

Earl Graves Oral History Interview- RFK #2, 7/18/1969
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Graves, Earl; administrative Assistant to Senator Robert F. Kennedy [RFK], New York (1965 - 1968). Graves discusses his role as a black member in RFK's presidential campaign (1968), what the dynamics of RFK's campaign staff looked like, especially pertaining to the lack of black staff members, and issues regarding outreach to black communities in New York and Indiana, among other issues.

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of EARL G. GRAVES**

Interviewed by: Roberta Greene

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Earl Graves- RFK #2

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Second Oral History Interview

with

EARL GRAVES

July 18, 1969

New York City

Roberta W. Greene

GREENE: Yesterday you mentioned that you had organized things in New York before going out to Indiana. Could you expand on that a bit^o and explain how ~~how~~ set things up, who was involved?in it

GRAVES: Well, in New York I had available to me not only ~~many~~ of the black leaders who were recognized nationally, such as Whitney Young and James ^{Donner} the head of the ^{Ford} School of Social Work, and Roy Wilkins, and also having also all the national offices of these major civil rights organizations^o. But I had persons who had either been volunteers in the

Kennedy office^e or had been involved in Kennedy-type efforts, such as the Associate program and so forth, who worked for me, who understood and knew the persons we should be getting in touch with in the black community. And they also had a feeling of how I wanted to get it done^e, and the sense of urgency about the thing. And so therefore, it seemed to make sense to try and get it started out of New York. The number of black persons who were in Washington at that time were either involved in the Administration^e, at that time, or had been involved in the Administration, and therefore could not necessarily be depended upon to be Kennedy rooters. They were going to be Johnson rooters, by the virtue of the fact that they had a reason to be, that being their job. And so therefore, when you looked at where the wealth of minority persons--not in dollars and cents, but in terms of talent, ability, and identity--would be, it had to be in New York. And it just seemed to me, if I gotta^{e it} established

and really have a strong home base and establish myself in a certain preeminence, that this was going to be my area. And I think if we're going to be completely candid for the record here, in terms of each person cutting out what he considered his particular piece of the campaign, and we have to recognize, and you're dealing with the human frailties of life as they were, within the campaign, each person wanted to have a piece of the action. They wanted to know that they were running their thing, that the senator recognized that they had done a particular part of the campaign that was theirs. And I guess I was no different than that, that the area that I thought I could play the greatest role and provide the greatest service was in the black community, and I wanted it rather clear from the get-go, in terms of cutting out and establishing what part of it I thought that I was going to run and handle. And anyone who is less candid in this with you, in terms of how they felt about the campaign, is not being

honest with you, because I dealt with them from day to day, from three weeks prior to his announcing, when everybody started shuffling around, and pushing and shoving, until the tragedy of his death. And I had a chance to see it in all of its stages, and all of this formation across the country, and I can tell you that at times it was pretty vicious. It had nothing to do with the fact that Kennedy was vicious, it had to do with the fact that, I guess, this was the kind of trip that to him, that the people who were around him were ambitious, and bright, and wanted to see it happen, and if you got in their way, they were going to step on you along the way. And I guess I took on a part of the same type of attitude, and wanted to do the best for him, on his behalf, but likewise thinking that it was going to be a beneficial thing to us, down at ~~the place~~.

GREENE: What kind of people generally fit into this category of the aggressive--his own staff, or friends that were. . . .

GRAVES: His own staff, We're talking about his own staff in the first instance, and then I guess in the second group you're talking about would be the persons who had been involved with the Kennedy family in the past. And I don't mean--I'm just citing an example--but the guy I was always impressed with was a guy named ^{Charles} Charles Spalding, who was an investment banker, who had gone to school with John Kennedy. He was a friend, who was not a member of the staff of the senator-- Lem K. Le Moynes Billings, and guys from that cloth; I kind of like to call them the Hall of Fame, such as Arthur Schlesinger and so forth-- each one of them had a particular input to make, and that group was the group, actually, I guess, you'd put before the staff, because the staff was kind of the--they were the hired staff. There were some who were very close to the senator, there were others who had varying degrees of how close they were to him, in terms of input. But I would think before that group even, came the

persons such as Arthur Schlesinger, and Chuck Spalding, and Lem Billings, and other persons who Ted Kennedy knew, and so forth. They had both gone to law school, and the whole family had a wealth of friends, from the prior Administration, and so forth. Now you start talking about persons such as John Seigenthaler, from Nashville, Tennessee, ^{can} and Burke Marshall, who I also. . . . And I neglected to report that that was one of the persons I was dealing with, and reporting to, was. . . . Burke Marshall and John Seigenthaler played a major role, because of their involvement with the black community. At times, it was rather awkward and it seemed to me, cumbersome, to have to call up and ask a white person, or suggest to him, because Kennedy had asked me to do it, then I wanted to seek his advice about how ~~to~~ ^{I should} approach a black person, and it seemed burdensome to me to have to do it. And after a while, I just started taking the initiative and going ahead and not

worrying about whether I had checked with him or not.

And, you know, what gives you the opportunity to do this, or what gives you the freedom to do beable to this, I guess, is a certain degree of success. And after we had won in Indiana--and I'd gotten some measure of credit for that, and then we'd gone on to Nebraska and had a fantastic situation there, in terms of how well we did, and what we had accomplished, the flak started to. . . . It didn't become as difficult to be able to maneuver a little bit more on my own, and then I found I really only had to deal with Larry O'Brien, and ~~after~~ when we moved on to California--again I'm not covering the New York thing too well-- . . .

GREENE: That's all right.

GRAVES: But when we moved on to California, I mean, by the time it was necessary for me to get out to California, it was a matter that was urgent, there was an urgency about my getting out there. I mean, I had gotten calls from Larry O'Brien three times, the night that the Oregon thing

was over--excuse me, not the Nebraska thing--the night that the Oregon primary was over. And we did win in the Black community. In some of the precincts we had voted 110 per cent of the people, and that's not easy! [Laughter]

I got a call from Larry O'Brien, he said as soon as the returns were in and I was satisfied that there was nothing more that I could do, forget about closing ^{down} ~~out~~, I was just to get out there, because the black politicians in Los Angeles had literally just revolted and said that Kennedy wasn't dealing with them, and hadn't dealt fairly with them, and he had promised to send Earl Graves back--and this was in the Los Angeles Times--I'm trying to quote verbatim--that Graves was to come out there and work with them and set it up, and he had not made it possible for Graves to get back, because he was tied up in other primary states, and if he didn't get back out there to deal with them, in a manner which they found acceptable, that they were going

to go out publicly and say he didn't have their support. But again, all of this seemed to me. . . . The point of departure seemed to be the New York situation, and it turned out to be that it was because in what I was doing I had separate funding all the way through the campaign. I didn't have to go through the--Helen Keyes, myself--the source of funding was directly through Helen Keyes, because I was working under particular part of the campaign that they thought was important enough. And when financing was necessary, I went directly to her, and as it went on, I was dealing directly with Steve Smith, in terms of direct funding, and checks that had to be given out, and so forth.

In some cases, because of the niceties of campaigning, or otherwise, all the payments were not made out in checks, in terms of certain organizations and/or groups that we found it necessary to support. And some of the things I am stating would probably, under any other circumstances, be libelous and inflammatory, but I

imagine that if you want to historically have what has to be in these . . .

GREENE: That's right.

GRAVES: . . . in this paper, then I think these are the things that should be said. So, you understand the ^{so}input that goes into what is necessary as far as the whole campaign is concerned. I think that many persons, not many persons, 90 per cent of the persons involved in ^{the} campaign, treated the black community as something different, as something that had to be handled, as if you were dealing with some ~~type of~~ structure from another world, rather than something that was really ^{they are} just people, ^{who} that just happened to be black. It was the situation that they were blacks, and it wasn't a matter that they were people who happened to be black. And it always made it a thing that, when we went into the black community, ^{it was} and, you know, which reporters should go, and our whole strategy had to be different, and a lot of that was unnecessary, because Kennedy was Kennedy.

I think that a lot of--although Kennedy had made some obvious good moves as far as the black community was concerned, and was already on record in terms of his involvement in the black community--that a lot of the accolades that were thrown to the senator, I think, were a guilt, as much in terms of the black community, ^{as it was} as far as it was in the white community, because of his brother, ~~because~~ ^{because} they wanted to do something. There's no doubt in my mind, that the fact that I was the only black staff assistant in the country that worked for any senator at the time that he was running was a credit to him, also. I think that his obvious wealth of friends in the black community, with guys such as Kennedy, Rosie Grier, and Rafer Johnson, and so forth, added to it.

One of the things ~~which~~ I found disappointing was that, in those particular individuals, although they were of great for crowd-gathering, and for being around, and so forth, they in themselves

did not accomplish anything in terms of the on-going activities of the day-to-day campaigning. There were a necessity; I would venture to say that were it not necessary to have black people around, to show a black identity, that in terms of interest of the campaign--maybe in the case of Rafer Johnson (he was around) and Rosie Grier, but there were many other black persons who were involved that they just wanted to have around for identity--those persons would never have been there, if it were left up to persons other than Senator Kennedy, from the persons who were making the plans in the campaign. And I cite an example: there were no advance men who were black. The only advance work that I did--and this was not true prior to the campaign--the only advance that I did was advancing in areas where I was working out of, and those were primarily black communities. And I believe, having run army batallions, and having done advance work for the senator all across the country, that this was not necessary.

that you could have sent. . . . In Portland, Maine, when we ran Governor [Kenneth M.] Curtis' campaign, I did the whole thing, and did the whole New England trip, and the fact that I was black was incidental to the whole thing. So it just proved that you wouldn't have to be gun-shy about it.

But the people who were making the judgments at the top in terms of advance work did not have black advance men on the road. It was no oversight; it was a thing that was pointedly done, that they didn't have them, period.

GREENE: Well, who's responsibility would you say that was?
you
[Interruption] I was asking about the advance, add why you feel there were no black advance people, and who you feel was responsible, and what was the senator's attitude towards this?

GRAVES: I don't think the senator had time to focus on it, the fact that there were no black advance men. I just make the point in terms of the overall composition of the campaign, that there was no

black. . . . Forget about the advance--We had put together the national headquarters, and until such time, whenever I came to Washington, there was no black staff person in that Washington office--at a higher level, ^{in anything} at a secretarial desk, or sweeping the floors--with the exception of Jacqueline Jackie Greenidge, who they'd brought out of the New York office, who was already on the staff, and just a receptionist. But in those back offices, where they had citizens' groups set up, and various campaign staffs going on--persons working on communications, persons working on transportation, and the like--there was not a black face in that national campaign headquarters. ^u ~~Tha~~ That went on until the California primaries. When I was not there, there was no black person there.

GREENE: Well, how do you explain that?

GRAVES: Well, you know, it's just a matter of ~~at~~ the persons come ⁱⁿ in; their first thought was not..... First of all, their first thoughts were about

themselves, in terms of, you know, "Let me make it good for myself," and then they brought on their own people, and their own people. . . . If you think of Ted Sorensen, Ted Sorensen's secretary was white! So I mean, it was not. . . . Why should Ted Sorensen have turned in the first instance to say, "Hey, I gotta bring a black girl in, have her be my secretary!" when the secretary happens to be white and a very capable person who I know. And Ted Sorensen happens to be a good guy; I'm just using him as an example.

So you bring in Ted Sorensen, you bring in Larry O'Brien, and you start bringing on different people, and you look up, and you don't have it. Now, because I kept harping on the fact we had to do better, Pierre Salinger agreed to hire somebody, and he hired an assistant press guy, Gene Simpson, who was out on the road. Gene Simpson's on CBS, ^{System} [Colombia Broadcasting Service] News now, channel 2 news. But people would not even mention the fact that Gene Simpson was. . . .

And he's a very perceptive guy; he'd be an interesting guy for you to interview, also. And he could give you some real insight into some of the things I'm saying. And John Lewis you should go talk with; I think he was in on it.

GREENE: John Lewis, yes.

GRAVES: But again, John Lewis would kind of have tears in his eyes about the Kennedy's, without looking at it at face value, and then really scratching away at the surface to see what we really had. And I'm not talking about the senator, now, I'm talking about the people who were surrounding him, in terms of their attitudes. And the persons who surrounded the senator, a lot of them gave, you know, less than full credit to persons who were black. I'm not talking about myself; I'm talking about just the idea that we're dealing with black men and just, "Well, those thieves," I used to get that kind of comment. And you're putting together a black rally. . . . It was always the matter that there was a little bit

like you were treating it like ~~that~~ part of the campaign was like a circus part of the campaign, you know, you did it, and ^{like} even when you were going into a black community, the television reporters would be all keyed up because there was something different about going into a black ~~there~~ community than ~~it~~ was about going out into an Irish community, or how about into a poor Irish community, or a poor Italian community. It was always treated as something special, you know, that you went along like going for a circus ride, when you were going on into a rally in the black community. If some reporters or TV crews would drop off of certain parts of the campaign, and ~~and~~ ^{that} you can believe/they looked at that advance schedule for the day, and ^{it} they saw that they were going to be in the black community at night, that everybody and his brother was there when the time came to be in that black community, because they wanted to get the flavor of the thing, and that was where Kennedy was at his best, that he had

the crowd mesmerized because it was Robert Kennedy and John F. Kennedy and the whole image that he projected. And again, those were probably the rallies that I would have advanced. And, of course, they always send in. . . .

I look at it, and

And, as I think about it, Tom [Thomas F.]

Johnston, because he was a very straight guy, would send me out to put together a particular effort for the senator, or, I would go out at the direction of the senator, to put together a particular effort for him, in a place like Maine, or a place like upstate New York or so forth. I would advance the total thing, from the time he got off the plane, to which room they're sleeping in, to which microphone he spoke at, and who sat on the platform, what we were going to eat and what church we were going to and what time we were getting back on the plane. And yet, once the campaign kind of got started, there was the thing that we were going to send out a white guy to take a look over Graves' shoulder, to see

how well he was getting it done. And the people they were sending out. . . . The thing that I used to resent about it, and finally I just told Larry O'Brien, and we kind of drew it up tight, and we cut off some of the nonsense—³was, they were sending out people that I had forgotten more than some of these guys knew. But just the fact that they were white-faced . . . It was just the matter that we gotta be certain, and if you've got a black guy out there, even if he's been on three years, just to be absolutely certain that it's done right, we better send a white guy out to take a look at it. I mean, there was just no doubt in my mind, that was the attitude. That was the attitude that prevailed. And among the persons who finally came on and worked with me, we recognized this to be the problem, that when it was being done in the black community, we had to have somebody white kind of looking over the shoulder at what the black guy was doing. That was it. The reason I had to report to maybe a

half a dozen people in the beginning was that they just wanted to be sure that whatever it was that I was going to be accomplishing in the black community, that somebody that could make a sound judgment was looking at the thing. And I guess, if you were going to be completely objective about it, and you said you wanted to win a campaign, and you want to be cautious about what you're doing, and you're dealing with something, which is volatile, which is an area where people are poor and disenfranchised and unrepresented, then you kind of do take a hard look at how you're going to handle what you're going to do there. The only thing is that if you could approach the thing in an objective manner, it's one thing, but you already have so many ingrained thoughts, and preconceived ideas about what you should expect and what's going to happen, that the rest of it kind of turns you off.

GREENE: How did the advance men who were working in black communities, and we not black, which means everybody but you, how did they work out? Did you think

they were generally sensitive to the problems?

GRAVES: Well, their first thing was to kind of roar into town, find out who the black ^{guy} wire was to deal, you know, be very patronizing to the guy who was there, and say whatever had to be said, and whatever they thought was cute, ~~you know~~, Anything in order to get it done--promise them the moon. . . . You know, if there was money that had to be spent, the money was spent, and it wasn't any ~~big~~ great thing about holding them back on modest expense. It was reasonable expense--I wouldn't say they were modest--but they were reasonable expenses, But they did what had to be done. And then, once a white advance man had gone out and had a rally that was successful in the black community, I mean, he was already considered an "advance man ^{he} emeritus" because he had gone out, and/had done this and survived, didn't have any knife wounds on him, and the whole thing. I mean, it was just a ridiculous attitude about the thing, in terms of when you were putting together rallies in a

black community. And I mean, I'm talking about dealing with this thing from the rally the night that Martin Luther died, and I was with the senator, to the rallies that you had the only white candidate ever to come into the dead center of Omaha, Nebraska, and have a rally on the hundred-per-cent corner, in Omaha, Nebraska, is Robert Kennedy. I'm talking about that rally, in terms of that afternoon it was raining, I'm talking about the rallies you had in Portland, Oregon, in the black community, where again I was with the senator; I know how that thing was treated. And I'm talking about rallies you had in California. It was the same thing; it prevailed, that it was treated differently. But when you started talking about the campaign staff, I mean, tell me somebody who flew on those airplanes, with the exception of either singers or football players, who were black. There just weren't any. There were no black persons getting off that plane with the senator. Period. The only person who got off

that thing was Rafer Johnson, who was an entertainer! And that was some of the criticism that I got, representing the senator, as I went around for him during the campaign. That's what is this nonsense about. . . . You know, don't we have any writers? Don't we have any educators? Where's a Whitney Young, or where's somebody who's a sociologist, or where's somebody who's just on the staff?" And there were none. You tell me, you've gone around, interviewed seventy people, tell me somebody you've spoken to, other than Rafer Johnson or Rosie Grien, that you could say has made some input into the campaign, as a staff member--and you're talking about traveling around with two full-sized jets--maybe 160 people--just wasn't there!

GREENE: Was there anybody among the traveling people who were sensitive to this? that you discussed it with? The senator, or any of his people?

GRAVES: Oh, I think I mentioned it to Frank Mankiewicz, and he kicked it around, and then. . . . It was

always the thing, ^{that} they were going to try and get a super-Negro. It wasn't just a matter of getting a Negro; they always had to find a "super" guy. They were going to try and get. . . . Somehow, they were going to try and shake Andy Andrew T. Hatcher loose again, and somehow that got all fouled up, and there were some problems about Andy Hatcher and his identity--and that never worked out. And then they were going to try and get. . . . Let me stop and think for a second Interruption. After Percy Sutton had dropped out of the senatorial race in New York City, they were going to try and get Percy Sutton, and they announced that Percy Sutton was going to come on as the senator's advisor on urban affairs--purely a sham thing, period. Purely a sham thing.

GREENE: Just as a front?

GRAVES: Just as a front. It would ^{have been} be nothing other than that.

GREENE: Why didn't it work out?

GRAVES: Well, you know, it just never really got off the ground. He couldn't shake it loose; he was the borough president of Manhattan at that time, and he still is the borough president. It was just a matter of him working it out ^{so} that he could spend time--he just didn't have the time to spend--he would come and just drop everything in New York and spend the whole time going around with Senator Kennedy, and getting off ^{and} on all the planes, and being his, ^{his} "supposed" "advisor," in quotes, on urban affairs. And, I assure you, not because Senator Kennedy would not have listened to him, but the persons who would have been making input and writing those speeches in terms of what he would have been saying, those would have been persons other than Percy Sutton, and Percy Sutton knew that. Now, I think Percy Sutton is enough of a man, that he would have seen that as being other than ^{what} it should have been, and he would have said, "If I'm going to be here, I'm going to make some input." But, in the first instance, in terms of

what was planned, he was only to be there for a front. And Percy Sutton, again. . . . When I made the point so strongly that there were no black people sitting in that headquarters, and

Louis F.
^ Lou Oberdorfer --excuse me. . . .

GREENE: When you bang, I think it shakes the mike.

GRAVES: Oh, ^{all right} sorry. Lou Oberdorfer, and persons like that, who were heading up citizens' groups, recognized it. They said, "Okay, Percy Sutton's going to come," and they starting clearing out an office for Percy Sutton, and Percy Sutton never quite got there. And so we ended up that campaign without having a black person sitting at any levels, with the exception of Jackie Greenidge at the reception desk, ^{and me} and me in those back rooms. And it was absolutely amazing to me, that some reporter didn't pick that up! ^{I would have} ~~the same~~ point I used to make. ^{I mean,} / if for nothing other than just doing it for the reporters, let's not leave ourselves open like that!

GREENE: Who besides Frank Mankiewicz did you take this to?

GRAVES: Salinger, Pierre Salinger, Frank Mankiewicz, Ted Sorensen . . .

GREENE: What were their reactions?

GRAVES: ^{I mean,} Now, they agreed! /Everybody agreed, just nothing happened. We had no difference in terms of, "Yes, you're right; you're not right." I mean, everybody agreed--Burke Marshall--they all agreed, ~~that~~ said, "we gotta do something," and Pierre Salinger was the guy who really pushed hard, to try and get it to happen. But he just never really got it off the ground.

GREENE: What about some of the people that we^{re} on the road, particularly someone like Jerry Bruno? What was his attitude?

GRAVES: You're trying to box me in. Bruno, ~~and~~ ^{around} /Joseph/ ~~Joe~~ Gargan, between Joe Gargan and ~~he~~, I think--had he had a major responsibility for whatever happened in the advancing work. And therefore I think Jerry Bruno played a direct influence in terms of the personality make-up of who were the advance people. And I know for a fact that Byron

Martin, who is a very bright lawyer, a very economically well-off guy out of Boston, Massachusetts, told me--he ended up working with me, because of course, I was doing the black thing, and I was particularly safe, that he could work with me-- that he had been sent out as an advance man, coming out of Boston, out of Teddy's part of Boston, being known by Teddy, who--being a very capable guy, extremely bright, having all the credentials he could have possibly needed, that Jerry Bruno, the first time he saw him show up in California, literally just asked him, "What the Hell are you doing out here?", and "Why don't you just get on a plane and go back?", and he got on the phone and ranted and raved about, "What are you sending this guy out here for? We don't need him."

And meanwhile, the same afternoon, Byron informed me that he heard that they were pushing and shoving to try and figure out where they were going to get some more advance men. So if that means anything, then I think I probably might let

it drop right there. But, that's the kind of attitude you had to build. And that was at the people who were in charge.

GREENE: Well, maybe this will come out in more specific instances, when we ~~go out and~~ get talking about Indiana. But what about in New York? How effective did you find your contacts? How much support was there for the senator in New York?

GRAVES: Well, I think there was real support for the senator in New York. There were persons, such as Whitney Young, who were going to reserve judgment in terms of what they were going to do in committing themselves, but the persons in terms of leaders of organizations. . . . I had approached and had an on-going relationship with all the presidents of all the NAACP National Associations for the Advancement of Colored People branches in the state, and had gotten a major commitment from most of them by the time I was ready to go out on the road, and two weeks into the campaign. Nationally, the presidents of many

of the large Negro fraternities and sororities. And the black doctors—I pretty well nailed them down--and the black lawyers for the country, and the black dentists for the country. . . . You have to remember, that in the black community--and particularly so in the South--whereas you have a white structure, there's a complete duplication of that in the black community. And this is true even in the East; there are black organizations, and there are black pharmacists, right down across the board. And the same thing's true with black beauticians, and so forth, with black ministers. . . . And the various conferences of the AME [African Methodist Episcopal] church, and the Baptist church. . . . And there are two conferences of the Baptist church, which, when you are talking about five million black people who are Baptists. . . . My own church, and I'm Episcopalian, trying to ^{just} involve, fill in some balance to the thing, in terms of getting it. . . . It was an Episcopal priest, who ^{served on the} Bedford-Stuyvesant

restoration board, trying to get him committed, and having him go and talk to white priests, to try and give real balance to the thing, to try and get a collective effort going, or a coalition of persons who were black and white from the Episcopal church, because the Episcopal church has such a conservative identity. Moving all ^{along,} right; I think that that was going rather well.

We had a real effort going on, and I would say that we had probably contacted upwards of two thousand persons, by telegram, many of them by telegram, at the time that I had really started to go out on the road, and therefore could not be back in the office.

GREENE: Who did you leave in charge of the office when you left? Is there anybody. . . .

GRAVES: Yes. In the New York office, Lee Stokes, was the black guy who we hired, and who were paying on a regular salary basis to run the New York operation. Lee's an extremely bright guy, and a guy that I'm fond of, in terms of being a good guy.

He was not the pusher that I would have wanted, but he was efficient enough to get things done, and to hold down the fort in terms of organizing for me, certain. . . . By the time we would have come back here ^{for the} from New York primaries, ^y we would have really been ready to roar, ^{and} make it happen.

GREENE: Were you able to keep in touch with him during the campaign?

GRAVES: I made it a point to. Edna Ednie Greenbaum, who works for me now, full time, had worked for me as a volunteer in Kennedy's office, almost for the full period of time that I worked in Kennedy's office, and she knew many of these black people as well as I did. And her input was absolutely invaluable to me, in terms of her day-to-day being on top of things when I was out of town. When we made up the black list for the funeral, I made up the list, and got her up at her apartment, in the middle of the night, to make up that list, when we knew the senator was dying.

and got her to get three or four other persons who I knew would be able to come up with a well- really comprehensive and/balanced list of black people across the country. And she had them in her apartment, ^{hours a day} too--I was out there, I called her from California--so I think that a lot of credit has to be given to her, in terms of the input she made.

GREENE: Did you actually set up a formal headquarters in New York before you left? A store-front, or something of that nature?

GRAVES: Well, there was a New York State headquarters Robert for/Kennedy [Interruption]; ^{it} which was located on the corner of 38th Street and Madison Avenue, which ironically is just one block from where my office is now. And Carter ^{Burden} Burgess ran that office and did a good job. He had a lot of difficulty trying to cut out his piece of the action, which was going to be running that New York office, because there were any number of persons who wanted to come in, and tell him how he should

be running that office, ^{or} and any number of persons who thought that maybe he wasn't capable enough, and it should be some other hot-shot doing it, from Washington, and he had his share of problems in terms of just trying to maintain his own identity as being the person who was going to run that New York operation. And within that operation, . . . We had Lee Stokes working, and I worked out of that office, also. We conceivably could not have a committee called "Blacks for Kennedy" — they talking about considered having minority communities for Kennedy, but it just seemed awkward to set up a structure that said, "Blacks for Robert Kennedy" — it was something repugnant about that terminology and that idea. But we did have "Communities for Robert Kennedy" — ^{West} Bedford-Stuyvesant, ^{Manhattan} Holland, and so forth, I think, and that said it, without really saying it.

GREENE: And did you have separate storefronts in these areas?

GRAVES: No.

GREENE: It was only a single . . .

GRAVES: Well, we would have had storefronts and we would have gotten it off the ground. . . . Well, we had one in Bedford-Stuyvesant, and we were setting one up in ^{Harlem} Holland, both of which I had set up, in between going back and forth across the country, and we would have obviously set up others, going upstate and so forth, and, you know. . . . We were planning on come back from California to really blitz New York, and we'd already started laying much of the groundwork, of what would happen when we did come back into New York, and it would have been a fantastic thing to have done New York State. There's no doubt in my mind we would have won, and probably Shirley Chisolm, being the congresswoman right now, would not be the case, because Willie William C. V Thompson was our choice for. . . . He was not our choice for congressman, I take that back. His delegates were our choice to be our delegates, and the understanding was that we wouldn't be in his way,

nor impede him, once he had supported us in terms of his delegates, and persons who we had some tacit agreement with regarding who they were going to support, and i.e.^R that being Robert Kennedy. But anyway, we did have a storefront in Bedford-Stuyvesant, and I would think that ~~wadd~~^{we}/come back into New York, we'd have not only done well in the minorities^{y communities}, which we'd been doing well in all across the country, but we would have also done well in the white communities as well.

GREENE: Did you try to make the organization in New York an integrated one? *or did it sort of come up automatically?*

GRAVES: First of all, by my being in New York, that/^{automatically}made it integrated, since I was black. And then, when start talking you talk about fleshing out the organization, we just from the get-go had it integrated, yes.

And I just made it a point; there was just no problem. Carter had no fuzz between his ears at all about that; we knew that was something that had to be. And we worked at it, and I was just ~~as~~ much a part, at that point, of being sure we

had black people out there who would. . . . If nothing else, they were just out there, because we needed to have black people. I mean, I was that much of a practical politician to realize that had to be, and then, of course, on the other side of the coin, I just wanted to know that I had people good ^{were} and were getting something done. But we rather worked ^{at} to getting black people involved and, of course, people like Bonnie and Gary Lefkowitz, who played a major role in the citizens' efforts, and so forth, in the campaign, had no fuzz between their ears; they were just good, straight people. And when they saw somebody who was good, whether the person was black or white, they brought him in. And, of course, you had many things like ex-Peace [?] Corp [?] volunteers who had worked under the John Kennedy Administration, and so forth, who were coming in, who were black.

And New York identified with Robert Kennedy, particularly as far as the minority ^{communities} is concerned. And you had the Puerto Rican community as well as

the black community. So that was not a problem. We just worked at that. And then, ^{it} for nothing else ⁱⁿ order to protect my own interests, which, is, again, what we're coming back to, which everyone did in the campaign. I made it a point to have black people there, who were looking out for Earl Graves. And, particularly when I knew I was going to be out of town, I wanted to know who was in charge and what was going on. The only way I was going to do that was to have people who I thought I could trust. ^{Now} ~~in~~ Edna was the exception in this, being white, but she was. . . . All I ^{would have to} could go on would be in terms of ^{Baruch} how good she was.

GREENE: What about Percy Sutton? How did Robert Kennedy feel about his possible candidacy?

GRAVES: Well, I think the senator pretty much felt that nobody could beat Jacob K. Javits in that year. We needed somebody who was going to be willing to go up against him, and then somewhere down the ^{side} pack, I guess we would have owed him a favor. And we talked Percy into doing it, with the idea

that probably Percy could have run again, in the gubernatorial thing, and get one of the *posts* such as Attorney General, or Lieutenant Governor if he had lost. That was the unspoken and tacit understanding that they had, but that would seem to me that that was what Percy had in mind.

GREENE: Had the senator spoken to him personally, or did you act as his liason?

GRAVES: No, they spoke personally about it. Because, I mean, if anybody go out and jump into a senatorial campaign, somebody's gotta be promissing them some money to get something done, otherwise there's no sense in even doing it. Which is what Gene Nicherson's problem was. I mean, they almost had to take up collections in a hat to put him on the airplane. Excuse me, is this still on?

GREENE: Yes.

GRAVES: Yes, it is. Okay. Well, it happens to be a statement of fact.

GREENE: During the early swing throught the country, when he went through almost all of the states around

the perimeter, ~~where~~ throughout the period in which you were setting up things in New York, or had you already gone out to Indiana? You were still in New York? Do you remember the date you went out to Indiana? the first time?

GRAVES: The first time I went out to Indiana ~~yes~~, I can tell you. Martin Luther King was killed on the Thursday . . .

GREENE: That was April 4th . . .

GRAVES: ~~That~~ He was killed?

GREENE: Yes.

GRAVES: Then it was the Sunday before, whatever the date that was in March. It was the Sunday before Martin Luther King was killed, that was the first trip I made out to Indiana, whatever date that was.

GREENE: Had you spoken to Dr. King at all, by the way, in contacting black leaders around the country?

GRAVES: Yes, I had.

GREENE: What was his feeling about the senator's candidacy? That's almost another. . . . [Interruption]

GRAVES: If you just want to be completely candid, in

[Interruption]

terms of why He didn't know, it was because, you didn't know because the only thing ^{that} the white community, whether or not, ^{the} the white community that surrounded Robert Kennedy, or ^{the} the white community that surrounded somebody else, they remember the entertainers and the football players. And that's what you're talking about. And the persons who got something done--it's just not there! Who ^{at you're been to} else has told you anything about any input of a black persons in the campaign? I see you can't. . . . You sit there ^{you} and ^{no one} say nothing, so there it is, that's the answer . . .

GREENE: Well, I mean, you're role was obvious, and you might say it's come out, but outside of that . . .

GRAVES: No, that's. . . . But what I'm saying. . . . Well, okay. Nobody has said to you that somebody made some generous input in terms of what he should have been saying as far as the welfare program is concerned. And you had a guy like James R. Dumpson, who had been head of welfare in New York City, who I had gotten to agree to support the

senator. Well, all you wanted to do was have super-Negroes; it wasn't matter of having persons who could really make input in terms of being basic persons. And it's not a direct result of Robert Kennedy's attitude; it's a direct result of some of the persons who were involved, and who surrounded him. There was a prevailing kind of giving the Negro second-best, in terms of giving credit where credit was due. And I don't mean myself as an individual, I just talking about just the fact that there were no other black persons involved in the campaign, as an example of what I'm talking about.

GREENE: Do you think that this whole business throughout the campaign was simply an extension of you experience in the Senate office? Were you conditioned sort of to expect this, by what had happened during your tenure in his office?

GRAVES: No, because I think the campaign was a completely different structure. The things that you dealt with in the campaign, and maybe some of it had to

do with the fact that it was just people who wanted to cut out their own piece of the action, and they wanted to reduce it down to the lowest common denominator, and the way to reduce it was, "First, let's eliminate. . . ." When you're thinking, the first thing you do, is the "last and hired, / first fired," is to keep the black persons out of it. And as I think back on it, when they talked about persons who surrounded the senator, and I can think of any number of newspaper articles that were written. . . . It was a matter of Pierre Salinger always having to go back and clean it up and tell them that he did, in fact, have somebody black working for him, because the reporters would end up writing about the entire New York office,--and I would have been sitting there two years--and not even recognize the fact that I was there. I mean, that's how flagrant it was. There was just absolutely nothing to be believed. And Mankiewicz and Pierre would have to go back and make it a point to let them know

that not only did he have somebody else working in the office, but that person happened to be black. And it was a credit to him to be able to say so, because no other senators had it. But, to answer your question, it was certainly different out on the campaign, because out on the campaign was really a cut-throat/thing. I mean, everybody just wanted to be their person. And I hope that what I am saying to you is not a suprise^{PSO} because the people who are not saying it to you are being less than honest about that campaign! I mean, it's just that simple; The campaign is a fantastic operation the way the Kennedy's run it, but in terms of what we're talking about, it's not an indictment of the Kennedy's when you say that people who are human beings, who wanted to push and shove, to be sure that they've cut out their own piece of the action. You should understand that. But I did not have those kind of problems in the Senate office. If we had problems, it wasn't because I was a black guy—well, I take

that back--to a certain extent it was, but it was not that prevalent. In the Senate office, if we had any problems about who was on first and who was on second, it was a matter that we just were pushing and shoving to be sure that we could win the senator's favor. And this is one thing that always existed, but that's true of life; that's true of industry; that's true of the people who work for me, that they want to let me know that they write the best, or they can get out a speech the best, or they can accomplish the job the best. That's what life is all about. They's why, in the Catholic church, some guys stay priests, and other guys become cardinals, because it's all politics, and that's what life is all about. It's true in the educational system, and it's true in the medical profession, and any profession in life you want to talk about. So that wasn't particularly different. The thing that was different was that in the New York office I did not have to put up with this thing on a

day-to-day thing, and have to touch base with six people, and that kind of aggravation. And I did have a clear identity that was not limited to just the black community, although on the campaign I cut this out for myself; it wasn't designated. But I venture to say, that had I not cut out ^{that} the particular part of the campaign for myself, I probably would be still wandering around trying to figure out what my role was in the campaign, Because there was no one that ever picked up the phone, and said, "Look, Graves, in the first instance, you're going to run the black community." It was, I picked up the phone and told them; I said, "I think that what I should be doing is running the black community," and for want of somebody else, or being able to think of somebody else to do it, they said, "Yes, you're right." But there was never a time ^{when} when Senator Kennedy turned and said, "Now, we need somebody to do the black community." It wasn't a matter ⁱⁿ he was not thinking about this; it was a matter he had too

many other things on his mind, ~~somebody~~ else was going to think of it. And nobody else thought of it, it's just that simple.

GRAVES: ^{o g h d o} So who did you make your contacts with?

GRAVES: ^M The first contact was with ^{William J.} ~~Bill~~ Vanden Heuvel, who ended up being kind of like the coordinator ^{you} know, everybody started kind of picking out their own things ^{and} they were going to do. And I looked up, and there was nobody suggesting ^{to me} that ~~I~~ do anything. And the same thing was true of ^{Clifton C.} Carter ^{Barton} and Dall Forsythe. The New York office kind of was just left languishing out there, with the exception of Tom Johnston, who had been in it at the beginning.

GREENE: ^{Dick} Do you this was just a question of ~~lack~~ of organization, which seems to be fairly obvious in these early days, or was it a deliberate oversight?

GRAVES: A lot of it had to do with a lack of organization, and a lot of it had to do with the fact that all the supernumeraries were in Washington where the action was. And if you couldn't get to Washington,

d you couldn't be where the action was; it's just that simple.

GREENE: Well, when you got to Indiana, what was the situation, as far as the organization went, and how ^{did} you ^{see} things, as far as what you were going to have to do, and ^{whom} ^{David} be working with?

GRAVES: Well, when I arrived in Indiana, as I ^{stated} said yesterday, there wasn't any organization, I mean it was almost like Gerry Doherty had just gotten there ^{and} and Gerry Doherty is a good guy ^{and} and the other persons who were there, they just hadn't gotten anything dealt with, and that Sunday was really an organizational Sunday, or an organizational day. And Senator Ted came in, and the major role he played that day, in addition to talking to some delegates, was to kind of just give the old pep talk about, "Let's go out and win this one!" and get the guys out on the road." So there wasn't any real organization to speak of, and it was just assumed. . . . You come right back to the same prevailing thing--it had nothing to do with

Senator Ted--that. . . . I remember^o as the districts were cut up that day--and I was in the room, there--there was no real discussion about, "Maybe Graves should take a congressional district," because this was assumed that the thing I was going to^{so} was to handle the black thing, because I was black. So in one instance it was the matter that I had pushed to get it, and in another instance it was just assumed that I was going to do it, when I was there.

GRAVES: Do you think this was in any way a demeaning assumption, or was it just, in their eyes at least, a natural thing, that you'd be better off handling this than a white person?

GRAVES: There was no question this was a demeaning assumption.

GREENE: Why? *It was.*

GRAVES: There's no doubt about it. It would never have crossed their minds, to say, "Let's put this black guy to do something to have to do with the white community. And I'm enough of a realist to

recognized, in many places you could not have done
it. Now, ⁱⁿ most areas in Indiana, it would have
been damn tough to have a black guy go out and
try and organize a white community in Indiana;
Indiana is as bad as Alabama in some places. But
I'm talking. . . . There were areas, there were
jobs, and things that could ^{have been} be accomplished. I
pushed hard to be sure that, maybe you couldn't
get some black advertiser, for him to take a
small piece of the campaign. Maybe you couldn't
get some ~~ba~~ack guy in graphics to get a small
piece of the campaign. It just seemed to me,
that, if ^{Richard} Bobbie Kennedy was going to ^{so a} represent ^{the}
what he stood for, that he had to be able to say
that he had done this, that when we looked at
the total campaign and what we had accomplished. . . .
And this is what I worked on. I catalogued all
the ~~persons~~ who requested to do something in the
campaign, on a professional basis. And I had
persons contacting me, who said that, you know,
"this is my expertise; I drive a car." And then,

of course, that's a very low level of entry we're talking about, but even persons who were involved in graphics, or persons who were going to be involved in TV producing, and so forth, I tried to suggest those names, and to get them in. It was to factionalized; even the persons you suggested it to, they always seemed to have to suggest it to somebody else. I talked to Burke Marshall. . . . If Burke Marshall happened to be available that week, then it went right through, and it maybe would move. But if that was his last day he was going to be giving the campaign for that week, and then he wouldn't be coming back to it for three or four days, then it was a matter that I'd have to, like. . . . Burke would say, "Why don't you talk to Ted," and Ted would be, you know, on his way back from Oregon, or his way out to Nebraska, something like that . . .

GREENE: You mean Ted Sorensen?

GRAVES: Sorensen. And maybe he'd say, "Yeah, you're right," and then it would it would kind of like

just drift off, and it wasn't a matter of ^{this} ~~he~~ intentionally ^{was} did not get it done, it was just a matter of it just never got done.

GREENE: Do you think that this kind of thing pervaded the organization, that it was just very loose at this point, and things weren't going through ^s at all levels, or was this particularly true of this particular issue, with the black ~~community~~ ^s and black volunteers? What I'm trying to get at ^s is, is this peculiar to this situation, or is this somewhat typical ~~of~~ the way the whole thing was operating at that point? A lot of people have said that it was ^a very disorganized, almost non-campaign, in the beginning.

GRAVES: Well, I think, exactly, it was a very much disorganized and non-campaign, but once you really got it going and got it cranked up ^s, the involvement of black people ^{as} as we looked at it, and I saw it happen, was that we had fifty football players come in who were black, and ten entertainers, but in terms of. . . . Nobody ever suggested to

me that we had a task force of black guys off working somewhere, ~~or~~ they were really qualified to do it, in terms of an economic development program for the black community. That was just not there. And I know that ^{wasn't} ~~wasn't~~ happen. So therefore, when we finally got it organized, the way it got organized first in the black community is now we had more entertainers and more football players, but in terms of guys who were really making input into the campaign, that wasn't happening.

GREENE: Was this a problem in the community itself; did you get a lot of questions about that?

GRAVES: No, ^{because} ~~But~~ the thing of Kennedy himself, he so mesmerized the communities and the people with which we were going out to the ghetto with, ^{put it together} that that was not a problem. Where I got the problem ^{and} in the black, was ~~with~~ the much more sophisticated persons who saw it as not being right. The people who were asking for those jobs in communication, persons who were asking for those jobs

in ad agencies, they were the ones who could see it. And they were the ones who were criticizing.

And then, of course, the request would come out of New York, and the campaign's out in Nebraska-- so how many people out in Nebraska, when the campaign's constantly on the move, out of a bus, out of an airplane, are going to be able to spot it? I mean, as quick as you spot it, it's gone. And if you didn't have some rather objective reporter there on the scene who would write that, it wasn't going to happen. And I think the reporters were almost as mesmerized by Kennedy as many of the people, because, hell, there were very few reporters who were critical of the Kennedy's as they went across the country. It almost got to be a cult, rather than a political campaign.

You know, that they had belonged to some kind of. . . . You know, right now, the Kennedy press still meets in Washington, and I think it's an honor to him that they do. But it just says to me that the Kennedy press was that much Kennedy press, that

Green: No, I have no reason to differ with you on the
GRAVES: We're going to do this about five more minutes, so
I've got to make some phone calls. #85-

they, in fact, would not be totally objective as
reporters. Maybe you differ with me, I don't know.

GREENE: All right, who were you working with in Indiana?

I know Walter Sheridan was in there at least
part of the time.

GRAVES: Walter Sheridan, of my understanding of what his
involvement was with the Kennedy's prior to my
meeting him in 1968, was that he had worked in
the Justice Department, and played a major role
in the indictment and subsequent investigation
of ~~Jim~~ James R. Hoffa, and that he was a
bright guy who worked for CBS TV, or I think it
was NBC, whichever it was--one of the major
networks. What his particular forte was, that
he ended up playing some role in the black com-
munity, I will never understand, because he had
no great. . . . He was a bright guy, but he had
no great talent. He was white, which gave him
one problem, and then I never saw that he was
particularly sensitive to what it was that had
to be accomplished. He was just a guy that I

guess they thought could work with something that had a lot of intrigue involved in it, and, of course, since we were treating the black people as being intrigued--and he had been involved in the things as mysterious as the Jimmy Hoffa thing-- that maybe he ended up doing it. I have no idea what his particular. . . . And I never could put a handle on how he ended up working in this particular area. I guess, each person probably tried to pick out an area which he thought he had some expertise in, and maybe he told somebody that was his thing, and he started off doing it. I will say that, by the time we got as far as. . . . In Indiana, I started off with him. He was involved in that thing I told you about yesterday, that they had some prob~~lem~~ . . .

GREENE: The meeting?

GRAVES: The meeting. He was involved in that thing.

He was the person who was kind of, I guess, running scared, and when these blacks told him that they were going to give the senator particular Hell

because I had not said to them that they were going to be able to make huge piles of money, he was another one of the persons they tried to bamboozle, and he fell into that. And these are the same guys that ended up, you know, being in jail.

But by the time we got to Indiana I mean one day we looked up and I was doing the thing-- and by this time I had really established my credentials with Larry O'Brien--and I said, "Well, let me check with Walter Sheridan." And Larry O'Brien just said, "Well, who the hell is Walter Sheridan?" And I said, "Well, he's the guy, you know, he's been going some things in the black community." And he said, "Well, as far as I'm concerned, you're the guy that makes the judgments. You don't have to check with anybody. You just deliver to me, just go ahead and do it!" And that was the kind of thing that took us until we almost got to California before I could hear that kind of thing from somebody who

had some authority in the campaign. And it was damn aggravating to always be looking around, having to respond to somebody else, who was white, and ~~and~~ get ~~something~~ done.

GREENE: Was Larry O'Brien particularly helpful in this respect, encouraging you to go out on your own?

GRAVES: Extremely helpful. He and Ira Kapenstein were real guys, when it came to getting it done. And it wasn't that Larry O'Brien, although Larry O'Brien is a straight guy, it wasn't because Larry O'Brien had some social conscience, and he wasn't carrying any flag, he wanted to win campaigns! That was his job, to be campaign manager and make it happen. And when he saw, back in Nebraska, that we had gotten it done, the way we had, it, and then he saw it in Oregon, that we had won, although the senator lost it by a narrow margin, he didn't lose in the black community. Then, we got to California, and I was able to calm things down as far as those black politicians were concerned; there was just

no question in his mind[?] that that's what I should be doing. And he was just a practical person, and I could always get to Larry O'Brien, when he was as big as he possibly could be. If I said I had something to discuss which had to do with what I'm doing, he was available! And if he wasn't available right then, he was available within a couple of hours. Or he'd come out and see me, he says, "Okay, I'll be out to see you."

GREENE: Of course, this is jumping ahead, because he wasn't there at the time of the meeting, was he, Larry?

GRAVES: Oh, no, no, no, no, no.

If I were going to look at it, in terms of how I started off my career, on that 1968 Presidential campaign, I would say, that Indiana, in the first instance, was a disaster. ^{Now} it was a disaster because there were white persons who were making judgments who should not have been making the judgments. And fortunately, you had persons, such as John Lewis, who was around, to say that

something here stinks, and be able to see what had gone wrong, by having this person, Holgate-- just was able to pull up tight. . . . I remember John Lewis, the night that that thing happened, which was the same night that Martin Luther King died, [Interruption]. I remember John Lewis stopping the senator in the hall. And John Lewis was very filled with emotion at that point, because Martin Luther King and he had been very close together in the Civil Rights movement, and saying to the senator that he wanted to set the record straight. And this was not at my request that he had done this. But he said, "You know, you had a meeting tonight with some black people who are not "good" black people, and you had some advice today from some white people who do not know what they are doing in terms of how they are dealing in the black community. And I was here, and I'm here working for you. Graves was not here today to defend his own cause, as to know what was going on, and I'm almost quoting

him verbatim, "and he was not dealt with honestly or fairly. And I think you should know this, because there are people who are giving you input that is not accurate, fair, or right." And I remember the senator stopping John, and saying, "Well, let's talk about it a little bit," and they in that hall and talked, and I just kind of wandered away, because I didn't want to stand there as if they were putting it together for me, and the senator came down the hall to me, and said, "If there was some misunderstanding in terms of what went on there, then we'll straighten it out." And, with Kennedy, it was never really much other than that fact that that just meant that it was resolved and it was no problem, and don't worry about it. And basically, that's what he said to me. He said, "Just forget the whole thing."

GREENE: What do you mean when you say they were not "good" black people? What was your objection to their

GRAVES: character?

GRAVES: When I say they were not "good" black people, I don't mean to put a connotation on "good" and "black", I mean that their interests were other than just for the senator's interest, their interest was just purely a monetary thing. They saw the campaign--and they were no different than many white persons who were involved in the campaign, either, I might say--well, it was obvious to me that they not persons who were interested in going out and pushing registration efforts and getting black people registered to vote for Senator Kennedy, so he could win the primary. They were persons interested in making themselves a pile of money, and coming in and saying they were going to accomplish these things, and pushing their own cause, that being just how to get some money out of this campaign.

GREENE: Now, I'm not sure I follow what you mean by "seeking money. Were they seeking handouts, or . . .

GRAVES: No, not handouts, they were money used. Persons would come in and say, "I can organize blacks

X, Y, and Z, and have three rallies for you, and register five hundred people, and it'll cost you five thousand dollars for me to get my people out on the street to get it accomplished. Or it'll cost me ten thousand dollars, or in the case of these guys, it'll cost twenty thousand dollars. And the question is whether or not you get it. And for what they were going to turn out for what you wanted, the answer was no, it's just not worth it. And I thought it wasn't worth it, and they still ended up getting a substantial amount of that money.

GREENE: At who's authority?

GRAVES: The senator left, then. It wasn't at the senator's authority, it was at someone's authority in Indiana, and I didn't stay in Indianapolis. If I told you yesterday, once, I saw that things went as they went, I elected not to be in Indianapolis, because I just saw it was never going to be satisfactory, and I wasn't going to sacrifice my career for what was going to happen in the black

community in Indianapolis, Indiana, with persons who I could deal with, later on down the pike. I wisely just moved on, and of course it all shifted out in the end, because it couldn't have worked out any better than it did, in terms of my relationship with O'Brien and the other people, as the campaign went on.

GREENE: ^{fund} By whose authority do you think it was to give these people whatever funds they wanted to have, authorize them to do whatever it was they were planning?

GRAVES: I would imagine that Walter Sheridan was probably the coordinator of whatever happened, to my knowledge. I'm not saying he was directly involved in handing them the money ^{nor that} what he did. . . . But it seems to me that what happened was that he was coordinating the thing, and if any monies were transacted, I ^{would} imagine he, or Gerry Doherty, or whoever played a major role in the running of Indiana. . . . When you start talking about large sums of money, like what I'm talking about,

then it would seem to me that it would probably
have to come at that level.