

**William J. Brady, Jr. Oral History Interview – RFK #2, 02/25/1975**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** William J. Brady, Jr.  
**Interviewer:** Roberta W. Greene  
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**Biographical Note**

Brady was lawyer, a Harvard University classmate of Robert F. Kennedy [RFK], and a Kennedy family friend. In this interview Brady discusses RFK's decision to run for Senate in 1964; the 1964 Democratic National Convention; working on RFK's 1964 campaign; numerous speeches made on RFK's behalf during his Senate campaign; other RFK campaign supporters; appealing to the Jewish and Italian communities of New York during RFK's Senate campaign; working with Lyndon B. Johnson's 1964 presidential campaign; RFK's mood during his 1964 campaign; the "empty chair debate" in 1964; Brady's relationship with RFK; how RFK reached his decision to run for President in 1968; the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner; and the battle for delegates among the different candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968, among other issues.

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Second Oral History Interview

with

WILLIAM J. BRADY, JR.

February 25, 1975  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

By Roberta W. Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Project  
of the John F. Kennedy Library

GREENE: Okay. I was going to ask you on the New York decision and how much you talked to him before he actually decided to run in the center, for the Senate in New York, and what alternatives were discusses and...

BRADY: Yeah.

GREENE: ...how things developed.

BRADY: Yeah. I think that the thing that I remember very well was early in '64, I think naturally there was the great, the great judgment on, as to, as to whether or not he would be a vice presidential candidate, as I recall. That was the, that was the crucial area of.... And things seemed to sort of flow along through those months of February, March, April, May, and June. And the issue of the Senator's race in New York came up, and it hit the press with.... And I remember being, my feeling that he, it was a great idea, and he should do it, and could go forward. However, in his own mind, I really feel that there was the reservation of being vice president and serving that period. That was completely smashed when the famous edict went out that anybody on the, in the cabinet wouldn't be considered.

GREENE: Uh huh.

BRADY: Et cetera.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: And then there was the prior meeting that Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] had with President Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] then, that occurred probably in the spring of seven—of '64. But at any rate, even after that I was always amazed at Bobby's ability to put off, continuing to put off his decision to go into New York, and I, and that, I remember the *New York Times* articles upset me a little bit about Bobby going up there. They were very critical of him and his father at that point, really. And that bothered Bobby quite a bit, the feeling that.... Criticizing his father bothered him much more than it bothered, than his own, than their criticizing him. But, at any rate, the.... It seemed to develop that he picked a right time, and obviously he was seeing everybody in New York, and he just handled it beautifully, although there was a lot of bitterness on the part of Pike [Otto G. Pike] and Stratton [Samuel S. Stratton] when he did go in, I remember that.

GREENE: Right. Did you go up for the convention and....

BRADY: I went up for the convention, yeah, in New York City it was held at an armory...

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: ...in a wild place. Yeah.

GREENE: Hot.

BRADY: Hot, yeah. Bobby was at the Carlyle [Carlyle Hotel] I think, and he made a speech at the armory and it was a great speech. He had a great knack of coming up all the time with important speeches.

GREENE: Uh huh.

BRADY: It was a good speech.

GREENE: Did you by any chance go to Atlantic City for the national convention, too?

BRADY: No, I remember it, I was going to go, but I never went. Dean Markham went, I know that. And at different times, but I didn't go, that was in the...

GREENE: Just before this...

BRADY: Yeah.

GREENE: ...the week before.

BRADY: That's right. Yeah.

GREENE: So it was your impression that his first choice was definitely the vice presidential nomination, and it was only after that...

BRADY: Oh, he....

GREENE: ...fell through that...

BRADY: He, he was a very, you know, changing mood at the time. I don't, I think that really that he had a great feeling that he was helping, and also the Democratic Party by running. And I really felt that he felt—and so did everyone else around him, I guess—you know, felt that this was what he had to do to help them. And, things, you know, the great swing of the country behind Johnson at that time and the willingness of everybody in the country to help Johnson, really gave Johnson, I think, actually a false sense of his own importance. And, that's why Johnson, I think, went about it, along with it, sort of. But I think, you know, and I think that you know Bobby was that sort, really to do exactly what, you know, what was necessary. I don't think really he felt at all that he *had* to have it, although he was enough of a politician and a political thinker that he recognized that this is, that structurally the place to be after what he had done. You know, after his being sort of the political architect of the '60 situation.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: And I, but he was always, you know, I don't think, there was never any exclusion on his part, you know, that he had to have it, or was his due to have it or anything like that, it was a very collective operation.

GREENE: What about your own decision to go up and help, and how did that fit in with your job at the Justice Department? Did you have to take a leave, or...

BRADY: Yeah, I did, I resigned at that time.

GREENE: Oh, you actually resigned?

BRADY: Yeah. I think you had to resign.

GREENE: Because of the Hatch Act [Hatch Act of 1939].

BRADY: Yeah.

GREENE: Yeah.

BRADY: You had to resign, so I resigned, and I went up there and stayed on one of the—I stayed in two different places because there were hotels that we had up there. Just lived up there beginning.... It was about September first or second, I guess. I tend to remember the 10<sup>th</sup> or thereabouts. But it was one of those things where, you know, I wanted to do it, and I asked Bobby, you know, and I guess at that time it was Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] was working up there, et cetera, and he, Steve Smith called me, as I remember.

GREENE: How did you end up, you told me on the phone, I think before our last meeting, that you were head of the speakers bureau?

BRADY: Yes.

GREENE: How did that come about?

BRADY: I don't remember how it came about, I think, I guess it was done between Bobby and Steve or something. They really never said to me, "What do you want to do?" or anything like that. I remember in '60, Bobby had come into Philadelphia and Delaware County and southeast Pennsylvania, and I had set up those three or four big things that he went to. That's when I was state chairman for Jack [John F. Kennedy]. Then, I guess, in '64 he felt that maybe I would be able to do this, you know. And, it just developed that way, and then we started. And I remember the first figures, the thing was a fiasco, there was some.... New York was so full of factions that you just...

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: ...It's really insane. Anyway, I got somebody there to speak and he didn't go over very big, he wasn't pro-Bobby enough, and...

GREENE: You don't remember who it was?

BRADY: No, I really don't remember who it was. It was down on that darn, you know, south—where all the wild people were, you know—structurally in the, I guess near...

GREENE: In the city?

BRADY: In New York City, it was in that section near NYU [New York University], wherever that is.

GREENE: Around the village?

BRADY: Yeah. The Greenwich, that's what I'm thinking of, the Greenwich Village area. And anyway, I got the guy and he just didn't, and he was well, really

well-known, but I didn't know, I listened to him, I thought that was strange. Anyway he was six of one and half dozen of the other, and he really wasn't somebody that we had thought of and I can't, as I say I can't remember the guy's name. And then you got all sorts of advice from all sorts of people. But I was lucky enough to sort of get a pretty broad base group of people working with me, and we got enough big things that it just really took off. It was the most amazing thing I've ever seen, really, in terms of structure, because we had the best people in the world, just everybody and anybody.

GREENE: Were you doing all of the organizational work, or was someone else working with you?

BRADY: Yeah. I was doing just about *everything*. It was twelve to fourteen hours a day, and it was better to do it that way, and I had three young, bright guys who drove for me, you know. And it's funny that you say that 'cause one of the first things we went to was a place in Brooklyn, in a new place that was being built, and, I think it was Arthur Schlesinger. I'd made arrangements for Arthur to go there, and there were people who were friends of Bobby's, I guess, but anyway they were supposed to be influential people. And Leonard Gorman, remember he went with Nixon?

GREENE: Oh sure, sure.

BRADY: He went with us that time.

GREENE: Really?

BRADY: And he spent the whole night with me. I'll never forget him, because kept questioning us, "Well, what's it all about?" And, "How are you doing?" And the other guy in Warner Lambert was supposed to be a count or something or prince in the, that Frenchman, or, I think, and he had a *beautiful* apartment, but he got, he was supposed to be backing Bobby. Obviously they were just in it to find out how we did the thing. But they and Becarmot were so...

GREENE: Who do think they were representing?

BRADY: Oh, Nixon, absolutely. Oh sure. Oh, there's no question of it that night. But anyway, they were interested in, and this was one of the first, very, very first few times that we, you know, that we were going out. And I remember that we had to hire a limousine, Steve hired limousines for us to take us over there, so we could do it. And it wasn't all that good. Anytime that it was, that people who had a track record of their own politically over there, you knew it was going to be a boomerang somewhere.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: With the universities, the big associations and all that sort of thing, that we got, they were great. Cause you'd get four or five hundred people and you'd

get all sorts of the people you wanted, you know, the voters. But if you started to fool around.... And I've seen all the names I've seen in New York, it's funny, they all, a lot of them worked with Lindsay [John V. Lindsay], I forget a girl's name, in Manhattan who became a big shot, who was awfully helpful to us.

GREENE: Ronnie Eldridge.

BRADY: Yeah. Ronnie Eldridge. She was great. You know, this was '64. She was really good. She, I mean, I don't know what, whose side she was on, but when she...

GREENE: She was working for Robert Kennedy at that time.

BRADY: Well, she got really gangs. I mean, we'd get Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen]. Sorensen was playing coy, he was like a great warrior up there on Long Island. Every time I'd call him he'd say, "Oh Bill, I promised my publisher that I wouldn't come down," but he finally he did come down, and he was just great. For ten days he gave us every day. My God, it was terrible, too, you know, the logistics of getting him around. He was a prima donna, you'd have to do, he was staying at Krim's [?] place, I think, and we had, oh God, be ready all the time. It was so terrible. And then we fouled up with what-was-his-name, Arthur Schlesinger. We had him up there to a *huge* affair. God, it was tremendous. Up in Westchester County. Then he missed a big party at Norman Mailer's, and he was sore as hell. And then the other time we had him he missed a big, we went to a rabbi's place about eleven o'clock at night, and they had already closed. And he was mad at me that time. But you couldn't do much, he had his speech that went exactly forty-one minutes, you know, and it was just a rip-roaring speech, you know, it was one of those great talks, that just.... You know, I had everything with it, you know, and made everything look good, and, you know, it was just really effective.

GREENE: Who else was effective?

BRADY: Sorensen, Schlesinger, Galbraith [John Kenneth Galbraith] was really effective, you know. We had *him*. His great buddy was vanden Heuvel [William J. vanden Heuvel], and every time I wouldn't give Galbraith some, you know, the call in time vanden Heuvel would call me up and said, "Big," I forget what, we used to have a funny nickname for him, but, "The big man's after you, you know, because you were, you haven't gotten in touch with him, because...." They all had these tight schedules, they'd all give you two or three nights or two or three days and you'd have to do something, then you'd have to make sure somebody was always around, and we did pretty well, we always did have somebody always around, I remember, when we had the big affairs with those three guys. Then, politically, we used to get just about anybody and everybody, Musmanno [Michael A. Musmanno] came in from New York, for instance, once, I remember.

GREENE: Who?

BRADY: Michael Musmanno was a Supreme Court judge who in that year was running for U.S. Senate, and he wanted to help in the campaign, and he didn't do very much, but he, the reason I remember it, I was from Pennsylvania, he called and they sent him to me to use, like and, he wanted to go up and do this and do that. And then we had the fellow from Missouri who went up and made a big hit with the state, with some of the state teachers colleges. A fellow named, from western Missouri, Bolling [Richard W. Bolling]?

GREENE: Bolling, yeah.

BRADY: He was a good man, he was good, and some of the senators, and I can't remember exactly. Although we had trouble with the senators because they told Bobby that it wouldn't be too good because of Keating [Kenneth B. Keating]. Keating was not disliked by those, by anybody. Keating seemed to be a fairly middle-of-the-road sort of guy, I guess.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: So we really. But we...

GREENE: For the most part we were these volunteers, people who called you, and said I'm available or did you have to solicit a lot of...?

BRADY: I worked with Bobby a lot. Because Bobby wanted certain people, FDR, Jr. [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.], for instance, did a lot of work. And he, everyone had their own entourage, I forget the two or three guys around FDR, Jr. And Sorensen, we had given Sorensen his entourage, it was me and another guy, whoever was willing, and then Schlesinger was the same way, we got along very well, but you know, you have to be with them all the time, they really wanted you to, you know. And then Galbraith, vanden Heuvel was around Galbraith all the time, and Bill was, you know, advising us about him, and then you'd have Joe Rauh [Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.], for instance, from the wild group, you know, where Joe was the one to come up, and then we had somebody from Alabama came up, a friend of Oberdorfer's, or his father or somebody else, but we had a group that wanted to speak to the Jewish people who... I think that was the pitch there. I don't remember it all. Then we had, it's too bad I didn't get all my notes together for that, that he, we had just about, we really did have a tremendously large group. Jim McShane [James J.P. McShane] was involved and he was the funniest one of all, of course Markham went along with Bobby as his basically his bodyguard, and I think Jim King [James King] was at that point also...

GREENE: Bill Barry [William Barry] came up for a while.

BRADY: Bill Barry, was King also there? Bill Barry did come up for a while, and but McShane was always there, and he was just, you know, he was the greatest

guy that ever lived. And then, we, every now and then we'd get those wild Irish groups and he'd, they'd have to have him there, I remember, Burke Marshall wrote a memorandum to Bobby saying, "You've gotta watch Brady, he's got everybody to speak up there, and they're all violating the Hatch Act," because McShane was so well known and well liked up there, you know, but, and then, well John Douglas was up there pretty much, and they came up. And I had Moynihan [Daniel P. Moynihan], I had Moynihan come up a few times. He was well liked up there by the same group that like Rauh, although he was always struck me as being a sort of "cutie," you know, Moynihan.

GREENE: Not as, not being a New Yorker, did you have anybody from the state working with you as far as, so you didn't end up putting the wrong person with a particular group?

BRADY: Yeah, I had a pretty good group, I had that Andy Heiney was a lawyer, and Art Levitt [Arthur Levitt, Jr.] was a lawyer, the son of Arthur Levitt, the comptroller, he worked night and day with me. And I had a half a dozen girls, a girl named Mary Walsh was excellent, a girl, Barbara Fife, I think was one of her friends and we had a couple of other girls who were pretty savvy and two or three different fellas who were savvy, Lehman [Herbert H. Lehman]. We had a good mixture, actually they seemed to, I was lucky enough to get the best sort of brains out of the group actually.

GREENE: You didn't have any bloopers when you sent somebody to a group that he fell on his face before, or anything like that?

BRADY: No, the type of person we had was just so good that, you know, you really could count on them for almost anywhere.

GREENE: For anywhere.

BRADY: And we just didn't sent Sorensen, Schlesinger, or Galbraith to anybody except huge halls where the audience really wanted to listen to something like that. Now, as for the other politicians in Brooklyn, Queens, and a few other places, we tried to mix up the ethnic mix a little bit, and then, but you know, Ronnie Eldrige, she had Sorensen, Schlesinger, and that group, and they were just really good. We were out on Long Island, it was the first, I think, the first time that Sorensen ever spoke on Long Island, it was just tremendous, and somebody, he gave a speech there, and somebody said how long it was, you know, you spoke about fifteen minutes, and it was about the same time that President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] spoke when he was up here at his dinner, and Sorensen said, "Yeah, that's right. My speeches are seventeen minutes, exactly," and that's what he spoke, seventeen minutes. And he was very good, he was very good with that group out there. They were a very rich group on Long Island.

GREENE: Would you coordinate at all with Feldman [Justin N. Feldman] and Nolan [John E. Nolan], who were doing the scheduling, or this was completely independent of them?

BRADY: It was almost independent all the time. Bobby would always be getting back to me saying to me, the first blooper he found out about himself, that he knew about the first blooper, about the fella being neutral.

GREENE: Yeah.

BRADY: And he said to me, "What are you doing?" And I said, "Well, what happened?" And then of course he told me what happened, and of course I didn't indicate to him that I was there and it wasn't as bad as the man said, but nevertheless, and then it went on, and then he was very satisfied, and at the end of it he got more and more satisfied, Bobby, but you know, but he got more and more satisfied because of the people he was able to bring in to because Sorensen wouldn't come in for me in September and October, but he'd come in for Bobby, when Bobby called him.

GREENE: They didn't assume when you were calling that it was for...

BRADY: Well, it was for Bobby, but they always...

GREENE: Wanted a personal...

BRADY: No, well, I don't think they wanted a personal thing as much as I would call them and be very direct with them, you know. I would just treat them as employees, like Moynihan would always say to me, "Why not have Ann talk, I've been talking too much, Bill." You know, they would always plead, you know, you can't treat me like this, you know, and I would be treating them as if they were shells, you know, you gotta go here, you gotta go there, and every now and then of course I'd get somebody who'd say, "No, I'm not going. What are you talking about, what are you getting me up there for?" And I'd do it, you know, I did the same time with Katzenbach [Nicholas deB. Katzenbach], with a bunch of young guys. I sent Katzenbach there and he, you know, there was a lot of trouble with that aspect of it, you know, because there was a... Because they were still officials in their department, you know, and I treated them as if they were our campaign supporters, you know, I really didn't think anything of it.

GREENE: Can you remember anybody that you tried to get who was unwilling to come in?

BRADY: Not... I think there may have been one or two, Bobbie, that may not have come in when I called them or something like that, but by and large, if any group was big enough, and they wanted X, I'd go to Bobby in a pinch for X, you know what I mean, I mean, you know, by... As it went along I just knew from the people that I knew constantly and constantly meeting that who they wanted because it worked out pretty good. I got into the job early enough that Smith [Stephen E. Smith] and Bobby and everybody else would automatically send them to me so I just knew the mixture pretty good, and whether it was Troy's area or, you know, and Queens or whether it was the Bronx and

Buckley [James Buckley] and all those guys, and you just, you know, they were my ilk anyway, I was brought up in those, that that type person, so I knew that automatically, and the only thing really new to me was the very, *very* rich intellectual and people in Manhattan, and some of those Brooklyn areas, actually. That's the only thing that was....

GREENE: I meant more, you know, speakers that you wanted to get, people you thought would be effective from your standpoint that who weren't cooperative?

BRADY: The only ones I would say would be senators. I don't know whether we did try to get Ribicoff [Abraham A. Ribicoff]. Ribicoff did come for us once or twice. He did slip in. Originally he wouldn't do it, naturally because he knew. And it wasn't something, there was something sort of unwritten law that they didn't do that, they didn't come out against the...

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: But he did come in a few times in private affairs. We did have a couple of others do the same thing. There was a big, big strong group up there that knew Ribicoff, Fred somebody [Manfred Ohrenstein], his brother, I think, became a federal judge later on, I've forgotten his name, but he was a very rich guy. And then we had....

GREENE: Oh, Freddy, I know who you mean.

BRADY: Do you know who I mean? He's about six feet tall, he's....

GREENE: I've never met him, but I, Ronnie, he was in that group, Freddy Ohrenstein?

BRADY: Yeah. Something like that.

GREENE: Is that who it is?

BRADY: That's what. He....

GREENE: Ohrenstein, I think.

BRADY: He was very wealthy, and I'm pretty sure his brother became a federal judge. He was a terribly good friend.

GREENE: That's right.

BRADY: He was, he and Ribicoff were sort of blood brothers, you know, they really were tight and you have to go through him a lot of times, like you have to get through a certain guy from FDR, Jr. I forget who he was, but, and.... Schlesinger and Soresen I'd go directly to them, and Galbraith as I say, but going, thinking

back on that period, we just had anybody and everybody, you know, and there were a lot of people who wanted to speak, who we didn't, I remember, Burt Roberts [Burton B. Roberts] was, he became a judge, he's district attorney of the Bronx. He was one of our speakers a couple of time, and he was really a excellent speaker. He spoke for William Fitts Ryan once, I can't remember the affair we had, but for William Fitts Ryan. And then he, Roberts was a great friend of Hogan [Frank S. Hogan], and Hogan wanted Bobby to go to the Harvard-Columbia game with District Attorney Frank Hogan but I never could, I was, anyway, the schedules didn't get, but we spent, you know, two or three weeks trying to work that out, but it never, we never could work it out.

GREENE: Were there people who were anxious to help, and that you tried to avoid using? Anybody like that, that was not particularly effective or tended to alienate people that was anxious to....

BRADY: Yeah, we had that. I had a few people who did, who didn't do too well, and wanted to more, you're right, you're right.

GREENE: Can you think of who it might have been?

BRADY: No, I can't think of the people so much because it was really a situation where I just didn't pay that much attention, you know, to the individual, I just, I was insulated to a great degree because not being a New Yorker they couldn't really pull much pressure on me, and I was next to Bobby as a former roommate and that sort of falderal, and so I was, I really was very lucky and I knew pretty much what was best and where was best, and we knew where we were weak up there. We were weak in the Jewish intellectual...

GREENE: That's what I was going to ask you.

BRADY: ...circles, you know, and we kept getting, and we were weak in some of the political aspects because he really did wrench the whole political machinery, so to speak.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: You know what I mean, certainly Wagner [Robert F. Wagner] and O'Connor [Frank D. O'Connor], I think, of them as being not terribly happy, I mean to guys who were sort of wheeler-dealers in the political scene naturally had to share that podium and, of course, that was a problem, but to a great extent the Buckleys and the rest of the machine guys were, we were in good shape, I mean, we always talked to them and always got along with them. I think, Frank Rosetti was there at the time too, and a couple others, and then they always got along very well with him because he, Bobby's name it was just so attractive that nobody wanted to really have an open fight, whether it was Stanley Steingut or anybody. It was just a case of where everybody's emissary, and these leaders all

had emissaries, when I met with them, well, everything was fine. They weren't demanding, it was very strange because, you know, knowing political leaders, it's just the opposite.

GREENE: Sure.

BRADY: They really wanted to get a modus vivendi with Bobby, there was no question about it, and it was, that's why it was the best possible political campaign that anybody could ever be in. You really just couldn't get a better set up actually. It was just remarkable, in that sense.

GREENE: Did you especially towards the end have to really pump people into places like the Jewish community, and the Italian community where you, which were kind of trouble spots as things developed, where you needed extra work?

BRADY: Yeah, well, you know, it got to the point where we had so many, many places that would, and that's where we really were lucky, we had a lot of people, and we sent out a lot of different speakers too, you know, to you know to whatchamacallit, to go to the different areas. And it was something where we were having so many spots to cover, Bobbie, that you didn't have to worry about, say, the Italian, the ethnic Italian or the ethnic Irish because we were just covering too many places and we were sending all people all out. It's too bad, as I say, I think of the stars in it, but we had an awful lot of people there that we were using in different places and we had a situation which was, you know, really extremely good but just because of the newness of Bobby, I mean all these people who were so used to worrying about the leaders across the bay, suddenly were looking to us to see how we were what we were doing, so it really was the most satisfying experience I, our problems really were logistics. Getting people to pick up the speaker and getting the speaker there, and things like that and meeting time deadlines, I mean we were that effective. There was no periods when there wasn't, you know, something that, something going on that was being successful, it was really amazing.

GREENE: How much opportunity did you have to observe the overall campaign organization, you know, outside of your own little speakers bureau?

BRADY: Well, I was up on that top floor or whichever floor it was, I forget now, and I think we were on forty-second street, but we did, it was pretty good opportunity. I was in touch with, say, Hackett [David L. Hackett] a great, great deal. He had the boiler room and the girls up there, and I saw Smith very, very frequently. We flew together to places, Auburn, New York with Sam Stratton and that group, and early in the campaign, and all the people around him and Smith was down the hall from me really so it was fairly good, and they gave me everything. I never read so much in my life, 'cause they cut everything out of the papers, and all over the state and it was going pretty good. I know that, you know, at the middle of the campaign it started, I guess the polls got close, I don't know, but....

GREENE: Well, in, at one point I think it was the second week in October they were

actually tied.

BRADY: Yeah, well I kept, I tried to give Bobby a line, I said it's, I just couldn't believe it frankly, but the polls did say that I guess, and that's when the famous, well I, interview was going to take place, and I'll never forget my argument with Bobby about the interview, what questions to ask Keating, and I kept....

GREENE: You mean the debate?

BRADY: Debate, yeah, and I kept screaming just ask him silly questions about, "Well, what have you done for housing?" You know, and I wanted to ask questions that you *can't* answer, I mean, whereas if you got specific I think he could answer specific questions, but if you say, "Well, what have you done for housing?" and you know, well gee, what do you mean, you know, and we had a big argument. John Douglas was drawing up various things, and letting, I don't know, Joe Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] was at a different, Joe Dolan didn't come up till later, as I remember, but he was being very, very, you know, precise about his questions and things, but at any rate he, as I recall, he, they did go on television about those things.

GREENE: Well, remember it was, what happened was the empty chair.

BRADY: Yeah, of course I remember the empty chair, boy that, he Bobby got that really terrific. He really came out of that like a...

GREENE: Do you have, were you involved at all in that night's preparation? Do you know whether, it was a deliberate thing that he get there too late to appear, or was it, he attempted to get there on time and just didn't?

BRADY: No, I always thought that he, that Bobby was just going to go in and show up at the right, I think that was his last judgment, and I wasn't in on the judgment making, but I think he just decided that he would go there at the crucial moment when Keating was going to do something, and I don't know whether it was, I think Ed Guthman [Edwin O. Guthman] must have been there, I can't remember right now.

GREENE: They were, yeah.

BRADY: They reminded me of Guthman, you know, just going in there at that very, very crucial moment, and it just, the press...

GREENE: Of course, he didn't get in.

BRADY: Oh, I realize, but he was banging on the door, and he got everything in the world, why Keating handled it so badly was inexplicable. Why he didn't let him in, and et cetera and let him go, was beyond me. NBC was terrible, well I mean, the press came out terrifically, Bobby said to NBC, "Why didn't you let me in?" He

was saying that the chair was empty and here I was. Well you didn't say, and the explanation was frightening, and it turned out that Keating's people had told the NBC to keep him out at any cost, which, well it really blew up in their face, you know.

GREENE: Right, that was probably the turning point. Or the final turning point.

BRADY: Well, Bobby won. I always was amazed by 750,000, I recall, or 720 or something like that.

GREENE: But it was way behind Johnson.

BRADY: Well, of course, but after all, I mean my heavens above us Goldwater, and that pitch, but you know, you had a situation where you had Keating who was the darling of, you know, the whole area, era so to speak. And you had, you did have, you know, a carpetbagger on the face of it, who was, which was a very difficult and you know, a very difficult point to overcome, I mean I think Keating had an awful lot, and Keating was very, and I thought he was *very*, very effective when he, when Bobby, when he said to Bobby, "You know and I know and your brother knows that I have been with him, and et cetera, et cetera." He was very effective on that one show, and that I saw, and you know, his record was a liberal record. It wasn't, you weren't running against James Buckley or someone...

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: Some cement head, or, you were running against a guy, you know, who had a fairly good situation, although, you know, it was, he was over his head, and Brownell [Herbert Brownell, Jr.] was his campaign manager. He had a raft of people who were backing him, you know, and you know, that was an amazing victory. I really think that, winning by as much as he did was really terrific, although, you know, I don't think Goldwater ever campaigned in the state though, Bobbie, as I recall, he was there so infrequently, I think he let the, he castigated the east coast, you know, specifically New York, that fellow Goldwater, you know.

GREENE: Do you remember any discussions about whether or not to link Kennedy, especially at this sort of nadir in the campaign, whether or not to link Robert Kennedy's campaign with Johnson, the Johnson-Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] campaign?

BRADY: They came in there, and I'll never forget it, and they, those polls must have been great for them because they really were nothing more than a, you know, celebrating army, those guys. They came in and they, we always talked about it, but they, you could see they weren't doing anything, you know, and we knew they, it was no point, and they were, I know Bobby must have been dealing with them, but they really had no effect on us, and we were doing too well to worry about it, and we were a pretty good unit actually, up there in New York. And I remember many times talking to all sorts of guys

from the national campaign for Johnson but they really were much more speculative, they were much more interested in how we were doing all that sort of stuff, and I think it was only very late in the day, maybe the end of October that they knew we were going, they knew we were being quite effective, and were going to do well. They must have known they were going to just sweep that area, because they were just sort of looking around, looking at us all the time. And there was a lot of talk, Bobby I think spoke to an awful lot of people. He knew so many people anyway, you know, that, but out situation in, where it really counted, there was no, because I talked to Washington people and they were, I mean in '60 when we were running the campaign in Pennsylvania, we used to get you know, some real cooperation from the national committee, they used to send Oscar Chapman, and a number of senators all through here, and we would handle them. Ribicoff came here, even Truman [Harry S. Truman] came here, and we had a great group of speakers here, but when I negotiated with them, it was utterly ludicrous, it was red-tapish, and we, there were two or three phone calls, and I just never called them again. And we didn't need them, and they were terribly southwest-oriented and everything else, and that sort of thing, so we never, very little, we just looked at, upon it, because naturally Johnson would come to New York, maybe twice in the whole period, and for three or four days you'd have his people who were setting up his stay there come though and see us, but we never, personally we never did very much, and what they had to say to us was just sort of silly. They, you know, weren't on top of what was going on in that New York situation, and they just couldn't help us, and we sort of early on I think that that's what we decided that's I mean that's what I decided, but the thing that developed so quickly those people that I had that got into the speakers bureau with me were just really bright, they would just knock you cold, they were so good and then we got these tremendous, you know, everything was channeled to us, that wanted a speaker, and they just were endless, you know, and then everybody that, you know, promised good crowds really worked turned out well for us, you know, they were just good. They were just good, and you know, and I knew we had a good thing, I knew we were making all the points we could make, and you know Johnson's guys couldn't help you. They, al they could do was hurt you in terms of the political structure, because Bobby had his own ballgame to win, you know, he just, and Keating hung in, he just hung in there, he hung in, and he had the press going with him, and he, you know, he had the sympathy and he was the underdog. But then when we had the big, Jackie came to headquarters that day that was really a mob scene.

GREENE: I remember reading about it, yeah.

BRADY: That was tremendous.

GREENE: Did you see much of Robert Kennedy during this whole thing?

BRADY: Well, during that campaign I'd see him, but I always be having something to worry about, you know, I mean one of the, if I did see him it was because a speaker was being with him and saying something to him. I wasn't seeing him on the basis of, you know, doing anything with him or for him, you know, because Schlesinger and Galbraith were following him or something like that going to hotels or something.

GREENE: Yeah, did you have much of a feel for how his mood and everything might have changed in the course of the campaign? Did he seem to become more enthusiastic?

BRADY: I thought he was too pessimistic. But, and you know, I guess so, but I think he, you know, he really was getting over the fact that he had been a campaign manager all his life up to that point and he really mixed both of them, but he was pretty good, actually, he was testier early on, earlier in the campaign.

GREENE: I was going to ask, did you get any feedback on that from people who were complaining that he was rude, or...

BRADY: Well, you get a little of it, but...

GREENE: Short.

BRADY: But he was, as I remember it, he was more short with say, Dave Hackett or more or something one or two times, you know about getting you know, not rolling along very effectively, I think he had that feeling, you know, that we weren't doing, we weren't being successful as I felt we were really, because I had gone through the same thing in '60 as he did, and I knew this was going a lot better, you know, this trip than he realizes. And I think that it, you know, it showed up a lot. But his mood, I think his mood changed a great deal, and I think he got a little nervous, you know, and I think he believed that poll that said he might have been beaten, you know. I really think he may have believed it, I guess he did believe it. We at that point things were doing so well, that I honestly believed it, would be alright. If you could see the whole picture.

GREENE: Right. Right. What about election night, do you remember anything specific about that?

BRADY: You know, we were celebrating, I think, and that's what it's almost. Actually, I don't remember what I was doing. You know, and, just we were at headquarters and calling different things, and just on the telephone and running around, I think, and then you know, then they came out, I think it was early I can't remember when in the night, that we said they were going to leave, but I think it was early that particular night. We really, and I remember.

GREENE: Yeah, oh yeah.

BRADY: And I forget, because, but some of the countries around there were really keeping good for us, and they surprised us. And I'm sure that, you know, that by ten o'clock, say, Bobbie, we weren't worrying about a typical long night, and I don't think we were expected to win by what we won by at all. I don't remember but the last *New York Daily News* poll was, but it was much, much closer, I think they kept the

race to be a pretty close race really. I can't remember what part the papers picked there, some of the papers upstate papers were picking Keating, but it was a toss-up of a race, I think at last week. As I recall.

GREENE: Well, I've seen a lot of credit given to both his empty chair debate and the other thing that a lot of people have cited as a major turning point is that Columbia speech. I don't know if you remember that, a lengthy speech he made to students at Columbia where they filmed extensively, and then used that for a blitz campaign on television and, oh, all kinds of public buildings they'd have the film going, and that was very helpful.

BRADY: Yeah, that was the first time, I think I really felt that he, answering questions that he was at his very best then, and I think that always really was one of his great, great fortes, to answer questions, when he did that. I think one of the great debates that he had, they tried to hoke him with that German connection with that General Aniline [GAF Coup]. A friend of his went to school with both of us, [unclear], was on the panel that was questioning those Republicans, they were a young group of panelists, and I thought he handled himself beautifully there. But I, he was just good in that in a confrontation et cetera he simply never made mistakes, he, you know, he really always kept the power on, all the time, he never, you know, he never really became taken by anything, he just, I mean for instance that charge they had, he kept backing away General Aniline, because he knew it was going to hurt the Jewish, that one thing they really were after, and I'll never forget them trying to prove it, they just didn't have it, it was one of those things that really...

GREENE: That didn't wash.

BRADY: That, yeah, exactly, it never washed, and in effect, just let them hammer away at it, because I think he may very well, you know, Bobbie, have known that they weren't going to wash it out. And it hung them so to speak, well he just...

GREENE: It back-fired.

BRADY: Yeah, it just hung up in the air or something it really was just, almost was like a McCarthyite charge, you know, of not, of just being in charge. But I think he was, he was just a good campaigner, and I mean, you know, and I think that that empty chair, that Keating debate showed that Keating was an older man, Keating handled himself badly, everybody handled themselves badly and they tried, NBC itself tried to protect Keating, you know, and it didn't look fair to Bobby, you know, there was an element of unfairness of it.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: But I think it was a typical Bobby campaign, he just, or Jack, I mean, they both were the same way, they did what they had to do, they went where they

should go, and they just *worked* really, Bobbie, they just worked at it, and it built, and it built and it built. You know, and it was just, were victorious.

GREENE: You went back to the Justice Department then.

BRADY: December, November 15<sup>th</sup>, I think or November 20<sup>th</sup>.

GREENE: Right. And then you told me on the phone that you saw him very regularly, even almost daily during that '65-'66 period you were still at the Justice Department.

BRADY: Right.

GREENE: He was in the Senate, was it primarily a social relationship?

BRADY: Primarily social, I'd be playing tennis, I was the in-resident athlete there for a while, you know, it would be Hackett, and I think Hackett may have gone to New York, I don't know, but Ed Markham was there for a while, and he was traveling a lot, Markham was a pretty late starter, and I was playing tennis a lot with Bobby at that point, you know, when we weren't, when he wasn't, when he was in town, you know, but he didn't travel too much, as I recall in '65.

GREENE: Just around New York.

BRADY: Yeah, that's what I meant, he, but that shuttle to New York was like a, you know, it was like a trolley car, because everybody was always on the shuttle going back and forth to New York, right.

GREENE: Right, how much did you get to talk to him about what he was doing in the Senate and how he was feeling about his job and that kind of thing.

BRADY: Well, that would be in '65, I'd be talking to him then, and actually in '65 the squeeze started to take place, on the Kennedy, you know, faithful. And really my position in Justice started to become, you know, really a make-way really, you know they, less and less that I had much to do with what I formerly had done. So I would say to him, you know, "What," you know, "I don't know what I'm going to be doing, you know, because, but I, my inclination was to be going on, you know, doing something else, going back to practicing law or something, so, but I didn't talk to him that much about it really because he was very busy with his, you know, with setting the office up.

GREENE: Did he show much curiosity, particularly towards the end of '65-'66 about what was going on in the Justice Department and asking your opinion on how Katzenbach or Clark [Ramsey Clark] or other people in the Cabinet were doing?

BRADY: Well, he always did that, he always wanted to know how things were going, and what it was like, and he, his curiosity was there, and I told him and, you know, he, it was a case of where you could see there were shifting sands, I mean they brought Barefoot Sanders [Harold Sanders, Jr.] in from Texas, to be almost like the managerial guy...

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: ...in the Department of Justice, and Katzenbach was shifting around, and he did become acting, he did become Attorney General for a short while, at the end of '64, and then he left, I believe the following year later to become the Under Secretary of State or something. And then this when they put Ramsey in. Ramsey, I always liked Ramsey, and I always felt that if it were up to Ramsey probably Bobby would have been the vice presidential candidate, but I think the Texas people had a, they were more partial, more partial I don't really know what to say, but it was just suspicious people I always felt in a way, although I didn't have much to do with them. But Bobby was always interested in it, and it really did lose, you know, its youthful verve, and all of its forward movement, there's an awful lot of bureaucratic individuals in the Justice Department, like any large department, and you can't do very much without leadership et cetera. Certainly Katzenbach was not a leader, in the true sense of the word.

GREENE: Would Kennedy express an opinion on cases or their the way he thought they were doing their job or was it mainly a matter of soliciting your views?

BRADY: I think it was a matter or what do I think with the Justice Department et cetera et cetera, and I don't think he, I don't think we ever did get very specific about certain things, I think that, I really think that there was just a general, my really conversations with him, had to do with individuals almost more so than cases, he knew cases, and he knew I wasn't that, I wasn't that informed about the cases either, I didn't pay that much attention to a host of stuff, because I was never in any of the investigative.... The Hoffa [Jimmy Hoffa] things were going on then, it was, the department was, we were fighting those appeals, and, there were a number of other things that were going on that Jack Miller [Herbert J. Miller, Jr.], the Pulliguins, and the Hundleys [William G. Hundley] were handling and things like that, but it was really a case of where it had gone by him so to speak, at any rate, he would only ask me about, what's so-and-so doing? Or, what does he think of, what do you think he thinks of a situation? Where does he stand about that?

GREENE: But he himself wasn't generally critical or of or complimentary to what he... What were you saying?

BRADY: No, I don't think he'd be critical of... [Interruption]

GREENE: Did you talk to him about your own decision to leave the Justice Department and what you would do afterwards, and....

BRADY: Yeah, I told him that chances are I'd go back to law practice and he, actually he really felt that I ought to come to New York with him, but...

GREENE: Did you consider that?

BRADY: Well, it was just that I had the children and the family and everything else and I had what I considered, you know, the political future of his own, which really was the presidency and I just thought structurally I'd come back to Philadelphia and get set up again as I did in '60, '59-'60 and do, be effective in that way. Going to New York just meant total break off of everything that I had done, and...

GREENE: Did he ever mention anything specific he had, that he had in mind in New York?

BRADY: No.

GREENE: No.

BRADY: No, he never did. And I didn't pursue it. And I went up, he did, I did, he did arrange some interviews for me, I guess it was Roswell Gilpatric at that law firm...

GREENE: Yeah.

BRADY: ...and Steve Smith's brother or something like that, and they'd just involve an awful lot of traveling, flying all over the country on that one case. And I just didn't, I don't know, I probably should have, but I didn't really, I just didn't think it was the thing to do at that time, you know, I told him in '66 I came back to Philadelphia there was a mayor named Tate [James H.J. Tate], who was, he turned out to be a very, quite dreadful, I think he even missed doing stuff going back there in that situation. But I, but you know, it was one of those things where you really, you couldn't very well do much down there, it was just like having the foreign troops in with all those taxi cabs around, you really were just going to be part of the furniture so to speak and I just didn't, you know, I didn't know what...

GREENE: Was he curious about that, how you were being treated?

BRADY: Not really, he, no, I...

GREENE: By Johnson's people?

BRADY: No, because I don't think I even brought that up that much. I mean I'd never complain to him that it was terrible the way they treated because it was

something you just accepted, I mean, and I accepted it, because at that point, the feeling was bad and I didn't like Johnson and Vietnam for any number of reasons and didn't like the guys from Texas basically because they all were such, thought they were big-shots, and you just automatically, you know, they knew where I was, and I knew where they were, and I didn't have to Bobby, "Listen, Bobby, these guys are treating me badly," because it didn't make, you know, I didn't care about that by that time, but you know, and it just, things went along, and you know, I always knew that I'd be going out and even when I left in October, '66, I always kept coming back, I think every month I was back twice or three times to the, you know, to Hickory Hill, and I always, you know, would play tennis and just tell him what was going on in Philadelphia and all that sort of stuff, and that took care of '67 and there we were. That was only for another year until Bobby began campaigning, I think we started July 15<sup>th</sup>.

GREENE: That was what I was going to ask you, if you could just explain the development of these conversations with him about what he was going to do and how it eventually evolved towards the presidency. What your own role was.

BRADY: Well, he was very adamant about not running for the presidency in sixty, I'd say '65 and '66, because I was adamant in his, you know, in his thinking about it and getting it ready. I thought, you know, you just have to get it ready, and then Johnson at that time was when I was there in '66, he was sending all these guys around because, you know, these university men, George Bundy and Roscoe talking about the great Vietnamese campaign, and I missed seeing how crazy he was, you know, he always reminded me of Texans looking upon Vietnamese as the next wetbacks or something I don't understand what he was doing, and I just knew Bobby was sort of, Bobby would tell him, he wasn't going to knock Rusk or McNamara they thought he was a lame duck and he... [Interruption] He'd never get specific, he just, he'd ask a question.

GREENE: He'd pick your brain, then.

BRADY: Yes, he questioned, the questions would always be well how's Johnson doing, you know, that only meant one thing, you see, in January and February of '64, you know, then, "Well, what do you think of the situation for me," and the President, you know, he was going to run, he didn't say that of course, but he was very, very interested all through February of '64 and March, I mean he was just, you know, he was really thinking about it. And I think that he just couldn't get over, and I don't think he believed the country would do what it did himself, I don't think he really it may have been wishful thinking but he didn't think, he thought the country would maybe look to him, you know, if he were Jack, et cetera. U mean, and he didn't think that Johnson would ever have the sort of outpouring of support from all sectors of the country after the tragedy you see, and...

GREENE: Did he ever talk at all about how he felt Johnson had treated him, and Mrs. Kennedy and that whole aspect of it, from a personal standpoint?

BRADY: Not a word, he just, all you'd do was know what had happened because of the expression on his face, he just, he would never say anything like that, it would just be a case of, you could feel, you know, the guy's name and you could feel, I mean Johnson's name and you could feel that, you know, almost like, it's almost just having known him for so long you just know every wrinkle, if one wrinkle was out of place you really knew that Johnson was really not that, you know, that was he the he never...

GREENE: Anyway, why don't you continue in terms of how things developed from your standpoint in '68.

BRADY: Well, I had strong anti-Vietnam leanings in that one period there, and I was, and I just kept saying to him in '66 and especially '67 too, you know, that he had to get going and get ready to run, and all that sort of stuff. Once again he just refused to make any moved at all, I always thought he just refused to make any moves at all, I always thought he just really played the, really, the iron hand and did nothing, and just stayed there, and let then you know, let McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] build up and I remember October of '67 he just sat there looking at him. I really think that, you know, he thought that he probably was right at the time, I mean it was a shoe-in in '66 and in 1966 in '67, you know, he just really, you know, he hadn't lost, he hadn't lost that much and I think that Johnson was wrong, and I think Bobby was thinking he would have won anyway, and I think that very well may be, that may very well be accurate, but you know, but and he refused constantly to do very much about the situation, and I think it was an awful lot had to do with it, but I don't think it wasn't crucial but he was loyal to McNamara and Rusk and whoever ordered that, I mean anybody who Jack had appointed he really did have a very strong tie with. But it also went along with his whole structure, he never would, you know, wanted to get excited and jump out into the stands, and scream, you know.

GREENE: But do you remember the pressure building up on him, was he finding it more difficult to stay out of it, you know, all the possible considerations.

BRADY: Yeah, well. I guess that was the period I don't know whether it was, was Frank Mankiewicz there...

GREENE: Yeah.

BRADY: And Joe Dolan, and.... If it weren't that I, I think Frank and I agreed...

GREENE: So before the – well you left officially on the 30<sup>th</sup> – like for the April second visit.

BRADY: Right.

GREENE: Which turned out to be a fairly dramatic moment – actually it was April first and second.

BRADY: Was it? Yes.

GREENE: Because it was the day after Johnson's [Lyndon B. Johnson] resignation.

BRADY: Yes it was. \_\_\_\_\_.

BRADY: I remember going to the thing and telling him how serious it was. I just said, you know, it's a situation where I think its to your benefit. I really do. I really felt that way.

GREENE: Was it too soon at that point to tell what effect it might have on the situation here? Whether he would benefit by it?

BRADY: Yes, it was too soon, I think. As I remember it, he was almost stark silent all the way back. \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: And then, remember there was the controversy – because he had long before that been invited by Bill Green [William Green] to speak at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner.

BRADY: Right. \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Then they all wanted him to withdraw.

BRADY: Yes.

GREENE: Do you remember? Did you get into that at all?

BRADY: No. I remembered it, though. I remembered going there and being so surprised and then all those people – you know, Ripley looking at him. It was really a mess.

GREENE: Was there any consideration – serious consideration – given to his not going to the dinner?

BRADY: I think [inaudible] made a real effort to try to get him to withdraw. I think he really pulled every possible string – and certainly cried bloody murder about us being there. Another instance where he was just screaming at the top of his lungs \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: What about Barr? Was he as...

BRADY: Oh, Barr was a very sane individual – oh no, Barr tried to act his role. \_\_\_\_\_. Lawrence was alive then too, you know?

GREENE: Yes, I didn't see much mention of him.

BRADY: Lawrence was always, on the surface \_\_\_\_\_...what he did must be a great example. And I just think that he did the same thing here with Tate – and of course, Tate did get a lot of money from Governor Murphy and did get a lot of breaks from the federal government. And Tate – always a political lackey – he's Jim Clark's [James Clark] sort of Schindler in the forties and then he became lieutenant to \_\_\_\_\_. He was somebody who really – who wants somebody [Interruption]  
We had a lot of contact in Harrisburg \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Yes, that was later right?

BRADY: That was later, wasn't it?

GREENE: About May 23<sup>rd</sup>.

BRADY: Kirk and David [David Burke]...who was his assistant at that time?

GREENE: Burke.

BRADY: David Burke. That's who we were very close with for that period. But getting back to Kirk – I think there was an area there – I don't know where O'Donnell [Kenneth O'Donnell] did it in—that group, so to speak – Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy]. But I think Kennedy was the guy that knew his own...and Kennedy saying to us that April – the first and second of April – that we've got work coming and we've got \_\_\_\_\_. You know, they're crazy.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: They were whistling Dixie and I'm there listening to this crazy stuff, and everybody's got to fall in line.

GREENE: It's interesting when you look through the \_\_\_\_\_ book, too – to see all this optimism \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Well, in fact, there was an indication in the book that it was a personal request from the White House through tape that Robert Kennedy not speak at that dinner. This is already after Johnson is out and they were still interested enough to put the pressure on to get him to not speak at that dinner.

BRADY: The tape was after that – the tape was after that guy – after Green, after the party. \_\_\_\_\_ invitation for weeks and weeks really—one, two, three? I don't know how long, but it was a long period.

GREENE: Yes.

BRADY: Well, a hundred people were here, you know, Bobbi. And they made an impression on Tate. Tate was a \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: What about the McCarthy people? Did you have any discussions with...? Well, these people were talking about sort of mapping out strategy – I guess – as far as whether to support McCarthy in the primaries since he was the only one on the ballot. Or how to instruct people \_\_\_\_\_ support regarding the primary?

BRADY: That came up, but we really – it was dropped. I guess it was just too late in the day and they had the McCarthy people here and they were set up. I started \_\_\_\_\_. We just didn't do much of anything.

GREENE: You didn't do anything to encourage write-ins or to discourage them on the other hand?

BRADY: No, we decided – I think – and I forget the primary date – what was it?

GREENE: April 23<sup>rd</sup>.

BRADY: April 23<sup>rd</sup> primary date? Yes... we just treated the McCarthy people nicely and didn't say very much and things like that. They had been going pretty strong \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: But if people would call as I assume they did and say, "I'm supporting Kennedy, but what do I do in the primary?"

BRADY: We would always say to write it in. To write his name in.

GREENE: Do you—you wrote...well, McCarthy got 340,000 plus.

BRADY: \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Yes, and then you got 44,304 and Humphrey [Hubert Humphrey] 33,000 – these are approximate.

BRADY: Write-ins from the party. And who else got...

GREENE: Yes, and Johnson got almost 14,000 and Wallace [George Wallace?] 10,600. Do you remember at all whether that was about what you expected or hoped for? Or did it exceed your expectations?

BRADY: We really didn't think a great deal about it, actually. We were sort of neutral on things in terms of how much we were going to do. Now Humphrey and

Johnson and those guys made it a point all the time to say, “We’re not going to get into it. It means nothing. It means nothing.” And they did something about it. They did try to get their people included.

GREENE: They did.

BRADY: But we really took the position – very honestly – that it was McCarthy’s situation and that locally we couldn’t—we had a number of people in Delaware County and locally in Philadelphia, and maybe a few in Lackawanna call and say, “We’re going to get some names in.” And we just simply said, “Go ahead.” But we didn’t do that sort of work where you say that you could get it. It wasn’t like ’60 when we killed ourselves.

GREENE: Right, right.

BRADY: That was just like hell. And this time we really just let the kids go – I mean, let the kids go. And we had a lot of guys lining up in there saying there going to do it, and that sort of stuff. We just didn’t sign anybody \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: What about the sort of postcard-letter petition strategy that was devised here on almost a kind of experimental basis? It seems that if it worked here you would try it elsewhere. Do you remember that? How you decided on that and whose idea it was?

BRADY: We all got together and figured out what were we going to do. There’s no election, right? The election was over April 23<sup>rd</sup>. So we had to get together and do things. We originally got the petitions out to different people – to write to different people. There were some uncommitted people – general delegates who were uncommitted – just chosen from the Democratic ranks, I guess. And they also had the people who were elected in the senatorial districts as delegates.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: We’d take different sections of the city and get maybe 5,000 signatures to send to those delegates. Now this was sort-of an ongoing situation. We instructed – these people were not instructed to vote for anybody, although we knew it was a matter of course how the tone was from the fact that the leadership in the state and the city was pro-Humphrey-Johnson. That is, we knew that from what Barr said and from what Tate said and what some of the other leaders in the state said. But we felt that when they got these petitions and cards and we said they were from their voters saying, “We implore you to vote for Robert Kennedy,” that would be something we could blow-up. And we had gotten a pretty good article on it locally, actually.

GREENE: Yes. In fact, it may have in a press account that I...

BRADY: Yes, about what we were doing with that. And that – we had figured, what can we do? We have all these people—we did have tremendous people.

BRADY: We had about 10 or 15 young guys who were just knockouts. And we had to devise something to get all these volunteers doing something. We started to get groups of four or five to go out at night, be together, pick a street, and just get signatures.

GREENE: Did you have enough time to measure the effect at all? Whether or not...

BRADY: No. All we knew was that we had a ton of signatures. The signatures just rolled in. We would stop somewhere and everybody would sign for Bobby. It was going to be really good because we were doing it in a generally Democratic area at that time.

GREENE: Do you – this is backing up a little bit to that April 2<sup>nd</sup> visit again. The senator had a reception for delegates, alternates, and other political leaders, and there was kind of a hassle afterwards about the public nature of the occasion. I don't know what they expected, but do you remember getting into that criticism? Because...

BRADY: That was a \_\_\_\_\_ created out of \_\_\_\_\_ for sure. I think O'Donnell and the rest of them—we were traveling the country and were pretty shocked at how it came. Because they came in one day saying, "I called Paul \_\_\_\_\_ and I called Matt McCluskey [Matthew McCluskey] and I called so-and-so and I called so-and-so." You know, these guys didn't really matter all that much in the whole picture of things. They thought everything was going to be – get it in the right shape.

GREENE: Because when Tate was making his public statements – which were very negative and critical – O'Donnell kept saying, "Well, I'm going to meet with Tate." And he and the senator did meet with him. I don't know what transpired.

BRADY: They did meet?

GREENE: Yes. With Tate.

BRADY: They did meet with Bobby? \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Yes. Well, in the \_\_\_\_\_ they did.

BRADY: Yes. Yes, well...I didn't know.

GREENE: During that visit, but I don't know anything about how it went. You? No?

BRADY: It didn't go well at all, because Bobby was worried.

GREENE: What about – you were sort of in charge of setting up the headquarters around the state, weren't you?

BRADY: Right.

GREENE: Were there any unusual problems with that – or in getting volunteers, or competition from McCarthy, that kind of thing – that you remember?

BRADY: Not really. We were just getting \_\_\_\_\_ and we had pretty much used that as our base \_\_\_\_\_ and calling, and following up Mary and the girls and whoever had a lot of names and things like that that were doing things for us and calling us and getting in touch with us. Things like that. I don't know – we opened up a few places, but I don't think I ever even got out to see a couple of them. I had gone over a list in '60, but a lot of them disappeared. In '68 it was just a new group really, almost like a new generation.

GREENE: Sure. What about the delegate gathering?

BRADY: \_\_\_\_\_?

GREENE: Yes. After...

BRADY: Oh yes, that's right. I got into that. Smith had me in York and in Lancaster. Where else did I go? Might have been Northumberland. We went out. They said to go out and see each, and I went out to see – I remember a woman, a publisher in York and a few other people, and I sat and talked to them and that sort of thing and got their views. That's right, we had spent a whole weekend.

GREENE: What was your sense of how you were doing?

BRADY: Good. Oh good. Well, I was just utterly confident. I was just so confident. It was just a matter – we were always winning at primaries and then \_\_\_\_\_ after the Indiana victory and all that sort of thing.

GREENE: Yes, I was going to ask you how much impact those had.

BRADY: Yes, that was good.

GREENE: Well, the next – as far as I can figure out – the next big thing – and maybe the most interesting thing – was that Hempstead Committee meeting on May 23<sup>rd</sup>.

BRADY: Was it May 23<sup>rd</sup>? Yes.

GREENE: Exactly...well, it started May 23<sup>rd</sup> and ran through that weekend to the 27<sup>th</sup>.

BRADY: Right, right.

GREENE: The 27<sup>th</sup> was the actual showdown on the polling delegation.

BRADY: Yes, that's what \_\_\_\_\_ said.

GREENE: Well, he came up on the 23<sup>rd</sup> and spoke that night at a dinner and then held a press conference and there was another explosion about that. Do you remember?

BRADY: Right, well Torquado[sp?] was the leader then. I'm sure it was Tate and Torquado. Unfortunately Lawrence had to be at that juncture *sub rosa* anti-Bobby, everybody was. Everybody was. The organization's structure was anti-Bobby.

GREENE: There was a memo....

BRADY: At that time? Where was that ....

GREENE: Okay. Now that's – I thought I brought that letter with me and I forgot it. I don't know how I overlooked it, but there is a very, very interesting letter from Schapp[sp?], a two-page typewritten letter to Humphrey. I don't know how you got it because it's an original. It doesn't look either a carbon – certainly not a carbon, and it doesn't look like a Xerox. But it's an original "Dear Hubert" letter in which he is incensed at what Humphrey's people are obviously doing behind the scenes in trying to call both first for a unit vote and then to call the delegation. It's saying that \_\_\_\_\_.

And I wondered. It was the only sign of Schapp, but it was a very strongly worded and very detailed letter. Did you have any contact with him?

BRADY: No, I didn't. I didn't have – you know, he was in the '60 campaign. But I didn't have – I didn't remember him. And I knew he wasn't for us. Because I'd remembered that –

GREENE: Well, he certainly wasn't pro-Humphrey.

BRADY: Well, he may not have been pro-Humphrey. I think he was pro-McCarthy [Eugene McCarthy].

GREENE: Yes.

BRADY: I think he was clearly pro-McCarthy. That's where he stood, yes.

GREENE: That's where, yes.

BRADY: You're right. You're right, yes. But that Harrisburg thing was really also ugly. But it was just an outgrowth of the Tate thing. Tate really set the tone because the rest of the guys around the state were never like he was.

GREENE: Well, Barr – see that's the thing – Barr. There's a memo from a woman named Loretta [ ]. I don't know who she is; I never saw her name anywhere else. And then there's also a memo from Mary-Jo [ ]. And they both say that Barr said – in quotes – that he “would now actively oppose Robert Kennedy because of Edward Kennedy's actions in Pennsylvania on the 23<sup>rd</sup>.” Barr claims that Ted Kennedy had broken a promise to him personally not to talk about any presidential candidates. And if you remember, he got up at that dinner and made a humorous, but obviously very biased speech. The same one where Mondale [ ] spoke.

BRADY: Yes.

GREENE: He was slipped onto the program; he hadn't scheduled to speak.

BRADY: Yes. Yes, that's right.

GREENE: Do you remember that?

BRADY: Yes. I remember...

GREENE: Did that make any sense or was that just an excuse for doing what he was going to do all along?

BRADY: Oh, an absolute excuse. An absolute, ridiculous excuse. Because the speech was so...it was just ridiculous.

GREENE: Innocuous.

BRADY: The mere fact that he was there – I mean – and to complain in front of all those other guys – and these were all Lawrence people—was why should he be here? Get him out of here. Get him out of here. Just his presence bothered them to death. Nothing that he said, really, but his presence bothered that whole group to death. It was the old-line Democratic leadership. The \_\_\_\_\_, just lost for 50 years in Pennsylvania, but there were adamant on that. They were pro-Humphrey and Johnson, I know that.

GREENE: Then that weekend – they \_\_\_\_ that group headed by the former governor Leader [ ]? Do you remember that?

BRADY: Yes.

GREENE: The Humphrey group.

BRADY: Right. Leader. Yes.

GREENE: Was that something impromptu that happened that weekend? Or was that something brewing?

BRADY: Oh, that was something that was absolutely part of the picture. Humphrey – Leader had become part of the Democratic machinery of \_\_\_\_\_. He had always been – that’s where he was. He was running those rest-homes or whatever they were. Old-people’s homes. He needed the \_\_\_\_\_, that’s all there was to it. And he needed the support of the organization.

GREENE: Because that was really a powerful group that he put together with....

BRADY: Leader did.

GREENE: Yes. Well, he had everybody. I mean, Tate and Barr didn’t put their names on it, but everybody that was associated with them was on it. And he had all the labor people, \_\_\_\_\_. I have a list of all the names.

BRADY: For Humphrey. Yes.

GREENE: There were about 40 of the top—there was really nobody who wasn’t on it, except Green and Barr. Or at least who wasn’t behind it, other than Green and Barr.

BRADY: Yes. Leader was somebody who was discarded. [inaudible] In ’60 he was really quite – York was a very good county for us. I don’t – although we didn’t do as well \_\_\_\_\_. And I like Leader. He really was a baby then. And I guess – I don’t know what it was – he felt that he had been manhandled. And he was during the ’58 race, against Scott [ ] he was sold down the river \_\_\_\_\_. But he was...and as a result he never really had a \_\_\_\_\_. But you’re right, he was very strong. And he’s been that way.

GREENE: Can you remember any efforts to try to counteract the impact of this group and to blunt it? Or to try to keep certain people from outwardly committing themselves?

BRADY: Well, we really knew what the structure was. I’ll put it that way. We really knew that that group was anti-Bobby, actually, and we accepted it. But, you must remember then, they weren’t very strong because the governor at that time was a Shaker. And these people were out of office now for—the Democrats were out of office for six years. \_\_\_\_\_ from ’62 to ’66. So you’re talking about people that weren’t as strong today as they were then – then they didn’t seem as strong to us. We didn’t care about

them. It's only recently that labor has taken the aura once again of being the decider of elections, I think, Bobbi. We didn't care, really, about that whole group that was \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: But in terms of the delegate control, they seemed to have it all wrapped up. By the end, after they polled that delegation, there was just nothing left. All Kennedy had was 20 or 21 uncommitted \_\_\_\_\_.

BRADY: Twenty uncommitted. Right.

GRENE: That was another thing I was going to ask you. How did you devise that strategy to hold your people uncommitted as opposed to having them come out outright for the candidate?

BRADY: Well, we just felt that there was no point in his seeming to be a competitor with the rest of them. By leaving him out, by not doing anything, it looked as if we weren't interested, so to speak. It looked like a bad beating because nothing had taken place \_\_\_\_\_. We had gotten a couple of releases out at that time. After all, Pennsylvania did vote for McCarthy and the idea of...and \_\_\_\_\_ didn't make the \_\_\_\_\_ now that you mention it. But the idea of saying that they all were going to vote for Humphrey, you know, we did like that noise for a while from the McCarthy people – that this is flying in the face of the mandate of the people. We enjoyed that vary much, and they were taking a pretty good beating.

GREENE: Well, you more or less got together with the McCarthy people to try to stop the polling of the delegation.

BRADY: Yes, they definitely did. Yes, \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Do you remember – this is something that I have tried to figure out – why didn't they end up voting on the \_\_\_\_\_? The Humphrey people, as it turned out, never even asked for a vote on the \_\_\_\_\_, although though they were expected to. And Kenny O'Donnell – in the press conference he held immediately after – claimed they just knew they didn't have the votes. But they seemed to be in such complete control that it didn't make sense.

BRADY: I did not for a minute believe that they were taking a beating from the press on that issue – then they decided –

GREENE: It was a Constitutional issue.

BRADY: They were very happy with the outcome. Practically, they have everything, don't they? What do they need the union group for? I'm sure that's the way they...

GREENE: Plus, there was a Constitutional question, I think, whether they were even

permitted to do that.

BRADY: Yes, there was a question of whether it was really legal, that's right. But even above and beyond that they really had gotten their victory in their judgment.

GREENE: Were you at all surprised by that? How strongly it went for Humphrey? Or was that....

BRADY: We were certain that it was going to be that way.

GREENE: Then why do you feel...what was the basis of your optimism? It wasn't...

BRADY: It was just that you just knew Humphrey was playing the wrong game. He was catering to this – I mean, here was Bobby winning everything that he went into, about four or five primaries, and it was building up. You saw the press turning. You saw Humphrey getting sour, and it was just a matter of they were going to try to stick to the sinking ship, really. We felt very strongly that there was just going to be an attrition. They weren't going to get out of...we thought it was going to be probably close. We thought it was going to be 30 percent for McCarthy, 35 percent for Humphrey – or 25, 35 for him – and then there were only two or three others, and Bobby would have 25 or 30. And it was just a matter of where would McCarthy people go, where would any defections from Humphrey go?

GREENE: So your optimism then was not about Pennsylvania, but rather about the convention as a whole.

BRADY: We felt Pennsylvania \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Really?

BRADY: We really felt that it was going to be a \_\_\_\_\_. And I think it was right, because locally here \_\_\_\_\_ would break with Tate and some of the people in Philadelphia would vote against Tate \_\_\_\_\_. We just barely won the numerality in '67, just barely.

GREENE: Right, and he won it with help from Clark, didn't he?

BRADY: Well, he....

GREENE: ...Tate, because – well, just to bring it up – we were talking about...it was, according to this Jack Lynch memo that Tate would be indebted to Clark because of Clark's support for him. But you're refuting that, but that doesn't....

BRADY: Well, there's no question that Clark, by not backing Specter [Arlen Specter]

helped Tate, but that's all Clark did. Clark did nothing else in terms of that campaign. Clark simply said that he was for Tate in the Tate-Specter race, I'm sure of it.

GREENE: It was not decisive?

BRADY: It was not crucial. Certainly if he came out for Specter it would have, I think – if he had attacked Tate it would have hurt. But how much – once again

\_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: But then you were going on to say that Clark was reluctant or refused to the end to come out openly for Kennedy.

BRADY: Yes.

GREENE: And he was playing all three camps.

BRADY: Yes. He clearly indicated that he could run as well as any of the three leading contenders. He used that as his basis approach.

GREENE: Well, that certainly conflicts with the kinds of things – the optimism – that they had in....

BRADY: In March, yes.

GREENE: Well, even right up through May. In fact....

BRADY: He clearly...that was absolutely Clark's position, publicly. I mean, his public position was evident: that he was not going to get involved with any of that business. And we were amazed, because when I went up to Washington, Bobby called Joe – Senator Clark – and said, "Bill, why don't you go over to talk to him," and Clark invited me to lunch. I was told I was going back to Philadelphia, probably. He said, "That's fine." I'll never forget, he asked me who I thought was going to win between Tate and Smith, and I thought Smith would win it; all the \_\_\_\_\_ leaders said that. But Clark knew there was a \_\_\_\_\_ in Philadelphia named Barrett who really swung the balance in that race. Barrett changed and went for Tate, and by so doing, broke the back of Smith's forces, and Smith really didn't have the organization primed up for that race, actually. They didn't have a candidate until the very last moment, a fellow named Kemp, and he lost two to one; 160 to 80. But Clark was doing what he was doing at this juncture because he didn't know if he was going to run next year. I mean, here he was a Democrat, and he had to run next year against strong opposition. And so, he couldn't take the chance of being for Specter who obviously he wouldn't want to be for. So he just quietly endorsed the Democratic ticket, and I never saw him again.

GREENE: Well, that's interesting because according to what I read in the black book, I

had the feeling that, you know, one little nudge would push Clark out in front.

BRADY: Of Kennedy?

GREENE: Yes, especially after that May 23<sup>rd</sup> session.

BRADY: Yes, nobody knew \_\_\_\_\_ absolute attrition. Just really thinks \_\_\_\_\_. And Clark had made a tremendous record of his own, Bobbi. He was really...he won 56 of his own against \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Of course, he worked quite closely in the senate with Robert Kennedy. They did a lot of...

BRADY: I thought they were close, too. But he's somebody – I don't think – that you can ever get that close to.

GREENE: Mm-hmm.

BRADY: He was really a very independent fellow. Very gifted person though – I mean – very smart individual. I'm sure he and Bobby \_\_\_\_\_ the issues together all the time.

GREENE: If you remember, after this May 23<sup>rd</sup> – after the *fait accompli*, when the votes and the polls were taken and O'Donnell had his press conference – then Green came out and held a press conference of his own.

BRADY: Yes, he did.

GREENE: In fact, Tate walked out on it.

BRADY: Right.

GREENE: Do you remember that?

BRADY: Right.

GREENE: How was that arranged? Or did Green do that on his own?

BRADY: Green. Yes, Green did it on his own.

GREENE: Really?

BRADY: He was very – yes, yes. Well, you know, it was a natural setup, too. The press was ready for something like that, because Green and Tate were pushing each

other back. I mean, Tate was the boss, he took Green through the place. I guess he thought he could handle Green, and he wanted to handle Green. You know, he didn't mind a little independence. But I think he just drew a line, and Green went out and had a press conference, \_\_\_\_\_. But it was good press for us.

GREENE: Mm-hmm.

BRADY: It helped us a lot.

GREENE: Okay. Just in retrospect, was there anything as far as that May 23<sup>rd</sup> convention that you might have done differently?

BRADY: I think we were – I remember up there – I was taking – I remember Senator... he's a Senator now, Frank Curry [Francis Curry], who was our chairman in '60 for college students for Jack. I remember he and his wife coming and he spent most of the time introducing him to Ted. Teddy was there, and we kept bringing this person in. Frank Lynch [Francis Lynch] was there from Philadelphia, another state senator I had gone to school with. It was a social gathering more than anything else. Because I think the whole picture was set. We knew – I remembered – I knew what was going to happen and that we were going up there because it was a good idea to go up there and at least find out how bad the opposition was. These are a bunch of old men, you know. They're all in their 60's or 70's, I think, as I recall. We knew what was going to happen, pretty much. The structure of the party was not there, and we knew that the McCarthy people had done \_\_\_\_\_ work in Pennsylvania and it wasn't going to be a completely easy thing. And what they were doing... the McCarthy people fighting as they were fighting, was helping our position because it was fighting our enemies.

GREENE: Sure.

BRADY: Clearly they were fighting our enemies. And we just wanted to.... and I thought it was it was just showmanship, us going up there and seeing what was what and things like that.

GREENE: How closely did you work with the McCarthy people?

BRADY: They were just friendly toward us. We didn't work...

GREENE: But on the polling thing? On what the strategy should be on the polling?

BRADY: Green pretty much – and O'Donnell – took care of everything. I was only... they'd work all the time, driving back and forth to the airport. We went away from Teddy, as I remember. My driver went to \_\_\_\_\_, I guess. I was more interested in the logistics and Green and Clark taking care of something that was a *fait accompli*, as you say: something that you knew what it was all about. There was no way you could change the structure of the situation at that point.

GREENE: Was there any discussion afterwards? Do you think this whole thing was clear to O'Donnell, too?

BRADY: No, I don't necessarily think O'Donnell was – that it was all clear to O'Donnell. I think that, you know, I think that... I don't know how much Green really... Greene was very new about the thing, and he wanted to do exactly what Teddy wanted him to do. I think he just sat down, probably, and with the help of Kenny figured this was the thing to do. It was a good ploy, but the press was ready for it, too, because of the railroading nature of the whole thing. And it worked out. It worked out good for us.

GREENE: Yes.

BRADY: It looked good. Probably people, I think, were, at that juncture – May 21<sup>st</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup>, and even before – were fairly... it was only the hard-core McCarthy people that were bitter about the press... a lot of the press releases. But I think the average McCarthy people at that juncture were still more pro-Bobby than pro-Humphrey.

GREENE: The next day, of course – after we spoke, which was on the 27<sup>th</sup> – was the \_\_\_\_\_ primary, which you lost. Can you remember any impact of that?

BRADY: All I remember then was I was trying to get in touch with Bobby. Because it meant nothing, I mean, I just \_\_\_\_\_. You know, one victory out of, what? Four? That was the only one we ever lost, I think.

GREENE: Right.

BRADY: We had 40 percent, McCarthy had 58 percent, or something, I guess.

GREENE: I don't think it was that big of a spread.

BRADY: 55-45? Yes. I forget what... I just felt it was one of those things that was bound to happen along the line, in the small amount of votes.

GREENE: What else were you doing around here? There wasn't much time... you're talking about a little over a week between... what was your strategy from then until the convention in terms of Pennsylvania?

BRADY: That's when we were starting our... we really were just holding daily gatherings. We were there from morning to night at the headquarters deciding what else we were going to do. We were going to have a parade, we wanted to get through L.A. We were going to try to... he was going to fly to New York after L.A., as I

understand. And we were in touch with people in New York about what his schedule was. We were constantly trying to find out whether or not we would do something in Pennsylvania in the way of a caravan or do that sort of thing.

GREENE: He had kind of promised to come into the state after California.

BRADY: You remember?

GREENE: Yes.

BRADY: Yes, he did. Yes, there was a period there where he was going to visit the state.

GREENE: By the way, the vote in \_\_\_\_\_ was 44.7 for McCarthy, 38.8 for Kennedy. So it wasn't....

BRADY: So it wasn't that big. Was \_\_\_\_\_ Hannon with him all the time out there in those places?

GREENE: Um, well...

BRADY: \_\_\_\_\_ Philadelphia?

GREENE: Um....

BRADY: I think that's his name.

GREENE: Yes. There were two Hannons.

BRADY: Yes.

GREENE: And then there was Jim Tobin was with him. Jim Tobin was sort of next to Bruno [Gerald Bruno]. The king and the prince of the advancement.

BRADY: Oh, is that right?

GREENE: I'm not sure where Hannon fit in.

BRADY: \_\_\_\_\_.

GREENE: Mm-hmm.

BRADY: What are they doing now?

GREENE: Well, nobody ever interviewed Hannon. The only ones we did were Bruno

and Tobin. And I interviewed Tobin. He's an attorney in New York.

BRADY: Oh, really?

GREENE: With a big firm. Most of those guys were lawyers.

BRADY: Were they? Yes.

GREENE: I think they've sort of stuck with that.

BRADY: Yes.

GREENE: Well, is there anything else that you can...think of regarding '68 or anything in general? That's about all I've got.

BRADY: No, that's about all. Then we had the train ride, that's all.

GREENE: I find that....

[END OF INTERVIEW]