport; the two of us drove out to Hickory Hill one Saturday. I think it took about two, two and a half hours. I don't think the fellow had encountered an interview of this type because the Kennedy household at Hickory Hill on a Saturday morning in good weather was rather confused, if not chaotic. It's difficult to keep a youngster's attention, particularly with curious siblings who would hang around the interviewer's neck

[-86-]

and press the buttons on the tape recorder and various other things. And they would want to know, "Why do you ask that? Why do you say that?" And I know on one or two occasions they said, "Well, Bobby, that isn't true at all. You know the cat's name is Unesco," or whatever it would be. It was quite an experience for the fellow, but he took it gamely and smiled. As the interview went on, he smiled broader and broader. I don't know whether it hurt more and more. But it had to be fun for me. But it was not quiet and there was a lot of activity going on. And also it was very difficult to keep his interest. Bobby would get thirsty or he'd get hungry and he'd leave and then come back. He'd want to watch his favorite television cartoon show. The interviewer had to put up with that. So probably a half hour of conversation was recorded in a lapse time of about three hours. But that condition was put in. The manuscript was submitted, and it was perfectly all right, as I remember. To my recollection there wasn't a deletion made.

Jack Bell [Jack L. Bell], who was then the head of the AP staff in the Senate and one I always regarded as having a very standoffish and generally unfavorable attitude towards Senator Kennedy, had inaugurated a series of questions and answers with members of the Senate. And he'd asked for an interview with Senator Kennedy. I had some problems because I'd seen some of Jack Bell's material. He was one of the fight promoters. You know, boxing is dead, but this town is full of fight promoters, and they're all in the press gallery. He was one who couldn't write a story about Robert Kennedy without juxtaposing it against President Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson], Mrs. Johnson [Claudia Alta "Lady Bird" Johnson], and Valenti [Jack J. Valenti], and Moyers [William D. Moyers]. There was always an adversary proceeding, whether it would be about pollution, or Vietnam or the Dominican Republic, or an amendment to the Voting Rights Act.

We had some problems with that. But this was one where I seemed so reluctant with Bell that he said, "Well, the Senator can look at it and edit it for grammar and any inaccuracies that I may have made." Well, we had some problems with that because the interview did take place. Then it was submitted. There weren't any things in the way of grammatical errors although we broke a few rambling sentences into shorter sentences. But there were one or two questions that the Senator asked be deleted, in keeping with his understanding of the agreement. And that led to a bit of a conflict with Bell, an argument with

[-87-]

Bell that I had because my understanding was it was not just grammar, but it was also if we felt there was inaccuracy or a question that was out of context which there wasn't time to elaborate sufficiently on. I don't remember accurately the problem question. My recollection is it was a question related to the Vietnam War. There was quite an argument on that, but finally Bell sort of groused about it, snarled, but the alteration was made.

GREENE: Was there any concern that the extraordinary amount of publicity that he was getting might wear out the reader's interest or that they might get tired? Is there any indication of this in the mail, that people were getting sick of reading about him?

BARTHELMES: I didn't have that. You know, we always wondered why the same themes were repeated that seemed irrelevant or marginal. But I don't ever remember Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] or Edward Kennedy's [Edward Moore Kennedy] press people or anyone around the Kennedy office expressing that sort of concern. I don't think.... There obviously was no reluctance to be publicized; the problems were with what direction the publicity, the attention was taking. But I don't ever remember that being raised. You know, this was only 1965 and there's sort of an overkill during his first year in the Senate.

GREENE: No concern about the effect on politicians?

BARTHELMES: Only in a very I think, intramural way, of this sort: the Senator was very sensitive to the fact that almost any gesture he made, even a silent gesture, became "news" and that it was very easy for him to be placed in a position of upstaging other Senators--inadvertently. This sensitivity supposedly wasn't one of his strengths. But he was very aware of it. I can remember a number of occasions. The most specific one I can remember was a luncheon over in the Senate Dining Room in S-100 in the Capitol, in the Senate wing of the Capitol. The Senator was invited along with Senator Yarborough [Ralph W. Yarborough], Burdick [Quentin N. Burdick] of North Dakota and four or lesser known senators. It was a case where a veterans organization--it may have been the Veterans of World War I--asked

[-88-]

Senators to come and discuss pension legislation. I can remember the Senator accepting. Then when the day arrived and we were within a couple of hours of it, he suggested that I find out how long it was going to take, and that he would come in at the end because the press always made, as he put it, a fuss over him and not about anyone else. And that's just not a very good idea. What he was saying was that he was going to sort of do it, as best a Kennedy could, to tiptoe into this affair and then tiptoe out. He did in fact do this. He went in at the very end. I knew when it was about winding down. He came in, he shook hands, said, "Glad to be here. This is how I feel, but I do have another meeting," and he left. What he did later--with a veterans group that was having this audience with the senators--is through me he

asked them if they would come over to his office later in the day and he'd be glad to talk to them. He didn't tell them why he had done this. But this is why he had done it, because he just felt that other Senators would get resentful--and properly so. He showed an awareness of this, and there were probably four, five, or six occasions at least in '65 when he showed the sensitivity.

GREENE: Was this ever the case with committee hearings and actual Senate activities, where he would always be the center of attention?

BARTHELMES: Oh, I think so. And I think there are others who could tell this, who were more of a party to it than I was. But certainly an illustration of this was the automobile safety hearings that were then being held in '65 in the summer, in August of '65 by Senator Ribicoff [Abraham Alexander Ribicoff] of Connecticut. Senator Kennedy was on three full committees. And then within those, he probably was assigned to, my recollection is thirteen subcommittees. You obviously cannot do justice to those assignments. No senator can. So you pick those where you feel you have the most interest and where the needs are the greatest. One of them obviously was the Senate District Committee. But he had not, frankly, paid attention to activities of all of them although his staff had reported to him what was going on so he wouldn't be out of date. He was informed that Ribicoff was having the automobile hearings. He had not attended them.

[-89-]

Then one morning in August of '65, as I recall it, he went to a subcommittee meeting within the Senate District Committee. And it had been cancelled unexpectedly, without his knowledge. At that point he said, "Well," as one who never wanted to be idle "What do we do now?" At which point--probably it was Wendell Pigman, I think, who was there said, "Well, Ribicoff is having these auto safety hearings over in Government Op." [Government Operations Committee] He said, "Well, let's go there." He went in and he sat down. Apparently the hearings had been underway. I guess the president of General Motors was on before the Committee that day, [Frederic G.] Dunner, I believe his name was. He [Dunner] was not at all responsive to Senator Ribicoff's questions as to automobile safety and design and how many engineers were working on safety designs. So the Senator, Senator Kennedy, was just arriving, was attending his first hearing on this subject being held by the subcommittee. He [RFK] began to ask Dunner questions about what proportion of the annual expenditures of General Motors was being spent on automobile safety. Dunner wasn't very responsive--he didn't really know. Finally, he did know because Kennedy was saying, "You mean to tell me that you're the president of General Motors and you don't know how much is being spent by your corporation on automobile safety?" So finally a figure was produced. I think it was something like five million dollars, which is a very fractional, infinitesimal percentage of what General Motors spends overall. All of a sudden, the lead stories the next day on auto safety were on Kennedy. Kennedy did overshadow Ribicoff. They sort of became Kennedy's hearings--Kennedy said this and Kennedy said that, at hearings that were being chaired by Ribicoff. This would happen. I think that was the most conspicuous example.

GREENE: Was there any resentment on Ribicoff's....

BARTHELMES: I don't know. I would think there would be, you know, frankly.

GREENE: Yeah.

BARTHELMES: I would think there would be. But I never--neither Ribicoff or his staff ever said anything

[-90-]

to me. You might ask Wendell Pigman about that when the opportunity provides itself. It's my recollection that Pigman did auto safety. I know it was within his legislation jurisdiction. But he would know that better than I.

GREENE: How much access was the press permitted to the staff, outside of yourself?

BARTHELMES: Any access they wanted.

GREENE: Really.

BARTHELMES: The immediate senatorial staff, they could wander around anywhere they wanted. If you'll remember, for the first part of 1965, the Senator had the ground floor, the street level at Constitution and First, Northeast. Then across the hall was the mail room. Joe Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] had his office over there. The door was always open. Reporters would wander in and tap Joe on the shoulder or... They always had access to me, although they might get backed up a little bit. And they always had access to Edelman [Peter B. Edelman] and Walinsky [Adam Walinsky]. Now they were very busy; that was not at all their primary function. But they would get in to see them. There was no restriction. It was very much *laissez faire* that way.

GREENE: There was objection to stories about the staff?

BARTHELMES: I think the staff was reluctant to have stories about itself and always discouraged--to my knowledge--always discouraged it. I don't remember that there was a great fascination with staff at first except for just a piece saying Joe Dolan was the AA [administrative assistant], and the bright people like Walinsky and Edelman would be brought up. I think the fascination with staff perhaps began a little later, particularly in '68. Thimmesch in his book mentions staff. *Robert Kennedy at Forty* had some reference to the staff, but there's not a great deal there.

Where the fascination was, I think, with the inquisitive reporters was: "Is this the *de jure* and the *de facto* staff? Or is there a kitchen cabinet somewhere in the basement or other out at Hickory Hill. Is all the work done here? Or

does he consult?" The questions would take that tone, you know, "Does he consult with Arthur Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.], Bundy [McGeorge Bundy], even though he's still in the government, Arthur Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg], who was then on the Court? Whom else does he talk to, whom else does he see?" There was a fascination with, "Where are everybody out in the shadows?" But I don't remember in the first few months that there was any great attention to staff. But the reporters were perfectly free to wander around, interview Angie Novello [Angela M. Novello] if they wanted to.

GREENE: Why was the staff so reluctant to be interviewed?

BARTHELMES: Well, I think it was if for nothing else, just self-protection. They were there as surrogates or agents, but Kennedy was the Senator. Robert Kennedy was the Senator. An individual member of the staff wasn't. They could perhaps speak for the Senator, but they were reluctant to become personalities in their own right. There may have been a little of this that did develop later, but I think in '65 and '66 it was a largely a self-effacing staff. Down at the White House during John Kennedy's time, individual members of the White House staff became sort of celebrities of their own, but I never saw any impulse for that in the '65-'66 period. That was my impression.

GREENE: Did you ever get information from press people with special contacts, like in the labor movement or civil rights groups? Do you ever use them for sources of information?

BARTHELMES: Well, there were some helpful reporters. John Herling, who has an office down in 1003 K Street, Northwest, has a labor column that's syndicated. It appears in the Scripps-Howard paper here in Washington, the *Washington Daily News*. John was very useful. He had particularly good contacts with the Steelworkers and the UAW and other primarily CIO [Congress of Industrial Organization] unions, before the merger with the AFL [American Federation of Labor]. He was quite helpful as to attitudes. Then there was a fellow by the name of Don Ellinger, E-I-I-I-n-g-e-r, W. Don Ellinger, who is now the, what I call the political agent for the machinists union [International Association of Machinists]

down at Connecticut and N by Dupont Circle. He was particularly helpful. He was very helpful. He was really very friendly in a union that with Al Hayes [A.J. Hayes] as President, was not at all favorably disposed towards Kennedy. There's two examples there. I think the labor movement--I think it was useful because the labor movement was not, at the upper level and even into the middle level, was not favorably disposed towards Senator Kennedy. So contacts there were useful as to what people were thinking or where there might be a

possibility for invitations to appear before a convention, state convention, national convention. But I think that Senator Kennedy's contacts, for example in government, were such that I don't believe that a reporter--I'm using this illustratively--who covered the State Department, no matter how good his contacts, would really inform him of anything before someone else in the State Department had. I think his contacts within the executive branch were quite strong. He had a great deal of help from government employees.

GREENE: But outside the government, in civil rights or business, was there anything like you've described in labor?

BARTHELMES: I think on civil rights one of the valuable continuing contacts he had was Charles Evers [J. Charles Evers]. I don't think any reporter in that area had anything to offer that Evers wasn't able to pass the word to him, at least on anything very important. [Pause] Then there was a great number of people who were willing to help the Senator in New York City. Mrs. Guggenheimer [Elinor C. Guggenheimer] on conservation and pollution was very helpful to him, meeting the city people and the state people on conservation work, and helping to arrange a tour of New York City by helicopter. Secretary [Stewart L.] Udall arranged for the helicopter. But in terms of where to go, and to have at Tavern-on-the-Green a luncheon that was put together, it was Mrs. Guggenheim. She turned out to be very helpful. I don't think that reporters except in the labor movement were very helpful to him. There were a good many who were willing to be helpful. But I think his sources were superior to theirs.

Now, there was one area that he did have an interest in

[-93-]

and reporters, certain reporters for newspapers in Europe, I think probably evidenced some helpfulness. You remember on the earlier tape I told you that it was my impression that at least a few correspondents stationed in Washington for foreign newspapers, particularly those in Italy and France, had some connection with the foreign offices of these nations. Also a German chain, Springer [Verlag] newspaper had a reporter who sort of dogged the office a great deal. But the Kennedys had always had an affinity or a liking for things British. And the British correspondents with the exception of Henry Brandon, who seemed not to like us and so wrote.... But Midgley [John Midgley] at the *Economist*, who was stationed in Washington in 1965-1966, still is I believe, and one or two others for the British papers would come to see him. He was always very willing to see them. Then there was a fellow who was stationed in Washington for one of the Prague papers by the name of Jirai Hockman, H-o-c-k-m-a-n, J-i-r-a-i. He was mentioned, as a matter of fact, as having been sent to Coventry, in a story in the *Washington Post* this morning, as an example of what's happening to the reformist group in Czechoslovakia. Hockman showed up and evidenced an interest in talking to him. He was very willing to see him quickly. Hockman was recalled in, I think '67, recalled home.

The *Tass* reporters, there were two *Tass* reporters who evidenced an interest, or attempted to cultivate me, but they never asked to see the Senator. I had a bunch of separate luncheons, one supper, and one night at the [Soviet] Embassy. But it was all very surface. It

was about the weather and types of coverages and how *Tass* covers the news and how the Moscow papers cover the so-called city news. It was simply an intramural thing. They had made the overture, but it was all very surface. But there were.... Jirai Hockman's the one that stands out in my mind. There was a reporter for the Polish paper, the Polish Press Agency. The Senator had been to Poland, probably in '64.

GREENE: Right.

BARTHELMES: There was a short, heavysset fellow with thick glasses, I don't remember his name; I could find it in my files. He represented the Polish Press Agency. He was stationed here in '65 and '66. The Senator agreed to, I think, two requests by him to be interviewed.

[-94-]

One thing more often than not with the Senator--which was unexpected to me but made some sense--was usually whether it be American correspondents, American reporters, or foreign correspondents with one or two exceptions, he preferred to be interviewed alone. I remember one of the first interviews when I was there was a magazine writer by the name of Milton Viorst. Viorst was ushered in the Senator's inner office and I stayed. And the Senator said, "Well, you don't have to stay." My feelings were hurt at first. But then I talked to him later. And then I talked to Ed Guthman [Edwin O. Guthman] who said that more often than not, he'd want to talk to them alone because he felt that he had problems enough with press people, who went in aggressively to him, but who were getting to know him. They tended to feel they were being monitored, thought they were being monitored. He thought that this was just one more burden he didn't have to bear. So more often than not in his office he was interviewed "unprotected." There were occasions like this fellow Ted Knap from the *World Telegram*, and there were one or two others whose names I don't remember, where he would say in advance, "Please stay in." This was a distinguishing characteristic, I thought. Because I know that other members of Congress I've worked for usually have wanted someone else in there.

GREENE: To cover them in case.

BARTHELMES: Yeah. To be monitored. Mrs. Green [Edith S. Green], for example, always wanted to be monitored, and the press treated her graciously, and for the most part accurately. She always wanted someone in with her, and one or two others I worked for did. At least this was my experience. I don't know about others who came after me. This isn't to say that this is true if you're on a train, or on a plane, or in a car. Obviously a good many interviews, as I said in the other tape, were conducted on the fly because everyone was so busy.

GREENE: In those cases he generally liked having you there?

BARTHELMES: Yes. Then he just talked.

GREENE: Yeah.

BARTHELMES: But in his office, usually he asked to be alone.

[-95-]

GREENE: Was he working on any book in the time you were with him? Had he started *To Seek A Newer World*?

BARTHELMES: Yes, just faintly. Just beginning. There was a feeling he should write it. There was a feeling that Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] had and others of us had that somehow he should do a book. There was a feeling that this is one of the things that he should do in an area in which he felt at home with and which he had a deep interest in. So there had been some discussion as early as January, February of '65.

GREENE: How involved would the staff get in something like that?

BARTHELMES: Well, Adam Walinsky particularly would get increasingly involved.

GREENE: Doing the research or accumulating ideas?

BARTHELMES: Accumulating ideas, discussing it in bits and pieces One day, today, next week and a little bit here and there. It was sort of on the middle burner. It wasn't on the front and it wasn't back. There were many burners in the Kennedy office. There weren't just front ones and back ones. This one was sort of in the middle burner--sort of when you had time. There really wasn't any time much for anything, but you made time.

GREENE: There wasn't any time set on it, when it should be published or anything like that.

BARTHELMES: No.

GREENE: What was the general procedure for, preparing him for a press conference, or for one of the interview shows when he began to do those? Was there a similar process, and who got involved?

BARTHELMES: I thought for newspaper interviews where an individual would be granted an individual interview, since the interviewer always asked what was on his mind—

[-96-]

“Would you like to talk about Vietnam? Would you like to talk about politics in New York State?”--the Senator should be informed in advance of the topic. But there was no skull session, no bonding up on those or in group ones. He would have press in, particularly the New York State press, in Watertown, Buffalo, and Syracuse, and other papers who had correspondents here. He developed the habit of having them in the afternoon for a drink and a chat--four or five o'clock in the afternoon for a couple of hours. There was no boning up for those occasions. There was, I think it's fair to say, extensive prepping for television appearances. But if you'll remember--the panel shows--we did no panel shows, I don't believe, until February, '66. But there was extensive preparation for those--you know, “What questions will be asked?” and, “I want to answer it this way.” And then we'd have sort of a simulated interview which usually took place in Hickory Hill the Sunday morning of the Sunday panel show, for example.

GREENE: Who would get involved in it?

BARTHELMES: Adam. Peter. They were the two legislative people. I'd be around the fringe and Joe Dolan would be out there with that knack of his for saying, you know, how they were going to hook him--how the reporters were going to hook him; what are the curves.

GREENE: Was anyone from the outside ever brought in for this?

BARTHELMES: My recollection of people from the outside, beyond the paid staff, brought in for the appearance in early '66 for the Sunday panel shows on the networks: “Face the Nation,” “Meet the Press,” “Issues and Answers”—all three networks: ABC, CBS, NBC--Fred Dutton was at one of the preparatory sessions at Hickory Hill and Dick Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] was at another. It seemed to me that a fellow by the name of Charles Frankel, who had been in the State Department as an Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural affairs (I think was probably the title--I'm not quite clear) was at still another or possible at the one Goodwin was at. But they weren't particularly prominent. They were there and they were sort of a resource. But for the most part it seemed to me those that carried the preparation, the simulation for the shows were probably Walinsky and to a lesser extent Edelman. I think

[-97-]

that's probably about the way it was. But there was extensive preparation.

GREENE: Would they practice by throwing him questions and having him respond?

BARTHELMES: Yeah. The way it would work is it was known in advance who the panelist would be, the newspaper reporters. There would obviously be Spivak [Lawrence E. Spivak], who'd had a long association with the Kennedys and actually seemed to be rather favorably disposed towards them. Then, oh,

perhaps Pete Lisagor [Peter I. Lisagor] from the *Chicago Daily News* was a panelist on one occasion. But anyway we'd know in advance who the panelists were and what their interests were and perhaps what their relationship was, if any, with one or more of the Kennedys-- what their interests were; what their beefs were, and the papers they worked for. From that direction we--from that we attempted to draw what the hypothetical questions would be and also what questions were being raised editorially, for example, in the paper at that time.

One of the recurring questions, if you are looking for the category of what I always call "hooker questions", there were two or three of those. One was this recurring business which the Kennedys always seem to be beset by. It was a chance remark the Senator had made about the distribution of blood plasma to combatants in the Vietnamese war, regardless of "whose side they were on." It got very garbled in the telling and the retelling. But as the Senator said once, it wasn't his "finest hour." And it was misunderstood. He wasn't as clear as he could have been. It got misunderstood. And pretty soon it got to the point where he was being portrayed as recommending that blood be sent to the North Vietnamese, which isn't what he said. This was one of the questions that was given to him in these preparatory sessions. Also one of the questions at the time in the February show was how best to meet Vice President Humphrey's [Hubert H. Humphrey] remark when he was in Vietnam, you know, in response to the Kennedy position...

GREENE: Letting the fox.

BARTHELMES: Letting the foxes in the chicken coops. My recollection is on one occasion, I think for the "Meet

[-98-]

the Press" show, which was the first panel show that was accepted, that there was a brief session on Saturday night. But then there was a full two hours or so late Sunday morning. It seems to me the arrival time at the Studio was around 12:30. The show was live at 1:00. This was one thing about the show being held in one of the studios downtown--the Kennedy staff would show up. It didn't matter what the particular staff member's function was. Alice Roosevelt Longworth would come as a member of the audience every time. Usually Senator Edward Kennedy would have her in tow. She always sat with Edward Kennedy and Ethel Kennedy. What that connection was and how that came about, I don't know. But my recollection is that she was at least at two of three successive Sunday panel shows in the audience.

GREENE: How did he usually feel he did on those programs?

BARTHELMES: I don't think he ever felt that he did very well. In the previous tape I told you about the time that he and Javits [Jacob K. Javits] appeared on the program. I think he was very uncertain in front of television. I don't know whether.... I think he knew that there were those who were glibber and those who were more facile and those who had some sort of quick pat response. I think he always compared himself- and I think in some respects unfairly--with that unfairly because he

wasn't glib and he wasn't pat and he wasn't facile. I don't think he ever was satisfied, even though he sought, understandably, reassurance, "How did I do?" For the most part everyone, for the moment, would say he did fine. Maybe the next day they'd say, "Well, the next time perhaps you should not pause so long, or say something along these lines." But I don't think he was ever convinced that he did very well.

I've never known him in my time to walk away from a television appearance satisfied at all. As a matter of fact, he was rather edgy about the whole thing. But in contrast newspaper interviews, mass or individual magazines, the printed interviews never phased him at all. He never voiced doubt or uncertainty. Nor did he on radio. Now, he would be on the Barry Gray show. Barry Gray liked to have him at WNEW, in New York. He would go on the Barry Gray show from time to time. Barry Gray used to call him and want him. This was fine radio. But television, I think television was a real problem for him.

[-99-]

GREENE: Did he prefer the tougher question, those which put him on the spot?

BARTHELMES: Well, in the preparation he always wanted it. You know, he wanted the difficult question thrown out at him.

GREENE: Did he ever get annoyed on a program like that when he felt the questions were unfair or....

BARTHELMES: I think so. But I don't remember any specific question. I think, once again, what it reflected was: "Why are you asking me that? This isn't what I'm saying." Or, "This isn't relevant to my position. You don't understand what I'm saying." Because his position on Vietnam in February of '66, which I think now everyone is coming around to but was sort of disparaged at the time, was the position of the NLF in a settlement and whether they should have a share in divising a provisional government as well as any sort of constitutional convention. These were very subtle things that were

[BEGIN TAPE II, SIDE II]

very easy to misinterpret at the time.

And on television when he would seek to explain it, it would either end up as too long a response that never really was understood. But he was visibly unhappy with the questions from time to time. As I said the last time we met, the only time I ever saw him erupt was not on a regular network panel show; it was the time that he was on a pre-tape television appearance with Abe Beame [Abraham David Beame] when he broke into the show and pounded on the desk and said "Abe, show some life. Say something." But that was not really the question. But that was the only time.

GREENE: Was the preparation for a formal press conference similar to that for a panel show? Did you also brief him and practice?

BARTHELMES: No. As I say, there was almost no preparation on those interviews that took place in his office either, where there was one or more than one reporter. Except he wanted to know, and understandably as every public official did, “What are they interested in? What questions are

[-100-]

they going to ask me? What topics am I going to be interviewed on?” Once he knew that, there was never any of this preparation.

I think the contrast was quite marked. I think on television it can be described as intensive preparation, but radio, no. He’d just get out of the car and go on the Barry Gray Show. There was simulation when he was going to be interviewed by newspaper people.

There was one exception that I remember any sort of preparation on, and that was a press conference that was televised, as well as having newspaper reporters present. That was February ‘66, when he made a statement on a Saturday morning in 1204 in the Senate Office Building, on Vietnam. It had taken three or four days to develop that speech. As I know it, there may be other pieces of it; as I know it, he had been wanting to say something. He was very tied up, as we discussed before. Very often he did not speak out on a major issue because he felt that he would be accused of doing it because of spite against Johnson or people would say he was running for President, whatever. So many times if he were the “garden variety Senator” he would have spoken out. He was inhibited on a good many occasions.

But if you will remember, that February speech was preceded that whole week by hearings before the Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee. On either Wednesday or Thursday--it may have been Friday--it was Friday of that week, Dean Rusk testified all day. It was quite apparent....The television set was on, one of the few times the set was used by the Senator. Often the staff would use it to catch the 6:30, 7 o’clock Cronkite [Walter Cronkite], Brinkley [David Brinkley] news to see if the things he had said during were being on. We’d monitor it. This was one of the few occasions *he* watched it.

You could see, as Friday went on, the prodding Buddha-like approach that Rusk made, this impenetrability—“Why are we there?” “Because we’re there.” I mean it was this type of thing. My judgment on watching this is this is really what triggered his decision that, “I’ve got to speak out.” There was the accumulation of the whole week, plus other dissatisfactions with the course of the war in Vietnam. The Fulbright hearings, particularly the Rusk appearances is what, I think, really decided that he’s just got to say something.

The intense frantic preparation that went on until 2:30, 2:45, 3 o’clock in the morning at Hickory Hill with drafts and redraft and consultations and notifications to Meyers that the speech

[-101-]

was being given so the White House would know. We were reading it to Bob McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] on the phone, portions of it, the outline of it. McNamara was still Secretary of Defense. Then that morning I think the press conference was at 10:30 or 11:00.

And early that morning he did want to say (A) "How will it be received, and what are they apt to ask me about? Is it too involved or too complicated?" There was preparation on that. And that was mixed, newspaper reporters, television and radio. There was preparation. That's the only time that I know of any preparation of that sort.

[In the following passages there is some confusion between events relating to South Africa and to Latin America.]

GREENE: How involved did you get in the preparation for the Latin American trip?

BARTHELMES: I didn't go on the Latin American trip, but I was involved in a good many of the details of the trip. There was the problem first of finding officials or knowledgeable persons within the State Department and outside the State Department, on the campuses, for example, who would be able to give the Senator an understandable and comprehensive briefing on the situation in Africa in the whole and South Africa in particular.

GREENE: I had asked you about Latin America. But that's all right, the next thing is South Africa, whichever you want to do.

BARTHELMES: On Latin America--talking into the Peace Corps. I talked to Mankiewicz [Frank F. Mankiewicz] on the phone, whose name I heard about. But I talked to him on the phone about it. At one point I think he volunteered to come up and talk about it at some length. He was very impressive. I think he was Deputy Director to Latin America, it's my recollection. I was talking to those who were in the faculty at the University of Syracuse, Columbia University, people whose names escape me, who had some knowledge and were recommended. There was a woman, Professor Carolyn May, I think was her name, who had spent some time in South Africa and was here in this country. I think she was South African by birth. We had her

[-102-]

in. I think the upshot was because three or four of the more reputable ones, who were the most highly recommended, were in New York State or at least above Washington. I think there was a session at the Carlyle in the Kennedy suite there. I think later on at one point, there was a session out at Hickory Hill one evening. And I was involved simply in the nuts and bolts of the mechanics, which aren't of any great interest, in talking to Pan Am [Pan American Airlines] about the flight. And also there was one fellow, I'd have to look at my notes, who was in the State Department, who had been in the State Department and now in New York, who seemed quite knowledgeable about it. He was very useful. He got in to see the Senator just on a spot basis. I thought he was very useful and that he ought to talk to him. And he did. Then I was working with Tom Johnston [Thomas M.C. Johnston] up in New York on how to put it together. I think Tom finally went down to Latin America ahead of time.

GREENE: Yeah, I think so.

BARTHELMES: Then, at one point, I think Seigenthaler, John Seigenthaler [John Lawrence Seigenthaler], then with the *Nashville Tennessean*, was brought in. Then John Nolan [John E. Nolan], who was in the Justice Department, a practicing lawyer in Washington, was brought into it, too. Then from the departure time on, I wasn't with him. So I don't know.

GREENE: Do you know anything about his briefings at the State Department? Were you present for any of those?

BARTHELMES: I was not. I know of one. But it's secondhand. You may have heard of it. It was a very famous one.

GREENE: Wasn't that where he first met Mankiewicz? Wasn't he present at the briefing?

BARTHELMES: My recollection is that I had talked to Frank on the telephone. Frank was very cooperative and obviously very friendly and had offered to come up and talk to the Senator. I thought that they had met up in Kennedy's office in the New Senate office Building, but I may

[-103-]

be mistaken on that. I thought this had happened.

GREENE: It is possible. This is just from my...

BARTHELMES: But there was a very.... I only know this secondhand; someone should talk to, say, Walinsky about it. There was a very disputatious session down in the State Department with others, including Jack Vaughn, who was then director of the Peace Corps. It leaked into the newspapers finally. But it was a very hairy and a very disputatious session. Quite understandably, it was in the pattern of Senator Kennedy's, Robert Kennedy's impatience with the standard, pat, conventional format and the standard, pat, conventional position on foreign policy that he was getting in this case on Latin America from the State Department. And he was just breaking in and saying this was a waste of his time, as I understood it. He wanted to really know. I understand Mankiewicz was there and that Mankiewicz was telling it as it is, so to speak. But whoever was sort of the chief State Department spokesman.... But my understanding is that this particular State Department man was very cagey and very guarded, as if it were an adversary proceeding.

My understanding, which you ought to check out, is that the format, the way the room was arranged, the way the tables were, that the Senator came in to find a seating format as if he were taking a bar examination or being interviewed for appointment to a military

academy. He came in and there were these people facing him. And it just from the very beginning was a bad scene. I was not there, but I sure heard about it within an hour after, you know, when everyone came up. Adam was there and he talked about it. Whether Peter Edelman was there, I don't remember. I'm sure Adam was there.

GREENE: I think it was the Glass [Andrew J. Glass] article that said that you were feeding him reports while he was in Latin America about the response to the trip back here.

BARTHELMES: That's true. That's true.

GREENE: Was this a common process?

[-104-]

BARTHELMES: Well, I thought it was part of my job. I think any press secretary.... You know, what are they saying on the trip--I mean is it a sort of a crowd story? You know, you go to Lima and there are ten thousand. Then you go to Caracas and there are fifteen thousand, and all you get is a crowd story, but nothing about what he's saying. One or two places, as I recall, it was sort of, "Senator Kennedy came to Peru, but embassy officials were holding their breath that...." You know; it was one of these things, as if somehow he was some foreign presence that had no business there. So we were looking out for him. For the most part, I think the reception was quite good. The newspaper reports were quite good.

There was one exception--this is one of the reasons I made a particular point of it--was that Jerry O'Leary, Jeremiah O'Leary, Jr., Jerry O'Leary, Jr. of the *Evening Star* was covering Latin America for the *Star* then; I think he still is, as a matter of fact, in 1969. He was a close friend of Jack Vaughn. He would not be writing daily, but every two or three days there would be a dispatch. I thought they reflected very much sort of the State Department line--the interloper coming down disturbing things. You know, he shouldn't say anything about the IPC [International Petroleum Co.], the negotiating of the IPC and Peru, that's very sensitive. And he's seeing the students and he's not seeing, you know, the "real" Peruvian, the businessman, or the Chilean businessman. He wants to see students; he wants to see Indians; you know, he wants to see people.

That's not how he's supposed to do it. He's supposed to have an embassy party; he's supposed to go through all that. Tom Johnston, I know as he told me afterwards, was very brutal about it. He, Johnston, told our Embassy people, "We don't want garden parties and all. We really want to get into the hollows and see people and talk." And this was a very distracting and disrupting thing, I gather. But I think it was part of the job to inform him of what kind of reception, either by cable or by telephone. Also, the representative clips were sent down by air mail special or by State Department courier. Some arrived and some didn't.

There was someone in the State Department on that trip to Latin America whom I should mention because I think he was helpful. There was a fellow then at the State Department by the name of Pedro Sanjuan, Sanjuan as in Puerto Rico. Pedro

Sanjuan's father-in-law was Edward Martin [Edwin McCammon Martin] who was then U.S. Ambassador to Argentina. He'd had a run-in with Tom Mann [Thomas Clifton Mann]. Pedro Sanjuan was in the State Department and had earned Robert Kennedy's trust, gratitude, confidence because he had been assigned the dirty job in '62 or '63 of grappling with the housing problem in Washington, D.C., and the suburbs, for African Diplomats. So that he would have to sit down with Shannon and Luchs [Company] and W.C. and A.N. Miller [Development Company], whatever that outfit is in Spring Valley and various places. He'd say, "It's too late in the country's life to run your business this way." Pedro Sanjuan had a great deal to do with breaking the housing barrier for Africans. [Pedro and I were good friends at the time.] This is confirmed also from talking with Ed Guthman and also with Senator Kennedy himself. I know he [RFK] spoke very admiringly of Pedro Sanjuan. The State Department was very unhappy about Pedro's role. It didn't really bother them apparently about African diplomats. They were more concerned about Nordic diplomats. So Pedro Sanjuan really.... The way it worked out was that Sanjuan would report directly any apparently insoluble problems that he had in this area of housing to Robert Kennedy, who was the Attorney General then. He'd go in and say, "For crying out loud, we're in a problem with the Mali Embassy or Shannon and Luchs."

Robert Kennedy then could go talk to the brother (President Kennedy) or do any number of things; or by being his brother's surrogate he could really lean on this problem. That's how they the Senator and Pedro, got to know each other. He had the advantage of being related to Ed Martin, who was admiring of the Kennedys, and had had a run-in with Tom Mann, who was then Assistant Secretary, I guess, for Latin American Affairs. So Pedro was very useful, very helpful. He did make the trip. He was very useful in putting this thing together. Professor Campbell [Waldemar B. Campbell] at the University of Syracuse was another one I talked to extensively. He also had entrée, anyway into Robert Kennedy's office because of his previous involvement in the John Kennedy Administration. But I would send representative clips down and also by cable very briefly so he could see what kind of "play" they got. For the most part, it was rather good.

GREENE: Did you do anything to generate publicity before or during or even after that?

BARTHELMES: Well, the one aspect I did forget about was a matter of, yeah, soliciting interest from the press in accompanying the Senator, from wire services and the newspapers, magazines. It really didn't take a great deal of effort because people were automatically interested. My recollection is the wire services let it (the trip) be handled by their stringers in these various places. But the New York papers, I guess except for the *New York Daily News*--the *Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times* were the two that sent people down. And then *Life* and *Look*, Stan Tretick [Stanley Tretick].

The (broadcasting) networks were the thing that took some problems because of the relative inflexibility because of mechanical equipment with television and the networks--how do they go down, what equipment, what pool arrangement, need there be a pool arrangement, and what have you? That took some effort. And once again there was the extreme competitiveness of the networks, something beyond the competitiveness of newspapers of wanting exclusive this and exclusive that. They were trying to set him up after the end of each, the visit in each country. Each one wanted to get something themselves for their news report back home. That was, part of it.

GREENE: Can you recall any discussions with him when he came back--just what he'd found and how he felt about it, who he blamed for what he regarded as shortcomings?

BARTHELMES: Nothing very specifically except, I would think, a rather profound discouragement, a rather profound discouragement about the quality of the State Department personalities encountered in most of the countries. I think Argentina was an exception. One of the things I don't think he was surprised at, except he was nevertheless discouraged about it, was the fact of the involuted nature of the diplomatic colonies in these various countries. He was disappointed at the United States embassies, the lack of knowledge about the language, the lack of knowledge about, you know, the "garden variety" of citizen. They knew the businessmen, and they knew other embassy people, but there were very few who were sensitive really to the problems of the peasants and the problems of the Indian and the problem of American business, economic penetration

[-107-]

in these countries. I think he was not impressed at all with the level of knowledge there. And more important than that--cultural insensitivity. Because this is something he was always aware of--was the relative insensitivity to the real world and the real problems of the country. And how, generally, the State Department people tended--this is not his phrase, it's my phrase--the tendency of the State Department to refuse to "go native" upset him. They refused to fall into the pattern of the government to whom they are accredited, both as to party and the administration that's in power. And they didn't understand--you know, "Why are there guerrillas in the hills?" I mean they didn't condone whatever violence and mayhem that occurred, but they had no idea why this should occur. There must be some reason, unless you would lay everything to Moscow goals. There must be some reason, real indigenous reason for this within the country. Never mind the business of Che [Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna] and Castro [Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz] and some conspiratorial theory. Are there things in the country that would have generated this anyway without whatever encouragement there might be elsewhere? I think he was very disturbed by this failing. He talked succinctly but I thought despondently about that.

GREENE: How did he feel about the Alliance for Progress?

BARTHELMES: I never was there when he talked specifically about the Alliance. I think it was, you know, just generally in terms of what he found domestically--just so much to be done. He saw so much that had to be remedied and so little being done. The people in the position of helping were doing relatively so little. I think the one government he seemed impressed by probably was the Frei [Eduardo Frei Montalva] government in Chile, F-r-e-i. It seems to me he went to Peru disposed to the Belaúnde-Terry [Fernando Belaúnde-Terry] government, but my impression was, without his being specific when he returned, that he was less than admiring of it because I think he saw some of the problems with the IPC when he was down there. But I think that the Chilean government, at least Frei himself, I should say--he had a very long (and he told me) rewarding conversation with Frei.

GREENE: I think he said at one point that he admired him as much as any leader that he had met.

[-108-]

BARTHELMES: He had a long conversation with Frei. One of the things that he appreciated, as I recall, is that it was an unmonitored conversation. There weren't, you know, three aides and two translators--he and Frei. I'm not sure whether there was or was not a translator there, but he and Frei were, in a sense, by themselves. But the Belaúnde thing--I don't think he was impressed with Belaunde, as it turned out, in meeting him. He wasn't competent; he didn't impress him. But Frei, he was...

GREENE: Which State Department people were most disappointing? You mentioned Mann before. Was he...?

BARTHELMES: Well, Mann wasn't on the trip. I think I was using Mann in juxtaposition to Ed Martin who was then the ambassador and Pedro Sanjuan's father-in-law. I think he felt that the Embassy in Lima was.... He gave me the impression that the Embassy in Lima was excessively sympathetic to the Standard Oil [of New Jersey] and that the AID [Agency for International Development] people in the State Department, the State Department people in our Embassy in Lima, were much too complacent in acceptance of the suspension of AID programs in Peru. This was really intolerable and unwise. You know, it was very unwise, very shortsighted. He was very distressed about that. And one of the things I gather that distressed the State Department people was that at the first opportunity, he wanted to break off and take off to the campuses and take to the hills, which he was reasonably successful in doing. But this would tie in.... I was not involved in those specific things. I think Tom Johnston was, but I didn't tie in with that same.... It was in the same area as I discussed about my role with invitation. It didn't matter whether it was a member of Congress or what organization it was, you know, "I'm coming in. If I speak at nine, I come in five minutes before, I make my speech and I leave. I'm not going to sit for two hours of toasts and black-tie chatter."

My understanding from Tom Johnston was the same way. You know, "We're not going to have a supper and then a garden party and then a tour and see everybody's house.

It's not a Georgetown garden tour. You know, I really want to see it." This was very brutally put. They kept it down. There was some problem in Buenos Aires, as I recall. But for the most part....

[-109-]

And they did get away in Brazil.

GREENE: To the Amazon?

BARTHELMES: Yeah. In the Amazon story. That was in Andy Glass' story.

GREENE: What about the strange conglomeration of people of people that Glass talks about having been along on this trip. Do you know how they were put together?

BARTHELMES: Those were just people that the Kennedys in some way invited themselves. Amanda Burden and various others. I think Mrs. Burden probably was Mrs. [Ethel] Kennedy's guest. I don't even remember [the name of] some that went. But that was done outside the office. I mean it was done at Hickory Hill or somewhere else. It wasn't done within the office, except in being told and having to tell Pan Am that there were various people being picked up along the route, including some in Miami, as I recall. The plane went from New York to Miami. Some got on at Miami.

GREENE: How did he feel about the White House's lack of attention to the trip or lack of follow-through? Was this disappointing? Jules Witcover makes a big point of this, saying that Kennedy resented the fact that each time he took a trip of some sort, especially his Latin American trip, that it was ignored by the White House. They didn't seem to feel that he had anything to contribute on his return. Do you remember any discussion of this nature?

BARTHELMES: I don't. No, I don't.

GREENE: Is there anything else on that trip that you'd like to talk about?

BARTHELMES: No. I don't think so. I don't think so.

GREENE: Now, you had started before to talk about the South African trip. At what point did that first come under consideration.

BARTHELMES: As far as I know, the genesis of the South African

[-110-]

trip began with a letter from the head [Ian A. Robertson] of the NUSAS [National Union of South African Students] student union or one of the student unions in South Africa, whose name I don't remember now, asking if he [RFK] would come over. It was an anniversary in connection with the student union as I remember. My impression was when the letter came through, that it sounded rather unlikely. It sounded as if he (Robertson) didn't really expect a positive answer. It seemed a rather difficult assignment. It was picked up right away, and thought was given to it. It was discussed in terms of the effect of his visit to South Africa, the attitude of the Administration which was always uncooperative and hostile. I think the Johnson Administration, or at least in its agents—they always were the ones that circulated the idea, as far as I was concerned, that this (RFK and his allies) was some sort of government in exile. Well, that's.... It really was. But it really for the most part was really their suspicions. It was their attitude that gave it edges and gave it definitions in a way. That was always a problem.

Then it was obviously compounded into what would be the attitude of the national government in South Africa. I don't remember names, but there was some dissent or dispute as to whether the trip should be undertaken.

GREENE: Do you remember the arguments against it?

BARTHELMES: Oh, simply that probably that it would be sort of a tour de force and a coup de theatre and all that, but that on the other hand, it could be destructive. Something might happen and it would get out of hand. Even, perhaps, after the Senator left there might be some backwash on it. It might make the position of the Bantus more difficult afterwards, or it might stir them to the point that there might be some kind of civil disturbance. It seems to me someone from the Steve Smith's office said, "Well, if Bobby's going to do it, this is one trip I want to make." I think it was decided pretty much within the clan whether to go or not, as I remember, as I saw it. But then there were a number of people who were called in on it. Wayne Fredericks was called in on it, down at the State Department. I believe he's still there. And there was a fellow at the state Department by the name of Waldemar Campbell, who's not there anymore.

[-111-]

I want to say Argyle Campbell, but that's not his name.

GREENE: Was it Allen Campbell [Alan Keith Campbell]?

BARTHELMES: I don't think it was Allen Campbell. No I would have to go back to the State Department phone directory of that period and look. I have it. Unlikely name, Waldemar Campbell, W-a-l-d-e-m-a-r Campbell. He was very knowledgeable in a technical way. But he was someone you could talk to, and you didn't ever know how he felt about it. But he would tell you all the information. He was very helpful. I don't know as he ever met the Senator but he certainly was very helpful.

Then it was decided that he would go. Then the Senator said, "Call Wayne Fredericks and ask him if he can come up to see me sometime at his convenience." Most of the Kennedy

requests were at “another’s convenience.” Fredericks came up. They talked for half an hour—I was not there—and left. The he came back a week or two later for about half an hour. I had the impression from Senator Kennedy that Fredericks was not unfavorable toward him. If he weren’t encouraging, at least he was open about it. And probably he was encouraging. Again I began with this trip arranging with Pan Am on who would go. What began to happen....

I’m blurred about the chronology. It became known in the *New York Times* from the South African correspondent there for the *Times*, who has since been expelled, Joseph Lelyveld [Joseph S. Lelyveld]. He’s in West Germany, or he’s some—I think he’s in Western Europe now. He confirmed it by calling the Kennedy office one Saturday night about 8 o’clock. I remember I got a call at home. It was cleared through his home office. The Senator was in Staten Island, as I remember, at Congressman Murphy’s [John M. Murphy] clubhouse shindig. It was agreed that it was all right to tell the *Times* because he was getting it from the (NUSAS) student people. When he confirmed it, then other student groups and other colleges within the Republic of South Africa began to write asking, “While you’re here, why don’t you come see us?”

And it grew as things do, not like Topsy, it grew in a very deliberate and structured way. I had sort of a Chamber of Commerce overseas invitation that was accepted. Then there were one or two other colleges. One of them was a

[-112-]

deeply conservative college, the Afrikaner college. Then it grew into more than just one appearance in and out. Then there were approaches by the Algerian Embassy and one or two other countries, to appear. Then it was suggested by those who thought that it would be useful if the Senator went to the South-West African Trust Territory and one or two other black countries. Some of these were turned down.

GREENE:                   How did you finally arrive at Ethiopia and Kenya and Tanzania? I believe those were the three outside of South Africa.

BARTHELMES:        I don’t know about the Ethiopian one at all, and very little about the other ones. I know the Tanzanian people had expressed interest through Campbell. We’d get calls from Campbell saying, “It’s my understanding that if the Senator did in fact go to the Republic of South Africa, that countries X and Y would not be adverse to his appearance.” So Kenya was one he mentioned and Tanzania. Tanzania was the first one he mentioned. Then Kenya was mentioned. I don’t remember Ethiopia. I know there were one or two others including Algeria. But Algeria didn’t need any help from the State Department because the Kennedys had some contacts in Algeria of their own. I think Senator Kennedy was intrigued by Tanzania particularly, with such a difficult country geographically, the way it was put together. Secondly, also, there were some reports that there were some Chinese bases there. So it had some appeal plus Nyerere [Julius K. Nyerere], is that his name?

GREENE:                   Nyerere.

BARTHELMES: Nyerere seemed to be making some attractive noises at the time. So there was a disposition to go. I remember Kenya being approached, but what the basis was I really don't know other than the fact I know that Sargent Shriver [Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr.] had been there. I suppose there was a Peace Corps mission there. I don't know if that's correct. You were there. I told you about that story. Did I on tape? Is that on tape?

GREENE: No. I don't think so. That's a good story.

[-113-]

BARTHELMES: A good story? A friend of mine who worked in the Peace Corps here in Washington sent me a clipping from the *Nairobi Times*? It [the name] doesn't matter, it's an English language newspaper in Nairobi. Shriver had been there with one of Robert Kennedy's sons. The headlines on the story said, "Kennedy Visiting Here With Uncle." I showed that to Senator Kennedy. He was very tickled by it. He right away, immediately in my presence, got on the phone to Eunice Shriver [Eunice Kennedy Shriver] because he thought that she should know that. I gather by the end of the conversation, it was very hilariously greeted.

GREENE: It's funny because I remember seeing that headline and thinking, "Well, what uncle could he be here with that would warrant the headline?"

BARTHELMES: There was a great deal of chuckle and merriment over that.

GREENE: Do you recall any visits from Al Lowenstein [Allard Kenneth Lowenstein] or conversations with him in this briefing process?

BARTHELMES: No. I do not. Do you mean for any of this?

GREENE: For South Africa.

BARTHELMES: I do not. There would be times when the Senator would go to New York, and I usually went with him. If he went up, I went up at some point, if not the same trip, the plane later. But there were times when I didn't. Very often there was a lot of activity at the Carlyle at any hour of the day and night where people would be heard, and it wouldn't be very easy for me not to know about it. No. I didn't.

GREENE: What do you know about the State Department briefings, outside of this one man you mentioned, on South Africa? Was he as disappointed in their attitude as he was with Latin America?

BARTHELMES: I think he found Wayne Fredericks “very cooperative,”

[-114-]

the word was Kennedy’s. Fredericks was very cooperative and very friendly. Those are two words (of RFK’s) I remember. But I was not there during the time that Fredericks and Kennedy discussed it.

GREENE: Were there any other more formal sessions?

BARTHELMES: I don’t remember any formal meeting or format along the line of the Latin American one where Senator Kennedy went down to the State Department and met with all these people. I don’t remember anything like that. My inclination is there wasn’t any. I don’t think there was. I think maybe the first one, the Latin American one was...

GREENE: Enough.

BARTHELMES: Sufficient. I’m sure. Maybe Senator Kennedy, maybe there wasn’t one because he didn’t ask for one. The first one was asked for, sought; it was solicited. It was asked for.

GREENE: Did you anticipate the press problems with the South African government that you ran into getting visas for reporters?

BARTHELMES: Well, I thought there was a great deal of speculation as to whether in fact the South African government would welcome anyone, and if so, what could they do to make the trip, make life more difficult, make the trip more difficult. I don’t know whether anyone mentioned the specific idea of visa problems. But it was just thought that all along the route, even after arrival, there would be difficulties of some nature. We were just sort of braced for them. But I don’t know if there were actual problems after all. I don’t think there were. I don’t remember them being discussed in any particular details, except on the matter of visas for the other members of the party. I think it was discussed that way. But I don’t know if it was ever discussed in terms of the press.

GREENE: You were actually gone by the time the trip took place?

[-115-]

BARTHELMES: Yes.

GREENE: So you don’t know too much about it?

BARTHELMES: I do not. No. I do not. Nothing about it firsthand.

GREENE: Is there anything else on that trip that you can think of, preparations?

BARTHELMES: No. I don't think so.

GREENE: I want to ask you a couple of questions about polls. Were they using any polls during the time you were there? Were there any polls solicited on various issues or attitudes towards Robert Kennedy?

BARTHELMES: My recollection is there was one poll which I believe was a Kennedy poll, but I don't think it was overtly a Kennedy poll. It was taken around the time of the mayoralty as to the attitude towards candidates for the mayoralty and also the strength of various Democratic "aspirants" for the governorship. Within that there were questions as to attitudes towards Senator Kennedy. You know, "Is he doing a good job?" "What do you associate him with?" My recollection is--I don't know how I'd go about remembering--there was a question about (as usual Kennedy wanting to know how it really was) or there were questions in there about the strengths and weaknesses. "What do you regard as his weaknesses, what do you regard as his strength?" "Is he too ruthless? Is he an outsider? Do you really believe he's an outsider?"--this type of thing. It seems to me it was for internal use for the most part. It was pretty much one that was sort of a progress report of his one year as Senator, a little less.

GREENE: You don't recall the findings?

BARTHELMES: I do not. I do not recall the findings.

GREENE: Do you know who did it?

[ -116- ]

BARTHELMES: If you hadn't asked me I would have told you.

GREENE: John Kraft [Joseph Kraft]?

BARTHELMES: Yeah. Yeah. I wanted to say Joe Kraft. John Kraft.

GREENE: Can you recall him counseling any of the people that were running in '66 on the use of polls?

BARTHELMES: If he did, I don't remember. I know that one point is—your word "encouraging" just reminded me—that he did encourage Moynihan [Daniel Patrick Moynihan] in New York. It had nothing to do with your question as to the polls. But when you said that, it triggered my recollection that he actively solicited and encouraged Moynihan, who didn't turn out to be a particularly

successful candidate, as a candidate. I don't mean whether he won or lost, but simply as a candidate. He was more than nominally interested in Moynihan's candidacy.

GREENE: In just an advisory capacity, or was he...

BARTHELMES: Yeah. I think that's all.

GREENE: Was there anyone else like that in '66

BARTHELMES: Well, about that time, the Senator was interested in developing candidates for state office as well. I know that he would invite Nickerson [Eugene H. Nickerson], who was then and is now the Country Executive of Nassau County, to go upstate with him and also encourage him to make upstate speaking appearances. There was a mild flirtation, I guess is the word, a relationship with Perkins [James Alfred Perkins], the president of Cornell. That never really got beyond the talking stage. Nickerson, Eugene Nickerson, did in fact talk upstate in Buffalo and Erie County and various other places. But it was very difficult to find a candidate that made any lasting impression. Because a week or two later, you would go up to Erie County and ask Joe Crangle [Joseph F. Crangle] who was then and may now be the County Chairman, and say, "Nickerson was up here." "Yes. That's true." "Wasn't he? How did he go?"

[-117-]

Well, the point is no one remembered so to speak. He made a fine impression. There was nothing wrong with the speech, nothing wrong with the appearance. But it never lasted. No one ever remembered what he said. Nobody remembered much more about it. This happened.

Then there was an interest in Tom Watson, Jr. [Thomas John Watson, Jr.]. But it turned out there was a residency problem there because he maintained a house in Greenwich, Connecticut. That didn't really seem to fit in in terms of a New York State candidacy. Obviously the one other problem was the relationship between Mayor Wagner [Robert Ferdinand Wagner, Jr.] and Senator Kennedy which was rather distant. There was the problem of fending off the candidates that the organization had generated—the Abe Beame of New York City. The Senator was really very much on the lookout for talented younger people, relatively young, who could run for county office, state office. He was always looking for those. But he never found one for governor. As it turned out, the one for mayor never won. Those are the ones: Perkins, Watson, and Nickerson are the three I remember as the ones the Senator encouraged and sought to expose, to have them accompany him or encouraged them to take an invitation here a speaking engagement there.

GREENE: Did you work with the advertising agency?

BARTHELMES: Pappert & Koenig?

GREENE: Is it Pappert & Koenig?

BARTHELMES: I probably can't read my own writing, but we'll continue. I talked once or twice--no. I think the answer to that is no. I've had some dealings with them. I don't even remember what it was. I think there was some effort to do a voter attitude survey on potential candidates for the gubernatorial nomination for governor. The other one was to put together some, start to work on some film, get all that film, hundreds of cans of film out of the '64 campaign and try to extract from it some potential TV spots and also perhaps a full-length feature film for some period in the future. We began to work with someone there on that. But I just don't remember whom I talked to. But we're talking about the same agency.

[-118-]

GREENE: Yeah. I think maybe it's Pappert Koenig & Lois.

BARTHELMES: Oh that's right. I can put my notebook away. But that was the only....

GREENE: Last time we discussed why you left and the circumstances of it. Can you recall any discussions with Robert Kennedy or Dolan or anybody else regarding the selection of a successor?

BARTHELMES: No.

GREENE: Do you know anything about the choice of Mankiewicz and how it came about?

BARTHELMES: No.

GREENE: Had he been chosen before you decided to....

BARTHELMES: No.

GREENE: Well, after you decided to leave, before you actually...

BARTHELMES: As far as I know there was no choice.

GREENE: You didn't do anything to help him get organized?

BARTHELMES: No. Joe handled some of the press for them. It just made an impossible job even more impossible. But there was nothing, there was a period there, there was a hiatus there for several weeks, if I remember.

GREENE: That was around the time of the Africa trip?

BARTHELMES: April, May. Yeah. Because I know Robert Duncan [Robert Blackford Duncan] was then a Congressman and running for the Democratic senatorial nomination in Oregon against Howard Morgan, the other Democratic candidate. I know that beginning in January of '66 Duncan had asked me to come out and I'd said, "No", and a couple of times after that he talked about leave, and I didn't think that was the way to

[-119-]

do it. I'd either go or not go. As I discussed last time what my feelings were, that I just decided probably that it'd be good, and I'd like to do a Senate campaign on my own. I mean I wanted to run a Senate campaign of my own for someone else where I would have really the major role in it at a staff level. That intrigued me. So I did. At the time we talked about, well, the Senator said, if it didn't work out and if I didn't like it or thought I'd made a mistake, you know, to come see him and he'd fix something up.

Then when he came out in the fall of '66, I believe in October of '66, we rode the plane together side by side from Corvallis, Oregon to Portland, Oregon. It was just a brief trip, twenty, twenty-five minutes. He talked about my plans: What if Duncan did not win? I wasn't really interested in working for Duncan in the Senate (if he won). I was just interested in doing the campaign. I didn't really, as I recall, ever have any intention of coming back to the Senate with Duncan. I was just interested in the campaigning which I like to do. So he said, "Well, I've got this thing going up in Bedford-Stuyvesant that would interest you." People are not neutral about New York. Some like it, some don't. I used to like it. I wasn't very keen on New York City to live with four children, growing children, young children.

GREENE: Do you know much about the formation of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Project?

BARTHELMES: No. My impression is Edelman does. I don't know whether you've talked to Edelman yet, Peter Edelman.

GREENE: Not yet. No.

BARTHELMES: I think Edelman had a hand in it.

GREENE: I think Johnston did, too.

BARTHELMES: Tom may have. But I expect Edelman would know something on it. But then of course, John Doar [John M. Doar] went up. I don't think he went on it at the very beginning, but eventually he went.

[-120-]

GREENE: Do you know of any changes in the press operations from when you were running it to Mankiewicz' time?

BARTHELMES: It grew a little later on. Sometime in late '67 and '68 it had grown. Pat Riley [Patricia A. Riley], who was in the office at the time I was there on the reception desk, she went to work for Mankiewicz. A girl who had worked for me by the name of Wendy Cimmet had gotten married and then she got to be doing something else, possibly invitations. Then at some point, I don't remember because I wasn't there, a fellow named Hugh McDowell [Hugh McDonald]. Is that the name? Hugh McDowell, that's awfully close.

GREENE: I looked it up last time.

BARTHELMES: McDonnell.

GREENE: McDonald. Hugh McDonald.

BARTHELMES: Hugh McDonald came on from somewhere as sort of Frank's assistant. He did a lot of routine press queries, as I understood it. Frank did a lot of larger material. Now I had thought that up in New York.... I know when I, in '66 I did some scouting around for a press person to be assigned to the New York office. There was a fellow who was interested who worked for the *Herald Tribune*, which was quite obviously a losing of effort at that point. It was indeterminate as to when, but it seemed either the *Times* [*New York Times*] was going to buy it or it was just going to fold. There were one or two persons who were under consideration that I talked to by phone, asked for resumes and met with up in New York--I don't remember their names--to be assigned to the New York Office on East 45th Street in the Lexington Postal Station there on the fourth floor. But nothing was done on that. Then I think, after I left, Earl Graves [Earl G. Graves] came on. I had at second to thirdhand understood he was doing some press work in New York particularly with the *Amsterdam News* and some of the others.

But there was always a feeling that there should be a press person because Tom Johnston was busy. It's quite apparent he really didn't like to deal with the press. He used to call me down in Washington and say, "They're after me for something.

[-121-]

What do you think?" Or, "What should I do?" There really was more than he had time to do. There was someone there earlier for the first year by the name of Phil Ryan [Philip J. Ryan, Jr.]. He and Johnston at the time were sort of co-equal. Ryan sort of scheduled around New York City among other things. Then he went with Morgenthau [Robert M. Morgenthau], that's my recollection, or he came from Morgenthau--I guess that was it--U.S. attorney. He tried to deal with the press, but that didn't work either. Then it became apparent it would be wise at some future point to have a press person in the New York office. As I said, whether anyone was really hired for that, I don't know. I thought Earl Graves had done some of that. But then I don't know when McDonald came on. Pat went right over with Frank fairly soon, I think, when he came along.

GREENE: Was there any particular reason that you know of for expanding the press operation at that point?

BARTHELMES: Well, it may have given Frank some breathing room because for the most part the press person, in this case myself, had to do an awful lot of routine things. For example, I would have to find out is he really going to be in Syracuse? Is the Senator really going to be in Syracuse on the seventeenth, and at what hotel? And there would be larger things: What is he saying about Rockefeller's [Nelson A. Rockefeller] legislation on mental hospitals? So that had to be done. It would be 9:00, 9:15 in the evening. There were probably on the average fifty-five, fifty-seven calls. I think in one week I did a check on my own and I think I averaged fifty-seven telephone calls a day. So it would be 9:00 and 9:15, sometimes at home, before you returned the call. I just believed in answering newspaper people's calls because I had been on the other end. Then I was very resentful of government people who didn't return phone calls. And then too--I think we all were that way--we just wanted to make as good an impression for the Senator as possible, and with as little resentment as possible, particularly in the press, which was a problem. We just made an effort to do that. I know that there were....

I remember on the southern trip to Mississippi and Alabama to the campuses that the reporter, [James Free] for the *Birmingham News* who's located here, his was an afternoon paper with an

[-122-]

8:00 a.m. deadline. I don't think the speech for the University of Alabama was finished until 2:30 or 3 o'clock in the morning. But I would drive a copy of it out to his house, out in Foxhall Road area out in Northwest, and drop it under his front door so that when he got up in the morning at 5:30, he'd have the copy so that he could file his story and get it in the first edition of the Birmingham paper, the afternoon paper, which had an 8:00 a.m. deadline. But there's just things like that. Now this is not every day. It was very infrequent. But here was an effort I think in the Kennedy office in different areas, for example, where Edelman would do something else. But I mean there was an effort really to be as helpful as possible.

GREENE: You mentioned off the tape about the conversation you had with Ed Guthman about the press...

BARTHELMES: Oh, I had forgotten that on the first tape. I didn't want to omit it in view of the first tape's, my exposition of the press operations because I think it has a place in it. We shook hands on my coming over in '65. Ed did sit down with me with the *Congressional Directory* of that date which has a list of all the accredited newspaper correspondents and TV correspondents, radio correspondents and magazine correspondents. And we went over each one, one by one. Some of them he didn't know, and they had no relationship with the Senator when he was Attorney General or when he was on the McClellan Committee. We went over them one by one where possible. And he gave me a rundown that was not binding, but was what his [Ed's] experience was with them--of those who were always friendly or open-minded, or unfriendly, or hostile, or who wrote

anti stories even though they never got in to see the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy as Attorney General. He said, "You may find that some of these that I say are unfriendly were unfriendly because I mishandled them. So you may find that there are revisions. But I wanted you to know my impressions of these people before I left. Just keep in mind that you may find just the opposite. The unfriendly ones may be the friendly ones. I don't know, but you should know this."

So we did have--which I thought was an interesting thing--sort of a "keeping book" on the correspondents of what Ed's experience had been with them. He remembered. He had a good

[-123-]

memory. He remembered what particular stories they had been on, or that they'd been to Oxford, Mississippi, or that they had covered the McClellan Committee. And he knew what their attitude was. Tony Lewis (*New York Times*), of course, was an example of a reporter who was very admiring of Senator Kennedy as Attorney General. There were others who were much less so, Bill White [William S. White], Drew Pearson. Those are the ones who come to mind notoriously. There were a lot of others, Ted Knap. No, Ted Knap hadn't come yet. I don't want to pick on Ted Knap. But he was so notorious later on in that area. But there were some that were.... *U.S. News and World Report* correspondents as a whole....

GREENE: Did your assessment sort of correspond to Guthman's?

BARTHELMES: For the most part

[BEGIN TAPE II, SIDE I]

I think generally Ed Guthman's assessment pretty much checked out with mine. I think there were one or two exceptions, but they were minor. They were minor. For the most part, I think they checked out.

GREENE: Were there any people involved in this discussion that you didn't mention last time as being either particularly favorable or particularly difficult?

BARTHELMES: Oh, there are one or two other names that came to mind. I think we talked about.... Well, Knap wasn't there then. I don't remember what names I added. I know that Vera Glaser, who was at NAMA [North American Newspaper Alliance], was quite unfriendly, quite demanding on the telephone. It was borne out, Ed's evaluation was borne out--his contact with her. On the other hand, Bonnie Angelo, who was then with Newhouse [National News Service] was very friendly. Gerry vanden Heuval was very friendly, who is now Mrs. Nixon's [Patricia Ryan Nixon] press secretary. Betty Beale was very unfriendly, and this was proven. This was the woman with the *Star*. She may be the women's editor of the *Star*.

I don't want to pick just on women reporters because Lord knows there were more male, one way or the other. Andy Glass, I told you. Warren Weaver of the *New York Times* was assigned to that office. Tony Lewis was very friendly. He ended up going to London. *Washington Post* reporters at the time--I don't

[-124-]

remember just who they were. Bob Albright [Robert C. Albright] never seemed to come around. Dick Lyons [Richard D. Lyons] covered the House, but he came over to the Senate sometimes. He was rather standoffish. Jack Bell of the AP, I mentioned him on the tape on the second of June; he was unfriendly. It was proven in our Q. and A. interview and the dispute we had over the ground rule.

GREENE: Was *Look* considered a particularly friendly...

BARTHELMES: Well, Stan Tretick was considered friendly. Warren Rogers--Warren, I guess was probably with Hearst at one point and then went to *Look*; he's with *Look* now. But I don't believe at that time that Warren Rogers was with Hearst in the Hearst bureau here. But he was friendly and he went with the Senator to.... He was one of those who had immediate entrée although they all touched base with me. He was one of those three or four who really could go in on his own. Joe Kraft was another. He went down with the Senator to the dedication of the Green Beret center, the guerrilla training center of the Green Berets down at Fort Bragg in May of '65.

GREENE: Laura Bergquist was with them...

BARTHELMES: Laura Bergquist was, and one or two for Life that were difficult. *Time* was very difficult. Lansing Lamont. John Steele was the bureau chief of *Time* then. Ben Bradley [Benjamin C. Bradley] was then the bureau chief of Newsweek. He's now the managing editor; he's now executive editor of *The Washington Post*. He was really a friend of John Kennedy. Then he had a relationship with Robert Kennedy, but then there was a falling out. Eventually it repaired in late, in the summer of '65. Healy [Paul F. Healy] of the *New York Daily News* was friendly.

This was one of the odd things that struck me about the attitude of press people towards Senator Kennedy. Although Senator Kennedy was really an advanced liberal, beyond the conventional "New Deal" type of liberalism, of urban liberalism--he was down the road ahead of that--that many of those who held him in high personal regard and really understood him as a person were conservative or extremely conservative people. In other words, there was a columnist by the name of Holmes Alexander.

[-125-]

Holmes Alexander is to the right of Ivan the Terrible [Ivan IV, Czar of Russia]. He's syndicated mostly in New England. I can remember him even before I came to Washington. He was in the *Worcester Telegram*. He has other papers in the directory. He is absolutely

incredible. But he thought that Robert Kennedy was about as fine a human being as ever existed. But you couldn't tell it from the copy because he would always be writing about how ambitious Senator Kennedy was, and this move was to advance his political ambition. It was as if nobody in town had political ambitions except for Kennedy. No one else ever had any. Lyndon Johnson never had any. Ribicoff never had any. Humphrey never had. The Kennedys had the political ambition. Only they were ambitious. But he was very friendly. Holmes is a conspicuous example of someone of very conservative political inclinations who understood him. I thought that was another interesting facet of the press work. On the other hand, Gilbert Harrison [Gilbert A. Harrison] of the *New Republic* and others--Jimmy Weschsler [James L. Weschler] excepted; we discussed that on the previous tape--Milt Viorst, Erwin Knoll, who's a correspondent here for the *Progressive* magazine, Madison, Wisconsin were real anti-Kennedy men. They are personal friends of mine. I've known them for years, worked with them on the *Post*. You never could convince them that Kennedy was anything but a smart-aleck, rich man on the "political make."

GREENE:                   How do you account for that?

BARTHELMES:        I think it was their political-blindness--somehow with the liberals, it was some knee-jerk reaction. You know, in their minds it went back to Joseph Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy]. We're discussing this for posterity, other people. I'd assume it would be on the tape elsewhere. If you assume that Joseph Kennedy made unfortunate remarks when he was Ambassador to Great Britain about Nazi Germany and Jews, Robert Kennedy was the lightning rod for everything. They piled everything on him. Liberal Jew reporters, many of whom I've known for years, found it impossible to disassociate him from his father: They said that he was anti-labor--whatever the hell that means. (They said) his father was a first-class son-of-a-bitch. You know, you couldn't convince them other than that. You know, it was just very difficult.

                  The really few deep conservatives like Holmes Alexander--I should go through the directory because there were two or

[ -126- ]

three others--they understood him as a human being. I talked to Holmes all the time about what a fine fellow he is. But the liberals for the most part, with the exception of Weschler, were very difficult to impress until late, '68, really. And, you know, Jules Witcover, now Newhouse, '66, '65-'66, you couldn't convince Witcover that Robert Kennedy did not wear horns. And he obviously grew to admire him and see him whole and clear--but in that early period. But this was also an interesting part of the press work. The liberals were the tough (i.e. hostile) ones.

GREENE:                   Is there anything else on your job or the operation in the office that we ought to add? I've about run out of questions in that area, but anything you have?

BARTHELMES:        No. I think that the only thing I would say in recapitulation is it was....

I think it was a comment on the inadequacy of the press people in Washington, particularly those assigned to Congress, how they did think in outdated stereotypes and how most of them were not particularly thoughtful, and how most of them were content for tomorrow's headlines and the irrelevant questions. They still thought in terms of not the full and the comprehensive story, but in terms of the scoop, the exclusive interview, the exclusive quote--to have it first, but not always have it right. You know, they wanted to have it first, but not have it right.

But there were a few thoughtful ones, enough to make the situation bearable and tolerable. Just when you were just about going down for the third time in despair over this, then somebody would come along and write a perceptive, reasonably perceptive, story. Clayton Fritchey came along. Now Clayton Fritchey to my knowledge never saw the Senator in the first couple of years. But for some reason he understood him. He was syndicated out of *Newsday*. I thought he was rather understanding. He caught him. And he (Fritchey) was critical of him. I don't think the test... It's human nature to like to be praised to the skies--although I think it made Robert Kennedy uneasy. I think the test was really whether you explained the position fully and whether you understood it. Then if you felt it was wrong, that was something else, but at least to explain it.

[-127-]

So often the Kennedy positions were put in a frame of reference that really distorted the position. So much of what he said was done in terms of President Johnson in the '68 presidential election. What you were really doing is you were misshaping it, misforming it rather than seeing it as it was. This is another thing that distorted his position.

GREENE: How much contact did you have with him after you left the office? You mentioned the Oregon memorandum. Were there any other things prior to the presidential consideration that he called you on?

BARTHELMES: In '66 he came to Oregon in the senatorial campaign in I guess October, to Corvallis and Portland. Jerry Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno] was the advance man while I was out there. We worked together on that. Then I rode up from Corvallis, and we talked about what was going to happen--what my plans were later. He was very kind. Then I'd see him occasionally. I say occasionally, maybe a couple of times a year at the house, a Christmas staff party, '66, '67. Then summer, in the summertime there was always a splash party for staff people. Although I was not literally on the staff, I'd come out to see him for that reason. Then I'd just pass along things that I'd heard or picked up on the House side where I knew of members who were making friendly comments, or perhaps a member from the New York City delegation that I heard or someone had told me was making unfriendly comments. I'd just send them along to Frank or to Joe by phone, occasionally in writing. Once or twice--not for each one--once or twice I'd just get a note saying, "Thanks for the word."

GREENE: During this period, let's say before early '68, did he call you in on anything for advice of any sort?

BARTHELMES: No. No.

GREENE: When and how did you first learn that he was considering running in '68?

BARTHELMES: By hope, I guess. I hoped he was running; I assumed he was running. I had lunch with Joe Dolan

[-128-]

in December of '67. Joe seemed inordinately curious as to what I thought should be done, which my view was obviously very peripheral towards, but nevertheless he was persistent which was unusual with Joe. He asked for the luncheon. My recollection is that Joe said, "Well, you and Adam (Walinsky) are the only ones that think he should run." This is December of '67. I think I said something like, "I had no contact with Adam during all this time." He said, "You know, you sound like Adam. Adam keeps saying, 'You've got to go. Go.'" But he (Dolan) said, "That isn't the feeling (i.e. among others of us)." That was December--I'm sure that was December of '67. That was all. The McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] candidacy was in '67. The luncheon was after the McCarthy candidacy.

Then just on my own, I began to check with a good number of people I know in Oregon, everything from newspapermen, politicians, and what passed for politicians in Oregon, asking what they thought. We would correspond. I was doing it simply because I knew that the fourth Friday in May was the Oregon presidential primary, and I wanted all the info I could get, just in case. It didn't seem very likely. But I think everyone got very discouraged with the turn the war was taking. Then with the Tet offensive, I guess that's where I felt even stronger, more strong that the Senator should run. Then there was a call, I don't remember the date of that memo that I gave you at the time you and I had the last interview--the memo on Oregon. It may say the twelfth on it. It may say 3/12/68.

GREENE: That sounds about right. It would be...

BARTHELMES: But I don't remember having dated it. Whatever I dated it was undoubtedly the date. The primary was what, the fourteenth? The New Hampshire...

GREENE: March the twelfth. The primary was March the twelfth.

BARTHELMES: The primary was the twelfth. I should have looked at my notes for this, and I haven't, my journal, as to when the Senator called over. It was one late morning or noon hour. He said, "Do you have any thoughts about Oregon?" That's all the introduction there was. I said, "Yes, I had some thoughts about Oregon." "Do you think I should

go?” meaning Oregon. I said, “Sure.” That was the real answer to that although I don’t think I really had any choice. But I think he was really saying, “What about it?” He asked, “Well, could I come over?” “No, not right now.” I did have other things to do. But I’d said I’d be over in a little bit. So I did come over. My recollection is that John Nolan was in the room for a while but I don’t think forever. He (the Senator) had a blue shirt with sleeves rolled up and a tie down and was looking very radiant, rather than harassed. He didn’t look harassed. He looked as if he were enjoying it. He hadn’t looked so good for a long time. His face was very expressive and very busy and very pleased. He said, “What about Oregon?” And then, what were the problems? I tried to outline them as I saw them, not having been in Oregon for a year and a half, what the pitfalls were. They were obviously McCarthy, and the academic orientation, plus there’s no “ethnic” there. It’s a different place entirely, not like Washington or California, the state of Washington. It’s one big suburb, one big neighborhood where everybody knows everybody. Party structure, there is virtually none.

And I can remember saying something silly to him like, “Well, maybe your brother (Edward) could stand in for you in Oregon.” As I look back on it, it was very silly. At the time, it didn’t seem very silly. It seems pretty stupid now. He just shook his head, “No.” Naturally he couldn’t. But he seemed worried about it because of the lack of ethnic.

Mrs. Green, he wanted to know about Mrs. Green, Representative Edith Green of (Portland) Oregon, who managed the John Kennedy primary campaign in ‘60, and in the general election. John Kennedy carried the primary and lost the general in ‘60. “How does she feel about me?” he said. I picked up where I left off because I found you really didn’t have to pussyfoot. There were times when to tell and not tell--timing, but when he asked...

GREENE:                   What was her attitude at this point?

BARTHELMES:           Well, I told him that it was in the memo. Then he asked for the memo. I told him, “Remember in ‘60, I don’t know if you know this, but she tells me--if it’s correct--that she asked John Kennedy not to let you [RFK] into Oregon in ‘60 because the McClellan

hearings were very fresh; the labor movement in Oregon, which is doubtful enough toward John Kennedy, didn’t like you, didn’t want you, blamed you for that.”

And Terry Schruck [Terry D. Schruck]--this was another thing. Terry Schruck was the mayor of Portland. The McClellan Committee had told him to come East and testify on the Teamster connections in Portland. Robert Kennedy had really taken Schruck over the coals. There was a very rough questioning session. The thing that the Senator, understandably, had not known was that Terry Schruck was still mayor of Portland, and is still the mayor of Portland nine, ten years later. Well, this was the problem in the city of Portland, which is really, in Eastern terms, the only large city in the state, 388,000 people. The rest of them, by Eastern standards, in the industrial states, are tank towns. He said, did I think he could win? And I said I thought it was kind of awfully close. “Would I do all right?”

was actually the question. And I said it would be quite close, but I thought, "yes." When I'd been out there in '66 in the Senate campaign, there were a number of younger pro-Kennedy people who had no particular party responsibility or visibility whom I thought.... And at the time, I kept asking for just such a contingent that I thought were favorably disposed to the Kennedys as a whole, and specifically to Robert Kennedy, that I thought could be called upon to volunteer. So I talked about that.

I told him that Mrs. Green's own people were badly divided. Some of her long-time supporters were very anti-Kennedy, very anti-Robert Kennedy. Subsequently, some of them just defected when she announced for the Senator. Some of them left, sort of left her and worked for Hubert Humphrey. Others worked for her in the Kennedy primary under real duress, real gun at the head. One of the things that I had discussed--I don't believe it was in the memo--either on the phone to him, I think possibly on the phone rather than in person, was I said, "Mrs. Green will tell you (you'll find out if she doesn't know) that very few of her supporters want to support you. She'll be able to, by cajolery or command, obtain the support of most of them. But some are not. She's going to tell you how difficult it's going to be, but she's getting.... She's going to get out of touch. She's been in so long. And there are an awful lot of young people, relatively young people who are Kennedy supporters whom she doesn't know about. They're not even particularly active

[-131-]

in politics, but they're there. And if she goes out, she can find those if she wants to. I gave him a couple of names of people, family people--lawyers with a mortgage and a couple of kids--thirty, thirty-five. If they're called upon, they'll come to life, but they weren't particularly active in Democratic politics. But I said, "Don't let her tell you that what she finds in her survey, talking to her people, is representative. There are a lot more Kennedy sympathizers than she thinks." And in fact this turned out to be, I understand through her administrative assistant Richard Feeney, that she took a survey out in Portland. She went home one weekend, went home for three or four days to Portland to scout the opinion in the terrain. And she said, "There's no support out here for him." But eventually she did find them, just new people whom she didn't know about who were waiting to be asked to get into politics and involve themselves.

GREENE: Did you anticipate how much competition you'd get from McCarthy? Did you think he'd be as strong there as he was?

BARTHELMES: I thought he'd be pretty strong. See, I had to fight with two things. I knew Howard Morgan would be for him. Then he had one or two political street walkers like Charlie Porter [Charles Porter], who sort of headed earlier in the year a "Citizens for Kennedy," but he'd go anywhere that he could get himself some notoriety. I thought he'd probably end up maybe.... And he's the type that should be kept away from Kennedy; he'd do him more harm than good in my view. I had to fight the thing of.... You know, I don't understand why anybody would support McCarthy. I had to fight that and realize in Oregon terms that there were an awful lot of people who

would. I thought it would be quite close. But I really thought it would be put together so that, in the sense that Kennedy would win the primary.

One of the big questions, I was--this was what, April? This was March? This was March of '68--I was employed here with Congressman Bolling [Richard W. Bolling], and I was in the middle of a book for him on reform in the House, *Power in the House*, published in September '68. The book wasn't finished. Much as it killed me, if I hadn't had the book I would have left. Even if I weren't asked, I would have left. But he did ask me if I would

[-132-]

help him. I said yes, I would, but I had this book to finish. It was at least two months away from being finished, and I just couldn't drop everything. I had a responsibility. So I didn't. No. I really thought, you know, that Kennedy would win because he always did win. But then there were sound grounds for it.

GREENE:                   What was the big mistake in your opinion?

BARTHELMES:           Well, I don't know if there was-any one big mistake. I did say--and I think that it was reflected in the memo,--that he had to have a representative in Oregon who could work with Mrs. Green in a way that he could do things in the most advantageous way for the Kennedy candidacy, without offending her. This can be done. I've done it myself years ago when I worked for Mrs. Green. But it was an uncommon quality. You couldn't just send anyone out there. You just couldn't send out an overtly abrasive and pushy person (because she'd get her back up) any more than you could outwardly pile a lot of money into the place in the way that Johnson had in New Hampshire.

Remember those ads that were running in New Hampshire on McCarthy that Governor King [John William King] of New Hampshire was putting in the paper? I mean that would just kill a candidate in Oregon. I'm not saying he had any idea of doing it, but if it happened, it would be less than helpful.

But I think that with that and with proper scheduling.... If I understand the scheduling in Oregon, there were just places, there were natural places for the Senator to go that he did not go. One which is an Oregon issue and always is, is out to the John Day Dam. The John Day Dam, in terms of producing hydroelectric power, is the largest dam in the United States. It's third--I think the two Russian dams, the two dams in the Soviet Union are second. It's a tremendous dam. It cost about three or four hundred million dollars, on the Columbia River. He should have gone there. It just was opening. It was being dedicated. He should have taken a canoe ride on it, or camped on it, made a speech on top of it, associated with that--which is a legitimate issue, the conservation issue.

The Warm Springs Indian Reservation in eastern Oregon was a classic case of where with private funds the Indian council on its own had created a very successful, a very successful tourist location on the Indian reservation. There were some spots down in southwestern Oregon along the dunes where they

[-133-]

tried to establish a national seashore, the Oregon Dunes, similar to Cape Cod National Park. There were four or five attractive issues I thought that he could associate himself with.

In talking to Joe Dolan, in talking to Mrs. Green's administrative assistant, this wasn't done. I just think they were awfully hard to avoid. I don't understand how they ever avoided them because they were so visible. So I think that the scheduling was improper. I think whoever did it goofed.

You know, Mrs. Green obviously had her back up and did some things that I thought were undoubtedly harmful to the Kennedy position, including the student leaders that the Kennedy campaign sent into Oregon. She sent one person out of Oregon, I understand authoritatively, because he wore a beard. You can't stay in Oregon if you have a beard. It's incredible because he was assigned to set up campus chapters for Kennedy in colleges in Oregon. So he went on to Utah.

GREENE: Was Jerry Bruno doing the scheduling in Oregon?

BARTHELMES: No. Jerry Bruno was persona non grata, barred, prohibited, ostracized, and everything else from Oregon. There were a number of people, three or four persons, whom Mrs. Green said could not come into Oregon, you know, one of the fifty states--in a presidential preference primary for Robert Kennedy, whose campaign she nominally headed in Oregon. Jerry Bruno, who is the par excellence of advance men or certainly a superior advance man, worked for the Kennedys for eight years, nine years, just couldn't come in because he had offended her as a result of a '66 trip that he had advanced in Portland, Oregon.

You know, Jerry obeyed one of the first rules. You try to create the best context for your crowd, for your spectators. Mrs. Green wanted to have Senator Kennedy talk in Oregon at the municipal, at the coliseum with fourteen thousand seats. There was no way, through partitions and drapes and what have you, to make it smaller, for six or eight thousand persons. It was more convenient. There was more parking around and the rest. Instead of that, Jerry selected a labor temple which sat five thousand at most. Close to seven thousand turned up, six thousand plus, hung from the chandeliers. They had to fight for space, but it was more effective.

The other thing, the labor temple--which is why Jerry is effective--holding it at the labor temple rather than at the

[-134-]

coliseum had symbolic values to the Oregon newspaper and the Oregon labor movement. It was a new labor building where the labor unions in Portland met. Senator Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, obviously had strained or broken relations, bruised relations with the labor movement in Oregon, even ten years after. Supposedly he was not nice to them. The fact of having it in the labor temple sort of, as the newspapers picked it up, was interpreted as that the rift had been mended, that the breach was no longer there for the simple fact that it was the first non-labor meeting ever permitted in the labor temple. Labor unions had been meeting there for a month or two, but they never had any outside group ever meet there.

In order to meet in the labor temple there had to be an affirmative vote of the board of directors of the labor temple, all of whom were labor business agents. So Bruno and I went to the labor temple and said, "We want to do it." Then the board of directors met. They had a lot of discussion about it--we weren't there--and they agreed. So you had a smaller auditorium to fit your crowd in, and you had the labor temple which got a story saying, "Kennedy and labor movement apparently kissed and made up because other than that how could he possibly be allowed to meet there." Mrs. Green was still, two years later, absolutely furious and absolutely unforgiving--"Bruno's not to go in."

GREENE:                   Who were the other persona non grata?

BARTHELMES:        I don't know. I had heard from Mrs. Green's office that Joe Dolan had one foot in that persona non grata group. But Joe in fact did get out there about a week, seven, eight, nine days before that. But I know, he had had his problems with Mrs. Green because I was sort of a middleman on a problem that involved a payment of a campaign debt during the 1966 visit of Robert Kennedy to Oregon in which she hired a room in a hotel for a small cocktail party for her followers to meet Robert Kennedy. There was a question as to what the ground rules were on payment for the room. She thought that Kennedy should pay for it, and it went back and forth. In '68, it was still unresolved. Then Joe sent me a letter, her latest letter saying, "What can you do about it?" I was really not one of the foremost ones to be asked that. (Mrs. Green and I had grown apart since I left her employ.) The way it happened is that--it probably shouldn't have been—

[ -135- ]

but the Duncan campaign account was still open from '66, the Senate campaign. There was just a hundred dollars in it. A hundred was just what Mrs. Green claimed that the Kennedys owed her. So I just wrote a check out of the Duncan campaign account for the hundred dollars and sent it to Mrs. Green. That liquidated the Duncan senatorial campaign account. There was a rationale for it because Kennedy did come to Oregon to speak for Duncan, not in Portland, but in Corvallis, Oregon. I didn't know what to do with that hundred dollars anyway. So anyway, she got paid.

But Joe had a terrible time. Everybody really did. But I always understood how difficult she was--capable as hell, but difficult. I had heard a couple of other names; I've really forgotten who they were. But Jerry Bruno obviously was one on the ten most unwanted list. But Dolan had told me who two or three of the other ones were. I don't remember the names. But I don't think he ever listed more than three of them.

GREENE:                   Did you speak to Dolan once he got out there as far as the state of the organization when he arrived and...

BARTHEIMES:        As far as I know, Joe Dolan got to a number of places, but he got to Oregon for the first time, I want to say eight days before the primary date. I got a telephone call from him at home. It was 6 o'clock, 6:30

P.M. Washington time, 3:30 Portland time. He said he had just gotten into Oregon that day and things were terrible! He wanted to know, what should we do? Where should we go? What should the Senator say? Well, I couldn't--I was twenty-seven hundred miles away, I couldn't say on instant request what the Senator should do.

But I did list some of these places I've just listed a few minutes ago where he should go, the profitable places for the Senator to visit and to make campaign appearances and speeches. The John Day Dam, Warm Spring Indian Reservation, down in the southwest, Douglas fir country, softwood country, the Textronics plant, which is something Oregon is very proud of, one of the few electronic, light industry plants in Oregon and three or four other places. I told him whom in the Negro Albina community to talk to. The Albina section of Portland is largely black, a north section of Portland. Some of these were impractical. There simply wasn't enough time left to arrange

[-136-]

for them all. I think one or two did actually, my suggestions, turn into campaign appearances. But the real good ones, the lucrative ones--John Day Dam, camping on the Columbia River, going to the Bonneville Dam, various things--I don't think ever got done. I think there just wasn't enough time. But Joe Dolan, not indicated, just said flatly that things were in frightful shape. That's why the phone call. I did the best I could from a distance. He didn't blame anybody, he just described the situation impersonally. Then, I think, there was one other call, a day or two later from Joe's secretary who wanted some supplemental information, Angie, not Angie Novello. She'd been in the New York office.

GREENE: Oh. Yes. Cabrera [Angelina Cabrera].

BARTHELMES: Cabrera. Right. She called. She was in Portland. She called a day or two later for Joe saying Joe would like to know something or other; I forget what it was. So at that point, they used to go and say things were in terrible shape--What can we do? Where should the Senator go? What should he say? It seemed to me it was downhill, deteriorating.

GREENE: Going back a bit to this meeting in his office, what was your impression at this time? First of all, could you place the date? Was it March twelfth--is that your recollection--just a few days before he announced? Or was it earlier than this?

BARTHELMES: He announced on a Saturday morning. It was--I don't remember the date, but I remember the day--it was the Tuesday ...

GREENE: That was the sixteenth that he announced.

BARTHELMES: Tuesday before that Saturday.

GREENE: That would be the day of primary, the twelfth.

BARTHELMES: I think that's the date of the memo you have from me.

[-137-]

GREENE: I'll have to check that.

BARTHELMES: I want to say that.

GREENE: What was the impression, that the decision had already been made and he was simply deciding in terms of which primaries to enter?

BARTHELMES: Well, he was very guarded about his business, but he talked to me simply in terms of Oregon. I obviously had the impression the wind was up, or I wouldn't have been there. He did say, "If I go, will you come with me and help?" And I said, "Yes." And then I had to tell him about the book, the damn book we, Rep. Richard Bolling and I, were doing. I had the impression on the twelfth-- because all that was discussed was Oregon--that it wasn't quite decided, that it wasn't quite nailed down. I felt that the firm and irrevocable decision hadn't been made, but that impression of mine could be completely askew you see.

GREENE: The primary results wouldn't have been in, and they were certainly a factor.

BARTHELMES: I had the impression it was the temptation and the lure, and the endocrines were working. He did talk about California. California was really the big one in the West, but he understood that Oregon was unavoidable.

GREENE: You mentioned to me off the tape about the deterioration of your relationship with Mrs. Green. Would this have been a problem, do you think, if you had been able to go into Oregon? Do you think you would have been persona non grata also?

BARTHELMES: I don't know. I may have been one of the ones. I don't know that. Well, Dick Feeney, Richard Feeney, who is Mrs. Green's administrative assistant today and was in '68, in March of '68, told me that my name was suggested along with Prettyman [E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.] and one or two others. Not one or the other go, maybe everybody go. I mean it was just, you know, how about sending A, B, and C?

[-138-]

And she said that's all right. Feeney said he heard it, but I don't know whether that would have done it or not. But I had the impression that the same atmosphere prevailed in that half

hour or forty-five minutes I was over in Senator Kennedy's inner office as prevailed in other two or three big major moments when I had been on his staff.

You could always tell when there was some sort of high point because all sorts of people would appear. You know, Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] would suddenly show up for lunch, or Schlesinger would come through the door, or Burke Marshall would suddenly be there, or Fred Dutton would come from nowhere. All of a sudden there would be lunch in the inner office and Angie would get busy on the phone. There would be a call from.... He'd say, "If my brother calls, why, put him right through to me." You'd feel it wasn't tension; you'd feel the excitement and the activity mount physically. It was almost as if you could physically feel it. And when I went into the office that day in March, right away you could feel that same thing. It wasn't that all these faces I've mentioned were there. But you could just tell the way Angie Novello was acting.

John Nolan was there who was not on the staff. He hadn't been in my time. He had been at Justice, but he was there. I knew he was one of those off-staff people whose judgment the Senator relied upon--very quiet, very capable, very much in the background, self-effacing, but very much respected. John was in there at one point. He may have been in there for most of the time. But I thought that the Senator--as he happened to be at times, major happenings, the few times I had known--looked absolutely radiant, as if he could hardly wait for whatever it was that was going to happen, which in this case obviously was the presidential campaign. He didn't look gloomy or anything like that. He was just bursting out all over.

GREENE: Is there anything else about the campaign or the events leading up to it? Outside of those two phone calls, did you make any contribution to the campaign, and the memorandum of course?

BARTHELMES: The only other.... I had occasional phone calls, maybe half a dozen, six or eight phone calls from friends of mine in Oregon who would call in and

[-139-]

say, "Why doesn't he do this? I could get a good crowd for him." I have a good friend of mine in Pendleton, Oregon, eastern Oregon, Pendleton, who said, "we could really get a good turnout on a certain date because it's the two hundredth anniversary of the county. And there's going to be a lot of people there, and the crowds there.... Just bring him in; it's a huge crowd. Maybe only two thousand, but it's a huge crowd for eastern Oregon and Pendleton is a town of ten thousand. "We could get a good turnout for him." Someone from the Neighborhood Legal Aid Services in Portland, Oregon (the OEO fund) who had worked for Neuberger, Mrs. Maurine Neuberger [Maurine Brown Neuberger], called and wanted to know, "Why in the hell doesn't Kennedy come down to, drop by our center, and we'll take him to see two or three of the blacks in North-Portland we feel are really more instrumental than all these front people that have been around for years with the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People], what have you?" He said why didn't I suggest that?

GREENE: What would you do with that information?

BARTHELMES: Well, I'd call Joe. If I couldn't get Joe, maybe Linda Weiss or someone he'd talk with, I'd get to them. Joe would be in New York, or I knew when the phone would be in his ear. I'd say, "Well, I'm just sending over a note on Oregon." Or maybe I'd talk to Frank or walk over and leave something with Frank.

Also, little things just would occur, like reporters I thought would be friendly, or reporters I thought or newspapers that would be very unfriendly. There were just two or three newspapers in Oregon I thought would give him any sort of support in a primary. One was at Coos Bay, and one was in Medford, and one was over in eastern Oregon. I just happened to know people who worked there, and I just thought Frank ought to know them. Then in turn, somebody who was out there ought to know. I knew one of the wire service people which is important, I think, in a state that wide because so much of the news that filled the dailies and the weekly, those little small ones, are from the wire service. And just things as they occurred, but nothing very instrumental. But I don't think he ever went to Legal Aid. I know he never went out to Pendleton for this crowd. There were two or three other useful things.

[-140-]

GREENE: Were you consulted at all in the debate question in Oregon--whether or not it would be advisable to debate?

BARTHELMES: No.

GREENE: Do you have an opinion on that? Do you think that could have made a difference?

BARTHELMES: Well, I myself never had any confidence in the debating ability of Robert Kennedy. I'm not being disrespectful. I just think everybody had strengths and weaknesses. I didn't think that was a strength of his. So I think my first reaction would have been adverse. But I don't remember anymore what the conditions and the circumstance were, whether he was running like a dry creek and needed something and perhaps it was worth the gamble. I don't remember what the circumstances were. It didn't sound like.... It never would strike me to go hunting to debate with somebody. That session in California I don't think strictly speaking was a debate. They both were on; there was someone in the middle. And one said A, and one said B, but they didn't always relate to each other. They were separate interviews almost, except what Kennedy made it. Kennedy had the acumen to make it into something, the Orange County remark and one or two others.

GREENE: Of course the problem in Oregon, as I understood it, was that McCarthy was pressing it and making it an issue, the Oregonians were

sort of attacking Kennedy on the basis of cowardice because he wouldn't debate.

BARTHELMES: I don't know everything that went on there in that situation. I do know.... One of the things I recommended--because I found that the Senator can be (in small groups) very disarming and very charming and be very impressive, even with hostile editors like the *New York Times* board of editors--that he just sit down with them in a room in a small group and discuss things. And this is what he should have done--maybe he did it, I don't know--with the editor of the Oregonian and some of his people. That's the only statewide circulated newspaper daily in the state. You can defuse or defang or blunt a good bit of this. I found

[-141-]

he could because he is very good in small groups of people, even those who were unfriendly to him.

GREENE: Is there anything else on the presidential campaign?

BARTHELMES: I can't think of anything.

GREENE: Okay you can put it on another time if you think...

[END OF INTERVIEW #2]

[-142-]

Wes Barthelmes Oral History Transcript – RFK #2  
Name Index

**A**

Abel, Elie, 84, 85  
Albright, Robert C., 125  
Alexander, Holmes, 125, 126, 127  
Angelo, Bonnie, 124

**B**

Beale, Betty, 81, 124  
Beame, Abraham David, 100, 118  
Belaúnde-Terry, Fernando, 108, 109  
Bell, Jack L., 87, 88, 125  
Bergquist, Laura, 125  
Bolling, Richard W., 132, 138  
Bradley, Benjamin C., 125  
Brandon, Henry, 94  
Brinkley, David, 101  
Bruno, Gerald J., 128, 134, 135, 136  
Bunche, Ralph J., 86  
Burden, Amanda, 110  
Burdick, Quentin N., 88

**C**

Cabrera, Angelina, 137  
Campbell, Alan Keith, 112  
Campbell, Argyll, 112  
Campbell, Waldemar B., 106, 111  
Castro Ruz, Fidel Alejandro, 108  
Cheshire, Maxine, 81  
Cimmet, Wendy, 121  
Cleveland, Stephen Grover,  
Crangle, Joseph F., 117  
Cronkite, Walter, 101

**D**

de Toledano, Ralph, 85  
Doar, John M., 120  
Dolan, Joseph F., 91, 97, 119, 128, 129, 134, 135,  
136, 137, 140  
Duncan, Robert Blackford, 119, 120, 136  
Dunner, Frederic G., 90  
Dutton, Frederick G., 96, 97, 139

**E**

Edelman, Peter B., 91, 97, 104, 120, 123  
Ellinger, W. Don, 92

Epstein, Edward Jay, 83  
Evers, J. Charles, 93

**F**

Fallaci, Oriana, 85  
Feeney, Richard, 132, 138, 139  
Frankel, Charles, 97  
Fredericks, J. Wayne, 111, 112, 114, 115  
Free, James Stillman, 122  
Frei Montalva, Eduardo, 108, 109  
Fritchey, Clayton, 127  
Fulbright, J. William, 101

**G**

Garrison, Jim C., 83  
Glaser, Vera, 124  
Glass, Andrew J., 104, 110, 124  
Goldberg, Arthur J., 91  
Goodwin, Richard N., 97  
Graham, Billy, 86  
Graves, Earl G., 121, 122  
Gray, Barry, 99, 101  
Green, Edith S., 95, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136,  
138  
Guevara Serna, Ernesto “Che”, 108  
Guggenheimer, Elinor C., 93  
Guthman, Edwin O., 95, 106, 123, 124

**H**

Harrison, Gilbert A., 126  
Hayes, A.J., 92  
Healy, Paul F., 125  
Herling, John, 92  
Hockman, Jirai, 94  
Humphrey, Hubert H., 98, 126, 131

**I**

Ivan IV, Czar of Russia, 126

**J**

Javits, Jacob K., 99  
Johnson, Claudia Alta “Lady Bird”, 87  
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 87, 101, 111, 126, 128,  
133

Johnston, Thomas M.C., 103, 105, 109, 120, 121,  
122

## K

Kennedy, Edward Moore, 88, 99, 130, 139  
Kennedy, Ethel Skakel, 80, 81, 86, 99, 110  
Kennedy, John F., 79, 80, 83, 92, 106, 125, 130,  
131  
Kennedy, Joseph P., 126  
Kennedy, Robert F., 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86,  
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,  
98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,  
110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117,  
118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126,  
127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134,  
135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141  
Kennedy, Robert F., Jr., 86, 87  
Kimball, Penn T., 82  
Knap, Ted, 79, 95, 124  
Knoll, Erwin, 126  
Kraft, Joseph, 117, 125

## L

Lamont, Lansing, 125  
Lasky, Victor, 85  
Lelyveld, Joseph S., 112  
Lewis, Tony, 124  
Lisagor, Peter I., 98  
Longworth, Alice Roosevelt, 99  
Lowenstein, Allard Kenneth, 114  
Lyons, Richard D., 125

## M

Mankiewicz, Frank F., 102, 103, 104, 119, 121,  
122, 128, 140  
Mann, Thomas Clifton, 106, 109  
Marshall, Burke, 139  
Martin, Edwin McCammon, 106, 109  
May, Carolyn, 102  
McCarthy, Eugene J., 129, 130, 133, 141  
McClellan, John L., 84, 123, 124, 130, 131  
McDonald, Hugh, 121, 122  
McNamara, Robert S., 102  
Meyers, 102  
Midgley, John, 94  
Morgan, Howard, 119, 132  
Morgenthau, Robert M., 122  
Moyers, William D., 87  
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 117  
Murphy, John M., 112

## N

Neuberger, Maurine Brown, 140  
Nickerson, Eugene H., 117, 118  
Nixon, Patricia Ryan, 124  
Nolan, John E., 103, 130, 139  
Novello, Angela M., 92, 137, 139  
Nyerere, Julius K., 113

## O

O'Leary, Jeremiah, Jr., 105

## P

Pearson, Drew, 124  
Percy, Charles Harting,  
Perkins, James Alfred, 117, 118  
Petro, Sylvester, 84  
Pigman, Wendell, 90, 91  
Porter, Charles, 132  
Prettyman, E. Barrett, Jr., 138

## R

Ribicoff, Abraham Alexander, 89, 90, 126  
Riley, Patricia A., 121, 122  
Robertson, Ian A., 111  
Rockefeller, Nelson A., 122  
Rogers, Warren J., Jr., 125  
Rusk, Dean, 101  
Ryan, Philip J., Jr., 122

## S

Sanjuan, Pedro, 105, 106, 109  
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 92, 139  
Schrunk, Terry D., 131  
Seigenthaler, John Lawrence, 103  
Shriver, Eunice Kennedy, 114  
Shriver, Robert Sargent, Jr., 113, 114  
Smith, Stephen E., 88, 111  
Sorensen, Theodore C., 139  
Spivak, Lawrence E., 98  
Steele, John, 125

## T

Thimmesch, Nicholas, 83  
Thomas, Helen A., 81  
Tretick, Stanley, 107, 125

## U

Udall, Stewart L., 93  
Unruh, Jesse M., 64

## V

Valenti, Jack J., 87  
Vaughn, Jack, 104, 105  
Viorst, Milton, 95, 126

## W

Wagner, Robert Ferdinand, Jr., 118  
Walinsky, Adam, 91, 96, 97, 104, 129  
Warren, Earl, 83  
Watson, Thomas John, Jr., 118  
Weaver, Warren, Jr., 80, 124  
Wechsler, James L., 126, 127  
Weiss, Linda, 140  
White, William S., 124  
Witcover, Jules Joseph, 110, 127

## Y

Yarborough, Ralph W., 88

Subject Index  
WESLEY BARTHELMES

Africa	
RFK and	111 - 115
Agency for International Development (AID)	109
Alliance for Progress	108
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)	38
Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA)	55, 74
Bedford-Stuyvesant Project	120
California	
Democratic Party	21
Primary Election, 1968	138
Civil Rights	
RFK and	92
African Diplomats	106
Mississippi	
Oxford	5
Communism in the U.S.	17 - 18
Cuba	
Missile Crisis	84 - 85
Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR)	40
Democratic Party	
RFK and	47
District of Columbia	154
Dominican Republic	
RFK and	4
Economic Opportunity, Office of (OEO)	44, 148, 163
Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on	101
Government Operations, Senate Committee on	90
Health, Education and Welfare, Department of	
Legislation	146, 156, 160
Interior, Department of	154 - 155
Investigations, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on	17
John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts	14
Johnson Administration	
RFK and	26-28, 32, 57, 64-65, 110-111
Johnson, Lyndon B.	
RFK Relations With	26 - 27, 68
Justice, Department of	1, 6, 146, 156, 159
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control	
Act (1961)	1, 143-148, 150-153, 157,
159	
Kennedy Administration	
Cabinet	12

Kennedy, John F.	
Humorous Anecdotes	4-5, 37
Kennedy, Joseph P.	
Appointment to Court of St. James's	126
Kennedy, Robert F.	
Attorney General, 1961 - 1964	67, 123, 145-46, 149, 155-157
JFK Assassination, 1963	83
Senate Years, 1965 - 1968	2-3, 25-26, 29, 33, 44-45, 52-54, 72, 74, 82, 88 - 89, 90,
165-166	
Staff	2-4, 6-11, 24-25, 52, 69-70, 91-92, 121 - 122, 165
Latin American Trip, 1965	102 - 110
African Trip, 1966	102, 110 - 115
Author	
<u>To Seek a Newer World</u>	96
Leadership and Administrative Style	4, 6-7, 22, 95, 170-171
Personal Characteristics	6, 22, 32, 42, 44, 50, 72-73, 169- 171
Political Philosophy	25 - 26, 33, 38
Press Relations	1, 2-13, 15-19, 22-4, 31-32, 34- 35, 49, 57-63, 64-66, 73-75, 79- 81, 85-88, 91-92, 94-95, 105, 122-127
RFK's Public Opinion Polls	116 - 117
Speeches	
Senate	24-25, 30-32, 39-40, 4 , 47-49, 2, 101-102
Vietnam,	266, 25-26, 30-31, 34, 59, 101- 102
Staff Relations	3 - 4, 6 - 7, 10 - 11, 2 - 53, 71, 144, 160 - 162, 167, 169
Labor, Department of	146, 156, 160
Labor, Organized	
RFK and	38, 82, 84, 92 - 93, 135
Labor-Management Relations, Select Committee to	
Investigate Improper Activities in	17 - 18, 131
Latin America	
RFK and	102 - 110
Liberals	
RFK and	3, 20 - 22, 34, 125 - 127
Magazines	
General	38, 66, 86 - 87, 107
<u>Esquire</u>	76
<u>Life</u>	125
<u>Look</u>	85, 107, 125
<u>Newsweek</u>	73, 124

<u>Playboy</u>	15
<u>Ramparts</u>	20 - 21
<u>Saturday Evening Post</u>	62
<u>Time</u>	19 - 20, 60, 73, 80, 125
<u>U.S. News and World Report</u>	19 - 20, 64, 124
<u>The Washingtonian</u>	7
McCarthyism	
RFK and	17 - 18
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)	140
New York	50 - 51, 118
Congressional Election, 1966	117 - 118
Democratic Party	8, 117 - 118
Newspapers	
<u>Amsterdam News</u>	22 - 23
<u>Birmingham News</u>	122 - 123
<u>Chicago Daily News</u>	18, 35, 62
<u>Los Angeles Times</u>	2, 16
<u>New York Daily News</u>	35, 125
<u>New York Herald Tribune</u>	35, 40-41, 62-63, 79, 107, 121
<u>New York Post</u>	3 - 35, 62
<u>New York Times</u>	11 - 12, 18 - 19, 35, 57, 64, 68, 75, 80, 107, 112, 124, 141,
<u>New York World Telegram</u>	19, 60, 63, 79, 95
<u>St. Louis Post Dispatch</u>	65
<u>Village Voice</u>	20
<u>Wall Street Journal</u>	75
<u>Washington Post</u>	20, 124-125
<u>Washington Star</u>	105, 124
Oregon	
Democratic Party	1, 71, 130 - 131
Primary Election, 1960	130 - 131, 158
Primary Election, 1968	129 - 137, 139
Senate Election, 1966	120, 128
Peace Corps	113 - 114
Presidential Campaign, 1968 - RFK	
Pre-announcement	129 - 132, 138 - 139
Ethnic Support	130
State, Department of	103 - 109, 111, 114 -
Television	
American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)	75
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)	12, 13 - 14, 33, 41
“Face the Nation”	13, 97
“Issues and Answers”	13, 68, 97
“Meet the Press”	13, 68, 97 - 99

United States Information Agency (USIA)	33
Urban Renewal Administration	12
Vietnam	
RFK and	30 - 34, 59, 65, 98, 100 - 101
VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America)	43 - 44
Warren Commission	83
Youth	
RFK and	39, 44 - 46, 145 - 148, 153 - 154