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This is the third interview with John Douglas. The interview is taking place in his office at 888 16th Street, N.W. The date is May 5, 1970, and maybe you can recall how you got involved really at first.

Well Larry, can I edit this when it gets through?

Oh yes. Just like the other ones.

Which I haven’t done.

Right. So it’s up to you to do with them what you will.

Well I first got involved in the 1963 march on Washington when Katzenbach [Nicholas de B. Katzenbach] asked if I’d be responsible for putting together the government’s efforts. Bob Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] and he had decided they wanted me to handle it and I understood later, from other
people, that the idea for some kind of government effort in coordination had come from President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]. There was an article in the New York Herald Tribune, Paris edition, on it which set forth some of the origins of the idea. But, as I understood it, President Kennedy was concerned on two scores: first, that a disorganized and fouled up march would be a blot on his administration, and secondly, it would have a very adverse and concrete effect on the civil rights bill of the administration which had been pending in Congress and which he very much wanted to have passed.

[2-]

According to third hand reports, attributed to John Reilly [John R. Reilly] and I think Ken O’Donnell [Kenneth P. O’Donnell], the President asked several individuals who was running the running—meaning who in private life was running the march? And he was told that there didn’t seem to be any clear-cut direction, whereupon, as I told sometime after the event, the President said, “Well, I’ll run it then.” And I gather that he must have spoken to the Attorney General, and Bob Kennedy in turn and Nick decided that I’d be the person to help coordinate it.

But, as I say, my first contact with the march preparations was sometime in July and my instructions were to try to coordinate the government’s efforts, see to it that the plans of the marchers made sense—to the extent that we could influence them in that regard—and that the response or organization of the government, and the various agencies involved, was sensible and that we should do all we could

[3-]

to have the affair go off smoothly. And it was with those goals in mind that we worked thereafter. My special assistant, Alan Raywid, worked with me very closely on this and in fact spent, I think, full time for the next five weeks on this project, and his memory of these events is better than mine is. There’s a great deal of detail which I have lost track of. The first thing that I did, as I recall, was to ask Al to list the different kinds of problems that he thought would be involved in such a march. And then we broke the problems down into categories…

HACKMAN: Want to look at this?

DOUGLAS: Yeah….categories and made some assignments for government responsibility with respect to those categories. Very early in the game, we met with police officials, and the National Park people, the Pentagon planners, the D.C. [District of Columbia] government people and some others in Justice, trying to get some kind of a framework for getting

[4-]

the government’s planning in order and moving on.
HACKMAN: How much contact had there been with the people who were presumably going to be in charge of the march—Bayard Rustin [Bayard Taylor Rustin] and Randolph [A. Philip Randolph] or whoever?

DOUGLAS: I don’t know what there’d been before I got into it. But very shortly after I got started, there was a meeting down at police headquarters which I regarded as rather unsuccessful but which I suppose was necessary. But Mr. Rustin and Cleveland Robinson, who I think worked with A. Philip Randolph, and several other representatives of the black community and other civil rights groups met in police headquarters with police officials—and a couple of others from Justice, as I recall, were present.

The difficulty with that meeting was that it was very formal. It was kind of a statement of position on the part of the police on the one hand, and the march organization on the other, with people sitting on opposite sides of the table and a rather stiff atmosphere throughout. But thereafter the formality of the relationships broke down or eased and a lot freer discussion and—this all took place subsequently to the meeting. We had some leverage with respect to the march itself, in that the marchers needed a permit and they needed help in getting some of the essentials of the march like planning for sound equipment, the planning for water facilities and things of that kind. And it was in their interest as well as ours to see that all those things worked out smoothly.

There was quite a lot of negotiation back and forth as to when the march would begin, where it would end, what the times would be, what the arrangements might be on water and toilet facilities, bus parking, and the like. And our own group in Justice, I think, met twice a day for about a month, the morning and the night, and went over things that should and should not be done and that remained to be done. In Justice, besides myself and Al Raywid: Jim McShane [James J.P. McShane], who was the chief marshal; John Reilly, who was the assistant deputy attorney general—no, he was, excuse me, he was in charge of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys—the four of us met, I think, twice a day everyday during most of this period. Then we met, from time to time, with people from the Pentagon—in particular General Powell [Herbert B. Powell], who was in charge of the plans at the Pentagon; Joe Califano [Joseph A. Califano, Jr.], who was then general counsel of the army; and in addition, from time to time, General Wehle [Philip C. Wehle], who was in charge of the military district of Washington and, I gather, more or less in charge of the locally based troops and potential troops.

We also met on occasion with Walter Tobriner [Walter N. Tobriner] who was head of the D.C. commissioners and his assistant Mr. Townsend [R.S. Townsend]. Then
Mr. T. Sutton Jett [Thomas Sutton Jett], who is the director of the National Park Service and his assistant, Nash Castro, who is the assistant regional director of the National Park Service. Jett was the regional director. We met on occasion also with General Abendorf, who was the Commandor of the D.C. National Guard, with Dr. Murray Grant who was the D.C. director of Public Health, and Dr. Fred Heath [Frederick C. Heath], who was his deputy director. Then we had a number of meetings with the police: Chief Robert V. Murray, Deputy Chief Kavel (?), Deputy Chief Liverman who was in charge of Traffic, Chief of the U.S. Park Police, Murdock, a number of other deputy chiefs of police, chief of the White House Police—I think we occasionally met with one of the representatives of the Secret Service, the Red Cross and so on. One or more of us, I think, met with the director of the Washington office or one of the managers of the Washington office.

of the Penn Railroad System, Mr. Fox of D.C. Transit and so on.

One of the initial problems we ran into was that there were a great many different overlapping aggressive (?) agencies in the field. The Park Police had jurisdiction over the parks. The question of the Capitol. The White House Police and the Secret Service. There were the Capitol Police to some extent. They were concerned about having enough police up in the Capitol. The problem of the D.C. National Guard, whether they should be mobilized, and it was early concluded that it was necessary to do so to make sure that there were enough law enforcement officials in the area.

HACKMAN: Was that advised by, through the Department of the Army, or was that at your own suggestion or where did that come from?

DOUGLAS: I’m not sure where the original idea came but when we looked at the numbers of police who would be available and the crowds, that we thought would be present and the necessity for having some police in the outlying areas, it was perfectly apparent that the numbers of police were not adequate. So I think it was agreed both by the Pentagon and by Justice that there just weren’t enough local police on hand and therefore that decision was made, I think, with complete agreement on all sides.

HACKMAN: You don’t remember any elements pushing for vast amounts or much greater amounts of military personnel stationed in the area that day than you would have wanted?

DOUGLAS: Well no, I wouldn’t say that. These were the people, the National Guard were the people who were on actual duty in the city of Washington, in the area of the march. They were mobilized and they were deployed there,
some from midnight on, I think, of the night before, perhaps from night calls the night before. But in addition

there were a number of other troops who were called in to standby service at Bolling, at Fort Myer and at other places and I think in retrospect the Pentagon probably erred on the side of calling (unreadable, fix). But at the time no one knew how the whole thing would come out and I think everyone felt that there had to be adequate preparation in case things went wrong. There was a great effort, however, on everybody’s part, certainly on Justice’s part, to play down all of that, to keep it as quiet as possible. And we all felt that one of the most important aspects of planning was not only to prepare as much as we could so that the thing would go off smoothly but also to foster a feeling of safety and organization so that people would not get panicky or so there wouldn’t be a large element of tension and hostility and the rest which we felt would encourage rather than deter any possible violence.

HACKMAN: Were any of the march leaders made aware of all the military plans in this regard? Can you remember?

DOUGLAS: No, I don’t believe they were. I think that all that we had said was that we’d have adequate law enforcement people on hand. Of course they became aware that there would be National Guard and they read about the movement of troops into the outlying areas because there was some last minute news on that score, but that was considered basically a governmental matter. We just continued to assure them that we wanted to cooperate in every possible way to have the march go smoothly and without any friction or tension.

But getting back to the planning for the march itself; we felt that it was important that the march and ceremonies be concluded at a time in the afternoon sufficient to enable all marchers to return to their buses or other means of transportation and leave town by dark, and we just thought that this was important in terms of having it go off smoothly with no after effects and no stragglers and groups with nothing to do or tired people who perhaps were frustrated, and also, it would make it easier for the police, if there were some trouble makers, to control them in a disciplined and organized, easy fashion. So we worked back from sunset to the time of the ceremonies at the Washington Monument—at the Lincoln Memorial to the Washington Monument—to figure out what were the best times that these things could go off. And we persuaded the marchers, by and large, to accept the kind of a schedule which seemed to make sense. Initially some of the marchers, or the march leaders, had wanted to put on a more ambitious schedule. They had initially wanted to have a march on the Capitol and then have another demonstration in front of the White House, and we persuaded them that this was really too much to bite off and that if they tried to do that much,
there would likely be a

scattering of their efforts and difficulty of controlling the day’s events. So they agreed to that. They had originally wanted to march. They had also wanted to march from the Monument grounds to the Lincoln Memorial. We had wondered at first whether it wouldn’t be wiser just to have the whole affair at one place or the other, but they wanted to have a march and we agreed that that was all right. So, over a period of time we worked out these basic details on timing, the route of the march; and after that had been worked out the other things tended to fall in place. There were elaborate arrangements on traffic, routing, coming into the city, places to park which would be near the—relatively near the—Lincoln Memorial or the Washington Monument grounds and which would enable people to get into their buses with relative ease after the march was over and after the ceremonies were over.

We also worked to some extent with, or kept in contact with, some of the United Auto Workers people, in particular Jack Conway because the U.A.W. was supplying some of the funds for the march. They were anxious to have their money spent in a sensible fashion and we wanted to make sure that the marchers had all of the bases covered in the important elements. So on the sound equipment, for example, I think that the UAW may have paid for that which was extremely important because if you have a large audience and the sound equipment goes sour, you’ve got problems. This meant sound equipment both at the Washington Monument and, more important, at the Lincoln Memorial. I think that we helped in fact to steer them to the sound equipment people. We also got the GSI which is the government, nonprofit corporation, supplying and operating some of the government cafeterias to have people on hand to dispense drinks and fill drinks and have the drinks put out in paper cups so there wouldn’t be bottles that might be thrown. And I think the National Council of Churches provided food. Then there was the matter of water and either the Park Service or the local D.C. government or Public Health made the arrangements for the sprinklers to be attached to hydrants which enabled a lot of people to drink. There were the toilet facilities which were essential. There were a number of those buses with toilets that the Park Service had that were stationed at various places throughout the march and strategic places on the grounds as well. In addition, there were some chemical toilets which were rented from some private company which the marchers were supposed to pay for but which, I think, eventually may have been paid for by the D.C. government simply because there was some confusion in the matter. In any event, they were important.
HACKMAN: Was there any definite agreement on cost before the march and was Robert Kennedy or were you concerned with holding down Federal cost? Was that a big thing?

DOUGLAS: Well, we took the general position that we would try to have the government—I guess the short answer to your question is no. There was no agreement. We sort of operated on the assumption that we’d try to be sensible, that the government could properly spend money on those items which effected the security of the affair and which represented the proper government response to the handling of a large crowd. So far as promoting the march was concerned or that sort of problem, that should be borne entirely by the marchers. For example, we refused for a long time to furnish government cots to some Catholic churches which wanted to put up marchers on Saturday night. We thought that this really was not a proper thing

for the government to do—that it was better really for people to leave the city that evening and in any event if they wanted to stay they should make their own arrangements and it wasn’t something the government wanted to do. Actually at the last minute, I think, somebody made an offer to the churches to provide Army cots, but by that time the churches said they didn’t want them. But in any event, we went over a lot of different things. I’ve got a list here of about seventy-three different items that we had. We broke them down into traffic, into health, transportation, security forces, the Washington Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, the march itself, publicity, dealing with traffic plans for example issued by the police to make sure that people understood what streets were closed and what were opened and to discourage people from coming into the area who didn’t intend to come to the march and so forth, press

facilities, intelligence, plans, and so forth. And on traffic we had things like parking, traffic routing, the No Parking sign, the tows, the fire engines, the direction signs. On health there were the ambulances, the drinking water, the food, the toilets, the refuse cans. Transportation: shuttle buses to the station into the fringe lots, and information booths. Security forces: the police, the National Guard, and the Civil Defense unit—oh no, was that called the Civil Defense unit? It’s the CDU, it’s a special unit of the police—Civil Disturbance Unit, excuse me, Army at Fort Myer, at Anacostia, at Bolling, headquarters’ communication. The Washington Monument permit, platform, audio, chairs, programs, signs, so forth.

I might say that in dealing with the police that initially they were kind of up-tight and stand-offish about the whole affair. They certainly didn’t want to have anything go wrong. On the
other hand they, I thought, initially were a little rigid in their views. The only real thing that we went to Bob Kennedy about, which I recall, was the insistence of the police that police dog units be available. That was at a time when dogs and police put together, marching together, had become something of a symbol because of Alabama. We thought that the use of dogs would be inflammatory. Police took the position that the policeman’s security was in danger, that they just would have to have police, I mean, just have to have dogs and therefore the dogs had to be available and moving around. We thought that it would be counter productive and that if things came to such a pass the National Guard or the other Army troops ought to be brought in. I think I spoke to Bob Kennedy about it and he persuaded, or told, the police that they didn’t want any dogs and as a result, there weren’t any dogs.

[-20-]

HACKMAN: Were there other things that he got involved like that on that you can remember?

DOUGLAS: I don’t think so. He reviewed the Army’s plans in some detail with Cy Vance [Cyrus R. Vance] together with Powell and Joe Califano, Powell being the regular Army officer in charge of plans for this type of operation. He reviewed the plans in some detail and was satisfied with them but he was content to be informed and seemed to be satisfied with the way things were going. Both he and Burke Marshall were concerned that the government not give the impression that they were worried about violence and believed that violence was likely or things of that kind, because they thought this would be more likely to be productive of violence than….So they wanted to have an impression of organization and of confidence as much as possible, and naturally we tried to carry that out.

[-21-]

HACKMAN: Did you get involved much with the press or was that mostly done through government and Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger]?

DOUGLAS: We tried to stay away from the press as much as possible. I think that to the extent possible, we let the police and the local D.C. government deal with those problems, and I think we felt that we could be more effective if we stayed out of the public view.

I remember when it was all over, Pierre Salinger spoke to Guthman [Edwin O. Guthman] and said, “Well should we give the press the full story of what the government did,” and spoke to me. Since everything had gone well, it just seemed better to let it sit and let the publicity stand where it was which was essentially that the police and local authorities had done a good job which they certainly had.

I should—there’s one thing that occurred to me. Well, it’ll probably come back to us but….
HACKMAN: Do you remember any stories in the press beforehand that were particularly upsetting to you or created a lot of problems?

DOUGLAS: No. There was a surprising little amount of press. (unreadable, fix) Banner was the only paper that printed anything at the time indicating the government planning in the matter, and it was fairly straightforward and innocuous that it was just trying to make sure that preparations were in order. There was some speculation about trouble and, but I don’t recall that it was a matter of great concern. We just went on about our business.

On the day of the march we had a rather elaborate communications set-up. There was a police hook-up which came into central police headquarters. We persuaded the police to put in a central communications system so that there would be control in police headquarters and they could get in touch with the basic commanders in the area. The whole region had been divided up among deputy police commissioners—as I recall that was what they were—I guess they weren’t called commissioners, deputy police chiefs. In addition there was an Army communications setup and General Wehle, and myself sat in a single room in the D.C. police headquarters. We had ties into the Pentagon and into the White House and into the Justice Department; and the police command post was, I think, next to ours. This was barred to the press. I’m not sure of the extent to which they’re aware of the existence of that command post. In any event, we had a constant stream of reports.

The Justice Department had a couple of people down at the station to report on the trains coming in and the traffic moving out from the trains to Washington Monument grounds. And we had a few hassles with the D.C. Transit because there weren’t enough busses immediately to move the people to the monument grounds, and it was important that they get there promptly so that everything else would move along promptly from the grounds. Then there were people stationed at, I think in the Department of Commerce building, other people at the Washington Monument grounds and, of course, some people at the Lincoln Memorial. So we had a fairly good indication of how things were going and it became apparent quite early that it was to be a peaceful crowd and everything really moved fairly easily. I didn’t leave the police headquarters….Oh I guess I went down to the station once, but basically I was at the police headquarters all day.
DOUGLAS: …John Doar [John M. Doar], who was with him, at a designated spot on Constitution Avenue, and they then went up to see the Cardinal and I guess the Cardinal was persuaded to relent somewhat and a new draft patterned satisfactory to him and he came down and appeared during the speech so that he participated in the program. So that was a relief, but I wasn’t in on the modification of that. Jim McShane who was the head of the U.S. Marshals worked with a unit of the marshals in trying to see to it that everything was orderly and he also worked with some of the police, with some of the marshals for the march personnel themselves. Quite a few of those marshals for the march had been recruited from the ranks of an organization of black policemen in the city of New York, some of whom Jim had known when he’d been a New York City Policeman, and that I gather worked out very smoothly and helped.

HACKMAN: At one point in the planning, I was just reading this in the New York Times, Martin Luther King had said that the people who were organizing the march were going to ask for something called the Federal Civil Rights Police Force. Do you remember, I don’t know what he meant by that, but do you remember any request that was like that?

DOUGLAS: No, I don’t remember that. I assume, Larry, that that was a reference not to anything to be done in connection with the march but in connection with proposed legislation. It sounds as though it was part of the dissatisfaction with law enforcement activities in the South on the part of the Justice Department.

HACKMAN: Yeah. He said it was to protect demonstrators and maybe it was in conjunction with the march.

DOUGLAS: I don’t think, I think he may have included that as a potential demand to be made on the occasion of the march but the demand was to be carried out,

I would think, by legislation and some kind of action would be my guess.

HACKMAN: That’s probably right.

DOUGLAS: A rather minor thing was that sometime during the course of the march—I seem to recall police headquarters with the, that one or two of the chemical toilets had overflown. What happened was that the trucks that come around to pump the toilets out couldn’t get through the traffic. On other thing. After it was all over, when night came, I was very anxious to have the whole thing cleaned up. There was a lot of debris around and I had to persuade the sanitation people and some of the others to make an all out effort to clean it up as much as possible that night. And one other thing
which I may have mentioned the first time round was Bob Kennedy called after the march was over, when the leaders had met with the President in the White House. He called from the White House and thanked me for helping to make it go off well. Then he asked for a list of people whom he should call to thank, and I said I wanted to make sure I had a good list and would call his secretary back and check with Al Raywid who was in an adjacent office. And he got together a list and I phoned it in to Angie Novello [Angela M. Novello] as I recall, in the White House or through the White House switchboard. And I think Bob called all of those people back which was of course typical of the way he operated and made a…. and naturally was very well received.

HACKMAN: Had there been any other calls from the White House or from Robert Kennedy that day, expressing any kind of concern with the way things were going?

DOUGLAS: I don’t believe so. I called in from time to time to the Justice Department and kept them informed as to how things were going, and I think that was the first time I spoke with him all day.

HACKMAN: Umm hmm.

DOUGLAS: Oh, one other thing. We’d had a rather careful plan worked out whereby if there was some kind of disturbance at the Lincoln Memorial, we could get the leaders, that is to say the people who were making speeches at the memorial, out of there safely and easily. And this was very helpful when we were getting Cardinal O’Boyle [Cardinal Patrick O’Boyle] to the platform in time because we used that route to bring him from the hotel and if he’d had to be brought through the traffic, it would have been impossible to get him there to the platform.

I can’t say enough for John Reilly, and McShane, and Al Raywood (Raywed?) in their planning. John had worked out the parking which was quite an elaborate thing. He’d worked with the police obviously and they had made the suggestions but the whole area was laid out in great detail as to what streets would be blocked off, what streets the buses would come, how they would exit, where they would be parked and how many buses could be parked here and how many buses could be parked there. But as a result, by the time the day came everything worked very smoothly. They were escorted in convoys
and parked in areas. It went off like a dream as a result. John had things sufficiently in hand by the time of the march. He wanted another assignment so he was given responsibility for coordinating the platform—well, the government’s role near the scene of the speeches and the platform and the rest of it and he worked with Jerry Bruno [Gerald Bruno] who was, who headed the Democratic National Committee. And Jerry, of course, is one of the great advance men of all time, a very smart and savvy individual, very experienced and blessed with common sense. And he and Jerry—John and Jerry—were very important movers and shakers up near the platform and helped see that all the arrangements were in shape and made things go.

Now we worked throughout this whole time with Walter Fauntroy [Walter E. Fauntroy] who was the local representative of the march organizing committee. He was very sensible and easy to work with and understood the limitations of what we could do, pushed hard for things beyond the limitations on some occasions, but was understanding when we told him we really couldn’t do this or that. But that made things go very smoothly. Frank Montero [Frank C. Montero] who I think either was or had been working at the U.N. [United Nations]…

HACKMAN: I don’t remember if he was there then, but he was from New York, right?

DOUGLAS: He actually worked there afterwards. Yes. Black leader from New York, very sensible, intelligent, smart fellow, public spirited. And he too was a person we worked with towards the end and….He really was more or less responsible for, he was sort of the leader’s—

the six or ten leader’s—representative and saw to it that they were organized and in one place up at the Statler Hilton and worked with people to see that they had the necessary transportation arrangements to get proper place and that was a great asset.

Walter was responsible for the overall early planning here in Washington and of course he was working with Bayard Rustin and Cleveland Robinson and others to make it, to see that everything was touched. And we reminded him of water problems and this and that and asked him if he’d made this or that arrangement. He said, “Well, who should he talk to,” and we tried to think of people he should talk to. [Interruption] Well, I don’t know, Larry. Maybe you ought to ask me some questions.

HACKMAN: Okay, okay. At the point that you first got involved in the meeting with Bayard Rustin and these other people or from what you heard, how clearly did the march leaders have their minds made up as to
whether this was going to be a mass meeting or whether it was going to be in some way disruptive of government business or embarrassing or harassing to political people here or whatever?

DOUGLAS: Well, it wasn’t all together clear in my mind because the first meeting I felt that Bayard Rustin and Cleveland Robinson were sort of making speeches and I wasn’t satisfied that was their final position, but if you were to take it at face value they were coming down here for a march and were not interested in just having some kind of a meeting. It wasn’t by any means clear that they intended to try any kind of disruptive tactics. In fact, they disavowed that, it seems to me right from the start. But I didn’t feel that they had the actual details of the affair down at all. I’m not sure they did and there was a great deal of negotiating within their own ranks and lots of meetings. I think one of the things we tried to do was to try and get them to focus

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on the details of how you get people down here, how you move people from one area to another, where you park the buses, how much time it’s going to take to have eight people or ten people or six people speak, get them to face up to some of the problems and the logistics in organizing a meeting and march of this kind. And once they did that, they were basically sensible: I think they then realized that they couldn’t attempt too much and have it a success as well.

I should say one other thing about the size of the affair. No one was sure whether there’d be few people or many people. When it finally developed I think everybody was surprised at how many people there were, but we’d had reports from various sources that it was really going to be a very poor turnout and those turned out to be wrong. And frankly we felt that if it was less than a hundred thousand people, that the civil rights bill would have quite a setback because although we had nothing to do with the

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actual size of the crowd, it would be taken, in the public press at least, as a lack of interest on the part of those seeking civil rights action. So frankly we were all pleased when there was a very large crowd.

HACKMAN: Who was predicting the small crowd? Were there any…

DOUGLAS: I don’t know that there were any specific predictions, but the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, as I recall, tended to suggest a small crowd.

HACKMAN: At the time that you became involved, had the President made his statement in his press conference, this was July 19th, that he was in general support for the march? Or do you remember? Did you get involved in any of…
DOUGLAS: I would have thought that we would have been involved before then because Al Raywid told me at lunch today that he worked for five weeks on it.

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HACKMAN: August 28th back, it’s almost that time. That would have been…

DOUGLAS: Now I’m just trying to see if there’s anything in these books before then. I should have looked in my diary.

HACKMAN: Well, hopefully you’re going to give all that stuff to the Kennedy Library someday.

DOUGLAS: Yeah, sure.

HACKMAN: Someone can do that. Can you remember at the time you got involved, having any feeling for concern on the [Capitol] Hill for the march and spending any time dealing with people up there?

DOUGLAS: Well there was concern on the Hill, particularly when, I think there had been some statements as I indicated earlier that there was a desire initially on the part of the marchers to march up to the Hill, and some of the Congressional leaders as I recall had expressed concern about that, but I can’t put my finger on them specifically. I do know that the police officials were sufficiently concerned about it to employ what we felt was a wholly unnecessary number of men to protect the Hill, and we persuaded them finally not to have so many up there since there was no effort on an organized basis to go up there, and police were needed elsewhere. But I think there was some concern, after all that was the first of the major marches, at least in the sixties I believe.

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HACKMAN: Right. Was there a continuing threat of some kind of action in regard to the Hill or was that something you felt you had in hand fairly early?

DOUGLAS: Well, I can’t remember when it disappeared as a major matter but what was finally worked out as I recall was that instead of a mass march up to the Hill which would consume too much time some of the leaders as a group or individually went up and talked to some of the Congressional leaders.

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HACKMAN: For example, a luncheon with your father [Paul H. Douglas]. Is that anything that you helped work out, can you remember?

DOUGLAS: I don’t recall one way or another on that.

HACKMAN: What about, let me just skip back to one other thing. I have you present at a Cabinet meeting in the White House on July 3rd, I believe.

DOUGLAS: Yes.

HACKMAN: Does this have anything to do with the march?

DOUGLAS: No. It’s doesn’t. I can’t remember whether or not, I rather imagine that the assignment to work in the march came after that meeting but I remember that meeting very well. I don’t know whether we talked about it that last time round, but maybe you’re be interested in it.

HACKMAN: Yeah, I would very much be and I don’t think we talked about it.

DOUGLAS: Well, I got a call at about twenty minutes before the Cabinet Meeting was to take place

from Angie Novello and she said, “Bob wants you to go to the Cabinet Meeting for the Department of Justice.” And I asked her why Bob wasn’t going and she said he was testifying before Senator Ervin’s [Sam J. Ervin, Jr.] committee and couldn’t make it and wanted me to go. And I said, “Fine, what do I have to do?” Angie said, “Well, you don’t have to do anything. All you have to do is be there.” So I said, “All right,” and she said, “I’ll have a car take you over and just be downstairs at ten of eleven or thereabouts” or ten of twelve, I can’t remember what the time of the meeting was. So I went down and went over to the White House, got into the White House a little bit before eleven, or a little bit before the meeting was scheduled to take place and most cabinet officers didn’t know who I was and I knew personally only a couple as I recall, but I went around to the place where the attorney general would ordinarily sit and just about fainted dead away when I looked

at the agenda in front of me because the agenda stated quite clearly that I was to, that each cabinet officer or representative was to talk about what had happened in his department during the time that the President was away on his European trip.

Well, about that time the meeting got started after some picture taking and I tried desperately to think of what I had read in the [Washington] Post and in the New York Times as to what had happened in the Justice Department because, while I knew what had happened in the Civil Division and knew a little bit about a few other things basically, I really was not
well informed. So I thought to myself, “Well, this marks my exit from the Washington scene.” But fortunately the President started out to his left and worked around the table clockwise fashion and since I was way around the other side of the table, by the time they reached me Bob Kennedy had finished his testimony, had

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come back and taken over.

I recall that meeting though rather well. Secretary Dillion [Douglas Dillon] talked at some length about the gold problem, the balance of payments. Postmaster General Day [J. Edward Day] who was about to—I discovered later—leave the Cabinet said absolutely nothing. Secretary Wirtz [Willard W. Wirtz] talked about impending numbers of strikes and said that if this strike came off there would be a shutdown of this particular industry or that particular area. If another strike that was threatened came off another segment of the country would be hard hit. And the President listened to all this and said, “Well, why don’t we close the whole country down?” And then Secretary McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] talked for about five minutes in very forceful fashion about how everything was coming up roses in Vietnam, and it was a very impressive performance to someone who was basically uniformed, like myself.

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HACKMAN: Umm hmm.

DOUGLAS: By the end of the year it was perfectly apparent that he had been wrong in about every one of his predictions. When it came around to Bob Kennedy’s turn, he talked about the Civil Rights problem and the bill up on the Hill, and its status. And then he talked with the President privately after the meeting broke off and then gave me a ride in his car—I waited for him to give me a ride back to the Justice Department. I should say that halfway through that meeting Pierre Salinger came to the meeting and the President got up and went out and came in and announced…

[TAPE I SIDE II]

…to the Cabinet Meeting that there’d been an indication on Khrushchev’s [Nikita S. Khruschev] part of willingness to enter into a non-proliferation treaty.


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DOUGLAS: Test Ban Treaty. And the President thought this was very significant and said he’d be thinking about the government’s response.
HACKMAN: Do you remember anything about either Vice President Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] or Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk] who were also present at that meeting?

DOUGLAS: Vice President Johnson didn’t say one word. Secretary Rusk spoke about, as I recall, the effect of the President’s trip on European relations and I really didn’t understand what he was talking about.

HACKMAN: Hodges [Luther H. Hodges] or Celebreeze [Anthony J. Celebreeze]?

DOUGLAS: Secretary Celebreeze spoke, but it didn’t register on me. At least it doesn’t register on me now. He had a couple of mildly humorous stories. Secretary Hodges, I just don’t recall what he said.

HACKMAN: Well, anything else about that meeting?

DOUGLAS: No, I think that was about it.

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HACKMAN: Any contacts with the White House staff as the planning for the march was going on. Lee Whitz? Anyone else?

DOUGLAS: No, I don’t believe so. I just assumed that others in the Department, probably Bob Kennedy himself, dealt with that. I can’t remember really more than that.

HACKMAN: Did you have the feeling as time passed that unity of some sort or a sufficient amount of unity was reached among the leaders of the march?

DOUGLAS: Yes. By the time that the march came off, I think, well we wondered if it might come unstuck. We felt that it was in quite good shape, that they settled on who was to speak, settled on the arrangements for the day and while there were, I guess, continuing changes up to the last minute that everything was in quite good shape.

To diverge for a moment, one interesting

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thing was that while, when we initially got into the whole matter, it seemed as though there were any number of government agencies pulling in any number of different directions, very quickly they seemed to be willing to get into harness together. This I think was attributable not to anything that I did, but rather to the fact that the Department of Justice with Bob Kennedy was thought quite properly to speak for the President and therefore—I was amazed, one time I called a meeting of people from the police and Pentagon and D.C. Commissioners
office. It was called up in my own name, and I said, “We’re having a meeting,” and I wondered if everybody would really show up which they did. But I think it was just the implicit understanding that when the Department of Justice spoke, it was the President that wanted things done.

HACKMAN: Umm hmm. What about participation in the

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march by non-black groups. Did you push this or did you get personally involved? You said Jack Conway and the UAW participated at least, church groups, whatever?

DOUGLAS: Well I think everyone connected with the march and in the government hoped very much that there’d be a significant number of whites in the march. That it would not be all black effort. But I’m not sure there was much of anything we could do about it except to encourage people like Jack Conway and the National Council of Churches to do what they could in this direction.

HACKMAN: Can you remember…

DOUGLAS: I remember speaking to my father about it once he was in complete agreement. I know he spoke to some people about it also. But of course the thing gradually built momentum and you could sense it, so that in the last week it was building and therefore it became much more of a thing to do—that is to say to

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participate in it. And I think as that feeling communicated itself to us, we became more confident there would be a significant number of whites and that is, in fact, what happened.

HACKMAN: Was there resistance, or much resistance, to that from the leadership?

DOUGLAS: No, no. I think the leadership there really wanted to have it an integrated affair.

HACKMAN: Can you remember making efforts with any white groups that fell through? I was thinking particularly maybe anyone in the administration making an effort with Meany [George Meany] and the AFL-CIO council.

DOUGLAS: That I don’t know.

HACKMAN: Any church groups?
DOUGLAS: I think the church groups were on board right from the start. The other thing that interested me—and again it was after this momentum built—was the tremendous number of people inside the government that wanted to participate in it as, or have some role in it. They didn’t want to sit on the platform or things like this. They just wanted to have a hand in what they believed would be a significant and historical event and something which they felt very deeply about as individuals. And I think quite a few people came to me whom I didn’t know and asked what they could do and try to work something out for them. But that in itself I thought was quite a thrilling kind of an occasion.

HACKMAN: What about the possibility of some gesture from the President, beyond some involvement by him, beyond the meeting that he has with the eight leaders, I believe or whatever, and also possibly by Robert Kennedy, either a speech or anything else.

DOUGLAS: No, that had not been, well certainly a speech by Robert Kennedy had not been even hinted at either by the people in the march or by Kennedy himself. The march was basically an outside affair. It was really a march by individuals petitioning their government and Congress for action, and it would have, I think, detracted from that if there had been government speakers at the rally. As for the President’s role, I think that it was part of the overall planning that they would come to see the President after the march was over and we felt that this would help to assure that everything went off smoothly because it would have been embarrassing for the march leaders, I think, if they had come to see the President if the march itself had been a rag tag, disorganized, unruly kind of affair. So that the timing of that appearance was a minor but useful spur—and probably unnecessary spur, but it was just an added thing that probably could have been useful.

HACKMAN: I know there was some concern with keeping Communists from participating or at least openly….Any other groups that you can remember that the government or you or whoever felt should be kept out?

DOUGLAS: There was some slurring flurry of reports about Black Muslims muscling in and seizing the microphone or trying to disrupt things, but we had confidence in the leadership that that wouldn’t have been possible and actually there was a switch down at the speakers platform that if
someone had seized the mike, some kind of disruptive performance, that the mike would have been turned off.

HACKMAN: Is this one of the reasons why you suggested the sound equipment and kept everything under control on that?

DOUGLAS: No, no, no. As a matter of fact, that was something that came up at the last minute and in retrospect was unnecessary but….Well the problem with sound equipment was simply that what we were concerned about was that the sound equipment would break down, that you’d have a large number of people without any means of communication, that there’d be rumors and frustrations and this seemed to us to be the, make for, create the kind of atmosphere where

there could be, where it would be more likely to be trouble—and certainly leave you a very frustrating day.

HACKMAN: Umm hmm. Any problems in working with the networks and the kind of coverage they were going to give it? Any of the physical arrangements on that?

DOUGLAS: No, I think they worked that out with the officials—that is to say the park police and the police officials. They knew where the march was going to be and—well, I guess we did make arrangements to have trucks to a, well we gave them passes, made sure they had passes to have the cameras on trucks to go down to Constitution Avenue and then make sure that there was a setup for them at the Memorial as well as on the Monument grounds. As I recall, they did have coverage at all three places. Well it was, you know, a sufficiently discreet area or areas that coverage really wasn’t a problem.

Oh, one other thing that was interesting, Larry, was that in order to plan for the march, we wondered how long it would take to go from the Washington Monument down to the Lincoln memorial and we had no idea how long it would take a large number of people. And so John Reilly suggested that he might go out and talk to some of the officials in the city of Chicago because they were, theoretically, very experienced in running parades and things of that kind. So John went out and spoke to Colonel Jack Reilly who was the, and still is, the Mayor’s Special Assistant on Special Events. And as I recall it, he came back and reported that according to Colonel Reilly’s estimate, it would take three and a half hours or so for this number of people to move down Constitution to the Monument from Memorial grounds maybe more than that—maybe it was six or seven hours. But in any event whatever our plans were, we felt that was high. And as it turned out, I think even
our estimates were too high, and the march somehow got started all of a sudden. I think people started to search for a route off the Memorial, off the Monument grounds on to Constitution and the leaders had to hurry to get ahead of them and the thing went very quickly. I think that they got down there in a matter of relatively few minutes. Of course, some people moved down the reflecting pools and got in position that way. But it went very much more quickly than most people thought and a great deal more quickly than Colonel Jack Reilly had envisioned.

HACKMAN: What about other law enforcement people around the country. Were there any arrangements that had to be made, particularly in the South, in terms of transportation of black people through the South or anything at all in that regard?

DOUGLAS: Well I really don’t know about that. There were a lot of arrangements made for renting buses but I don’t recall that there were any...

HACKMAN: You don’t remember any threats to buses or anything like that?

DOUGLAS: I don’t recall that. There may have been, but I don’t recall that it was a major problem.

HACKMAN: Well what about the problem in possible Communist participation in the thing and what had to be done?

DOUGLAS: I think that we felt we couldn’t prohibit them obviously from participating. We were concerned that some of them might be trouble makers in the sense of trying to inflame the crowd. We did have some reports that some of them were coming. But I don’t know of any incidents that actually developed and I don’t know actually who among them did come or didn’t come.

HACKMAN: I heard that Wilkins, that Roy Wilkins was extremely helpful in this regard, in keeping—I don’t know whether it was you, but the government at least informed on developments on that. Can you remember that being so?

DOUGLAS: Well I think he was very concerned about it, as we all were. But what he did, I actually don’t know. The Bureau had some reports that we saw. But, I don’t think anyone thought it was a major problem.
HACKMAN: Can you remember any kinds of things that the Bureau had at that point? Were the people around Martin Luther King of great concern to them? Did that become apparent to you at that point?

DOUGLAS: No, not that I recall?

HACKMAN: Do you remember ever talking with Robert Kennedy about the Black Muslim movement at that time?

DOUGLAS: No I didn’t.

HACKMAN: I know there was one case in the Civil Division about some Black Muslim prisoners out at Lorton [Reformatory] and I wondered if that was anything you recall.

DOUGLAS: I don’t recall that. There was one fellow who, when I was away for a couple of days, came in the Department of Justice and said that he had heard reports that the Black Muslims or some troublemakers were going to try to disrupt the meeting or that there was a threat that they would disrupt the affair, and I think it was at that point that the arrangements on the microphone were made so that it could be switched off. I think that there was some fellow, I wonder what his name was, came in and talked to someone in the Department about it and of course in retrospect it seems to have been a completely erroneous rumor. I don’t know what the basis of that particular individual’s information was; I think it was speculation.

HACKMAN: Did you get involved with the Civil Service Commission in terms of, or just the whole decision of what kind of leave policy to have within the government?

DOUGLAS: Yeah, we talked about that and didn’t we say that they could have leave but it would be charged against them?

HACKMAN: Just regular annual leave policy, but a liberal leave.

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DOUGLAS: Yeah. I think that John Macy came over one day and that perhaps was discussed with the Attorney General or with Nick. I should say, Larry, that throughout this thing we kept Bob and Nick quite well informed. I talked rather infrequently with Bob about it. I did talk with Nick periodically, but I have the feeling that Bob kept up on all these things but he left a very free rein.
HACKMAN:  Was that typical of him to…

DOUGLAS: I think so. I think he was mainly interested in having confidence in the person he selected. Once he’d made the assignment, he was content to sort of monitor it and then if something seemed to go wrong or his intervention was needed, he’d pop in, but otherwise he’s just keep an eye on it. He had, I suppose, a dozen other balls in the air that were equally if not more important.

HACKMAN: Did you make any effort to get members of the House or the Senate to come down physically, to

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come down and participate in the march?

DOUGLAS: No, I didn’t personally do that at all. I think that the marchers, march leaders, wanted to have that done and they may have informed us of that. If they did, we certainly would have had no reason to object and I’m sure that some of them probably talked to the Attorney General or to Nick or to Burke Marshall and I’m sure they would have said that it sounded like a good idea. But I myself did not talk with any such persons.

HACKMAN: Out of this experience, were there other contacts with civil rights leaders or other involvement in civil rights matters that came to your desk because you’d been in charge of this? Now you talked about the trip to Auburn and the trip to…

DOUGLAS: Yeah, Selma.

HACKMAN: …see Governor Breathitt [Edward T. Breathitt]. You didn’t talk about Selma.

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DOUGLAS: No. I guess that was after…

HACKMAN: Robert Kennedy left, that’s right.

DOUGLAS: …he left. No, I really wouldn’t say so. I talked with Walter Fauntroy occasionally or Jim Muntz perhaps a year thereafter, but I don’t think there was more than that.
HACKMAN: Can you remember why this memo came about concerning, it says, “Memo concerning the amenability of members of the National Guard in the District of Columbia to court’s martial or other disciplinary action?”

DOUGLAS: Well I should. That brings up a point, Larry. One of the things we did was to have the Office of Legal Counsel draft a whole series of orders and rules and opinions on the calling up of additional troops. They not only provided the basic documents for the calling up of the National Guard, but they also prepared a whole series of documents for possible us in the event that regular troops were needed. There was a document that had been prepared for Chief Murray’s signature who had gone to D.C. Commissioner Trobriner and the document prepared for Trobriner’s signature to go to the President. And the document for the President to sign, calling the troops up. So we had all those documents in place, it would have taken only thirty seconds to…

HACKMAN: One of the things you just said off the tape last time, it was as I think we were walking somewhere, you said that one of the things that surprised you during the ’68 campaign was the amount of talking that people involved in the campaign did to the press, and I’d wondered just if you can remember why you felt that way?

DOUGLAS: Well there were stories in the press about the “bad” Bobby and the “good” Bobby and it seemed to me that they had to come from people in the campaign. And I think…

HACKMAN: You can cut this out if you want to. I don’t mean to embarrass you by the questions we discuss.

DOUGLAS: No. I think I had perhaps a rather naïve idea as to how a national campaign would be run—that the candidate and his press agents would do the talking to the press and the rest of the people would do their work and go about their business. Well I think that was probably unrealistic and it certainly was unrealistic. There was a lot of chit-chat between various individuals and the press and it was just too much to expect in retrospect that people would not do that, and who’s to say what’s right and what’s wrong.

HACKMAN: I mean does that come primarily out of your experience in Indiana?
DOUGLAS: Indiana and Oregon—to a minor extent in Oregon. I was there a couple of weekends.

HACKMAN: One other thing you said, there were certain things or at least a couple of conversations with Robert Kennedy that you had a hard time really fitting in with his personality, and I don’t know, the one you mentioned was when he was talking about your experience at the Justice Department and what it meant. Do you remember that? What it meant to you in terms of your personal career?

DOUGLAS: Yeah.

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DOUGLAS: Well on the Manchester book, I was out in Chicago working on my father’s campaign. I had resigned from the Justice Department in September. I had really resigned earlier than that but it was effective in September and then come out to Chicago to work with my father in his Senate campaign. And I got a call from Dick Goodwin [Richard Goodwin]. Dick had said that Bob Kennedy was having a meeting with some people in New York on the problem of, a problem concerning the Manchester book, and would I be willing to come on….

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HACKMAN: …why don’t you start that over with the Manchester thing. It was running backwards.

DOUGLAS: Well I got a call from Dick Goodwin, I can’t remember when, but sometime in the fall of that year while I was in Chicago working on my father’s campaign and Dick said that Bob was having a meeting on the Manchester book and wanted me to come east to attend it. So I said well I could come if he really wanted me but that I would not be able to stay very long. I’d have to get on back to Chicago because there was just too much to do there. So I flew east and went, as I recall, directly to Bob Kennedy’s apartment on the U.N. Plaza. And Bob was not there at the outset of the discussion and the meeting started without him. Burke Marshall was there. Dick Goodwin, Arthur Schlesinger…

HACKMAN: The people I have are Siegenthaler [John Siegenthaler], Guthman, Salinger, Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen], Si Rifkind [Simon Hirsh Rifkind],

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Goodwin, James Greenfield, and yourself.

DOUGLAS: Well Si Rifkind must have come in later. I do remember the others there. I guess John Siegenthaler was there. Well, the question I guess was whether to sue or not to sue and it was a very disjointed conversation. Dick and Burke, as I recall, laid out different possibilities. Bob Kennedy came in after the meeting had been under way for more than a half an hour or an hour. And if you were to ask me now the positions in which these people were, I couldn’t say for sure. My impression, however, was that for all the people there, only Dick Goodwin favored a suit, and that the others with varying degrees thought a suit was unwise—that is of those who expressed an opinion. I had to go….The meeting, then there was a, I guess after awhile people were going to go out to dinner, and I just had to get back to Chicago so I left. I spoke with Bob in the corridor as I was going and he asked me about it and I said, “Well I

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just didn’t think a suit was wise. At least that’s what I recall my views were. I couldn’t be sure about it. And Bob had asked some pretty—I mean that was the general feeling of the meeting when he arrived and he asked some fairly penetrating questions as to questioning that, but I think it’s still the main view of everyone including myself. I include myself in that majority who were not to sue. Well, I talked briefly with him. He was coming out to Chicago as I recall, or had he been out to Chicago?

HACKMAN: I don’t remember. I don’t have the exact date of that meeting—whether he’d been out before or not.

DOUGLAS: He had come out to Chicago. As I recall, he had concluded after his swing through Chicago that the Illinois Democratic Party was in very bad shape. He didn’t tell me that. I rode out to the airport with him after his day and the mayor had been in the car with the two of us and he and Bobby were fairly discreet, but I under-

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stood from Joe Dolan—I had not gone around with Bob to his meetings that day. There’d been quite a hassle about his routing through what sections of the city he should come and he had not been placed in the most advantageous positions. We had not done a good job in insisting where he should be placed. We didn’t have the—that is to say the people working the Douglas campaign—did not have the muscle or the personnel to place him in various cities and spots. The mayor had control of that and the mayor had a lot of pressure, I think, from people like Danny (inaudible) not to put him in certain areas of the city, areas where I think Bob would have been even more effective. They kept him out of the northwest area which is generally thought at the Polish-American section, and in any event, he had not been used to the fullest advantage. But what the reasons for all that were I don’t know, but I do know that there was a tremendous amount of backing and filling inside the Chicago
Democratic organization as to where he should be placed in Chicago on the occasion of his visit. Now whether that took place before or after—when was the meeting in the apartment?

HACKMAN: That’s what I don’t know.

DOUGLAS: I have a feeling that he came out after that.

HACKMAN: Your impression at that time was though that he personally was leaning toward a suit?

DOUGLAS: No, I had no impression of that. My impression was that he was troubled, that he wasn’t sure what he’s do, and he was—but more than that, I don’t know.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Well what was he focusing on in his questions. I mean, how much did he show he knew about the book and its contents?

DOUGLAS: He knew quite a bit about it, I’d say. He knew some of the things that Mrs. John Kennedy [Jacqueline B. Kennedy] had disclosed that were of a sort of personal nature between Mrs. Kennedy and the President, which—I think those people who heard it or were told about it—were considered to be in poor shape, poor taste. I don’t mean that Mrs. Kennedy’s statements were in poor taste but the inclusion of some of the personal statements was thought to be in poor taste. And somebody, I can’t remember if it was Dick Goodwin or somebody else, read some of the excerpts which were read I think before Bob Kennedy came back, which dealt with the reactions of members of President Kennedy’s staff to President Johnson and vice versa, the day or shortly after the assassination.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any discussion of the political aspects of the book and what might embarrass President Johnson and particularly Robert Kennedy’s concern with that, if any?

DOUGLAS: Well I think there was a discussion of what it would do to President Johnson’s—the relationship between President Johnson and Bob Kennedy. I think, however, that I recall most people felt that that relationship was already sufficiently shaky that the book probably didn’t make much difference.
HACKMAN: Did you get involved after that meeting then…

DOUGLAS: No, I never heard another word. And frankly I was quite surprised when the suit was filed.

HACKMAN: At the time of that meeting, was his a discussion only of a possible suit by Mrs. Kennedy or is it also a consideration of a suit by Robert Kennedy, a joint suit, how was it defined?

DOUGLAS: I can’t remember whether there was any discussion of who would be the plaintive. It seems to me the—I can’t remember that. I was under the impression that the suit, if any, would have been by Mrs. Kennedy.

HACKMAN: Did you get any feeling from him or from other people at the meeting as to why things had reached that state, the development of the whole disagreement and mistakes on whoever’s part in the early part of the process?

DOUGLAS: No, I really didn’t.

HACKMAN: The other thing I wanted to ask you about was a memo in January of ’64 to Robert Kennedy

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regarding the possibility of entering primaries for the vice-presidency.

DOUGLAS: Was my name on that?

HACKMAN: Yes.

DOUGLAS: I don’t remember that that all!

HACKMAN: Really? [Laughter] I mean I haven’t seen it. I’ve just been told that your name was on it.

DOUGLAS: Really? I don’t remember that at all.

HACKMAN: I’m going to see if I can’t get a look at it. I’ll send you a copy.

DOUGLAS: I just have to see what is said, but in retrospect I would say that Bob’s interest in the vice-presidency really came as something of a surprise to me in ’64.
HACKMAN: Maybe someone’s confused John Douglas with John Nolan or someone else. I don’t know. I’ll check it out.

DOUGLAS: Yeah, would you?

HACKMAN: The other thing is that you had talked about, right at the end of the Indiana campaign, riding back with Robert Kennedy and there had been

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some disagreement with Hartke [Vance Hartke] in the final part of that campaign. Do you remember how that, was that resolved…

DOUGLAS: Well I’ll tell you what happened on that. It wasn’t really riding back with him. What happened was the night of the primary campaign itself, I was over in the campaign headquarters. Bob Kennedy and some of his immediate family and campaign workers were over in the hotel suite across the street. And I went over after the, I’d seen I think the appearance on television of Bob Kennedy—the victory statement. But I then went across the street to the hotel, had watched the television in headquarters. They came into the hotel; out from the elevator came Senator Hartke and Mike Sperling [Miklos Sperling]. Mike had been a strong Kennedy supporter, and Mike Sperling and Senator Hartke were very annoyed and irate. And I said something to Mike or he said something to me and he said, “That’s outrageous.” And how I said, “Well, what’s the problem?” and I knew

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immediately that there was some friction between Senator Hartke and Senator Kennedy. And so they were in no mood to go back up to see Senator Kennedy, so I talked to them and got the story and while I then went up into the candidate’s suite briefly, I didn’t do anything about it until the next morning. The next morning, however, it seemed to me that something had to be done because whatever else might be said about it, Senator Hartke had gone about as far towards endorsing Senator Kennedy as anyone—certainly he had done more than, publicly, than any prominent Indiana Democrat—and what had happened was that, as I got the story, was that while they were watching the returns up in Senator Kennedy’s suite, the time had come for Bob to go down and make the victory statement, and he’d said to Senator Hartke, “Vance, why don’t you come on down and appear with me,” and Senator Hartke had said, “Gee, I

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don’t think that I should do that, Bob. I don’t want to detract from your victory by that.” And Bob had said, “Well, I guess you’re right” and had gone on down without him. And Hartke had felt offended. So I told Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton], I went over especially to see Fred in the motel where they were staying near the airport and I said to Fred that I just
thought that Senator Kennedy ought to do something to patch this thing up; that some recognition had to be given to the fact that Hartke had stuck his neck out. So Fred agreed and just about that time, Senator Kennedy came into the room and said, “Well, I understand that Hartke’s mad at me” and I said “Yes, and I think you really ought to do something about it.” Bob was tired and worn out. I said, “Well, you settle if possible.” And then he said, “But you’re right” and so what he did was to ask him to ride with him back to Washington, in the plane with him.

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HACKMAN: You talked about going out to Oregon and then immediately getting sent back one weekend on the Martin Luther King thing, I believe, or somehow getting involved in it in any way.

DOUGLAS: No, I really didn’t. Oh!

HACKMAN: Well you talked about it a little bit, the Drew Pearson story.

DOUGLAS: Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh. Well, I went out to Oregon on two weekends.

HACKMAN: Yeah, and what I was going to ask you was, what other than that did you do in Oregon. That’s it.

DOUGLAS: Yes. Did I go through the Dr. King?

[END OF TAPE]

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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