For Immediate Release: October 16, 2002
Further information: Ann Scanlon 617-514-1662
Boston, MA – As part of its activities commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum today released a new study prepared by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago to help provide a better understanding of how the American people experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis, how public opinion changed because of the events, and how the American public views the Cuban Missile Crisis in retrospect.
While the Cuban Missile Crisis lasted only 13 days (October 16-28, 1962) and the public phase covered barely a week (October 22-28, 1962), the confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union over nuclear missiles in Cuba is one of the key defining events of the Cold War in general and of John F. Kennedy's presidency in particular. And though the Cuban Missile Crisis is the most examined event of the Kennedy presidency, scant attention has been given to how the public reacted to the crisis.
The John F. Kennedy Library Foundation commissioned the report on public opinion data to complement the Kennedy Library’s other commemorative activities, including a special Museum exhibit on the Cuban Missile Crisis and a series of public forums featuring former advisors to President Kennedy, former Soviet and Cuban officials, prominent historians, journalists, and experts on international relations to discuss the crisis and its aftermath.
Among the reports finding’s on American public opinion during the world's closest encounter with a nuclear World War III:
- All mentions of “foreign affairs” as “the most important problem” more than doubled from a relatively low level of 35% in August 1962 to a near record high of 72% in November 1962. Only in the weeks preceding Pearl Harbor were concerns over international problems higher than during the Cuban missile crisis.
- Thoughts about "the atomic bomb or fall-out" rose from 27% in the spring of 1962 to 65% during the crisis.
- Nationally, in April 1963, only 5% expected a world war in the next year - the lowest level recorded during the 1950s and 1960s. Likewise, only 24% thought that a world war would occur within five years. This was also one of the lowest levels in the 1950s and 1960s and the 58% who thought war would not happen was the highest during this period. Thus, the outcome of the missile crisis was lower than the fear of nuclear war.
- During neither the peak of the public crisis from October 22nd to the 28th, nor at any point during the longer period of heightened concern over Cuba from September 1962 to March 1963, was the public terrified or driven to panic. The country, like its leadership, paid close attention to events and showed grace under pressure.
- At the crisis' peak (October 22-28, 1962) people's thoughts did focus on the international situation in general and on atomic war and fall-out in particular, but the public was neither traumatized nor paralyzed by events. Cuba did not dominate people's worries, and concerns about Cuba did not center on fears of nuclear war and survival. Thoughts of death were actually less common during the climax week than before the crisis. Also, just 11% said that their lives during that week differed from most weeks because of the Cuban situation.
- Additionally, there is little evidence of widespread stress, anxiety, or psychological harm. The picture is rather complex, but the public showed no large, negative psychological swings. Positive affect was down, but happiness was up, and negative affect changed little. There was little change in symptoms of stress and anxiety, but some rise in negative behaviors, especially some increase in drinking, occurred.
- Similar to responses to other foreign crises both before and since, the Cuban missile crisis drew the country together as people rallied around the president. Presidential approval rose 13-15 percentage points, and the public backed the blockade and President Kennedy's resolve to have the offensive missiles removed. But people were not swept up by a militarist urge to go to war over Cuba. Invading Cuba was never favored by more than a quarter of Americans. They opposed Castro and the Soviet arms build up in Cuba and wanted action taken, but backed action short of war.
- To a large degree the Cuban missile crisis did not change public opinion towards Cuba. Throughout the early 1960s, both before and after the missile crisis, the public was opposed to the Castro regime and concerned about the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere, but rejected US military action to remove him. Immediately after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April/May 1961, shortly before the missile crisis in late September 1962, and after the crisis in February 1963, support for sending US troops to help overthrow Castro held steady at 20-24%.
- Many Americans opposed the US sending troops to overthrow Castro because they feared the consequences. A majority (51%) thought that such an action would likely lead to "an all-out war between the United States and Russia," 37% believed this was unlikely, and 12% were unsure. Among those considering a world war as likely, only 19% backed invading Cuba, while among those not seeing a general war as likely, 36% favoring overthrowing Castro. Others opposed a US invasion because they did not think it was needed. Two-fifths (41%) thought that within three years the people of Cuba would topple Castro (43% thought this unlikely and 16% didn't know).
- Despite the fact that nearly three out of five (59%) Americans surveyed between February 7-12, 1963 felt that “the Cuba situation is a serious threat to world peace at this time,” more than three out of five (63%) “disagreed” when asked: “Some people say the U.S. should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree?”
- Following the crisis, Kennedy's presidency was seen in a new light. Not only was his job approval up, but the basis for evaluating his presidency changed. Foreign policy was now viewed as the most important area and positive evaluations outnumbered negative ones by better than 4-to-1.
- Also, the Cold War was seen more optimistically. Expectations of a world war declined, hope for the US and the Soviet Union reaching peaceful agreements increased, and for the only time during the Cold War, more people saw US power as rising than those who believed that the Soviets were gaining ground.
- During the crisis' apex, people's thoughts did focus on the international situation and atomic war and fall-out were much more on people's minds, but the public was neither traumatized nor paralyzed by the situation.
The report was authored by Tom W. Smith, an internationally recognized expert in survey research specializing in the study of social change and survey methodology. Since 1980 he has been co-principal investigator of the National Data Program for the Social Sciences and director of its General Social Survey (GSS) at the National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago.
Of special note was Smith’s observation of the resiliency of the American people.
“Over the last six decades the United States has experienced several dozen major foreign policy crises,” Smith reports. “Probably the two that most gripped the nation were the Cuban missile crisis and the September 11th terrorist attacks. While the particulars of the two events are quite different, they were both events of enormous importance that involved a clear and present danger to the country, galvanized the populace, and propelled the political leadership into decided and forceful action. They also share the characteristic that while they greatly affected the nation, the public was neither paralyzed nor terrorized. Politically and psychologically the American people were resilient in face of these confrontations. They absorbed the shock, backed their leaders, and carried on with their lives. This may be the hallmark of the American people in times of greatest challenge.”
Data for the study are mostly drawn from two sources: 1) numerous Gallup polls conducted during this era before, during, and after the crisis and 2) two special surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago. The first, the Cuban Crisis Study, was done in late October and early November 1962 in two Illinois communities. The second, the Civil Defense/Fallout Shelter Study, was conducted nationally and in various local communities in January 1963. Information is also drawn from state and student samples conducted in 1962 and later retrospective polls by Harris and Market Opinion Research.
The John F. Kennedy Library and Museum is a presidential library administered by the National Archives and Records Administration and supported, in part, by the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, a non-profit organization.
The mission of the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum is to advance the study and understanding of President Kennedy's life and career and the times in which he lived, and to promote a greater appreciation of America's political and cultural heritage, the process of governing and the importance of public service. The core function of the Kennedy Library is to collect, preserve, and make available for research the documents and artifacts of President Kennedy and many of his contemporaries.