Biographical Note
Doherty, Massachusetts political figure, friend of Edward M. Kennedy, Campaign aide for Edward M. Kennedy's Senate campaign (1962), Robert F. Kennedy's Senate campaign (1964) and Presidential campaign in Indiana and Massachusetts (1968), discusses the 1968 Indiana presidential primary, the night Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, and the Francis X. Morrissey affair, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

with

GERARD F. DOHERTY

February 3, 1972
Boston, Massachusetts

By Larry J. Hackman

For the Robert F. Kennedy
Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Maybe you could just start off talking about contacts with Robert Kennedy before '68 because I don't really know how many of those there were, whether you discussed at all with him the '62 Edward Kennedy campaign or '64 in New York or any of these things.

DOHERTY: When I went to Harvard, I was a freshman when Robert Kennedy came back in 1946, right after the war. I was playing freshman football and he was playing varsity football. I think we sort of used to grunt to each other on occasion. I think I ran into him once or twice in the late fifties when his brother John [John F. Kennedy] was the senator and also was the congressman from our district. I think I might have run into Robert Kennedy maybe once or twice. In 1961, in the winter around Christmas time, a little before Christmas--I guess in November--I ran into Edward Kennedy and I did a couple of things for Edward Kennedy. Then, over a period of time, increasingly I got more and more involved so that by March or so I was very much involved in Edward Kennedy's campaign. I was a newcomer; nobody really knew me. Quite frankly, I had a lot of problems with a lot of people who were very suspicious of me. Edward Kennedy was faced with a convention in June, and in about early April things apparently were not going very well at all. Just prior to Easter I volunteered. I wrote a breakdown of the fight in each one of the forty senatorial districts. As a consequence, . . . Teddy took that with him to Palm Beach; saw the president; the president read it and said, "You know, whoever wrote this knew what he was
talking about." Teddy returned on the following Monday or Tuesday. He asked me if I could go to Washington the following Friday. On Friday we had a long, oh, probably about a three-hour session with the president. Robert Kennedy was there. And all the people had some kind of Massachusetts roots. The meeting went late. The English prime minister came in town and so they had to call it off. They asked us if we could stay over for the next day and meet with Robert Kennedy. We met with Robert Kennedy—and with myself and the then [Massachusetts State] Senate President Maurice Donahue—who

was sort of involved very much in the campaign. At that point, a lot of questions were asked, and after about two or three hours, Robert Kennedy said, "Look, you're on top of this thing and you're responsible. I look to you." At which point he gave me his telephone number at his office, his private number, his home number, and said, "If you have any problems, let me know."

The next time I heard from him was. . . . We went through the convention which was in June. From the day of the meeting, from there on in, anytime I had a problem I always threatened to call whenever anybody wouldn't do what I wanted them to do. The convention worked out just the way we had hoped it to be. We got the exact vote count we thought we were going to get. Teddy won it on a Friday night. We sort of rested on Saturday night. I disappeared to Pittsfield to relatives of my wife. Monday morning I was in bed. About 9 o'clock the phone rang. I got out of bed. It was Robert Kennedy. All he said is, "You know I asked you to do something; you did it, you did very well. Our family will be forever grateful to you."

The next time I saw him was sometime in the following late January after Teddy had been seated as a senator. He spoke to me, nodded to me. I was standing in a group and as he went by, somebody said, "This is Gerry Doherty. You must know him." And then, he turned, wheeled around and talked and was very, very friendly. I think I might have seen him once or twice after that. He announced, as I can best remember, I think it might have been March 12 or 13, that he was going for the presidency, which I think was a Saturday.

HACKMAN: Right. A Saturday morning.

DOHERTY: On Sunday night, I called Teddy. I got hold of Teddy and said, "Look, I'll do anything you want me to do." I had just returned to the law business and I was chasing after ambulances. "But," I said, "I'm not going to, you know, take apart paper clips and put them back together again."

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: "Whatever you want me to do, I'll do, but it has to be meaningful." The following Thursday at noontime, I think it was like March 19, I was at the Parker House having dinner. The phone rang. It was Teddy and he said, "You know, I'm thinking about looking around in Indiana and. . . ." There's always been a sort of a standard joke that if they needed people, Chinese midgets or anything, I was always able to
find them. So he said to me, "Do you think you can find somebody who could look around?"
I said, "Well, if you want me to go, I will go." And then he explained to me that they had to
get a certain number of signatures, had to get on the ballot, and then had to evaluate all these
things.

HACKMAN: Right. Did he say whether anyone had been out or what their feeling was at
that time on. . .

DOHERTY: No, I'll get into that in just a moment. I said, "Well, I'll come as soon as I can."
He said, well, like right away. I went to Washington. They were
going to brief me about Indiana and about the hundreds of thousands of
people they had. When I got down there, they had a lot of chaos and confusion, which was
understandable, and all they really had was just something which might have been in the
Congressional Directory which had a breakdown on the number of congressional districts.
They had a couple of Xerox copies of pages of election law and procedure in Indiana, and I
had the contact name of a guy who was president of the Young Democrats, who had
volunteered to help, by the name of Michael Riley--at which point, I was to leave for
Indianapolis. There was all sorts of confusion about getting on a plane, and I finally flew out
of Baltimore. And there was a snowstorm.

Well, I arrived about 3 o'clock on Friday morning, expecting to be met by hundreds
of thousands of cheering people. I was met by Michael Riley and two other fellows--one of
them had sold storm windows and the other one was a nice, young professional guy who sold
insurance--and that was it. So we sat and we talked. I told them what I needed. They were
completely at a loss to get what I needed. At that point, we had come to the conclusion that
there are eleven congressional districts in Indiana and we needed to get five hundred
signatures from each one of the congressional districts.

I started talking about the congressional districts and our contact people. And we
didn't have any contact people. I talked about getting petitions. They didn't have any
petitions. I talked about getting voting lists and there are no voting lists available. So we
talked till about quarter of five in the morning. I went back to bed. And then we'd agreed that
Michael Riley would have a press conference the following day in the hotel I was staying at.
He announced to the world that he was going to enter Robert Kennedy's name and was going
to seek the signatures.

While he was doing that, I asked one of these fellows, one of the other two fellows
with him, a fellow by the name of Louis Mahern, a very talented fellow, a young guy who I
guess was in the storm window business and a fellow by the name of Schrigle who now
works in Washington--if they could get me a copy of the petition the Governor Branigin
[Roger D. Branigin] was using. I said, "You know, rather than fool around for a couple of
days developing the right language and everything, let's just take his name off one and put
our name on it and get to the printer's and get them out because if we're going to have a
problem, he's going to have the same kind of problem so that it would have to be in good
form. At that point, we went back, started cranking those out to the printer, and then we
started to break the state up in each one of the congressional districts. Then, the thing I
looked for is, although there weren't any voting lists available, where the population centers were in each one of these places in the likelihood we could get some Democrats.

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Then, I brought with me eleven names of people who had sent in telegrams or letters indicating they'd offer support. So we started to call those people. One of them, I remember, was teaching up in Fort Wayne in a small Catholic school. I called him; I got him at 2 o'clock in the morning. I told him we were going to send up these petitions and have him meet the bus. Some guy whose name escapes me, we got out of Kokomo, who had never been involved in politics before in his life. We told him that we were going to drive the things up to him. So we went for a whole day. We started. . . . Then it snowed. It snowed all that day and there were snowstorms throughout southern Indiana so we couldn't move around. Well, through Saturday we worked and we got the petitions out.

Then we filed in the northerly most district, which was the first, which was Gary. They kept taking--everything we'd put on the bus to send to Gary, they kept taking off. And then, by about that time, Michael Riley had been fired from his job as an assistant to the attorney general. One or two other people indicated they were going to help us; they were fired. But we kept finding people and kept multiplying people so that late Sunday night we were sure that we had almost 10,000 signatures, and it was obvious to me that we could get on the ballot.

So then I went back to Washington on Monday morning. Then we had a big council of war, at which point everybody was against him going into Indiana. Teddy sort of felt obliged because I'd gone out and done what was supposed to have been done. I was told that we couldn't get the signatures and they were going to stop us. They didn't know that he had been sitting on the signatures.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

DOHERTY: So. Still nobody. . . . And then they recited the figures, that they couldn't afford a loss at the outset. They couldn't. . . . You know, John Kennedy's greatest disappointment was in Indiana. So they were still back and forth. I said, "Look, if you're going to go, it's not going to help for me to sit and debate. I've made my point. If you're going to go, I've got some things that I can do back there and get the signatures." At which point, we were having some--not problems with getting signatures. They had to be certified and I wanted to make sure that we--because we needed them for the following Thursday back at the state capital to file them.

So I got back late Monday night to Indiana. Teddy called me and said that Robert Kennedy had come to the meeting after I'd left and said, "Look, if I'm going to run for president, I've got to run all the time. I've got to start now. This is the first one. We go." So, at about that point, we got the signatures. Then we started to crank up a reception for him as he went to the state capital and indicated that he was going to, you know, enter and hand in the signatures. So then we had to crank up a lot of people.
This other one thing happened. You know, all along I was Edward Kennedy's friend and nobody knew who I was. In fact, the night he [Robert Kennedy] came into town, couldn't even get into his room because nobody knew who the hell I was.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

DOHERTY: We became friendly. We talked for a little bit. He asked me if I could stay. I said I had to do a couple of little things. I would stay. From that point on, I just did what I was supposed to do. A lot of resentment, antipathy towards me from New Yorkers. And as the thing went along and he spent more and more time in it, more and more people were inclined to want to get in where the action was. By that point, they were so nervous about the thing developing, they had thrown in the keys. I had people in and I could then go and sulk or, oh, pout and say, "Look, if you want me to do it, give me my guys."

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: And then there was sort of a backturn which was rather funny. You know, he'd say, "Teddy, does Gerry know what he's doing?" He'd say, "Sure, sure, sure, sure." So Teddy would call me and say, "Hey, Gerry, I hope you know what you're doing." And I'd say, "Sure, sure." Then by that time, I had some friends out so we played that game.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: The next time I saw him was the night Martin Luther King got killed. We had him scheduled then to speak, you know, really in the ghetto section of Indianapolis. The mayor of the city called me that morning and didn't want him to go in. Well, the hell with it, he's going in. After Martin Luther King got shot, he saw the decision whether to go or to not go and he should make it. He did make it. In the meantime, we had an awful lot of problems with the so-called black leaders. Many of them were already with McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy]. The other guys were just--it's a sorry thing to say, but they were looking for money for everything. And they told us that rally, . . . I remember them coming into my office the day before, you know. If they were to help us with the rally, they needed money for this and money for that. I finally said to them, "Look, okay, if the only way Robert Kennedy can get a crowd is to buy them, then it's better we find out now."

HACKMAN: Now these are mostly Indianapolis people that . . .

DOHERTY: Indianapolis, right. Blacks. "We'd better find it out now. And if he has to buy it, then he ought to get the hell out." So, I don't know anything about blacks and,

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you know, still don't. There were a lot of guys around, you know, shuffling around who had these dashikis on and the little skull caps. So we had scheduled for after his speech down there for him to meet with twelve or fourteen of these leaders. Well, you know, he went down and Martin Luther King got killed. He came back to the hotel and all these leaders were there. Somebody called him. These guys were very angry, very upset. At which point somebody sent for me and said for me to go in and entertain them. So I, you know, I would imagine Robert Kennedy was calling all over the country, so for about an hour and one half, I sat with fourteen blacks. And I don't understand blacks. They're screeching and screaming at me, saying it was my fault, and this and that. Robert Kennedy came into the room. Physically, I never realized how small he was. That day he was smaller than he ever was. He sat in probably the biggest chair I can remember and smoked the biggest cigar I've ever seen anybody have. Then we had an interesting diatribe that went on for about twenty-five minutes. They accused him of taking advantage of them and who the hell did he think he was and they weren't going to do anything for him, he was exploiting them, using them. Well, he listened to it for about twenty, twenty-five minutes. I can remember—I'm going to paraphrase what he said. I can remember first he started out somewhat humorously and said, "I was trying to raise money this morning and the reason I couldn't get any money from certain Establishment people which you tell me I'm a member of—the reason I couldn't get any—-is because they said I was too close to the have-nots and to the blacks particularly. Now I sit in a room with blacks who tell me I'm too close to the others. Now, what the hell is happening? I don't need all this aggravation. I could probably sit next to my swimming pool. You know, God's been good to me and, you know, I really don't need anything. But I just feel that if He's been that good, I should try to put something back in. And you all call yourself leaders and, you know, you've been around here moaning and groaning about all personal things."

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: "You haven't once talked about your own people."

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: "And I'm just telling you with or without you I'm going to win this thing. I'd like your help." There was a young fellow whose name escapes me who just sort of jumped in and, I don't know, thought maybe he'd soften them and get them at this point. Because obviously he'd carried the day. I never knew Robert Kennedy—to be honest with you, until that moment, I had never known him, never seen him. And that to me was a very significant. . . The way he felt. He wasn't making a speech for a speech's sake. You could see that he was sincere, he was genuine, he was tough, and he was getting across.

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HACKMAN: Yeah.
DOHERTY: Then, after he had accomplished what he wanted to accomplish, then they started talking about logistics, going to do this and going to do that. "Well, you know, it's great for you. You know, Senator, you're going to get in that plane and you'll fly away. You know how to... What's going to happen to all of us when we have all these needs and these requests?" He said, "Well, the reason Gerry Doherty's with me is (you know that was exact words, the use of the language) he's my brother Edward's closest political intimate. When you're talking to him, you're talking to me." "Well, you're going to get in a plane and out, too." "He's here. He'll know you and he'll respect you." So then we got through with the niceties. We got up and, you know, walked down the corridor. He's smoking his cigar and he said, "Well, I've really assured that your next five weeks around here will be interesting, haven't I?" Well, then the next time I saw him that we had any conversation. . . . You know, we used to sort of bump into each other.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: It was always a strange relationship. I was not his guy; I was his brother's guy. If he had something to say, he'd say it through his brother. There were a lot of people who were friendly to him, who were very upset with me. Once or twice his brother had to, you know, get them all off my back. And he got them off my back.

HACKMAN: Jerry Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno], for instance.

DOHERTY: Jerry Bruno and a couple of other guys, you know. I said, "Hey, you know, you guys wanted to run it, you know, when you weren't going to win it, that's fine. I'm willing to do it." So we had, you know, continual problems that way.

Then, the next time we had a problem was I had a call from him [RFK] at midnight. He wanted to see me right away. I didn't see him. I was someplace and he called me again. Right on the phone, he blasted the living daylights out of me. He started on the. . . . I thought, you know, he had just come from Gary and he was told that we were in a complete shambles and nothing was going to happen. It was all my fault. Well, I listened to him well enough because I didn't know him well enough to fight with, to be honest with you.

HACKMAN: Did he say who told him that?

DOHERTY: Well, I knew who told him that. Now the name escapes me, but you know who it is. I says, "I'll tell you where you got that information." I says, "First of all,

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we're not ready. We will be ready, but we're not ready. You know, three weeks ago, if you'd gone into South Bend, you would have had the same story. You know, we're doing so much at a time."
HACKMAN: Right. Yeah, right.

DOHERTY: We're building the thing, you know, piece by piece, and this is the last piece. Furthermore, I'll tell you the guy who said it. You ought to get your ass kicked for riding with him because he didn't bother to tell you that he hadn't declared for you either. I'll tell you the guy who told you: a guy by the name of Lou Karras. If I had my way, he wouldn't have been within twelve miles of you. He's kicking the living daylights out of you to all the slobs up there and then he rides with you and tells you what you've got going wrong. One of the things you've got going wrong is you. So, I guess, he's not used to people talking to him that way. I bump into him. When I say "bump into," there's always a strain between the two of us. I mean I was not his guy, and he didn't know what I was doing, I was subject to a lot of criticism by people who he had faith and confidence in.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: Yet, his own brother kept saying, "Look, he knows what he's doing. It'll work out all right."

HACKMAN: Yeah. Right.

DOHERTY: The next time that I had anything to do with him was election night. It was about 9:30 or so. We were coming in just about where I said we were going to come in. I got a call from--what's the fellow that's on the Board of Regents out in California that used to be . . .

HACKMAN: Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton].

DOHERTY: Fred Dutton. "The senator wants to see you." You know, I figure this is a timeless thing. I'm not very good at...We had a lot of friends of mine and Teddy's that had come out from Massachusetts. They had worked hard. They had gone into all the tough areas and had done very well. I thought my responsibility was with them. Just about five after ten the phone rang again and Fred Dutton said, "The senator wants to see you and see you now." So I went over and I--maybe I shouldn't say it, but I'll say it. I grew to like him, grew to respect him, but I think he had an affinity for more kooks and more nuts than I'd ever seen assembled. It used to remind me of a Cecil B. DeMille Crusades movie, you know, when you've got dancing girls, jugglers, and dogs, and all this kind of stuff.

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HACKMAN: Yeah, I kind of...

DOHERTY: So I went over there, and all these people were there. Needless to say, they weren't my people. He called me near to him. You know, again he was very terse and said, "Look, you know, it worked out far better than we ever thought
it would. I'm grateful to you. And I want you to go down into that room with me." I said, "What? Hey, you know, you brought it up. My obligation is to your brother. If he's happy, I'm happy." He said, "I want you to go with me." Then we had sort of a funny situation. I don't know whether I said it or he said it. "I think it'd be rather helpful if we went into the room with somebody from Indiana," because we really have mostly ringers up there. So then we get hold of Michael Riley. Now, we played sort of, you know, dodge ball with Vance Hartke, who in the worst way wanted to go in there.

HACKMAN: Right. Right.

DOHERTY: And he just said, "Look, hey, Gerry, it's you and it's Riley and that's it. Or if you tell me somebody else, that's it. But, you know..." So we went down and, you know, he talked. He was very, very kind to me--you know, more than I ever expected from him. And that was the end. He called me about... Meantime my law business had gone right to hell and I had come back here. They called me and asked me if I could go to Oregon. And I said, "You know, let me just breathe a little bit." So I agreed. I told them. He asked me if I'd go back, and I told him I would. I think I was going back like--he got killed, what, on a Wednesday or on a Thursday he died--I think my plans were to go to New York the following Monday.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: You know the Maine thing. You know the rest of that time I did some things in Maine and Vermont for Teddy, but... So I didn't have a very close relationship with him.

HACKMAN: Okay. Well, let me go back over a few of the things you said. First of all, in '62 in those meetings when you went down to Washington, the meeting at the White House and then the next day with Robert Kennedy. Do you remember him expressing any definite viewpoints on anything that was going on in Massachusetts? Decisions which they...

DOHERTY: Yeah. One of the things that... He was rather quiet in the first meeting. The second meeting, the day afterwards, when we would say... Well, I read through this section by section, senatorial district by senatorial district. And he would say to me, "How do you know that Charlie Jones or Charlie Hackman or Mary Smith is okay and

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how's this guy?" And I'd say, "Well, I know it because of this reason and this reason." "Okay, fine." "Now, well, how do you know this?" I'd say, "For this reason and this reason and this reason." Then he gave sort of a soliloquy about the importance about getting... You know, even if it was information he didn't want to handle, that it be quick, it be accurate, need a network, a system for suggesting to do this and do that, do such and such. They kept getting
back to in the process by way of illustration what about so and so and this, and, you know, I had an answer. So then he said, "Well, somebody's got to be in charge of this whole thing." There was some digression; some question came up. I had the answer. He said, "Okay, you know, you're in charge of it." That's when he, you know, said, "Look, you know, if anybody gives you a hard time, you get me." Up until that time, I would, you know, my whole. . . . All my accouterments was I had the top drawer in somebody's desk. I went back the following Monday, got all the, you know--if I wanted eleven of this and twelve of that and everybody to wear red hats and they didn't, I used to you know . . . . I suppose I'm as much of a Machiavellian as anybody. I just say, "Hey, do you want me to call him? I'll call him." And that was the end of it.

HACKMAN: Any conversations after that campaign about how things had gone that he was involved in?

DOHERTY: No. The only conversation I had was the Monday after the primary which was in June, the convention. He called me right out of the woodwork. He said, "Look, hey, I'm grateful to you."

HACKMAN: Okay, any conversations in late '67 or early '68? Well, let's say not with him, but discussions with Edward Kennedy or with other people who were trying to decide whether to run in '68?

DOHERTY: I wasn't, you know, I mean I was…

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: They probably discussed it more with you than they did with me. They didn't. I mean I had a peculiar relationship. Mine is somebody sits, makes a decision, and I do what they want me to do. Edward Kennedy, I had more of a--you know, I'd been more of an influence upon decision making, but usually he decides to do anything he wants to do anyway.

HACKMAN: Yeah. You don't remember any particular polls on, let's say, Massachusetts' voters' attitudes on Vietnam or any particular . . .

DOHERTY: No.

HACKMAN: . . . efforts like that at all?

DOHERTY: Oh, wait a minute. The only one other time that we did have some interchange was--two other times. One during the Judge Morrissey [Francis X. Morrissey] affair. I, sort of my mentor or my entree to Edward Kennedy was Frank Morrissey. During my period of I guess it was '65, I went down there and stayed for two
weeks. It was my job to, you know, work on the numbers. Robert Kennedy and I had some conversations, two or three times.

HACKMAN: Do you remember his role in withdrawing the thing? Or any meetings where that was discussed with other people?

DOHERTY: No, I was not involved in that. I think I had much to do with--not in terms of advice or counsel. I just kept. . . . I knew nothing about Washington and knew nothing about the senators but the information that was being given to me.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: You know, I said to Teddy that, you know, we went from, "we're in pretty good shape," to "well, with a little bit of luck, we can do it. Well, we're going to need a lot of luck." And then, I remember saying to him it was mathematically impossible.

HACKMAN: But the information was being given to you by who? Who were you working with?

DOHERTY: I was working with David Burke.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: And I was saying, "Davie, you know, don't take that answer. Get this. You know, get a yes or no."

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: And I got a lot of those people. The first time I knew that a decision was made to pull out was I had talked with Birch Bayh and I had talked with Claiborne Pell. Claiborne Pell doesn't like to fly and always had to go down by train. He had to leave at some kind of crazy time. Ted said, I guess, "If you can, get him to stay here. And if you can't, get him to go all night." I remember getting him and saying that the senator said not to go. And I remember him getting in touch with Birch Bayh, telling him not to come.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Can you remember people that they were particularly disappointed in at that point in the Senate for lack of support or for sitting on the fence?

DOHERTY: Yeah. McIntyre [Thomas J. McIntyre]. He was one that they were very
disappointed in. There was a lot of exchange about McClellan [John L. McClellan] getting even with Robert Kennedy for some reason. There was some conversation back and forth about Cannon [Howard W. Cannon] of Nevada for the same reason.

HACKMAN: Do you remember discussions with Tydings [Joseph D. Tydings] at that point?

DOHERTY: Teddy and I were involved in that part, but Robert never.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Remember any people that--even though Edward Kennedy was accepted as the guy who was more effective in the Senate, with other senators--that Robert Kennedy could bring around for Edward Kennedy on that at that point?

DOHERTY: No, well, what he did, you know, was pretty much, you know, "Teddy, you know, you're the boss, you tell me what I'm most effective in doing."

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: And Robert Kennedy mostly throughout kept saying, "Look, most of these guys don't like me so I can't help you."

HACKMAN: Yeah, right.

DOHERTY: Oh, the other…

HACKMAN: Then the other.

DOHERTY: The only other conversation--I'm just trying to think of the only other conversation I had--was the day after Robert Kennedy was elected in 1964. He was at the hospital where he went to see Teddy. I had gotten some thirty-five to forty people to go down to New York to work for Robert Kennedy. And Teddy wanted me to handle those people so Robert Kennedy could thank them.

Then the only other time I ever had any conversation with him was probably in '66 or '67 over the Kennedy Library. It was involved in getting the--let's see, how did it go. For the MBTA [Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority] to get out of the site in Cambridge, they were going to have to relocate in the Codman Yards. There was a piece of legislation which was put in by the local legislators. They tried to stop it. They were told a long time ago they couldn’t stop it, but they tried to stop it. Oh, I don’t do as much of it as I used to, but I still do some

lobbying. But at that time, it was with the Library. Before the thing was coming up for a vote, we had a breakfast over at Teddy's house down at 3 Charles River Square. Robert Kennedy
was there. We talked about it. I ran into him afterwards. We took an awful, awful pasting on it. Oh, I don't know, I ended up getting three guys to vote with us. There were a lot of recriminations, a lot of people were pointing the finger at me, "Well, you know, now that I'm going to croak you on this. But everything that you've personally get up here as an account we're going to croak you on it." Somehow, he found out about it from [?]. He said, "Look, I realize the [?] you went through. I appreciate it." And that's all.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Do you remember any... In that discussion when you came back from Indiana, you'd gone out the first time, met with Mike Riley and a couple of other guys, and you come back to talk with Edward Kennedy, Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith], Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen]. I don't know who else was in the meeting; I've heard those three were. Anybody at all who was for going in at that point?

DOHERTY: No. I think Edward Kennedy was for going in because of me.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: Steve Smith I'm friendly with. He was interested in, you know, at least meeting me half way.

HACKMAN: Yeah. On that first trip out, did you talk to anyone except those young guys? I mean did you talk to anyone in the regular party structure? St. Angelo [Gordon St. Angelo] or anybody...

DOHERTY: Everybody. Everybody. They turned me out. He, you know, St. Angelo, you know, treated me like some kind of a nut. As a matter of fact, St. Angelo had told Teddy that it was inhumanly possible for us to get the signatures. And if somehow we got the signatures, he'd make sure they weren't certified. On the first count of the first district which is Lake County they tried to hold up our signatures. I got hold of a guy who told me that he's on the--I can't even think of what his name is--he was an attorney, he was on the Board of Regents, he was appointed by the governor. You know, I don't even know how I found him. And he said, "Look, get one thing. I'm going to be for the governor, I'm going to work for the governor, I'm going to vote for him, I'm going to pound the living daylights out of you guys. But if you get the signatures to be certified they'll be certified." I had gotten hold of a lawyer and we were prepared to enter a U.S. court and everything else so... And Teddy had, I think, might have had a meeting, maybe Tuesday, with St. Angelo and St. Angelo still was the same.

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I remember him calling me and saying, "Are you sure you're right?" I said, "Look, hey, a genius I'm not. You know, I can count. We've got them. We're sitting on them."

HACKMAN: Yeah. Do you recall any talk at all with St. Angelo about him either urging Branigin not to come in or...
DOHERTY: It was already...The general impression I got is that it was already done and there wasn't a way...All those guys, including Bayh, had worked to get him in and they couldn't. We got--you know, I can't remember all of them now, but of the John Kennedy group that was in Indiana, we only could get one guy, one guy by the name of Marshall Hanley.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: Everybody else ducked, you know, really ducked. We had a guy in the legislature by the name of Kennedy [Arthur D. Kennedy], the state legislature, who was with us. We had two or three county commissioners. At a later point in time, we got the district attorney in Vigo County, which is Terre Haute. And we got the president of--what the hell is the name of that guy--Shooker . . .

HACKMAN: Shooker.

DOHERTY: Shooker. Schrieker. President of the Otto Schrieker Club, which is a Democratic club in one of the counties, in Allen County. That was the extent of the people in public life that were with us. Everybody else avoided us like the plague.

HACKMAN: How about a guy, let's say, like Beatty [James W. Beatty]?

DOHERTY: He was on again, off again; in again, out again; up again, down again. You know, he almost kept being with us, but he wasn't with us. Then we had a. . . . He was being opposed (proposed?) by a group headed by a fellow by the name of Judge [John C.] Christ.

HACKMAN: Right.

DOHERTY: One of the funnier times we had out there was. . . . As all the pieces started going into place, we found out that there were certain wards out there which are what they call "fast wards" where at 6 o'clock in the morning, 6:15, you had five hundred votes in the machine. There were other wards out there, in the black wards, what they called slow wards where they just slow down the voting. And many of them are in the black wards, in the "action" wards, you know, and this is where Christ always did pretty well, so he had a call from a guy

by the name of Owen Mullin, who was an attorney, old-school kind of guy. And so when all the pieces were in the right place, you know, the one base we had to touch was with. . . . We had--it was really sort of cloak and dagger. We had one of those real clandestine meetings with Owen Mullin. I remember I went with a guy from here, a fellow by the name of Frank Quirk. We had to go to...
HACKMAN: Right.

DOHERTY: . . . it was almost like a club speakeasy: and knock four times on the door when you arrive, you were let in. So after we were there about twenty minutes, Owen arrives--this guy with sunglasses and big cufflinks. We sat down and he called the waitress over and said he wanted a drink. He started lighting a Tiparillo and started smoking. "You want to smoke?" We both said, "No, I don't smoke." "Oh, I'm going to have a drink. How about you guys having a drink?" I ordered a Coke and the other guy ordered a ginger ale. It was pretty funny. And then he said, "Well, would you like to dance?" [Laughter] And then we, you know, we sort of went back and forth. You know, their attitude towards politics was entirely different from ours. When they say they're going to volunteer to help you, this means that they're the first guys--they'll let you pay them first.

HACKMAN: Right.

DOHERTY: And we started talking about. . . . The guy I brought with me, who was a guy from Massachusetts, it was his job to know the wards and who it was for and what we had in this city. And we talked about this ward and that ward. It wasn't as suggestion of mine, but you could sort of smell it around, and I said, "Look, hey, you know, all I can say to you is that the Kennedys aren't ingrates and I'm probably the best testimony in the world. They found me back there in the legislature and they've been good to me. They've never paid me any money. I've never been on their payroll, but they're good to their friends. And all I can say to you is that if something happens to Robert Kennedy and he doesn't make it, and Edward Kennedy's around. . . . And this guy, Owen Mullin, after you get rid of all the old wives' tales and the myths, was not a--was a very nice guy and a good fellow and was not, you know, some 69 year-old nabob. He was a guy who was probably in his late forties or early fifties, who obviously had some miles on him and I said "Robert Kennedy gone? Edward Kennedy, one of these guys. . . . If they go off in the priesthood, some one of these Kennedys was going to be around. So you could be one of the first guys to stand up." And I will say, we shook hands and didn't have a problem from there on in.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Did you find a lot of people like that around the state or is that an exception?

DOHERTY: We gave up on the pols.

HACKMAN: What about a guy like Judge Christ, for instance?

DOHERTY: He was--you know, I know how to handle those guys. You know, "If you want to invest in the future, invest in the future. You know, if not, we're not
going to give you $4,000 to poll workers, or $3,000 for this, because Jesus Christ isn't worth that kind of money." So he and Mullin came around and in their precincts we did well enough. And since they had better guys, we did okay.

HACKMAN:  Yeah. When you went out or as things developed, what kind of understanding did work out on a budget? Did you put together a budget that was approved and stick fairly close to that? And how much money was raised by you or other people at the local level?

DOHERTY:  I didn't raise any money.

HACKMAN:  Not [Miklos] Sperling or somebody like that? Mike Sperling.

DOHERTY:  Well, we had some funny experiences with him. That first night that they came in, that Robert Kennedy came in, we had nothing. There was myself and another guy I brought out of here. And then for five days, all we did was, you know, work our tail off about, one, getting. . . . Like we brought bus-loads of people down from Chicago to Gary-Hammond to get the signatures going to get them certified. So we're working on the certification of signatures, you know, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, and then we've got to get them in to the state capital. Then what we had to do was--I know all the rogues' tricks. Then what we had to do was now we had to go and get them Xeroxed and make sure when they found fault with our signatures. . . . Oh, we were forever having fights with the clerks in all the college places like Lafayette at Perdue and the place of the state university and over at Muncie. They were knocking off all the kids. So we had to play a little tough with them. When we came to Sperling, we needed this and we needed twelve of this and twelve of that, and I just kept signing his name to everything. Whatever money we used, we brought from out of state. They got, you know. I can think of a dozen people they got out of this state. They paid for their transportation. It didn't cost them a penny. Well, they fed them. There weren't any salaries. You know, I never realized until last June that the campaign, out-of-pocket cost me $4800, which, you know, I think that's fine. It was the least that I could do at that time.

[HACKMAN:  Can you remember getting involved in arranging for any polling in Indiana? I've seen at least one Lou Harris [Louis Harris] poll from late March, I think.

DOHERTY:  There was a poll which, I think, that they got almost at the outset. No, I had some Mickey Mouse polling which we did, but getting involved with--what's the other guy's name? Not Harris.

HACKMAN:  Well.

DOHERTY:  Not Kraft [Joseph Kraft].
HACKMAN: Muchmore [Donald M. Muchmore]?

DOHERTY: No. Quayle [Oliver Quayle].

HACKMAN: Quayle, Oliver Quayle.

DOHERTY: Yeah. He did one. I was not involved there. I read it and told him whether or not I agreed with it and what was wrong with it.

HACKMAN: As things developed, how much of a problem did you have on people at the Washington end sending out people that you couldn't use, either--not just advance men, but other kinds of people? I've seen in some of your calls to Nance Lyons that this was one problem you seemed to be having here.

DOHERTY: Well, in the early days they didn't have anybody. The better people didn't want to come then. In the later days, all the pretty people wanted to come there and, you know, we just didn't have time to hold hands and I just didn't want to.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: I made it clear to Teddy. If it's my neck, I want to be my own executioner. And, you know, he put me in... You know, they said I couldn't get the signatures, I got the signatures; they said I couldn't get a crowd, I've done all these things. Now you're going to have to trust me. So I... You know, okay, you know, one of the things I learned a long time ago, if somebody says, you know, a guy can walk on water, I'm not going to turn him away. I found very few that could walk on water.

HACKMAN: Yeah. How did John Douglas [John W. Douglas] tie into the whole thing? I know...

DOHERTY: He was good for me, you know, in terms of establishing my credibility. You know, he was there, spent a lot of

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time there. He could vouch for the fact that I was there at 8 o'clock in the morning and left at midnight. He could vouch for the fact that, you know, that I'd say, "On Tuesday I need 8,000 things to go to Evansville and be back again." And he could vouch that on Thursday that they had gone and come and went back again and that things were being done. We used to always laugh at him and think he was sort of, you know, a good guy spy--and probably was. Maybe I, you know, I'd do the same thing.

HACKMAN: Yeah.
DOHERTY: He was sort of minister without portfolio. There were some days that was kind of tough and hard. And, you know, I loved John Douglas, and you know, he stood up for us. Like for example, when Robert Kennedy, the first time he came in to go to the state capital, we were doing the whole thing on baling wire and nobody had arrived and we were working our tail off. And I had one guy, a couple of very good girls we found, we brought them out of Chicago. Oh, like the day before, we got a call from an advance man who was at the airport and was very upset because his ride wasn't at the airport. And I just said to the advance man, "Hey, if you're the advance man and you can't get yourself in from the airport, then you've got a lot of problems. So you get your ass in here, and if you don't, then, you know, we don't need you."

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

DOHERTY: Well, this kind of stuff, I mean I got reported to Jerry Bruno for that.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

DOHERTY: You know, he's a tough guy. It didn't bother me. We had... Throughout the whole thing, there was somewhat of a cleavage between "New York people" and "Massachusetts people." In all the key places, I just put all Massachusetts people. When the thing was over, with the exception of one guy who was a family friend, all the other districts were run by Massachusetts people.

HACKMAN: How would you describe the difference between Massachusetts politics or Massachusetts campaigning and Indiana campaigning in terms of the kind of adjustment that you and the Massachusetts people had to make? Are there any things that your people had a difficult time in adapting to particularly?

DOHERTY: What at the outset was our weakness the first three weeks, turned out to be our strength. Let me qualify that by saying that when we first went in there, we couldn't get voting lists. They're not public documents in Indiana as they are around here. We couldn't get simple things. You'd take a guy... The guy who's the mayor of Fitchburg, Massachusetts, now, he was practically dropped by parachute to the--what is it--the second district, maybe the fourth district which is in and around Muncie. He had never been in Muncie before. He never knew where Muncie was. He didn't know how to get there, couldn't get back. So we meet him in Indianapolis and say there are buses, there should be some buses running from here someplace that will take you to Muncie. And when you get to Muncie, there is a guy who got us some signatures, why don't you talk to him and see if he can get you started. These guys were sort of thrown... There was a lot of time wasted just learning geography. But when I say what was our weakness turned out to be our strength, if you get involved in campaigns... Let me give you a contrast. As sort of some public penance, Edward Kennedy sent me, volunteered me, you know, he asked for me
to go to work for Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey]. And they sent me to Ohio. I was in Ohio for eight weeks. Well, in Ohio I spent some time in Cleveland. I couldn't talk to a single person without clearing it with the county chairman; I couldn't talk to a single person without clearing it with the legislator; couldn't do anything without inviting all these people who weren't going to get off their ass. And, as a result, I just, you know, I wasn't under the same kind of tension, same kind of strain. Where, in Indiana, when we got through that three week period of time, we had all the doers. The only way a guy ended up becoming some kind of a, you know, commander-in-chief of a county or a district is because for three weeks he broke his tail and, then, you now, produced. And we had no protocol. We didn't have to talk to anybody because they made it clear to us that they weren't going to talk to us.

HACKMAN: Sure.

DOHERTY: Then the last couple weeks, guys would say, "Well, you know that list you wanted, well if you met at midnight we'll get it for you." By that time it was just marvelous.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: Then the other thing that was good for me was I picked all the guys, they all responded to me, they all knew that their reward was going to come from me, and that nobody was trying to take my job so you didn't have that rivalry where guys hide papers on one another.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: Everybody was clear as to what they were to do. So we were a very mobile kind of thing, that made it a lot easier.

HACKMAN: Yeah. I've heard people say that some people in the state or maybe a congressman, maybe Jacobs [Andrew Jacobs, Jr.] or Hamilton [Lee H. Hamilton], whoever it was, were helpful in providing lists. What you're saying basically, if I hear you right, is that it wasn't really that helpful; if it came, it came pretty late.

DOHERTY: It came late.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: It came late. You know, at a later point in time, we got hold of Beatty's lists.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: We got hold of...The other list which we got hold of are teachers' lists.
But when the help was really needed, I mean the stuff that would have been, you know, a gigantic source of help was those first, you know, that first week. I mean, you know, we could . . .

HACKMAN: I'm trying to think of the guy's name with that teachers' organization that you might have gotten that from if that's the guy you're talking about.

DOHERTY: As I can remember, the UAW [United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America] people were somewhat helpful.

HACKMAN: Bob Wyatt, do you remember that name?

DOHERTY: No.

HACKMAN: The state teachers' organization.

DOHERTY: No. But they weren't that overwhelming. I'll tell you who the real, you know, stars of the show were, you know, were the blacks. They put, you know . . .

Well, first of all, you know, politics in Massachusetts, this an entirely different level than it is in Indiana. You know, one day the voting place is in your house and then they move it, you know, into a cellar someplace. And if you're smart enough, you can find it and you get to vote. And then, they do things that, you know, if it were ever done in this state, people would go to jail for. They tried to frighten the blacks. The visible black leaders were all for McCarthy. Towards the end, they started to back off. But the thing that was the phenomenal, and it really was phenomenal, was that on occasion when I did go out--and I thought it was a mistake to sit strapped to a desk; you had to get some kind of feeling--if you have a Kennedy button on and you walk a block, some black would come over and ask you if he can have the button.

We then have this crazy and damnable slate. And it was impossible to find him on some of the slates. What we had to do was what it appeared to me, we found out where he was going to be on the county machine or that part of the county machine and say, "Vote 3A with the picture of Robert Kennedy." But there was this labyrinthine thing, and it was just unbelievable.

Another thing they used to do is they used to hire like guys like Pinkerton guys with the biggest hats and the biggest epaulets and the biggest whistle. They'd stand there with the biggest flashbulb cameras to frighten people away. Well, election day, those people, the blacks--you know, it's a credit to them--they came out of the woodwork to vote.

HACKMAN: How were Walter Sheridan and Frank Holgate [Franklin W. Holgate] in Indianapolis?
DOHERTY: He was helpful. Then we had another guy who works now for the attorney general, who was very helpful, who worked very closely with Walter Sheridan and Frank Quirk.

HACKMAN: Right.

DOHERTY: They were both very, very helpful. They didn't particularly like it, but they got down there. . . . Franklin, as the thing went on, Franklin Holgate, was less effective. But when he first when in there, he was very effective. You know, after a while, I suppose, he thought he was some kind of a general. The first couple of weeks, everybody was a general, but you didn't have any privates either. After that, he took himself a little bit too seriously.

HACKMAN: How about Earl Graves?

DOHERTY: Oh yeah, he was, you know, just right out of the movies. You know, he's the kind of guy that, you know, I'm sure he's good to his mother and I'm sure he's a good fellow, but if I were involved in anything, I just wouldn't want him around.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Can you recall particular problems?

DOHERTY: Yeah. He had everybody fighting with one another. He suggested that the Kennedys had all the resources in the world and whatever anybody wanted, they'd have. Frankly, he used to go around and tell everybody how close he was to Edward Kennedy and about all the things he'd done for Edward Kennedy. He gets a Christmas card from Edward Kennedy at Christmas, period.

HACKMAN: You said that a lot of the blacks were with McCarthy until the last. Why was that so? Money or why was that so?

DOHERTY: Money. He spent a great deal of money. Out-spent us two to one out there.

HACKMAN: Yeah. What could you, what kind of feeling did you have about the McCarthy campaign other than the spending of money?

DOHERTY: Well . . .

HACKMAN: What weaknesses could you see particularly in the way they were operating?

DOHERTY: Well, there were a couple of things that hurt us, you know. You know, the weekend that I first went in, looking to get those 10,000 signatures, I'd
normally say "Well, go to the, you know, go to the campus towns and crank them out." The problem was all the people who were activists in the campus towns were already with McCarthy. So we got all the campus dopes. But it was an interesting sociological experiment in that we found that, looking back on it, I'd rather have sort of the campus dopes who were trying to make an effort than, you know. . . . As the thing went on, we got a couple of campus hot shots who, you know, had a plan and do this and, you know. They got to be really pretty tough to take.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

DOHERTY: Whereas we just some of the middle kind of guys who really went with us. That was one thing. The other thing that bothered me--never caught on--is, when I was, you know, desperately looking for help during the first weekend and the first couple of days, I called around to the church people who were very active. And I was turned down very coldly because they were all with McCarthy.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

DOHERTY: Suburban Catholics, you know, upper middle income white Catholics who were with McCarthy and stayed with him.

HACKMAN: Ross Pritchard and B.J. Warren, are those people who were sort of . . .

DOHERTY: Yeah.

HACKMAN: . . . planning the . . .

DOHERTY: B.J. Warren was, you know, somewhat helpful. He worked with religious groups. Nobody knew what the hell he was going to do. Ross Pritchard was, you know, they got us some kids. I think I would have done it a little differently, but, you know, I had no hostility toward them. They did about what should have been done. It could have been better; it could have been done a hell of a lot worse. There was no personality problems with them.

HACKMAN: Can you recall any particular problems in getting college students registered and anything that could be done about it?

DOHERTY: No, we had problems. The major problem we had was in the early days getting those signatures. See, we were very lucky. When we got the signatures in such a desperate way, you know, we'd find more one-eyed people never been asked to do anything before. You know, then when all the good-looking people came along--if we had to use them, we used them. I always believe in using everybody. But the one-eyed people who we know
can do the job, we had. So we had an instant organization which, you know, hey, never in a million years would, you know, I ever have the good fortune, the good luck I had, the same kind of circumstances to be able to be able to have put the thing together so quickly. And it stayed.

One funny experience which we had was a meeting with some of the college people. Frankly, they were not that. . . . They wanted to go out and "develop dialogue" with the voters. Well, I got a little impatient with that. We were importing people, and they're bringing them in, and it was costing us for the transportation, food and their lodging. And we were getting only, you know, like six interviews a day. So I can remember when I had a meeting with Teddy. He was meeting with the various groups, you know, firing up the students with his talk about various things and then he started talking about a typical, typical late Kennedy campaign: "We've got TV and got this--and of course, we've got the tabloid. We want you to deliver the tabloid." This was probably one of the funniest times, you know, in the entire campaign. "The tabloid's important and we want you to deliver it. This is critical." He kept saying this. And everybody, you know, was very wooden about the whole response. Well, then he'd say, "Well, you know, the tabloid, you're going to deliver it." And finally somebody had the courage to say, "We're not going to deliver the tabloid. We're just not. That's not the kind of thing we're doing here."

HACKMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

DOHERTY: Then Teddy went on after that and then he got back again on the tabloid. And then again got the same thing. Well, he was really thunderstruck. So the next morning he had to go someplace. I had to talk with him about something too. I met him and I drove him to the airport. We were talking about, I don't know. We were talking about blacks,

we were talking about something else, and you know, far removed. And he--I remember him slumping down, and he said, "And they won't deliver the tabloids." Like, you know, he kept muttering it to himself. So finally we worked out some ways to get it delivered and we got it delivered.

HACKMAN: But they wanted the dialogues and the…

DOHERTY: The dialogue and the planning and the thinking and all this kind of stuff.

HACKMAN: Did you still use the old O'Brien [Lawrence F. O’Brien] manual from '60 with anybody--students or otherwise--in '68 Indiana?

DOHERTY: We used our own manual of, you know, getting people out on the street, creating activity, seeing if they can find somebody, and, you know, the big thing was, you know, you go out and see if you can find ten other people who
want it to work. And you're just kind of cranking out people, cranking out people, cranking out people.

HACKMAN: Now the state, the way its listed, is organized by congressional district. Any alternative systems of organizing considered or is that an obvious way or was that the obvious way?

DOHERTY: Well, we started that way. Then you just ended up with population centers—you know, you figured on where the Democrats are, where the vote was going to come out, and that's it. Like the second district, that has no numbers here, was a Republican district. Well, there was going to be a pretty good Democratic vote out of Michigan city, out of Lafayette, and that's pretty much it. The eighth district which was way down south, which is Evansville, the rest you know, after you leave Evansville, the rest of the district was farmland, we just organized those cities where the vote came out of and stuck pretty much to that.

HACKMAN: Can you remember discussions all the way through the campaign on what part of the state to concentrate on? Not only organizational effort, but where you put the candidate?

DOHERTY: Yeah. Well, we took, you know, we looked where the votes, you know, and what the potential was, and, you know, I rated them. You don't have to be a genius to rate them. If 20,000 votes can come out of a place, then you could put him in there. If 10,000 votes could come in, then you put him in part of the day. If you could put together a cluster of towns where, you know, maybe altogether 25,000 votes are going to come out, like the Wabash thing, that trip he took was to go through those small, intermediate size places. You know, he got the side effect of getting as hell of a lot of good publicity. So we put him into, for example, we put him into like a place like Richmond, Indiana. That was worth going into. You have your standard things. You go into a place like Muncie or, you know, you put him into Ball State, you put him into a couple of other, you know, factories and some things like that. And then you work up, you know, maybe a day and a half Ball State or Muncie. I should say, South Bend. You know, and you've got some easy hits. You know, Notre Dame is an easy hit. Then when we sent him up there for Dingus Day, and then there is another day when he does a little bit of everything.

HACKMAN: But you don't remember a lot of disagreements that you had, let's say, with Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] over where he should spend how much time, things like that?

DOHERTY: No. You know, in all fairness, I can't say that I, you know, got along that well with Dolan, but I think Dolan was a little more sane about things than Bruno.
You know, he could look at a map, look at the votes and understand where he had to go.

HACKMAN: I had heard that Edward Kennedy felt that more time should be spent in the two districts in the southern part of the state. Does that ring a bell at all with you or does that make any sense to you as opposed to where he was going?

DOHERTY: No, you know, there wasn't that much in the south. In the southwest corner there was Evansville, and then on the southeast corner there was Jeffersonville and New Albany, place that are, Columbus, that just didn't lend themselves to our campaign. I think that if he'd spent more time--you know, he did well enough in both places. If I were to look at it again, I think the place we should have spent more time in is the area of suburban Indianapolis.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any discussions on what kinds of things you do with the campaign?

DOHERTY: I don't know.

HACKMAN: Let's say . . .

DOHERTY: There's only so many things you can do with them. I mean you can have a head-on-head visitation with the town elder, but, you know, when you're doing that, what else are you letting go down the drain?

HACKMAN: Yeah.

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DOHERTY: So you ended up with, you know, factory gates, some kind of a quasi-civic kind of thing at noontime. You know, a college hit was easy: in and out of a couple of clubs, if you could find a couple of clubs, and then just hoped for motorcade which they did in some of those towns.

HACKMAN: You don't remember people being particularly upset at too many motorcades and at too many crowds? That's one of these things which's been mentioned as an issue.

DOHERTY: No. You know, the place that he had to work on them, had to work the crowd up was the place where the motorcades were there and they were good and they came in the end. I remember that specific conversation. He said, "You're right." We were in better shape just running him up through Gary, through Hammond, and through Whiting. The last time he went, you know, they lined the sidewalks. But you had to do that, because up until that point, you know, a guy would say, "Well, you know, Jesus, maybe I'm for him, but nobody else is for him."
HACKMAN: Yeah. What do you remember about Hatcher [Richard G. Hatcher]? And what had to be worked out with him or what arrangement finally was worked out?

DOHERTY: He wasn't that great. I didn't . . . Frankly, all the things . . . I don't know; I wasn't privy to them. All the things that supposedly were done for him beforehand, we didn't get that much help. We got a lot of help from some people in Chicago who were sitting on their tails, couldn't do anything for him across the line, and worked out of Gary and Hammond, a hell of a job.

HACKMAN: How helpful was Wade [Richard C. Wade] out of Chicago?

DOHERTY: He found us a couple of people who were very good and the, you know, that was the end of it. He was very helpful. He's the one that put the buses together and got help to get the signatures. But then after that, he, you know, he got sort of academic. And it wasn't, you know, it really wasn't an academic setting. It was just go, go, go, go, go.

HACKMAN: How much help, if any, was O'Brien when he came in fairly late? Or what kinds of things did he recommend that you do either worked or didn't work?

DOHERTY: He came in, spent about two days, and was very good to me. He paid a compliment to me. And, you know, it has been repeated to me by about half a dozen people, that there was no reason for him to stay. Everything that could be done was done and it was better organized than he anticipated it

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could be organized, particularly since it was Indiana. And that caused, you know, a lot of people to be upset because they didn't, you know. . . . Well, things that, you know. . . . There was a lot of resentment of me being sort of a. . . .

[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

HACKMAN: Can you remember getting any help from Robert Rock [Robert L. Rock] or…

DOHERTY: No.


DOHERTY: No.

HACKMAN: . . . or Manfred Core. . . .
DOHERTY: Played that game. Same. Played that game: "Well, we'll see you at 2 o'clock tomorrow." "Well, no, no, we better not be seen together." I went there. I made all those overtures, you know.

HACKMAN: Ever remember any discussion with St. Angelo in which he said well, he would be helpful if somehow he would be named chairman of the Democratic National Committee?

DOHERTY: I never had any conversation with St. Angelo. The only thing that I could remember getting incensed at is probably the Tuesday, the Monday we had the meeting as to whether or not, you know, I thought he should go in. Teddy met him in Chicago. And Teddy called me to say that St. Angelo said we weren't going to get the signatures. I was quoted someplace, you know, sort of incorrectly but the thrust was correct. I said, "You tell that son of a bitch, you know, I'm just getting sick and tired of breaking my tail for you and, you know, having this guy give you--you know, sit down in a nice hotel room with him. If it was my way, you know, I'd break his legs in two." The last we ever heard of him--I should say the last I ever heard of St. Angelo. Well, Teddy. . . . You know, I was friendly with Teddy and Teddy had funny ways. He wouldn't tell you things and then he'd just sort of. . . . Somebody would tell him something, you know, and with that information stick into you.

HACKMAN: Once the Branigin-St. Angelo whatever, organization got operating, what kind of observation did you have about them, about what they were good at or what they were very poor at?

DOHERTY: Well, you know, have in mind the background. That I think the great thing they did, the marvelous thing as that they did was avoid--you know, they had the elective officers in line. Everybody was frightened to death about publicity doing anything, you know, because the patronage was going to be cut off. That to me was, you know, a great tribute to the system. I've said that that's the kind of system that should exist everywhere.

HACKMAN: Although people have said that on the other hand, a lot of these people weren't enthusiastic about Branigin and didn't work on his side of the vote.

DOHERTY: No, they didn't work on it, but, yet, Robert Kennedy in his own right wasn't so attractive to some people either. You know, we'd gone under that organization to find housewives--as I call it, the one-eyed people--who responded.

HACKMAN: What do you remember about labor leaders? Did you spend much time with these people?
DOHERTY: A little. A little bit of time in the early days. And then I was, you know, making sure Teddy saw this. So I figured out where they'd be a concentration of labor leaders, you know, people to do this and people to do that, go here and go there.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Ever any significant help from either Dallas Sells or Berndt [Raymond H. Berndt] of the UAW or anyone?

DOHERTY: What's the guy's name in the UAW?

HACKMAN: Ray Berndt, I believe.

DOHERTY: Yeah, he was very helpful. Berndt was helpful, and Sells was somewhat helpful. There's another guy Milt Couss or Milt Cues . . .

HACKMAN: I don't know that guy.

DOHERTY: . . . who was somewhat helpful. But labor was tough against us. And in the early days they had every single guy--you know, national labor organizers where the union was in croaking us. The [International Brotherhood of Teamsters in Evansville was just unbelievable. They were tough on us. The top level people in [United Steelworkers of America] up around Gary were tough on us.

HACKMAN: How much visibility could you. . . . How much could you detect in an effort from the Johnson administration on behalf of Branigin?

DOHERTY: The way they really tipped their hand was on the labor leaders. All of them were in there helping Branigin.

HACKMAN: But do you remember other things? I mean, let's say, poverty programs . . .

DOHERTY: I never got into that. I just was watching those labor leaders. You know, Birch Bayh's people were very helpful; they did for us what they could, even though they didn't come out. [Andrew] Jacobs gave us, you know. . . . I'm trying to think of the name of a black fellow, very good guy, who we used to meet with regularly that Jacobs did. . . . I think maybe in the end he might have come out. But throughout most of it, the people who were most helpful to us were friendly with Jacobs. I would think that if Jacobs wanted to croak us, when I arrived at the airport, nobody could have been there.

HACKMAN: Do you remember any discussions of how much time to spend in blue collar areas as opposed to black areas? This whole thing ties in with what he should say on law and order and this whole thing.
DOHERTY: Yeah, one of the interesting things I found very early-in fact, I didn't find it; those kids from the buses found it--was that, you know, going back to '64 when Wallace [George C. Wallace] had run, Wallace, had done very well at Lake County. When they went into the. . . . Robert Kennedy had also sent to jail, you know, the former mayor Jumping Joe . . .

HACKMAN: Chacharis [George Chacharis].

DOHERTY: Chacharis, yeah. The interesting thing--and this always bothers Teddy, and I saw evidences of it again in Cleveland--was in the blue collar-Slav Central European districts we got a pretty good response on that Sunday out. The people said they were either for Kennedy or for Wallace which is sort of a contradiction, but it reappeared over and over and over again. Our vote was in the blacks with the blue collars. And the smarter the people got--you know, Robert Kennedy hated that; but the smarter they got, the more unlikely were our chances of getting them. So we spent. . . . You know, that was never a very violent argument. We spent a good amount of time in the blue collar areas.

HACKMAN: Would you ever get into discussions with Walinsky [Adam Walinsky] or whoever it was on speech writing kinds of things?

DOHERTY: No. You know, they were sure that if somebody opened up the window and they threw me out, I'd go up instead of down; and I knew the same thing about them. So we never. . . . Occasionally I, you know--it now comes back to me--during the course of the campaign, I'd have maybe three, four

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sessions at midnight with Robert Kennedy, where I'd go in and saw him. And here were all these people around. He'd be sitting there eating a big dish of chocolate ice-cream with his dog and his wife. And he'd get up on an excuse and we'd go into the side bedroom.

HACKMAN: Maybe you could go into more detail on the whole problem with advance men and what it was. Not just about Bruno, but about other people that created problems for you and for your coordinators around the state.

DOHERTY: Well, first of all, they had been spoiled. You know, it's very easy if you've got a crowd and you're never going back again, you can step on toes, push people down elevator shafts; and really, you know, leave a bad taste in people's mouths. They couldn't understand in the early days why if they went to a given place, why we didn't have a hundred thousand people there. The reason we didn't have a hundred thousand people there because we didn't have any people to start out with to get the hundred thousand. We didn't--you know, things like putting out circulars. We didn't have fifty people to put out circulars; we didn't have a mimeograph machine and we didn't have any money and we didn't have any ink. So we tried to explain this. So we finally got a guy--the first time
in politics--we can use his mimeograph machine. Well, they'd go through, you know, some town like Richmond, and the next thing you know somebody the day afterwards and they busted the guy's machine, insulted his secretary, peed on his floor, and left. And, you know, we're there trying to pick up the pieces. You know, a lot of these guys are. . . . You know, after you get nominated, when there are going to be some crowds around, you know, the crowds are there despite you, not because of you. In putting the pieces together. . . . And they just came on like, you know, their whole style. . . . A funny thing happened. This guy by the name of Ralph Berry who was probably the only real heavyweight we had with us. He was the district attorney in Vigo County, which is Terre Haute. And we had a guy up in Terre Haute. After a while, Berry was willing to sit. So I sat down with him. He was going to commit himself publicly. A couple of things he wanted. One thing he wanted. . . . Well, immediately I figured that he wanted a Robert Kennedy appointment--at least go on the Federal Court and maybe the Supreme Court. You know, you get that and then you're ready to handle it. So, this was probably--Robert Kennedy went into Terre Haute once and a half times up until this point. So I'm well expecting. . . . "What do you want?" And he said, "Okay, yeah, now the only thing I want is no son-of-a-bitch from New York is coming into Terre Haute. I'll deal with people from Massachusetts, but nobody from New York's coming into Terre Haute." To be honest, I never had a problem with Walinsky or with Greenfield [Jeff Greenfield] or Edelman [Peter B. Edelman]. They would just, you know, come and go. You know, I had problems with Bruno; I had problems with a couple of the other advance men; and I had a couple of problems with some guys from Massachusetts, who, you know, figured they'd go out and [?]. And the two of them. I had to sit down. I told them they were going on the next plane home if I ever heard that they were doing those things again. Then, you know, that was basically the problem. Probably our perspective was different.

HACKMAN: What about the press operation? Any observations on whether that was a strength or a weakness? I know there were a couple of young guys there again: Bill Groover and the other guy's name was Jim McMannis.

DOHERTY: Well, we picked up a guy who was pretty good. Jim McMannis was pretty good. But, we went the first three weeks in the campaign without a press guy.

HACKMAN: How well did Riley work out during the campaign? I remember a lot of the comments that you were sending back to the boiler room was that people were upset that the pros, the pros were very upset with your choice of Riley, saying, "You know, the first mistake you made was choosing Riley."

DOHERTY: Yeah. He worked out. One of the things that he was able to do was get a guy, you know, a guy's name. And he'd say, "Well, I went to the university with somebody", I'd say, "Why don't you call him and see if you can get a hold of these guys." That's what he did. And he did it pretty well. And he knew geography. I mean he
could tell us which buses went to which places. You know, having been involved in politics
he always picked the wrong guy. You know, if you have a Polish committee, they're always
at you to pick a Polish committee, and as soon as you get a Polish committee, you pick the
wrong Poles according to the Poles.

HACKMAN: What about Matt Reese's [Matthew A. Reese, Jr.] operation? He came in fairly
late, did a lot of phoning, and other kinds of things.

DOHERTY: You know, you never knew whether it was helpful or not. I like Matt. I
happen to--you know, could have gone without him.

HACKMAN: Why was he brought in? On whose decision, I guess that's the question.

DOHERTY: Well, it wasn't mine. I remember saying to Steve Smith, " Okay. If you feel
happy, get him, you know, if you need him."

HACKMAN: Do you remember anything about an effort with the Mexican-American
community? Jack Ortega?

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DOHERTY: Yeah and…

HACKMAN: Bert Corona, was it Bert Corona?

DOHERTY: Ortega was another guy who, you know, all he did was moan and groan. He
goes up to East Chicago moaning and groaning that he didn't have enough
money, didn't have a credit card, didn't have this and that.

HACKMAN: Yes, everybody wanted money.

DOHERTY: He just got to be one colossal pain in the ass, if you wondered.

HACKMAN: One of the questions there, and in other areas was how you handled money on
election day? Can you remember any decision being made across the state? Or
where do you have to pay money on election day, or what you . . .

DOHERTY: You know, we only had to pay. You know, we paid little money for workers.
We wanted money for gas, we wanted money for back up, but, you know,
there were very few instances…Hatcher, you know, Hatcher, he was our man.
He was the only guy to take us on that part.
HACKMAN: How in that campaign was money handled in terms of getting bills paid? Or how much of a problem was that for you? Let's say, people are running to Leo Racine and asking him for money.

DOHERTY: Well, you know, I had a relationship with Leo going way, way back. You know, a lot of people thought that Leo was a nut and was very light. You know, I've known Leo a long time. I value him as a good friend. I've always respected him. He got there and very early, you know, we sat down and he said, "You got something you want done, you just tell me and it'll be done." You know, so I never had a problem with Leo. The advance men, you know, for pheasant under glass stuff, he'd give them a hard time. Hey, if I were Leo, I'd do the same thing.

HACKMAN: But that's mostly the kind of stuff it was.

DOHERTY: Yeah. I never once immobilized or slowed down because of lack of money. The first two and one half weeks we went there without a single dollar.

HACKMAN: Using Sperling?

DOHERTY: Using Sperling; Milos and using a lot a nerve. We had one guy at the Marriott Hotel, who went for us for two and one half weeks, and every time he'd look cross-eyed, the guy would say, "Well, you know, when Jackie [Jacqueline B. Kennedy] comes out for the tea, I don't think we could have it here really."

HACKMAN: How was the speakers' bureau, the celebrity kind of thing? Any use of any problems with them?

DOHERTY: Well, they got to be more of a nuisance than anything. You know, they would select a couple, I think. You know, Bob Graise did some things. He was pretty good. One of the--what the hell is the fellow's--Jackie Kennedy's sister's hocus-pocus count. He came out and he . . .

HACKMAN: Stan.

DOHERTY: Yeah.


DOHERTY: Yeah. He was a . . .

HACKMAN: Radziwill.
DOHERTY: Yeah. Radziwill. He was, you know . . . . John Glenn went one place, that was aright. I can't say that for the amount of aggravation we went through it was a help.

HACKMAN: What do you remember about the impact of Johnson's [Lyndon B. Johnson] withdrawal in Indiana?

DOHERTY: Well, you know, it was sort of a funny situation. Teddy and I were having dinner together. And I think it's the only time in the whole campaign I ever had dinner with Teddy. We were eating chicken sandwiches. We hadn't had anything--it was a Sunday, we had gone all day. And Teddy was starving. At about 9 o'clock or 8:30, he said, "Let's slow down and watch Johnson." We were eating chicken sandwiches and we were so hungry that as soon as they arrived, Johnson was on and we were jamming them into our mouths. And, you know, Johnson made the statement and Teddy--out of his mouth and all over. We then went down to Michael Riley's law office, got every phone we could get, broke into an office across the hall, got their phones, and started calling everybody. You know, a Who's Who across the country. And after about half an hour, it was obvious they were just going to stall and hold their place.

HACKMAN: But you don't remember particularly the impact in Indiana? Was anybody shaking loose in Indiana?

DOHERTY: No.

HACKMAN: Oberdorfer [Louis F. Oberdorfer], Lou Oberdorfer supposedly was running special groups: businessmen, doctors, whatever. Did that ever get started enough to be helpful in Indiana?

DOHERTY: I didn't think so.

HACKMAN: What else can you remember in Indiana that came up in terms of tough problems for you or just issues that seemed to . . .

DOHERTY: Well, the only time I think I really--I mean, you know, occasionally I'd get a little bullshit or upset at some of the advance men for, you know, sending people out in the districts--was we had. Finally we got a headquarters. We were in a big theatre building. We had a big bowling alley downstairs. In order to save money, we were housing other students down there. And it was ten days before the election and we had a lot of students in. Like we had, four, five, six hundred students. Unbeknownst to me, somebody had decided to have entertainment in our cellar. We're in the middle or the very edge of a black area. And one of the Massachusetts guys came up to me and said, "I don't want to cause you unnecessary problems, but," he says, "there's, you know, about four
hundred people downstairs. They've got a rock and roll band and they're going to be there all night. And all these black kids are going to come pouring down over the stairs. You're going to have a problem." So I tried to find out somebody who knew something about it. Nobody knew anything about it. So I went down and I went up to the guy who had the band and said, "You're all through." He said, "I'm paid to 10 or 11 o'clock." I said, "You're all through." He said, "I got paid two hundred dollars to stay until 10 or 11 o'clock. I need the money." I said, "I'm paying you three hundred dollars to leave now." So he went out the door. You know, he went, everybody went. But Jesus, you know, we were within, you know, an inch of having something--was a real tinderbox. I remember that.

HACKMAN: What about Robert Kennedy's own performance in the campaign in terms of doing things that you might have needed him to do, either phone calls or things like that?

DOHERTY: Marvelous. You know, the greatest strength the Kennedys have is if they have confidence in you and you know what they're doing, you can tell them to walk down the street in the altogether and they'll do it.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any mistakes that he made in calls or that you didn't think he handled well in that campaign?

DOHERTY: No, I thought he did pretty well. I think very early

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he and I independently—I picked it up first, and he knew it. He knew it right away. I think he might have even gone to a place called Columbus—was talking about a lot of things—I had made a suggestion about, you know, "The old people that are all out there. Try to do something." He included something about Medicare in his speech. He didn't elaborate, but he came back that night and said, "You're right. You know, we're wrong in not going that way." The other thing I suggested he did, and he did it, was up north there was a lot of resentment about the blacks. He framed his approach and his speeches to, you know, "I'm not for handouts. I'm for giving everybody an opportunity. If they want to work, they should have the chance to work." You know, this had a great impact. The thing that really turned out to be very, very helpful on that, if you look at the vote, in addition to the blacks and blue collar places, of the area that we did very well in—better, you know, better than we anticipated--were the small, rural county seats where there were a lot of old people and the old thing caught.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any other surprising sorts of things in looking at the results in Indiana that . . .

DOHERTY: Well, I remember was a little, little—you know, being somewhat of a Catholic bigot, I was a little upset at the Catholics. As soon as I looked at a couple of those returns, I knew immediately they had all gone with McCarthy and stayed with him.
HACKMAN: Do you remember anything at all surprising about Evansville? I'd heard that Evansville was quite a disappointment.

DOHERTY: Oh yeah, there was one--I can't remember what it was, but, most of the, you know... A couple of things happened to us in Evansville. There you get back to the blacks. You know, across the state in black precincts Robert Kennedy was getting 91, 92, 93, 94 percent of the vote. In Evansville, they had a very strong machine guy down there by the name of MacDonald. And they told MacDonald, "Okay, you know, we'll follow you out the window for anything and for everything, but just stay out of this fight." But there were three precincts--I think there's three precincts in Evansville--that Robert Kennedy got less than 30 percent of the vote that were black. And, you know, I think there is something rotten in Denmark there.

HACKMAN: After the Indiana primary then--well, you said earlier that you came back and you were planning to go out again. What about the Massachusetts situation? Now I've been looking at the Massachusetts black book. I've seen just a couple of things that you either called in or wrote in on Massachusetts in that period: Lester Hyman being in a little bit of trouble maybe up here at that point on the state chairman, and then the question of what to do with McCarthy here in the primary. Can you remember discussions of that?

DOHERTY: Well, you know, the real question while I was in Indiana was, you know, you try to win it for Robert Kennedy. I'm of the opinion that they could have. But they were very strapped for human resources. If they did, how could they... You know, I feel that--I'm going to sound like Jesus Christ. I feel that I or somebody else could have come back here for two days; there were enough people who couldn't go out, who were here. You could have put it together.

HACKMAN: Any reaction on that from Robert Kennedy or from Edward Kennedy?

DOHERTY: Well, I guess they were a little nervous. You know, we were up to their eyeballs in...

HACKMAN: Yeah. Was anything done on a write-in or...

DOHERTY: No. They left it alone.

HACKMAN: That's about all I've got. Oh, just getting back to Indiana, can you think of what you regard now as major mistakes on the ways things were done or just things that were left undone?
DOHERTY: Yeah. What I say next is going to sound sort of cruel or vicious and it doesn't.
... You know, if we spent less time screwing around with phony, temperamental people. You know, we had more--you know, it wasn't the enemy that gave us difficulty. You know, I don't know how they do it on. They end up with the greatest collection of high--you know, big, you know, people. And what happens is that they all have this syndrome of. . . . You know, if Robert Kennedy wasn't around, then for some peculiar reason they had to play Robert Kennedy. You know, there was some wasted effort with that. You know, the fooling around with, you know, that Citizens for Kennedy Oberdorfer, you know; I don't think I would have put quite the kind of effort that they put in on that.

HACKMAN: That's all I've got. Unless you can think of anything.

DOHERTY: No.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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