The Other Geneva Conference
I want to discuss in particular tonight one of the most distressing examples of this Administration's failure to face up to the critical long-range problems which confront us. Aside from the Vice-President's trip to Moscow, our attention has been centered in the past several months on the Geneva Conference – on the seemingly hopeless efforts of the Foreign Ministers to resolve the crisis in Berlin and pave the way for a possible summit meeting. I would not minimize the importance of this Conference – I would not minimize the urgency of the current Berlin crisis. But I am concerned that we have not given equal emphasis and attention to the somewhat more long-range problems being discussed at the other Geneva Conference – the conference which is now almost completely obscured, overshadowed and forgotten – and I am referring, of course, to the conference on atomic testing and surprise attack.
This is the "other" Geneva Conference. It preceded the meetings of the Foreign Ministers – it will, without question, outlast them. And in terms of its long-range significance – in terms of the relative importance to our long-range security of the problems under discussion – the Geneva Conference on nuclear tests and controls will outlast any mission to Moscow, any exchange of notes over Berlin and even a summit conference itself.
There is a tendency today to dismiss the efforts for international agreement on nuclear tests as visionary and unrealistic – as an ideal goal to hope for, but something not very relevant to the real problems of armaments and the East-West struggle. There is a tendency also to assume that very few nations can match the scientific know-how, the industrial might and the natural resources which made possible the Manhattan project and our own nuclear progress. But the harsh facts of the matter are that the time is not far off when many nations in many parts of the world of many political shades and commitments will possess nuclear or even thermonuclear weapons.
Think for a moment what that means.
Many nations now possess, or have access to, the scientific personnel and know-how, the power and fuel supplies, the mineral and chemical resources, the industrial base and the transportation facilities which combined to make the United States the first great nuclear power. These other nations have not obtained the necessary technical information through espionage or accidental leaks. On the contrary, there have been such enormous developments in pure and applied science since Hiroshima that today there are, for all practical purposes, no longer any real atomic secrets – except for methods of detonation and isotope separation. The basic knowledge required is possessed by practically every country – the only question is how many will commit themselves politically and economically to joining the nuclear club.
Canada, Communist China, France, Sweden and Switzerland have all given various indications this past year that they are on the way to the development of such weapons. Sweden has doubled its budget in this field during the current fiscal year. It has been predicted that France will be testing Nagasaki-type bombs by next year. Canada already possesses a variety of reactors, as well as adequate uranium supplies and trained personnel. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, both Czechoslovakia and East Germany have tapped their rich supply of ores, and stepped up the training of their best minds in nuclear physics.
Similar data could be cited for Belgium, for Japan, for India, for Italy and for West Germany. Within a few years, other countries should be able to accumulate the necessary industrial and scientific resources – countries of such varying political status as Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland, the Union of South Africa, Spain, Hungary, Argentina, and Austria. There is no evidence, moreover, that nuclear bombs developed by such nations as Sweden or Switzerland will not be sold on the world market, just as guided missiles and reactors for peaceful uses are sold commercially today. There is no evidence that a smaller or less developed nation could not secretly convert a reactor it receives for peaceful uses today to make plutonium for use in a bomb. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that those 42 countries which will soon possess peaceful reactors will be one-half the distance to the development of nuclear weapons.
In short, many nations are potential members of the atomic club, in what is called the "Nth country" problem. Their intentions, to be sure, may not be to impair Western security – they may be seeking only increased prestige, or a reduction in expensive conventional forces, or a stronger voice in international councils, or more independence from big power decisions. But regardless of their present intentions, it is clear that this trend foreshadows developments that will alter every basic military and diplomatic premise of our time. It will radically change every fundamental concept which now prevails in our Departments of State and Defense.
Possibilities of accidental war will be enormously increased – the possibilities of a nuclear holocaust being initiated for irrational reasons by a fanatic or demagogue will be tremendously increased – so will the possibilities of nuclear blackmail by any nation that chooses to use its atomic armaments as a diplomatic tool or threat. It will make much more difficult and much less likely the chances for international agreement and controls on atomic weapons. The distinction between great powers and small powers will become less meaningful. To rest our hopes on a so-called balance of power will become impossible. And the security of this nation and the entire world will depend upon the daily events, the political stability, the motives and the politics of unknown or little known leaders all over the globe.
If one thermonuclear bomb in the low megaton range were to be dropped on this nation – it would not matter whether the sender was responsible or fanatical – whether he was acting rationally or irrationally – deliberately or accidentally – it would still release more destructive energy upon this land than all the bombs dropped on Germany and Japan during World War II.
These developments should be of concern to everyone in Portland, to everyone in Washington and indeed to the entire country. They should be discussed, not for purposes of alarm, but for purposes of alert. For it is not too late. The nth country problem is not yet an accomplished fact. France has not yet joined the nuclear club – Russia is not yet eager to share her atomic know-how with her satellites, or even with China – and the Geneva Conference on atomic testing and surprise attack, the other Geneva Conference, is still going on.
But its success will require new emphasis and a new effort on our part. The terrible dangers which are inherent in this situation have received very little public debate and attention – and they have apparently received very little top-level attention in Washington and other world capitals.
I do not say that a cessation of tests under international agreement provides the final answer. But it would place a major obstacle in the path of those nations which have not yet successfully conducted tests, and which would be unwilling to risk the tremendous investment necessary in weapons which could not be tested. And surely such an agreement would give reassurance to those of us who are concerned about the atmosphere we live in and the air our children breathe – for it is the same atmosphere and the same air in all nations, weak or powerful, rich or poor, on this side of the Iron Curtain or the other.
There is no serious scientific barrier to international agreement – despite increasing difficulties in problems of inspection and implementation. The only difficult barriers now are political and diplomatic. If we could mobilize the same talents and energy and resources to meet this challenge that we did to split the atom in the first place, then we should be able to persuade friend and foe alike that continued neglect of this problem will make all the world a loser – while its solution will make all the world a winner – and a better place with a better future for the children of every land.
Source: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Senate Files, Box 904, "Dave Epps Memorial dinner, Portland, Oregon, 1 August 1959." John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.